Dissertation for Wednesday 22/04/2015 Department of Government

Project Supervisor: Professor Han Dorussen

Russia’s new foreign policy: reasons and goals behind the

Putin doctrine

Name: Axel Xavier Patrice Rigault de Puteani Jorgensen

Registration number: 1202108

Module code: GV831-6-FY-CO

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I) INTRODUCTION...................................................................................3

II) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.........................................................4

III) BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.............................................6FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION............................6

IV) APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK...........8

REALISM: BACK TO THE USSR............................................................8

EURASIANISM: BACKFIRE.....................................................................9THE BALTIC DILEMMA: A HISTORIC, LINGUISTIC AND ETHNIC ATTACHMENT....................................................................................................... 11

The Commonwealth of Independent States.........................................13

GEOPOLITICS: THE PUTIN DOCTRINE............................................15

SOFT POWER VERSUS HARD POWER.............................................17FINLANDISATION.................................................................................................17

Reunification.................................................................................................... 19

V) UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIAN POINT OF VIEW: A LINKAGE BETWEEN REALISM, EURASIANISM, AND GEOPOLITICS..........................................................................................23

CONTESTING THE RUSSIAN JUSTIFICATION.....................................................29

VI) CONCLUSION....................................................................................32

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I) Introduction

On March 18th 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin and the Crimean leadership signed an

agreement formally making the Ukrainian peninsula part of the Russian Federation. This

operation was an evident response to the Ukrainian revolution, in which pro-Russian president

Viktor Yanukovych renegaded from his promise to sign a long awaited association agreement

with the European Union after years of negotiations. Under evident Russian pressure, he

abandoned his promise to the Ukrainian people1. While Kiev was in turmoil, Putin did his

utmost to take advantage of the situation. The annexation of Crimea was well planned and

skilfully executed. This move pointed to the impression that Putin for long had intended to

occupy the region in order to extend Moscow’s sphere of influence, and to succumb their

smaller, uneasy neighbour. In the following weeks, the Eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk

and Luhansk declared independence from the government in Kiev, marking the beginning of

what has since been called the Ukrainian civil war2. The unrest in Ukraine and the Russian

occupation of Crimea has plunged Eastern Europe into a nail-biting conflict, not seen since

the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s.

Russia might still be an enormous country, although it declined considerably in size since the

end of the Cold War. The Baltic countries, Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus countries,

Belarus, and the Central Asian ex-Soviet republics all gained independence after the Soviet

Union collapsed, something of a calamity for Moscow.

In the years prior to the Crimean annexation, Russia had unfolded her strategies according to

the familiar playbook of the regional bigger brother. Moscow intentionally stirred up ethnic

tensions and applied soft power in neighbouring regions to gain a strengthened foothold over

the political landscape, making these countries targets for Russian influence3. The Russian

annexation of Crimea, however, was from a Western perspective, a hostile act of aggression,

directly opposed to the old ways of applying diplomatic and economic pressure. Putin has

demonstrated his ambition, and indeed willingness towards his neighbours and to the world.

Putin is looking to slowly rebuild Russia’s super-power reputation and impact on the world 1 BBC 2013, ”Ukrainian protests after Yanukovych EU deal rejection” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25162563 30/11/2013, retrieved on 7/01/2015.

2 Time 2014, Feeney, Nolan ” Pro-Russia insurgents declare independence in Eastern Ukraine” available at http://time.com/96102/ukraine-donetsk-independence-russia/ 12/05/2014, retrieved on 7/01/2015.3 Mankoff, Jeffrey (May/June 2014) “ Foreign affairs: Russia’s latest land grab, how Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine” Council of foreign relations, New York, p. 60.

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stage by reasserting Russia’s right to interfere and control former parts of its empire. The

Russian bear has showed its claws, and no one knows where it will strike next.

This research paper will focus on the doctrine of one man, Vladimir Putin, who as head of

Russian politics for the last 15 years, has transformed and developed a broken and fragile

state into a powerful and aggressive player in international affairs. Russian hegemony within

the country’s sphere of influence is the pinnacle of this doctrine, which was thoroughly

demonstrated to the world in March of last year.

Thus, my research question is the following:

Why is President Putin focusing on his foreign policy agenda to reaffirm and restore Russia’s

greatness? And how is the president planning to do so?

II) Theoretical framework

This essay will encompass several theories. These will be developed and defined to help the

reader comprehend the nature of the concepts involved, and what functions they serve to the

research question at hand. The theories will be shortly defined, while the main part of the

essay will describe how the Putin doctrine can be linked to each individual theory.

- Geopolitics

- Realism

- Eurasianism

Geopolitics

Geopolitics is a common term to define global conflict and change; it characterises the

struggle over power and geography that are dominant in the world today. Geopolitics provides

us with an understanding of “historical struggles over the organisation of global political

space”4. This theory deals with the complete vision of the world’s political landscape5.

4 Tuathail, Gearoid, Dalby, Simon & Routledge, Paul (1998)” The Geopolitics reader, Routledge, New York, foreword. 5 Tuathail, Gearoid, Dalby, Simon & Routledge, Paul (1998)” The Geopolitics reader, Routledge, New York, p . 1.

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Territorial struggles, globalisation, conflict, sovereignty, and national interests are all

variables of modern day geopolitics. Although the end of the Cold War brought the great

geopolitical struggle of the 20th century to a close (the Cold War between East and West),

variables such as national boundaries, national self-determination, and spheres of influence

have continued to play a part of today’s geopolitical agenda6. The Russian annexation of

Crimea confirms this point to be true.

The reason geopolitics plays an important part of the essay is because it is an integral part of

any foreign policy doctrine, and especially that of Russia.

Realism

Realism in the realms of international relations is a framework well worth using when trying

to understand, or describe the Putin doctrine. Realism sees the state as an independent actor in

international politics, where no superior power exists, and actors operate out of basic self-

interest without consideration for others7. It is a presumption that, all states, democratic or not,

tend to operate in accordance with decisions based on maximising their national interest.

Foreign policy, for realists, should be performed in conformity with realpolitik8. The struggle

for national security, power and wealth are pivotal in a realist state of mind. Furthermore,

according to Brian Schmidt, “ the real essence of the state is found to be sovereignty (…)

absolute authority internally and externally”9. Realism advocates that there is no power above

the sovereign state, because there is no other sovereign authority which enforces the rule of

law10, hence, every state has the right to make its own decisions.

6 Foreign Affairs 2014, Mead, Walter R. ”The return of geopolitics: the revenge of the revisionist powers” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141211/walter-russell-mead/the-return-of-geopolitics May/June issue, retrieved on 6/04/2015. 7 Steans, Pettiford, Diez & El-Anis (2010) “An introduction to international relations theory, perspectives and themes” Pearson Education limited, Harlow, Essex, p.71. 8 Rochester, Martin J. (2010) “Fundamental principles of international relations“ Westview Press, Boulder, p.83. 9 Schmidt, Brian C. (1998) “The political discourse of anarchy: a disciplinary history of international relations”. State university of New York press, New York, p. 83.

10 Steans, Pettiford, Diez & El-Anis (2010) “An introduction to international relations theory, perspectives and themes” Pearson Education limited, Harlow, Essex, p. 54.

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Lastly, the autonomy of a country’s political sphere, the drive for the state’s survival, and the

promotion of national interests are basic assumptions for realist thinking11. Realist theory is

fitting to the essay at hand, for it will help to interpret the Putinist doctrine.

Eurasianism

Eurasianism is a geopolitical theory that focuses on Russia having a particular and exclusive

position in the world; Russia is unique and posses its own path and mission12. The theory

rejects the notion that Russia is part of Europe, or entirely part of Asia, but something in

between. The goal for Eurasianism is to create a different centre of power and culture that

would be neither European, nor Asian, but would have traits of both13. The new Eurasian

movement, advocated by Russian political theorist Alexander Dugin, is anti-American, anti-

European, and clearly expansionistic in nature. The theory states that it should be an ultimate

goal for the Russian state to incorporate all of the former Soviet republics, and all former

Soviet satellites into Russia14. It is an ultra-nationalistic, neo-imperial ideology, which, as the

Putin doctrine, promotes Russia’s rebirth as a great power. Thus, it is a suiting theory to use to

analyse Moscow’s foreign policy agenda.

III) Brief historical background

From the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation

11 Donnelly, Jack (2000) “Realism and international relations” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.7. 12 Foreign Affairs 2014, Barbashin, Anton & Thoburn, Hannah ”Putin’s brain: Alexander Dugin and the philospohy behind Putin’s invasion of Criema” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putins-brain 31/03/2014, retrieved on 06/04/2015.

13 Foreign Affairs 2014, Barbashin, Anton & Thoburn, Hannah ”Putin’s brain: Alexander Dugin and the philospohy behind Putin’s invasion of Criema” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putins-brain 31/03/2014, retrieved on 06/04/2015. 14 Foreign Affairs 2014, Barbashin, Anton & Thoburn, Hannah ”Putin’s brain: Alexander Dugin and the philospohy behind Putin’s invasion of Criema” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-thoburn/putins-brain 31/03/2014, retrieved on 06/04/2015.

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On New Year’s Eve 1999, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin took the reins of the Russian

presidency after the resignation of Boris Yeltsin15. Putin, an ex-KGB officer fluent In German,

had been head of the Federal security service, and then Prime Minister of Russia16. He had

been Yeltsin’s protégé, and had quickly risen in the ranks of Russian politics, and was now

holding the highest office in Russia.

For the ordinary Russian, he represented a return to a stable and idealised foreign policy

order, after the turbulent presidency of Boris Yeltsin17.

The mysterious and complex allure of the new president astonished Western and Russian

commentators alike, prompting them to ask, “Who is Mr Putin?”18 If there was ever any

doubt, the Russian annexation of Crimea 15 years later removed all doubts of who Putin was

or of what his intentions were. With such a bold and unanticipated move, he intended to prove

to the world that Russia was back in the top flight of world politics, and that he would defend

Russian interests abroad whatever the cost. The question, from a Western perspective, is what

exactly prompted this hostile act against a sovereign and independent country? And what

agenda and ideology is at the starting point of this blunt and unexpected move?

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia became a shadow of her former self, the

economy was in crisis, and society was in turmoil19. Furthermore, 14 of the other Soviet

republics had declared independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

Although Russia was by far the largest and the most important state in the union, the

independence of the other republics led Moscow to lose 49% of the former Soviet Union’s

population, 24% of its territory, and 39% of its gross national product20. The nascent Russian

Federation was fragile, and the sad reality of post-communist society, which was far from as 15 BBC 1999 ”Putin takes over as Yeltsin resigns” available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/31/newsid_4102000/4102107.stm 31/12/1999, retrieved on 8/01/2015.16 The Telegraph 2012, Brown, Mick ”Vladimir Putin: the godfather of a mafia clan” available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/9100388/Vladimir-Putin-the-godfather-of-a-mafia-clan.html 25/02/2012, retrieved on 8/01/2015.17 Lo, Bobo (2003) ”Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy” Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, p.1.18 Lo, Bobo (2003) ”Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy” Blackwell Publishing Ltd, Oxford, p.2. 19 BBC 2011, Brinkworth, Malcolm ” The Soviet Union’s last stand” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/soviet_stand_01.shtml 17/02/2011, retrieved on 9/01/2015. 20 Thompson, John M. (2013) ”Russia and the Soviet Union: A historical introduction from the Kievan state to the present” Westview Press, Boulder, p.321.

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ideal as expected, made Russians lose faith in Yeltsin and in the newly established democratic

free market system21. As the new millennium dawned, however, a new man was in charge,

and he was ready, eager and most willing to bring Russian pride and glory back from the

ashes. The age of Putin would bring drastic changes not only to Russia and its people, but also

to Russia’s closest neighbours.

IV) Application of the theoretical framework

Realism: Back to the USSR

Throughout Vladimir Putin´s time in power, Russia has steadily reorganised, restructured and

reformulated its foreign policy, differentiating it from that of Boris Yeltsin. Under Boris

Yeltsin, the first post-Soviet president, Russia sought a rapprochement with the Western

powers22. This approach saw an abrupt end when Russia occupied Crimea. The relations

between the East and the West are, once again, at a freezing point. Russia has once and for all

rejected the Western rules of the game. They see themselves as the master of their own house,

and nobody has the right to interfere in their internal affairs. From a Russian perspective, the

seeds of conflict were sown even before Putin became president. As the newly born

Federation was struggling to find its place in the post-Cold War era, the West, and especially

the United States, the only remaining super power, was presented with two choices of

partnership towards Russia. The first option was to include Russia as an equal partner in

world affairs, and assimilate her to the West. The second was to wrest away Russia’s former

sphere of influence23. President Bill Clinton and George W. Bush chose the latter option24. In

the late days of the Soviet Union, although not formally, the United States had promised not

to meddle in what was then the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. However, as the USSR

21 Thompson, John M. (2013) ”Russia and the Soviet Union: A historical introduction from the Kievan state to the present” Westview Press, Boulder, p. 322.22 Foreign affairs 2014, Lukin, Alexander ”What the Kremlin is thinking: Putin’s vision for Eurasia” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141538/alexander-lukin/what-the-kremlin-is-thinking July/August 2014, retrieved on 9/01/2015.23 Foreign affairs 2014, Lukin, Alexander ”What the Kremlin is thinking: Putin’s vision for Eurasia” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141538/alexander-lukin/what-the-kremlin-is-thinking July/August 2014, retrieved on 9/01/2015.

24 Foreign affairs 2014, Lukin, Alexander ”What the Kremlin is thinking: Putin’s vision for Eurasia” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141538/alexander-lukin/what-the-kremlin-is-thinking July/August 2014, retrieved on 9/01/2015.

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collapsed, the West went back on their word. Although the mentioned promise was never

concretely formalised, Russians believed that their plea had been heard, and that the West

would stay out of the affairs of the former Soviet Union. Within a few years and three rounds

of enlargements later, NATO added 12 new Eastern European and former Soviet satellite

states as members to its alliance system25. Russia was outraged. For them, naive cooperation

with the West was off the table, and a more realism-based foreign policy would have to be

applied26. Russia had proven their willingness to make sacrifices in order to improve relations

and reach compromise, but perceived that they had ultimately been betrayed. From that time

on, the defence of Russian national interests has come before all else, and Vladimir Putin has

become the tool to reinforce the will.

Eurasianism: Backfire

For Russia, the United States and the European Union are no longer perceived as credible

partners, neither economically, nor politically. Eurasia has become the new playing field for

Russian economic and political interests. The former Soviet republics are not only closer to

home, but they are rightfully seen as the pillar of Russian influence and activity. Under Tsarist

Russia and the Soviet Empire, these regions were highly significant for Russian geostrategic

interests. To counter his Western rivals, Putin hopes to transform the Eurasian countries into a

geopolitical and cultural alternative to the West27. Europeanization of Russia is out of the

question, as Russia posses its own unique cultural values and norms which will only be

respected and implemented within an entity that Moscow is able to de facto control. Hence,

the regions and countries close to home, which fear Russia enough to succumb to its will.

This Eurasian integration process and its crown jewel, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU),

which is the pinnacle of this cooperative compromise, seems to have collapsed even before it

could blossom. The reason for this catastrophic start is, ironically, because of Russian

meddling in Ukraine. The union was supposed to be composed of Belarus, Kazakhstan,

Russia and Ukraine (while Armenia and Kirgizstan would join later), and Putin has himself

25 Foreign affairs 2014, Sarotte, Mary E. ”A broken promise? What the West really told Moscow about NATO expansion” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141845/mary-elise-sarotte/a-broken-promise September/October 2014, retrieved on 9/01/2015. 26 Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009) ” Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics” Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, p. 28. 27 Mankoff, Jeffrey (May/June 2014) “ Foreign affairs: Russia’s latest land grab, how Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine” Council of foreign relations, New York, p. 66.

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stated that the Union would amount to little without Ukraine28. Simply explained, it is because

Ukraine would not be able to offer its substantial economic potential to the union (the country

has the second biggest economy after Russia of the member countries). The reason for the

Ukrainian revolution was directly related to President Yanukovych’s rejection of the

association agreement with the EU, a decision that was forced upon him by Moscow. The

Kremlin knew that, if the Ukrainians were allowed to sign the accords with the European

Union, they would directly exclude themselves from the Eurasian Economic Union and it

would lead to the demise of the EEU. Unfortunately for Putin, his manoeuvres backfired

utterly. Not only did the Ukrainian people oust Yanukovych for his broken promise, thus

removing Russia’s hand in Ukrainian politics, but the new Ukrainian president Petro

Poroshenko ultimately signed the association agreement with the European union a few

months later. This killed the last Russian hope of a Ukrainian puppet state, and the dreams of

a well functioning Eurasian Economic Union. Eurasian political and economic cooperation

without Ukraine has undermined the union’s integrity, and the shared effort by Kazakhstan,

Belarus and Russia has ultimately not given the Kremlin anything more than bragging rights

about the symbolism of a Russian made union29.

For Putin, it became clear that Ukraine had ultimately chosen Europe over Russia. In response

to the Euromaidan revolution, Crimea was occupied and annexed, not only to get exclusive

access to their black sea fleet, or to accommodate the will of the Russian majority on the

peninsula, but as a symbolic act, meant to prove that Russia was still in charge. Further

repercussions against the Ukrainians were steadfastly reassured throughout the spring and

summer of 2014 when Russia was directly involved in arming pro-Russian separatists in

Donetsk and Luhansk, albeit they deny ever having gone through with such measures30. The

message from Moscow, however, is clearer than ever: Ukraine is Eurasian, and Eurasia is

ours.

The Baltic dilemma: a historic, linguistic and ethnic attachment.

28 Mankoff, Jeffrey (May/June 2014) “ Foreign affairs: Russia’s latest land grab, how Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine” Council of foreign relations, New York, p. 66.29 Foreign affairs 2014, Schenkkan, Nate “Eurasian Disunion: Why the union might not survive 2015” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142745/nate-schenkkan/eurasian-disunion 26/12/2014, retrieved on 11/01/2015. 30 Reuters 2014, Grove, Thomas & Strobel, Warren ”Special report: where Ukraine’s separatists get their weapons” available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-ukraine-crisis-arms-specialreport-idUSKBN0FY0UA20140729 29/07/2014, retrieved on 11/01/2015.

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The Russian annexation of Crimea, which was part of sovereign Ukrainian territory, left many

of Russia’s neighbours feeling especially hesitant and vulnerable about their own security.

Three states in particular are genuinely concerned about what Moscow’s meddling in the

region could suggest for their own safety. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are the countries in

question. In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s seizure of the Crimean peninsula, the Baltic

States were not only the first, but also the fiercest condemners of Russian aggression against

Ukraine.

The three states have the right to dread Putinist foreign policy, which according to Chatam

House, a London based institute of international affairs, clearly implicates the Baltics as being

part of Russia’s sphere of influence31. According to Eurasianist theory, the Baltics form the

Western frontier of a larger Russian state, and are not part of Europe.

There are thus several compelling arguments that would serve as a reminder to Europe and

NATO, that Russia might make the Baltics their next target of neo-imperial subjugation.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all share common features with Ukraine, which points to the

main reason these countries showed solidarity with the Ukrainians after Russia’s annexation

of Crimea. Firstly, there are several historic connections at play. The Baltic States have all, at

one time or another, been part of either the Soviet Union or Tsarist Russia32. In 1917, the

nascent Soviet Union lost her former Tsarist territories, and the three new countries gained

independence. It did not take long, however, before Russia once again would incorporate

them into the Soviet Union under Stalin. After a few years under German occupation during

World War II, they once again became part of the USSR as Germany retreated westwards. It

would take until 1991, and the collapse of the Soviet Union before the countries would regain

freedom33. Like the Baltic States, Ukraine gained independence in 1991 as well34. The four

countries are former Russian territories, and former Soviet republics. If the scale of Russian

31 Chatam House 2012, Grigas, Agnia “Legacies, Coercion and soft power: Russian influence in the Baltic States” available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_grigas.pdf April 2012, retrieved on 20/01/2015. 32 The Economist 2014 ”Echoes of the Sudetenland: the Baltics look to NATO for protection” available at http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21599828-baltics-look-nato-protection-echoes-sudetenland 29/03/2014, retrieved on 20/01/2015. 33 O’Connor, Kevin (2003) “ The history of the Baltic States” Greenwood Press, Westport, p. 3.34 The Washington Post 2014, Taylor, Adam “To understand Crimea, take a look back at its complicated history” available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/02/27/to-understand-crimea-take-a-look-back-at-its-complicated-history/ 27/02/2014, retrieved on 20/01/2015.

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aggression were to be considered strictly in respect to historical attachments, the Baltics

would essentially be Putin’s next geostrategic objective.

Secondly, an even more compelling argument, which supports the comparison between the

two regions, is the Russian minority population spread across all the four countries.

According to World Politics Review, a Washington based think tank covering international

relations, the percentage of Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltics amounts to almost one

third of the countries’ linguistic makeup; In Estonia Russian speakers make up circa 30% of

the population, in Latvia roughly 34%, while Lithuania has around 15% of Russian speakers35.

It most be pointed out that having a considerable Russian ethnic minority has never been an

obstacle in itself, however, after having seen the Putin doctrine at work in Ukraine, it could

become a hypersensitive and problematic affair. Ukraine on its part has, according to a 2001

census, only 17% of ethnic Russians living within its borders, although 30% of Ukrainians

considered Russian to be their mother tongue36. Looking at the history that unfolded in

Crimea, where Russia used the pretext of protecting “compatriots and fellow citizens”37, it

gives Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the right to tremble. Moscow has already demonstrated to

its neighbours that Russia is more than willing to establish puppet states in countries with a

strong Russian minority population. South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, Moldova’s

Transnistria, Ukraine’s Eastern half and Crimea have all faced Russian foreign policy at

swords’ points38. Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius might be next.

The Commonwealth of Independent States

What replaced the Soviet Union were 15 independent states, who all struggled to find their

place in the new world order. In the aftermath of the collapse, the Commonwealth of 35 World Politics Review 2014, Grigas, Agnia ”Compatriot Games: Russian-speaking minorities in the Baltic States” available at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14240/compatriot-games-russian-speaking-minorities-in-the-baltic-states 21/10/2014, retrieved on 20/01/2015. 36 Forbes Magazine 2014, Krasnozhon, Leo “The ethnicities of Ukraine are united” available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/13/the-ethnicities-of-ukraine-are-united/ 13/03/2014, retrieved on 20/01/2015. 37 Crowley, Michael & Shuster, Simon (May 2014) “ Time magazine: This is war: Vladimir Putin has seized Crimea and destabilised Ukraine, what drives him?” Time inc, New York, p. 20. 38 Mankoff, Jeffrey (May/June 2014) “ Foreign affairs: Russia’s latest land grab, how Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine” Council of foreign relations, New York, p. 62-63.

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Independent States (CIS) was declared, encompassing all former Soviet states except Georgia

and the Baltic countries39. Through this organisation, the former Soviet countries have kept

close cultural, economic and political linkages. However, during the 1990s, the CIS turned

into a contested zone between the major powers; Russia, Europe, the U.S. and even China

tried to seek influence in these former Soviet republics40. The pursuit of influence within these

states came as a surprise to Russia, who regarded the entire region as hers exclusively, but in

the 1990s, Russia was too weak to enforce its claim41. Times have changed. Under Vladimir

Putin, Russia has become reborn, and is ready to reassert its claim on the Russian sphere of

influence. Moscow is looking to become a pivotal player inside the CIS, by reversing the drift

of member countries away from its orbit42. The reasoning behind Russia’s neo-imperial and

Eurasian agenda is simple. The reconstruction of a strong Russian state, with the mandate to

interfere and control former parts of the Soviet Union is the main goal. The Question is why?

As mentioned earlier, when the Soviet Union broke up, Russia lost 49% of the Soviet Union’s

population, 24% of the territory and close to 40% of its GNP43. Although the Soviet Union

was never rich, the loss of these factors plunged Russia into deep poverty in the 1990s. The

Russian economy is thus a fundamental aspect of Russian foreign policy, and is an important

cause for wanting to retain control over the Commonwealth of Independent States. The

energy sector is pivotal in understanding Russia’s need to reassert her power. The Russian

struggle does not entirely evolve around power politics and nostalgia over past greatness. The

economy plays an important role in all aspects of Putin’s agenda. The Caucasus and the

Central Asian republics are all major energy producers, while the Caucasian countries,

including Belarus and Ukraine are important elements in Russia‘s “pipeline diplomacy” with

the major powers44.

The newly established Eurasian Economic Union is meant to be a steppingstone for an

economic integration process between Russia and former Soviet republics with the intention 39 Global Security 2014, ”Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)” available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/cis.htm 13/12/2014, retrieved on 23/03/2015. 40 Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009) ”Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics” Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, Maryland, p.241. 41 Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009) ”Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics” Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, Maryland, p.241.42 Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009) ”Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics” Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, Maryland, p.242.43 Thompson, John M. (2013) ”Russia and the Soviet Union: A historical introduction from the Kievan state to the present” Westview Press, Boulder, p.321.44 Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009) ”Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics” Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, Maryland, p.244.

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of retaining the latter states under the Russian orbit. Russia cannot allow other major powers

to meddle in the Caucasus, the central Asian republics or in Ukraine, as it means losing not

only political control, but also economic benefits, which are pivotal in the pursuit of a strong

Russia.

Looking at the growth of the Russian economy since Putin’s time in power from 1999 to

2008, and comparing the numbers with the Russian economy in the 1990s, the improvement

is outstanding. From 1992 to 1998, the Russian economy suffered a staggering annual decline

in GDP of 6,8% per year. The country was in turmoil, and was struggling to adapt to the new

free market system and the globalised world economy. From 1999 to 2008 however, the

Russian GDP increased with 6,9% per year45. In his quest to rebuild Russia, the economy has

been pivotal for Putin. The strong growth during his first two terms in office proved that

Russia adapted to the market forces. The President is determined to preserve the component

which gave the Russian economy such a boost. This component has been Russia’s close

economic partnership with the CIS. Russia will thus try to hinder any other major player

access to the CIS markets, so she alone can benefit form the economic profits. The CIS

countries are all well within the Russian sphere of influence, and to loose them to economic

rivals is out of the question. Through Putin Russia posses the powers to enforce its economic

claims on these countries, unlike during the 1990s, when these regions were out of the

Russian reach. The Eurasian Economic Union is meant to favour Russia at the expense of the

other member states, which are to have secondary roles46. The newly established organisation

already resembles the CIS, meant at consolidating Russia’s control over these member states’

markets, to cement Russia’s dominion and to prevent Europe or the U.S. to gain a foothold in

the region. The Eurasian campaign is partially ideological, but also has a major economic

context. Eurasianist theory is thus crucial in understanding Putin’s foreign policy.

Geopolitics: The Putin doctrine

The reasons for Russian aggression must be seen in the light of the foreign policy agenda,

which is currently in place in the Kremlin. This doctrine might not be as ideologically guided

as the one of the Soviet Union, but there is no doubt that Putin has a well-composed and

45 Nichol, Jim (2014) “Russian political, economic and security issues and U.S. interests” Congressional research service, Washington, p. 34. 46 Foreign affairs 2015, Barbashin, Anton “The Eurasian illusion: the myth of Russia’s economic union” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142781/anton-barbashin/the-eurasian-illusion 15/01/2015, retrieved on 24/03/2015.

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fastidious idea behind what he is doing. According to Western journalists and policy makers,

there is a coherent interest-driven philosophy behind the Russian foreign policy of the

moment. That philosophy is based on regional hegemony in the Russian sphere of influence47.

There are several notable advantages that may come of this, most particularly the economic,

military, cultural, and political reintegration of what used to be the former Soviet republics

under Russian leadership48. Putin knows exactly what he wants, and there is no reason to

share his thoughts through totalitarian propaganda. After all, the age of totalitarian Russia is

over.

What is not over, however, is the reminiscence of past days of glory, in other words, the era of

Soviet foreign policy. For many Russians, including the policy makers, Russia has the right to

interfere in her former territories. It is a notion of “Russia’s historical heritage” in the cadre of

security in the country’s sphere of influence49. The justification given by the president in the

aftermath of the annexation of Crimea was simple, and it was taken out of the upper drawer of

Putinist foreign policy. He claimed the broad right to protect “ compatriots and fellow

citizens”50. The right to protect Russian minorities in different countries is a major item on the

foreign policy agenda, which makes up the Putin doctrine. If the Kremlin decides to go

through with this concrete policy, many countries other than Ukraine have the right to feel

threatened, for Ukraine is far from the only country in Eastern Europe with a sizeable Russian

minority, as discussed earlier.

At the annual State of Nation address in the Duma in 2005, Vladimir Putin proclaimed that

the breakup of the Soviet Union was “the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th

century”51. This statement utterly surprised Russians and Westerners alike. Was the President 47 The Moscow Times 2014, Ryzhkov, Vladimir “The new Putin doctrine” available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-new-putin-doctrine/497316.html 3/04/2014, retrieved on 14/01/2015.48 Foreign affairs 2013, Aron, Leon, “ The Putin doctrine: Russia’s quest to rebuild the Soviet state” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine 8/03/2013, retrieved on 14/01/2015.

49 The Moscow Times 2014, Ryzhkov, Vladimir “The new Putin doctrine” available at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-new-putin-doctrine/497316.html 3/04/2014, retrieved on 14/01/2015.50 Crowley, Michael & Shuster, Simon (May 2014) “ Time magazine: This is war: Vladimir Putin has seized Crimea and destabilised Ukraine, what drives him?” Time inc, New York, p. 20. 51 BBC 2005 ”Putin deplores collapse of the Soviet Union” available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4480745.stm 25/04/2005, retrieved on 15/01/2015.

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simply reminiscing on the old days in the KGB, or was there a grander meaning behind this

proclamation? Looking at the speech today, many believe they have understood the true

meaning behind it. It can in some respects be interpreted as Putin’s doctrine for the years to

come. In this speech, Putin declared “Our objectives on the international stage are very clear –

to ensure the security of our borders and create favourable external conditions for the

resolution of our domestic problems”, and “ We consider international support for the respect

of the rights of Russians abroad an issue of major importance one that cannot be the subject of

political and diplomatic bargaining”52. Of course, journalists, political analysts and politicians

alike are free to make assumptions as they see fit, but by thoroughly analysing some of the

quotes from the speech, one can draw a striking parallel between the annexation of Crimea,

and Russia’s ruthless foreign policy from the Georgian invasion onwards. The creation of

´favourable external conditions´ can be associated with pro-Russian neighbouring

governments, or the establishment of such governments, if deemed necessary. In other words,

the defence of geopolitical interests at the expense of governments, seen as unfavourable to

Moscow, within the Russian sphere of influence is Putin’s unequivocal goal. The most

forceful example is Russian interference in Ukraine, as well as the mentioned swift military

campaign against Georgia in 2008, to protect pro-Russian separatists. The conclusion that can

be drawn from the second quote ´the respect of the rights of Russians abroad´ can be coupled

with Putin’s pretext for the Russian invasion of Crimea, to “protect compatriots and fellow

citizens”. After all, Putin declared that the annexation was a reunification with Russia53.

The question is whether the reunification policy of “what was once ours will once again be

ours” is to be steadfastly enforced in other regions. If that were to be the case, a long list of

countries could be under the scope. Especially the former Soviet republics members of the

European Union, or NATO, for they have according to Russia, drifted away from the true

path. Legitimately they are seen as assets of Russia, and not the Euro-Atlantic alliance

system54. The doctrine only demonstrates to what length Putin is willing to go to fulfil his

52 Vladimir Putin (2005), ”Addresses to the Federal Assembly” available at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml 25/04/2005, retrieved on 15/01/2015. 53 Washington Post 2014, Englund, Will ” Kremlin says Crimea is now officially part of Russia after treaty signing, Putin speech” available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-putin-prepares-to-annex-crimea/2014/03/18/933183b2-654e-45ce-920e-4d18c0ffec73_story.html 18/03/2014, retrieved on 15/01/2015. 54 Financial Times 2014, Milne, Richard & Buckley, Neil ”Baltic security: tensions on the frontier” available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/13469356-5829-11e4-b331-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Ou61zdlO 20/10/2014, retrieved on 15/01/2015.

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ambitions as leader of a powerful, re-born Russia. Economics, politics and indeed security are

three components, which Russia will not hesitate to use as weapons in her quest for greatness.

Soft power versus hard power

Finlandisation

Finlandisation was a term coined during the Cold War, to describe Russia’s control of

Finland’s foreign policy55. Although the Finish state was neutral during the Cold War, that is

neither a NATO member nor a communist state; Russia exercised substantial influence, and

indirectly controlled Helsinki’s foreign policy. This Northern European country, which shares

an immense 1300km border with Russia, was strongly affected by the Cold War, and her

policies were thoroughly scrutinized by the Eastern superpower until 199156.

Although the process of Finlandisation was a notion of the past, the present Russian foreign

policy agenda has made the term applicable once again. This approach is precisely one of the

measures that the Kremlin wishes to implement as a standardised policy towards her

neighbours57.

Russia does not necessarily need to be in complete control of all the regions inside her sphere

of influence (e.g. the incorporation of Crimea into the Russian Federation), as long as she can

find a way of controlling policies, which coincide with Russian interests. There is a strategy

understanding between Russia and the former Soviet republics by which the latter surrender a

measure of independence in exchange for economic, political and even military assistance by

Moscow58.

For several years, Russia has tried to “Finlandise” countries that have in Russian eyes, been

flirting with the West, and behaved independently towards the Kremlin’s policies. Ukraine is

this far, the most obvious example. Using energy supplies as a weapon, the Kremlin has time 55 The Oxford dictionary 2015 “The definition of Finlandisation” available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/Finlandization, retrieved on 16/01/2015.

56 BBC 2014. Bosworth, Mark ”Finns on Russian border wary of NATO ties” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29049601 04/09/2014, retrieved on 16/01/2015. 57 Foreign affairs 2013, Aron, Leon “ The Putin doctrine: Russia’s quest to rebuild the Soviet state”, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine 08/03/2013, retrieved on 16/01/2015. 58 Mandelbaum, Michael (1998) ”The new Russian foreign policy” Council on foreign relations books, New York, p. 38.

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and again undermined the free will of Ukrainian policy makers, forcing the country to stay

inside Russia’s orbit59. The policy of Finlandisation is intimidating, but it might still be better

than the fate that awaits those who do not befall the might of Putninist politics.

Looking at history for evidence, Russian policies are a new form of neo-imperialism; Russian

expansionism today is similar to the legacy of former Soviet ideology60. Countries under

former Russian control are to be vassals of Putin’s new Russia. It is very much a combination

of Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy doctrines, a fusion of subjugation and repression, to alter

the will of anyone who is opposed to Russian hegemony.

Presently, Russian expansionist policy has the same aim as that of Finlandisation during the

Cold War. It is a new code of conduct, with similar goals. The result is the same; puppet states

controlled by Moscow. It is a pragmatic and blunt order of business. There is no middle

ground between Moscow and the West. You either chose one or the other, and depending on

your choice, you can either be a beneficiary of Russian goodwill, or be a victim of outright

hostility. If a country is unwilling to adjust to Russia’s will by the means of quiet subjugation,

it will alternatively have to be reunified with Russia, by more coercive measures.

This leads to the second option in Putin’s foreign policy agenda, which is the reunification of

former Soviet republics into a greater Russian state.

Reunification

For Western journalists, political scientists, and politicians alike, a reincorporation of former

Soviet states into Russia seems more probable than ever before. Both fomer U.S. Defence

Secretary Chuck Hagel, and Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk have stated that a

reunification of the former USSR is Putin’s ultimate goal61. Russian expansionism is one of

59 BBC 2014, Kirby, Paul “Russia’s gas fight with Ukraine” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29521564 31/10/2014, retrieved on 16/01/2015. 60 Foreign affairs 2014, Gessen, Keith ” What’s the matter with Russia? Putin and Soviet legacy” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141487/keith-gessen/whats-the-matter-with-russia July/August 2014, retrieved on 16/01/2015. 61 Town Hall 2014. Barkoukis, Leah “Hagel: It’s no secret Vladimir Putin wants to reunify the USSR” available at http://townhall.com/tipsheet/leahbarkoukis/2014/05/26/chuck-hagel-vladimir-putin-wants-to-restore-soviet-union-n1842602 26/05/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.

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two sets of mechanisms to fulfil Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy doctrine (the other being neo-

Finlandisation). There are numerous examples of this form of realpolitik conducted by the

Kremlin. Firstly, there was the annexation of Crimea, which was reunified with Russia, and is

now believed to be an inseparable and integral part of the Russian homeland. Secondly, there

is the Kremlin’s attempt to justify the right of Russian minorities to defend themselves in the

Eastern half of Ukraine. In April of last year, Putin first used the term “Novorossiya”, literally

meaning New Russia, about the part of Ukraine engulfed by civil war. This phrase, coined

during the zenith of Tsarist Russia, was used to define the areas controlled by the Tsar in the

19th century, which included large parts of Southern and Eastern Ukraine62. By uttering this

one word, Putin once again raised a lot of eyebrows, and sent shockwaves from Washington

to Kiev. Was it meant as a threat, or was it simply melancholic rhetoric? Either way, it is clear

that Putin has the will, and the means, to restore Soviet and Tsarist possessions to their

perceived rightful sphere. These are two of several examples, which do support the theory that

Russia will in fact try to reunify former Soviet or Tsarist territories, if he is not actively

halted. As Ukraine is trying to wrestle away from Russia’s orbit, and create a stable

democracy, Moscow is doing everything in its power to prevent this goal being achieved,

which, once again certainly proves Russia’s appetite for expansionism and hunger for

conquest63.

As mentioned above, the Putin doctrine is twofold on the issues of soft power and hard power

in its approach regarding the former Soviet territories. In this context, soft power corresponds

to Finlandisation, while hard power corresponds to reunification. If a country inside Russia’s

sphere of influence bluntly denies any affiliation to Moscow, force is the only tool deemed

adequate to compel that state to remain loyal. This is exactly what happened to Ukraine,

where Crimea was incorporated into the Russian Federation, and the on-going attempt to do

the same with Novorossiya (Luhansk and Donetsk). In fact, Russia had “Finlandised” Ukraine

from its independence leading up to the Euromaidain revolution. One Ukrainian leader after

another were seen as puppets of Russia, or at least as taking a severe pro-Russian stance in

foreign as well as domestic policy (Leonid Kuchma, and Viktor Yanukovych being the two

62 Holmås, Ragnhild (2014), ”Perspektiv: The Ukraine crisis: the fight for Russia’s border states” Flyktningshjelpen, Oslo, p. 17.63 New Eastern Europe 2014, Valkov, Volodymyr “Expansionism: the core of Russia’s foreign policy” available at http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/interviews/1292-expansionism-the-core-of-russia-s-foreign-policy 12/08/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.

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most potent examples). When Ukrainian Presidents, and Prime Ministers alike, attempted to

gain political independence from the Eastern bigger brother, Russia used multiple coercive

measures to make sure that they would be toppled, lose elections, or suffer severe popularity

drops, thereby turning the people against them. Viktor Yushchenko, the highly popular pro-

European presidential candidate was poisoned during his election campaign in 200464, while

Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was arrested for violating court procedure during her trial

for abuse of power in 201165.

While the perpetrators of these injustices towards pro-Western politicians have mostly been

Ukrainian, they have done so either with Russian help, or in accordance with Russian

wishes66. Ukraine has for years been the main battlefield for Russian interests, and the country

is the most evident example of Putin’s neo-imperialist agenda.

As the saga of Russian foreign policy unfolds, it only gives credence to the theories of a new

Soviet Union. Putin follows in the steps of the former Soviet leaders by decisively reasserting

Russia’s right to interfere in its sphere of influence. On the one hand, like his predecessors, he

targets countries where he is not wanted (Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008 compared to

Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Budapest in1956)67. On the other hand, he is decisively ignoring

the economic challenges to his country caused by his actions. Western sanctions have

drastically damaged the Russian economy since they were introduced in reprisals for Russia

annexing Crimea68. Lastly, the Russian president is using a swaggering display of courage to

64 The Washington post, Rupar, Terri “Remember when a Ukrainian presidential candidate fell mysteriously ill?” available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/03/12/remember-when-an-ukrainian-presidential-candidate-fell-mysteriously-ill/ 12/03/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.65 Huffington Post 2011, Melnichuck, Anna “Yulia Tymoshenko arrested: Ukraine’s Ex Prime Minister picked up during trial” available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/05/yulia-tymoshenko-arrested_n_919405.html 8/05/2011, retrieved on 19/01/2015.66 The Age 2005 ”The man who survived Russia’s poison chalice”available at http://www.theage.com.au/news/World/The-man-who-survived-Russias-poison-chalice/2005/01/22/1106334263427.html 23/01/2005, retreived on 19/01/2015. 67 The Fiscal Times 2014, Francis, David ”Putin divulged his plot to reunify the USSR years ago” available http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/04/28/Putin-Divulged-His-Plot-Reunify-USSR-Years-Ago 28/04/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015. 68 New York Times 2014, Kramer, Andrew E. ”Russia’s steep rate increase fails to stem ruble’s decline “available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/business/russia-ruble-interest-rates.html 16/12/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.

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cover up the weaknesses of his country, proving himself worthy of Stalin. The latter did the

exact same thing, using charisma and might to project a false sense of power69.

The resemblance between the Soviet leaders and Putin can indeed make Russia’s neighbours

shiver with fear. Stalin showed no reluctance when it came to restoring Russia’s pre-1914

borders after he came to power70. The question now is whether Putin will do the same to

restore the Soviet Union’s pre-1991 borders. If that is the case, the Baltic countries, as

mentioned earlier, could become the new front line in Putin’s imperious quest, for that is

exactly where Stalin started in 193971.

The difference between Ukraine and the Baltics

After Russia shook the West in February and March of last year, the leaders of the Baltic

countries have urged the West to react with the harshest of measures. Tallinn, Riga and

Vilnius have sought to draw parallels between themselves and Kiev. They are attempting to

use the civil war and the Crimean occupation as basis for their own security. The higher the

degree of similarities they share with Ukraine (historic, ethnic, linguistic and geostrategic

ties), a country where Russia is wreaking havoc, the bigger the perceived threat towards their

own countries. This perspective serves to draw Western attention towards their dilemma, and

in case of a Russian attack, the bigger are the chances of allied interference. In August 2014,

Latvia’s President Toomas Ilves declared, “Ukraine is under attack by the armed forces of the

Russian Federation. This military aggression should finally dispel any doubts that Russia’s

words fail to match its actions”72. A month later, Lithuania’s President Daila Dybrauskaite

went even further in her rhetoric towards the Kremlin, saying “He (Putin) is capable to reach

Warsaw, the Baltics and Bucharest in two days (…) if we allow him to go, he will go

69 The Fiscal Times 2014, Francis, David ”Putin divulged his plot to reunify the USSR years ago” available http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/04/28/Putin-Divulged-His-Plot-Reunify-USSR-Years-Ago 28/04/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.70 Khaleej Times 2014, Margolis, Eric S. “Return of the Soviet Union” available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/kt-article-display-1.asp?xfile=data/opinion/2014/March/opinion_March26.xml&section=opinion 16/03/2014, retrieved on 19/01/2015.71 Misiunas, Romuald J. & Taagepera, Rein (1993) ”The Baltic states, years of Dependence, 1940-1990” University of California Press, Berkeley, p. 15. 72 Office of the President, Public relations department 2014 “Comments by President Toomsa Hendrik Ilves on the invasion of Russian troops in Eastern Ukraine” available at http://president.ee/en/media/press-releases/10486-comment-by-president-toomas-hendrik-ilves-on-the-invasion-of-russian-troops-in-eastern-ukraine/index.html 28/08/2014, retrieved on 21/01/2015.

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anywhere”73. The Baltic leadership have indeed been the most strident condemners of Russian

aggression, as they fear that an intrusive Russian foreign policy could spill over into their

homelands.

The Baltic States, however, have an advantage over Ukraine, as they are full-fledged

members of NATO. This is a deterrence mechanism aimed at Moscow that is absent in the

case of Ukraine.

The military alliance, which comprises of 28 countries, has the capability, and the

responsibility to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through military means,

and have a common goal of self-defence74. If Putin were willing to invade, conquer, or in any

other way dominate these countries militarily, article five of the NATO charter would be

enforced. The focal points from this article of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation goes as

follows: “The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or

North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently agree that, if

such an armed attack occurs, each of them (…) will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by

taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties, such action as it deems

necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North

Atlantic area”75. In a more straightforward wording, an attack against one is an attack against

all. On the one hand, It is one thing for Russia to occupy the Crimea, which belongs to

Ukraine, a country that enjoys no backing from a strong Westernised military alliance. On the

other hand, it is an entire different matter to go to war with the Baltic states, thereby engaging

the power of countries such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and of course, the

United States.

V) Understanding the Russian point of view: A linkage between realism, Eurasianism, and geopolitics.

73 Slate Magazine, Weymouth, Lally “An interview with the Lithuanian President Daila Grybauskaite” available at http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/09/russia_and_ukraine_lithuanian_president_dalia_grybauskaite_says_vladimir.html 24/09/2014, retrieved on 21/01/2015.74 NATO 2015 ”What is NATO” available at http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html January 2015, retrieved on 21/01/2015. 75 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 1949, “The North Atlantic Treaty” available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm 04/04/1949, retrieved on 20/01/2015.

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Ever since Russia annexed Crimea, Western media and politicians have been criticising and

condemning this aggression fiercely. Anti-Russian rhetoric has become the prevailing

orientation towards the conflict, and finding non-biased perspective in Western media has

been tricky. To thoroughly understand the causes and motivations of Russian policies it is

necessary to study the Russian standpoint. Looking at their agenda, their approach may

become more justifiable.

The West currently gives the impression that ruthless Russian foreign policy is something

new and unheard of in the realms of international relations. Russia, however, only follows the

norm. Russian aggression against Ukraine is a classic example of how great powers use their

strength to secure their national interests by interfering in the internal affairs smaller states.

This is a realist approach to foreign affairs, which defends the right of the strongest party to

affirm their power. It is a notion of ‘the survival of the fittest’ in the realms of international

politics. The Western powers in their view, have the right to denounce and point fingers.

However, they are the originators of such great power politics, and to claim that Russia does

not have the right to do as she pleases in her sphere of influence is nothing but hypocritical

and two faced.

Russian behaviour in the aftermath of the Ukrainian revolution is a typical case of great power

politics, something the West, including the United States, has been doing for years76. From

Afghanistan to Iraq, the United States has gone to war to defend their national interests. When

Russia tries to do the same in a region a lot closer to home, it immediately gets branded as an

aggressor and a conqueror. It is an unfair and arbitrary denouncement of Russia, when they in

fact had more reason to invade Ukraine than the Americans had when they invaded two far

away Middle Eastern countries. Why should the world be utterly condemning when a strong

nation other than the U.S. decides to resolve their foreign policy agenda through the use of

power?

From an objective point of view, Russia’s near abroad, through historical, linguistic, and

ethnic bonds, belongs to Russia’s sphere of influence. Still, the U.S. and the European Union

have time and again tried to undermine the will of Russian policy makers, by either

Europeanising ex-Soviet republics, or to bring them under NATO’s orbit. From the Kremlin’s

perspective, these two organisations are clearly trying to wrest away Russian influence from

76 The National interest 2014, Kramer, Mark ”Russia’s great-power Ukraine strategy” available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-great-power-ukraine-strategy-11145 25/08/2014, retrieved on 24/03/2015.

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what used to be the Soviet Union. The EU has been flirting with Ukraine for the better part of

a decade, while NATO has handed out memberships to countries once loyal to Moscow.

During the 1990s, Russia did not have the power to halt such enlargements. Under Putin,

however, Russia has regained enough strength to enforce her will to show the West that the

country is, once again, master of its own house. The question is whether the Kremlin in fact

have a point in asserting such an aggressive foreign policy?

If we once again look at history for examples, there are plenty of cases in which super powers

and strong nations have affirmed their right to defend their national interests through the use

of power. Russian meddling in Ukraine is far from the worst example. The United States and

Cuba during the 1960s is a clear example of a stronger nation trying to reassert its rule in their

own backyard. The United States did their utmost to destabilise, and undermine the Castro

government, after they took power in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution77. The U.S. used

all possible tricks in the book to try to oust, and even assassinate Fidel Castro. They could

simply not accept a communist, anti-American government a little less than 150 km from the

American homeland. The point of the matter is that the U.S. has seen Cuba as an impediment

to its vital national interest in the Caribbean ever since the revolution, and Cuba is thus seen

as a threat to American interest.

Furthermore, during the Cold War, when communists or even democratically elected socialist

leaders came to power in the Caribbean, Latin or South America, the Unites States would do

everything in its power to make sure these regimes would tumble, because of the ideological

threat posed by communism and leftism in the ramifications of the Cold War 78.

For the United States, as for any other major power, national interests are at the top of a

country’s foreign policy agenda. If these interests are threatened, Washington will not hesitate

to retaliate in the most severe of manners. Numerous examples were demonstrated during the

Cold War (Cuba, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Chile, El Salvador, Grenada and so on), and

continually in the post-Cold War period (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia).

The conclusion drawn from these examples is that the U.S. has time and again proved willing

to interfere in another country’s domestic policies when those policies have been perceived as

a threat to American interests.

77 Council on Foreign Relations 2013, Hanson, Stephanie & Lee, Brianna ”U.S. Cuba relations” available at http://www.laleadership.org/userfiles/30/Classes/806/U.S.-Cuba%20Relations%20Backgrounder.pdf 31/01/2013, retrieved on 26/03/2015.78 Bulmer-Thomas, Victor & Dunkerley, James (1999) ”The United States and Latin America: the new agenda” Institute of Latin American studies, London, p. 34.

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From a Russian perspective, it is thus utterly hypocritical that the United States criticizes

Russia and imposes strict economic sanctions on the country, when the United States itself

has engaged in the same type of policy towards perceived hostile regimes for decades.

Although the U.S. condemns Russia for its actions in Ukraine, they have themselves used

realpolitik and geopolitics as an excuse for decades, to interfere in foreign countries, topple

governments, and start wars. In this perspective, Russia is simply following in the American

footsteps.

The point is, that a geopolitical cataclysm like the Crimean annexation has not taken place

since the end of the Cold War, and since the U.S. became the sole most powerful player in

world politics. The U.S. does not want to allow any other country to rival their status as the

only super power, especially not Russia.

In a long interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, a Russian government daily newspaper, the

former FSB (Russian security services) chief Nikolai Patrushev gives a clear view on how the

Kremlin sees the situation in Ukraine. The entire interview was translated and printed in

English for the Guardian newspaper. In the interview, Mr Patrushev criticises the United

States for the sanctions and repercussions the country has initiated towards Russia. He states

the following: “The actions of the American administration during the Ukraine crisis are part

of a new current in White House foreign policy designed to preserve America’s position of

leadership in the world by containing the growing power of Russia and other centres of

power”79.

Moscow thus views America as an impediment to their national interest, not because the

Russians themselves chose to, but because the Americans forced them to.

This view clearly echoes throughout the higher echelons of the Kremlin. The Crimean land

grab was not a Russian initiative, but it was a response to U.S. conduct in the region80. Crimea

was invaded to protect Russian interest as the country felt geopolitically threatened by the

United States. This action was instigated due to the American pursuit of a potential Ukrainian

NATO membership, which Russia believes, started the hostilities between the two ex-arch

79 The Guardian 2014, Egorov, Ivan & Patrushev, Nikolai, translated by Johnston, Cameron ”Ukraine crisis-the view from Russia” available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24/sp-ukraine-russia-cold-war 23/10/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015. 80 The National Interest 2014, Saudners, Paul J. ”How Russia sees the Ukraine crisis” available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-sees-the-ukraine-crisis-11461 13/10/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.

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enemies in the first place81. The approach taken by the Obama administration in the aftermath

of President Yanukovych’s removal from power has been a quest of quelling the Russian

geopolitical recovery. The purpose of which is to compromise Russia’s revival as a strong

regional power, because of their opposition and rejections of U.S. policies inside the Russian

sphere of influence82.

On the contrary to Western perceptions, the Kremlin considers that Russia is under siege, and

not the other way around, that Russia is an aggressive conqueror. Anti-Russian sentiments,

severe rhetoric, sanctions, and heightened tensions are to be blamed on the West, not on

Russia, nor on Putin himself.

From the Russian point of view, the Unites States, NATO and the European Union have

penetrated dangerously deep into Russia’s recognised sphere of influence, therefore Russia

felt it as a necessity to respond in similar kind83.

Moscow has a point in believing that Washington has for many years tried to interfere in the

Russian sphere. The United States has for several decades tried to transform Ukraine into a

pro-Western entity situated within Washington’s sphere of influence, for security measures to

fend off Russian ambition84.

Putin will have nothing of it. America’s sphere of influence is not thousands of kilometres

away in Eastern Europe, but closer to home (Cuba). The U.S. should, geographically,

historically, and politically have no claim on Ukraine, for it belongs in another major power’s

backyard. Imagine if Putin tried to exert Russia’s power to gain influence in a country

belonging to America’s backyard. The United States would never accept it, yet they try to do

the same in Russia’s orbit.

The one time Russia in fact forged an alliance with a country opposed to American hegemony

in the U.S.’s backyard (Cuba, 1962), it led the world to the verge of nuclear war85. The

Russian response to Western entanglement in Ukraine is in this perspective a great deal less 81 The National Interest 2014, Saudners, Paul J. ”How Russia sees the Ukraine crisis” available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-sees-the-ukraine-crisis-11461 13/10/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.82 Global research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the Geopolitical chessboard” available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-and-the-geopolitical-chessboard/5375343 26/03/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015. 83 Global research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the geopolitcal chessboard” available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-and-the-geopolitical-chessboard/5375343 26/03/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.84 Global research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the geopolitcal chessboard” available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-and-the-geopolitical-chessboard/5375343 26/03/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015.

26

intense. Russia did indeed invade Crimea and made the peninsula part of the Russian

Federation, but only after a referendum, which according to Russia was in conformity with

the wishes of the Crimean people86. According to John Mearsheimer, an American political

scientist and expert in the filed on international relations theory, “U.S. and European leaders

blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now

that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue

this misbegotten policy”87. Hence, Mearsheimer blames the West’s excessive interference in

Ukraine as the main factor that pushed Putin to annex Crimea.

This theory is very much in line with the normative view of Moscow’s ruling elite and the

Russian people.

From a Russian perspective, the Crimean annexation was justifiable, for more than one

reason. Russians view the Ukrainian conflict as a family dispute. They are the guarantors of

the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine, and fail to understand why the West would react so

decisively to a task they believe to be fair and legitimate88. The problem is that the United

States struggle to escape the bounds of their conservative Cold War rhetoric; it is impossible

for America to view the conflict which is unfolding from a Russian perspective. According to

Andranik Migranyan, an analyst and writer for the Kremlin connected Institute for

Democracy and Cooperation in New York, there is only one main objective behind American

sanctions and hostility towards Russia: “a desire to limit Russia’s geopolitical role”89.

85 BBC 2012, Fidgen, Joe ”Cuban missile crisis: When nuclear war seemed inevitable” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20068265 25/10/2012, retrieved on 26/03/2015. 86 BBC 2014 “Crimea referendum: voters ‘back Russia union’” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26606097 16/03/2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015. 87 Foreign Affairs 2014, Mearsheimer, John J. ” Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault September/October 2014, retrieved on 26/03/2015. 88 The National Interest, Saunders, Paul J. ”How Russia sees the Ukraine crisis: can a compromise be found?” available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-sees-the-ukraine-crisis-11461 13/10/2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.89 The National Interest, Saunders, Paul J. ”How Russia sees the Ukraine crisis: can a compromise be found?” available at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-sees-the-ukraine-crisis-11461 13/10/2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.

27

The Kremlin believes that Western leaders were totally unprepared for the Crimean

occupation, hence they rejected the Crimean referendum, declaring that the annexation was

illegal and the vote null and void90.

The West clearly fails to recognise the crucial importance the Crimean peninsula has played

in Russian history, and how it only became part of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet republic in

1954 when Nikita Khrusjtsjov handed the peninsula over as a sign of good will91. From 1783

until that year, Crimea had belonged to Russia92 (with the exception of a few years during the

first and second World Wars), and Russians or Russian speakers have inhabited the peninsula

ever since. Indeed, the rationalization that Crimea belongs to Russia gains credence through

historic, ethnic and geographic linkages. For Russians, Crimea is now in its rightful

possession, which it had been for centuries. In geopolitical terms the reunification was

justified simply to halt NATO’s continual advance toward Russia, something of an existential

matter for Moscow93.

The West faces two choices in Ukraine. They can either continue their anti-Russian policy,

which will only magnify hostilities with the Kremlin, while it will tear Ukraine apart, or they

have the option of halting their relentless campaign of westernising Ukraine, to help create a

neutral and potentially affluent country, which does not threaten Russian interests94.

Contesting the Russian justification

From a Western perspective Russian foreign policy under Putin is utterly ruthless and

dangerous, while Russia justifies its actions in the context of American, NATO and European

90 Global Research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the Geopolitical chessboard” available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-and-the-geopolitical-chessboard/5375343 26/03/2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.

91 The Telegraph 2014, Korolkov, Alexandr ”Crimea: Nikita Khrushchev’s ’gift on a golden dish’” available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/rbth/politics/10745698/khrushchev-crimea-ukraine.html 18/04/2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015. 92 Dickinson, Sara (2002) ”Explorations in Russian and Eurasian history” Slavica Publishers, Indiana, p. 2. 93 Global research 2014, Smith, Jack A. ”Ukraine and the Geopolitical chessboard” available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-and-the-geopolitical-chessboard/5375343 26/03/2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.

94 Foreign Affairs 2014, Mearsheimer, John J. ” Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: the liberal delusions that provoked Putin” available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault September/October 2014, retrieved on 27/03/2015.

28

interference in the Russian orbit. This, however, does not overcome the fact that Russia

unexpectedly invaded a foreign country without any grounds or plausible claims, and in

discordance with international law.

The reasoning behind the annexation was to fulfil Putin’s foreign policy agenda, as any great

power claims to have the right to do, in conformity with realist theory. In the 21st century,

however, no such claims should be justified. A land grab of a sovereign country’s territory is

indefensible except in the case of war. Ukraine and Russia were not in a state of war when the

annexation was executed.

Not history, ethnicity, or even geopolitics can defend Putin’s choice to annex Crimea. The

Russian population on the peninsula might have had a desire to become Russian, but they

were neither threatened, nor ill-treated by the Ukrainian authorities. Crimea even had its

own autonomous status, with its own parliament and Prime Minister95. Hence, there was no

imperative cause for the annexation. According to leading legal experts on international

law, the Crimean referendum provided no justification for the annexation96. The second

article of the United Nations charter clearly states “ all members shall refrain in their

international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or

political independence of any state”97. In other words, the forceful acquisition of sovereign

territory is illegal under international law. Putin acquired Crimea through the use of force,

without the acknowledgment of his Ukrainian counterpart, or the international community.

From a Western perspective, the Russian foreign policy doctrine is alarming, and to blame

the rationalisation behind such a political agenda on the West’s interference in the former

Soviet bloc is therefore groundless and unwarranted.

The West must see Russian foreign policy for what it really is, a ruthless and intrusive

agenda aimed at the total and complete recovery of the political, economic and geostrategic

benefits that evaporated after the collapse of the Soviet Union98. Although Putin’s regime

95 BBC 2014 ”Why Crimea is so dangerous” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26367786 11/03/2014, retrieved on 30/03/2015. 96 International Bar association 2014, Lowe, Rebecca ”Ukraine: clear breaches of international law in Crimea” available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=0b6a41e4-bca2-4234-8b3e-9cb027b98607 2014, retrieved on 29/03/2015. 97 The United Nations ”Chapter I, article 2” available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml 26/06/1945, retrieved on 30/03/2015. 98 Foreign affairs 2013, Aron, Leon, “ The Putin doctrine: Russia’s quest to rebuild the Soviet state” available at

29

has remained secretive about the Kremlin’s long-term foreign policy goals, it is evident that

Russia is playing a dangerous game in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, designed to

destabilize the region and to re-establish Russia as the dominant power99. The collapse of

the Soviet Union was an immense disaster for those who believed in the system, including

Putin who perceived the collapse as an extreme humiliation. The Russian elite never

accepted the fact that the Soviet empire gave way, and that Russia became a second rate

power on the world stage. The break-up of the Soviet Union only resulted in nostalgia for

lost greatness and a feeling of revanchism and hatred towards those who made it happen100.

Furthermore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union made Russia lose its superpower status,

and its influence in Eastern Europe, which has reinforced the need to redefine the Russian

identity ever since101. Putin’s realist-based Eurasian design has become the pinnacle of that

identity. A strong, reborn Russia with the capabilities to interfere and control former

dominions is the objective of this new Russian identity. It is a belief that the past greatness

will be restored through exerting power and influence in Russia’s near abroad. Only then

will Russia regain her rightful place as one of the world’s dominant powers.

The Russian foreign policy doctrine will exert military-political pressures and armed force

to achieve greater influence towards neighbouring states102, meanwhile the Kremlin is also

willing to play the ethnicity card; the fact that 25 million ethnic Russians and over 30

millions Russian speakers live outside the Federation gives the Kremlin the opportunity to

use this hand as a tool for the reassertion of Moscow’s control in a new sphere of

influence103. It happened in Ukraine, in Georgia/South Ossetia, in Transnistria (Moldova),

in Abkhazia (Georgia)104. Since 1991, Russia has deliberately taken advantage of ethnic

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine 8/03/2013, retrieved on 30/03/2015.

99 Van Herpen, Marcel H. (2014) ”Putin’s wars: the rise of Russia’s new imperialism” Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, p.55.

100 Van Herpen, Marcel H. (2014) ”Putin’s wars: the rise of Russia’s new imperialism” Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, p.50. 101 Allison, Roy & Bluth, Christoph (1998) ”Security dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia” Royal institute of International Affairs, London, p. 33.102 Allison, Roy & Bluth, Christoph (1998) ”Security dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia” Royal institute of International Affairs, London, p. 36.

103 Allison, Roy & Bluth, Christoph (1998) ”Security dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia” Royal institute of International Affairs, London, p. 36. 104 Foreign affairs 2014, Mankoff, Jeffrey ”Russia’s latest land grab: how Putin won Crimea and lost Ukraine” available at

30

tensions as one of many methods to reinforce its influence in what used to be the Soviet

Union’s former territories.

The Russian explanation for exercising these powers is that the West, predominantly

NATO and the European Union, have attempted to expand their respective organisations’

into Russia’s backyard, thus transforming it into a Russian security issue more than

anything. NATO was after all established to contain the Soviet threat, and the spread of

communism105. As of today, however, the further enlargement of NATO will not negatively

affect the security of Russia. The organisation’s goal is to protect the sovereignty of

individual states106, not to provoke Russia. From the 1990s onwards, NATO has

successfully expanded without reviving Cold War divisions in Europe, and the

organisation’s aim is to promote peace and stability, as opposed to only defending member

states against neo-imperialist Russia107. There is no NATO threat towards Russia, unless the

Kremlin instigates one. Unfortunately, that is what is happening. The aggressive Russian

foreign policy, which Vladimir Putin advocates, only heightens tensions between East and

West, threatens the very foundations of post Cold War Europe, and the peaceful

coexistence between Russia and the West.

VI) Conclusion

In this paper, I have endeavoured to study Russia’s foreign policy agenda, more precisely

the Putin doctrine, focusing on the annexation of the Crimean peninsula and its aftermath.

Taking as a point of departure a theoretical framework, respectively geopolitics, realism

and Eurasianism, I have studied and discussed, using newer Russian history as a frame of

reference, Putin’s Russia on the international scene. Taking into account both a Western

and an Eastern perspective, and referring to the three theories along the way, I have

attempted to justify both approaches. By applying this dual perspective I have, on the one

side discussed NATO’s and EU’s eastward movement, and on the other side I have

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141210/jeffrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab May/June 2014, retrieved on 31/03/2015.105 Goldberg, Ronald A. (2012) ” America in the forties” Syracuse University Press, New York, p. 153. 106 Herd, Graeme P. & Moroney, Jennifer D.P. (2003) ”Security Dynamics in the former Soviet bloc” RoutledgeCurzon, London, p. 80.107 Herd, Graeme P. & Moroney, Jennifer D.P. (2003) ”Security Dynamics in the former Soviet bloc” RoutledgeCurzon, London, p. 80.

31

attempted to understand Moscow’s reactions, rationalization and indeed justification in

reference to the annexation of Crimea.

Since Vladimir Putin came to power, he has made it his quest to rebuild a strong Russia,

with the capabilities to control and dominate former Soviet or Tsarist possessions in the

near abroad. Russian national interests are today defined by the absolute recovery of

geostrategic, political, and economic assets that Russia lost after 1991. Countries in

Russia’s backyard have the choice of either quietly succumbing to Russian desires, or they

can face the wrath of the Kremlin’s power politics. The Ukrainian people chose the latter

option, and suffered for it as a consequence. Meanwhile, countries decisively opposed to

Russian hegemony, the Baltic States not least, are alarmed by Putin’s power play, and fear

what may come if Moscow is allowed to resume its neo-imperialist plans.

The Kremlin have a firm belief that what they are doing is strictly in line with the country’s

vital national interests. From the Russian point of view, it is the West’s constant meddling

inside the Russian sphere, which has caused the Russian reaction.

Although Putin sees Russia as a victim, and not a conqueror, Russia is in fact the latter. The

foreign policy agenda advocated by Putin is indeed aggressive and neo-imperialistic. The

unprovoked and wanton aggression against a sovereign country’s territory is inexcusable.

The Crimean land grab and the instigation of ethnic tensions in Eastern Ukraine has only

served the Russian cause, but it has aggravated the relationship between Russia, its

neighbours, and the West. Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy doctrine is not only threatening,

but is also an authentic confirmation of the president’s plans of restoring Russia as a major

powerhouse, at the expense of the independence of Russia’s nearest neighbours.

The Russian President is using his foreign policy doctrine in order to create a powerful

Russia, which could take centre stage in world affairs, and secure Russian hegemony in

Russia’s historic sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin is using variables such as ethnicity,

language, geopolitics, history, and realpolitik in a bid to implement and justify his agenda

towards neighbouring states and the West. The Eurasianist doctrine is to be rationalised

through realist power politics for the benefit of Russian geopolitical goals.

32

Bibliography:

My dilemma when writing this essay is that the topic is relatively young and is a developing

political process. Hence, literature on the subject is limited apart from newspaper- and

magazine articles in addition to reports from various think –tanks. The theory has of course

been taken from hard copy publications.

The time-span of the essay ends in April 2015.

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33

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