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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

THERESE DICKOW,

on behalf of herself and a class of personssimilarly situated, Case No. 12-Hon.Magistrate:

Plaintiffs,

vs. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A,Successor in interest from the Federal DepositInsurance Corporation, as receiver for

Washington Mutual Bank; BOARD OF GOVERNORSOF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM; andOFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY(federal bank regulators),

Defendants.__________________________________________________________/WOLFE LAW GROUP, PLLCJack B. Wolfe (P39667)Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class24901 Northwestern Highway, Suite 212Southfield, Michigan 48075(248) 809-2005 (o)(248) 809-9969 (f)(248) 229-1187 (m1)(248) 228-6307 (m2)[email protected] _______________________________________________________________________/

Except as provided below, no civil action between these parties or other parties arisingout of the transaction or occurrence alleged in this complaint has been previously filed inthis court, nor has any such action been previously filed and dismissed or transferred afterhaving been assigned to a judge. Except as provided below, I do not know of any othercivil action between these parties, arising out of the same transaction or occurrence asalleged in this complaint, that is either pending or was previously filed and dismissed,transferred or otherwise disposed of after having been assigned to a judge in this or anyother court except Oakland County Sixth Circuit, Case No. 11-DA9393-AV and 48

th

District Court Case No. 10-25020-LT7. /s/Jack B. Wolfe

Jack B. Wolfe (P39667)

2:12-cv-10337-SFC-LJM Doc # 1 Filed 01/25/12 Pg 1 of 33 Pg ID 1

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VERIFIED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE,

DECLARATORY AND OTHER RELIEF AND JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs, Therese Dickow, individually, and on behalf of all those similarly

situated John and Jane Does, by and through their undersigned attorneys, WOLFE LAW

GROUP, PLLC, and for their Complaint, state as follows:

PARTIES, VENUE AND JURISDICTION

1. Plaintiff, Therese Dickow, is a resident of the City of West Bloomfield,

County of Oakland and State of Michigan and owns a home at 4250 Margate Lane, West

Bloomfield, Michigan, 48322 (the “Property”) and her claims against Defendants are

representative of the similarly situated plaintiffs.

2. All other similarly situated plaintiffs, John Doe and Jane Doe, are located in

the State of Michigan and have a connection to Defendants by way of a residential

mortgage loan transaction with Washington Mutual Bank (“WAMU”) and property owned

by or at one time by the similarly situated plaintiffs.

3. Defendant, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase Bank”, “Chase” or

sometimes referred to as the “Foreclosing Lender”), is the successor in interest to WAMU.

4. Defendant, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“FRB”),

which is a quasi-government entity has contacted Dickow because their loan with

WAMU “may be eligible for an Independent Foreclosure Review that may result in

compensation or other remedy.” Dickow’s Independent Foreclosure Review (“IFR”) is

attached as Exhibit A.

5. Defendant, Office of Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), is a

government entity involved with the FRB in the IFR.

6. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a).


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7. The amount in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the

sum of $50,000,000.00 and is a class action in that any member of any class identified by

plaintiff is a citizen of a State different from defendants. 28 USC § 1332(d) (2) (A).

COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

8. On September 25, 2008, the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”), within

the United States Department of Treasury, closed WAMU and appointed the Federal

De posit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) as receiver over WAMU.

9. Pursuant to a Purchaser and Assumption Agreement, dated, September 25,

2008, between the FDIC, as receiver, and Chase Bank, as buyer, Chase Bank acquired all

of WAMU’s loans and loan commitments. Upon information and belief, the applicable

Purchaser and Assumption Agreement referred to herein is attached as Exhibit B.

10. 12 USC § 1821 governs the FDIC’s Authority as a receiver, which states,

in pertinent part, as follows:

“(d) Powers and duties of Corporation as conservator or receiver

* * *

(2) General powers

(A) Successor to institution

The Corporation shall, as conservator or receiver, and by operation of law,

succeed to —

(i) all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the insured depositoryinstitution, and of any stockholder, member, accountholder, depositor, officer, ordirector of such institution with respect to the institution and the assets of theinstitution; and

(ii) title to the books, records, and assets of any previous conservator orother legal custodian of such institution.


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[12 USC 1821(d)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) (Emphasis added).]

11. The FDIC’s authority to dispose of the Bank’s assets is set forth in 12

USC 1821(d)(2)(G),which provides:

“(G) Merger; transfer of assets and liabilities

(i) In general

The Corporation may, as conservator or receiver —

(I) merge the insured depository institution with another insureddepository institution; or

(II) subject to clause (ii), transfer any asset or liability of the institution in

default (including assets and liabilities associated with any trust business) withoutany approval, assignment, or consent with respect to such transfer.

(ii) Approval by appropriate Federal banking agency

No transfer described in clause (i)(II) may be made to another depositoryinstitution . . . without the approval of the appropriate Federal banking agency forsuch institution.”

12. Consistent with this authority, the FDIC and Chase Bank entered into the

Purchase and Assumption Agreement, pursuant to which Chase Bank acquired Dickow’s

indebtedness. The agreement states that Chase Bank, as “the “Assuming Bank desires to

purchase substantially all of the assets and assume all deposit and substantially all other

liabilities of the Failed Bank[.]” Exhibit B, page 1.

13. Article III of the agreement, pertaining to the “purchase of assets,”

provides, in relevant part:

“3.1 Assets Purchased by Assuming Bank. Subject to Sections3.5, 3.6 and 4.8, the Assuming Bank hereby purchases from theReceiver, and the Receiver hereby sells, assigns, transfers,conveys, and delivers to the Assuming Bank, all right, title, andinterest of the Receiver in and to all of the assets . . . of the FailedBank . . . . . [T]he Assuming Bank specifically purchases allmortgage servicing rights and obligations of the Failed Bank.”


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14. Reading the agreement in conjunction with the federal statutory

provisions, the FDIC, as receiver, rather than Chase Bank, acquired WAMU’s rights,

titles, powers and privileges “by operation of law.”

15. Chase Bank simply purchased the loans from the FDIC after they were

transferred to the FDIC from WAMU by operation of law.

16. Pursuant to the foreclosure-by-advertisement statute under Chapter 32 of

Michigan compiled laws (the “Foreclosure Act”), MCL 600.3204 provides, in relevant

part, as follows (emphasis added):

“(1) A party may foreclose a mortgage by advertisement if all of thefollowing circumstances exist:

(a) A default in a condition of the mortgage has occurred, by which thepower to sell became operative.

(b) An action or proceeding has not been instituted, at law, to recover thedebt secured by the mortgage or any part of the mortgage; or, if an action orproceeding has been instituted, the action or proceeding has been discontinued; oran execution on a judgment rendered in an action or proceeding has been returnedunsatisfied, in whole or in part.

(c) The mortgage containing the power of sale has been properly recorded.

(d) The party foreclosing the mortgage is either the owner of the

indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the mortgage or the

servicing agent of the mortgage.

***

(3) If the party foreclosing a mortgage by advertisement is not the original

mortgagee, a record chain of title shall exist prior to the date of sale under

section 3216 evidencing the assignment of the mortgage to the party foreclosing

the mortgage.”


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17. Chase Bank was not the original mortgagee in any WAMU transaction

with the Class and acquired its interest in the mortgage of a Class Member by

assignment.

18. Pursuant to the plain language of MCL 600.3204(3) under the Foreclosure

Act, Chase Bank was required to record its assigned mortgage interest “prior to” the date

of the sheriff’s sale.

19. The Michigan’s Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he right to

foreclose by advertisement is conferred solely by the statute” and that strict compliance

with such statutory provisions is required. Dohm v. Haskin, 88 Mich. 144, 147; 50 N.W.

108 (1891).

20. MCL 600.3204(3) of the Foreclosure Act makes no exception for

mortgage interests acquired “by o peration of law” was the ruling of the Michigan Court

of Appeals in Euihyung Kim and In Sook Kim v. JP Morgan Chase Bank , No. 302528

(January 12, 2012) (For Publication) (Exhibit C).

21. The Kim Court held that:

“Therefore, pursuant to the plain language of MCL 600.3204(3),defendant was required to record its mortgage interest before thesheriff’s sale. Because defendant failed to do so, it was not

statutorily authorized to proceed with the sale….[Appellants] wereentitled to set aside the sheriff’s deed.”

Id .

THE SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE PUTATIVE PLAINTIFF

22. In 1993, Eugene S. Dickow (“Mr. Dickow”) and Therese Dickow (Mrs.

Dickow”), husband and wife (collectively “Dickow”), acquired the Property by warranty

deed as tenants in the entireties (Exhibit D).


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23. On August 8, 2007, Mrs. Dickow granted a mortgage (the “Mortgage”)

(Exhibit E) and note (“Note”) (Exhibit F) on the Property to the originating lender,

WAMU, in the amount of $381,119.00 (the “Loan”).

24. Mr. Dickow signed the Mortgage to waive his homestead rights, if any.

25. Mr. Dickow was not an obligor of the Note, only Mrs. Dickow. See,

Exhibit F.

26. As set forth above, WAMU was taken over by the FDIC, with all its assets

sold to Chase Bank; however, no record of this sale was recorded until the Sheriff Deed,

dated, December 1, 2009 (the “Sheriff’s Sale”), which included an affidavit of the FDIC

(“FDIC Affidavit”) of the purported sale (Exhibit G, all the recorded documents

associated with the Sheriff’s Deed).

27. Mr. Dickow was in the real estate investment business, which fell apart in

2007-2008, leaving him financially devastated.

28. Dickow was unable to keep up with their life expenses and Mrs. Dickow

defaulted on the Note, resulting in the acceleration of the Note and pending foreclosure of

the Mortgage.

29. First publication of the foreclosure process occurred on March 31, 2009

(“First Publication”) (Exhibit H, Notice of Publication).

30. At the time of First Publication, the recorded chain of title for the Property

indicated that the owner of the Mortgage was WAMU (Exhibit I).

31. There is no recorded assignment in chain of title for the Property of

WAMU’s interest in the Mortgage to Chase Bank prior to or after the Sheriff ’s Sale other


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than the FDIC Affidavit. The FDIC Affidavit which is part of the foreclosure sale

documents at Exhibit G is separately attached as Exhibit J.

32. The Note was paid to the order of WAMU at the time of the Sheriff’s Sale,

with no negotiation of the Note by endorsement by WAMU to Chase Bank.

33. Prior to the Sheriff’s Sale, the original published sale date was April 28,

2009, but was allegedly adjourned for over seven (7) months by Foreclosing Lender until

December 1, 2009, with an interceding 6-month loan modification in which loan

payments were accepted by Foreclosing Lender from Dickow.

34. The Foreclosing Lender asserts that it adjourned the Sheriff’s Sale for one

week intervals from April 28, 2009 to December 1, 2009, as required by MCL 600.3220

and, to this end, produced Affidavits of the adjournments (the “Adjournment Affidavits”)

allegedly undertaken pursuant to MCL 600.3220, copies of which are attached as Exhibit

K, which are stamped, not signed, and allegedly from the various deputy sheriffs and/or

the sheriff of Oakland County, Michigan.

35. The signatures on the Adjournment Affidavits were not actually ever

reviewed by the party attesting to the facts.

36. As of May 6, 2011, the law firm for Foreclosing Lender had an attorney

grievance complaint filed and pending against it for allegedly participating in “robo-

signing” of affidavits and committing “fraudclosure” on behalf of its lending clientele

(Exhibit L, evidence of the grievance). There is also an apparent investigation underway

by the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission of the Oakland County Circuit Court Judge

who did not investigate these allegations but, instead, summarily dismissed the

allegations. Id.


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37. Dickow was granted a loan modification and timely paid their loan

payments during the six (6) months between April, 2009 and November, 2009, had no

change in their income or other revenue related matters, but were denied the continuation

of the loan modification and, without any additional notice, were foreclosed upon by

Foreclosing Lender.

38. Dickow has attempted to purchase the Property for the redemption amount

plus per diem, paid taxes and attorney’s fees and has demonstrated proof of funds for

such purchase, but has been rejected by the Foreclosing Lender, who has indicated to

Dickow, though its agents that before Dickow can purchase the Property, they must

vacate the Property.

39. Mrs. Dickow filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief on May 31, 2011, and

was converted to Chapter 7 on August 2, 2010, receiving her discharge on October 26,

2010 (Exhibit M, Bankruptcy Docket Entries for Mrs. Dickow).

40. After the order of discharge, the Foreclosing Lender filed a summary

proceeding against Dickow, who were to have had a hearing on November 3, 2010

(“Initial Hearing Date”).

41. On the Initial Hearing Date, Dickow’s attorney filed an answer,

affirmative defenses and a jury demand (Exhibit N, Responsive Pleadings).

42. The parties adjourned the Initial Hearing Date and several subsequent

hearing dates as they attempted to work out an amicable resolution to repurchase the

Property, as set forth above, with the Court scheduling the matter for a trial on May 16,

2011 (Exhibit O, District Court Register of Actions).


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43. The Foreclosing Lender filed a pre-trial motion and brief (the “Motion”)

pursuant to MCR 4.201(J) (2), alleging there was no triable issue and the Motion hearing

date was scheduled before trial for May 13, 2011 (the “Hearing”), with service upon

Dickows’ counsel by overnight mail on May 2, 2011.

44. Dickows’ counsel did not receive the overnight package until May 3, 2011

(Exhibit P, Notice of Hearing and Proof of Service).

45. Dickows’ counsel filed their response on May 12, 2011, the day before the

hearing (Exhibit O, District Court Register of Actions) and, at the Hearing, the trial court

answered opposing counsel’s inquiry as to whether the court would allow oral argument

as follows: “Nope. Unless there’s anything further the Court’s ready to rule.” (Exhibit

Q, Transcript at p. 3). Nevertheless, Dickow’s counsel orally argued prior to the Judge’s

ruling that at the time of First Publication, the Foreclosing Lender must be in control of

the mortgage obligations, which it was not, and there is no exception to the non-judicial

foreclosure statute where there is a FDIC receivership takeover of a bank to allow the

Foreclosing Lender, the buyer of the taken over bank’s assets from the FDIC, to not have

to have the Mortgage in record chain of title prior to First Publication or to have the Note

endorsed to it ( Id . at pp. 4-5).

46. Counsel further argued the factual validity of the Adjournment Affidavits,

raised issues of fact especially in light of the recent grievances filed against opposing

counsels’ firm for participating in “robo-signing” affidavits and the judicial grievance

against the judge for not investigating the allegations ( Id. at p. 6). Counsel then indicated

that he had filed his brief late and whether this was affecting the Court’s decision to


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which the trial court stated: “It’s only affecting it that I surely didn’t read it” Id .

(Emphasis added).

47. Dickow’s counsel argued that whether the trial court read his response was

not relevant to the issue of standing and subject matter jurisdiction, which cannot be

conferred by consent and can be raised sua sponte ( Id . at pp. 6-7).

48. The trial court ignored counsel’s arguments, finding no defect or

irregularity in the foreclosure process, that the Foreclosing Lender had standing, and that

the trial court had the subject matter jurisdiction to grant a judgment of possession ( Id . at

pp. 7-8).

49. Dickow appealed the ruling of Judge Barron to Oakland County 6th Circuit

Court and drew Judge Bowman as their Appellate Judge, serving their Appellate Brief on

Judge Bowman on July 25, 2011, with oral argument before the Judge on August 31,

2011, and at that hearing, Judge Bowman dismissed the appeal over the arguments of

Dickow that there was no assignment of mortgage to Chase Bank in record chain of title

at First Publication or prior to the Sheriff Sale as is required under the Foreclosure Act

and there is no exemption under the Act for Chase Bank receiving the assets from the

FDIC. (Exhibit R, Appellate Transcript).

50. Dickow filed a motion for reconsideration before Judge Bowman (Exhibit

S), which Judge Bowman denied by written opinion on October 10, 2011(Exhibit T).

51. Chase then filed a motion for an order of eviction before Judge Barron to

be heard on October 17, 2011, and Mr. Dickow filed for Chapter 13 Bankrutpcy

protection on the day before the hearing on the eviction order on October 16,

2011(Exhibit U, Bankruptcy Docket Entries for Mr. Dickow).


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52. The Bankruptcy Judge in Mr. Dickow’s bankruptcy granted the motion of

Chase to lift the stay to allow Chase to proceed with the eviction of Dickow from the

Property over the objections of Dickow’s counsel that Dickow had received the IFR form

from the FRB and OCC, had experienced financial harm and would not receive any

determination until after April 30, 2012.

53. Dickow has completed and sent their IFR form to the FRB and OCC, a

copy of which is attached as Exhibit V.

54, Dickow has filed before Judge Bowman with the Oakland County Circuit

Court a motion to set aside the dismissal of the appeal based upon the Kim, supra, case, a

copy of which is attached as Exhibit W.

55. The law and precedent in the State of Michigan is that Chase Bank does

not have standing under the Foreclosure Act and that Michigan courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction to enforce a Chase Bank Sheriff Deed issued in connection with a Sheriff

Sale pursuant to the Foreclosure Act where Chase Bank was enforcing mortgage

obligations originated by WAMU which Chase Bank acquired on September 25, 2008

(Ex. J), from the FDIC and failed to record an assignment of the mortgage in chain of

title prior to the Sheriff Sale as required by MCL 600.3204(3) rendering the Sheriff Sale

void ab initio.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

56. This lawsuit and the allegations herein satisfy the prerequisites for the

maintenance of a Class Action as set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, as set forth below:

A. Class Definition. Plaintiff, Therese Dickow, brings this action

individually and on behalf of the following class of similarly situated persons (the


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“Class” and/or “Class Members”), of which she is a Class Member: Persons in the

State of Michigan (collectively, “homeowner s”), who had as the originated lender

WAMU and had or have Chase Bank as their Foreclosing Lender and/or have

received the IFR and either have been non-judicially foreclosed upon pursuant to

the Foreclosure Act and evicted from their homes, are in the process of being

evicted from their homes pursuant to the Foreclosure Act, have been foreclosed

upon pursuant to the Foreclosure Act and are in their redemption period and are in

the process of foreclosure pursuant to the Foreclosure Act and have a pending

foreclosure sale date. Excluded from the class are homeowners who are Michigan

residents but were judicially foreclosed upon pursuant to Chapter 31 of Michigan

compiled laws, homeowners who are not Michigan residents, Chase Bank and any

of its officers, directors or employees, the presiding judge or any member of his or

her immediate family, and members of any class or classes previously certified.

Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend the above class definition based on discovery

and the proofs at trial;

B. Numeriosity. The members of the Class are so numerous that

joinder of all Class Members is impracticable. While the exact number of Class

Members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through

appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are over five thousand (5,000)

persons in the Class and at least one thousand (1000) persons in each sub-class or

combination thereof from the State of Michigan;

C. Commonality. There are questions of law or fact common to the

Class including, inter alia, the following;


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a. Whether Foreclosing Lender recorded an assignment of the

WAMU mortgage in chain of title before the Sheriff Sale of any of the

homeowners pursuant to Foreclosure Act;

b. Whether Foreclosing Lender was the holder of the Note of the

homeowner at the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings under

non-judicial foreclosure pursuant to the Foreclosure Act as “holder ship”

is defined under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) as adopted by

the State of Michigan;

c. Whether Foreclosing Lender had or has standing to foreclose under

the Foreclosure Act;

d. Whether a Michigan Court has subject matter jurisdiction to evict

homeowners from their foreclosed upon homes where Foreclosing Lender

had acquired the WAMU loan of homeowners from the FDIC and failed to

record the assignment of the WAMU mortgages in chain of title prior to any

Sheriff Sale and/or was not a holder of the WAMU notes as defined by the

UCC at the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings under the

Foreclosure Act;

e. Whether Chase Bank must disgorge proceeds received from a

foreclosure sale pursuant to the Foreclosure Act where it failed to hold the

WAMU note it acquired from the FDIC and record an assignment of the

WAMU mortgage it acquired from the FDIC prior to the Sheriff Sale in

violation of the Foreclosure Act and/or the UCC;

f. Whether Chase Bank has violated of The Fair Debt Collection Act


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(the “FDCA”), 15 U.S.C. §1692(A)(6), where it failed to hold the WAMU

note it acquired from the FDIC and record an assignment of the WAMU

mortgage it acquired from the FDIC prior to the Sheriff Sale in violation

of the Foreclosure Act and/or the UCC;

g. Whether Chase Bank by foreclosing in violation of the Foreclosure

Act as set forth above has “financially injured” homeowners pursuant to

the IFR;

h. Whether a declaratory judgment providing that Chase Bank has

violated the Foreclosure Act, the UCC, the FDCA and caused, where

applicable, financial injury or harm to homeowners pursuant to the IFR is

appropriate;

i. Whether injunctive relief is appropriate to stop all foreclosures and

evictions in process which have WAMU in chain of title;

j. Whether the Class has sustained damages and, if so, what is the

proper measure of those damages; and

k. Whether the Class is entitled to the relief sought, including

attorney’s fees.

D. Typicality. The claims and defenses of Plaintiff are typical of the

claims of the Class;

E. Adequacy. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests

of the Class. The interests of the Plaintiff are aligned with, and not antagonistic to,

those of the Class. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in the

prosecution of complex fact litigation and an expert on foreclosures, the mortgage


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industry and the UCC and satisfies the “adequate representation” requirement of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4).

57. Certification of the Class is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(1)(A) as inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to Chase Bank would

create incompatible, inconsistent and non-uniform rulings.

58. Class Certification is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(B)

(2) as final injunctive relief is appropriate with respect to the Class to stop the violations

of Chase Bank of the Foreclosure Act, UCC and FDCA, which continue to be perpetrated

on Plaintiff and the Class and the continuing financial injury or harm being inflicted by

Chase Bank pursuant to the IFR.

59. A class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3) is superior

to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims asserted

herein related to the common scheme and course of conduct of Chase Bank because: (i)

A class action will allow streamline litigation to proceed in a court of law, before a jury;

(ii) It does not appear that any particular member of the Class has any unique or special

interest in individually controlling the prosecution of these claims; (iii) A class action

would not present any difficult case management issues; and/or (iv) Common questions

of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class Members.

60. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b) (3), where in view of the complexity of the issues or the expense of litigation, the

separate claims of individual Class Members are insufficient to support separate actions

and a class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient

adjudication of the claims asserted herein.


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61. Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(b)(3), since joinder of the individual Class Members is impracticable given the large

number of Class Members and the fact that they are dispersed across the State of

Michigan, as well as the fact that the expense and burden of individual litigation would

make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the Class to: (i) redress wrongs

done to them; (ii) justify the cost to the court system of adjudicating thousands of

individual cases as it would be enormous; (iii) individualize litigation which would also

magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system; and, by contrast (iv)

conduct this action as a class action in this Court shall present far fewer management

difficulties, conserve the resources of the parties and the court system and protect the

rights of each member of the Class.

62. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3) (A), Class Members have

a significant interest in controlling the prosecution of separate actions and, as previously

stated, individualized litigation would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and

the court system, as well as make it difficult or impossible for individual members of the

Class to redress wrongs done to them.

63. Notification is not an issue in that Chase Bank and the FDIC has a loan

file record for each and every Class Member permitting direct notification and there is

either court or other public records that can be readily and easily accessed.

COUNT I.

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST CHASE BANK

64. Plaintiff re-alleges and restates paragraphs 1-63 above of the Verified

Complaint as if more fully set forth herein.

65. Chase Bank is, and has been at all times pertinent hereto, and will in the


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future engage in conduct, in direct violation of the Foreclosure Act, the UCC and the

FDCA.

66. That unless enjoined by this Court, Chase Bank will continue in its illegal

practices as enumerated in this Complaint to the detriment of the named Plaintiff, and all

members of the Class.

67. That unless enjoined by this Court, Class Members are in imminent threat

that the illegal actions of Chase Bank will result in the loss of their homes, and the

eviction from their homes and will suffer irreparable harm as a direct result of the

wrongful conduct of Chase Bank.

68. There is no adequate remedy at law for the damages which will be

inflicted upon and suffered by Class Members if Chase Bank, as successor in interest to

WAMU, is not immediately enjoined from continuing with or commencing any eviction,

foreclosure or mortgage collection activities in the State of Michigan.

69. Plaintiff and the Class Members will likely prevail on the merits of their

claims that Chase Bank is violating and has violated the Foreclosure Act, the UCC and

the FDCA given the Kim, supra (Ex. C), precedent of the Michigan Court of Appeals.

70. Public policy requires that injunctive relief must be granted in this matter

to stop the violations of the Foreclosure Act, the UCC and the FDCA by Chase Bank, to

prevent any further financial injury or harm to Class Members who have received the IFR

and to prevent and further loss and/or harm to Michigan homeowners.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of all Class Members,

requests that this Court grant their request for injunctive relief enjoining Chase Bank, as

successor in interest to WAMU, from engaging in, continuing with or commencing any


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eviction, foreclosure or mortgage collection activities in the State of Michigan during the

pendency of this litigation and grant such other relief that the Court may deem just,

necessary, equitable or appropriate.

COUNT II.

DECLARATORY RELIEF AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS



72. The following issues are ripe and need a speedy determination by this

Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57:

A. Chase Bank, as successor in interest to WAMU, has violated the

Foreclosure Act as set forth above and the Sheriff Deed and Sheriff Sale are void ab

initio as to any Class Member;

B. Chase Bank, as successor in interest to WAMU, violated the UCC

and the Sheriff Deed and Sheriff Sale are void ab initio as to any Class Member;

C. Chase Bank, as successor in interest to WAMU, violated the

FDCA as it was not a proper creditor of a Class Member for violating the UCC; and,

D. Chase Bank has caused financial injury or harm due to its

violations of the Foreclosure Act and UCC causing direct financial injury or harm to

Class Members and that Defendants, FRB and OCC, must expedite the process of

awarding to these Class Members compensation for the damaging actions of Chase Bank.

73. Any one of the foregoing enumerated in paragraph 72 above render

engaging in, continuing with or commencing any eviction, foreclosure or mortgage

collection activities in the State of Michigan by Chase Bank as void against Class

Members.


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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of all Class Members,

requests that this Court order a speedy hearing on this matter and at such hearing

determine and adjudge that Chase Bank, as successor in interest to WAMU, has violated

the Foreclosure Act, UCC and FDCA, by failing to record into chain of title the mortgage

acquired from WAMU and/or obtain the status of a holder of the WAMU note before

attempting to collect on the note, that the actions or lack thereof of Chase Bank, as the

successor in interest to WAMU, has caused financial injury or harm to Class Members as

the term “financial injury or harm” is or will be defined by the FRB and the OCC

pursuant to the IFR and that the compensation due under the IFR for applicable Class

Members must be determined without further delay and for those Class Members who

have lost their homes, damages must be determined and adjudged to be equal to the loss

of their homes.

COUNT III.

SLANDER OF TITLE AGAINST CHASE BANK



75. Plaintiff, Therese Dickow, and the Class Members are and/or were owners

and occupants of their homes and the real property upon which it stood.

76. The Sheriff Sale of Chase Bank, as successor in interest to WAMU, on the

Property is void ab initio for violating MCL §§ 600.3204(1)(d) and 600.3204(3) pursuant

to the precedent of Kim, supra.

77. The Sheriff Sale of Chase Bank, as successor in interest to WAMU, on the

Property is void ab initio for violating the UCC as Chase Bank was not a holder of the

WAMU Note at the time of the Sheriff Sale.


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78. Chase Bank did not foreclose in good faith pursuant to MCL § 600.3228.

79. Chase Bank violated MCL § 600.3220 as to Plaintiff and, upon

information and belief, all other Class Members.

80. For the reasons set forth above, the Sheriff Sale is void ab initio and the

claim of ownership by Chase Bank and/or any successor in interest of Chase Bank to the

Property of Plaintiff and all other property of Class Members is slander of title.

81. Chase Bank and/or any successor in interest alleged ownership of the

Property and attempt to enforce an action of eviction on Plaintiff or any Class Member,

the actual owner of the Property or property, respectively, is slander of title.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all Class Members,

respectfully requests that this Court require the immediate revocation of any Sheriff Deed

obtained by Chase Bank, as successor in interest to WAMU, as slander of title to the

Class Members ownership of their homes and that the Property ownership be restored to

Plaintiff and all Class Members, where necessary, actual damages to the Class in excess

of $100 Million, treble damages, Chase Bank to disgorge to Class Members any proceeds

received from sale of homes wrongfully foreclosed upon or from payoffs which Chase

Bank was not entitled to receive as illegally received due to their slander of title plus

attorneys’ fees, interest and costs incurred, lost profits, exemplary damages, non-

economic damages, any other damages of any kind and nature to which the Class and/or

Class Member is entitled and any other relief which is equitable, just, proper and

appropriate.

COUNT IV.

VIOLATION OF FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

15 U.S.C. §1692, et seq. AGAINST CHASE BANK


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83. Chase Bank is a Third Party debt collector subject to the FDCA when

acting as the servicer of the WAMU loan.

84. Chase Bank by bringing foreclosure lawsuits as a servicer is “attempting

to collect, (either) directly or indirectly debts within the meaning of the statute. 15 U.S.C.

§1692(a)(6); Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S.291, 115 S.Ct. 1489 (1995).

85. Upon information and belief, Chase Bank acted as a servicer to many of

the loans acquired from WAMU, including Plaintiff’s loan, which were sold to a

securitized pool or Mortgage Backed Security (“MBS”).

86. FDCA was passed to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt

collectors to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt

collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged and to promote consistent State

action to protect consumers against debt collection abuse.

87. Under the FDCA, a “consumer” is any natural person obligated or

allegedly obligated to pay any debt.

88. Any obligation or alleged obligation of any consumer to pay money

arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services which are

the subject of a transaction and primarily for personal, family, or household purposes are

under the FDCA.

89. Under the FDCA, a debt collector is any person who uses any

instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose

of which is to collect debts, or who regularly collects debts or attempts to collect debts,


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directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due to another.

90. A debt collector may or may not use any false, deceptive or misleading

representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.

91. A debt collector may not violate the FDCA by using either unfair or

unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.

92. Any debt collector who fails to comply with the provisions of the FDCA is

liable for any actual damages sustained, statutory damages up to $1,000,000.00 for each

violation, attorney fees as determined by Court and costs of this action.

93. Chase Bank and/or legal counsel on its behalf as a result of the allegations

alleged in this Verified Complaint has violated the FDCA by use of false representations

and deceptive means in pursuing Plaintiff and other Class Members for payment of a debt

given that the basis of Chase’s ability to collect was a mortgage lien that was void ab

initio and unenforceable.

94. Chase Bank and/or legal counsel on its behalf as a result of the allegations

alleged in this Verified Complaint has violated the FDCA by use of false representations

and deceptive means in pursuing Plaintiff and other Class Members for payment of a debt

given that the basis of Chase’s ability to collect was a Note that is was not a holder

thereof.

95. Chase Bank and/or legal counsel on its behalf has violated the FDCA by

engaging in conduct the natural consequence of which was to harass, oppress or abuse

any person in connection with the collection of its debt.

96. Chase Bank and/or legal counsel on its behalf has violated FDCA by

falsely representing the character amount or legal status of the debt.


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collecting amounts not permitted by law.


communicating with consumers at any unusual time or place which should be known to

be inconvenient to the consumer.

99. The Class, as a result of these violations of the FDCA, have suffered

statutory, actual, financial, and emotional damage and seek their attorney fees and costs

as allowed for under the FDCA.

100. As a result of the conduct of Chase Bank in violation of the FDCA,

Plaintiffs have hired the undersigned counsel who is an attorney in good standing and has

personally represented hundreds of consumer cases and has been involved with thousands

of consumer loans.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs request this Honorable Court grant the following

relief as provided for under FDCA, 15 U.S.C. §1692e:

A. Compensatory damages in excess of $100 Million for the Class;B. Statutory damages in excess of $100 Million to be allocated to each Class

Member;C. Punitive damages in excess of $100 Million for the Class;D. Attorney fees, interest and costs pursuant to statute and incurred in this

action; and,E. Grant such other relief as the Court may deem equitable, proper and just.

COUNT V.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT AGAINST CHASE BANK

101. Plaintiff re-alleges and restates paragraphs, 1-100, above of this Verified


102. Chase Bank is and has been in the ongoing process of charging and

collecting monies for services it has performed that are illegal in law and equity.


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103. Chase Bank should not unjustly benefit from collection and receipt of

monies under the guise of a legal foreclosure and/or payoff of secured liens presumed to

be valid while in effect illegal in law and equity.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this Court enter an Order disgorging from

Chase Bank the unjust benefits received by their wrongful and illegal conduct as alleged

in this Verified Complaint in excess of $100 Million, plus attorneys’ fees, interest and

costs incurred and any other relief which is equitable, just and proper.

COUNT VI.

FRAUD AGAINST CHASE BANK



105. Chase Bank made statements to Plaintiffs that they knew were not true or

had reason to know were not true, including, without limitation, the following:

A. Chase Bank had the right to enforce the first lien on the subject

properties and to non-judicially foreclose as to the properties knowing that the neither the

mortgage assigned were recorded in chain of title prior to sale nor the notes endorsed to

Chase.

B. Chase Bank and/or successor in interest had the right to initiate

eviction proceedings as to the subject properties knowing that Chase Bank had no right to

evict nor did any successors in interest as such non-judicially obtained sheriff deeds were

of no force and effect as no interest was transferred.

106. Chase Bank engaged in a scheme, course of conduct, and conspiracy to

defraud Plaintiff and Class Members.

107. As part of this scheme, Chase Bank failed to state facts or misrepresented


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facts necessary, in order to make the statements made or omitted, in light of the

circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

108. Chase Bank intentionally and knowingly and with reckless disregard for

the truth represented or made statements to Plaintiffs which were false and/or misleading.

109. Chase Bank knew that such statements were material to the transaction

and that non-disclosure would tend to mislead and had a duty to Plaintiffs to disclose

such facts, and to ensure that all of its statements and representations were complete,

truthful and not false or misleading.

110. Chase Bank’s conduct was willful, wanton, malicious, and outrageous and

with reckless disregard for the rights of Plaintiffs and the Class is entitled to exemplary

damages.

111. As a direct and proximate result of Chase Bank ’s fraudulent statements

and/or omissions, Plaintiff and the Class Members have been damaged.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all Class Members,

requests that this Court enter Judgment against Defendants for fraud awarding

compensatory damages to the Class in excess of $100 Million, exemplary damages to the

class in excess of $100 Million, plus attorneys’ fees, interest and costs incurred and any

other relief which is equitable, just and proper.

COUNT VII.

TRESPASS AGAINST CHASE BANK



113. Chase Bank intentionally invaded Plaintiff’s and other Class Members’

property.


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114. Chase Bank’s invasion of Plaintiff and the Class Members’ property was

unauthorized and illegal as Chase Bank was forbidden to foreclose pursuant to the

Foreclosure Act.

115. Any authorization Chase Bank claim pursuant to the mortgage documents

was rendered invalid by Michigan statutes and case law, to wit: Kim, supra.

116. Chase Bank’s invasion of Plaintiff and the Class Members’ private

property was an illegal trespass, and was willful, wanton and malicious.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to their actual

damages, exemplary damages, and an injunction barring the continuing trespass on

Plaintiff’s and the Class Members’ property.

COUNT VIII.

ACTION TO SET ASIDE FORECLOSURE SALE/QUIET TITLE AGAINST

CHASE BANK



118. Chase Bank had no standing under MCL § 600.3204(1)(d) due to its

failure to comply with MCL § 600.3204(3) of the Foreclosure Act and the failure to hold

the WAMU Note pursuant to the UCC which also violated MCL § 600.3204(1)(d) of the

Foreclosure Act to foreclose upon Plaintiff and/or the Class Members.

119. Any Sheriff Sales and Sheriff Deeds associated with Chase Bank

foreclosure activities pursuant to the Foreclosure Act involving an originated WAMU

loan acquired by Chase Bank from the FDIC were illegal and invalid.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to this Court

entering an Order voiding the foreclosure sale of Plaintiff and any of the Class Members,


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the subsequent sales of the mortgaged property, if any, ordering the return of the

mortgaged property to Plaintiff and the Class Members, if applicable, and voiding the

mortgages on the properties of Plaintiff and the Class Members.

COUNT IX.

ACTION FOR POSSESSION AGAINST CHASE BANK



121. Under Michigan law, a person entitled to the premises may recover

possession of the premises when possession is taken by trespass without color of title or

other possessory interest.

122. Chase Bank had no right to foreclose under the Foreclosure Act, and any

title obtained by the relevant and applicable Sheriff Deed was void.

123. The taking of possession of Plaintiff ’s and the Class Members’ property

by Chase Bank and its successors in interest was a trespass and without color of title or

other possessory interest.

124. Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to recover possession of their

mortgaged properties wrongfully dispossessed by Chase Bank as successor in interest to a

WAMU loan acquired from the FDIC.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to this Court

entering an Order voiding the foreclosure sale of Plaintiff and any of the Class Members,

the subsequent sales of the mortgaged property, if any, ordering the return of the

mortgaged property to Plaintiff and the Class Members, where applicable, and voiding

the mortgages on the properties of Plaintiff and the Class Members.


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COUNT IX.

ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE WITH

POSSESSORY INTEREST AGAINST CHASE BANK



126. Plaintiff and the Class Members had a possessory interest in their

mortgaged properties.

127. Chase Bank interfered with those interests forcibly and in an unlawful

manner by foreclosing under the Foreclosure Act as the successor in interest to a WAMU

loan acquired from the FDIC and without standing to foreclose under the Foreclosure

Act.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to their actual and

treble damages, as well as recovery of possession of their mortgaged properties.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

Based upon the foregoing, this Court must grant the following relief:

A. Certification of the Class;

B. The appointment of Plaintiff as class representative;

C. The appointment of Plaintiff’s counsel as the Class counsel;

D. Injunctive relief enjoining the Chase Bank and/or successor in interest

from engaging in the unlawful conduct described herein during the

pendency of this trial;

E. Declaratory relief as to the unlawful conduct described herein by

Chase Bank and/or successor in interest and to FRB and the OCC to

compel the immediate determination and award of the financial injury


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or harm caused by Chase Bank and/or its successor in interest to Class

Members;

F. Returning to the possession of Plaintiff and the Class Members all

mortgaged properties so wrongfully obtained by Chase Bank and/or

successor in interest and awarding to Plaintiff and the Class Members

actual, exemplary, punitive, economic, non-economic and treble

damages sustained;

G. Voiding all Chase Bank foreclosure sales of WAMU loans pursuant to

the Foreclosure Act based upon the precedent of Kim, supra, and the

facts set forth herein;

H. Chase Bank and/or successor in interest Sheriff Deeds as slander of

title and awarding damages in connection with such slander of not less

than $100 Million;

I. Awarding damages of not less than $100 Million for Chase Bank

and/or its successor in interest violations of the FDCA as set forth

herein;

J. Awarding damages of not less than $100 Million for Chase Bank

and/or its successor in interest fraud as set forth herein;

K. Compensatory damages for the Class to be determined at trial but not

less than $100 Million;

L. Exemplary damages to be determined at trial but not less than $300

Million;


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M. Punitive damages to be determined at trial but not less than $1.0

Billion;

N. Treble damages of not less than $300 Million;

O. Disgorging the unjust enrichment of Chase Bank and/or its successor

in interest wrongful receipt of proceeds from payoffs and foreclosures

which were not valid in excess of $100 Million;

P. Awarding lost profits;

Q. Awarding all non-economic damages of any kind and/or nature;

R.

Awarding interest, costs and attorney’s fees so wrongfully incurred

and/or sustained both pre-filing and post filing;

S. Awarding all other damages of any kind and nature to which Plaintiff

and the Class Members are entitled; and,

T. Granting such other relief as is equitable, just, proper and appropriate

under the circumstances.

VERIFICATION

The foregoing is true and accurate to the best of my information, knowledge andbelief.

/s/ Therese DickowTherese Dickow

Subscribed and sworn to before meon this 24th day of January, 2012

/s/Harvey D. MoorerHarvey D. Moorer, Notary PublicOakland County, MIMy commission expires: 1/4/2014


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Respectfully submitted,

WOLFE LAW GROUP, PLLC

By: /s/Jack B. Wolfe

JACK B. WOLFE (P39667)Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class24901 Northwestern Hwy, Suite 212Southfield, Michigan 48075(248) 809-2205(w); (248)809-9969(f)(248) 229-1187 (m1)(248) 228-6307 (m2)[email protected]

Dated: January 24, 2012

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a jury trial.Respectfully submitted,

WOLFE LAW GROUP, PLLC

By: /s/Jack B. WolfeJACK B. WOLFE (P39667)Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Class24901 Northwestern Hwy, Suite 212Southfield, Michigan 48075(248) 809-2205(w)

(248) 809-9969(f)(248) 229-1187 (m1)(248) 228-6307 (m2)[email protected]

Dated: January 24, 2012


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EXHIBIT LIST

A Independent Foreclosure Review (“IFR”)

B Purchase and Assumption Agreement between FDIC and Chase Bank

C Case Law Euihyung Kim and In Sook Kim v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 302528

(January 12, 2012)

D Warranty Deed

E Mortgage

F Note

G Recorded Sheriff ’s Deed and all accompanying attachments

H First Publication

I Oakland County Public Records Report

J FDIC Affidavit

K Adjournment Affidavits

L Evidence of Grievance

M Bankruptcy Docket Entry for Mrs. Dickow

N Responsive Pleadings to Eviction Complaint

O District Court Register of Actions

P Notice of Hearing and Proof of Service (District Court)

Q Transcript (District Court)

R Appellate Transcript

S Motion for Reconsideration to Appellate Court

T Written Opinion and Order on Recon Motion / Appellate Court

U Bankruptcy Docket Entry for Mr. Dickow

V Completed IFR, and confirming Letter that IFR has been received by FBR and OCC

W Motion to set aside dismissal in Appellate Court based upon Kim, supr a


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Dickow Class w

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