Dialogue and Urbanism

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DIALOGUE AND URBANISM:ON BUBER, NAESS, SPINOZA AND

THE QUESTION OF DIVERSITY

Hune E. Margulies

The Problem of Diversity

Does the concept of diversity, in particular, as found in the discourse of ecological thought, itsprotection and legitimacy, apply to areas other than biology and the physical sciences? If, asArne Naess argues, deep ecology is a broader civilization concept, one with implications intoall realms of our culture, we might argue that urbanists might be well advised to examine theurban-bound implications of diversity, in particular, the more ethically challenging spatialimplications the concept of diversity assumes when applied to the realm of urban society."Deep Ecology" is a concept coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. It refers to thebelief that the fundamental roots of the ecological problems we face, lie not merely inparticular development practices or inadequate technologies, (the strictly environmentalparadigm) but rather essentially, in the structure of society and in the cultures that support

it. Deep ecology, as a movement, sets out to define specific policy proposals for the treatmentof "nature." As a critique of culture, ecological theory attempts to pierce through the shallowlayers of our civilization and delve deep into the roots of humanitys fundamental ethicalattitudes towards life in the cosmos. There is no easy definition of the concept of deep ecologyor Ecosophy, but one may attempt to define it as a philosophy seeking to understand andprescribe a relationship towards nature predicated upon the ethical model of dialogue.Ecology cherishes diversity for its own sake, its protection and encouragement are values inthemselves. The term "Nature" as used by Naess in his interpretation of Spinoza refers to thewhole of existence; not only to what in common parlance is referred to as the "country-side."In addition to Spinoza, deep ecologys principles are rooted in the ethical visions of

philosophers as disparate as Kant and Buber. The term dialogue will be defined in accordanceto Bubers definitions.

The issue then is diversity, diversity at the macro level of the cosmos or nature, and diversityat the micro level of pluralistic cities and social institutions.

I will attempt to build an argument based on Naesses premise that diversity is a broadcultural construct. I will argue that if the concept of diversity represents a civilizationconcept, it must be tested for its pragmatic applications in urban policy. I argue that in thefield of social policy, the concept of diversity begets the issue of the social equivalents tonatural habitats, namely, cultural-spatial enclaves. I will introduce the concept of the

continuum culture-ethnicity-territory, and argue that for the sake of the preservation ofcultural diversity, urban theory must either acquiesce or straightforwardly encourage theestablishment of carved-out-enclave territories assigned to particular ethnic-culturalgroupings within the cities. Furthermore, I argue that an enclave, in order to constitute trueterritorial space, must exhibit an urban morphology of residential housing and a minimum of


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economic self-gestion. All this presents us with serious ethical dilemmas. I will arguehowever, that the concept of diversity, as found in ecological discourse, and when modified bysome key concepts found in social philosophy, can successfully offer a model that partiallyresolves those ethical dilemmas by offering a positive urban vision of diversity within unity.

In short, the concept of diversity has spatial and housing policy implications in the realm ofthe urban sphere. With the aid of concepts extracted form Naess and others I will attempt toshow that the vision of urban communitas is not merely an utopia, but to the contrary, as

much of utopia has always been, its structures and foundations are already in place to befound in the modern multi-and-poli-everything-western cities.

We can distinguish two dimensions of diversity: Physical and human. The physical dimensionis clearly preoccupied with the protection of vital physical conditions for the preservation ofanimal and vegetation species. Ecological thought seems to have successfully articulated twokey issues concerning physical diversity: what it is we need to protect? and what areappropriate policy goals to accomplish that. We generally agree that physical diversity impliesthe protection of the integrity of habitats. The non disturbing of geographically markedterritories, with all their existing natural resources and systems, is one key proposal of

environmental policy. When switching the focus onto the human dimension of diversityhowever, the key conceptual analysis becomes a bit more blurry, and substantially less clearcut. For instance: what kind of human diversity do we wish to protect, and what specificpolicies should we pursue to accomplish that goal. Are racial, ethnic or national traitslegitimate components of a diverse system in human society? If so, how do we preserve theracial integrity of a human group? National implications of diversity seems less problematic:we protect national rights of self determination and oppose colonialism and imperialism.However, can those same concepts extend to race, and suggest that in order to protect racialdiversity, we must oppose their physical and/or residential mixing? Should urban policy, inorder to confront colonial penetration, assign controlled areas to each race separately? Theright to protect and preserve a culture seems acceptable to the core of environmentaladvocates. Wouldnt we then be compelled to accept that the preservation of culturesrequires also the assignment of spatial territories of their own?

Cultures have historically emerged form the interaction of particular ethnic groups withinterritories over which they exercised some modicum of sovereign control. We can argue thatdisturbing a culture form its ethnic and territorial basis, risks the dismantling and abolition ofthat culture. Ethical dilemmas boldly emerge from this analysis. Where do we draw the linebetween diversity and segregation, between particularism and racialism?

To understand this question better, lets examine the perceived uses of human habitats.

What are territorial enclaves needed for? Generally speaking we can identify four distinct butinterrelated uses for territories in social policy. 1. A territory offers the ruler (whoever andwhatever that may be) the ability to control culturally meaningful behavior. 2. A territory, inthe past, offered the rulers the ability to control cultural policy, that is, the flow of informationand semiotic values. 3. A territory offers the ruler the ability to control the physical assets ofthe land and population. 4. A territory offers the community (away from the ruler now) theability to create intentional societies based on spatial propinquity. (The Hasidics for instance.)As mentioned above, for a territory to become an enclave, it must have a housing-residentialcomponent of strong demographic density. Without housing, the territory is emptied of aclear cultural-ethnic majority, and the cultural preservation task is non-accomplishable.Later in this paper we will look at some particular examples.

To broaden the meaningfulness of the concept of diversity, Naess utilizes various conceptsextracted form Spinoza. This combination of Naess and Spinoza is particularly fascinating.Spinoza has always held interest for environmental oriented thinkers. His God or Nature(Deus sive Nature) intrigued those who believed in the biblical mandate to tend and protect


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the earth. As Naess writes in Spinoza And The deep Ecology Movement, "The deteriorationof life conditions on earth has motivated many people to take up the philosophical andreligious basis for their action in favor of the preservation of the richness and diversity of lifeon earth" (pg.2) The confluence of theology, ethics and ecology has been called TheologicalEcology. In my view, one earlier version of ecological theology can be found in the work of theJewish theologian, A. J. Heschel. Heschel, in his book The Sabbath, renders a poeticdescription of the spiritual and the political meaning of the category of the "holy" whenascribed to "time" (the day of the Sabbath) as opposed to space. Spinoza, however, brings a

different dimension to the concept of religiosity and Godness, one that Naess findsparticularly satisfying for a philosophy of deep ecology.

In Spinoza And The Deep Ecology Movement, Naess claims that one of the inspiring aspectsof Spinozas Ethics is that "it outlines a total view. It outlines the ultimate premises in ourthinking about ourselves and the greater reality we are part of" (pg. 1) In this paragraph,Naess underlines two different themes. The first is the totalizing perspective of Spinozasphilosophy. This is consonant with our previous claim that for Naess, diversity, represents abroader cultural construct. The second theme is Spinozas view that places humans within agreater reality, a more encompassing cosmos within which ultimate meaning obtains. In a

sense all religiously oriented thinkers have always claimed that man belongs in a greaterscheme of reality. Spinozas innovation however lies in the fact that for Spinoza, that greaterscheme of reality lies not in the transcendent realm of non-mater, but in the immanent realmof nature. For Spinoza all of reality is one single substance, it is God and it is Nature. Spinozathen called for the beatific vision of an all encompassing love of God-Nature.

When Spinoza utilizes the concept of love of God, the intuitive response of the reader is totranslate that into love of nature, God and nature being one and the same thing. It is obviousthought that a term such as "love" is wide open to alternative interpretations. For instance, intraditional religions, the love of God was defined through pre-established religious cannons.Prayer, good deeds and devotional rituals where normally associated with behavior investedwith the love of God. It seems rather difficult to simply transpose that kind of religiousattitude towards nature. We cant, for instance, according to Spinoza, pray to nature. Spinoza,deeply steeped in the critique of paganism of his Jewish background, ridiculed teleologicalbeliefs and insisted that we should expect no retribution other than the love of nature itself.Like Naess writes, "When I contemplate the life of Spinoza I have a suspicion that he nevercompletely gave up his Jewish faith, the transcendent God he loved in his youth" (pg. 4) Theclosest thing to devotional behavior in Spinoza is his intellectual contemplation of divinity innature. Good deeds is a different thing altogether: what sort of behavior is then appropriatefor those who believe in God-Nature and proclaim a system leading man to the ultimaterealization of true love of God?

According to Naess, an intimation of ecological thought appears in Spinozas concept that theidentity of God with Nature is expressed in the affirmation that God is actually present in,and expresses "himself" through each existing being. God is not present as an outside entityentering the inside being of a separate entity, but as a constitutive part of that thing itself. Inother words, the identity of god and nature is not merely an abstract intellectual constructbut a practical systemic assumption of the Spinozistic system of love. Naess writes "TheEthics furnishes no basis for assuming that the immanent God expresses its nature, essenceor power (all key Spinozian concepts) in any other way other than through each existingbeing" (pg. 5) The implications of this are very important. For Spinoza, the practical

implications of loving God are manifested in a relational attitude towards nature, not just in adevotional, heavens-bound religiosity. For Spinoza nature is a Thou, not an It. (See below) InNaesses words: "Therefore, Amor Intellectualis Dei must somehow be a love of theseexisting particular beings of our everyday life-parts of the total richness and diversity of lifeforms on earth." (Pg. 5) Later "Love of the immanent God, is love of Gods expression. If a


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being expresses Gods nature or essence, love of God cannot be different form love of such abeing" (pg. 6) But is that love of God, for Spinoza, also a call for preservation and protection ofdiversity for its own sake? Did Spinoza carry his argument to that political conclusion? Theanswer is not clear.

Naess makes the point that for Spinoza, the immanent presence of God in nature is actuallythe presence of Gods power, essence or nature in that being. Power and essence are theforms by which God expresses itself. In mystical kabalah, God is also said to be present in

nature, but the form of that presence is more abstract and "spiritual." In Kabalah, God ispresent in the form of "seeds of Holiness" that must actually be released from their naturalencapsulation. In Spinoza, God is present thorough its own nature and therefore is not apartfrom, but is a part of, and the same as nature. As Naess puts it " God is not apart from Godsexpressions" (pg. 6) Naess again states the conclusion that "In light of the aboveargumentation, the Intellectualis Amor Dei may be interpreted as Loving understanding ofparticular beings." Without dwelling on the meaning of the term "loving understanding," butrather focusing on the "particular beings" issue, we can discern here the foundations uponwhich to build a review of the implications of Spinozas philosophy for deep ecology and, asdiscussed above, by extension, for urban policy as well.

For Spinoza, the highest virtue is the intellectual love of God. Love in accordance to reason.Reason is the antidote to natural impulse. Natural inclinations are beyond mans efficientcontrol, therefore, man cannot be truly and deeply free unless it lives its life in accordance tothe dictates and rules of a well developed reason. Reason breaks man free from the chains ofnatural causation. For Spinoza, his Ethics provided the programme capable of achieving theelevation of reason above impulse.

Can we then stake the claim that the goals of Naesses deep ecology are in accordance withSpinozas premises? Naess writes "The philosophical aim of the deep ecology movement, as Isee it, may be formulated in a way no different from that of Spinoza when he speaks about

God or nature and the role of particulars" Again the issue of particulars, the quandary ofdiversity. Spinoza was not, to our knowledge a vegetarian, nor he opposed the industrial useof nature. Naess recognized that Spinozas Ethics cannot be easily translated into concretepolicy formulations, such as the ones we are trying to elucidate. Naess writes "The Ethicsdoes not go into politics, but does express views on community." (Pg11) It is important thatNaess sees Spinoza as establishing views on the issue of community. This is particularly sobecause I argue that are precisely those views on community that render Spinoza valuablefor our analysis of diversity and urbanism. To be more specific, Spinozas views oncommunity, when modified and contrasted with key concepts from other philosophers ofcommunity such as Martin Buber, constitute a good basis upon which to resolve the ethical

dilemmas of diversity in urban space. (See below)

This divergence between specific policies, such as those advocated by Naess and the deepecology movement, and philosophical formulations found in Spinoza, might actually be thedifference in the way in which we, in our time, and under the environmental circumstanceswe came to know, might wish to interpret Spinozas premises. We may want to make theintellectual jump and assume that Spinoza himself, under these same conditions, and knowingwhat we know today, would have interpreted his own philosophy in the specific policy termsof deep ecology. How could he have not we may ask? The love of particulars after all impliestheir preservation and care. Had Spinoza known the dangers poised to nature by uncontrolledindustrial growth he might have concluded as Naess has, and interpreted his principles in asimilar vein. As Naess rightly states "I mention this (Spinozas concepts) only as an exampleof how one may, if one has a special liking and respect for Spinoza, enjoy even remoterelatedness of conceptions" (pg. 11) In short, Spinoza serves the deep ecology movement as aheuristic tool. But herein lies his greatness. A great philosopher is one that provides premises


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that while not being immutable, are nonetheless eternal. We can, with some modifications,base an ecological philosophy and an urban policy on Spinoza. Like Naess wrote "Whichphilosopher of the past deserves to be called great?.. One indicator is that of beingrediscovered and highly appreciated by successive generations of philosophers. Anotherindicator is the persistent richness and diversity of interpretations of their texts. Spinozascores brilliantly in both ways". (Pg1)

As I stated above, I will attempt to combine some of Naesses Spinoza with other

philosophers of community and outline a philosophical basis for the understanding of the issueof diversity in urbanism. Following this I will provide some concrete samples of ethicaldilemmas raised by the issue of spatial policy in the national and urban spheres and as aconclusion I will suggest one sample of relative communal success in the application of therules of spatial propinquity in the modern western city.

Philosophical foundations

As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, Naesses interpretation of Spinoza becomes the

more relevant and meaningful when modified through a combination of philosophical theories.In this chapter I will attempt to show how Spinoza can be interpreted and justified through areading of Buber and other philosophers of encounter and community.

The philosophical dimensions of ecological theory, in particular, ethics, offer fascinating policyimplications in the areas of urbanism, cultural policy, ethnic and race relations, class analysisand environmentalism. In particular, some aspects of ecological ethics, can help us re-evaluate the validity and legitimacy of what I refer to as the "continuum territory-ethnicity-culture." Ultimately, ethics is the study ofinter-relationships, that is, behavior towards the"other" and the principles that inform it. Ecological ethics deals with interactions at twolevels: Interpersonal and Environmental.

Briefly stated, there are three ethical paradigms of relevance in the context of Spinoza, Buberand ecological ethics. These paradigms are identified in accordance with whats perceived tobe their central grounding, or the main justificatory principle animating the ethicalperspective. The three paradigms I identify areMonism,Dualism and Utilitarianism.

The importance of Monism in the context of this analysis is that Spinoza was considered aMonist. A monist perspective tends to identify selfwith nature. For a monist, the whole ofbeing is one. The one being is encompassed within the realm of one single substance. Thereare various degrees of exactness to this. For some monists, the unity of being is manifested

not necessarily in ontological terms, but mainly in ecological, or mutual dependency terms. Inmonism, the ethical treatment of nature is not a separate category from the ethical treatmentof man and vice-versa. Whatever ethical principles apply to man, apply to nature as well. It isin this sense that Naess finds Spinoza, the philosopher of the love of nature, to be particularlyrelevant to the deep ecology movement. I will argue later that Bubers realm of "thebetween", offers a novel approach to the dilemma of monism versus dualism. One realmwhich is neither, but which encompasses and transcends both.

In contrast, a dualist posits a clear categorical distinction between the substance of nature,within which mans corporeality falls, and the nature of the soul, or the immaterial essence ofman. As with monism, dualism varies in degrees of exactness. If Spinoza is the principal

monist, Descartes is the main figure representing the dualist perspective. As the soul is for adualist, hierarchically speaking, above nature, the ethical concerns of man do not coincidewith those of nature. The interesting part is that from a dualist perspective one may arrive atthe same ethical implications as those of monism, though from the opposite end: A dualistmay espouse an ethic of detachment from nature, which in practical terms may result in the


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same policy implications vis a vis nature and the environment as that of monism. The entireethical implications of monism need to be properly worked out. Spinozas monism included afunctional distinction between matters of soul and matters of matter, despite there beingboth different attributes of the one, single, all encompassing substance.

Utilitarianism is a more conventional view of ethics, and in it, the major concern is with themaximization of benefits from the utilization, or the lack of utilization of nature. Utilitarians,depending on their view of the material capacities of nature and sustainable development,

may find themselves in any policy end of the debate. Oftentimes, the ethical structure ofecological thought is casted in terms of anthropocentrism versus biocentrism. This distinctionis very important because its deep seated meaning collapses in front of Spinozas monisticconceptualizations. It is my contention that anthropocentrists and biocentrists are found ineach of the previous three models. In other words, anthropocentrism and biocentrism are notsufficient grounding categories for a consistent ethical theory.

The term "Dialogue" as used in this paper, resembles Bubers conceptualizations. Buberscategories of I-Thou and I-It can assume, in my view, a central role in deep ecology ethics,particularly, when mediated through Naesses Spinoza. Ecological ethics is the ethics of

dialogue. (Dialogical principles in the practice of city planning have also been explored byJohn Friedmann. In particular, Friedmann deals with issues of planning processes, and thenegotiated decision making procedures between government and clients.) In Bubers terms,there are two basic attitudinal categories with regards to the other: I-Thou and I-It. The firstset is the I-It attitude. An It is generally an object serving a specified utilitarian goal orpurpose of the user. In contrast, a Thou refers to a fully open, non-manipulative, andreciprocal relationship. According to Buber, both the isolated I and the massified-We, areillusory categories of identity. There is only the I of the I-Thou or I-It pair. In Bubers terms,the I of the I-Thou continuum constitutes the higher level of ethical relationships. In practicalterms, no human society can survive without the "It", but it is only within the I-Thou dyadthat the I emerges as genuine person. Personhood, or identity, emerges only from within thecontext of relational-behavior. In ecological ethics, identity is defined in terms of the relationand attitude towards nature, that is, the ethical confirmation of nature constitutes identity,and there can be no "selfhood" outside of dialogue with nature. Dialogue is the categoricalopposite of reification, manipulation, exploitation.

In Bubers terms there are three levels for dialogue and two basic inter-relational attitudes:The levels of dialogue are between man and nature, between man and man, and betweenman and God. The two relational postures are I-Thou and I-It. All dialogue centers aroundmans attitude towards the "other". Dialogue requires a form of paradoxical intentionality andreciprocity. This issue goes to the core of Spinozas contention that love of nature does not

imply reciprocal love from nature. We can draw a parallel between Bubers Thou andSpinozas love of nature.

Non-humans do posses a capacity to reciprocate (in their own way), but lack the ability ofconscious dialogicalintentionality in the rational sense of the term. It is mans duty then, asis his vocation and reward, to be called upon to assume the entire responsibility for thatrelationship. In this model, responsibility connotes not only the duty to protect and preserve,but in essence, it is a general attitude, or borrowing Deweys term, an "orientation" towardsnature that holds the promise of what in deep ecology is referred to as "self realization." FromBubers perspective, self realization can only be attained through self-transcendence. That is,to the extent that the self is oriented, not inwards, but dialogically towards the other, itbecomes possible for the I to attain true ontological identity. The I, apart form the I of the I-Thou dyad (or of the I-It dyad, but in a different sense) can not be said to posses ontologicalreality. This represents the deep meaning of the concept of dialogue. This argument stronglysupports the claims of deep ecology with respect to mans attitude towards nature. In Victor


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Frankls terms, "human existence -at least as long as it has not been neurotically distorted- isalways directed to something, or someone other than itself-be it a meaning to fulfill oranother human being to encounter lovingly...What is called "self-actualization" is ultimatelyan effect, the unintentional by-product, of "self transcendence." Some criticisms to theconcept of self-realization in ecological ethics have been raised. Particularly, deep ecologysemphasis on the isolated "self," a predicate which does not account for the fact that "selves"are constructions in the wider context of cultural practices. Deep ecology seems at times to beworking out of a Cartesian notion of autonomous selves. Some have also raised the issue of

identity in the context of urban form and the subconscious paradigms that underlie much ofcity form and design. Martin Buber proposed a different paradigm of personhood. For Buber,both the I and the We are illusory constructs. The I can only emerge in the context of adyadic relationship. For Buber, there is no meaning to the term I outside of the dyadicrelationship. This derivation of identity from within relational situations, provides a moreadequate model for the ecological model of identity. In this same vein, A. J. Heschel, in theSabbath, writes that while in the western world the task has been to know oneself, theBiblical call was to know God first. (Contrast for instance the title of one of Rollo Mays books"Mans Search for Himself" with one of Heschels "Man in Search of God.") V. Frankl refers tothis when he remarks that the derivation of self identity results from an act of self-

transcendence. In general, we can say that the intellectual task for deep ecology is toincorporate an ethics of self realization through dialogue.

There is a sense, however, in which dialogue is fully realizable without consciousintentionality. Buber speaks of the act of "grace", or more precisely, the fact thatintentionality in the approach to the other bears the danger of suspending the non-utilitarianrequirement of the genuine-dialogical encounter. One of deep ecologys main tenets is also therejection of strict utilitarian views of nature. Buber is attempting to establish the conditionsunder which non-utilitarianism is possible. From this perspective Buber contributes to thegeneral principles of deep ecology. Genuine dialogue, writes Buber, cannot be generated ifpreceded by willful intention. In Naesss words, "Intentions are objectivations of purposesbefore they are realized" It is precisely the elimination of objectivations, or reification thatBuber sees as the hallmark of the dialogical encounter. The act, or the moment of dialogue,cannot be pre-planned or sought after. It is an event of grace. From this discussion we cansay that the reference to intentionality in the context of dialogue, must be understood toallude to the overall-life-orientation of man towards others. Life must be lived in such amanner, perennially oriented and opened towards the other, so as to meritand be ready forthe receipt of the grace that is dialogue. Dialogue, like Spinozas love of nature, is its ownreward. In this regard, Frankl added, "We have said that religion is genuine only where it isexistential...now, we have seen that the existentiality of religiousness has to be matched byits spontaneity...Intentionality would thwart the effect.." It is in this sense that the

relationship man-nature is the more profoundly open to dialogical realization. It is also thisaspect of dialogue that is at the center of ecological thought. The issue then is to reassess therelationship towards nature as constituting a radically more profound dialogue between manand nature, beyond the mere recreational, observational or even preservationist stands.

When Naess attempts to derive an ecological politics out of Spinoza, he refers specifically tothe way in which Spinoza derives his conception of love of nature. The ethics that derivesfrom identifying God with Nature, coupled with the imperative to, above all, seek knowledgeof Nature-God, a knowledge which in turns is identified with the act of loving, implied, forSpinoza, an excruciatingly set of specific behavioral and political imperatives, most noticeably

in the areas of community imperatives. (Particularly parts IV and V of the Ethics, andSpinozas earlier works, which derived its political principles, partially, from his underlyingmetaphysics.) In Spinozas terms, God and Nature are one and the same (Deus sive Natura).For Spinoza, there are three kinds of knowledge: Opinions, Rationality and Intuition.According to Naess, Intuition represents the highest kind of knowledge. Intuition is equated


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with love of God-Nature. Naess writes "One may say that the understanding love of God, andthe third (intuitive) way of cognition, concentrates on the content of reality, not its abstractstructure" (pg.6) What that means is that love of nature implies a concrete existentialrelationship towards nature, one that flows from a deeper realm of intellectual consciousness.Furthermore, Nature is described as possessing two intrinsic and parallel qualities: Natura-Naturans, which is the creative flow operating within the essence of nature, and Natura-Naturata, that is, nature as begotten or created. As Naess writes, these two aspects are nottemporally apart. Creation and created are one and the same event. For Spinoza, knowledge

is the act of love "sub species Aeternitatis," from the perspective of eternity. The kind ofknowledge that obtains from the act of love is a clear, distinct and immediate intuitiveapprehension of the meaning of reality. When placed within the context of ecological ethics,Spinozas Love is the equivalent of Bubers Thou. The Love of God is the love of and withinnature.

For Buber too, the Dialogical attitude translated into political formulations. Buber, influencedby the anarchist Landauer, developed a clear political programme also derived from hismetaphysics. The dialogical aspects of ecological theory find a basis in Kants imperative totreat each individual always as an end, never as a means or as a tool. This Kantian principle

was later modified and developed by Martin Buber in his theory of Dialogue.

An interesting connection can be made here between some of the concepts developed aboveand Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein wrote thatEthics andAesthetics are one and the same thing.Inasmuch as both concepts refer to a certain form of intentional relationship towards the"other," it is fitting to say that both are but different aspects of the same reality. Withoutengaging in a thorough discussion on the Tractatus, some commentators have argued thatwhat Wittgenstein actually meant was that ethics and aesthetics are the same in that theyboth belong to the realm of the silent. Silence can also be viewed as a form of non-active-intentionality in the same vein as Bubers dialogue. Different readings of the earlyWittgenstein have been offered in this regards. The reading I follow is that Wittgensteinsviews were not only related to philosophy of language but had a metaphysical component aswell. Particularly, Wittgensteins use of Spinozas termSub Species Aeternitatis in connectionwith the sameness of aesthetics and ethics reinforces the view that for Wittgenstein, theconnection between the two was Spinozian in essence.

Buber worked through a category that Spinoza rejects: the Transcendent. Bubers Thou isonly an intermediate step. Beyond the Thou there is the "Eternal Thou", that is God. Spinozaplaced God not beyond, but within nature. This distinction between immanence andtranscendence represents the major philosophical point of departure between Spinoza andBuber. However, It can be argued, that it is only within the framework of the ethical attitudes

of ecology that their philosophies merge in a commonality ofpoliticalimplications.

Although theology can contribute to the concept of deep ecology, the ecological model at playis not theology but Spinozas monism. Spinozas monism is a profoundly secular (non-theistic)-spirituality where God and Nature are identified as one and the same substance. Itis precisely within this secular context that, following Arne Naess, a strong foundation forecological ethics can be established in the philosophy of Spinoza. Spinozas monism representsthe first and most thorough attempt to theorize the relationship between a monisticconception of nature and the ethical imperatives derived thereof. I will further argue that it isin this particular field of ethical-ecology that other philosophies of the "other" (besidephilosophies of dialogue, such as Bubers) find full political expression. In particular, Imreferring to the philosophies of Levinas as well as elements of Whiteheads Processphilosophy. As mentioned above, it is within the realm of ecology that a "unified field" getsestablished and the manifold contributions of Spinoza and Buber, Levinas and Whitehead,Wittgenstein, Frankl and Kant, meet, interact, and bear fruit in the form of critical


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approaches to ecological policy.

Ethnic rights. Social Macro Diversity

The implications of diversity in the social realm are various. I will argue in this chapter thatthe concept of diversity, when applied to the broad ethnic and national realms, results in verydifficult ethical dilemmas. For a study of ethnic rights two basic ecological-ethical concepts are

particularly useful: inherent rights and pragmatism. An ecological ethics based on theconcepts of inherent rights is the extension of the concept of ethnic-primordiality. Theconcept of inherent rights creates a whole set of urban planning-ethical problems, inparticular when dealing with the continuum of culture-territory and ethnicity. The ecologicalethics based on the concept of pragmatism offers a more useful paradigm in that the focusshifts from group politics per-se to a meta discourse of rights anteceding the politics of grouprights.

The rights referred to above are those attached to claims of cultural primordiality. There aretwo ways to understand the concept of culture: the restricted one identifies culture mainly

with the arts and crafts (painting, music, theater and other forms of belle arts.) The moreencompassing view of culture views it as a form of collective, deeply ingrained, generalizedpsychological attitude towards life, something akin to a way of life, a weltanschaung. Thelater, more anthropological sense of the term, views culture as a group phenomena.. Culturetherefore is imbued with group rights. Aesthetics, broadly defined, refers to the constructionand derivation of meanings from objects and activities. From the perspective of culturaltheory, the differences in socialized-aesthetic practice, the type of objects selected, and thecollective manner of meaning derivation, all represent that which constitutes the definingcharacter of particularized, i.e., national cultures.

The intentional relationship to objects (aesthetics) acquires political significance when

contextualized within the framework of a theory of culture. In a sense, aesthetics is a deeplyethical event, for it ascribes intentional value-categories to behavior between persons andobjects broadly defined (form territory, to crafts, music, etc.) Cultural policy, that is, officialstate policy towards cultural institutions and practices, as well as unofficial or private culturalpolicy, play a significant role within ecological theory. From this discussion it becomesapparent how the issue of diversity and the preservation of particularities is one of the majorchallenges faced by planners of cultural policy.

We can argue that ethical discourse is embedded within cultural contexts from which itderives its meaning. This isnt full blown relativism yet. To understand this particular aspect

of the connection between culture and ethics, we should consider what I call the continuumbetween Territory, Ethnicity and Culture. According to this paradigm, cultures havehistorically emerged from the interaction between a certain ethnic grouping and a specificbounded territory over which the ethnic polity exercised some form of sovereign control. Thepolitical status of the bounded territory, its actual borders and ethnic composition evolvedthrough history, its character shifted, changed and churned through several historicaltransformations arriving at what is today the modern nation-state. Ethnic groups, like spaces,have also shifted and turned. The debate whether ethnicities are primordial or constructedseems to be settling on the constructed hypothesis.

To produce a culture, a three dimensional intentional relationship must operate between thegroup members as a whole, the space they inhabit, and their evolved ethnicity. This isreferred to as nationalor ethnic culture. Spaces are essential constituents of culture. Urbanplanning must answer whether it can or it should work out separate spaces for separatecultures.


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The reconstitution, reshuffling and mixing of ethnicities, territories and cultures occurring insome of the major cities in the Western world renders this traditional continuum paradigmquestionable. Cyberspace, telematics, super-fast transfer of information, globalized ecologicalproblems, the migratory patterns of peoples, technologies and objects, the mixing ofethnicities, the carving out in the urban realm of ethnic-cultural enclaves, enclaves whichhappen to coincide with demarcations along class lines, and other sociological phenomenataking place in these new poly-cultural, poly-ethnic cities, hold the potential (or to some, thethreat) to break-down the "biological" foundations of group culture. This breakdown will also

occur indirectly through the weakening of the racial element in the composition of ethnicitiesthat is presently taking place in the pluralistic urban realm. Ethnicity in the urban realm isadopting more a cultural and class status, and less of a racial meaning. In positive terms, thepotential and the promise are to be found in a new culture based on principles other thanblood, spatial-statism and exclusionary-narrow traditions.

To tackle the territorial dimensions of the ethics of diversity in more depth, we shouldconsider the following two issues related to ethnicity and multi-culturalism: Deep ecologyargues that all collective forms of cultural differentiation are imbued with inherent value andmust be preserved against global homogenization. Granted this, and in light of the continuum

territory-ethnicity-culture, must it then follow, that each culture ought to demand the rightto demarcate exclusive spatial realms of their own? Obviously, the implications of theseissues for urbanism are very important. For instance, if political discourse obtains meaningonly within the context of the particular culture within which it operates, multi-cultural citieswould be advised, as Young suggests, to provide for spatial and legal recognition to selfconscious groups within the framework of a federalist and regionalist administrative scheme.According to this, this spatial arrangement only will be able to provide for a unified, efficientand profoundly democratic political system of governance (Young, 1984.) If democracyrequires a free discursive process, how can differing conceptions of freedom, both explicit andimplicit, and contrasting models of discourse, equally function, and operate with equality in ademocracy?

Ethnic Rights: Urban Micro Level

A similar analysis as the above can be applied to the more restricted realm of the urban. Theurban is a microcosm where similar social phenomena manifests itself. The consequences ofdiversity in the urban arena are, in a sense, and within its smaller scale, all the morepronounced. There are many spatial and political considerations as to how territorial enclavescan be properly incorporated into the physical planning of cities. It is essential to preventspatial policies from becoming tools for the segregation and exclusion of groups on the basis of

race or ethnicity. The demand to preserve cultural differences, when connected to spatialpolicies, bears conspicuous dangers for democratic theory and practice.

One example of a public policy approach to poly-ethnic cities was Mayor David Dinkinslikening New York City to a gorgeous mosaic. What the mayor had in mind was somethingquite benign: a pluralistic city of multiple colors, creeds, sounds, smells and choices, a citythat, when beholden as a whole, inspires a sense of beauty and awe to those withsympathetic, and aesthetically trained eyes. The mosaic image was deemed a more realisticmetaphor to the old ethnic melting pot vision. What the mosaic image also conveys however,is that each single piece, to preserve the integrity of the whole, must be restrained firmly

glued to its own pre-determined place in the mosaic, never mixing, nor cracking, nevercompromising its unique character, lest the shape of the composite as a whole becompromised. Sticking with metaphors, what the modern poly-and-multi-everythingwestern city resembles better than a mosaic, is one of those multi-color, camel drawn sandbottles one buys in the suq. Inside the bottle, over time and movement, the sand will mix,


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colors and figures will change, and the overall design will evolve into multifarious shape-cocktails. However, despite its ever-changing inner shapes and forms, the sands physicalmake up and its outer-limits of expansion remain constant and bounded within the confinesof the glass-bottle. Confining as it might be, the bounding bottle is made out of glass, clear andtransparent to the outside and the inside. The image is this: The city needs to simultaneouslyevolve and preserve, to confine and remain open, to create community and staunchly protectthe individual, to offer spatial enclaves and remain united.

Multi-ethnic and multi-cultural cities therefore must make hard choices regarding theterritorial rights and prerogatives afforded to citizens claiming the right to preserve theirparticular group-cultural content. Culture, apart from territory and ethnicity, in and by itself,constitutes a major category of differentiation. Potentially, culture can also serve as a tool forsegregation and oppression. But if the case is that culture emerges from within the context ofspecified territories and identified ethnicities, it seems then fully justified for self-consciousgroups to segregate themselves, territorially, culturally, and socially form the rest of overallsociety. On the one hand we fear segregationist outcomes, on the other unfair colonialism.

The issue of difference is very important. Iris Young argues for a politics of difference where

group interests and rights be granted antecedent privileges over that of either atomizedindividuals or the amorphous homogeneous collective. The dilemmas resulting from thatpolitics of difference are various. On the one hand, allowing for functional cultural diversitycan easily result in substantial negative differences between groups, differences which mightinfluence the future outcomes of their respective social and economic status in society.However, to affirmatively promote equality by denying the rights to active particularity,might also be viewed as constituting a form of neo-colonialism instituted by dominant groupsdemanding assimilation of the "lower" cultures into the "higher" ones in power.

When culture is intentionally bonded to ethnicity, it is easy to see how cultural differencesmay evolve into ethnic or racial segregation. In the same vein, when culture and ethnicity are

bonded with territoriality, proto-apartheid spatial arrangements might potentially emerge.But when culture is associated with new non-racial ethnicities, group differences may bespared some of the negativity accompanying the politics of difference. The emergence of newethnicities, ethnicities not based on traditional components of common ancestral land, bloodor culture, provide a window of opportunity for the implementation of the positive sides ofthe politics of difference. Difference with equality is the vision of a proper harmoniousecological system.

In this context, and on the basis of the creation of new ethnicities and new identities in newterritories, we can argue that urban-ethnic enclaves, hold a promise and a danger. Cities that

are spatially separated along ethnic-cultural lines, are also divided along class lines whichroughly correspond. This may be by design or spontaneously. In fact, segregationist spatialarrangements can be official state policy or "natural" occurrences, that is, market responsesto prevalent social conditions in the city. How can we then justify ethnic enclavization whilesimultaneously expecting a unified, operationally effective city, a city that minimizesoppressive type differences? How can we accomplish a measure of economic justice (if such isdefined as equality of outcome vs. equality of resources) while at the same time, respectingand encouraging the diversity of constituent groups? In light of this, an issue for urban policyis whether ethnic enclaves, that is, ethnic cultures in ethnic territories, should be tolerated,encouraged or dismantled through affirmative housing policies. The ecological view seem toside with preservation of diversity not with its dismantling. It bears stating that diversitybased on injustice is not the type of diversity that deep ecology cherishes or tolerates.

Urban housing policy here is key. As culture and territory go hand in hand, housing policybecomes an arena for the struggles, dilemmas, promises and implementation of culturalpolicy. Demographic density guarantees a cultural (and ethnic) majority. Without a majority


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the local culture is in peril (see Tibets claims against the importation of ethnic Chinese intotheir territory)

The case of the Hasidic community, both in New York Jerusalem offer fascinating insightsinto the issues and the problematic of urban ethnic-cultural territorial enclaves.

All the contradictions, promises and dangers of spatial policies come clearly to the fore in thecase of Hasidics. Hasidics thrive in the framework of societies that are open, democratic and

pluralistic, all the while their internal societal structure is essentially totalitarian. Hasidicsneed a pluralistic society that tolerates non-pluralistic communities in their midst. In fact,pluralistic societies are more prone to grant full civic rights and tolerate the clustering ofethnic groups along identifiable demarcated spaces.

On the one hand, Hasidics are arguably the victims of exclusionary policies aimed at keepingthem apart. In spatially segregated New York City, Hasidics are excluded from many spacesand social contexts. However, thanks to the fact that spatial-exclusion represents the norm ofthe housing market in New York, Hasidics have succeeded in turning separateness around totheir own benefit. Hasidics claim the need for spatial propinquity and recognize the right of all

other groups to carve out a space of their own. They vehemently oppose any attempt,especially by the state, to forcibly intrude upon each others territories through fair housingand other affirmative housing policies. This last point is particularly poignant becauseHasidics actively seek government funding for their housing developments. Hasidics clearlyunderstand that the success of their attempt to establish territorial enclaves lies in theirability to build sufficient quantities of housing units within their neighborhoods for theexclusive benefit of their own adherents. Government funding though comes with stringsattached. A government funded housing project must, by statute, be open to all needypersons regardless of race. Hasidic housing projects are built and designed for Hasidics only.The issues of fair housing policies and regulations however are more complex than that.Hasidics exemplify the case of a community that under one reading represents a clear case of

an oppressed group, culturally different and spatially apart, but under a different reading,and by virtue of spatial policies, a group that becomes also a segregating society on their ownright.

To help further clarify these issues, a distinction must be made between what I callexclusionary and oppressive differences and between non-oppressive (though not necessarilyinclusionary) differences.

A free society may allow for the proliferation and free expression of ethnic and otherdifferences, and yet, affirmatively, promote and legislate inclusive policies. This occurs when

groups, despite their ethnic, cultural or other differences, equally participate in a higher levelstructural unity. By this I dont mean the "nation." Nationality is another problematiccategory within the scheme of urbanism. In fact, the concept of "nation" can adopt a positive,communitarian oriented meaning or a negative, nationalistic connotation. In ecology we find adistinction between nation and state. While the state is primarily an instrument of oppressionand suppression, a nation can become the locus for culture and the spirit ofcommunitarianism. This is important for an ecological ethics addressing the issue of how toaccommodate exclusivity with integration, territory with freedom, and ethnicity withhumanity.

The higher unity encompassing diversity can materialize through the institutionalization of

processes for open and reciprocal dialogue across groups. When dialogue across groupsoccurs, new common goals emerge, reinforcing unity by becoming new focal locuses or targetsfor dialogue. As Hilary Putnam once wrote, "The challenge of modern, multi-cultural societyis to preserve diversity while preserving communication" By focusing on the communicativeprocess as the tool for the preservation of diversity within unity, it is useful to incorporate


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elements of Habermass analysis as it applies to democratic planning processes. It is thecommunicative features of process, that is, the process of dialogue, which breaks down theexclusionary features of nationality and ethnic identity.

To clarify these matter even further, we can introduce an additional notional distinction.there are two types of political divisions: Spatial and Social (in its wider meaning.) There arethree types of social separation: intentional separations, voluntary separations, andinvoluntary exclusions. One theory concerning the positive aspect of non-oppressive

separation is shared by both, deep ecology and anarchist theory. Colin Ward wrote, "Theanarchist alternative is that of fragmentation, fission rather than fusion, diversity rather thanunity, a mass of societies rather than a mass society" Following this description, an intentionalsociety is a group of people who voluntarily chooses to demarcate a shared spatial realm inwhich to communally reside and/or work. This spatial separation is usually intended for thepurpose of advancing a "spiritual" or ideological goal, a goal that in the view of its members,requires the shared ownership of land, means of production, products, and other commonfunctions and institutions. These societies, despite their spatial dimensions, are, within reasonand practical ability, open to all who share their views, regardless of biological (race) or othernon-ideological determinants. In contrast to intentionality, voluntary societies, are those

established for the purpose of spatially joining groups who actively wish to exclude non-desirable others from their areas of residence and/or work. Voluntary societys exclusionarypolicies may not necessarily be racial in content. For the most part, class separationsconstitutes the major divide in this category. Religion, nationality, culture or any othercategory will do as well. Some categories, by definition, can never be fully inclusive, other,such as religion, or class, at least theoretically, could be. The last category, Involuntaryseparations, occur through exclusionary policies consciously designed to prevent others fromjoining a certain space, class or social group. While the excluding group is acting voluntarily,the excluded group is not. This last type is segregation and results in oppression andexploitation.

To begin to answer the question concerning the application of the concept of ecologicaldiversity to the urban realm, we might say that with the aid of anarchist and Buberianprinciples, the diversity that ecological theory can support is the first kind: intentionalseparations

What would then be the task of the ecologically minded multi-culturalist? Can we haveterritorial-cultural-ethnic diversity, allow for spatial policies of difference, and still guardagainst the dangers of apartheid? Can this be accomplished, and still not loose thecommunicative processes underlying democratic systems? The answer is not clear. Perhaps,the definition of race, taken as a social construct, will undergo mutations sufficient to

accommodate, transform itself, and emerge re-designed in the mold of the new multi-poly-everything cities of todays western world.

The issue of multi-culturalism, and to some extent the spatial consequences of ethnicdiversity, have been explored in many disciplines of inquiry (sociology, anthropology, etc.) Inthe introduction to "Culture, Globalization and the World System," A. King writes that"Appadurai...asks how people are drawn into world cultures and how, through technology andpeople, cultures become separated form territories." This is the process I refer to before asthe creation of new ethnicities and the emergence of culture independent from theirtraditional molding frameworks. King continues, "Hannerzs attention to the spatial orderingof cultures prompts important questions about the inherent social and spatial units throughwhich culture is organized: ethnicity, race, gender and class on one side, and theneighborhood, city, region, nation and the world on the other." The point of departure fortraditional urbanism was the ethnic enclave. Ethnic enclaves were conceived as mostlyintermediate economic and social structures of mutual support in the way to full assimilation


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within the larger society. (Portes, etc.) The new urbanism recognizes the role of territory andethnicity in the creation and reproduction of culture. In a sense, we can propose the followingmodel of ethnicity in the urban realm: In the beginning a foreign group in a foreign cityconstitutes a national group. Over time they become an ethnicity. At the later stages ofdevelopment they become an heritage group. National groups demand national rights, ethnicgroups civil rights, heritage groups, cultural rights. As national rights cannot be implementedwithin the scope of a foreign nation, the immediate focus shifts to civic rights, the right tovote, the right to equality and equal treatment under the law. Heritage rights are more soft

and find expression in collective endeavors such as ethnic social clubs, parades and othercultural affairs.

This clearly brings the topic of the relationship between territory and cultures to the pointwhere the issue of nationalism comes squarely to the fore. On page 151, King adds,"Boundaries are constantly being drawn round cultures and sub-cultures in terms of power,economic, political and social, territorial markers establish specific domains.." King raises herethe issue of the political uses of spatiality. Political uses, valid as they are in the context of thisanalysis, do not, by themselves, exhaust the issue of the relationship between theconstruction of cultures and the need for spatial boundaries. Immanuel Wallerstein, in the

same volume, (Pg. 94) writes, "My basic reason for an initial skepticism about the concept ofa world culture stems from the sense that defining a culture is a question of definingboundaries that are essentially political, boundaries of oppression and of defense againstoppression." That is precisely the point: boundaries are essentially political, but theimplication of the abolition of boundaries is not only political but cultural as well. Theecological demand to remain aware of and to preserve all natural and cultural diversity, hasadditional concrete effects on the ethnic, social and physical planning of cities.

Ecological thought must deal directly with these issues, because its basic intuition is topropose the abolition of the state, while simultaneously preserving national diversity.

The function and the role ofspace, in all its philosophical and cultural meanings, is undergoingsuch transformations that the creation of national cultures will need to rest on principlesother than territory and ethnicity. Changes in the concept of space should be noted byecological thought, especially when working out of Spinozas conception of space or extendedres. When borders are no longer defined by strictly physical markers, the role of the state, bynecessity, must also be reassessed. This new independence of culture from territory willpotentially render the state all but immaterial. The traditional role of the state as promoter,defender and regulator of culture will dissipate. The state as a whole becomes progressivelyirrelevant as more culture, and with it, group and personal identity, is created independentlyof state-institutional structures. In the long run, it is the anarchist vision embedded in deep-

ecology that appears poised to carry the day.

To be fully relevant, policy proposals of interest to deep-ecology must be divided into twoprimary areas of concern: Nature and Humans. In contrast to the more circumscribed scopeof the environmental or "Green" movements, deep ecology must seek to ascertain a role forecology within human affairs. Arne Naess wrote: "There is a tendency in the deep-ecologymovement to say, "Earth first" in the sense that we are more fond of nature than of people."The very essence of the ecological movement is that the distinction between human andnatural concerns is mostly a matter of semantics, admitting to no programmatic distinctions.(The emphasis here is on the abolition of distinctions as per pragmatic concerns only, not asregards to ontological distinctions. Deep ecology is not a "mystical system".) The intrinsicinterconnectedness and relationship between human society and natural elements must berecognized and cherished.

For instance, not only cultural-ethnic-enclaves, but also the need to limit the builtenvironments encroachments on green areas are urban policy consequences of the call to


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respect diversity. Many cities feel that limitation on growth results in their relegation toslower levels of economic development. Some cities claim that development is necessary toexpand their tax base, to retain the young populations returning from college, and to attractnew industries and businesses to their jurisdictions. The whole issue of environmental justice(Gelobter, 1988) in the urban settings, the arbitration between competing claims and theprioritization of urban policy is key to any effective ecological policy. Ecological policy, as itregards to the concern for people and nature, must deal with these issues to demonstratethat it is fully compatible with "sustainable" economic growth.

National rights. Territorial diversity

To some extent, and to move away from the more constricted urban scope, a similar analysisconcerning diversity and territories can be extended to the issue of nationality and nationalrights.

The national rights for Native Americans across the American continent, the claims ofTibetans vis a vis China, Catalans and Basques with regards to Spain, the Jewish national

movement prior to 1948, Palestinians towards Israel, and other such national and/or ethnicclaims represent the "foreign affairs" dimension of the poly-ethnic city dilemma.

There is a distinction to be made between national and ethnic rights, and a further distinctionbetween ethnic minorities residing within the territory of their own nation and those residingwithin the territorial boundaries of a foreign nation. (Yiftachel, 1993)

The case of Native Americans is perhaps the only pure case, as I see it, of a group which isentitled, by virtue of nationality, culture and history, to territory and full national rights but,is instead granted only the rights which are normally accorded to a national minority in a"host" country: that is, autonomous territorial reservations. Native Americans rights do not

fall under the ethnic rights category because they constitute a nation in their own right. Theirstatus however, remains ambiguous: Native Americans should certainly not be consideredone more amongst the many ethnic groups comprising the United States, for they are "more"than just that. They are often referred to as "nations" but not accorded the rights ofterritorial sovereignty commonly accepted for all nations. In a sense, Native Americansconstitute a national minority in the land that is their own. Not only were their national rightswere obliterated, but the land, the space upon which they constituted a nation has largelybeen confiscated. In the case of Native Americans, their land has been pulled away fromunder their feet, and their national status rendered undefined and weak.

Native-American land reservations are crossovers between ethnic enclaves and autonomousregions. The virtual demise of Native American culture, in all its traditional and politicalforms, went hand in hand with their loss of territory, the loss of their national home in theirsovereign land.

As mentioned above, deep ecology is an ethical philosophy. Within deep ecology, ethics ispolitical philosophy. This is so due to the pragmatist nature of the discipline and its vocation-logos. What then, might constitute a possible ecological answer to the problematic of multi-culturalism and diversity? For one thing, as mentioned above, ecological ethics recognizes nopolitical boundaries. The concept of "planet" takes precedent. Deep ecology is well poised tocontribute to the creation of a paradigm of globalitywith difference. The concepts of dialogue

towards nature, political anarchism and communitarianism, are powerful enough to constitutethe desired ethical paradigm. What rests to be done is elaborate these concepts into specificpolicy proposals.

There are eight policy components to the principles of deep ecology: 1) the inherent (non-


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utilitarian) value of nature; 2) the inherent value in the diversity of natural and culturalforms; 3) humans attitude toward diversity; 4) slow population growth; 5) slower urbandevelopment; 6) political, social, technological, economic and ideological changes; 7)ecologically sustainable development; and 8) the duty to implement ecological policies.

Finally, we might argue, that the concept of deep ecology is a contemporary variation on thetotalizing systems of philosophy of the past. Naess saw totalizing as the key to Spinozasphilosophy. Ecologys advantage over its predecessors is that its point of departure is the

direct interaction between ideas and praxis, not between ideas and other ideas within thesystems of logic. Inasmuch as it offers a holistic view of nature and a radical formulation ofethical behavior, ecology remains a powerful programme for the future of the planet and forthe political transformation of society as a whole.

There are strong thematic and logical connections between deep ecology and anarchisticthought. As we have seen, the issue of the abolition of the state is a primary concern ofecological ethics. In particular, many different philosophers arrive at similar end-positionsdespite emanating from seemingly dissimilar points of departure. Murray Bookchin and ColinWard are two exponents of current anarchist thought dealing with urbanism. In the case of

Bookchin in particular, his central positions are directly concerned with environmental issues.According to May, (Pg. 51,n) "Bookchin is the foremost example of an ecologically orientedanarchist." Bookchin and Heyward proposed a variant of the anarchist concept of free-federated-voluntary associations called "municipal federations." These federations willreplace the state as an entity and take over its global functions in a non-coercive, but ratherconsensual manner. Bookchin deals with the issue of environmental scarcity and the need toreformulate our economic goals in light of that. In my view, issues in ecology concerning therole of the nation-state, ethics as political philosophy, (that is, ethics as a political program forpublic policy,) dialogue, and the connective threads running through Spinoza and Buber,render deep ecology a focused variant of propositions echoed throughout the Anarchisttradition. It is interesting to see how Young arrives at the similar political program offederations of regional municipalities out of an analysis of difference and the politics of grouprights. This shows the deep connections between anarchism and various variants of post-modern political thought.

Anarchist thinkers, in particular Gustav Landauer, espoused the pacifist, socialist, andhumanistic brand of left-libertarianism. Landauer advocated the restructuring of society intoa federation of smaller, cooperative-communal societies. These federated, spatially boundedand socialist communities will be established inside and apart from the existing state and willgradually replace it. Spatial communities in the urban realm are difficult to implement. Mostintentional communities have re-emerged in the outskirts of urban limits. The Hasidics, I

argue, are a singular case of intentionality within the limitations and opportunities offered byurban space.

While Marx advocated the overthrow of the state by violent means, as aprecondition for theestablishment of the revolutionary society, Landauer (as did Kropotkin, Bakunin andProudhon) advocated the establishment of revolutionary societies in the here and now as theprecondition for the overthrow of the state. These societies will be organized to operate fromwithin the structure of the state and empowered to systematically dismantle theconfiguration of political power. Power, being a tactical, horizontal and diffuse operation, notonly a state organized structure, will be extricated through a changing of tactical relationshipsat all levels of communitarian affairs (May.) This was Landauers position. In Landauersviews, anarchism was that system of relationships between persons. The anarchist societycannot be established by political means, because the deeper meaning of anarchism is theredesign of ethics. In Landauers words "The state is a condition, a certain relationshipbetween human beings, a mode of human behavior, we destroy it by contracting other


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relationships, by behaving differently." We can see here the deep connection between thisbrand of anarchism and deep ecology. Deep ecology argues for a non-power relationshiptowards nature and humans. Martin Buber borrowed immensely from Landauers thought.For Buber and Landauer, the state represents the external, political embodiment of a certaintactical, internal ethics, the replacement of which requires the inner-acceptance of a differentethical praxis. This ethical approach was opposed by the more political positions in anarchism,particularly Bakunin, who saw the state primarily as a set of economic relationships. Thestate, for Bakunin, as was the case for Marx, represents a political-class tool for the

oppression of the proletariat. As such, the state must be abolished through political action.Once abolished however, a classless society will need no state to enforce relations ofoppression. Bakunin strongly objected to the Bolsheviks state driven revolution. ForBakunin, the first revolutionary step would be the abolition of the state, allowing theproletarians the precondition of liberty necessary to overthrow the state and take control ofthe regime of society.

Another exponent of ecological anarchism was the early Zionist leader, A. D. Gordon. Gordonwas one of the founders of the Kibbutz movement in Palestine-Israel. He is especiallyimportant for he was one of the few thinkers in this school to actually implement the political

programme of the ecological-anarchist movement. Gordons Kibbutz, espoused stronganarcho-socialist and ecological principles. For Gordon, the connection between man and land,and particularly, the labor of agriculture, constituted the center for the spiritual and politicalreawakening of humanity. In this he was close to Spinoza. This man-land connection, forGordon, must also be accompanied by concomitant changes in the social arrangement ofsociety. Gordons socialism was of the utopian-libertarian type. He was close to Buber in hisespousal of anarcho-socialist-communitarianism, and he was close to Spinoza in his secularspirituality. Current ecological thought will be best served by re-examining Gordons basicpositions.

Conclusion: Varieties of intentional experience:the Urban Hasidics

A Successful application of diversity in the urbanrealm

In this chapter, I will attempt to show a particular experiment in diversity that offersglimpses into possible successful solutions to the quandaries of diversity and ethics. In orderto make the argument clear, I will need to rehash concepts introduced before and show their

particular application in this specific case. The main subject of my research in urbanism is theHasidicpolity, that is, the organized communal patterns, the institutions and the spatialculture of Hasidic society. My central focus is the spatial culture of the Hasidic polity, and inparticular, the relationships between the institutional structure of Hasidics and theirintentionalspatial configurations. Within the variety of intentional experience, the Hasidicsrepresent the urban variant of what traditionally had been rural-based intentional societies.Due to the observed inherent relationship between territory and culture in the Hasidiccommunity, I argue that intentionality constitutes an adequate theoretical framework for theinterpretation of the Hasidic polity. In the case of the Hasidics, intentionality is the foundationof their territorial claims. As I have argued above, intentionality represents the non-oppressive form of spatial enclavization.

Within the context of our discussion of ecology and diversity, it is my aim to demonstrate thatthe Hasidic polity provides an adequate model for a program aimed at the recovery andreemergence of communitas, and in particular, the recovery of community in the realm ofurban society. To analyze the issue of community recovery, it is necessary to assess the


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relationship between spatial policies, community intentionality and the ethical implications ofspatial policy in the urban realm.

At the very onset, the primordial spatial trait of the Hasidic community is spatial propinquity.There are several theoretical explanations, both internal and external, for the Hasidic questfor propinquity. To some extent, Hasidic spatial culture mirrors that of other intentionalcommunities with one major difference, namely, that Hasidics remain an urban intentionalcommunity. Besides the issue of community-intentionality, Hasidic spatial arrangements are

also tied to the issue of ethnic relations within society at large. Because the focus is onHasidics, the issue of ethnicity and its role in community formation becomes central as well.The Hasidic community in metropolitan New York represents an historical instanciation ofthe relationship between ethnicity, territory and culture.

The principal interest in the Hasidic polity centers on the issue of the recovery or re-emergence of community as a function of territory (or territory as a factor in communityrecovery). The issues of community, inter-subjective relations, the nature of individuality,group identity, ethnic, national and other group rights, etc., all emerge as central themes inthis context. These issues emerge in many different scholarly contexts as well, particularly in

ethics, political philosophy, geography, anthropology and sociology.

I argue that to understand the issue of recovery of community, we must examine the uses ofspatial propinquity. I identify two distinct uses of propinquity: segregational andcommunitarian-intentional. Through a study of the Hasidic community, we can explore thevarious meanings of propinquity and discover the test conditions under which propinquityevolves into either one of its two variants.

I argue that the paradigm that best interprets the modern western poly-everything city, thecity within which the Hasidic polity is located, is that of the continuum territory-ethnicity-culture. A study of the attributes of the interrelations among these three elements shows the

dual nature of spatial propinquity. The case of the Hasidics shows how a certain modifiedform of spatial enclavization results in intentional communitarianism and not segregation.The Hasidic polity is a modified form of enclave that works well within the urban realm. Itpreserves propinquity, allows intentional urban residence, and minimizes the dangers ofexclusivism.

At its core, the issue of ethnicity is the issue ofOtherness. We can view the other in twoways: The other as the alien, or the other as the I in the context of We. Otherness is eitherthe individual I seeking protection against the We, or the Wes rejecting the non-we. Thebasic issue then for ethnic policy thus is to determine what political implications, and in

particular, what urban-spatial policies, logically derive from different conceptions ofotherness. Spatial policies aimed at the other as alien, are diametrically opposed to thosedealing with the other when conceived as a legitimate bearer of subjectivity. The former leadsto segregation and apartheid, the later to communal intentionality. The other, when viewedwithin its own cultural context becomes the bearer of rights. Aliens in contrast, are regardedas threats.

I argue that the danger of spatial (and social) segregation is minimized, once the relationshipbetween culture and territory, as derived from the continuum territory-culture-ethnicity, ismediated through the ethics of intentionality. Intentionality constitutes the ethicalmodifierthat transforms the relationship between space and culture from a potential form of

segregation into an actual form of intentional communitarianism. Without the ethics ofintentionality, territorial propinquity degenerates into spatial segregation. I call the ethics ofintentionality, ecological ethics, and argue thatDeep Ecology offer adequate models forethical interpretation. The Hasidics fit the spatial patterns of intentional communitarianpropinquity modified to account for the urban variant of its spatial character.


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Through a study of the Hasidic polity, one might examine the issue of whether it is possiblefor communal intentionality to emerge and operate within the framework of the urban realm.The perspective assumed by this question is that of urbanism. Urbanism refers to the studyof spatially bounded areas comprised of a multiplicity of institutions and social groupings.Group differences are roughly defined by categories such as, ethnicity, class, religion, race,gender, the multiple mixing of all those, etc. Urbanism studies the complex dynamics of theinter and intra-relationships occurring at all levels of the urban realm: top-down, bottom-upand horizontally; the conflicts, competitions, coalitions and possibilities for community

formation emerging as a result of these dynamics.

In response to the pluralistic and diverse formation of the urban society, urbanism adopts anapproach akin to ecology. The modern western poly-city, exhibits the diverse, plural,balancing morphology of ecological systems. For a diverse city, the ethics that apply is thatdealing with ecological diversity.

Furthermore, observing the Hasidic community as a case study, I argue that some forms ofpolitics of difference, when mediated into the urban realm, and in light of the continuumterritory-ethnicity-culture, present significant ethical, cultural, philosophical and political

challenges. I will argue then, that the resolution of these dilemmas is essential for therecovery of community intentionality and its re-placement in the culture of urban life.

In my view, a new perspective on the Hasidic polity, one that results in a more accurateinterpretation of the processes and dynamics underlying the communal structure ofHasidism, provides the opportunity to ascertain the legitimacy of attempts at intentionality inthe realm of urban communities. Taking the Hasidics as a case study, we want to exploreissues of intentionality in urban communities, the role of ethnicity in the advent ofcommunity, models of state-ethnic groups dynamics in the urban areas, and issues of ethicalsignificance for the formulation of urban public policy vis a vis ethnicity.

Within this analysis, the issue of ethnicity becomes central. The continuum territory-ethnicity-culture shows that national cultures emerge from within the framework ofterritories over which ethnicities exercise some form of sovereign control. The sustenance ofculture, national, ethnic culture, is intractably tied to the sustenance of the three linkageswithin the continuum. In addition, it is a fact that in America, most historical intentionalcommunities were initially established along ethnic-religious lines. I argue that this fact is ofno mere historiographic interest, but underscores the role of ethnicity in creating, preservingand reproducing intentionality. On the other hand, it also underscores the pitfalls and dangersof ethnicity-based intentionality. The Hasidics as a religious-ethnic group also fit theintentional match but with all the peculiarities that attach to the urban substance of the

Hasidic intentionality.

There are four steps to fully conceptualize the Hasidic community in the context I propose.The first is by providing a geographic description of the Hasidic spatial dispersion. Hasidiccommunities are divided into four distinct types: urban neighborhoods (exclusive andinclusive): Williamsburg, Boro Park and Crown Heights within the borough of Brooklyn in thecity if New York, suburban hamlets: Monsey, in Rockland County, Yorktown in WestchesterCounty; suburban settlements: Mount Kisco in Westchester County, Kiamesha Lake inSullivan County; and incorporated municipalities: Kyrias Joel in Orange County, Kaser andNew Square in Monsey. There are several internal and external social factors behind eachtype, as well as an internal Hasidic rationale for their particularistic spatial culture.

The second step is to introduce what I regard to as the useful categorization of Hasidics asintentional communities. When comparing the Hasidics with other intentional communities,we find that in the structure of the Hasidic polity, lies a model of community tailor-made forthe urban realm. From this model, we can derive implications for general urban community


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development. By comparing Hasidics with intentional communities we can also raise in boldrelief the inner structure of the Hasidic community, and, more importantly, ascertain theextent to which this structure can serve as a paradigm of urban-intentionalcommunitarianism. The other side of this analysis underscores the sui-generis aspect of theHasidic polity, and the line of demarcation between centered and diffused communities.

I argue that Hasidics differ from intentional communities in five respects, and that this ismainly due to the urbanity of the Hasidic polity. (And hence their relevance to the field of

urbanism.) The five areas of divergence are: Space, governance, welfare, economics andarchitecture.

Spatially, Hasidics favor enclaves but not seclusion. In governance, Hasidics favor autonomybut not independence. In social policy, Hasidics practice social welfare but not communism. Ineconomic life, the Hasidics participate (by and large) in the economic mainstream (as opposedto economic enclavization) but not in the sociological mainstream. In architecture, both, thesymbolic meaning, and the communal process of development that characterize ruralintentional communities, is largely absent. Hasidics compromised and adopted urban in-fillmethods instead of mystic-symbolic architecture. The issue of economic participation raises

other interesting questions concerning the non-value-neutral character of economic activities,and the intentional communities needs and desire to remain socially, and thus spatially,enclavized.

The third step in the conceptualization of the Hasidic polity is to offer a model of ethnicdynamics borrowed from a sub-field of ecology: epidemiology. By epidemiology I refer to thestudy of the interrelationships between a constituted social body, and the penetration offoreign organisms in its midst. The effects caused by this interaction to both, the organismand the body constitute the research fields of epidemiology. I likened the presence of ethnicminorities in the city to an epidemiological model.

The epidemiological model operates at three levels: state-group, group-state and group-group. These dynamics can be modeled after epidemiology in the following senses:Intentional societies, (self conscious identifiable communities) might be likened to a foreignorganism or "virus" penetrating the confines of the social body. The question arises as to howdoes the virus affect the body and viceversa? This determination strongly depends on whatare the dominating concepts of what the social "body" is and what constitutes the conditionsfor organic health. In this context, it is crucial to determine who does the defining, self orforeign, and what role does the foreign organism itself play in the process of defining. In turn,all this depends on the predominant conceptions as per the nature of the virus. The virus,that is, the ethnic group, can be conceived of as either primordial, constructed or embedded,

and again, whos the definer.

Three basic epidemiological approaches to state-group dynamics come to mind: Laissez-faire,ecological and reactionary. The reactionary aspect is further divided into negative top-down,in the form of segregation, or positive bottom up in the form of cultures of resistance. Thelaissez faire approach tolerates the existence of different groups to the extent that no majorbreakdown occurs in the orderly function of society at large. Laissez fairers may believe thatwhen left to their own devices, diverse groups will eventually assimilate into the pre-existingconstituted body. The ecological approach seeks the harmonious balancing of diversity.According to this view, all diversity is inherently justified. One of the implications of theecological approach is for the city to provide the spatial means and the targeted socialprograms by which the many diverse societies will be preserved, protected and encouraged.It is also expected that each group will respects the rights and privileges of all others. Thismutual respect will provide the balancing act needed to preserve harmony in diversity. Thereactionary approach in contrast, reacts to the existence of diverse groups with policies ofseclusion and segregation. Segregated groups often react back through their own version of


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ethnic separatism. These are cultures of resistance. Ethnic pride, dress codes, ancestrallanguages and other cultural symbolisms all are part of the program of cultural resistance.

For the purposes of public policy, the focus cannot be on the virus itself, for its structure isconstantly mutating through interaction with the body and other viruses, and it does notaffect all parts of the body equally. The focus should be on the epidemiology, that is, on theprocess of dynamics between the group and the wider body politics: the reaction,counteractions, the mutual affects and effects between the social body and the foreign

organism, the general temporal measures applied to countenance the effects of the virus, andthe viruss own mechanisms of defense.

The fourth and final issue concerns the question of ecological ethics. Intentionality is theethics that mediates between culture and territory. By intentionality I refer to the desire ofindividuals and families to live in close spatial proximity and to conduct their social affairsunder the guidance of some shared spiritual, political or social value. Spatial propinquity is acondition sine qua non of intentionality. Intentionality removes the negativity of segregationand replaces it with the positivity of a politics of difference. I argue that in likening the poly-ethnic city to an ecological system of diversity, (harmony, balance, integration, splitting and

chaos) public policy must come to grips with the ethical issues related to the politics ofdiversity. In fact, the poly ethnic city can only survive providing it searches and applies acoherent set of polices that can be justified in the context of ecological ethics. The field ofecology has produced good theoretical work in the field of the ethics of diversity. Some ofthese insights, when translated from the field of nature and into human society, can berendered useful for the debate concerning urban policies towards ethnic groupings.

Hune E. Margulies

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Dialogue and Urbanism

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