06 Dec 2017

Despite Astana Progress Bringing Hopes of Peace

the Conflict in Syria is Far from Over

International Visiting Researchers Program

Alexander Aston-Ward

Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies is an independent, nonprofit, research, cultural and media institution. Its main focus is to conduct studies and researches about the Arab region, especially Syria. It also works towards cultural and media development, enhancing the civil society performance, and spreading democratic awareness and values of dialogue, as well as respect for human rights. The Centre also provides consultation and training services in political and media fields to all Syrians on the basis of Syrian national identity.To achieve its objectives, the Centre conducts its activities through five specialized units, (1) Policy Studies Unit, (2) Social Researches Unit, (3) Books Review Unit, (4) Translation and Arabization Unit, and (5) Legal Unit.A set of action programs are also adopted, such as the program for Political Consultations and Initiatives; Program for Services, Media Campaigns, and Public Opinion Making Program; Program for Dialogue Support and Civil and Cultural Development Program; Syria Future Program. The Centre may add new programs depending on the actual needs of Syria and the region. In implementing its programs, the Centre deploys multiple mechanisms, including lectures, workshops, seminars, conferences, training courses, as well as paper and electronic press.

HARMOON CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES

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Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 2

First: Is the Regime Close to a Military Victory? .................................................................................. 3

Second: Will Assad Restore Stability in Syria? ..................................................................................... 5

Third: Will Reconstruction Funding Help Bring an End to the Fighting? ....................................... 6

Forth: An End in Sight? ........................................................................................................................... 10

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................ 11

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Introduction

With Astana talks resuming, Russia clearly sees an end in sight to the conflict in Syria.

Vladimir Shamanov, the chairman of Russia’s parliamentary defence committee, told

lawmakers that the “major tasks” of Russia’s campaign in the country have “almost been

accomplished”.(1) This suggests that the Kremlin believes that Putin’s stated goal of “stabilising

the legitimate power in Syria and creating the conditions for political compromise” is nearing

its completion.(2) The talks, according to the UN chief negotiators have reached “the moment

of truth”.(3) With the UN sponsored Geneva process stalled, Astana talks have provided a way

for rebels, the regime, and key international players such as Turkey, Iran, and Russia to find

ways to reach agreements on the ground, including the so called ‘de-escalation zones’. Despite

the intervention of Russian, Iranian, and now Turkish ground forces in an attempt to enforce

these ‘de-escalation zones’, violence continues to spiral casting into doubt expectations that

peace will soon return to Syria. A number of sadly misguided assumptions underpin these

expectations.

(1) Deutsche Welle, “Syria: Russia sees end in sight at peace talks”, Deutsche Welle, 30/10/17,

http://m.dw.com/en/syria-russia-sees-end-in-sight-at-peace-talks/a-41167098. (2) Interfax” Russian Presidential Statement”, Interfax, 11/10/17, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/472593. (3) UN Multi-Media, “News in Brief 26th October 2017, UN Multi Media,

http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2017/10/news-in-brief-26-october-2017-

am/#.Wf7B_4hpHIU.

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First: Is the Regime Close to a Military Victory?

The first is that Assad is close to, if not has already achieved, a military victory. While Assad

and his allied militias have regained control over vast swathes of rebel territory, opposition

forces are far from vanquished. According to the Washington Post, over 40% of the country

remains under rebel control, including the country’s most important oil fields and areas of

Idlib, Damascus, Daraa, Aleppo and other provinces.(4) Moreover, Syria’s Kurdish forces have

forged out an essentially autonomous zone in the countries north, and despite accusations of

collaboration with the regime, only time will tell whether the Kurds remain so compliant.(5)

Powerful Jihadist groups also dominate the Syrian battlefield.(6) While occasionally operating

as a unified force against regime forces, battles between opposing Jihadist factions, and

between Jihadists and more moderate opposition groups, present significant roadblocks to

the achieving of peace. (7) The fact that these groups still control territory across the country,

and remain able to regularly attack regime institutions in Damascus, suggest that Assad is far

from achieving a complete military victory.(8) Therefore, While Assad clearly has not won, he

has effectively stopped any other party from seizing victory.(9) As a result of this stalemate, the

(4) Ibrahim al-Assil, “Syria’s Civil War is a Long Way From Over- And Here’s Why That’s Important”,

Washington Post, 11/10/17, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-

post/wp/2017/10/11/syrias-civil-war-is-a-long-way-from-over-and-heres-why-thats-

important/?utm_term=.9ce6e42683b4. (5) Alexander Aston-Ward, “The Kurdish Referendum: The Impact on Syria”, Harmoon Center of

Contemporary Studies, 7/10/17, https://harmoon.org/en/archives/6936. (6) Zachary Laub, “Who’s Who in Syria’s Civil War”, Council on Foreign Relations, 28th April 2017,

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whos-who-syrias-civil-war. (7) Moni Alami, “Is the Beginning of the End for Idlib’s Jihadi Groups?”, Al-Monitor, 22/09/17,

https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/09/syria-idlib-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-russia-iran-

turkey.html. (8) Ellen Francis, “Damascus Bomb Blast ‘Suicide Attack on Police Station’ Eyewitness Report”, The

Independent, 02/10/17, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/damascus-bomb-

latest-eyewitnesses-report-suicide-attack-police-station-syria-a7978796.html. (9) Colin H. Kahl and Ilan Goldenberg, “A Strategy for Ending the Syrian Civil War”, CNAS, 07/06/17,

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/a-strategy-for-ending-the-syrian-civil-war.

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complexity of alliances, and changing international contexts, the notion that “there is no

military solution for Syria” still holds true.(10)

However, it is unlikely that armed opposition movements will ever lay down their weapons

and accept Assad’s continued rule, and equally unlikely that Assad will do the same until he

has regained absolute control.(11) The same can also be said for the millions of Syrians who

have suffered so terribly at the hands of his tyrannical megalomania. With the death toll

estimated at 500,000, and sectarian wounds still bleeding, Assad will likely never be accepted

as Syria’s legitimate political authority by the countries Sunni majority(12) regardless of any

externally imposed political solution to the conflict. Despite this, the international community

appear to have accepted Assad’s continued rule… at least for the time being.

(10) Barbara Crossette, “There is No Military Solution for Syria”, The Nation, 18/03/17,

https://www.thenation.com/article/there-is-no-military-solution-for-syria/. (11) Lizzie Dearden, “Bashar al-Assad Vows to Retake Whole of Syria by Force Despite Ceasefire Attempts”,

The Independent, 12/02/17, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/bashar-al-assad-

vows-to-retake-whole-of-syria-by-force-despite-ceasefire-attempts-a6870141.html. (12) US Department of State, “International Religious Freedom Report Syria”, US State Department, 2006,

https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71432.htm.

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Second: Will Assad Restore Stability in Syria?

The second assumption is that allowing Assad to remain in power will restore stability in

the country.(13) In reality, the Syrian state and its institutions are weaker than they have ever

been. The Syrian Arab Army, through defections and the attrition of war, has been depleted to

a third of its pre-war size.(14) In order to maintain its military advantage, the regime has been

forced to cede control over its military strategy and future economic direction to foreign forces

in Moscow and Tehran, side-lining the regimes control over the direction of the conflict and

future of the country.(15) Moreover, what remains of the regime state is bankrupt, and the

economy of the country has been largely destroyed. Aleppo, formally the country’s economic

capital has been reduced to rubble and considerable numbers of Syrian businesses have

relocated abroad.(16) Since the beginning of the conflict, this capital flight has left the regime

with little option but to borrow considerable funds from Russia and Iran to replace the

taxation vital in sustaining its coffers, pay its employees, and maintain the functions of

statehood.(17) This economic devastation and entanglement with foreign powers will do

nothing to heal some of the root causes of the conflict; economic malaise, the regimes crony

capitalist system, and sectarian systems of wealth accumulation in the country.(18)

However, the Assad regime has used the remaining functions of the state to increase the

dependency of the people upon his regime. Through its control of electricity and water

(13) Julien Barnes-Dacey, “Time to Play the Money Card in Syria”, European Council on Foreign Relations,

30/03/17, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_time_to_play_the_money_card_in_syria_7261. (14) Global Fire Power, “2017 Syria Military Strength”, Global Fire Power, 2017,

https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=syria. (15) Nikita Sogoloff, “Russia’s Energy Goals in Syria”, The Washington Institute, 30/08/17,

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/fikraforum/view/russias-energy-goals-in-syria. (16) Harun Onder and Faya Hayati, “The Toll of War: The Economic and Social Consequences of the

Conflict in Syria”, The World Bank, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/syria/publication/the-

toll-of-war-the-economic-and-social-consequences-of-the-conflict-in-syria. (17) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-economy/syria-expects-more-financial-aid-from-

russia-iran-idUSBRE93N0QA20130424 (18) Bassam Haddad, “The Syrian Regime’s Buisness Backbone”, Middle East Research and Information

Project, 2016, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/syrian-regimes-business-backbone.

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supplies, bureaucratic offices, and access to passports and other travel documents, the Syrian

regime has ensured that it remains the only power in the country capable of providing services

to its people.(19) The Syrian regime remains the largest employer, the primary provider of

healthcare, fuel, and education, and only state run bureaucrats can allow Syrians to marry,

register property or travel outside the country. The regime has also heavily bombarded health

centres, schools, bakeries, and other vital services in opposition areas to deny opposition

groups the ability to construct alternative systems of governance. It is unlikely that even if a

political solution is reached, that the regime will relinquish its control over the functions of

the state that have served its interests so well, let alone allow opposition groups to develop

contending systems of governance in the areas that remain under its control. Therefore, the

conflict will be brought no closer to a political conclusion.

Third: Will Reconstruction Funding Help Bring an End to the

Fighting?

Some believe, with almost inconceivable naivety, that humanitarian aid and reconstruction

funding(20) directed through the regime itself will bring respite and development to the people

of Syria.(21) However, the ways in which the regime has used humanitarian aid as a tool of war

has been widely documented. The UN and other international organisations have been forced

to negotiate the delivery of vital humanitarian assistance through the regime in Damascus,

allowing the regime to hold hostage areas under rebel control through the withholding of

(19) Shawn Carrie and Rami Zayat, “The Bureaucratic Nightbmare of Obtaining a Syrian Passport Abroad”,

PRI, 30/06/17, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-06-30/bureaucratic-nightmare-obtaining-syrian-

passport-abroad. (20) Tom Rollins, “Syria’s Reconstruction Plans take Shape”, Al- Monitor, 22/05/17, https://www.al-

monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/05/syria-war-reconstruction-process-regime-opposition.html. (21) Aron Lund, “The Un Enters Syria’s Moral Labyrinth”, Carnegie Middle East Center, 09/09/16,

http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/64524?lang=en.

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supplies necessary for survival.(22) In 2015 and 2016, almost 75% of UN requests to deliver

aid across the battle lines went unanswered by the Damascene authorities.(23) For the regime,

the withholding of humanitarian assistance is a deliberate strategy of collective punishment,

and a way of preventing opposition groups from creating an alternative political structures.

The regulation and distribution of internationally provided aid, from foodstuffs to

electricity(24) is also used to reward loyalty and deepen the dependency of civilians on the

regime.(25) While UN Security Council resolutions 2165(26) and 2191(27) allowing cross-border

aid corridors to bypass regime controls have eased the suffering in some areas, such efforts

have proved insufficient especially in areas under siege by regime forces. The insistence of

international agencies such as the Red Cross to “preserve minimum principles of impartiality

and neutrality” have only compounded this problem.(28)

In light of this, it is naïve to suggest that Assad would channel any reconstruction assistance

to rebel held areas. As seen in Aleppo, the pro-regime western sectors of the city have been

totally repaired, with markets and schools functioning as normal. In contrast, rebel held

(22) Aron Lund, “The Failure to Stop Starvation Tactics in Syria”, Carnegie Middle East Center, 31/3/14,

http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/55172. (23) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Statement by Humanitarian Affairs and

Emergecny Relief Coordinator Stephan O’Brian”, Relief Web, January 2016,

https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/under-secretary-general-humanitarian-affairs-and-

emergency-relief-29. (24) Jose Ciro Martinez, “Assad’s Bread Problem”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 03/02/15,

http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=58941. (25) Jose Ciro Martinez, “Leaving Syrians No Options”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

27/10/15, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=61763. (26) UN Security Council, “Resolution 2165”, United Nations, 14/07/14,

http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2165. (27) UN Press Center, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2191 (2014) Renews Authorisation Allowing

Agencies, Humanitarian Partners Continued Aid Access across Syrian Borders”, United Nations, 17/12/14,

http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11708.doc.htm. (28) Dr. Joanne Liu, “Letter to the Member State of the High Level Group on Syria”, Doctors Without

Borders, 18/12/13, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/speechopen-letter/letter-

member-states-high-level-group-syria.

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eastern sectors have seen very little reconstruction, and remain destroyed, largely inhabitable,

and cut off from basic services.(29) It is unlikely then, that reconstruction funding will be evenly

distributed; Assad has far more existential needs for that money. As argued by Yezid Sayigh,

the regime’s strategy of continuing the violence in Syria is to secure the economic and

financial assets required to survive the transition from war to peace. This means continuing

to use violent coercion until it has secured the means of rebuilding its domestic political power

and social control.(30) Therefore, the dilemma faced by the regime is not that it is unwilling to

reach a political settlement, but it is unable to do so if it wants to maintain its position. This is

indicative of the way systems of control in Syria have been historically constructed.(31)

The structure of political power built by Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, are crucial

to understanding the regimes peacebuilding predicament. The creation of a crony-capitalist

class of business elites through the construction of familial ties between businessmen,

military figures and the Assad family, resulted in the plundering of Syria’s economy and the

centralisation of wealth production around a number of key figures and their allies. As a result

of this business co-option, by the 1990’s the business community that the Assads had created

in their own image had transformed Syria from a semi-socialist state into a crony capitalist

state par excellence.(32)

These business ties were further entrenched after Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in

2000. In an attempt to reverse economic malaise, the economy was liberalised into what

became known as the Social Market Economy. However, far from benefiting the majority of

Syrian society, the policy perpetuated this cronyism, allowing families close to the regime to

(29) Courrier International, “Syrie: Ravage par le guerre, un marche d’Alep Retrouve des Couleurs”, Courrier

International, 16/11/17, https://www.courrierinternational.com/depeche/syrie-ravage-par-la-guerre-un-

marche-dalep-retrouve-des-couleurs.afp.com. (30) Yezid Sayigh, “Clausewitz in Syria”, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14/10/16, http://carnegie-

mec.org/2016/10/14/clausewitz-in-syria-pub-64761. (31) Alexander Aston-Ward, “Assad Regime Resilience During the Syrian Civil War: An Historical

Perspective”, Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies”, 24/10/17,

https://harmoon.org/en/archives/7098. (32) Bassam Haddad, “The Syrian Regime’s Business Backbone”, Middle East Research and Information

Project”, 2016, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer262/syrian-regimes-business-backbone.

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dominate the private sector and gain considerable control over public assets. These networks

have been crucial in supporting the regime by funding militias and helping to float the Syrian

currency; they are very well aware that their fate is intertwined with that of the Assad regime.

The regime’s grip on the reins of power in the country depends on these extensive networks

of patronage throughout the state apparatus, security forces and both public and private

sectors of the economy.(33) These networks, deprived of their historical access to the country’s

wealth and resources have transformed into black marketeers and remain deeply embedded

in the war economy, developing highly profitable networks of wealth involving the security

forces, Ba’ath party cadres and international black market actors.(34)

According to Lina Sinjab, “the dynamics of this war economy mean that any deal on the

international table might be hard to implement locally”.(35) This is also the case lower down

the ladder of Syrian society, as many of the pro-regime militia known as “shabiha”, who later

became “popular committees”, then the “National Defence Forces”, have turned into

powerful warlords, capitalising on the authority given to them by the regime. Many of these

warlords come from impoverished minority sects. However, their loyalty to the regime has

paid dividends, with many going from earning £S 10,000 (Syrian pounds) per month, or $200

before the war, to earning nearly £S2 million a month, or $4000, as a result of their black

market and criminal trades.(36) This wealth comes from the bottom up, sustained by the green

light given by the regime to fine, hold to ransom, and extort businessmen and civilians under

areas they control. Moreover, the Assad regime also has allowed terrorist organisations such

as Daesh to flourish, allowing them breathing room while the regime focused on its political

opponents and fuelled its military using oil purchased from Daesh held areas. There is also

considerable evidence that Syrian regime businessmen have enriched themselves by

providing services such as telecommunications, and importing and exporting goods from

(33) David Butter, “Syria’s Economy: Picking up the Pieces”, Chatham House, June 2015,

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150623SyriaEcono

myButter.pdf. (34) Lina Sinjab, “How Syria’s War Economy Propels the Conflict”, Chatham House, 28/07/17,

https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/how-syrias-war-economy-propels-the-conflict (35) Ibid. (36) Ibid.

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Daesh held territory.(37) These violent militias and unscrupulous businessmen are unlikely to

give up these profitable pursuits and new socio-economic status in Syria regardless of any

international political agreement.

In short, as a restoration of the country’s pre-war economy can only be envisioned far into

the future, the regime needs war, and its associated profits, to ensure its continued survival. It

is likely then, that the regime would use any funds provided for reconstruction to repay the

crony capitalist elite and the nouveau riche militias for their loyalty and sacrifice in support of

his regime and buy their continued allegiance. The regime, in this sense, is forced to continue

the bloodshed and resist the withdrawal of the shadowy war economy from which this

wealthy elite have profited so handsomely.

Forth: An End in Sight?

Therefore, despite recent victories against ISIS, the confinement of rebel forces to defensive

operations around their few remaining strongholds, and peace talks in Astana continuing, a

resolution to the conflict will remain as elusive as ever. US secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s

recent comments that “the reign of the Assad family is coming to an end”(38) are divorced from

reality and US policy after recent visits by US security officials to meet their counterparts in

Damascus and the focus of US military strategy in Syria lying solely on the fight against Daesh.

As suggested by US White House officials, the US now accepts the “political reality”(39) of

Assad’s grip on power in Syria. This will only fuel future conflict and reveals a criminal

underappreciation of the conflict’s underlying causes. By accepting a continuation of the

regime’s rule in Syria, Western governments would ignore his role as the country’s most

(37) Aryn Baker, “Why Bashar Assad Won’t Fight ISIS”, Time, 26/02/15, http://time.com/3719129/assad-

isis-asset/. (38) Gardiner Harris, “Tillerson Says Assad Family’s Reign “Is Coming to an End” in Syria”, The New York

Times, 26/10/17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/26/world/middleeast/tillerson-syria-assad.html. (39) Michael R. Gordon, “White House Accepts “Political Reality” of Assad’s Grip on Power in Syria”, The

New York Times, 31/03/17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/us/politics/trump-bashar-assad-

syria.html.

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violent conflict actor and the ways in which he is structurally unable to formulate any real

initiatives to bring an end to the violence while ensuring his own survival. If the international

community is serious about bringing a sustainable end to the violence, governments and aid

agencies should focus on providing aid and reconstruction assistance, not through Damascus,

but via cross border humanitarian corridors from neighbouring countries thus depriving the

regime of the resources it so desperately needs to cling onto power.

Conclusion

A bottom up system of reconstruction, centred on liaison with local councils, would

reinforce emerging institutions of representative governance, as well as denying the regime

the ability to use starvation as a weapon or to finance its black-market networks. Reinforcing

the ability of opposition groups to construct opposing systems of governance based around

democratic and representative ideals is the only way to bring the Syrian regime to the

negotiation table with any serious intentions of stopping the bloodletting. Until then, with the

rebels understandably unwilling to lay down their weapons and accept a continuation of

Ba’athist rule, and the regime unable to disentangle itself from systems of patronage and war

economy it has so effectively fostered, no amount of political talks will bring either side down

from the barricades.

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