DEPENDENT ELITES IN POST- SOCIALISM: ARE LAND-BASED POST- COLONIAL SYSTEMS SO DIFFERENT FROM THE...
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Transcript of DEPENDENT ELITES IN POST- SOCIALISM: ARE LAND-BASED POST- COLONIAL SYSTEMS SO DIFFERENT FROM THE...
DEPENDENT ELITES IN POST-SOCIALISM: ARE LAND-BASED POST-COLONIAL SYSTEMS SO
DIFFERENT FROM THE TRANSCONTINENTAL ONES?
byPal TAMAS [Institute of
Sociology, HAS Budapest]
STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
1. STATE PROBLEMS. DESTINIES AND POLICIES
2. THE MODEL DEBATE [LA]3. EURASIAN ELITE’S AUTONOMIES
IN THE 2000ES.
DEPENDENT ELITES- WEAK STATES
dependent elites = political class with shortage internal, country based legitimacy [in weak states]
Weak states- min-max - unable to control its territory - limited „violence management” -limited tax collection and financial control mechanisms -military insecurityCases: Belorus- stong dependency, but relatively strong, Ukraine- dependent, but weaker state, Georgia, Moldova- strong dependency, very weak
state
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
a. Who does generate Post-Soviet underdevelopment?
b. What are the tools of a low cost „energy imperialism” in comparison with the classical „imperialism of free trade” [Ru-EU?] in this region?
c. How do networks, webs, or circuits of foreign origin divide the new political class?
d. Are members of the Post-Soviet intelligentsia still modernization zealots?
POSTCOLONIAL TERRITORIES
• The postcolonies can be divided into settler, nonsettler, and mixed.
• Settler postcolonies include countries that are dominated by European settlers with only sparse native populations (e.g., Australia)
• Nonsettler postcolonies are characterized by large native populations and only a small number of Europeans (e.g., India).
• Mixed postcolonies refer to countries with both sizable native and European populations (e.g., South Africa and Kenya)
POST-SOVIET ANALOGIESSETTLERS- Belorus? Ukraine?NON-SETTLERS- Georgia, UzbekistanMIXED- Moldova, Kazahstan
POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES I
Soft state (Myrdal)
• Lack of social discipline: general inclination to resist public controls / rules– both officials and citizens
• Why?– traditional authority structures destroyed by
colonialism– ‘habit’ to oppose colonial authorities
• soft state = non state
POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES II
Overdeveloped state (Alavi)
• State not grown from its social, political, economic structure
• but imposed from outside– to promote outsiders interests– by controlling and subordinating the indigenous
• This state was inherited after colonialism, an instrument:– to controll and subordinate the people– to promote the interests of the successors of the
colonizers
POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES
III
Weak state (Migdal)
• low capacity of state to penetrate society– regulate social relationships– extract and use resources
• Why?
• state versus other sources of social control: – organizations / actors– which can be precolonial, colonial or postcolonial– but do originate from society and are rooted and therefore
strong– no state autonomy from these powers
POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES
IV
Predatory State
• State as engine of predation– without providing collective goods in return
• Matter of degree, depending on relative bargaining power– social groups that control resources– state structure (democracy, etc.)– strategies:
• increase patrimonial power• smash alternative sources of power
DEVELOPMENT PARADOXES- ELITE STRATEGIES
Development malaise of the 90ies: 2x2 matrix and look at internal and external factors.
· Domestic-Destiny [structural characteristics]
· Domestic-Policy
· External-Destiny
· External-Policy
THE MODEL DEBATE
PRECONDITION OF THE SUCCESS- PRACTICAL MODELS NOT FOR COPIES, BUT FOR COMPARISONS
THE POST-SOVIETS:a. are not ready-made nation statesb. are not natural resource exportersc. not FDI heavensd. very weak internal cohesion in their
societiese. in the shadow of a regional power
without a really interested strong competitor from outside
AVAILABLE MODELS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
Applied, but inadequate: RU, EUDisscussed, but nor really applied:
Visegrad 4 [and now in their political crises?]
Not discussed, but applicable: Latin America
LA AS A METAPHOR IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE
Superficial analogies as starting points for model building:
Belorus- Mexico in the 50-60iesUkraine of Juchenko- Argentina of
PeronGeorgia- Nicaragua of the 80iesMoldova – post-civil war Central
American states [Salvador, Honduras]
SOCIETAL Networks
Routes, Capacities
Velocities and Magnitudes of trade
Organizational transformationof nodes
STATES MARKETSfrom factions & coalitions from structurally cohesiveto sovereignty - emergent k-components - emergent Spatiopolitical units Network units (overlap)
state attributes and distributions
Pop. Size Hierarchy
Urban Industries plus
Commerce, Finance
Hinterland Productivity
Dynamics from
Structural Cohesion
Unit Formation (e.g. polities)
Demography/Resources
Conflicts
CO-EVOLUTION OF POST SOVIET STATES AND SOCIETAL NETWORKS
Interference and attempts at regulation
Sources of boundary conflicts
Economic institutions and economic performance (1)
.
Lo
g G
DP
pe
r ca
pita
, P
PP, in
19
95
Avg. Protection Against Risk of Expropriation, 1985-954 6 8 10
6
8
10
AGO
ARE
ARG
AUSAUTBEL
BFA BGD
BGR
BHR
BHS
BOL
BRABWA
CANCHE
CHL
CHN
CIVCMRCOG
COLCRI
CZE
DNK
DOM DZAECU
EGY
ESP
ETH
FINFRA
GAB
GBR
GHAGIN
GMB
GRC
GTM
GUY
HKG
HND
HTI
HUN
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
ISLISR
ITA
JAMJOR
JPN
KEN
KOR
KWT
LKA
LUX
MAR
MDG
MEX
MLI
MLT
MNG
MOZ MWI
MYS
NERNGA
NIC
NLDNOR
NZL
OMN
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRY
QAT
ROM RUS
SAU
SDNSEN
SGP
SLE
SLVSUR
SWE
SYR
TGO
THATTO
TUNTUR
TZA
UGA
URY
USA
VEN
VNM
YEM
ZAF
ZAR ZMB
ZWE
Economic institutions and economic performance (2)
.
Lo
g G
DP
pe
r ca
pita
, P
PP, in
19
95
Control of Corruption0 .5 1
6
8
10
ARG
ARM
AUSAUTBEL
BFA
BGR
BOL
BRA
CANCHE
CHL
CHN
COL
CZE
DEU DNK
DOMECU
EGY
ESP
FINFRA
GBR
GEO GHA
GRC
HKG
HRV
HUN
IDN
IND
IRLISRITA
JAM JOR
JPN
KAZ
KEN
KOR
LBN
LKA
LTULVA
MAR
MDG
MEX
MLIMOZ MWI
MYS
NGA
NLDNOR
NZL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
ROMRUS
SEN
SGP
SVK
SVN
SWE
THA
TUNTUR
TZA
UGA
UKR
URY
USA
VEN
VNM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
CONCLUSIONS I
1. „Core” metropolitan interests. Ukraine, Belorus in the RU-EU energy interface, Georgia- Larger Middle East”s Rim, Moldova- only local-small borderland interests
2.Selective adaptation of „informal techniques of free trade” in each periphery
3.New cultures of „official mind” [Robinson-Gallagher] and minimalistic programs in public goods deliveries.