Democratic Transition Under Military.pdf

Atef SaidThe Paradox of Transitionto "Democracy" underMilitary Rule

IF WE AGREE THAT THERE IS A CENTRAL PROBLEM OR PARADOX WITH

the ongoing Egyptian revolution that began in 2011, it would be thatthe Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) has been in chargeduring the transitional period, defined here as that between the ousterof President Hosni Mubarak and the emergence of a democraticallyelected civilian government. Why is this a paradox? Two main attri-butes make it so. The first is the fact that the SCAF and the army ingeneral constitute a significant component of the state's political appa-ratus. The army leaders can be seen as part of the ruling regime that therevolution was aimed at replacing. Hence, the SCAF in simple terms isnot a neutral body to run the transitional period. The second attributeof this paradox relates to the fact that an institution such as the mili-tary, which is based on hierarchy, strict regulation, and obedience, hasbeen leading the transition to democracy.

It is precisely this paradox that has led several scholars onEgypt and revolutions to suggest that there is something wnrong inthis case. Asef Bayat (2011), for example, described it as "re-folution"(that is, neither a simple reform nor a complete revolution). NathanBrown (2011) has suggested that it is stumbling. And this is the primaryreason that Talal Asad has been skeptical about the trajectory of thisrevolution. Having a military-led transition is not unique. SeveralLatin American countries had military governments during the secondhalf of the twentieth century. Examination of these cases reveals that

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militaries often institutionalized a self-declared "guardianship" overthe nation through control of political and economic institutions. InArgentina, the military's original claim to power centered on protect-ing national securify but later evolved to strategically infiltrating andseizing control over constitutional and governmental institutions thatwould normally rest wdth a civilian government (MacSherry 1997, 269).Uruguay and El Salvador provide similar examples illustrating that themilitary is often the last institution willing to allow change or democ-ratization (Farcau 1996; Gillespie 1991). In cases of transition, militaryguardianship generally persists through the economic and politicalempires built during the transitional period (Farcau 1996). Egj^t's 1952revolution was a military one, and the military origins of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Anwar el-Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak are only the most outwardsign of its continuing influence. Emulating the militaries of the LatinAmerican countries would not be difficult, as the economic and politi-cal influence of the Egyptian army has been enormous and grovwng forthe past 60 years.

So how do we explain this apparent paradox; Why did theEgyptian military lend pivotal support to the protestors during therevolution itself, but now, in its administrative role during the transi-tional period, seems so reluctant, if not actively resistant, to allowingactual democratic change? I break this question into two subquestions.First, why did the army seemingly decide to "side" v̂ dth the revolutionduring the 18 days of the protests, from January 25 to Febmary 11,2011? Second, following the revolution, why have the Egyptian mili-tary leaders resisted major political reforms? They have not only doneso, but during the transitional period have even gone farther and usedexcessive violence and attacks on those advocating democracy.

This is not to suggest that there has been no political reform inEgypt after the revolution. Since then Egypt has adopted an interimconstitution, endorsed by about 70 percent of Egyptians on March 19,2011. According to this constitution and some of its supplementarylaws, Egypt's elections have become seemingly fairer, wdth impartialbodies to supervise them; presidential terms became limited only to

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two periods, each for four years; and laws have given more freedomfor forming political parties. But, as this paper will show, it is useful tounderstand how and why the SCAF has seemed to prefer not to makereforms but has done so only under pressure firom protesters. Exceptfor the first two decisions by the SCAF regarding dissolving the oldParliament and "freezing" the old constitution, and the interim consti-tution, which seems to have been primarily meant to legitimize theSCAF's power until transferring this power to civilian elected govern-ments, most of the steps taken by the SCAF have been done under pres-sure. Other than this, Egypt has repeatedly v^àtnessed grave escalationsof the crackdowns on protests and extensive human rights abuses,including the killing of protesters. Few could have imagined this after ademocratic revolution, at least in its transitional period.

To answer my first question, I argue that the Egyptian militaryhas been positioned in a set of complex and contradictory economic,social-demographic, historical/cultural, and international geopoliti-cal factors, all of which have combined to influence its actions. Thesefactors are: the army's economic empire; the army's social base, whichincorporates roughly about 75 percent of drafted Egyptians; the army'sconstructed image as a foundation of the modern Egyptian state, estab-lished after the military coup of the Free Officers in 1952, and as theguarantor of the republic's legitimacy; and the army's special ties withthe United States, especially with the Pentagon and the American mili-tary-industrial complex.

It was the combination of these factors that led the army to takethe stance of siding with the revolution at the time. As my analysis willshow, the army leaders decided to sacrifice their support of their leader,the ousted dictator, only after 17 of the 18 days, in January and Februaryof 2011, which are conventionally described as the days of the Egj^tianrevolution. The army leaders were not prepared to hold power, butassumed it on the condition that they were able to retain their specialposition in Egypt's economy, and especially so that they could continuereceiving the annual $1.3 billion in US military aid. Since then, affectedby the various factors, the army leaders have continued to navigate

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between contradictory goals, aiming to establish a conditional formof democracy, but one that allows them to continue to maintain theirprivileges.

Why the excessive violence and repression then? In this paper,I discuss three explanations for the army's use of excessive repressionand resistance to more radical political reform. These are: (1) reorga-nizing the state's political apparatus to hold its grip on power, whichmeans simply resorting to the same repressive methods its predeces-sor used; (2) punishing protesters who humiliated the army's leader,Mubarak, and seemed to challenge the army's basis of legitimacy,estabhshed in 1952, by calhng for an end to any form of the army's mleand privileges; and (3) the presence of apparent disagreements amongthe army's leaders about how to go about retaining their grip of power.While attempting to navigate their way through the major factors thatinfluence the army, I argue that all these explanations are valid, butshould be understood in the larger problem of the revolution's chal-lenge to the military mle in Egypt that has been in place since 1952. Therevolution in a sense did not only challenge both the paternal imageof the army institution to the nation and threaten the army leaders'economic privileges, but also seems to shake the army's old legitimacy,being a revolution that was based mainly on a mass revolt—comparedto the 1952 coup by the army, which presumably became a revolutionafter gaining public support.

This paper analyzes the period in Eg5^t from January 25, 2011,to April 10, 2012. The paper is based on ethnographic work conductedin Cairo from February 4, 2011, to April 15, 2011; 60 interviews withEgyptian activists, 50 of them randomly selected from different groupsduring the revolution, made in person, and 10 selected interviewsvwth activists during the transitional period, the latter of which wereconducted by phone; and archival work, especially on op-eds written byEg3T3tian intellectuals in Eg3T3tian newspapers, both before and afterthe revolution.

The paper is divided into two parts, each devoted to discussing oneof the two questions stated above. I am engaged here in two research

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strategies. The first is situating my ethnographic notes and interviewsin their historical and social context, especially in light of some latercomments made during my interviews. While I vdtnessed many eventsin Egypt during the revolution, I was not there ftom January 25 toFebruary 3, a period during which many things happened that involvedan army presence in the streets. I will look back at events that tookplace then, both things I directly observed and others I missed, in lightof some observations made during my interviews as well as those madein analyses by Egyptian vmters after the events took place.

THE ARMY DURING THE REVOLUTIONThe Eg5^tian military will not do what the Tunisian coun-terparts did viâth Ben-Ali.

—The Egyptian chairman of the Chiefs of Staff,speaking on the first day of what would later become a

revolution, January 25, 2011, in Washington, D.C.(Bhalla2011)

The Egyptian army stood next to the people and protectedthe revolution ftom its very first days until the moment.

—General Esmaeel E'ethman, former SCAFmember and adviser to the SCAF, one week after the

first anniversary of the revolution, on Februaiy 2, 2012

(EgyptNews 2012)

Why did the military decide to endorse the demands of the revolu-tion during the time of the revolution? Below, I closely examine someimportant events during the 18 days of the revolution that involved thearmy presence or actions in the revolution in order to explain how thearmy stood by Mubarak for the first 17 days of the revolution, but thendecided to support his ouster and assume power itself As I vwU show,it was only after these events that the army leaders decided to sacrificetheir leader to retain their privileges, and only after "the country's topleader had suddenly changed ftom an asset to a liability" (Sänger 2011).


Before this close analysis, I will start with a brief note on the differentperspectives necessary to understand the Egyptian military.

Various factors and Perspectives

The first perspective is economic-based. The main issues in thisperspective are the widespread economic interests of the military,which owns many economic assets in Egypt. According to someconservative estimates, the Egyptian military controls between 15and 40 percent of the economy (Tadros 2012). Three military bodiesdo work in civil production: the Ministry of Military Production,the Arab Organization for Industrialization, and the NationalService Products Organization. The percentage of the productionof these bodies that goes to civilian markets varies from 40 to 70percent. However, because of the lack of transparency, analysts andthose outside the government only know about non-defense activ-ity. "Whereas official statements suggest they make a total of $750million a year, workers have claimed higher figures—as much as $5billion from only one company" (Abul-Magd 2011). Despite nominallyfollowing the policies of International Monetary Fund (IMF) struc-tural adjustments programs, including privatization, the Mubarakregime left the economic empire of the army untouched and ran itin "an archaic, non-competitive Soviet manner" (Abul-Magd 2011).This included at least 35 factories and a variefy of companies. Thearmy's budget has been a separate total item in Egj^Jt's budget, withno civilian oversight. It is precisely this overlap and the confusionbetween military production and business production that makeexamination and evaluation of the operations of the Egyptian militaryeconomic empire so problematic. Ahmed Hashim (2011) describedthis as the military-industrial-business-commercial complex(MIBCC). In Egypt, Hashim suggests, the MIBCC is a "vast military-run commercial enterprise that seeps into every corner of Egyptiansociefy" (2011, 2).

The second perspective looks at the army's social demograph-ics. The army's manpower and strength is based on compulsory mili-

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tary service for all males between the ages of 18 and 30. The army isone of the biggest in the Middle East, with 440,000 people, more than300,000 of whom have been drafted. In one old estimate, approximately650,000 males reach military age each year, of which approximately80,000 are conscripted into the armed forces. Thus, the military annu-ally absorbs around 12.3 percent of Egyptian males entering the workforce (Gotowicki 1985). There appears to be a gap between the gener-als and the lower-ranking officers and soldiers. This gap reflects theclass dynamic of a sociefy where there is a great disconnect betweenthe people and the elite who mle them. However, it also reflects theidea that the "army is the people," as this is largely tme; the army iscomposed of mostly ordinary people v«th families and lives closelyconnected to those of working people. Because of this, as I will showlater, the fear of defection within the army becomes real in times suchas the revolution. The main sources of defection are the low-rankingofficers who have not been in the army for very long and who simplyare not satisfied. They have close ties vwth civil sociefy and their fami-lies and they do not see their own interests as aligned with those of thearmy and the generals.

The third perspective looks at the army historically and cultur-ally, especially in terms of the historically constructed images of thearmy and how the public perceives the army. The military is seen tohave acquired much of its legitimacy from the 1952 coup d'etat thatoverthrew the monarchy as well as from the 1973 war under Sadat.In Egypt there is a constmcted narrative about the army as the foun-dation of the modern nation-state after Muhammad Ali, and that itset the path for modernify (Fahmy 2003). At the same time, the armyalso brought about a kind of social welfare state with Nasser and theFree Officers who contributed to ending British colonialism (Abdel-Malik 1968; Bamett 1992; Hashim 2011; McNamara 2005; Trimberger1978). However, while it may have ended British colonialism, the 1952coup ultimately set the stage for a dictatorship in which democracywas left out and the people were subordinated to the state (Faulkner1953; Harb 2003; Kechichian and Nazimek 1997). There is this idea


that the people and the army have always seen eye to eye, but histori-cally this is not especially accurate, and in recent memory the armyis seen as more ambivalent and its dedication to serving the peopledoubtful. Over the years there has been a somewhat problematicrelationship between the people and the army. For example, in 1977the army went into the streets to break up the bread riots and bringorder and stabihfy back to the streets. In 1986, under Mubarak's rule,the army was sent to suppress a revolt by Central Securify Force (CSF)officers.

The fourth perspective looks at the Egyptian army specifi-cally within the larger international and geopolitical context. Themost important aspect in this perspective is the fact that the UnitedStates has provided Egypt with conditional military aid for the past30 years of around $1.3 billion annually. This has created a structuraldependency on the United States for military aid. The American mili-tary-industrial complex is structurally tied to and affects this samecomplex in Egypt, since the Egyptian army depends on the UnitedStates for a number of needs, including training, weaponry, and arma-ments. As activist Yehia Fekry bluntly stated in an interview on April2, 2011, "The [Egyptian] army is not really an Eg3^tian army. It is anAmerican army." The Egyptian army is so tied to the United Statesthat it is difficult for the Egyptian government and the army leader-ship to go against the United States when it comes to decision making.These decisions affect Egypt on the international scale but they alsoaffect the outcome of its internal domestic issues and affairs. The mili-tary often uses the claim of "national securify" because of its sharedborder with Israel in order to justify coercive, secretive, and corporatistpolicies.

These four perspectives involve different dimensions of the army.Instead of looking at them as separate dimensions, I suggest that itis useful to look at these perspectives as complex and contradictoryfactors. As I explain below, it is really difficult to separate these dimen-sions from one another when looking at why the army seeminglydecided to "side" with the revolution.

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THE ARMY DURING THE EIGHTEEN DAYS OF THEREVOLUTIONLooking at the timeline about the developments of events related tothe military and their position during the eighteen days of the revo-lution indicates how these factors were interwoven and how theirinfluence shifted from day to day. In terms of the social demographicdimension, very few incidents of army defections took place duringthe 18 days, and even fewer of them became known in the media atthe time. One of these was when Major Ahmed Shoman joined theprotesters in Tahrir Square on February 10, 2011. In a live interviewwith Al Jazeera, he called on Mubarak to listen to the demands of thepeople and to step down after 30 years of oppression: "Resign. Thiscountry is not yours. The people now do not want you and I am oneof the people" (YouTube 2011). He mentioned in the interview thathe had a weapon and gave it to one of the other soldiers when hewent to go join the protests because "this is a peaceful revolution."In the interview, he also addressed Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi,the Egyptian minister of defense and head of the SCAF, and said thatthe dufy of the military was to protect the people, not the regime.He accused Tantawi of being part of this regime, and called for himto also resign. He called on the military to carry out their jobs. Healso said that there were many officers who were willing to defectbut were waiting to see what would happen. Despite his criticism ofTantawi and Mubarak, he said it was the time for the army to sidewith the people (YouTube 2011).

There were rumors that Shoman would have faced the deathpenalfy or 25 years in prison for his defection and statements againstthe military if it were not for public pressure to release him. Accordingto sources, Shoman was later pardoned by the SCAF for his defectionand returned to his position (Zeinobia 2011).

Another documented incident is by 30-year-old Captain EhabFathy, another military defector. He joined the protesters, also onFebmary 10. In addition, on Febmary 8, I saw a huge banner in thesquare held by former veterans of the war between Israel and Egypt in


October 1973. The banner read: "October 1973 veterans endorse thedemands of the Eg5^tian people: the martyrs of October 1973 and themartyrs of the January 2011 revolution are together in heaven." Events,such as the incidents of defections and the sjmibolic message of thisbanner, created significant pressure on the Egyptian army during thedays of the revolt, and ended with the seeming endorsement of therevolution on February 10.

The economic dimension has also been present, as military lead-ers have been in conflict in recent years with Gamal Mubarak, Hosni'sson, and his circle of businessmen. Two 2008 Wikileaks cables showhow Tantawi, as Egypt's minister of defense, and the Egjqîtian mili-tary elites were critical of privatization programs (Abul-Magd 2011). Inanother document, an unnamed Egyptian parliamentarian said Gamalhad regarded Tantawd and former Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman,who was appointed vice president during Mubarak's last days in power,as a threat to his ambitions (Al-Ahram 2011). In other words, there hadbeen mutual skepticism between Gamal Mubarak and his ftiends on theone hand and the army leaders on the other. The reasons for this werenot only Gamal's political ambitions but also the attempts of Gamal'scircle of businessmen to privatize the army's properties. Barany alsosuggested that Egj^tian military leaders were not pleased "to see theregime leaning on—and sluicing ever more privileges to—a large policeand security apparatus that in Egypt is thought to have employed asmany as 1.4 million people" (2011, 32). While it took some time for thegenerals to make up their mind, the revolution was perhaps an oppor-tunity to assert their influence without competition.

As for the Egyptian and American military ties, there is cosider-able evidence about the constant communications between Eg5^tianand American military leaders, and broadly the American administra-tion, during the revolt. Perhaps they were not on the same page allthe time, but there were at least constant communications and coor-dination. On January 25, the Egyptian military chief of staft was inWashington, D.C. and said to the media that "the Egj^tian militarywill not do what the Tunisian counterparts did with Ben-Ali (Startfor

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2011). From January 25 to January 29, 2011, the American administra-tion did not make any explicit references to the Eg5^tian military. AfterJanuary 28 and beyond, however, the administration began to speakabout communications with the Egyptian military. Secretary of theState Hillary Chnton stated that the army in Egypt was a respectableinstitution and that it could play a role in an orderly transition in Egypt(Landler 2011). Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs,made many statements about how professional the Egyptian militarywas and how the Americans tmsted that the Egyptian military wouldhave a stabilizing influence in Egypt {New York Times 2011). During mypresence in Tahrir at that time, many protesters I talked to told me thatthey had been following reports about the American administration'sreferences to the Egyptian military and any news regarding communi-cations. Later in March, many activists I interviewed told me they hadserious worries about potential deals or at least some sort of mutualunderstanding between the American administration and Egyptianmilitary leaders regarding managing the transitional period in waysdesigned to guarantee both the United States and the army's interests.

Egyptian blogger and activist Maikel Nabil Sanad (2011) suggestedthat there were two important factors preventing the Eg3^tian armyfrom shooting at the people. One was that using American-made weap-ons against a large peaceful protest by an army that had very specialties to its American counterparts would not only have serious repercus-sions on Egyptian-American army relations but might further damagethe American image in Egypt, the region, and perhaps the world. Thiscorresponds with many statements made after January 29 by Chiefs ofStaff chairman Mike Mullen and other American mihtary figures thatthey trusted that their Egyptian counterparts would use restraint indealing with the protesters (Bumiller 2011). Vice President Joe Bidenalso warned the Egyptian army against using violence to suppressprotesters, and American military leaders were advised to speak totheir Eg3T)tian counterparts during this time (Sänger 2011).

On January 29, 2011, the Egyptian air force sent two F-16warplanes roaring low above protesters in Tahrir Square. Most protes-


tors I talked to later told me that this was an attempt to terrorizeprotesters and disperse them. Sanad (2011) suggested that one dayafter the Egyptian army flew American planes to terrorize protesters.President Barack Obama became tougher on Mubarak and asked himto leave. Egyptian military leaders also knew that there would be seri-ous implications regarding the use of American-made arms against theprotesters among the American public.

The cultural and historical dimensions regarding the army'simage were also influential during the revolt. While the mainstreammedia portrayed the scenes of the appearance of the army in the streetsduring the late afternoon of January 28, around 5 a.m., as only welcom-ing and greetings, the actual picture was more complicated. As manyactivists who were present at the time told me, when the army firstappeared, the situation was chaotic. Most of the protesters were young,and they did not remember the last two times the army intervened inthe streets (1977 and 1986). Some were happy at being relieved after along battle that had lasted 10 hours with police forces, and after seeingmany injuries and deaths. The slogan "the people and the army are onehand" first appeared at this time. But many did not like that. Accordingto several activists, this slogan was an intelligent and strategic movefiom the protesters, made in an attempt to neutralize the army butdone so in an atmosphere of uncertainfy and confusion. When I was inTahrir at the time, and throughout discussions with many protestersbefore Febmary 11, 2011, a common sentiment among many activistswas that the army was like a black box. Activists told me that we do notknow what is in this box. The period fiom January 28 until Febmaiy 10was a long period of anxiefy and uncertainfy about the army, especiallyin Tahrir.

After many incidents of what protesters affirm were armymembers giving weapons to police, protesters burned armored vehiclesand stopped tanks. The army tried many times to disperse protestersusing different methods, including, as noted earlier, flying two F-16planes very close to the protesters, but did not succeed. But they beganto realize that there was a certain degree of determination to resist

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among the protesters. And attacking or shouting was a rislcy decisionto take given the large number of protesters. Many protesters beganto write graffiti on the army tanks, including such phrases as "FuckMubarak" or "Down with Mubarak." Protesters saw being able to sendtheir message, assert their demands, and insult the army's commander-in-chief using their own tanks as a symbolic victory. Wael Khalil, a lead-ing blogger, told me in an interview on April 5, 2011, that "it is this mixof feelings/actions toward the army that sums it up: on the one hand wehave chanted the people and the army are one hand, and on the other,protesters decided to sleep under tanks and block them fiom encroach-ing on the square or dispersing the Tahrir sit-in."

Khalil also told me that what he described as the "psychology ofprotesters" shifted fiom one day to another and even during the sameday, based on developments on the ground. Looking closely at the time-line of the army presence in the Egyptian streets during the 18 daysof the revolution, I divide this period roughly into three stages: fromJanuary 28 to Febmary 2; from Febmary 3 to the afternoon of Febmary10; and fiom Febmary 10 to Febmary 11.

In the first stage, the military was obviously coming to "restore"order. Soldiers were coming to assist the failed police (in repressingprotestors), under instructions by Mubarak, their commander-in-chief. In this stage the army, in more than one incident, tried to attackprotesters indirectly by assisting police. The military also attempted tothreaten protesters with live ammunition, and by fiying the two F-16sto terrorize protesters in an attempt to disperse them.

On February 2,2011, a turning point occurred after what is knownin Egyptian media circles and among activists as the camel battle. Thisrefers to an incident in which a few hundred Mubarak supportersarrived with horses and camels, along with mling parfy thugs carryingMolotov cocktails and sticks, to attack protesters. The battle, in whichprotesters succeeded in protecting their unorganized (at that time) sit-inand occupation of Tahrir, was not only a marker of the regime's lack oflegitimacy, but also shaming for the military, which was generally seenby protesters in Tahrir as complicit for not intervening while protesters


were being injured and assaulted. There was one minor exception herewhen a few military officers tried to disperse the thugs.

After Febmary 3, the military made efforts to indicate that theywere neutral. Assaults did not stop the protesters from mling parfythugs, and the military tried more than once to seize the place andstop encroachments on the square, preventing food and medical aid;but they did not try to attack. On Febmary 10, the same day as thetwo documented incidents of army defections, the army made its firststatement about endorsing the demands of the protestors. This was thefirst obvious signal that military leaders were preparing to distancethemselves from Mubarak, ensuring the protesters that they wouldnot attack them and that they respected the demands of the people.This was only 17 days after the beginning of the protests. The irony isthat the SCAF's first statement appeared only a few hours after militaryleaders had met with Mubarak.

The revolution was not only in Tahrir. In many other places,people gave flowers to the army soldiers and took pictures of and vwththe tanks. After January 28 in these areas, people in general beganto feel some sense of empowerment and decided to form neighbor-hood watch committees, since the pohce had disappeared. This wasa response to a sudden securify vacuum in the country. There wererumors, which later turned out to be tme, that many prisons had beenleft unattended and that escaped prisoners were everywhere. Manypeople I spoke with felt a strong sense of betrayal from the police. Atthis point it became not simply a fight with protesters in Tahrir butwith a significant part of the state, as the pohce seemed to leave thepeople throughout the country without securify. The army appearedat this time, dealing with people who were protesting but who alsostill needed securify.

In sum, the army leaders received internal pressure (concernabout defections), street pressure (what seemed to be an upper handfor the protesters in the streets and especially in Tahrir and some othermajor cities such as Alexandria), and vdthin the context of interna-tional geopolitics (unable to shoot with American weapons) that forced

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them to stay neutral. This can be added, of course, to the fact that theyfelt compelled to do what it took to protect their economic empire.

Barany (2011) classified the different stances of the militaiy in theArab revolts of 2011 into three categories: (1) siding with the protesters,as in Tunisia and Egj^t; (2) divided stances due to divided loyalties, as inLibya and Yemen; and (3) defending the current regime, as in Syria andBahrain. However, while both the Tunisian and Egyptian military mayhave sided with the protests in the end, this was a clearer and easierdecision by the Tunisian military as compared to the Eg5fptian one. OnApril 2, 2011, Yehia Fekry, a political activist and member of the paral-lel parliament Egj^tian activists formed before the revolution, told me:

We knew it all along. But we could stop people's eupho-ria at a time. Many people said we could come back to theSquare if needed. The army leaders do represent a signifi-cant/core component of the Egyptian ruling class, and incoordination vwth the US government, decided to sacrificeMubarak for this orderly transition. This means simplyan administrated transition to guarantee the interests ofthe army and the United States in the region. This was notsiding, it was a decision to hijack the revolution.

Some evidence supports Fekry's claim, especially the escalationof labor protests in many significant sectors in Egypt (railway, publictransportations, the Suez Canal) and calls for general strikes in Egypt onFebruary 12,2011. When I spoke to many labor organizers in Tahrir andelsewhere during the final days before ousting Mubarak, they repeatedalmost the same phrases: "we want an economic justice-based state; wewant to overthrow the whole system, not just getting rid of Mubarak."

Yet, ftom many conversations I had with some activists, andafter analyzing discussions at the time, it seemed that many Eg5fptianshad and have contradictory perspectives about the army. On the onehand, they want a strong military regionally, but at the same time theydo not want military intervention in politics. Of course, after violent


events escalated and human rights abuses took place in the transitionalperiod, many have become even more skeptical about the role of thearmy in politics. Polls of Egj^Jtians support the fact that these contra-dictory perspectives do exist (Telhami 2011).

In sum, the army leaders conceded to the revolution only on theconditions that it let them keep their economic empire, and that it gotrid of Camal Mubarak. But this also meant, at least at the time and evenlater, keeping a constmcted image about the national role of the militaryalive, as well as absorbing any potential threat from the dissatisfactionof younger military officers who could expose military leaders' corrup-tion. The outcome is that the military leaders of Egypt have accepted thetransition, perhaps unwillingly, and have been only willing to establisha conditional form of democracy if it is one which maintains the mle,privileges and, above all, the economic interests of the army.

And of course these factors have continued to play a role in influ-encing the army in the transitional period. For example, defectionstook place on April 8, 2011, when many army officers joined protests insolidarify with protesters' demands calling for the trials of importantfigures of the former regime, including Mubarak. The army-US rela-tion has been in the forefront in the context of what became known asthe NCO crisis. (This refers to the Egyptian government and the SCAF'slaunching of a legal prosecution campaign against foreign NCOs thatare not hcensed to work in Egypt.) The crisis raised the question of thecontinuation of the US mihtary aid. During the crisis many Americanstaff members of these NCOs were banned from leaving Egypt. Thecrisis seemingly ended with the lifting of the travel ban. Secretary ofState Hillary Clinton waived legislative conditions related to Egjqjt'sdemocratic transition, which was resulted in releasing the US militaryaid for the next year. The step appeared to be in favor of American mili-tary corporations that benefit from its relation with the Egyptian army(Myers 2012). On December 7, 2011, Amnesfy International released areport in which it confirmed that the United States has sent severalarms shipments to Egypt in the transitional period; some of these weresupplies to Egj^t's securify forces.

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WHY EXCESSIVE REPRESSION IN A TRANSITION TO"DEMOCRACY"?

[It was one of our first priorities to] to stop the unrelentingrevolutionary temper and movement. Such a movementcould lead to the obliteration of the military, the economicand the securify system, and state apparatuses.

—(High-ranking military officer, mentioned inEl-Senawy [2012a])

It is perhaps expected fiom any elite, either that newly formed after arevolution or the old elite against which revolutions took place, to fightback or resist change. But looking at how the events in the transitionalperiod unfolded indicates unprecedented repression, which has seenmore killing of protesters and Egyptians than during the time of therevolution itself In November 2011, Amnesfy International releaseda report in which it suggested that human rights abuses under mili-tary rulers have been worse than those under Mubarak. Not only haverepressive policies escalated during the transitional period, but thisperiod has also witnessed what appears to be social and economic chaosas well as a securify crisis. For example, one of the most aggressivemeasures the army leaders used was to refer civilians to military trials;the average estimated number of civilians prosecuted before militarycourts during the first year of transition was fiom 12,000 to 15,000 citi-zens. By contrast, the total number of civilians tried before militarycourts in 30 years under Mubarak was only about 3,000 citizens.

This level of repression has led many to question whether or notthe army leaders are vdlling to transfer power to a civilian government,as they have claimed. One might suggest that a better transition forthe army would have been a shorter transition, with less violence, andwhile protesters were still celebrating the army in the street. This mayactually have been better as far as allovwng army leaders to retain theirinterests and perhaps reach one version of the formula Steven Cookdescribed as "mling but not governing" (2007). Despite the apparentsuccessful grip on power by Egyptian army leaders during the transi-


tion, it makes sense to suggest that the excessive repression has costthem a lot. How can this be explained? Can this be attributed solely totheir objective of retaining the army's business? Below I discuss threeexplanations, followed by my conclusion, in which I suggest that therevolution seems to present one of the biggest challenges in contempo-rary Egyptian history to the legitimacy of the army's mle, a challengethat will affect political debates and politics in Egypt for years to come.

But before this discussion, it is important to address two issues.The first is that while looking at the army's actions to protests in thetransitional period, I am not implying that these events have beenonly unidirectional. On the contrary the escalated repression was inresponse to protests, which perhaps have also been increasing in thetransitional period. A New York Times editorial described the Egyptianrevolution as a never-ending one, due to the continuation of theprotests all through 2011 and until after the anniversary of the revo-lution (Cook 2012). Protesters in the transitional period have ralliedmany times at the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense to protestmilitary rule, something that was unconceivable in the recent historyin Egypt.

The second note concerns the composition of the SCAF. By discuss-ing the army leaders' actions, I am not in any way suggesting that thearmy leaders are a homogeneous and single actor. Despite the decadesof its existence, the SCAF remains essentially an ad hoc committee.The body has existed since President Sadat, met with him based onlyon his requests, and mainly just to offer consultations related to mili-tary affairs (Carnegie Endowment 2012). There has been no evidencethat the SCAF held regular meetings under Mubarak. The state-ownedinformation center suggests that the SCAF has 21 members, while theCarnegie Endowment in the reference above suggests that there are 19members (Egypt State Information Service 2012). All of the membersare high-ranking military officers. Some of those members occupydirect military posts, such as leaders of the different commands thatcover the country, while some head different parts of the armed forces,such as the navy, air force, air defense, and border forces.

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However, in addition to these posts, the minister of defense alsoappoints five assistants to the minister of defense. Field Marshal Tantawi.According to the website of the Officers for the Revolution, those assistantsare loyalists to the minister. This website presumably represents theviews of some defected military officers or anonymously representsviews of still-serving officers who support the revolution and are criticalof the SCAF. Those members have been engaged in the military's financesand properties (experts on the army's business and perhaps thereforeon cormption). The problem with this composition is that it mixes bothmilitary leaders and also "business" leaders. The commanders of militarydivisions seem to be less political, or at least are not tallcing to the media(Carnegie Endowment 2012). There are perhaps divisions and conflictsof perceptions about how to proceed in the future among these variousleaders. And it may make sense that those closer to the minister andchief of staff, who happened to be the most vocal with the media andmost involved in the ministry's finances and politics, are not in totalagreement about their visions of the economy and the country's politicsand transfer of power, as I will discuss later.

Excessive Repression Due to Using the Same Old Methods of the State

Apparatus

The first explanation of the army's excessive repression in the transi-tional period is that army leaders seem to generally resort to the state'spolitical apparatus. The army leaders simply cannot do any better butmust seek the help of the military police and intelligence apparatus. Inother words, they reorganized the state's pohtical apparatus in order tostop the continuation of protests. By political apparatus, I mean someof the key institutions of the state, such as the institutions of the police,military, and intelligence, as well as the government-controlled media.I suggest that there are three features that best represent this reorgani-zation. These are: (1) the continuation of the militarization of the state;(2) expanding the role of intelligence in the state and sociefy; and (3)conducting a phony securify reform while resisting major or genuinereforms in different sectors of the state.


The first is the continuation of the process of militarizing thestate. By militarizing the state I mean reserving many important postsin different areas, especially high economic and political positions, forpeople ftom military backgrounds, mostly former high-ranking mili-tary personnel. This is a practice that has been in place since Nasser,albeit with some shifts: it witnessed some decline after 1967 andthroughout Sadat's time, and even under Mubarak to some degree.But this practice has been increasing since 2000. And, as some analystssuggest (Abu-Almagd 2012), this has coincided vdth the rise of GamalMubarak, and it can be explained by the idea that Mubarak wanted tobuy the loyalty of military leaders.

Some of the most important posts that the SCAF has continuedto reserve for people ftom military backgrounds are the governors. Forexample, in August 2011, the SCAF appointed 5 former military andpohce generals out of 11 newly appointed governors. But the SCAF keptmost governors' posts unchanged. Egypt has 27 governors, many ofwhom are those with high positions in Mubarak's mling party. Out ofthe 27 governors, 18 are former military and police generals (Al-MasryM-Youm 2011). Another post is the minister of information, who is ftoma military background, also appointed by the SCAF on December 2011.This is Ahmed Anis, a former mihtaiy general, who previously served ashead of the Egj^Jtian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) under Mubarak.Many human rights activists I spoke to suggested that ERTU under theSCAF has been closely tied with the Moral Affairs Administration inthe Egyptian military, which is simply the propaganda department ofthe military. A report published in the Febmary 2, 2012, issue of Timeclaimed that ERTU has 43,000 employees. And, according to severaltestimonies by workers in ERTU, who are resisting military control ofthis body, only 3 to 4 percent ofthat number are technicians, while therest hold administrative and security posts. Many of them are employ-ees who are paid but who are not really working in the building. Therole of ERTU has been significant in justifying and also bringing tobear measures against protesters. In the attacks against Coptic protest-ers and Mushm supporters, who protested the buming of a church in

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Aswan, on October 2011, ERTU reporters simply asked the public to gointo streets to protect the army from "Coptic protesters who carry gunsto attack the army" (Elwakil 2011).

The second feature of the SCAF's reorganization of the state'spolitical apparatus is the expanded role of the intelligence agencies.Many incidents occurred in the transitional period that indicates anexpanded use of the intelligence apparatuses. Some human rightslawyers I exchanged email communications with (in the period fromJanuary 2012 to March 2012) suggested that the Military IntelligenceDepartment (MID) (Edaret Al-Muokhabarat Al-Aaskariya), formerlydealing with police officers and soldiers who may be engaged in orknown to have any kind of political activities or orientation, beganto survey major nationwide political activities, especially protestsand sit-ins that criticized the SCAF or raised issues regarding theunmet demands of the Egyptian revolution. In addition to this, thoselawyers emphasized the presence of agents of the Military DetectiveDepartment (Edaret Al-Taharyat Al-Askariya) in almost all protestsand sit-ins during the transitional period, especially in the Tahrirarea and in major rallies by protesters. In several incidents activistsin these sit-ins have caught soldiers who worked with MDD in theTahrir area and actually interrogated them. The role of these agentshas included surveillance of the sit-ins and occasionally involvementin provocations against police and the military. Activists have alsodocumented some of these incidents in their blogs (Eg5^t to Where2011).

In addition, the role of the Egyptian Ceneral Intelligence (ECI)seems to continue to be more visible. It is worth mentioning here thatECI historically has focused on national securify issues related to foreignaffairs. The former director of ECI, Ceneral Omar Sulieman, also vicepresident to Mubarak for a few days during the revolution, has playedan important role in Palestinian-Israeli affairs. It was only during therevolution that Sulieman visibly intervened in internal political affairswhen he met with different political parties and groups in an attemptto stop the protests on January 29, 2011.


Some of the incidents of the expanded role of the EGI includethe following. First, Sulieman's successor. General Murad Mouwafi, hasbecome more visible and engaged in constant consultation with differ-ent figures from different political groups (Samaan 2012). These meet-ings have varied from rights groups to selected political figures to theyouth of the revolution (Shams El-Din and El Sirgany 2011; Zeinobia2011). Several activists say this is a new thing in Eg5^t; at least it is avisible intervention in domestic policies by EGI, which previously onlyused to focus on foreign issues.

In addition to these meetings, many documented incidents haveoccurred that have entailed the kidnapping and imprisonment ofpolitical activists. After these were released, these activists have saidthat they "were interrogated and tortured" by a "sovereign body" (gehasyadiyya). In the Eg5^tian media, they always refer to EGI (and this mayinclude the MID). Most of those activists are critical of the SCAF, suchas youth who are working in the "no military trials" campaigns (NoMilitary Trials 2011). In addition, the prosecutor of Mubarak said in hispresentation that EGI had not been cooperative in collecting evidencerelated to Mubarak's trial (Kirkpatrick 2012).

In addition, one of the most problematic areas related to crimescommitted during the revolution has witnessed what seems to be noserious investigation. This concerns the question of protesters killedby snipers, as nobody really knows to which securify body the snipersbelong. The newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm published a rigorous reportabout this, suggesting that the Ministry of Interior has hidden relevantinformation. EGI requested all documents from the newspaper (Zidan2011). Several human rights activists and lawyers told me it is diffi-cult to believe that EGI knew nothing about this issue. They also saidthat the fact that they were not cooperative during Mubarak's trialsuggests that they were either involved or at least complicit in theseactions, and that they were willing to protect the parties involved.

The third feature of reorganizing the state's political apparatusis doing a phony securify reform as well as blocking calls for purifi-cations (a term activists used to mean removing important figures

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from the old regime) in key posts in the state. Despite the efforts oflocal and international human rights NGOs to offer proposals forpolice reform, these efforts seemed to have been ignored (AmnesfyInternational 2012). One crucial example of this is the change of thename of the former State Securify Intelligence (SSI) to National SecurifySector (NSS). Several human rights activists told me that the new bodyis still engaged in the same practices as the old one—intervening indifferent aspects of life such as elections in universities—and that itcontinues the surveillance of protesters as well. This suggests thatwhile the SCAF has partially reorganized the state apparatus, it doesnot mean that this reorganization is settled or that the process hasbeen coherent or thorough. Tamer Wagieh, a socialist writer, suggeststhat leaving the state apparatus to the military in the revolution hasbeen one of the most problematic issues in the transitional period. Hestates:

It is expected that any ruling class against which any revo-lution took place will fight back. But the most ironic andunfortunate story of our revolution is that we gave ourcorrupt ruling class a golden opportunify to destroy therevolution and shatter its revolutionaries. It is a goldenopportunify because they control the most important andinfluential posts in the state (Wagieh 2012).

Excessive Repression Because the Generals Hate the Revolution

One other explanation is psychologically based. Several activists Iinterviewed by phone recently affirmed one common idea about theunprecedented violence in Egyptian streets and especially that whichhas been directed at protesters. This idea is that this violence can beexplained only if we think that there is a deep psychological problemregarding the army leaders and the revolution. The activists claim thatthe army generals simply hate the revolution. Why is that, since therevolution has put them in power, in the transitional period at least,and helped in ending the succession plans of the president's son? One


Cartoon that was widely circulated in social media circles. In the cartoon,the arnay says of the January 25, 2011, revolution: "The army protected therevolution." A civilian, seemingly a young protestor, who represents the revo-lution, replies: "[No,] the army protected the regime." ©2011 by Ashraf OmarPublished with permission.

reason is that the revolution presumably ended the military rule thathas been in Egypt since 1952. Not only that but it exposed the military'sbusiness and humiliated the president, who comes from the military.Abdala El-Senawy, a prominent Nasserist writer, has suggested that theSCAF has what he describes as "Omar Sulieman logic." According tothis logic, "Egyptians do not deserve a good and working democracy.The way they humiliated Mubarak, who ruled the country for thirfyyears, is unforgivable" (El-Senawy 2012a). Khaled Fahmy, a prominentEgjrptian historian, has also suggested that the army leaders' aggres-siveness in responding to protests in the transitional period cannot beexplained simply by their concern about their economic empire (Fahmy2012). Fahmy claims that the revolution was not only against Nasser's

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paternal state, but also against the old model of the nation-state thathas been established since Mehmet Ali; he suggests that this state hasbeen a paternal, exclusionary state, one that has been based on forcedlabor. Many statements by the SCAF during the transitional period havethe same idea: that criticism of the army and the SCAF is a threat to theEgyptian state itself.

Excessive Repression Due to Spiits among SCAF Members

The third explanation is the presence of some divisions among SCAFmembers about the best way to protect the army's interests and/ortransfer of power. There are not enough details about the nature ofthis division, given the lack of transparency about the SCAF's meet-ings. However, one assumption we can make is that assistants to theminister and those who are immersed in the army's business are reallyconcerned about the future transfer of power. For example, prior toEgypt's first parliamentary election after the revolution, which tookplace on November 28, 2011, Eg3^tian security forces attacked protest-ers who demanded the army relinquish power. The battle lasted foralmost a week, ftom November 19 to November 24, 2011, occurringwhile the election campaigns were taking place. The downtown areawas almost like a war zone. Approximately 42 people were killed andover 3,000 injured. Live ammunition was used and activists and criticsin Egypt wondered how an election could take place in this context.

Some activists have suggested that there are some members inthe ruling SCAF council who really wanted to postpone the election.For example. Tamer Wagieh, a leading activist in the Socialist AllianceParty, stated that he has no doubts about the presence of "doves" and"hawks" in the SCAF. While both are in agreement about the goal ofending street protests and preventing any further radicalization inthe street after the revolution, those in the SCAF differ on the waysto handle this. The first camp sees elections as the best way to absorbstreet politics; hence, the army should protect the election. The secondcamp is very concerned about conftonting a strong Parliament, onewhich could demand a share of power with the SCAF, especially after


seeing how Islamists dominated Parliament in the first round of elec-tion (Wagieh 2011).

Nevertheless, despite the soundness of this reasoning, we do nothave sufficient evidence or information about this division, and spec-ulation can only be problematic. And of course the SCAF is certainlynot a homogenous body; at least we know that it has generals who areimmersed in the army's business and seem to be vocal in politics afterthe revolution as well as those who are military commanders and notvocal in pohtics. Many analysts also suggest that the SCAF's actions andthe council's reluctance to engage in serious reform could be explainedby its members' fears, especially the fear of civihan oversight of mili-tary business in the near future.

In addition, as many human rights activists told me, many SCAFmembers are quite worried about potential criminal trials for theiractions in the transitional period (Hanna 2011), not to mention duringthe years before. This analysis resonates with some evidence. For exam-ple, in March 2012, Major Ceneral Mahmoud Nasr, assistant minister ofdefense for financial affairs, in a meeting with many Eg5^tian writersand journalists, said that the army would not accept any supervisionfrom any civilian government. He even openly said to journalists: "Thearmed forces will fight to defend our projects. We have been buildingthem for 33 years and we won't give them to anyone else to destroy"(Wahish 2012).

The Crisis of Legitimacy for Military Ruie

These three explanations do not necessarily conflict with one another.I suggest that despite the outcome of the transitional period, the revo-lution created significant pressure on the army leaders, pressure theycontinue to feel. And it has created debates throughout Egyptian sociefythat have destabilized the paternal militarized state. I would argue thatthe excessive violence should be understood as well in the context ofwhat I describe as the crisis of the legitimacy of mihtary mle in Egypt.The revolution appears to have created such a crisis for mihtary mle inthe near future and for years to come.

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Many writers have argued that any new legitimacy in Egypt—thatis, a new republic—has to begin fiom the January 25, 2011, revolution.Before the revolution, writers only questioned the political legitimacyof Mubarak's mle. For example, writers in contemporary Egypt, suchas Mohamed Hassanain Haikal, the Arab nationalist and Nasseristvwiter, have been suggesting that if there was any political legitimacyin contemporary Eg3^t, this would have been that established by boththe July 1952 revolution and then that of the 1973 war. Mubarak lackedany such legitimacy.

Ahdaf Soueif, a prominent vwiter, published in El-Shorouk newspa-per only two weeks after Mubarak's ousting and the beginning of thetransition period (and after two incidents in a long list of continuousattacks by the SCAF on protesters) that there was now no clear basis forthe SCAF's legitimacy to rule. The SCAF has to make it clear whether itmns the country on the basis of the mandate/transfer of power givenby Mubarak to it, on the basis of a mandate from the revolution and thepeople, or simply based on its possession of physical force (Soueif 2011).After a majorify of Egyptians endorsed an interim constitution on areferendum, Tareq El-Beshry vwote in the Guardian that now the legiti-macy of the SCAF was based on the interim constitution. This suggeststhat the SCAF is still mandated by the people and that its legitimacyis conditioned upon the transfer of power to a civilian governmentaccording to this interim constitution (El-Beshry 2011). But after theSCAF violated the interim constitution, in continuing the emergencystatus and changing the time plan for transferring power, many activ-ists have argued that the SCAF is only mling the country based on phys-ical force.

In addition, many prominent writers have made explicit compar-isons between the 1952 coup and the 2011 revolution, suggesting thatthe first was a military coup that became a revolution after gainingpopular support, but that the second is a widespread mass revolt,which the military leaders want to turn into a coup so that they canretain the power they have held since 1952. In this context, Galal Aminhas affirmed that the generals of 2011 are radically different fiom the


free officers of 1952: the first belong to the mling ehte and the statusquo, but the former were young middle-class officers who wanted andworked for change (Amin 2011).

Being aware that this is not their revolution, the main narra-tive in the SCAF's public statements in the transitional period hasbeen based on the idea that the army was the protector of the revolu-tion; hence, it was a partner of the people. Of course, this narrative isself-contradictory, as on the one hand it entails that the army and thepeople are partners in the revolution, but on the other affirms that thearmy is for the people. "How can you be a partner with yourself?" oneactivist asked me. Al-Masry Al-Youm conducted a discourse analysis ofthe SCAF's statements made during the year after the revolution andshowed how these statements have been full of contradictions—themost important of which is the move from praising the revolutionaryyouth as heroes in the first few months after the revolution to labelingthem throughout the transitional period as infiltrators and destructiveagents (Abdel Fatah 2012).

Several low-ranking officers have also provided anon3mnous testi-monies to the media about some the SCAF members and army leadersin which they have expressed nothing but contempt for the very ideaof civilian rule and the revolutionary youth. One general said, "We willdiscipline those kids of Tahrir. . . . We thought we were protecting arevolution, but it turns out that we were protecting nothing but bunchof nonvirgin girls and homosexual kids" (Abdel Latif 2012). Because theSCAF not only attacked protesters and also deemed them not worthyof protection, many activists I have talked to and read about in socialmedia appear to have come to the conclusion that the SCAF cannotbe a guardian for a revolution they attack and work against. The armyseems to continue to lose legitimacy. This was a revolution that wasmade by the people, against a cormpt despotic figure who came fioman army background, a revolution that has also suffered human rightsabuses at the hand of the army. The problem is that the army has towalk a fine line between intemal pressure, the public's dissatisfaction,and its relationship with foreign powers in order to maintain any form

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of the formula "ruling but not governing." This means working behindthe scenes of a weak president and/or Parliament. One high-rankingmilitary officer recently said:

I vow with my military honor, we do not want to make a mili-tary coup nor do we want to retain power. Circumstancesare radically different from that of 1954. We do reallyhonor and think that Nasser is an ideal leader. However, wecannot really repeat his actions. A military coup today is asuicidal action for the Egyptian military. But this suicidalthought is not totally unthinkable. We are ready to do thisto prevent Egypt from becoming a religious state (quotedin H-Sena\yy 2012b).

The reference here was to events of 1954, when Nasser's regimedissolved the Muslim Brotherhood and prosecuted some of its leaders.The Free Officers then promised to transfer power to a civilian govem-ment—a promise broken in order to maintain stabilify. Neither thedomestic context nor the international one, or even the lessons learnedfrom history, would allow the army to carry out an explicit coup. Thiswould be described, at best, as a hijaclcing of the revolution. In sum,the revolution created a crisis for the legitimacy of the military mle foryears to come.

CONCLUSIONIn the first part of this paper, I discussed a set of factors that underliethe situation and actions of the Egyptian army. In the second part Ianalyzed what it seems to me the central problem that explains thearmy's resistance to comprehensive democratic reform and its exces-sive repression in the transitional period. This problem is the crisisof legitimacy of military rule in Egypt, after a mass revolt begun andconducted mainly by the people. These factors and this crisis of legiti-macy vwU play a significant role in influencing the army's actions andaffect the future of power relations in Egypt. While this paper focused


on the role of the army in both the revolution and in the postrevolu-tionary transition, in many parts of the discussion I analyzed how thisrole is not taking place in a domestic or intemational vacuum.

A number of important events took place in June 2012 after Iwrote this paper. These include the decision to dissolve the only demo-cratically elected institution in the aftermath of the revolution, theEgj^tian Parliament, following a ruling by the Supreme ConstitutionCourt. The SCAF also regained both legislative and executive powers,with the new president sharing only the executive power. Many criticshave described this as a military coup. This paper does not touch onthese events. While these events do not contradict the general argu-ment in this paper, I believe that the situation in Egj^t is far more fluidand unsettled with respect to power arrangements than some may real-ize. Hence, the idea that the SCAF has already succeeded in turning theEgyptian mass revolt into a military coup is far ftom a final conclusion.

There are two issues that play an important role in shaping thenear future in Egypt. The first is what many activists and writers inEg3^t describe as the problem of a strong civil society and the never-ending revolutionary fever, which has had more reasons to escalateafter the revolution, given the SCAF's continuing repression and thedisappointing economic and security situation. It is telling that thepeople's ambivalent vision about the army has changed during thetransition. For example, many intellectuals, who were against criti-cizing the army in the beginning of the revolution, have accepted theneed for that. The slogan "the people and the army are one hand" wasperhaps a successful revolutionary tactic during the time of the revolu-tion. But many activists now see it as a tme representation of counter-revolution. The strongest chant in the demonstrations that took placeon the anniversary of the revolution was "down with military rule." Butwhile street protests against the military have continued since the firstanniversary of the revolution, the main problem that conftonts thesecular and leftist youth of the revolution—^which seem to be the corecomponent of the revolution and this strong civil society in Egypt—istheir lack of equivalent strong political parties to represent them.

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The second important issue is the contemporary crisis of dual-ity in power in Egypt, with a Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist-dominated elected Parliament but the SCAF acting as the executiveauthorify until a new president is elected. The crisis of legitimacythat the SCAF has positions it in a very difficult situation toward thebrotherhood. On the one hand, the SCAF needs the Brotherhood toact as a strong ally in endorsing a new constitution that retains themilitary's interests. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood isnot simply a partner willing to give in to the military's demands. Boththe SCAF and the Brotherhood had perhaps some shared interests atsome point to use the legitimacy of the Parliament against escalat-ing protests (which I have not discussed in this paper). But they nowappear to be clashing about which vision of the transfer of power toendorse.

As this issue was going to press, the SCAF decided to dissolve theEgjqjtian Parliament that the Muslim Brotherhood dominated. This tookplace after a decision taken by the Supreme Constitutional Court thatthe Parliament was elected based on an unconstitutional electoral law.Critics and bloggers have described this move from the SCAF as a "soft"mihtary coup or a coup that took judicial means. These changes do notcontradict my claim that this dualify of power or the struggle betweenthe SCAF/the old regime and the Muslim Brotherhood will impact poli-tics in the near future in Eg5q3t. Finally, it seems that both the MuslimBrotherhood and the SCAF share the same vision with respect to theeconomy, which is clearly a neoliberal one. While this is frustrating forthe public, it is also not clear how the Muslim Brotherhood's economicvision can easuy coexist with the SCAF's economic interests.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI would like to thank Tarek Metwally, Zeinab Khalil, and Eman Abdelhadifor assisting me with this paper. I am also grateful to Zeinab Abul-Magd,Fatma Muge Cocek, and Ceorge Steinmetz for their comments on thepaper. And I am especially grateful for Arien Mack and Talal Asad fortheir comments on the first draft of this paper.


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