Democracy With Adjetives

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Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative ResearchAuthor(s): David Collier and Steven LevitskySource: World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Apr., 1997), pp. 430-451Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054009

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Research Note

DEMOCRACY WITH ADJECTIVES

Conceptual Innovation in

Comparative Research

ByDAVID COLLIER andSTEVEN LEVITSKY*

THE

recent globalwave of democratization has presented scholars

with the challenge of dealing conceptually with a great diversity of

postauthoritarian regimes. Althoughthe new national

political regimes

in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the former communist world share

importantattributes of

democracy, many of them differprofoundly

both from each other and from the democracies in advanced industrial

countries. Indeed, many are not considered fiilly democratic.This article argues that scholars

respondto this

challenge by pursu

ingtwo

potentially contradictory goals.On the one hand, researchers

attemptto increase

analytic differentiationin order to

capture the di

verse forms ofdemocracy that have emerged. On the other hand,

scholars are concerned withconceptual validity. Specifically, they

seek to

avoid theproblem

ofconceptual stretching

that arises when the con

cept ofdemocracy

isapplied

to cases for which, byrelevant

scholarly

standards, it is not appropriate.1 The result has been a proliferation of

alternativeconceptual forms, including

asurprising

number ofsubtypes

*We acknowledge the valuable suggestions of Ruth Berins Collier, Larry Diamond, Andrew

Gould, Peter Houtzager, Marcus Kurtz, Terry Karl, David Laitin, George Lakoff, Arend Lijphart,

James Mahoney, Scott Mainwaring, Carol Medlin, Gerardo Munck, Guillermo O'Donnell, Michael

Pr?tes, Philippe Schmitter, Laura Stoker, Mark Turner, Samuel Valenzuela, and participantsin the

Berkeley Working Groupon

Comparative Method. Steve Levitsky's participationin this research was

supported byaNational Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship, and David Collier's work on this

projectat the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences was

supported by National Sci

ence Foundation Grant no. SBR-9022192.1Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in

Comparative Politics," American Political Science Re

view 64 (December 1970); and David Collier and James E. Mahon, Jr., "Conceptual 'Stretching' Re

visited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis,"American Political Science Review 87

(December 1993).

WorldPolitics49 (April 1997), 430-51



DEMOCRACYWITH ADJECTIVES 431

involving democracy"with

adjectives."2 Examplesfrom among the

hundreds ofsubtypes

that haveappeared

include "authoritarian democ

racy," "neopatrimonial democracy," "military-dominated democracy,"

and"protodemocracy."

This proliferation has occurred despite the efforts by leading analyststo standardize usage of the term

democracyon the basis of

procedural

definitions in the tradition of Joseph Schumpeter andRobert A. Dahl.3

Inimportant respects this standardization has been successful. Yet as

democratization has continued and attention has focused on an in

creasinglydiverse set of cases, the

proliferationof

subtypesand other

conceptualinnovations has continued.

Hence, giventhe risk of

growingconceptual confusion, the earlier effort to standardize usage

must now

besupplemented by assessing

the structure ofmeaning

that underlies

these diverse forms of the concept.

This article initiates this assessment, focusingon

qualitativecate

gories4 employedin the

studyof recent cases of democratization at the

level of nationalpolitical regimes,

withparticular

attention to work on

Latin America.5 Our goalis twofold: to make more

comprehensiblethe

complex structure of the alternative strategies of conceptual innovationthat have

emergedand to examine the trade-offs among these strate

gies. Webegin

with Sartori's well-knownstrategies

ofmoving up and

down a ladder ofgenerality?strategies

aimed atavoiding conceptual

stretchingand

increasing differentiation, respectively.Because this ap

proachcannot be used to pursue both

goalsat once, we find that scholars

have often turned to otherstrategies: creating

"diminished"subtypes

of

democracy, "precising" the definition of democracy by adding defining

attributes, and shifting the overarching concept with which democracy

is associated (for example,from democratic

regimeto democratic state).

2A

parallel expression, "democracy without adjectives," appearedin debates in Latin America

among observers concerned with thepersistence

ofincomplete

andqualified

forms of democracy. See,

for instance, Enrique Krauze, Por una democracia sin adjetivos (Mexico City: Joaqu?n Mortiz/Planeta,

1986).3

Schumpeter, Capitalism,Socialism and

Democracy (New York:Harper, 1947); and Dahl, Polyarchy:

Participationand

Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).4Along with the

qualitative categories that are the focus of this discussion, valuable quantitative in

dicators have been developed for comparing recent cases of democratization. Ultimately, itwill be productive to

bring together insights about the strategies ofconceptual

innovationemployed

in these

alternative approaches. However, an essential prior step, which is ourpresent concern, is to learn more

about the conceptualinnovations introduced by scholars who

employ qualitative categories.5We are thus not

primarily concerned with the literature on advanced industrial democracies, al

though this literature is animportant point

of reference in the studies we areexamining. In a few

places,we have included recent studies of countries that are not

actually part of the currentepisode

of

democratization, but whose relativelynew democracies are a

pointof

comparisonin the studies under

review, for example, Colombia. We also include a few references to other historical cases that have been

used in recentscholarship

asimportant points of analytic contrast.



432 WORLD POLITICS

Morebroadly,

theanalysis

seeks toencourage scholars to be more

careful in their definition and use of concepts. The subtypes and other

conceptual

forms examined here are, after all, generallycritical compo

nents of the main substantive arguments presented bythese researchers,

oftenadvancing

the author's overall characterization of the case or cases

inquestion.

These are the "data containers" that convey the most salient

facts about theregimes

under discussion.6 If one is to describe the new

regimes adequately,these data containers must be

employedin a clear

andappropriate

manner.

Improved description,in turn, is essential for

assessingthe causes and

consequences of democracy, which isa

central goal of this literature.

Manystudies have treated

democracyas an outcome to be

explained,

including majorworks of

comparative-historical analysisand old and

new studies of "socialrequisites."7

Otheranalyses

have looked at the

impactof

democracyand of

specific types of democracyon economic

growth,income distribution, economic liberalization and

adjustment,

and international conflict.8 In these studies, the results of causal assess

ment can bestrongly

influenced bythe

meaningof

democracyem

ployed by the author.9 We hope that the present discussion can serve as

astep toward a

greater consistencyand

clarityof

meaningthat will pro

vide a moreadequate

basis for assessing causalrelationships.

6Sartori (fn. 1), 1039.

7Barrington Moore, Jr., Social

Origins ofDictatorshipand Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the

Making

of theModern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); GregoryM. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism, or Social

Democracy:Social Classes and thePolitical

Origins ofRegimesin Interwar

Europe (New York: Oxford Uni

versity Press, 1991); Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne HuberStephens,

and John D.Stephens, Capi

talistDevelopment

andDemocracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Seymour Martin

Lipset,

"Some Social

Requisites

of

Democracy:

Economic

Development

and Political

Legitimacy,"American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959); and idem, "The Social Requisitesof Democracy

Revisited," AmericanSociological

Review 59 (February 1994); John B.Londregan and Keith T. Poole,

"Does High Income Promote Democracy?"World Politics 49 (October 1996); and Adam Przeworski

and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," World Politics 49(January 1997).

8Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," Journal of

EconomicPerspectives

7 (Summer 1993); Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Political

Democracy and the Size Distribution of Income," AmericanSociological

Review 50(August 1985);

Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles, "The Effects of Democracyon Economic Growth and Inequality:

A

Review," Studies inComparative

InternationalDevelopment

25 (Spring 1990); Karen L. Remmer,"The

Politics of Economic Stabilization: IMFStandby Programs

in Latin America, 1954-1984," Compara

tive Politics 19 (October 1986); Barbara Stailings and Robert Kaufman, eds., Debt andDemocracy

in

Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); Bruce Russett, Grasping theDemocratic Peace:

Principles fora Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael E. Brown,

Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., DebatingtheDemocratic Peace: An International Secu

rityReader (Cambridge:

MIT Press, 1996); AlfredStepan

and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frame

works and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism," World Politics 46

(October 1993); Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failureof

PresidentialDemocracy (Balti

more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy,"

Journal ofDemocracy5 (January 1994).

9See, for example,

Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Democracy, Stability, and Di

chotomies," AmericanSociological

Review 54(August 1989), 613-16; and Russett (fn. 8), 15-16.




It meritsemphasis

that thesestrategies

ofconceptual

innovation are

byno means

uniqueto

qualitativeresearch on recent democratization.

They

are found in

many conceptual domains,

both in the social sciences

and beyond.10A further goal of this article is therefore to advance the

broaderunderstanding

of howqualitative

researchers deal with these

basic issues of analytic differentiation andconceptual validity.

I.Definitions of Democracy in Research on

Recent Democratization

In his famous analysis of "essentially contested concepts," the philoso

pherW. B. Gallie argues that

democracyis "the

appraisive politicalcon

cept parexcellence.'m

Correspondingly,one finds endless

disputesover

appropriate meaningand definition. However, the

goalof Gallie's

analysisis not

simplyto underscore the

importanceof such

disputes,

but to show that arecognition

of the contested status of agiven

con

cept opens thepossibility

of understanding each meaning within its

own framework. With reference todemocracy,

he argues that"politics

being the art of the possible, democratic targets will be raised or low

ered as circumstances alter," and he insists that these alternative stan

dards should be takenseriously

on their own terms.12

In thisspirit,

we focus on theprocedural

definitions that have been

mostwidely employed

in research on recent democratization at the

level of national political regimes.These definitions refer to democratic

procedures^rather than to substantive

policiesor other outcomes that

mightbe viewed as democratic. These definitions are also "minimal," in

thatthey deliberately

focus on the smallestpossible

number of attrib

utes that are still seen asproducing

a viable standard fordemocracy;

not

surprisingly,there is

disagreementabout which attributes are needed

for the definition to be viable. Forexample,

most of these scholars dif

ferentiate whatthey

view as the morespecifically political

features of

theregime

from characteristics of the societyand economy,

on the

10For an

analysis that focuses on some of these samestrategies

with reference to another social sci

ence

concept,

see David Collier,"Trajectory

of a

Concept: 'Corporatism'

in the

Study

of Latin Amer

ican Politics," in Peter H. Smith, ed., Latin America inComparative Perspective:

NewApproaches

to

Method andAnalysis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995). For discussions by linguists

andcognitive

scientists of the intuitive structure that underlies these strategies,see D. A. Cruse, Lexical Semantics

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chap. 6; George Lakoff, Women, Fire, andDangerous

Things:What

CategoriesReveal about theMind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), chaps. 2,

6; and John R.Taylor, Linguistic Categorization: Prototypes

inLinguistic Theory, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1989), chaps.2-3.

11W. B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings oftheAristotelian

Society56 (London:

Harrison and Sons, 1956), 184; emphasisin original.

12Ibid., quote at 186; see also pp. 178,189,190,193.



434 WORLD POLITICS

groundsthat the latter are more

appropriately analyzedas

potentialcauses or

consequences ofdemocracy,

rather than as features of democ

racy itself.13Within this framework, we focus on a

"proceduralminimum" defini

tion that presumes fully contested elections with fiill suffrage and the

absence of massive fraud, combined with effective guarantees of civil

liberties, includingfreedom of

speech, assembly,and association.14

However, there isby

no means consensus on asingle

definition. Some

scholars, forexample,

have created anuexpanded procedural

minimum"

definition by adding the criterion that elected governments must have

effective power to govern?which, as we will see below, is a crucial issue

in some countries.

II. Sartori's Strategies

We first consider Sartori'sstrategies

forachieving

differentiation and

avoiding conceptual stretching.Sartori builds on a basic

insight about

theorganization of concepts:

asignificant aspect of the

relationship

be

tween themeaning

of concepts and the range of cases to whichthey

applycan be understood in terms of a "ladder of

generality."15This lad

der is based on apattern of inverse variation between the number of

definingattributes and number of cases. Thus, concepts With,

fewer

definingattributes

commonly applyto more cases and are therefore

higheron the ladder of

generality,whereas concepts with more

definingattributes

applyto

fewercases and hence are lower on the ladder.

13For discussions of

procedural definitions, see Guillermo O'Donnell andPhilippe C. Schmitter,

Transitionsfrom

Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1986), chap. 2; Samuel P.Huntington, "The Modest

Meaningof Democ

racy," in Robert A. Pastor, ed., Democracyin theAmericas:

Stoppingthe Pendulum (New York: Holmes

and Meier, 1989); Schumpeter (fn.3); and Dahl (fn. 3). On minimal definitions, seeGiuseppe Di

Palma, ToCraft

Democracies: AnEssay

onDemocratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1990), 28; and Samuel P.Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth

Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 9. Ontreating characteristics of the society

and economy as a cause or consequence of democracy,see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritar

ianRegimes,"

in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W.Polsby, eds., Handbook

ofPolitical Science, vol. 3

(Reading,

Mass.:

Addison-Wesley,1975), 182; and

Terry LynnKarl, "Dilemmas of Democratization

in Latin America," ComparativePolitics 23 (October 1990), 2.

14O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 13), 8 (but see note 33 below); Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and

Seymour MartinLipset, "Preface," inDiamond, Linz, and

Lipset, eds., Democracyin

DevelopingCoun

tries: Latin America (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), xvi; Di Palma (fn. 13), 16. See also Juan J.

Linz, The Breakdownof

DemocraticRegimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and

Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1978), 5.15

Sartori (fn. 1), 1040, actuallyrefers to a ladder of "abstraction." However, because the term abstract

is often understood in contrast to concrete, this label can beconfusing.

We therefore find that "ladder of

generality" expresses the intended meaningmore

clearly.



DEMOCRACYwith adjectives 435

Differentiation

One of Sartori'sgoals

is to show howconceptual

differentiation can be

increasedby moving

down the ladder ofgenerality

toconcepts that

have moredefining

attributes and fit a narrowerrange of cases. These

concepts providethe more

fine-graineddistinctions that for some

pur

posesare invaluable to the researcher.16 This move down the ladder is

oftenaccomplished through

the creation of what we will call "classical"

subtypesof

democracy.17Classical

subtypesare understood as

^///in

stances of the root definition18 of democracy in relation towhich they

are formed, at the same time that they are differentiated vis-?-vis other

classicalsubtypes

of this concept. Thus, "parliamentary democracy,"

"multiparty democracy,"and "federal democracy"

are all considereddef

initelydemocratic

(bywhatever standard the author is

using),at the

same time that each is considered aparticular type

ofdemocracy (see

Figure 1). In research on recent cases of democratization, the use of

classical subtypesto achieve differentiation is found, for

example,in the

importantdebate on the consequences of

parliamentary,as

opposedto

presidential, democracy.19

Moving down the ladder of generality provides useful differentiation,

and thesubtypes just

notedplay

animportant

role in the recent litera

ture. Yetsubtypes

formed in this mannermay leave the

analystvulner

able toconceptual stretching,

becausethey presume the cases under

discussion aredefinitely

democracies. If the particularcase

beingstud

ied is less than fully democratic, then the use of thesesubtypes

as a tool

ofconceptual

differentiation may not beappropriate. Analysts

there

fore seek concepts thatdistinguish among different

degreesof democ

racy, in addition todistinguishing among different

typesof

democracy.

Because classicalsubtypes

ofdemocracy only

contribute to the second

of these twogoals, they

have not been the most common means of con

ceptualdifferentiation in studies of recent democratization.

16Sartori (fn. 1), 1041.

17We refer to these as classical subtypes

because theyfit within the "classical" understanding of cat

egorization discussed by such authors as Lakoff (fn. 10), 9 and passim; and Taylor (fn. 10), chap. 2.18

Inreferring

to the root definition, we do notimply

that it is the "correct" definition of the relevant

concept (in this case, of democracy).It is

simplythe definition that, for a

particular author, is the point

of departurein forming the subtype.

We will occasionallyuse the

expression"root

concept"to refer to

the concept (again,in the present context, democracy) that is the point of departure

for the various

conceptualinnovations analyzed here.

19Linz and Valenzuela (fn. 8); Stepan

and Skach (fn. 8); and Giovanni Sartori, ComparativeConsti

tutionalEngineering:

AnInquiry

into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes (New York: New York Uni

versity Press, 1994).



436 WORLD POLITICS

REGIME

Up the Ladder:

Avoiding Conceptual

Stretching

I

Civilian regime*

Competitive regimebElectoral regime0

Root Concept

i

I

DEMOCRACY

?Down the Ladder:

Increasing

Differentiation

Parliamentary democracy*1

Two-party democracy0

Federal democracyf

Figure 1

The Ladder of Generality:

increasing differentiation versus avoiding

Conceptual Stretching

"JohnA. Booth, "Framework for Analysis,"in John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., Elec

tions andDemocracy

in Central America(Chapel

Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 26.

bRuth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shapingthe Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor

Movement, andRegime Dynamics

inLatin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 354.

cJames Petras and Fernando Ignacio Leiva, Democracy and Poverty in Chile: The Limits toElectoral

Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 89.

dJuan J. Linz. "Presidential orParliamentary Democracy: Does ItMake aDifference?" in Juan J.

Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failureof

PresidentialDemocracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1994), 3.

eMarkJ. Gasiorowski, "The Political Regimes Project,"Studies in

ComparativeInternational Devel

opment 5 (Spring1990), 113.

Raymond Duncan Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom:Experiences and Suggestions,"

Studies inComparative

InternationalDevelopment

25(Spring 1990), 35.

Avoiding Conceptual Stretching

Sartori'sproposal

foravoiding conceptual stretching

is to moveup

the

ladder of generalityto concepts that have fewer defining attributes and

correspondinglyfit a broader range of cases.20 In the present context,

20Sartori (fn. 1), 1041.




this involves concepts located abovedemocracy

on the ladder of gener

ality.Scholars commonly

viewdemocracy

as aspecific type in relation

to the

overarching concept

of

regime.Hence, if

they

have

misgivings

as

to whether aparticular

case isreally

a democraticregime, they

can move

up the ladder and simply call it aregime.

However, becauseshifting

to aconcept

asgeneral

asregime

entails a

great loss ofconceptual differentiation, scholars have

typicallymoved

to an intermediate level (Figure 1)?adding adjectives to the term

regimeand

thereby generatingclassical

subtypesto differentiate spe

cifictypes

of regime. Theresulting subtypes

remain moregeneral

than

the concept of democracy, in that they encompass not only democracies but also some /w^-democracies.

Examplesinclude "civilian re

gime," "competitive regime,"and "electoral

regime." Althoughscholars

thus achieve someconceptual

differentiation in relation toregime, they

do notspecifically

commit themselves to the idea that the case under

discussion is ademocracy.

A similar patternis followed when scholars

use asynonym for

regime,as in "civilian rule" and

"competitive polity."21

Although climbing the ladder of generality helpsto avoid conceptual

stretching, it has an important drawback. Because these subtypes re

main moregeneral

than the concept ofdemocracy,

thisapproach

leads to

a loss ofconceptual

differentiation. Thus, takentogether,

Sartori's two

strategiescan advance one or the other of these

goals,but not both at

once. As aconsequence, many scholars have turned to other

strategies.

III. Diminished Subtypes

An alternative strategy ofconceptual innovation, that of

creating"di

minished" subtypes,22can contribute both to achieving differentiation

and toavoiding conceptual stretching.

It is astrategy widely used in the

literature on recent democratization. Twopoints

are crucial for under

standingdiminished

subtypes. First, in contrast to the classical sub

types discussed above, diminished subtypesare not fiill instances of the

root definition of"democracy" employed by

the author who presents

thesubtype.

Forexample, "limited-suffrage democracy"

and

"tutelarydemocracy"

are understood as less thancomplete

instances of democ

21See, respectively,

Richard Wilson, "Continued Counterinsurgency: Civilian Rule inGuatemala,"

in Barry Gills, Joel Rocamora, and Richard Wilson, eds., LowIntensity Democracy:

Political Power in the

New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993); and Terry Lynn Karl, "Democracy by Design:The

Christian Democratic Partyin El Salvador," in

Giuseppe Di Palma and Laurence Whitehead, eds.,

The Central AmericanImpasse (London: Croom Helm, 1986).

22The idea of diminished

subtypesbuilds on the discussion of radial concepts inCollier and Mahon

(fn. 1), 850-52. See also Lakoff (fn. 10), chap. 6.



438 WORLD POLITICS

racy becausethey

lack one or more of itsdefining

attributes.23 Conse

quendy,in

usingthese

subtypesthe

analystmakes amore modest claim

about the extent of democratization and is therefore less vulnerable to

conceptual stretching.

The secondpoint

concerns differentiation. Because diminished sub

types representan

incompleteform of

democracy, they mightbe seen as

hwingfewer defining attributes, with the consequence thatthey

would

be higheron the ladder of generality and would therefore provide less,

rather than more, differentiation. However, the distinctive feature of

diminished subtypes is that they generally identify specific attributes of

democracy that are missings thereby establishing the diminished character

of thesubtype,

at the same time thatthey identify

other attributes of

democracythat are

present. Becausethey specify missing attributes, they

also increase differentiation, and the diminished subtype in fact refers

to adifferent

set of cases than does the root definition ofdemocracy.

The inclusion and exclusion of cases that occurs with a diminished

subtype,as

opposedto

moving upor down the ladder of

generality,can

be illustrated with the examples of contemporary Britain, the United

States, and Guatemala(Figure 2). Britain and the United States, but

probably notGuatemala (at least up through themid-1990s), would be

seen as democratic in terms of theprocedural

minimum definition. If

we climb the ladder of generality,we find that the broader concept of

"electoralregime"24 encompasses all three cases. Lower down on the

ladder the classicalsubtype "parliamentary democracy"

would include

one of the two democracies, that is, Britain.By contrast, the dimin

ishedsubtype

"illiberaldemocracy"

would includeonly Guatemala,

the

case thatspecifically

did not fit the root definition ofdemocracy.25

Figure3 presents

someexamples

of the many diminishedsubtypes

that have beengenerated

in relation to theprocedural

minimum and

expanded proceduralminimum definitions of

democracy noted above.

In many instances, scholars created diminishedsubtypes

inwhich more

than onecomponent attribute of

democracyis

missing,but for the pur

23Because they

are less than complete instances, itmight

be objected that theyare not

really "sub

types"of

democracyat all. Drawing

on a term from cognitive linguistics,one can refer to them as con

ceptual "blends" that are derived in part from the concept of democracy. However, to avoid referring

repeatedlyto

"subtypes and blends," it seemssimpler

in the discussion below to call themsubtypes.

See Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, "Conceptual Projection and Middle Spaces," Reportno.

9401, Department of CognitiveScience (San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 1994).

24This

subtypeis understood to have the

meaning explainedabove in the discussion of

Figure1.

25Regarding illiberal democracy,

seeFigure 3. Two further points about diminished subtypes should

be underscored. First, if scholars fail toidentify

the root definition of democracy in relation to which

they form subtypes,it is difficult to determine whether a

given subtypeis classical or diminished.




Up theLadder

Electoral RegimeCases: Britain,

U.S., Guatemala .

?Root Concept

Democracy

Cases: Britain, U.S.

~~T~Down the Ladder

Parliamentary

Democracy

Cases: Britain

Diminished Subtype

Illiberal

Democracy

Cases: Guatemala

Figure 2

Inclusion and Exclusion of Cases:

Ladder of Generality versus Diminished Subtypes

pose of illustration we focus onexamples

inwhich the author has been

reasonablycareful in

isolatinga

single missing attribute. Thesubtypes

in the first group (la) refer to caseswhere themissing attribute is full

suffrage. Here we find terms such as "male" or"oligarchical'' democracy,

which are used inpointing

to the contrast between contemporarycases

and historical casesprior

to the advent of universalsuffrage.

Where the

attribute of full contestation ismissing (lb), aswhen important parties

Second, the fact that asubtype refers to what might be understood as a

"problematic" feature of

democracy does notnecessarily

mean that it is a diminishedsubtype.

Forexample, O'Donnell's con

cept of "delegative democracy," which refers to cases with weak horizontal accountability among the

branches of government, in fact meets his minimum definition of democracy, given that he does not

include horizontal accountability in the definition. See O'Donnell (fh. 8), 56. Hence, in his usage, del

egative democracy is a classicalsubtype.

For a discussion of subtypesthat refer to

"problematic" democ

racies, see alonger version of the present analysis

inDavid Collier and Steven Levitsky, "Democracy'with

Adjectives': ConceptualInnovation in

Comparative Research," Working Paperno. 230 (Notre

Dame, Ind.: The Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, 1996), 20-26. The above characteriza

tion of delegative democracyas a classical

subtypeshould be understood as

correcting the assessment

of this subtype presentedinCollier (fn. 10), 147-48.



1. Diminished from ProceduralMinimum Definition

(la)

Missing Attribute:

Full SuffrageLimited democracy*

Male democracy1*

Oligarchical

democracy0

(lb)Missing Attribute:

Full Contestation

Controlled democracy*1De facto one-party

democracy*

Restrictive democracyf

(lc)Missing Attribute:

Civil Liberties

Electoral democracyg

Hard democracy11

Illiberal democracy1

2. Diminished from Expanded Procedural Minimum Definition

Missing Attribute: Elected GovernmentHas Effective Power to Govern

Guarded democracy

Protected democracy1

Tutelary democracy1

Figure 3

Partial Democracies: Examples of Diminished Subtypes

"Ronald P. Archer, "Party Strength andWeakness in Colombia's Besieged Democracy," in Scott

Mainwaringand

TimothyR.

Scully, eds., BuildingDemocratic Institutions:

Party Systemsin Latin Amer

ica (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 166.

bGeorg Sorensen, Democracy and Democratization: Process andProspects

in aChanging

World (Boul

der, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 20.cJonathan Hartlyn and Arturo Valenzuela, "Democracy

in Latin America since 1930," in Leslie Bethell,

ed., TheCambridge History ofLatin America, vol. 6

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 99.

dBruce Michael Bagley, "Colombia: National Front and EconomicDevelopment," in Robert Wes

son, ed., Politics, Policies, and EconomicDevelopment

in Latin America (Stanford: Hoover Institution

Press, 1984), 125.

cAdrian Leftwich, "Governance, Democracy, and Development in the Third World," Third World

Quarterly14 (1993), 613.

fCarlos H. Waisman, "Argentina: Autarkic Industrialization and Illegitimacy,"in

Larry Diamond,

Juan J. Linz, and Seymour MartinLipset, eds., Democracy

inDeveloping

Countries: Latin America

(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), 69.

gAxel Hadenius, "The Duration ofDemocracy: Institutional vs. Socio-economic Factors," inDavid

Beetham, ed.Defining

andMeasuring Democracy (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 69.

hGuillermo ODonnell andPhilippe

C. Schmitter, Transitionsfrom

Authoritarian Rule: Tentative

Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 9. This is

our translation of their democradura. InEnglish they refer to this as "limited democracy," the same term

used in laabove,

butthey

make it clear that theirmeaning corresponds

to lc.

Donald Emmerson, "Region and Recalcitrance: Questioning Democracy in Southeast Asia" (Paper

presentedat theWorld Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, 1994), 14.

JEdelberto Torres Rivas, "La gobemabilidad centroamericana en los noventa," America Latina, Hoy

2 (June 1994), 27. This is our translation of his democraciavigilada.

kBrian Loveman,"

'Protected Democracies' and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in

Latin America, 1978-1993,"JournalofInteramericanStudies andWorld

Affairs36 (Summer 1994), 108-11.

'Adam Przeworski, "Democracyas a

Contingent Outcome of Conflicts," in Jon Elster and Rune

Slagstad, eds., Constitutionalism andDemocracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 60-61.




are banned from electoralcompetition,

we find terms such as

"controlled" and "restrictive"democracy.

Where civil liberties are in

complete (lc),scholars have used terms such as "electoral" and "illib

eral"democracy.

The subtypes in the final group (2), introduced by the scholarswho

created theexpanded procedural

minimum definition, providea usefiil

reminder that themeaning

of thesubtypes depends

on the root defini

tion ofdemocracy

in relation to whichthey

are formed. From thepoint

of departure of that definition, these scholars introduced diminished

subtypes inwhich the missing attribute is the effective power of the

elected government to govern. These subtypes therefore do not meet

theexpanded procedural

minimum standard fordemocracy, although

theydo meet the

proceduralminimum standard.

Examplesthat refer to

cases where themilitary

is seen ashaving

an inordinatedegree

ofpolit

ical power include"protected"

and"tutelary" democracy.

Diminishedsubtypes, then, are a useful means to avoid

conceptual

stretchingin cases that are less than

fullydemocratic.

Theyalso

provide

differentiationby creating

newanalytic categories.

Various scholars

have pointed to the need to move beyond a dichotomousconceptual

ization of authoritarianism anddemocracy

andrecognize

the"hybrid"

or "mixed" character of many postauthoritarian regimes.26 Figure3

suggests that thisrecognition

has indeed occurred, and on a ratherlarge

scale.

For countries that are less thanfully democratic, however, the ques

tion arises as to whether itwould be better to avoididentifying

them as

subtypes

of

democracy,

for

example,

in cases of gross violations of civil

liberties and/or severe restrictions on electoralcompetition.

Anexample

of suchquestioning

is BruceBagley's rejection

of the numerous dimin

ished subtypes of democracy that have been applied to the National

Front period in Colombia (1958-74); these include "restricted,"

"controlled," "limited," "oligarchical," "elitist," and"elitist-pluralist"

democracy. Bagleyinstead characterizes Colombia as a

subtypeof au

26James M. Malloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin America," in James M. Malloy and

Mitchell A. Seligson, t?s., Authoritarians and Democrats:Regime

Transition in Latin America (Pitts

burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 256-57; Catherine M. Conaghan and Rosario Espinal,

"Unlikely Transitions toUncertainRegimes? Democracy without

Compromisein the Dominican Re

public and Ecuador," Journal ofLatin American Studies 22 (October 1990), 555; Jonathan Hartlyn,

"Crisis-Ridden Elections(Again)

in the DominicanRepublic: Neopatrimonialism, Presidentialism,

andWeak Electoral Oversight," Journal ofInteramericanStudies and World

Affairs36 (Winter 1994),

93-96; Terry Lynn Karl, "The Hybrid Regimes of Central America," Journal ofDemocracy6 (Summer

1995); and Francisco Weffort, Qualdemocracia? (S?o Paulo:Companhia

das Letras, 1992), 89-90.



442 WORLD POLITICS

thoritarianism: as an"inclusionary

authoritarianregime."27

Other

scholars have addressed this issue by climbing the ladder of generalityto labels such as

"civilian," "competitive,"

or "electoral"

regime,

which

are found in the upper part of Figure 1.A third option is to use dismis

sivesubtypes

like those noted above, such as "facadedemocracy,"

in

which theadjective essentially

cancels the democratic character of the

subtype.Scholars should be self-conscious about the

analyticand nor

mativeimplications

ofchoosing

to formsubtypes

in relation to democ

racy,as

opposedto some other concept.

IV. Precising the Definition of Democracy

Another strategy ofconceptual

innovation focuses on the definition of

democracy itself and is concerned with "precising" the definition by

adding definingattributes.28 As the concept is extended to new set

tings, researchers may confront aparticular

case that is classified as a

democracyon the basis of a

commonly accepteddefinition yet is not

seen asfully democratic in light of a

larger shared understanding of the

concept. This mismatch between the case and the formal definition

may leadanalysts

to makeexplicit

one or more criteria that areimplic

itly understood to be part of the overallmeaning,

but that are not in

cluded in the definition. The result is a new definition intended to

changethe way

aparticular

case is classified.Although

thisprocedure

ofprecising

the definition could be seen asraising the standard for

democracy,it can also be understood as

adaptingthe definition to a

new context. This innovation increasesconceptual differentiation, by

addinga further criterion for

establishingthe cutoff between democ

racy andnondemocracy.

The strategy may therebyalso avoid concep

tualstretching

because it does notapply

the label "democracy"to cases

that, inlight

of this new criterion, theanalyst

sees asincompletely

de

mocratic.Although

the use of this strategy may arise from a concern

withadapting

the concept ofdemocracy

to fit aparticular context, the

modified definition should not be understood asbeing relevant only to

that context.

Indeed,the modified definition can also

provide

new in

sightinto other cases for which the

significanceof the new

definingat

tributes had notpreviously

beenfully appreciated.

27Bagley, "Colombia: National Front and Economic Development,"

inRobert Wesson, ed., Politics, Poli

cies,and EconomicDevelopment

in Latin America (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 125-27.28

See Giovanni Sartori, "Guidelines for Concept Analysis,"in Sartori, ed., Social Science

Concepts:A

Systematic Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1984), 81; andIrving

M.Copi

and Carl

Cohen, Introduction toLogic,

9th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 173-75. In Social ScienceConcepts

(p. 42), Sartori also uses this as a verb, as in "to precise"a definition.




One example of precising the definition is the emergence of the

standard of anexpanded procedural minimum, noted above. In several

Central American countries, as well as in South American cases such

as Chile andParaguay,

onelegacy

of authoritarian rule has been the

persistenceof "reserved domains" of

military powerover which elected

governments have little or noauthority.29 Hence, despite

free or rela

tivelyfree elections, civilian governments in these countries are seen

bysome

analystsas

lackingeffective power

to govern. Inlight

of these au

thoritarianlegacies,

and often in response to claims that because these

countries have held free electionsthey

are "democratic," some scholars

have modified the procedural minimum definition of democracy byspecifying

as anexplicit

criterion that the elected governmentmust to a

reasonabledegree have effective power

to rule.With this revised defin

ition, countries such as Chile, El Salvador, andParaguay

have been ex

cludedby

some scholars from the set of cases classified as democracies,

eventhough they

heldrelatively

free elections.30 These scholars have

thus adapted the definition toexplicitly include an attribute that is

often taken forgranted

in studies of advanced industrial democracies

but that is absent in these Latin American cases.

This revised definition has received substantial acceptance, although

therecertainly

has not been full agreementon the treatment of

specificcases. For

example,in

analyzingChile in the

post-1990 period,Rhoda

Rabkin takesexception

to the usage adopted byscholars who intro

duced theexpanded procedural

minimum definition. She argues that

theproblem

of civilian control of themilitary does not

representa suf

ficientchallenge

to thedemocratically

elected governmentto

qualify

Chile as a "borderline" democracy.31

Two other initiatives toprecise

the definition have not received simi

lar acceptance, butthey usefiilly

serve to illustrate the issues that arise

with this strategy.The first is found in discussions of what might be

called aTocquevillean

definition ofdemocracy

that includes a focus on

selected aspects of social relations. Inanalyzing postauthoritarian

Brazil, scholars such as Francisco Weffort and Guillermo O'Donnell

29J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process,

and Facilitating Conditions," in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela,

eds., Issues inDemocratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies inComparative Perspective

(Notre Dame, Ind.: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1992), 70.

30Karl (fn. 13), 2; Valenzuela (fn. 29); and Brian Loveman, "'Protected Democracies' andMilitary

Guardianship:Political Transitions in Latin America, 1979-1993," Journal of

Interamerican Studies and

WorldAffairs

36 (Summer 1994). See also Humberto Rubin, "One Step Away from Democracy" Jour

nalofDemocracy

1 (Fall 1990).31

Rhoda Rabkin, "The Aylwin Government and 'Tutelary' Democracy: AConcept

in Search of a

Case?"Journal ofInteramerican Studies and World

Affairs34 (Winter 1992-93), 165.



444 WORLD POLITICS

have been struck by the degreetowhich rights of citizenship

are un

derminedby

thepervasive

semifeudal and authoritarian social relations

that

persist

in some

regions

of the

country.

In

light

of this concern,theyhave

precisedthe definition of

democracyso as to exclude Brazil. Thus,

Weffort adds the definitional requirement of "some level of social

equality"for a

countryto be considered a

democracy,and O'Donnell

introduces a similarstipulation.32

Inadopting

this usage, these authors

view themselves asremaining

within theprocedural

framework. Yet in

troducingissues of social relations nonetheless represents

animportant

departurefrom earlier

proceduraldefinitions. We will see in the next

section that O'Donnell has subsequently arrived at an alternative meansof

incorporatingthis set of concerns into his

conceptualizationof

democracy.

Another effort toprecise

the definition has arisen from a concern

that in many new democracies in Latin America and in former com

munist countries, electedpresidents

at times make extensive use of de

creepower, circumvent democratic institutions such as the

legislatureand

political parties,and govern in a

plebiscitar?anmanner that is seen

as having strong authoritarian undercurrents. In the Latin American

contextprominent examples

include Carlos Menem inArgentina,

Fer

nando Collor de Mello in Brazil, and, in the most extreme case, Al

bertoFujimori

in Peru. The concern with these authoritarian

tendencies has led some authors to include checks on executive power

in theirprocedural

criteria fordemocracy

and thus to exclude cases of

unconstrainedpresidentialism.33 However, this innovation has likewise

not beenwidely adopted.

Precisingthe definition can thus

usefullyserve both to introduce

finer differentiation and to avoidconceptual stretching,

and the associ

ated debates have raised essential issues about themeaning

that schol

ars wish to attach to the term"democracy."

Yet caution is in order.

Amongthe alternative

strategiesof

conceptualinnovation examined in

this article, precisingin a sense introduces the most drastic

change:it

modifies the definition of democracy itself. If an innovation based on

32Francisco Weffort, "New Democracies, Which Democracies?" Working Paperno. 198, Latin

American Program (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1992),

18;Weffort (fn. 26), 100-101; Guillermo O'Donnell, "Challengesto Democratization in Brazil,"

WorldPolicy Journal 5 (1988), 297-98; and idem, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," inMain

waring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela (fn. 29), 48-49.33

Authors who haveemployed horizontal accountability

in their definitions include Philippe C.

Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is ... and Is Not," Journal ofDemocracy2 (Sum

mer 1991), 76, 87; and Alan R. Ball, Modern Politics and Government, 5th ed. (Chatham, N.J.:

Chatham House, 1994), 45-46. O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 13), 8, actually include it in their formal

definition, but it appears toplay

no role in theirsubsequent analysis.




precising iswidely accepted, ithas the important effect of changing the

definitional point of departure with reference towhich all of the other

strategiesare

pursued,in effect

unsettlingthe "semantic field" inwhich

these scholars areworking.34 By contrast, the introduction of a new

subtypedoes not affect the semantic field in the same

way. In a litera

ture inwhichconceptual

confusion is arecurring problem,

theanalytic

gains from precising the definition must be weighted against the cost

of unsettling the semantic field.

Hence, it isimportant

that scholars avoid "definitionalgerrymander

ing,"35in the sense of

introducinga new definition every time

theyen

counter a somewhat anomalous case.However,

the contrast between

the first example (adding the criterion of effective power togovern) and

the third example (adding horizontal accountability) shows that schol

arsmay in fact

imposeconstructive limits on

precising.In the first ex

ample,the

inabilityof elected governments

to exercise effective power

was seen asinvalidating

their democratic character.By contrast, in the

thirdexample, involving heavy-handed

assertions of power bythe pres

ident, a crucialpoint

is that thesepresidents

are elected leaders. Hence,

itmight be argued that it is appropriate to treat these regimes as meet

ingaminimal standard for

democracyand to avoid

precising?as longas (1) theymaintain presidential elections and a

general respect for civil

liberties and the legislature and (2) opposition partiesare not banned

or dissolved (asoccurred inPeru in 1992).

Finally, the initiative of precisingcan raise the issue of bringing back

into the definition ofdemocracy

attributes that scholarspreviously

had

explicidydecided to exclude. An

exampleis the concern with social re

lationships in the Tocquevillean approach. These authors could be seen

asremaining within a

procedural framework, in the sense thatthey argue

thatpolitical participation

becomes lessmeaningfijl

in the context of ex

treme socialinequality. However, this

conceptualinnovation reintroduces

features of social relations in away that nonetheless represents

amajor

shift from earlier recommendations about which attributes should be

included in definitions of democracy.

V. Shifting the Overarching Concept

Yet another strategy ofconceptual

innovation is to shift theoverarching

concept, in relation to whichdemocracy

is seen as aspecific

instance?

that is, as a classicalsubtype. Thus, although

scholars mostcommonly

34On the

problemof unsettling the semantic field, see Sartori (fn. 28), 51-54.

35Jennifer Whiting, personal communication, suggested this term.



446 WORLD POLITICS

viewdemocracy

as asubtype

of theoverarching concept "regime" (and

the procedural criteria for democracy discussed above would routinelybe understood as

applying

to theregime),

some recent literature has

understooddemocracy

as asubtype

in relation to otheroverarching

concepts,as in "democratic

government"and "democratic state."

Hence, when agiven country is labeled "democratic," the

meaningcan

vary accordingto the

overarching conceptto which the term is at

tached.

A shift in theoverarching concept

canyield

an alternative standard

fordeclaring

aparticular

case to be ademocracy, yet without either

modifying or stretching the concept of "democratic regime." As can beseen in

Figure 4, scholars have used this strategyto create a standard

that can be either less or moredemanding.

Forexample,

a scholar who

finds Brazilian democracy in the immediate post-1985 period to be so

poorlyinstitutionalized that it appears inappropriate

to use the overar

chinglabel

"regime" may refer to a "democratic situation." This distinc

tion follows theexample

of Juan Linz'sanalysis

of Brazilduring

the

earlierpost-1964

authoritarianperiod:

he introduced the concept of an

"authoritarian situation" to take account of the weak institutionalization

of nationalpolitical

structures.36 Otheranalysts

concerned with the im

mediatepost-1985 period

in Brazil have referred to "democratic gov

ernment" in order tosuggest that

althougha

particular government

(that is, the head of state and the immediate political leadership that

surrounds the head of state) has been electeddemocratically,

the ongo

ing functioningof democratic

proceduresis not

necessarily assured. By

shiftingthe

overarching concept fromregime

togovernment in this

way, scholars lower the standard forapplying

the label "democratic."

Alternatively, by shiftingthe

overarching concept from"regime"

to

"state," O'Donnell establishes amoredemanding

standard forlabeling

particularcountries a

democracy. Writingafter Brazil's

presidential

election of 1989, which led scholars toreinterpret

Brazil ashaving

a de

mocraticregime,

O'Donnell raisesquestions

about the democratic char

acter of the state in Brazil, as well as in some other South American

countries. Hesuggests that,

in the context of the "neofeudalized" and

at times "sultanistic"political relationships

found in many parts of the

country, the national state does notprotect basic

rightsof

citizenship,

36See Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of anAu

thoritarian Regime: The Case of Brazil," in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil:Origins, Policies,

Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). Malloyuses "democratic moment" to convey a sim

ilarmeaning. See Malloy (fn. 26), 236.




Author

Lowering the

Standard

Democratic

Situation

Democratic

Government

Point of

Departure

Democratic

Regime

Raising the

Standard

Democratic

State

Duncan Baretta

and Markoff

Yes No

Hagopian and

Mainwarin^

Yes No

O'Donnell

(1988)c

Yes No

O'Donnell

(1993)d

Yes No

Figure 4

Shifting the Overarching Concept:

Characterizing Post-1985 Brazil

"Silvio Duncan Baretta and John Markoff, "Brazil's Abertura: Transition toWhat?" in James M.

Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., Authoritarians and Democrats:Regime

Transition inLatin Amer

ica (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 62.

bFrances Hagopianand Scott Mainwaring, "Democracy in Brazil: Problems and

Prospects,"World

Policy Journal A (Summer 1987), 485.

cGuillermo O'Donnell, "Challengesto Democratization in Brazil," World

Policy Journal S(Spring

1988),281.

dGuillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems," World

Development21 (August 1993), 1360.

and specifically the rights of citizens to fair and equal protection in

their social and economic relationships. This failure may not direcdyinfluence the

functioningof the regime,

in the sense ofdirecdy

affect

ingthe elections and associated civil liberties that are core features of

theprocedural understanding

of a democratic regime. However,

O'Donnell argues, this failure of thelegal

and bureaucratic institutions

of thepublic

sector toprotect and promote

a broader set of democratic

rightsof citizens is a crucial feature of the Brazilian state. Hence, al

thoughhe

recognizesthat countries like Brazil have a democratic

"regime,"he excludes them from the set of countries he considers to

have democratic "states." This shift in theoverarching concept consti

tutes another way ofmaking

a more differentiated assessment of what

is deemed to be anincomplete

case ofdemocracy, specifically by

estab



448 WORLD POLITICS

lishinga

higher and a lower standard for democracy and declaring that

these countries meetonly

the lower standard.37

From thestandpoint

ofmaintaining

aprocedural

definition of

democracy,this innovation can be seen as a better solution to the

problem thatO'Donnell and others initially tried to address by creating the

Tocquevillean definition. Thus, in conjunction with shifting the over

arching concept, democratic"regime"

continues to have aprocedural

definition, and this concernwith the broader functioning of citizenshipin the context of authoritarian patterns of social relations is addressed

via the concept of the state.

To summarize, the strategy of shifting among alternative overarch

ing conceptscan serve to introduce finer differentiation

by creatingan

additionalanalytic category. When the strategy is used to lower the

standard fordeclaring

a case to be ademocracy,

it can alsohelp

avoid

stretchingthe concept of a democratic

regime. When the strategy is

used to raise the standard it is not relevant to theproblem

ofconceptual

stretching, because it is not concerned with avoiding what might be

seen as the mistake ofcalling

agiven

case a democraticregime. Rather,

it provides additional information about cases that are accepted as hav

ing democratic regimes.

VI. Concluding Observations

We have examinedstrategies

ofconceptual

innovation usedby analysts

of recent democratization asthey

seek to meet a twofoldchallenge:

in

creasing analyticdifferentiation in order to

adequatelycharacterize the

diverse regimes that have emerged in recent years and maintaining con

ceptual validity by avoiding conceptual stretching. Our goal has been

both to make morecomprehensible

thecomplex

structure of these

strategiesand to evaluate the

strengthsand weaknesses of the strate

gies.Even when these scholars

proceed intuitively,rather than self-con

sciously, theytend to

operate within this structure, which, as noted

above, isby

no meansunique

to research on recent democratization.38

Yet, in the interest of conceptual and analytic clarity, it is farmore de

sirable for them to proceed self-consciously, with a full awareness of the

trade-offs among the differentstrategies.

Figure5

providesan overview of this analytic

structure.Conceptual

innovation has occurred at the three levels of the rootconcept of democ

37Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democratization and Some

ConceptualProblems: A Latin

American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," WorldDevelopment 21, no. 8

(1993), 1359 and passim.38

See again references in note 10.




5. Shifting the

Overarching Concept

Over

arching

Concept

5a. Lowering the Standard

Increases differentiation,

avoids stretching

:___:5b. Raising the Standard

Increases differentiation,

does not avoid stretching

?

2. Up the Ladder

of GeneralityDoes not increase differentiation,

avoids stretching

Root

Concept

4. Precising the Definition

of DemocracyIncreases differentiation,

avoids stretching

Subtypes

1. Down the Ladder

of GeneralityIncreases differentiation,does not avoid stretching

3. Diminished Subtypes

of DemocracyIncreases differentiation,

avoids stretching

Figure 5

Evaluating the Conceptual innovations:Contribution to Increasing Differentiation and Avoiding

Conceptual Stretching

racy itself, thesubtypes,

and theoverarching concept. We observed that

Sartori's strategies of (1)moving down the ladder of generality to clas

sical subtypes of democracy and (2)moving up the ladder to classical

subtypes of regime can usefully serve either to increase differentiation or

to avoidconceptual stretching,

butthey

cannot do bothsimultaneously.

These two goalscan be achieved simultaneously, however, by (3) creating

diminished subtypes, (4) precising the definition of democracy by adding

defining attributes, and (5a) shifting the overarching concept as a

means oflowering

the standard.By

contrast (5b), shiftingthe overar

ching conceptto raise the standard for

democracy does not serve to



450 WORLD POLITICS

avoidconceptual stretching vis-?-vis the

concept of a democratic

regime, but it does introduce new differentiation.

We have also underscored issues that are distinctive toparticular

strategies. Diminished subtypes are useful for characterizing hybrid

regimes, but they raise the issue of whether these regimes should in fact

be treated assubtypes

ofdemocracy,

rather thansubtypes

of authoritar

ianism or some other concept. The strategy of precising the definition

is subjectto the perennial problem of scholarly disputes

over definitions

of democracy,aswell as to the problem of imposing limits on defini

tional gerrymandering. Although the strategy of shifting the overarch

ing conceptwith the

goalof

raisingthe standard is not relevant to the

problemof

conceptual stretching,it does allow scholars to introduce

newanalytic

issues withoutabandoning

aprocedural

definition of

democracyand of regime.

Finally,these

strategiesshare two common

problems. First, giventhe

complexstructure of these

strategies,the

potentialfor confusion and

miscommunication is considerable. It isimperative

that scholarsclearly

define andexplicate

theconception

ofdemocracy they

areusing

so as to

situate themselves unambiguously in relation to this structure.

Second, this literature faces amajor

dilemma in theproliferation

of

concepts and terms, many of which meanapproximately

the samething.

The consequence,once

again,can be growing scholarly

confusion. Al

thoughnew terms are created in part because scholars are

pursuingthese

goalsof differentiation and

avoiding conceptual stretching, they may

also be introduced with the goal of developing compelling labels that

vividlydraw attention to novel forms of

democracy.39In the literature

on national political regimes over the past three decades, important an

alytic innovations have periodically been introduced in conjunctionwith the creation and/or

systematizationof concepts and concept labels

thatvividly capture important

constellations ofphenomena:

for exam

ple, "authoritarianism," "polyarchy,""bureaucratic authoritarianism,"

"corporatism,"and "consociational democracy."40 Correspondingly,

the

invention of additional concepts thatplay

this same role is animpor

39For a reminder of how important vivid labels can be, one need only look at the impressive evolu

tion of game theory, with its codification of different patterns ofpolitical

interaction designated by

such labels as"prisoners' dilemma," "chicken," "stag hunt," "slippery slope,"

and "battle of the sexes."40

Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,"in Erik Allardt and Yrj? Littunen, eds., Cleav

ages, Ideologiesand

Party Systems:Contributions to

ComparativePolitical

Sociology,Transactions of the

Westermarck Society, vol. 10 (Helsinki: Academic Bookstore, 1964); Dahl (fn. 3); Guillermo O'Donnell,

Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Institute of Interna

tional Studies, Politics ofModernization Series no. 9 (Berkeley: University of California, 1973); Philippe

C Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?"Review

ofPolitics 36 (January 1974); and Arend Li

jphart, Democracyin Plural Societies:A

Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).




tantgoal

in theongoing study

ofregimes. However, if research on de

mocratizationdegenerates

into acompetition

to see who can comeup

with the next famous concept, the comparative study of regimes will bein serious trouble.

Hence, wepropose another

major objectiveof concept usage,

one

that introduces a further trade-off vis-?-vis the twogoals

ofachieving

differentiation andavoiding conceptual stretching.

In addition topur

suingthese

goals,scholars should aim for

parsimonyand avoid ex

cessiveproliferation

of new terms and concepts. Otherwise, the

advantagesthat derive from the

conceptualrefinements discussed in

this article will be overridden by the resulting conceptual confusion.

Democracy With Adjetives

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