Democracy and the Chain of Command: A New Governance of Africa's Security Sector
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Transcript of Democracy and the Chain of Command: A New Governance of Africa's Security Sector
8/7/2019 Democracy and the Chain of Command: A New Governance of Africa's Security Sector
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1
Serious political crises in Niger, Honduras, Turkey,
Bangladesh, Guinea, Madagascar, Thailand, and Mau-
ritania in recent years illustrate the continuing inu-
ence o security orces on the political trajectories o
countries around the world. Examples o such instabil-
ity are particularly recurrent in Arica. When Arica’s
political crises turn into coups, armed insurrections, ortragic conrontations, the deense and security orces
(DSF) are invariably key players. For many years, such
military actions were justifed as an established right o
state sovereignty over domestic issues. Oten, they were
even recognized as such on the international level.
This chaotic state o aairs is no longer accept-
able. Much o Arica is now frmly committed to ur-
thering the standards o democracy and human rights
AfricA Security Brief
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that have advanced over the past two decades. None-
theless, the path toward democracy, stability, and de-
velopment is long and has many blind alleys. I Arica
is to stay on this path, its deense and security orces
must resolutely ulfll the role assigned to them by the
nations they serve with dedicated and consistent ad-
herence to constitutional rule and a republican ethos.How can the deense and security orces be re-
ashioned to support democracy? Ultimately, this is
dependent on deep respect or the rule o law by all
stakeholders, whether civilian or military, governmen-
tal or nongovernmental. The caliber o command and
leadership exercised by a country’s senior ofcers, ac-
cordingly, will determine the DSF ability to eectively
support democratic governance. To this end, deense
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2
and security sector leaders should ocus on fve priority
reorms to orge a new military governance in Arica.
reform no. 1 : eStAbliSh nAtionAl,
threAtS-bASed dSf
Some Arican deense and security orces con-
tinue to operate without any constituent document
that clearly sets orth their missions and defnes their
rules o deployment. This perpetuates many problems
and causes great conusion in defning their purposes,
their confgurations, and the resources and the tasks
assigned to them.
In the feld, this oten results in orces that are
insuiciently organized and poorly equipped with
lopsided troop numbers that are difcult to manage
and control. Roles and responsibilities o the mili-
tary and police in some instances are unclear and
overlap, leading to inadequate budgetary support and
improper and counterproductive deployments.
To remedy these structural and organizational
weaknesses, it is incumbent on the senior chain o
command to:
◆ deine a clear and pertinent interservices
national security strategy
◆ establish suitable doctrines or the use o orce
◆ adopt rational organizational structures
◆ establish and maintain appropriate human
and materiel resource management practices.
Well-conceived national security plans are signs
o military proessionalism and enable proactive, ex-
ible, and rapid responses to threats. Ghana, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso, among others, have
made noteworthy progress toward developing such
comprehensive plans.
A coherent national security strategy provides a
systematic basis to restructure a nation’s deense and
security orces. This is a top priority given that orce
structures or many Arican countries are misaligned
with today’s threats. A rational deense structure pro-
vides commanders and oversight authorities the abil-
ity to better balance the missions to be ulflled with
available resources. It also osters a more outcomes-
based means to create budgets, recruit, train, procure
assets, maintain equipment, and reliably track troop
compensation. As a result, even in a context o lim-
ited budget resources, overall efciency and readiness
can improve. Additionally, these tools help prevent
embezzlement and corruption, a requent aiction
within Arican DSF. For example, public submission
o the deense budget to parliament was reinstituted
in Zambia in the 1990s and has continuously led to
adjustments that produce new eiciencies, reveal
poor management, and rectiy the misallocation o
unds within the DSF.
Restructuring deense and security orces must in-
volve key societal stakeholders. This approach under-
scores that DSF are rom and or the broader society—
not distinct rom it. Sierra Leone, which continues to
consolidate reorms made during a multiyear compre-
hensive DSF restructuring, provides a model o pro-
ductive consultative deense review. Citizens’ groups,
civilian agencies, and senior ofcers collaborated to de-
sign new policies that streamlined the DSF command
structure, elevated training and personnel priorities,
and enhanced accountability and transparency.
reform no. 2 : build inStitutionS of
ProfeSSionAl dSf
Order, discipline, know-how, and rigorous stan-
dards have always been the mainstays o eective de-
ense and security orces. Scenes o mutiny, looting,
and violence by troops in ragged atigues—all too
amiliar in Arica—are the antithesis o a proessional
DSF. Reorms that enhance ethics, improve training,
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and provide adequate means to support the well-being
o troops will institute and sustain proessionalism.
The oundation o a proessional deense and
security orce is relected by basic ethical values
typically ormalized in an oicial code o conduct
meant to guide the thoughts and actions o troops.
Such values include loyalty to the nation and to the
armed orces, a sense o duty, seless service, and in-
tegrity. While some security orces in Arica wholly
lack codes o ethics, others in countries such as Mali,
Senegal, Ghana, Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi have
made great strides to inculcate these norms into their
day-to-day operations. A code o conduct, however,
is only valuable in so ar as it is known and respected.
As successul eorts in Mali have shown, such codes
must be instilled in new recruits as well as seasoned
ofcers and modeled by commanders i they are to
be absorbed.
Ethical values must also be reinorced by a
senior command that scrupulously rewards troops
on merit and perormance and strictly prohibits a-
voritism and arbitrary decisionmaking. Moreover,
leadership by example, absent all demagoguery, is
a undamental quality o a disciplined and ethical
DSF. Senior ofcers must know how to listen and
advocate or their troops, exercise authority airly,
and emphasize proessional development. Further-
more, the willingness to embrace ideas rom the out-
side cultivates innovation and improvement across
the chain o command.
Proessionalism within the DSF is sustained
through ongoing high-level training. This must be
the underlying principle governing any organization
that seeks to operate eectively. Proessional skills are
acquired through objective selection o participants,
meaningul instruction delivered by experienced o-
fcers, and by the proper use o human and fnancial
resources. Many Arican states, however, lack thesta colleges and other acilities that oster technical
specialization and advanced strategic comprehension.
To this end, properly targeted and dynamic military
cooperation must be developed not only between
developed and developing countries, but also among
the latter.
Given the general security environment in Ari-
ca, training programs that ocus on peace operations,
responsible crowd and riot control, rules o engage-
ment, soldiers’ compliance with the rule o law, and
inormation and communication technologies are
critical priorities. Such training enhances DSF capa-
bilities and integrates democratic norms. Programs
must also moderate ofcers’ and soldiers’ perceptions
o “enemies” to more humane notions o “adverse
parties,” particularly during the low-intensity opera-
tions common in peacekeeping and those inrequent
domestic police operations that require DSF support.
Troops who assess threats dispassionately and ratio-
nally will operate more eectively.
Special attention must be paid to the social
aspects o the military. A social services network
is needed to ensure a dignifed reentry into society,
retirement, and management o amily aairs. Simi-
larly, every eort must be made to establish insurance
policies to support amilies in the event o a serious
injury or death o a member o the DSF. The aim is
to meet basic material needs, thus acilitating compo-
sure, readiness to serve, and decreased susceptibility
to corruption and the risk o manipulation.
During the 1980s, the Senegalese armed orces
established a health-care system unded by military
personnel on a monthly basis. Accountable manage-
ment led to the addition o a social welare provision,
loans or property acquisition, and other services. In
2007, the armed orces o Burkina Faso established a
similar system through a modest government subsidy
coupled with monthly private contributions. The sys-
tem has worked to the great satisaction o person-
nel—boosting morale and pride.
reform no. 3 : inSPire reSPect for
rePublicAn vAlueS
Endowed by the constitution with the capac-
ity to employ orce, deense and security orces must
transcend partisanship and represent the ideals o national unity and patriotism. In short, they must
relect an exemplary republican spirit. In a demo-
cratic orm o government, this means respecting
citizen rights and reedoms during periods o elec-
tions, strikes, protests, and other orms o democratic
expression. Unortunately, the demonstration o re-
publican values among deense and security orces in
Arica remains rare.
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To achieve that spirit, the actions o the senior
DSF command should ocus in particular on three
main goals.
First, adhere to a legal ramework grounded in the
primacy o the nation’s democratically elected political
authority over the deense and security orces. This
basic requirement must be reinorced by the nonpo-
liticization o the armed orces and by their neutrality
as an institution. Among Arica’s armed orces, only
those o Tanzania, Botswana, Malawi, Senegal, Mau-
ritius, and a handul o others have never orchestrated
or involved themselves in military coups. I Arica’s
emerging democratic militaries wish to be widely re-
spected as proessional, this must become the norm.
Second, ensure that the nation’s deense and
security orces are a genuinely national orce and
a melting pot containing all o the country’s eth-
nic and social components. Such an approach will
help build a sense o national identity, generate a
deep-rooted pride in the armed orces, and inspire
an attitude o sacrifce and readiness to deend the
interests o the nation. Recruitment in Burkina Faso
is nationwide and nondiscriminatory. Selection is
based on a rule o proportionality. Recruitment tar-
gets are determined by the size o the population
living in a given area relative to the total number
to be recruited at the national level. As a result, the
DSF better reects the nation’s diversity.
Third, the conduct o security orces must be exem-
plary at all times, in all venues, under all circumstances,
and solidly grounded in international humanitarian law.
Violence, racketeering, and other types o harassment
o the local populace must be eliminated i security
orces are to earn the trust and respect o citizens. To
oster such conduct, the senior chain o command must
empower and ully sta Ofces o Inspectors General
within the DSF to deter, investigate, and punish abuses.
Similarly, senior ofcers must work closely with parlia-mentary committees responsible or oversight as well as
auditors and judicial authorities.
reform no. 4 : imProve
civ il-mil itAry relAtionS
Despite eorts rom both sides, relations between
civil and military ofcials in Arica continue to be
typiied by mutual distrust, deep prejudicial eel-
ings, and taboos based primarily on ignorance and
lack o communication. Indeed, there are relatively
ew domestic venues where civilian and military o-
fcials regularly convene. When Arican civilians and
members o the military meet at international events,
a wide gul in perceptions is oten apparent despite
their complementary skills.
Forums where civilians and the military can
reely and confdentially meet and explore common
interests and establish a culture o dialogue are need-
ed. Such orums not only provide opportunities to
establish relationships but also oer space to discuss
integrated approaches to national security and devel-
op shared understandings o roles and responsibilities.
In times o crisis, the relationships built through such
orums contribute invaluably to fnding consensus-
based and durable solutions.
Experiments in bringing senior-level civilians and
military ofcers together or strategic planning sessions
in Nigeria, South Arica, and Egypt have been con-
structive. Additionally, the well-respected Southern
Arica Deence and Security Management Network
has proven an exceptional initiative or promoting
transparency, ostering confdence and cooperation
between civilian and military ofcials, and contribut-
ing to shits in policy and thinking. Originally devel-
oped in South Arica, the network o 10 universities
and research institutes across the Southern Arican
Development Community subregion is an independent
nongovernmental body unded in part by international
donors. It provides police, military, and civilian secu-
rity proessionals with joint specialized and accredited
training, as well as support to governments in deense
policy analysis and ormulation. Similar initiatives
should be adopted by other Arican countries and
subregions. As an initial step, the creation o proes-
sional exchange programs between senior ofcers and
civilian counterparts would build trust and ensure thatthe actions undertaken on each side are coordinated,
complementary, and mutually understood.
The culture o secrecy that pervades many o A-
rica’s armed orces (or example, some do not even pub-
licize their national security plans) is another obstacle
to constructive civil-military relations. An appropri-
ate communications strategy that provides the public
and media an understanding o lie in the barracks is
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5
essential—as a matter o principle and practical beneft.
A public that knows and understands a DSF and its
purpose will more reely support it. Such a DSF, in turn,
will beneft rom timely inormation-sharing, thereby
enabling it to more eectively ulfll its protection mis-
sion. Due to the dramatic expansion o communication
technologies in Arica, the rapid transmission o rumor
and suspicions can quickly escalate into crises and com-
plicate DSF missions, as it did in Kenya’s 2007 postelec-
tion violence, the 2010 ood riots in Mozambique, and
recurring communal conict in Nigeria. A proactive
strategy to share inormation—oten by leveraging such
technology—can combat conusion and rumor and pre-
vent or stabilize conict.
reform no. 5 : m it i gAte the
comPlexity of nonmi litAry fActorS
Any progress toward improved governance
within the DSF will also depend on complex issues
involving actors beyond the security sector.
As a popular saying puts it so well, “the fsh rots
rom the head down.” I the armed orces are subsidiary
to civilian political authority, then adherence to re-
publican values within the deense and security orces
will depend to a great extent on the quality o civilian
political leaders. Unortunately, sectarianism and indi-
vidual sel-interest have requently taken precedence
over the interests o the nation. In order to hang on to
power or to seize victory in raudulent or lost elections,
some Arican leaders are even prepared to violate the
constitution and to imperil the country.
Such machinations oten involve attempts to ma-
nipulate or command military and paramilitary units.
Moves designed to oment discontent or even uprisings
are typically started by spreading rumors and alse inor-
mation, sometimes cleverly fltered by vested elements
within the media. On occasion, some well-o, power-
hungry politicians will even deploy private militia inpursuit o their ambitions. Such irregular orces and
armed gangs have played a predominant role in recent
or current conicts in the Democratic Republic o the
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Sudan,
Liberia, Uganda, and Somalia. Elsewhere, weak insti-
tutional checks and balances leave DSF vulnerable to
politicization. For instance, the role o the legislature in
approving deployments, nominations, and other deci-
sions taken by the civilian commander in chie is oten
unclear even in Arica’s most stable states.
The recurrent and crucial role o private security
providers also requires attention. Mercenaries motivated
by money are, at times, entrusted with critical deense
and security responsibilities. This tends to privatize and
trivialize the deense and security o the nation. Com-
pounding matters is the persistent intervention by cer-
tain major powers that, on occasion, exacerbate internal
conicts or strategic, economic, or other motives.
Models o good governance that can counter-
act these complex nonmilitary actors are available,
however. In particular, the United Nations, Ari-
can Union, and Arica’s increasingly vital Regional
Economic Communities have established legal in-
struments or strengthening democracy, peace, and
good governance. For example:
◆ The Arican Union’s Arican Charter on
Democracy, Elections, and Governance
◆ The New Partnership or Arica’s Develop-
ment’s Arican Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM), adopted by the Arican Union
◆ The Economic Community o West Arican
States’ Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance.
Rather than allow commitments to democratic
standards, basic human rights, and good governance to
remain optional considerations, these and similar agree-
ments seek to make their observance obligatory. Disre-gard o such principles has contributed to weak state
legitimacy, institutional sclerosis, and other shortcom-
ings that requently cause and drive crises in Arica. In
other words, adherence to democratic processes—and
the legitimacy this engenders—has a direct impact on
peace and conict, and thereore on the DSF.
When signatories violate the Charter or Protocol,
regional bodies and their members are obligated to take
“a pblc that knws andndstands a DSF and ts pps
wll l sppt t”
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irm and consistent steps to halt and reverse urther
extra-constitutionalism and destabilization. With par-
ticular relevance to the senior command, such actions
by regional bodies help strengthen the buer that sepa-
rates politics and deense and security. Civilian leaders
who respect these charters earn the trust not only o
the people but also o military ofcers and their stas.
When that buer is breached, senior ofcers conront
a troubling dilemma: respect the principle o civilian
authority or uphold the standards o democracy. As a
result, the state and entire chain o command is let
compromised and the trajectory o the nation uncertain.
The Arican Peer Review Mechanism merits
special mention regarding reorming Arica’s DSF.
Through the APRM, Arican states evaluate their
eorts to advance democratic governance, including
whether states have eective policies, institutions,
and processes in place to prevent and manage intra-
and interstate conlict. To enhance accountability
and share best practices, this sel-assessment is com-
plemented by a separate evaluation conducted by a
multinational team o Arican experts. All 12 o the
completed APRM assessments have identifed specifc
vulnerabilities to conict and recommended how the
DSF can improve diversity, human rights training,
due process, and other inefciencies. In other words,
the APRM provides the senior chain o command a
constructive process to measure perormance, identiy
areas or improvement, and receive recommendations
and innovations rom Arican counterparts. The DSF
should vigorously cooperate with and contribute to
the APRM process.
Complementing the aims o these Arican instru-
ments, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (an
agency o the U.S. Government) is an initiative that
rewards good governance with greater development in-
vestment. This initiative merits replication within the
security cooperation realm in Arica. Security coopera-
tion and assistance that avors partners with a track
record o principled and eective perormance can in-
centivize responsible governance within the DSF while
discouraging the exploitation o deense and security
orces or political ends and personal interest.
concluSion
The degree to which democracy is consolidat-
ed in Arica is contingent on deense and security
orces that are well structured, proessional, based on
republican values, and subordinate to civilian politi-
cal authority. Across the continent, then, all societal
and governmental leaders, including top military of-
cials, must acknowledge the need to reverse outdated
mindsets that stymie necessary reorms and adjust-
ments. Additionally, international partners must
work to consistently encourage good governance and
unequivocally denounce the intererence o deense
and security orces in politics, politicians who seek to
skirt constitutional checks and balances, and the use
o armed militias and mercenaries as an instrument o
contestation and conquest. Sustained support to com-
mitted reormers as they seek to implement sound,
consensus-based plans is equally critical.
With professional defense and security forces
fully dedicated to these reforms, Africa will be able
to sustain the momentum now under way and steadily
expand the number of countries on the continent re-
spectful of democracy and human rights.
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AfricA center for StrAtegic StudieS
p://www.aa.
AfricA center for
StrAtegic StudieS
Director: Ambassador William
M. Bellamy (Ret.)
National Deense University
300 Fith Avenue, Building 21Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319-5066
Phone: + 1 202-685-7300
Web site: www.aricacenter.org
AfricA center
regionAl office
in dAkAr
Regional Manager:
Elisabeth Feleke
Phone: 221 33 869 61 00
Email: [email protected]
AfricA center
regionAl office
in AddiS AbAbARegional Manager:
Brad Anderson
Phone: 251 11 517 4000
Email: [email protected]
AfricA Security briefS
Editor: Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.
Phone: + 1 202-685-6808
Email: [email protected]
6