Defence Aviation Safety Assurance · PDF fileApplication for aircraft registration . ... Annex...

Original Date of Issue: 13 Dec 17

Sponsor: DACPA-DASA

File Reference: AB33613358

Defence Aviation Safety Assurance Manual

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FOREWORD

Safety is of prime importance in the generation and sustainment of an effective military aviation capability. Further, Defence has a moral and legal obligation to ensure that risks to health and safety are eliminated or minimised so far as reasonably practicable.

Military aviation is a unique undertaking; as such the statutory requirements, articulated within Work Health and Safety Legislation, cannot be reasonably and practicably satisfied without provision of additional specific policy and regulations, which provide amplification for the Defence aviation context. The required amplification is primarily achieved through the Defence Aviation Safety Framework.

The Defence Aviation Authority is committed to a Defence Aviation Safety Framework that recognises and supports compliance with statutory safety obligations, and ensures that Defence aviation remains responsive to emerging safety challenges, while enabling aviation capabilities in defence of Australia’s national interests to be fully exploited.

The Defence Aviation Safety Framework is underpinned by the implementation of Defence Aviation Safety Program. To maximise the efficiencies afforded through improved recognition of, and where practicable alignment with, international aviation authorities, the Defence Aviation Safety Program has been established in accordance with contemporary global aviation safety management conventions. The key components of the program are safety policy and regulations, safety promotion, initial safety certification, and oversight and ongoing safety certification.

The unique nature of military operations, and the imperative to balance operational objectives and safety outcomes within resource constraints, is well understood. The Defence Aviation Safety Framework acknowledges these competing priorities, and provides Commanders with a framework to support informed safety judgements that enable capability generation, while ensuring that aviation safety risks are eliminated or minimised so far as is reasonably practicable.

The military aviation environment is both complex and continually evolving. Therefore, it is imperative that all personnel, involved with delivering a military aviation capability, ensure that threats to safety are actively treated, through an ongoing process of hazard identification and risk management

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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PART 1 MANAGEMENT OF DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY

CHAPTER 1 AVIATION SAFETY POLICY Introduction Purpose Aviation safety policy statement Defence aviation safety The Defence Aviation Authority The Defence Aviation Safety Authority The Defence Aviation Safety Program Aviation safety and command

CHAPTER 2 PREVIOUS AVIATION SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS Introduction Purpose History of developments in defence aviation safety

CHAPTER 3 FUTURE AVIATION SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS - TO BE ISSUED

PART 2 DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1 PRINCIPLE DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS Introduction Purpose Aviation safety management The Defence Aviation Authority The Defence Aviation Safety Council

Defence Aviation Safety Council membership The Defence Aviation Safety Authority

Delegations to DASA key appointments Delegations to regulated organisation key appointments Delegations by the DASA

The Defence Aviation Safety Program Prescribe safety policy and regulations Promote aviation safety Establish and certify initial safety requirements and standards Conduct oversight and enforce ongoing compliance

Annex A - Delegates of the Safety Authority

CHAPTER 2 PRESCRIBE SAFETY POLICY AND REGULATIONS Introduction Purpose Aviation safety policy Effective regulations

Structure of Defence Aviation Safety Regulations DASR framework Regulation change process

Safety standards Annex A - Regulation change process

CHAPTER 3 PROMOTE AVIATION SAFETY TO BE ISSUED

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CHAPTER 4 ESTABLISH AND CERTIFY INITIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS TO BE ISSUED

CHAPTER 5 CONDUCT OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCE ONGOING COMPLIANCE Introduction Purpose Oversight ongoing compliance

Regulatory requirement Compliance by regulated entities Compliance assurance by the authority Compliance assurance requirements

Enforce ongoing compliance DASA enforcement principles Proportionate and graduated enforcement DASA enforcement process Enforcement action and commercial organisations Coordination with external regulatory authorities Enforcement appeal process

Accident and incident investigation

CHAPTER 6 INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW Introduction Purpose Authority for independent boards of review Role of independent boards of review Composition of independent boards of review

Airworthiness board Independent boards of review convened for other reasons

Scope of independent boards of review Airworthiness board Independent boards of review convened for other reasons

Convening independent boards of review Airworthiness board Independent boards of review convened for other reasons

Outcomes of independent boards of review Airworthiness board Independent boards of review convened for other reasons

CHAPTER 7 AVIATION SAFETY OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION Introduction Purpose Reporting and safety information

The need for occurrence reporting Safety data collection and quality Defence aviation safety reporting process

Incident and accident investigation The need for safety investigation Defence aviation safety investigation process Independent investigation capability Aviation safety investigation appointing authorities Financial aspects of aviation safety investigations

CHAPTER 8 SPECIALIST AVIATION ENGINEERING TO BE ISSUED


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CHAPTER 9 COMMAND AVIATION SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE ISSUED

PART 3 AVIATION SAFETY DURING ACQUISITION OF DEFENCE REGISTERED

AIRCRAFT

CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW OF AVIATION SAFETY ACQUISITION OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT Introduction Purpose Applicability Defence registration Appointment of key personnel Acquisition aviation safety strategy

Defence Aviation Safety Authority engagement The type certification process Define operating intent and usage Develop Certification Program Plan Design Compliance demonstration Issue type certificate

Arrangements to support aircraft operation Acquisition flight test and aircraft operation prior to award of a Type Certificate Role of the Airworthiness Board Fleet addition and new models of an existing aircraft type

CHAPTER 2 DEFENCE REGISTRATION Introduction Purpose The Defence Register Determination of registration type

Configuration and role Duration and type of operation by defence

Inclusion of aircraft on the Defence Register Application for aircraft type application identifier assignment Application for aircraft registration Application for registration of additional fleet aircraft

Removal of aircraft from the Defence Register Reinstatement of aircraft to the Defence Register

CHAPTER 3 PLANS AND KEY PERSONNEL Introduction Purpose Aviation safety strategy

Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan Detailed plans

Military Air Operator Compliance Management Plan Certification Program Plan Logistics Support Plan

Accomplishment Summary Key personnel Annex A - Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan Annex B - Military Air Operator Compliance Management Plan


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Annex C - Accomplishment Summary preparation

CHAPTER 4 CERTIFICATION AND OPERATION OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT Introduction Purpose Applicability Key concepts Relationship between type certification and authorisation of flight operations Determining type certification requirements Statement of Operating Intent and Usage

Development of a Statement of Operating Intent and Usage Changes to the SOIU

Recognition of certification by other authorities Concurrent certification by recognised airworthiness authorities Compiling the Type Certification Basis Requirements documentation suite

Compliance demonstration evidence Managing airworthiness issues

Issue papers Resolving airworthiness issues

Issue of a Type Certificate Individual aircraft airworthiness

Authorisation for an aircraft to conduct flight operations Requirements for authorisation to conduct flight operations

Additional fleet aircraft and new models of fleet aircraft Additional fleet aircraft New models of fleet aircraft

Military Permit To Fly Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit Annex A - Operation of aircraft before being listed on the Defence Register Annex B – Acquisition Flight Test Support Annex C - Amendment of the Military Air Operator Certificate Operations Specification Annex D - Management of Military Permits To Fly

CHAPTER 5 AVIATION SAFETY INSTRUMENTS Introduction Purpose Instruments issued by the Authority Instruments issued by other appointments Annex A - Military Air Operator Certificate Annex B - Military Type Certificate Annex C - Military Restricted Type Certificate Annex D - Military Supplemental Type Certificate Annex E - Military Permit To Fly Annex F - Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit Annex G - Defence Aviation Authority Directive Annex H - Airworthiness Directive Annex I - Advisory Circular Annex J - Approval To Operate Annex K - Authority to Operate Annex L - Flight Simulation Training Device Installation Operating Permit


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PART 4 INTERFACES WITH OTHER AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITIES

CHAPTER 1 OVERVIEW TO BE ISSUED

CHAPTER 2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT OF CIVIL REGISTERED AIRCRAFT TO BE ISSUED

CHAPTER 3 MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS TO BE ISSUED

CHAPTER 4 MANAGEMENT OF VISITING STATE AIRCRAFT TO BE ISSUED

PART 5 DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY SPECIALIST TOPICS

CHAPTER 1 PROCEDURES FOR ISSUING OPINIONS, SPECIFICATIONS AND GUIDANCE TO BE ISSUED

CHAPTER 2 PROCEDURES FOR TAKING INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO BE ISSUED

CHAPTER 3 AVIATION SAFETY INFORMATION COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS TO BE ISSUED

CHAPTER 4 AIRWORTHINESS DESIGN REQUIREMENTS TO BE ISSUED

PART 6 EMERGING DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES TO BE ISSUED

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LIST OF FIGURES

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Figure No Title

PART 1 2–1 COSC agreed aviation management regulatory framework

2–2 Map of regulation areas against recommended adoption of EASA regulations

PART 2 1–1 Defence Aviation Safety Program structure

2–1 DASR structure

2–A–1 Regulation change process

5–1 Proportionate approach to enforcement

PART 3 1–1 Type certification process

PART 4 - TO BE ISSUED



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PART 1

CHAPTER 1

AVIATION SAFETY POLICY INTRODUCTION

1.1 Defence has a moral and legal obligation to ensure risks to the health and safety of personnel, arising from military aircraft operations, are eliminated So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) and, if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risks to health and safety, to minimise those risks SFARP. The basis for these safety obligations is found in Commonwealth Work Health and Safety Legislation and Common Law.1

1.2 Military aviation is a unique and complex undertaking that necessitates the amplification of statutory Work Health and Safety (WHS) requirements for the Defence Aviation context. This amplification of safety requirements and provision of the means to discharge them is achieved through the adoption of a structured aviation safety framework2. The Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of Defence, through their Joint Directive on The Defence Aviation Safety Framework3 (the Joint Directive), have established the framework for the management of aviation safety within Defence, including detailing the authorities responsible for its implementation and ongoing administration.

PURPOSE

1.3 This chapter describes the Defence aviation safety framework for the management of aviation safety within Defence, and the authorities responsible for its implementation and the ongoing administration of safety requirements and programs.

1 In this context the term WHS Legislation is used to collectively refer to the Work Health and Safety Act 2011, the Work Health and Safety Regulations 2011, and the various Codes of Practice made pursuant to the principal Act from time to time.

2 In line with the Chicago Convention, State aircraft are explicitly excluded from Australian civil aviation legislation and associated regulations. Defence, as an independent authority, must therefore establish an aviation safety framework that recognises and supports compliance with statutory safety requirements.

3 Secretary and CDF Joint Directive 24/2016, Joint Directive on The Defence Aviation Safety Framework, dated 24 Aug 16.

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AVIATION SAFETY POLICY STATEMENT

1.4 The aviation safety policy statement in the Joint Directive states:

Defence shall implement a credible and defensible aviation safety framework that recognises and supports compliance with statutory safety obligations. Recognising the unique nature of military aviation, the framework shall include appropriate flexibility provisions to support command decisions in response to compelling operational imperatives. Acknowledging the benefits and efficiencies afforded through adoption of global conventions and practices, the Defence aviation safety framework shall be aligned, where appropriate, with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) principles and European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR).

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY

1.5 Aviation safety is the state in which risks to personnel arising from aircraft operations are eliminated SFARP and, if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risks to health and safety, those risks are minimised SFARP, through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management. In the Defence context, aviation safety encompasses the manner in which aircraft are flown, the environment that aircraft are operated in, and the tasks, activities and management systems whose primary purpose is to enable safe flight.4

1.6 Aviation safety accountabilities within Defence include the following Aviation Systems:

a. Defence Registered Aircraft, including installed components

b. Civil Registered Aircraft, including installed components, operated exclusivelyfor or on behalf of Defence, where compelling reasons exist to supplementexisting National Aviation Authority (NAA)5 oversight

c. aircraft, including installed components, that are the subject of statutoryairworthiness responsibilities placed on Defence by the Civil Aviation SafetyAuthority (CASA)6

d. other aviation systems as may be determined by the Defence AviationAuthority (Defence AA).

4 Joint Directive on The Defence Aviation Safety Framework, p2

5 The National Aviation Authority (NAA) is the government statutory authority in each country that oversees the approval and regulation of civil aviation.

6 The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is the NAA for Australia.

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1.7 The Defence aviation safety framework includes provision for recognition of NAA and Military Aviation Authority (MAA) safety frameworks, when determining the level of Defence oversight to be applied to civil or foreign military aircraft, and aviation systems used for Defence purposes.

THE DEFENCE AVIATION AUTHORITY

1.8 The Chief of Air Force (CAF) has been appointed as the Defence AA7 and is accountable to CDF and the Secretary for the regulation and oversight of all aspects of Defence Aviation. CAF is to ensure that he remains independent of aircraft operations while fulfilling the role of the Defence AA. In discharging the responsibilities of the Defence AA, CAF is required to:

a. establish the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA)

b. establish an accident and incident investigation capability

c. oversee Defence aviation safety performance, including engaging withService Chiefs and Group Heads on aviation safety matters under theircommand or management

d. establish appropriate consultation and liaison arrangements with external civilaviation organisations, and equivalent international military authorities.

THE DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

1.9 The DASA is responsible for enhancing and promoting the safety of military aviation. To assist in achieving this objective, the DASA shall develop and enforce a regulatory framework that promotes a generative safety culture, and assures a high and uniform level of safety across Defence Aviation.

1.10 The DASA executes its responsibilities by implementing and maintaining a Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP). The DASP recognises and supports compliance with statutory safety requirements, while enabling commanders to effectively exploit aviation capabilities in defence of Australia’s national interests.

THE DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM

1.11 The DASP has been established cognisant of contemporary aviation safety conventions, including International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) and European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR). The key objectives of the program are to:

a. prescribe safety policy and regulation for Defence Aviation

7 Refer to the CDF Charter Letter to Chief of Air Force.

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b. promote Defence Aviation safety through education, training anddissemination of safety information

c. establish and certify the initial safety requirements and standards for DefenceAviation organisations, platforms and systems

d. oversee and enforce the ongoing certification of Defence Aviationorganisations, platforms and systems

e. investigate accidents and incidents, to prevent recurrence and improve safetyperformance.

1.12 In support of DASP oversight activities, the Defence AA may convene independent reviews to examine, and make recommendations on, Defence Aviation safety performance.8

AVIATION SAFETY AND COMMAND

1.13 Aviation safety is a command responsibility. The Joint Directive establishes a framework for the management of aviation safety within Defence, and the DASA, through regulation and oversight, provides assurance that safety obligations are being achieved. However, responsibility for ensuring the safe operation of aviation systems resides with the command chain. Commanders and managers are therefore accountable for ensuring aviation systems under their command or control are designed, constructed, maintained and operated to approved standards and limitations, by competent and authorised personnel acting as members of an approved organisation.

1.14 The nature of military aviation is unique, and the need for commanders to balance operational objectives and safety outcomes is well understood. The Defence Aviation safety framework provides flexibility to assist commanders, faced with compelling operational imperatives, to make informed judgements regarding compliance with substantive regulations. Such judgements must be made at the appropriate command level, to ensure that aviation safety risks are eliminated SFARP and, if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risks to health and safety, to minimise those risks SFARP.

8 An independent review of aviation safety may be convened on any aspect of Defence Aviation, including but not limited to Aviation Systems and operating/support organisations.

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PART 1

CHAPTER 2

PREVIOUS AVIATION SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS INTRODUCTION

2.1 Defence is bound by the provisions of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (the WHS Act). The safety policy for Defence is issued by CDF and the Secretary in DI(G) PERS 19-18 – Defence Work Health and Safety Manual.

2.2 Australia, as a contracting State of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention), has an international obligation to establish systems whereby aviation operations are conducted in a safe and orderly manner. The Chicago Convention, including associated amending protocols, is set out in the Schedules to the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Clth), and further implemented through the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Clth).

2.3 Consistent with Article 3 of the Chicago Convention, Section 4 of Part I of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 states that, apart from some specific exclusions, references to aircraft or air navigation in the Civil Aviation Act 1988 do not include references to State aircraft or air navigation by State aircraft. This explicitly excludes the majority of Defence Aviation from governance by the Civil Aviation Act 1988. As a consequence, Joint Directive 24/2016, Joint Directive on The Defence Aviation Safety Framework (the Joint Directive), was issued by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of Defence, and directs Defence to implement a credible and defensible aviation safety framework, that recognises and supports compliance with statutory safety obligations. Additionally, the Joint Directive also requires implementation of a Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) as a fundamental tenet of complying with statutory aviation safety obligations.

2.4 Defence is also bound by a duty of care for members participating in aviation activities, in the course of their duties, in aircraft that are not regulated by Defence.

2.5 Notwithstanding Defence’s current aviation safety obligations, aviation safety has, for several decades, been recognised as an important element of capability generation. Consequently, aviation safety requirements and programs have been developed, and subsequently evolved, over many years. These requirements and programs underpin establishment and implementation of a contemporary DASP.

PURPOSE

2.6 This chapter describes the evolution of safety requirements and programs. As such, it provides an understanding of the approaches taken to address aviation safety over numerous years, and their influence on development of the current DASP.

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HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY

2.7 Prior to the late 1990s, aviation safety was predominantly managed independently by each Service, through different mechanisms and with varying levels of integration and coordination. In 1997, the Directorate of Flying Safety–Australian Defence Force (DFS–ADF) was established, by extending the role of the former Directorate of Flying Safety – Air Force (DFS-AF) to encompass all three Services. In early 1998, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) appointed the Chief of Air Force (CAF) as the single ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF AA)1, flowing from decisions following the Army Black Hawk accident (June 1996) and the Defence Reform Program (April 1997). In 1998, CDF also directed CAF to review systemic and organisational issues within the ADF aviation community, and bring forward recommendations on how the safety of all ADF flying activities during training, peacetime operations and combat could be improved. The resulting Review of ADF Aviation Safety Management (RAASM) noted that there was a lack of both an overarching flying safety policy, and a centralised and coordinated flight safety program2. The RAASM also observed that ADF aviation safety was highly dependent on a small core of experienced supervisors and commanders, who were critical to safe ADF aviation management, and noted that different aviation cultures existed within the ADF3. While recommending substantial changes to improve aviation safety, the RAASM also recognised that some significant initiatives to improve aviation safety had already been introduced, and concluded that these should continue largely unchanged.4

2.8 During consideration of the RAASM by the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in early 1999, the ADF AA advised that a definition of Aviation Safety Management (ASM) was important as a basis for achieving improvements to the present system, and proposed that ASM be defined as “encompassing all aspects of technical and operational airworthiness management, and flying safety management”. COSC subsequently agreed to the aviation management regulatory framework depicted in Figure 2-15. Further, the Service Chiefs all agreed with the RAASM recommendation that an ADF airworthiness structure be based on the following concept:

a. single ADF airworthiness authority

1 COSC Minute 2/98. 2 DI(G) OPS 28-2 - Australian Defence Force Flying Safety Philosophy, Organisation and Responsibilities was first issued on 7 September 1999.

3 RAASM report, November 1998, paragraphs 8 - 9. 4 These initiatives included the creation of Airworthiness Boards as independent boards of review in 1991, and a technical airworthiness regulatory framework in 1994, following a major review of RAAF engineering (Blue Print 2020) in 1993.

5 COSC Minute 8/99.

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b. the development of a framework of ADF regulations to regulate technical and operational airworthiness

c. the conduct of ADF aviation activities in compliance with the ADF regulatory framework

d. an independent ADF aviation safety and accident investigation body.

Figure 2–1 COSC Agreed Aviation Management Regulatory Framework

2.9 In addition to adoption of a revised airworthiness structure, the RAASM identified a range of ADF aviation safety management concerns, and made several recommendations to improve the following specific aviation safety management functions:

a. management of flying safety by DFS–ADF

b. the flight test authorities of the Air Force’s Aircraft Operational Support Group (AOSG) and the Navy’s Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit (AMAFTU)

c. the cargo loading and cargo handling authority of the Air Movements Trials and Development Unit (AMTDU)

d. management of airspace by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE) organisations (which were later retitled Air Traffic Management (ATM) and Air Battle Management (ABM) respectively)

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e. management of selected aircraft simulators that were designed and acquired specifically to support the training of aircrew and tactics development.

2.10 The RAASM also noted that, while development and implementation of a technical airworthiness regulatory framework, for the conduct of design and engineering support activities, was already mature, regulations for the conduct of maintenance and production/modification activity were still in development. The RAASM further noted that the technical airworthiness framework encompassed the conduct of technical airworthiness audit activities, and that this framework provided a model for development of a similar operational airworthiness regulatory and audit framework.

2.11 A key recommendation of the RAASM was development of a single ADF Airworthiness Manual. The initial issue of AAP 7001.048 was titled the ADF Airworthiness Manual, and was authorised in 2001 through DI(G) OPS 02–2, ADF Airworthiness Management, and promulgated details of the ADF airworthiness management framework and airworthiness management processes. In October 2004, the extant Operational Airworthiness Policy Review Committee (OAPRC) endorsed development of a more usable tiered structure for ADF airworthiness regulations. This tiered structure was to consist of high level Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREG), promulgated in the ADF Airworthiness Manual, supported by Operational Airworthiness Regulations (OAREG) and the extant Technical Airworthiness Regulations (TAREG). Draft OAREG were approved by the OAPRC in May 2005, and initially issued within the ADF Airworthiness Manual. Subsequently the OAREG were removed from this manual and published separately in a new document, AAP 8000.010 — ADF Operational Airworthiness Manual (renamed in 2011 as the Defence Operational Airworthiness Manual). The TAREG continued to be promulgated separately in AAP 7001.053, Technical Airworthiness Management Manual (TAMM).

2.12 A 12 element Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS) was introduced in December 2003, and the corresponding Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM) was issued in March 2004. Guidance from Canada, the US, UK, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and the AS/NZ Standard 4804:2001, 'Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems', was considered in constructing the elements of the Defence ASMS. This guidance was compared against the nature and requirements of Defence aviation operations, to derive the elements required for an effective ASMS in the Defence aviation context.

2.13 In March 2004, following the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Tiger Team Report of December 2003, DFS-ADF and the Directorate of Air Force Safety (DAFS)6 were combined into a single Directorate, with distinct roles of ADF Aviation Safety and Air Force OHS. However, the amalgamation of these two separate Directorates, and concurrent appointment of a single Director with dual titles to account for the two distinct roles, resulted in confusion within Air Force and the wider

6 DAFS was formed from the Air Force Ground Safety Agency (AFGSA), which was established in April 2001 as a result of the F-111 Deseal-Reseal Board of Inquiry.

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Defence Aviation community. Consequently, in April 2006, the Directorate of Flying Safety and the Directorate of Air Force Safety were renamed the Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS).

2.14 In response to recommendations from the Board of Inquiry into the Sea King accident at Nias Island in 2005, the ADF AA commissioned a strategic review of the ADF Airworthiness Management System (AMS) in 2007. The ADF Airworthiness Management System Review was unclear as to whether safety is considered to be part of the AMS or vice versa. The review further considered that, while the objectives of the AMS and Aviation Safety Management System (ASMS) are closely aligned, airworthiness and aviation safety were not well coordinated in the ADF. The review also recommended adoption of a revised objective for the AMS of “ensuring State aircraft and aviation systems are operated by the Services at an acceptable level of risk”, and noted its similarity to the published ASMS objective of “reducing the risks of accidents and dangerous occurrences to as low as possible”.7

2.15 The ADF Airworthiness Management System Review concluded that the AMS is essentially a regulatory structure within which ADF aviation units are required to operate, and that compliance with the regulatory structure is a command responsibility, with authority and accountability for flying safety and airworthiness delegated through the command chain. The review further concluded that the AMS excludes aviation safety, is overly complicated and has blurred responsibilities, leading to confusion and a lack of clear understanding of the AMS.8

2.16 The commencement of the WHS Act on 1 January 2012 imposed more stringent WHS obligations on activities undertaken by Defence. Of particular note Defence has a primary duty of care to ensure, So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP), the health and safety of workers while at work.9 The fundamental consequence associated with commencement of the WHS Act is to replace the stated objective of Defence Aviation being conducted at an acceptable level of risk, with an obligation that Defence both meets the stated objective and ensures that risks to health and safety are eliminated SFARP and, if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate risks to health and safety, to minimise those risks SFARP. This requirement diverges from the ICAO approach, which requires that aviation be conducted at an Acceptable Level of Safety (ALOS).

2.17 In September 2011, DI(G) OPS 02-2 was reissued with a revised title of the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP), to reflect a single integrated policy that addressed both the extant AMS and ASMS, along with the change in obligations foreshadowed with commencement of the WHS Act on 1 January 2012. With incorporation of the ASMS into DI(G) OPS 02–2, the appointment of the ADF Airworthiness Authority (ADF AA) was amended to the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), to better reflect the revised focus of this appointment as having a

7 ADF Airworthiness Management System Review, July 2007, paragraphs 47-49.

8 ADF Airworthiness Management System Review, July 2007, paragraphs 47-49.

9 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Clth), Part 2, Division 2 Section 19(1).

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broad aviation safety responsibility that is relevant, but also specifically limited, to the DASP. As such, the Defence AA's responsibilities do not extend beyond the DASP. Other significant changes associated with reissue of DI(G) OPS 02-2 included formally expanding the scope of the DASP to include non-Defence registered aircraft that are engaged by Defence, and a number of Aviation Support Systems (AvSS). Subsequently, in September 2012, the ADF Airworthiness Manual was reissued as the Defence Aviation Safety Program Manual.

2.18 In 2013 it was recognised that the bespoke TAREG, initially issued in 1994, had significant limitations, were not aligned with any contemporary global regulation system, and provided limited opportunity for viable reform. Consequently, a review of comparable regulatory systems was undertaken at the direction of the Defence AA. The review concluded that the European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR) 10, which were derived from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, represented global best practice in military aviation regulation. Additionally, adoption of the EMAR, where appropriate, provides an opportunity to harmonise Defence aviation regulations with the aviation regulatory system being adopted widely across the world, including by the CASA, who is Australia’s National Aviation Authority (NAA). Accordingly, following a thorough due diligence assessment, the EASA regulations and EMAR were selected as the most appropriate benchmark against which to design the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR).

The Defence AA subsequently agreed that DASR, based on the EMAR to the maximum extent practicable, be developed.11

2.19 Of particular note, the review concluded that full adoption of EASA regulations was not appropriate for Defence aviation, and assessed the extent to which adoption of the EASA regulations should be pursued. The results of the assessment were mapped against the five broad areas of regulation, as depicted in Figure 2-2, with the recommended extent of adoption of EASA regulations indicated by the green area in each of the five broad areas of regulation. Development of the DASR was undertaken cognisant of the outcome of this assessment.

10 The European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR) consist of Parts 21, M, 145, 66 and 147, and are based on the equivalent part of the EASA regulations, amended as necessary to reflect specific military requirements such as cargo delivery and employment of weapons.

11 Defence AA Decision Brief, Concept to Redesign Airworthiness Regulations, dated 29 November 2013.

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Figure 2–2 Map of Regulation Areas Against Recommended Adoption of EASA Regulations

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PART 1

CHAPTER 3

FUTURE AVIATION SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS TO BE ISSUED

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PART 2

CHAPTER 1

PRINCIPAL DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

1.1 To comply with Defence Aviation statutory safety obligations, the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and Secretary of Defence, through Joint Directive 24/2016, Joint Directive on The Defence Aviation Safety Framework (the Joint Directive), have established a structured framework for the management of Aviation Safety within Defence. The framework comprises clear authorities and accountabilities, supported by a comprehensive Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP). The DASP has been developed cognisant of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Standards and Recommend Practices (SARP) for safety management1, which have been appropriately tailored and focussed to ensure that they are pertinent to Defence Aviation, and that the unique aspects associated with Defence Aviation are effectively addressed.

PURPOSE

1.2 This chapter describes the principal Defence Aviation safety arrangements. Specific details on each component of the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) are provided in the following chapters.

AVIATION SAFETY MANAGEMENT

1.3 The aim of aviation safety management is to assure adequate levels of safety whilst allowing operational commanders to exploit capability to the maximum possible extent. Importantly, aviation safety management allows commanders to make operational judgements based on a known and sustainable state of their aviation assets. In this regard, aviation safety regulations should rarely be a major obstacle to capability; instead, compliance with the regulations should, where possible, allow flexibility to minimise any capability impact. In particular, when considering application of the regulations the following two key factors should always be considered:

a. Intent. What is the intent of the regulation? In other words, what hazard isbeing treated by complying with the regulation? Satisfying the intent will, inmost cases, satisfy the regulation.

b. Compliance. Through what process or mechanism will compliance beestablished? Is this method appropriate to meet the substance or intent of theregulation?

1 Annex 19 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Safety Management.

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1.4 Ultimately, the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), represented by the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA), provides authoritative advice on the interpretation and application of the regulations. Early engagement with DASA staff when considering application of the regulations is strongly encouraged, to assist in appropriately applying and managing the aviation safety requirements that will underpin the intended capability.

THE DEFENCE AVIATION AUTHORITY

1.5 The Chief of Air Force (CAF) has been appointed as the Defence AA2, and is accountable to the Secretary and the CDF for regulation and oversight of all safety aspects of Defence Aviation.

1.6 In accordance with the Joint Directive the Defence AA is required to establish:

a. an appropriately resourced aviation safety organisation to be known as theDefence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA)

b. an independent accident and incident investigation capability

c. appropriate consultation and liaison arrangements with external aviationorganisations, such as the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), the ICAOand equivalent international military aviation authorities.

1.7 In addition to the responsibilities listed at paragraph 1.6, the Defence AA is required to:

a. maintain oversight of Defence Aviation safety performance

b. proactively engage with Service Chiefs and Group Heads on aviation safetymatters under their command or management.

THE DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY COUNCIL

1.8 The Defence AA has established the Defence Aviation Safety Council (DASC) to effectively govern the DASP. The DASC is also responsible for considering the views of all significant Defence Aviation stakeholders when aviation safety initiatives are proposed, and ensuring that the approach to aviation safety adopted by the DASA is aligned, where appropriate, with that taken by the CASA and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Additionally, DASC members provide significant impetus to facilitate implementation of Defence aviation policy.

2 CDF/OUT/2016/567, CDF Charter Letter to Chief of Air Force, dated 28 June 2016.

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DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP

1.9 The DASC is chaired by two star officer appointed by the Defence AA, and its membership comprises the following:

a. Permanent Members. The following personnel are Permanent Members ofthe DASC:

(1) Air Commander Australia (ACAUST) or other two star officer designatedby Chief of Air Force (CAF)

(2) Commander Forces Command (COMD FORCOMD) or other two starofficer designated by Chief of Army (CA)

(3) Commander Australian Fleet (COMAUSFLT) or other two star officerdesignated by Chief of Navy (CN)

(4) Capability and Sustainment Group (CASG) Head of AerospaceSystems Division (HASD) or other two star/SES Band 2 officerdesignated by DEPSEC CASG

(5) Director General DASA (DGDASA)

(6) Director of Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (DACPA)(Secretary)

(7) Director of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS).

b. Permanently Invited Members. The following personnel are PermanentlyInvited Members of the DASC:

(1) The Director of CASA

(2) The Chief Commissioner of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.

1.10 The DASC is to convene at least yearly, but may convene more often as required to address specific issues. Meetings will be scheduled to facilitate attendance by Permanent Members.

1.11 DASC Secretariat. Secretariat functions for the DASC will be provided by the DASA.3 DASC outcomes will be recorded by the secretariat and forwarded to all DASC members for endorsement.

3 DACPA is to make appropriate arrangements to ensure the required secretariat functions are provided.

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1.12 DASC Agendum. Matters for decision, discussion or noting by the DASC should be proposed at least one month prior to a meeting. Briefs will be required for each agendum item and should be forwarded to reach the secretariat at least 12 working days prior to the meeting. Briefs should be in dot point format, and of no greater than three pages in length (not including references). Agendum briefs will be compiled by the secretariat for ongoing DASC matters, and those initiated by the DASC Chair. Briefs for other matters are to be raised by the proposing authority. All agendum briefs should note consultation with other authorities.

THE DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

1.13 The Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) was established by the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), and is an organisation with three executive directors4 who are primarily responsible for the Airworthiness, Operational Airworthiness and Aviation Safety functions.5

1.14 The primary objective of the DASA is to enhance and promote the safety of military aviation. To achieve this outcome the DASA shall develop, implement and maintain the DASP, a structured safety program comprising the functions necessary to assure effective management of aviation safety risk. The overall goal of the DASP is to ensure that Defence Aviation is only undertaken where mechanisms to enable effective management of aviation safety have been established, and the risks to aviation safety are either eliminated So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) or, if it is not reasonably practicable to eliminate the risks, minimised SFARP. The DASP will also enable commanders to fully exploit aviation capabilities in defence of Australia’s national interests, while recognising and supporting compliance with statutory safety requirements. The DASP is approved by the Authority.

DELEGATIONS TO DASA KEY APPOINTMENTS

1.15 The Defence AA may delegate the approval of specified activities, and/or specific aviation safety aspects, to key personnel within the DASA.

1.16 Delegations to act on behalf of the Defence AA may be provided to the personnel holding the positions of DGDASA, DACPA, and DDAAFS. Any delegations given to these personnel will be in writing from the Defence AA, and will clearly describe the scope and limits of the delegation provided. A delegation will be to the person holding the appointment and, unless revoked by the Defence AA beforehand, will expire when that person ceases to hold the appointment.

4 DGDASA, DACPA and DDAAFS are the executive directors of the DASA.

5 While not aviation safety assurance functions, some related specialist functions (ie: Aircraft Structural Integrity and Air Force Safety) have been included as part of the DASA organisation solely for convenience.

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1.17 Delegations may be amended or revoked by the Defence AA at any time. Amendment or revocation of a delegation is to be provided in writing from the Defence AA and, where a delegation is amended, is to clearly state the amended scope and limitations of the delegation.

DELEGATIONS TO REGULATED ORGANISATION KEY APPOINTMENTS

1.18 The Authority may delegate the approval of specific activities, and/or specific aviation safety aspects, to key personnel within the regulated organisations. Any delegations given to these personnel will be in writing from the Authority, and will clearly describe the scope and limits of the delegation provided. The delegations will be to the person holding a specific appointment and, unless revoked by the Authority beforehand, will expire when that person ceases to hold the appointment.

1.19 Delegations may be amended or revoked by the Authority at any time. Amendment or revocation of a delegation is to be provided in writing from the Authority and, where a delegation is amended, is to clearly state the amended scope and limitations of the delegation.

DELEGATIONS BY THE DASA

1.20 The DASA may issue delegations for specific functions to personnel within regulated organisations. These delegations are referred to as Delegates of the Safety Authority (DoSA), will be in writing from the DASA, and will clearly describe the scope and limits of the delegation provided. The words “For and On Behalf of the DASA” are to be used whenever these delegations are exercised.

1.21 The categories of DoSA under which personnel within regulated organisations may be issued a delegation are described at Annex A. Subject to demonstrated satisfaction of specified competencies, delegations will be issued to the personnel holding specific appointments and, unless revoked by the DASA beforehand, will expire when that person ceases to hold the appointment. The process for management of DoSA delegations, including determination that competencies have been satisfied, is detailed at Annex A.

1.22 Delegations may be amended or revoked by the DASA at any time. Amendment or revocation of a delegation is to be provided in writing from the DASA and, where a delegation is amended, is to clearly state the amended scope and limitations of the delegation.

1.23 DASA staff will not be issued delegations. Notwithstanding this, DASA staff are to use the words “For and On Behalf of the DASA” when promulgating the formal position of the DASA on a particular issue.

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THE DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM

1.24 The DASP has been developed in line with contemporary Aviation Safety conventions, including ICAO SARP and European Military Airworthiness Requirements (EMAR)6. Figure 1-1 depicts the structure of the DASP, with the key components of the program being:

a. prescribing safety policy, regulations and standards for Defence Aviation

b. promoting Defence Aviation safety through training, communication anddissemination of safety information

c. establishing and certifying the initial safety requirements for Defence Aviationorganisations and aviation platforms/systems

d. conducting oversight and enforcing ongoing compliance of Defence Aviationorganisations and aviation platforms/systems.

Figure 1–1 Defence Aviation Safety Program Structure

6 The EMAR predominantly reflect the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, which are recognised as best practice, contemporary regulations that have been adopted by numerous countries (both within and outside of Europe).

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PRESCRIBE SAFETY POLICY AND REGULATIONS

1.25 Aviation safety policy is dependent on appropriate legislation for its authority. Accordingly, the relevant provisions of the Defence Act 1903 provide the authority for policy prescribed by Defence. However, other legislation, such as the Work Health and Safety Act 2011, also places specific safety obligations on Defence Aviation. Consequently, prescription of safety policy needs to ensure that all applicable legislative requirements have been appropriately identified and addressed.

1.26 Defence Aviation safety policy is prescribed through the Joint Directive, the DASP Policy Statement issued by the Defence AA, this manual, and related manuals that detail specific safety requirements. The policy provides the framework, authority, obligations and accountabilities necessary to implement and operate an effective aviation safety program.

1.27 Airworthiness Terminology. To maximise the benefits associated with harmonisation of Defence aviation regulations with a global standard, the use of similar terminology is necessary. This includes the use of globally recognised terms that have been adopted in EMAR for "Initial Airworthiness" and "Continuing Airworthiness".

1.28 The ADF’s "Operational Airworthiness" term does not feature in EMAR, as EMAR are focussed solely on regulation of technical aspects. Operational Airworthiness has been retained by the ADF as a key concept that uniquely addresses the ADF’s means of striving for high professional standards and a zero accident rate. As such, Operational Airworthiness principles will continue to overlay all flight operations and the wide variety of support functions and integrated systems that contribute to safe aviation in Defence.

1.29 The specific elements of “Prescribe Safety Policy and Regulations” are detailed in Part 2, Chapter 2.

PROMOTE AVIATION SAFETY

1.30 The ICAO recognises that entities responsible for aviation safety should have an integrated approach to their respective roles. Therefore, it is important to ensure that there are effective safety communication channels that enable safety information to be shared, communicated, disseminated and coordinated amongst the entities.7

1.31 Effective promotion of aviation safety is dependent on sound communication, to ensure that all affected personnel are aware of safety hazards, issues and requirements. In particular, the value of talking directly to personnel should never be underestimated, as it provides an ideal opportunity for focussed discussion on safety issues and concerns, and for personnel to contribute ideas for improvement. Other safety communication tools include policy documentation, safety committees,

7 ICAO Document No 9859, Safety Management Manual, State Safety Program, Component 4.

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surveys, audits, visits by safety authorities, safety stand downs and open reporting mechanisms.

1.32 Education is a vital means of ensuring that the appropriate competencies necessary to achieve aviation safety objectives are met. Aviation safety education is already embedded into many existing Defence courses, and military and civilian agencies external to Defence also offer a variety of aviation safety and related education programs.

1.33 All personnel within the Defence Aviation sector8, who undertake or directly support aviation activities, should receive sufficient education to achieve a general understanding of aviation safety. Further safety education should also be provided commensurate with each person’s aviation safety responsibilities. Where possible, education should be targeted to priority areas. There are a number of means (such as safety trends, audit results and incident reports) to identify opportunities for targeted education. In particular, a mature risk-based approach to education will identify the level of education required, and facilitate development of tailored education necessary to address any emerging trends. This also ensures that education remains operationally focused and valid.

1.34 The specific elements of “Promote Aviation Safety” are detailed in Part 2, Chapter 3.

ESTABLISH AND CERTIFY INITIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS

1.35 Effective safety management is predicated on ensuring compliance with specified requirements and standards. Consequently, there is a need to both establish the requirements and standards necessary to achieve the intended safety outcome, and then certify that organisations, products and processes comply with the specified requirements and standards. These certifications establish safety baselines that can subsequently be used to assess ongoing compliance with the requirements and standards, and assist in measuring safety performance.

1.36 In the civil aviation sector it is common for the activities of multiple, often diverse entities to collectively enable safe aviation. Similarly, generation of the Defence Aviation capability often relies on safety activities undertaken by a range of both commercial and Defence entities. Consequently, effective safety outcomes are contingent on the safety requirements and standards being specified such that they are equally applicable to both Defence and commercial organisations. Further, a consistent approach to certification against these requirements and standards should be adopted, to facilitate establishment of a common safety baseline, irrespective of whether the entity being certified is a Defence or commercial organisation.

8 This includes Australian Public Service (APS) and contractor personnel who may not have received any form of aviation safety education, or who may require additional education to meet specific requirements.

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1.37 The specific elements of “Establish and Certify Initial Safety Requirements and Standards ” are detailed in Part 2, Chapter 4.

CONDUCT OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCE ONGOING COMPLIANCE

1.38 A key tenet of assuring ongoing aviation safety is to regularly confirm that the basis for certifying an organisation, product or process as compliant remains valid. Additionally, regular oversight enables discovery of any deficiencies regarding compliance with the basis for certification, thereby allowing corrective actions to be taken, and thus assure that the required level of aviation safety is maintained.

1.39 If disregard for aviation safety requirements becomes apparent, or there is reluctance to address any aviation safety deficiencies within agreed timeframes, an appropriate mechanism is required to address these issues. An effective enforcement mechanism, which is fair and proportionate to the deficiency, graduated in its application and based on objective evidence, has been established to meet this requirement.

1.40 Despite extensive effort to ensure aviation is undertaken safely, preventing all accidents and incidents from occurring is not feasible. However, while the goal is to prevent accidents and incidents from occurring, accidents and incidents provide a significant opportunity to identify weaknesses within the safety program and associated Safety Management Systems (SMS), and thus facilitate their ongoing improvement. Indeed, the sole objective of aviation accident and incident investigation is the prevention of further accidents and incidents, not the apportioning of blame or liability.

1.41 Defence maintains an accident and incident investigation capability to ensure that the causal factors that resulted in an accident or incident are identified and understood, thereby facilitating remedial action required to address identified deficiencies. In accordance with global best practice, the Defence accident and incident investigation capability has been established independent from any other organisation whose interests could conflict with the tasks entrusted to the investigation authority.9

1.42 The specific elements of “Conduct Oversight and Enforce Ongoing Compliance” are detailed in Part 2, Chapter 5. Annex: 1A Delegates of the Safety Authority

9 ICAO Document No 9859, Safety Management Manual, State Safety Program, Element 1.3.

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PART 2 - ANNEX 1A

DELEGATES OF THE SAFETY AUTHORITY INTRODUCTION

1. The Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) may issue delegations for specific DASA functions to appropriate personnel. These delegations are as Delegates of the Safety Authority (DoSA), will be in writing from the DASA, and will clearly describe the scope and limits of the delegation provided. When exercising a delegation, a DoSA is undertaking this function as part of the DASA.

PURPOSE

2. This annex describes the categories of delegations that may be issued by the DASA, and the process for management of these delegations, including determination (both initial and ongoing) that the required competencies have been satisfied.

CATEGORIES OF DELEGATIONS

3. The DASA may delegate specific functions to DoSA in the following categories:

a. Occurrence Report Assessment for specific functions related to DASR 21, DASR M and DASR 145

b. Airworthiness Directives (AD) for specific functions related to DASR 21 Sub-part A

c. Military Permit To Fly (MPTF) for other than flight test, including flight conditions, for specific functions related to DASR 21 Sub-part P

d. MPTF for flight test, including flight conditions, for specific functions related to DASR 21 Sub-part P

e. Military Certificate of Airworthiness1 (MCoA) for specific functions related to DASR 21 Sub-part H

f. Airworthiness Standards for specific functions related to DASR 21.A.16B

g. Projects for a broad range of specific DASA functions related to Type Certification

h. other categories as considered necessary by the DASA for effective management of aviation safety.

1 Includes Military Restricted Certificate of Airworthiness (MRCoA).

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4. Further information on the specific functions associated with each DoSA category is detailed in the guidance for DASR Form 104, 'Candidate Nomination For Appointment As A Delegate Of The Safety Authority'.

ISSUE OF DOSA DELEGATIONS

5. DoSA delegations will be issued by the DASA when:

a. a correctly completed DASA Form 104, with supporting evidence as specified, has been submitted to the DASA

b. the DASA has, using the information provided, conducted a preliminary assessment of the candidate’s suitability to be delegated functions as a DoSA

c. the candidate has, through interview with DGDASA, established their suitability to be delegated functions as a DoSA.

6. If successful, the application to be delegated functions as a DoSA will be approved, and a DoSA Minute specifying the delegated scope, along with any conditions and limitations, is issued to the candidate.

7. Where necessary, the DASA will provide induction training for new delegates, and will continue to conduct quarterly DoSA workshops for on-going training, feedback and coaching of extant delegates.

8. DoSA delegations are issued to a specified individual. They are not transferable and cannot be further delegated2.

MANAGEMENT OF DOSA DELEGATIONS

9. All DoSA delegations will be recorded by the DASA and, unless revoked beforehand, each delegation will remain in effect until the delegate moves from the position that the delegation was required for.

10. The DASA will oversight all DoSA delegations, through a review of selected DoSA actions and decisions, to provide assurance that each DoSA is appropriately exercising their delegated responsibilities.

2 For example, if a DoSA is absent on leave or duty, their delegation cannot be exercised by the person who is appointed to act in the DoSA’s position while they are absent. In this situation any decisions requiring approval by the DoSA must be forwarded to the DASA for approval, unless the person acting in the position also holds a separate DoSA delegation issued to them by the DASA.

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PART 2

CHAPTER 2

PRESCRIBE SAFETY POLICY AND REGULATIONS INTRODUCTION

2.1 Contemporary aviation safety programs are normally based on policy that is clearly enunciated, and supported by comprehensive regulations and a suite of applicable safety standards. Consequently, the first component of the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) is “Prescribe Safety Policy and Regulations”. The component comprises the following elements:

a. aviation safety policy

b. effective regulations

c. safety standards.

PURPOSE

2.2 This chapter describes the elements of the “Prescribe Safety Policy and Regulations” component of the DASP.

AVIATION SAFETY POLICY

2.3 Aviation safety policy is dependent on appropriate legislation for its authority. The Defence Act 1903 provides the authority for Defence Aviation safety policy prescribed by Defence1.

2.4 While the Defence Act 1903 provides the authority for prescribing Defence Aviation safety policy, other legislation, such as the Work Health and Safety Act 2011, places specific safety obligations on Defence Aviation. Consequently, prescription of safety policy needs to ensure that all applicable legislative requirements have been appropriately identified and addressed.

2.5 Defence Aviation safety policy is prescribed through Joint Directive 24/2016 issued by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Secretary, the DASP Policy Statement issued by the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), this manual, and related manuals that detail specific safety requirements. The policy provides the framework, authority, obligations and accountabilities necessary to implement and operate an effective DASP.

1 This includes policy issued jointly by the CDF and the Secretary, and policy issued by the CDF or a Service Chief.

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2.6 Defence Aviation safety policy provides direction regarding the Defence Aviation safety framework, appointments and requirements. It also provides key objectives for the DASP, and provides positive management commitment to safely undertaking Defence Aviation.

EFFECTIVE REGULATIONS

STRUCTURE OF DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY REGULATIONS

2.7 The Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) comprise a Basic Regulation (BR) that defines the overall, mandatory regulatory requirements and, where necessary, supporting Implementing Regulations (IR) that amplify and contextualise the BR by providing additional detailed regulations and guidance material. Figure 2-1 depicts the structure of the DASR.

Figure 2–1 DASR Structure

2.8 As the DASR are aligned with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulations, they provide an opportunity to harmonise Defence Aviation regulations with the aviation regulatory system being adopted widely across the world. The intent of the DASR is to only regulate to the extent considered necessary to achieve safety objectives, and to regulate the entity best placed to deliver the desired safety outcome.

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DASR FRAMEWORK

2.9 The DASR brings revised language and concepts to the Defence Aviation environment. While retaining the fundamental tenets of the previous system, the DASR aims to align the Defence Aviation safety framework with contemporary aviation safety conventions.

2.10 Operational Airworthiness is a long-standing tenet of the ADF aviation community and addresses the widest margins of the aviation safety landscape. Operational Airworthiness extends beyond the scope of flight operations regulation to consider any aspect or condition that impacts the safe operation of Defence aircraft. This may include operational factors relevant to initial and continuing airworthiness regulation; systems that interface with the aircraft or impact on aircraft operation, such as air navigation, aerodromes and aviation safety management systems; or other foreseeable hazards to aviation operations that are not covered explicitly within the DASR.

2.11 Operational Airworthiness provides a framework of controls, and underpins the learned safety culture required to enable commanders to eliminate risks to aviation safety So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) or, where eliminatiion is not reasonably practicable, minimise the risks SFARP. As such, Operational Airworthiness terminology shall continue to endure in the orders, instructions and publications issued by ADF commanders. This is particularly relevant in situations where commanders are expected to operate Defence aircraft at higher levels of risk than normal2, to achieve non-discretionary activities in support of Australia’s national interests. In these circumstances an approved Military Permit To Fly (MPTF) or Command Clearance is required to supplement the approved Military Certificate of Airworthiness (MCoA).3

REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS

2.12 By virtue of the changing nature of Defence technology and its operations, safety processes, regulations and aviation safety policy will be subject to continual review and amendment. The Regulation Change Process (RCP) ensures all future DASR and aviation safety policy is developed, reviewed, approved and documented in an appropriate manner. Interested parties may petition the Authority to repeal, modify or propose regulations IAW the RCP. The RCP is detailed at Annex A.

2 This includes operating an aircraft outside the approved configuration, role, environment or prescribed limitation or condition.

3 While an MPTF is a recognised continuing airworthiness instrument in European Military Airworthiness Regulations (EMAR), Command Clearances are unique to Australian military aviation operations and are allowed under certain Operational Airworthiness provisions. Regulatory requirements pertinent to a Command Clearance are detailed at DASR.SPA.10.

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SAFETY STANDARDS

2.13 A standard is a document that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose.4 Safety standards are those standards designed to ensure the safety of products, activities or processes. They may be advisory or compulsory, and are normally prescribed by an advisory or regulatory body.

2.14 Standards are important for ensuring aviation safety, as they provide a basis for developing, certifying, testing, manufacturing, operating and supporting aviation systems that is broadly accepted across the aviation community. They are also frequently referenced by regulators and legislators to protect users and business interests, and in support of government policies.

2.15 Safety standards are generally referenced in requirements that are placed on regulated organisations, either through specific reference to one or more standards, or by reference to an authoritative document that prescribes standards for a particular function (eg: AAP 7001.054, Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual, prescribes safety standards for the majority of airworthiness design requirements).

2.16 Safety standards will normally be prescribed by the DASA. Compliance with these safety standards is mandatory, unless deviation from compliance with a prescribed standard is approved. In general, the DASA will only consider approving deviations from compliance with a prescribed standard where it can be demonstrated that the standard (or part thereof) is not applicable, or the organisation seeking the deviation can demonstrate that the intent of the standard has been met through other means. Annex: 2A Regulation Change Process

4 http//www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm, 14 September 2016.

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PART 2 - ANNEX 2A

REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS INTRODUCTION

1. The Regulation Change Process (RCP) facilitates the timely development, review and publication of Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) through a coordinated and consultative approach. The RCP is a disciplined process and enables regulation changes by assigning clear responsibilities and accountabilities at all stages. All regulation changes will be supported by documented decisions, made by the Change Sponsor (the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA)) and approval authorities. The intended end state is delivery of well drafted regulation with a documented and auditable trail of reviews, comments and decisions.

2. The RCP initiator may be a Publication Improvement Report and Reply (PIRR)1 or other suitable format that includes an initial assessment and categorisation of the proposed change, conceptual design, regulation drafting, approval and publishing processes, and a structured implementation of the regulation. Throughout the process relevant consultation, endorsements and approvals are gained.

CATEGORIES OF REGULATION CHANGE

3. All regulation changes are categorised as one of the following:

a. major

b. minor

c. editorial.

4. Each category is treated differently within the RCP to reflect the differing levels of risk, work, consultation and approval required. The categorisation of regulation changes will necessarily require some judgement and, where doubt exists, the process for the higher change category should apply.

MAJOR CHANGE

5. Major changes bring significant regulation change with a corresponding change to compliance requirements for the regulated community. A major change would typically be an amendment to address one of the following aspects:

a. previously unrealised hazards to aviation safety

b. treatment of existing hazards where policy is ineffective

1 Web Form AO 011 - Publication Improvement Report and Reply (PIRR).

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c. a fundamental change to the approach or intent of existing regulation

d. removing regulation where hazards are already treated via alternative policy

e. removing regulation where there is no benefit to aviation safety.

6. The RCP for a major change is depicted at Figure 2A-1.

MINOR CHANGE

7. Minor changes should improve the regulation, but not change the intent. A minor change should not impose new regulation. A minor change would typically be an amendment to address one of the following aspects:

a. improving the clarity of regulatory requirements

b. improving guidance material supporting a regulation

c. removing guidance material where content is covered in other regulations or policy.

8. Minor changes do not require the same process overheads as major changes. The RCP for a minor change is depicted at Figure 2A-1.

EDITORIAL CHANGE

9. Editorial changes make editorial corrections to regulations and would typically address:

a. revised terminology

b. organisational change where name changes are required

c. formatting errors

d. grammatical errors

e. punctuation errors

f. spelling errors

g. internal document structure/reference errors (eg. broken hyperlinks, table of contents or index)

h. other minor errors of an editorial nature.

10. Editorial changes do not require the same process overheads as major or minor changes. The RCP for an editorial change is depicted at Figure 2A-1.

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Figure 2A–1 Regulation Change Process

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RESPONSIBILITIES

11. The key appointments and responsibilities that apply to this instruction are:

a. Approval Authority. All regulation changes will be approved by theAuthority

b. Regulated Community Heads. Regulated community heads represent theregulated community and may initiate regulation changes, provide feedbackon proposed concepts and provide endorsement as required for changes.Regulated community heads include Service Chiefs, CJOPS and otherGroup Heads

c. Change Sponsor. The DASA is the Change Sponsor responsible for themanagement and implementation of all changes under the RCP

d. Change Manager. The Change Manager will be an appropriate appointmentdesignated by the Change Sponsor to manage the RCP.

REGULATION CHANGE PROCESS

STEP 1 – REGULATION CHANGE INITIATION

12. A variety of circumstances may lead to the requirement for a regulationchange. Accordingly, an auditable trail of change initiation requests is essential. TheRCP will be initiated by the Change Manager after receipt/ or production of a changeinitiator form. This form should be retained in an enduring manner.

STEP 2 – REGULATION CHANGE ASSESSMENT

13. Upon receipt of a change initiator, the Change Manager will undertake a regulation change assessment to determine the validity of the change request and the change category. Once assessed, for major and minor changes the Change Manager should seek Change Sponsor endorsement of the assessment. If a change is endorsed as a major change, proceed to Step 3 – Concept Development. If a change is endorsed as minor change, proceed to Step 6 – Initial Draft.

14. If the Change Manager assesses the change as an editorial change the Change Manager may proceed to Step 10 – Final Draft without seeking Change Sponsor endorsement.

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15. Regulation Impact Statement (RIS). A RIS is a decision making tool that helps ensure Defence is compliant with Government requirements regarding regulation. The RIS helps determine if a change is required in the first instance, or to ascertain if non-regulatory options might be a better outcome. The RIS is achieved by answering the following seven RIS2 questions (adapted for Defence aviation):

a. What is the hazard the change intends to address?

b. Why is Defence action needed?

c. What are the policy options available?

d. What is the likely net benefit of each option?

e. Who should be consulted?

f. What is the best option being presented?

g. How will the option be implemented?

16. Completion of a RIS will support the concept development of major changes to regulations.

STEP 3 – REGULATION CHANGE CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

17. A major change should undergo development and endorsement of a regulation change concept. The regulation change concept will define the conceptual design for the new or revised regulation and address desired outcomes, including limitations and constraints. The concept development for a major change should include a RIS. The Change Sponsor should determine the level of external consultation required during this phase, acknowledging that significant knowledge and expertise resides in the regulated community. Concept development should include the:

a. affected regulation

b. scope of the regulation change (product of concept development)

c. reason for regulation change (product of concept development)

d. outcome sought from the regulation change

e. summary of RIS questions

2 The RIS questions provided in this annex are an extract from the Australian Government Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) (www.cuttingredtape.gov.au), which provides broad guidance for RIS assessments.

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f. priority of change as follows:

(1) High: Aviation safety critical regulation to be published ASAP

(2) Medium: Aviation safety significant regulation to be published in <6 months

(3) Low: Resource/capability impact improvement to be published in <12 months

(4) Routine: General regulation improvements to be published in <24 months.

g. implementation schedule, and

h. other affected regulation, policy and/or publications.

18. Unless allocated high or medium priority, a major change may take a substantial period of time to complete, which could result in the intent becoming lost over time. The concept development and endorsement process should prevent this from occurring.

STEP 4 – REGULATION CHANGE CONCEPT ENDORSEMENT

19. Once the change concept is developed, the Change Sponsor will send the concept to key DASA appointments and relevant regulated community heads for concept endorsement.

20. Endorsement of the regulation change concept is critical in achieving major regulation change, and assures that the regulated community expects the change and is formally engaged at the concept development stage. Where the concept is not endorsed the Change Sponsor may:

a. negotiate with the applicable authority to refine the scope of the concept, or

b. elevate the decision to the approval authority, where the aviation safety implications of not implementing the change outweigh any additional requirements or workload associated with implementing the change.

STEP 5 – REGULATION CHANGE CONCEPT APPROVAL

21. Once the regulation concept has received endorsement, the Change Sponsor will seek approval from the approval authority to develop the major regulation change.

STEP 6 – REGULATION DRAFTING

22. The draft regulation change should be developed in line with:

a. The “10 Ways to Better Aviation Regulation” Handbook

b. The Australian Government Guide to Regulation

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c. The Office of Parliamentary Council (OPC)3 regulation development tools, such as the OPC Plain English Manual

d. The Defence Writing Manual (DWM).

23. Drafting the regulation should involve relevant working level stakeholders in the first instance, both internal and external. In this manner, the regulation change process is likely to be more successful, as significant issues will have already been identified and negotiated by the Change Manager.

STEP 7 – DASA CONSULTATION

24. A DASA internal consultation phase is critical to ensure agreement of major (Step 7a) and minor (Step 7b) draft regulation changes is reached prior to commencing external consultation with the regulated community.

25. Step 7a. The DASP Agency internal consultation phase for a major change is as follows:

a. The Change Sponsor proposes a timeline for review/comments4 and distributes the regulation pack to key DASA appointments. The regulation pack is documented, tracked and filed IAW respective DASA internal processes

b. Key DASA appointments conduct an internal review of the regulation pack and provide written feedback to the Change Sponsor, including feedback where the appointment has no comment5

c. The Change Sponsor will consider and incorporate changes to the draft regulation as appropriate

d. A summary of responses is then provided with a revised draft to the key DASA appointments for endorsement. The revised regulation should be returned to the Change Sponsor within ten working days6, indicating whether or not it is endorsed

3 http://www.opc.gov.au/

4 A representative timeframe for review is ten working days.

5 This ensures a closed loop feedback process.

6 As the document will have already received considerable attention during the initial review phase, ten days is reasonable.

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e. Depending on the positions of the key DASA appointments, the change may:

(1) re-enter the internal consultation process

(2) be provided to the regulated community as part of the external consultation phase7, or

(3) be directed to the next suitable authority for arbitration.

f. The DASP internal consultation phase should be completed before formal external consultation occurs.

26. Step 7b. The DASP Agency internal consultation phase for a minor change is an informal process that affords flexibility regarding the level of consultation. It enables regulation Subject Matter Expert (SME) input without increasing oversight unnecessarily before Final Drafting (Step 10).

STEP 8 – EXTERNAL CONSULTATION

27. Prior to formal external consultation, it is expected that informal consultation will have occurred with relevant stakeholders.

28. Once the DASA internal consultation phase is complete, the Change Sponsor will provide the draft regulation to the regulated community and request feedback. The entire regulated community may provide change feedback direct to the Change Sponsor; however, any feedback received, that has not been cleared by the relevant Military Air Operator Accountable Manager (MAO-AM) or Group Head, should be provided to the relevant AM or Group Head, so this feedback may be moderated as part of the formal reply.

29. With respect to external consultation, the following aspects should be considered:

a. Review of the draft regulation change may require inputs from key stakeholders, such as the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG)

b. Each MAO-AM and Group Head will determine the level of engagement required within their organisation to obtain feedback on the proposed change

c. Feedback may drive significant change to the initial draft, such that a further round of external consultation may be required before seeking approval to publish the regulation

7 Should a key DASA appointment not endorse the change, this should not automatically prevent the change from being distributed to the regulated community for comment, as issues that exist may be resolved via this process.

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30. The majority of engagement will occur via correspondence. Additionally the bi-annual Airworthiness Board (AwB) convocation provides a regular forum for key stakeholders to discuss regulation development or associated concerns if required. Where necessary, the DASA will ensure regulation development is an agenda item at AwB convocations.

STEP 9 – EXTERNAL FEEDBACK

31. While all feedback may be considered by the Change Sponsor, only the feedback that has been moderated by an MAO-AM or Group Head must be formally addressed by the Change Sponsor.

STEP 10 – FINAL DRAFT REGULATION

32. The Change Sponsor will ensure the final draft regulation is produced after considering the change feedback received.

STEP 11 – FINAL DASA CONSULTATION

33. The process is as per Step 7 and is the final DASA opportunity to solicit aviation safety and regulation SME advice, and endorsement of the final draft regulation. Should the feedback from Step 7 - DASA Consultation not include any negative comments of substance, the Change Sponsor may elect to skip Step 11. If so, the Change Sponsor should advise the key DASA appointments of this decision.

STEP 12 – FINAL DRAFT ENDORSEMENT

34. The Change Sponsor will send the draft regulation change to relevant MAO-AM and Group Heads, seeking endorsement prior to seeking approval to publish. Should the feedback from Step 8 - External Consultation not include any negative comments of substance, the Change Sponsor may elect to skip Step 12. If so, the Change Sponsor should advise the relevant authorities of this decision.

STEPS 13A, 13B AND 13C – APPROVAL

35. The Change Sponsor will request approval to publish and implement the regulation change from the appropriate approval authority.

STEP 14 – PUBLISH REGULATION

36. The Change Sponsor will publish the regulation change after receiving written approval from the approval authority.

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STEP 15 – IMPLEMENT REGULATION

37. The Change Sponsor will implement the regulation change by ensuring:

a. an implementation transition strategy is advised

b. promotion and education of the regulation change is provided for the regulated community

c. an oversight and enforcement strategy is advised, and

d. a regulation review schedule is planned8.

CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT

38. Once a regulation is published it is subject to continuous improvement.

8 Major changes may require a review after a defined period to confirm that they are having the desired effect. This is likely to be the case when introducing regulation for a new capability.

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PART 2

CHAPTER 3

PROMOTE AVIATION SAFETY TO BE ISSUED

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PART 2

CHAPTER 4

ESTABLISH AND CERTIFY INITIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS

TO BE ISSUED

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PART 2

CHAPTER 5

CONDUCT OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCE ONGOING COMPLIANCE INTRODUCTION

5.1 The effectiveness of the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) is governed by the suitability of, and the level of compliance with, the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) that underpin it. Organisations that operate within the regulatory framework seek to maintain compliance in two ways: firstly, by developing and implementing organisational systems, supported by policies and instructions, that observe and implement the regulations and; secondly, by developing feedback mechanisms to verify that the policies and instructions have been followed, and that the policies and instructions remain suitable for the purpose of meeting regulatory requirements.

5.2 Compliance assurance contributes to aviation safety by identifying potential areas of concern that may then be evaluated further and addressed if necessary. Compliance with DASR also mitigates systemic and human errors which dominate the hazards to aviation safety. Compliance assurance is a systematic means of monitoring organisations, that operate within the regulatory framework, for their level of observance and understanding of the regulatory system, as indicated by their policies and instructions and their adherence to them. A natural consequence of compliance assurance is that it also provides insight into the suitability of the regulations themselves, which is essential for their ongoing development.

5.3 A key component of an effective regulatory framework is ensuring that regulated entities have a clear understanding of when, why and how the Authority may take action in the event of regulatory breaches or unresolved safety performance issues. The DASP enforcement policy supports compliance with the DASR through application of a consistent enforcement framework, and has been developed with due consideration of the Defence aviation environment and associated Commonwealth legislation.

5.4 Accident and incident investigation also provides an excellent opportunity for oversight of compliance with the aviation safety policies and systems, as the structured means of determining and assessing the factors that led to the accident or incident should reveal any deficiencies regarding compliance with the DASR. Furthermore, aviation safety occurrence reporting of Events1 can provide an indication of an organisation’s level of compliance with the DASR. Consequently, investigation reports and occurrence reporting data should be considered during development of a compliance assurance program.

1 Refer to Part 2, Chapter 7, Footnote 1.

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PURPOSE

5.5 This chapter describes the elements that comprise the “Conduct Oversight and Enforce Ongoing Compliance” component of the DASP. This chapter applies to all entities regulated under the DASR, and any entity performing Defence Aviation functions that is regulated by a DASA recognised National Aviation Authority (NAA) or Military Aviation Authority (MAA).

OVERSIGHT ONGOING COMPLIANCE

REGULATORY REQUIREMENT

5.6 DASR BR.60 specifies the requirements for compliance oversight and enforcement, and requires all Defence, civilian and contractor entities operating within the Defence Aviation safety regulatory framework to comply with the DASR. Regulatory compliance is subject to ongoing oversight at multiple levels within the framework, and results of the oversight are used to:

a. ensure that regulated entities are complying with the DASR,

b. inform future DASR development, and

c. refine the processes and procedures that support implementation of theDASR.

COMPLIANCE BY REGULATED ENTITIES

5.7 Regulated entities are required to ensure that their own organisations comply with applicable aviation safety policies and instructions. Ensuring compliance requires the systematic and routine review of organisational elements, to assess the element’s compliance with the Authority's policies and instructions relating to aviation safety. Each regulated entity should establish arrangements, procedures and processes, including a compliance review schedule, to ensure compliance with the DASR.

COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE BY THE AUTHORITY

5.8 Compliance assurance is required to provide confidence to the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) that Defence Aviation operations are being undertaken safely, in accordance with legislated requirements.

5.9 Normally, compliance assurance of regulated entities is achieved through the review of approved organisations by the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA), in accordance with compliance assurance programs involving both on-site and desk-top evaluations and interviews. In addition to providing a measure of the regulated entity’s compliance with the DASR, the reviews also act to provide a level of confidence that appropriate arrangements are in place to support the compliance of subordinate organisations with the DASR. Where a review identifies a non-compliance with the DASR, the review’s findings will include recommendations for corrective action.

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COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

5.10 Compliance assurance activities are to be conducted regularly; however, the periodicity of reviews may be influenced by adopting a risk based approach for some organisations or operational activities. Compliance assurance activities are required to be conducted against defined criteria, and by qualified staff who should be substantially independent of the area being reviewed.

ENFORCE ONGOING COMPLIANCE

5.11 In addition to oversighting ongoing compliance with the DASR, the DASA is required to enforce the ongoing compliance of Defence Aviation organisations2 , and aviation platforms and systems, as one of the key objectives of the DASP.

5.12 The DASA is obligated to address any identified regulatory non-compliances and safety issues that regulated entities encounter, and the DASA enforcement policy supports compliance with DASR through application of a consistent enforcement framework. This framework takes due consideration of the Defence aviation environment, and uses a fair, proportional and graduated response to remediate deficiencies with the management of aviation safety risks.

5.13 Regulated entities are expected to willingly comply with aviation safety requirements. Where deficiencies with DASR compliance are identified, the DASA expects that the deficiencies will be remediated with minimal DASA involvement or intervention. Notwithstanding this, if a non-compliance is either wilful or poses a significant increase in risk to aviation safety, the DASA may pursue a more interventionist approach.3

DASA ENFORCEMENT PRINCIPLES

5.14 The DASA enforcement policy is founded on the following principles:

a. Principle 1: Enforcement action may be taken in the event of regulatory non-compliance or safety issue.

(1) The decision to take enforcement action will give due and equitableconsideration to distinguishing consistent or premeditated non-compliance, from non-compliance resulting from unintentional errors ordeviations.

2 A Defence Aviation organisation is any Defence organisation or contractor who holds an organisation approval under the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR).

3 Enforcement action taken by the DASA is predominantly focussed on the regulated entity. Importantly, it is not a replacement for, and must not be confused with, disciplinary or administrative processes, that may be utilised by command chains where Defence personnel have committed offences or demonstrated significant professional failings.

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b. Principle 2: Enforcement action shall be graduated.

(1) Enforcement action shall commence at the lowest level commensuratewith the increase in risk to aviation safety and willingness of theregulated entity to address the non-compliance, and should beescalated only when necessary to secure compliance.

(2) The rate of escalation is cognisant of the underlying aviation safety risk,prior interaction between the DASA and the non-compliant entity, andthe entity’s motivation and capacity to comply with the regulations.

c. Principle 3: Enforcement action shall be fair and proportionate.

(1) Full details of the nature of the non-compliance will be disclosed, alongwith supporting evidence where possible.

(2) The response to the non-compliance will be proportionate to theidentified breach and the increased risk to aviation safety.

(3) Enforcement action will relate directly to the non-compliance andassociated increase in safety risk.

(4) In the interests of procedural fairness, regulated entities will be affordedthe opportunity to review and respond to an identified non-complianceprior to enforcement action being initiated.

d. Principle 4: Enforcement decisions shall be independent and evidencebased.

(1) Enforcement decisions will be independent, transparent andunderpinned by objective evidence.

(2) Enforcement decisions will not be influenced by personal, political,capability or financial considerations.

PROPORTIONATE AND GRADUATED ENFORCEMENT

5.15 Non-compliances may occur for a variety of reasons, ranging from a genuine misunderstanding of the regulations, through to a consistent and deliberate disregard for aviation safety. As shown in figure 5-1, a proportionate approach to enforcement takes account of the regulated entity’s intent, with regard to compliance with the DASR, when determining the type of enforcement action to be taken in response to identified non-compliances.

5.16 The left side of figure 5-1 represents the regulated entity’s attitude to compliance, from fully compliant (totally willing) at the base to disengaged (totally unwilling) at the peak. The right side of figure 5-1 represents the DASA response that should be expected based on the regulated entity’s attitude, and covers the range of responses from advisory and persuasive measures at the base, through to specific direction to minimise the risk to aviation safety at the peak.

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5.17 Enforcement action will be based on the intent of the regulated entity, the increased risk to aviation safety associated with the non-compliance, and the capacity of the regulated entity to remediate the non-compliance. In some cases, a non-compliance may only require education, training and/or oversight, whereas for more significant non-compliances a specific enforcement action may be necessary to achieve compliance or deter a repetition.

5.18 When a specific enforcement action has been directed, the DASA will escalate the enforcement action where the regulated entity fails to adequately respond to the directed enforcement action.

Figure 5–1 Proportionate Approach to Enforcement

5.19 The key factors influencing a DASA decision to escalate an enforcement action include:

a. the nature, seriousness and extent of the non-compliances, including thesafety implications and the intent (if applicable) of the non-compliances

b. the willingness of the organisation to address the non-compliances andensure that they are not systemic

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c. the nature and sufficiency of available objective evidence of the non-compliances

d. the action required to effectively and efficiently address the aviation safetyrisks that have been identified or are likely to arise

e. the need to obtain expert assistance on a complex technical or operationalissue, including legal advice

f. the obligation to be fair, consistent, impartial and proportional in takingenforcement action.

5.20 While imposing a sanction that suspends or revokes an entity’s approval is a real and credible course of action, as part of a graduated response to serious and/or continuing non-compliances, this may not always be in the interests of the Service. If the DASA is considering limiting, suspending or revoking an entity’s approval, the relevant Service Chief or Group Head is to be consulted before any proposed sanction that suspends or revokes an entity’s approval is imposed.

DASA ENFORCEMENT PROCESS

5.21 Coordinated enforcement is aimed at achieving better informed and consistent enforcement across the regulated community. Accordingly, where imposition of an enforcement action is being considered, the DASA will ensure that all pertinent aspects are considered in determining the most appropriate response including, if necessary, whether previous enforcement action should be escalated.

5.22 Enforcement action will be considered when:

a. a Level 1 finding is identified4

b. an entity’s non-compliances reveal systemic deficiencies, and the DASA isnot satisfied that the entity is willing or able to rectify these deficiencies

c. repetition of a number of serious non-compliances, of the type previouslydetected, is discovered

d. an entity does not respond appropriately to a remediation plan agreed withthe DASA

e. in consultation with the affected entity, any other situation arises that theDASA considers warrants consideration of enforcement action.

4 Compliance assessment levels are based on the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) regulatory framework, and comprise Level 1 and 2 Findings, and Observations where a finding is not considered to be warranted. A non-compliance will be assessed as a Level 1 Finding where the non-compliance is significant, lowers the safety standard and seriously hazards flight safety.

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ENFORCEMENT ACTION AND COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS

5.23 The requirement for commercial entities to comply with DASR requirements and maintain relevant organisational approvals is normally secured through contractual provisions. Where the DASA is considering taking enforcement action against a commercial entity, the relevant Defence contract management authority will be consulted, to ensure that any action taken complies with applicable contractual requirements.

COORDINATION WITH EXTERNAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

5.24 In certain circumstances the DASA may identify a regulatory breach or safety concern that falls under the jurisdiction of an external NAA or MAA. If this occurs, the DASA will consult with external agencies as necessary, to ensure a coordinated approach to any enforcement or remedial action is undertaken.

ENFORCEMENT APPEAL PROCESS

5.25 If an entity disagrees with an enforcement decision taken by the DASA, an appeal process is available for review of the enforcement decision. An appeal against an enforcement decision will only be considered if it is made in writing to the DASA, by an accountable person in the entity subject to the enforcement decision.5

5.26 In handling an appeal against an enforcement action the DASA will:

a. consider any appeal that is in writing, by email or letter, and includes relevantinformation to support the appeal

b. treat appellants fairly and courteously

c. deal with appeals promptly as follows:

(1) acknowledge initial receipt of a written appeal within five working daysof receipt

(2) send a full response within 20 working days of receipt

(3) if unable to respond fully within 20 working days of receipt, provide awritten explanation to the appellant advising the reason for the delay inproviding a full response, and the date by which the full response will beprovided

d. handle the appellant’s personal information in accordance with therequirements of the Privacy Act 1988.

5 Accountable persons are the Senior Executive of a DASR approved organisation or the holder of a DASR Form 4, Acceptance of Nominated Management Personnel.

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5.27 All appeals will be dealt with through the following process:

a. Tier 1 - Initial Review. On receipt of a written appeal, the DASA will identifyan independent member with suitable expertise and authority to review thecase. The independent member will be directed to undertake anindependent review of the enforcement action, including contacting theappellant to discuss their concerns. The DASA anticipates that most appealswill be resolved through this independent review.

b. Tier 2 – Supplementary Review. If the appellant is dissatisfied with theresult of the Tier 1 review, the appellant may choose to seek asupplementary review of the DASA enforcement decision. Upon receipt of awritten submission explaining why the initial review has failed to resolve theappeal, the DASA will, in conjunction with the Defence AA, identify anappropriate senior independent member6 to reconsider the appeal.

ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

5.28 Specific details on accident and incident investigation are contained in Part 2, Chapter 7.

6 The DASA expects that the senior independent member will be at least a two star officer.

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PART 2

CHAPTER 6

INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW INTRODUCTION

6.1 The Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) has, since 1991, used Independent Boards of Review (IBR) to provide assurance that a satisfactory basis for airworthiness has been established and is being maintained. The introduction of the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP) in 2011 has resulted in a broadening of the emphasis by IBR on airworthiness, to include aviation safety assurance.

PURPOSE

6.2 This chapter details the authority for the use of IBR, and their role, composition and scope.

AUTHORITY FOR INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW

6.3 The Joint Directive on The Defence Aviation Safety Framework (the Joint Directive), issued by the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Secretary of Defence, provides the basis for the Authority to convene IBR to examine Defence Aviation safety activities.1

ROLE OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW

6.4 The Authority requires that IBR be convened to provide independent assurance that aviation safety is being effectively managed.2 To meet this requirement Airworthiness Boards (AwB) are convened on the direction of the Authority. AwB members are accountable to the Authority for reviewing Defence Aviation aspects as directed, and for providing findings3 regarding the management of aviation safety.

6.5 In addition to AwB, the Authority may convene IBR for any other reason considered necessary to provide confidence that Aviation Safety is being effectively managed.

1 IBR may be convened on any aspect of Defence Aviation, including but not limited to Aviation Systems and operating/support organisations.

2 Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) BR.60.F requires that the Authority shall ensure mechanisms exist for the independent review of aviation safety.

3 Findings may include recommendations, corrective actions, concerns, notes and observations.

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COMPOSITION OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW

AIRWORTHINESS BOARD

6.6 Each AwB must comprise at least one operational and one technical member. The Authority will assign officers to each AwB from a panel of AwB members in accordance with prescribed criteria. Officers appointed by the Authority to the AwB panel must:

a. be star rank officers of the permanent forces, or reserve forces on active duty

b. possess either:

(1) an operational background with extensive experience in Defenceoperation of Aviation Systems

(2) a technical background with extensive experience in Defence technicalmanagement of Aviation Systems.

INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW CONVENED FOR OTHER REASONS

6.7 The composition of IBR convened for other reasons is at the discretion of the Authority, and will consider the skills and experience required to effectively undertake the review.

SCOPE OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW

AIRWORTHINESS BOARD 6.8 The Authority may convene an AwB to provide an independent review, and to make recommendations regarding Type Certification and a Military Air Operator’s (MAO) management of aviation safety, for: a. Aircraft being introduced into service4

b. Certified or Specified Type A category Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)being introduced into service5

4 This includes aircraft being introduced into service under a Military Type Certificate (MTC), Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) or Military Permit to Fly (MPTF). Aircraft being introduced into service would normally be subject to review by an AwB, unless there is compelling evidence that the risks are known, well defined and effectively managed, and that an AwB review is highly unlikely to result in further elimination or minimisation of risks associated with operation of the aircraft type.

5 Certified or Specified Type A category UAS being introduced into service would normally be subject to review by a AwB, unless there is compelling evidence that the risks are known, well defined and effectively managed, and that an AwB review is highly unlikely to result in further elimination or minimisation of risks associated with operation of the UAS.

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c. Defence Registered Aircraft and Certified category UAS that are subject to aMajor Change, which have been designated by the Authority as requiringAwB review, before the Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC)associated with the Major Change is issued

d. Defence Registered Aircraft, and Certified and Specified Type A categoryUAS, at a periodicity6 commensurate with the safety risks assessed by theAuthority

e. any other reason as directed by the Authority.

6.9 In determining whether a Major Change requires AwB review, the Authority will consider the following criteria:

a. the complexity associated with the Major Change, particularly where thereare significant initial, continuing and operational airworthiness implications

b. the extent to which the Major Change is unique to the ADF, including theability to access information from other operators regarding issues orconcerns associated with the change

c. the significance of any identified design deficiencies and, in particular, howthese are proposed to be managed

d. the adequacy of the operations, design, continuing airworthiness, logisticsand safety management arrangements proposed to ensure safety iseffectively managed.

6.10 The default periodicity for AwB review of in-service aircraft, and Certified and Specified Type A UAS, is 'normal' periodicity. The Authority may vary (increase or decrease) this period after consideration of the following criteria:

a. the outcomes of previous AwB

b. changes to the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) andconfiguration since the previous AwB

c. Safety Performance Indicators (SPI), with a specific focus on any trends thatmay indicate the existence of systemic issues

d. the adequacy of the operations, continuing airworthiness, logistics and safetymanagement arrangements established to satisfy statutory safety obligations

e. any other concerns regarding the management of aviation safety.

6 There are three broad periodicity categories - heightened (<12 months), normal (12 - 23 months) and lessened (> 23 months).

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6.11 At the discretion of the Authority, an AwB may also be convened to provide an independent review of, and make recommendations regarding, the effectiveness of aviation safety management for operation of:

a. Non-Defence Registered Aircraft (NDRA)

b. Specified Type B category UAS.7

6.12 At the discretion of the Authority, or if requested by COMAUSFLT/COMD FORCOMD/ACAUST and approved by the Authority, an AwB may also be convened to provide an independent review of, and make recommendations regarding, the effectiveness of aviation safety management for operation of AvSS.

6.13 The AwB should consider whether the operations, design, continuing airworthiness, logistics and safety management aspects are sufficient to provide confidence that aviation safety is being effectively managed, when the Aircraft or UAS is operated in its approved roles. In general, the review should predominantly focus on operations, design, continuing airworthiness, logistics support and safety management criteria likely to pose the greatest risks, and seek a detailed explanation of any significant changes or reasons for non-compliance with safety requirements. As such, the Authority may limit the scope of an AwB to only those criteria that have been assessed as being likely to pose significant airworthiness and safety risks.


6.14 The scope of IBR convened for other reasons is at the discretion of the Authority. The scope of such an IBR will be detailed in the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the review.

CONVENING INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW

AIRWORTHINESS BOARD

6.15 The AwB must be made aware of any significant changes affecting the way Defence Aviation is undertaken. Specific factors include:

a. special conditions or limitations for in-service needs, that are put into effectby either a Military Type Certificate (MTC), Military Permit to Fly (MPTF) orMilitary Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) Operations Specification (OpSpec)

b. activities conducted under a Command Clearance

c. new approved roles, including action taken to implement the role into theapplicable MAOC OpSpec

7 For Specified Type B category UAS the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) should be consulted as early as possible by the applicable MAO or Group responsible for operation of the UAS, to ascertain whether there is a requirement for an AwB review as part of the UAS introduction into service program.

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d. noteworthy developments, such as the progress of flight crew trainingaccreditation on flight simulation training devices; and

e. any operations, design or continuing airworthiness changes that areconsidered to have improved or affected the way roles are undertaken.

6.16 The AwB should only convene, to consider the ongoing operation of Defence Registered Aircraft and Certified category UAS, following the submission of supporting evidence by the Military Air Operator Accountable Manager (MAO-AM) 8 and organisation holding the MTC which demonstrates that:

a. the Type Certification Basis and environmental protection requirements forissue of the MTC or Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) remain validfor the approved configuration, ongoing roles and operating environment ofthe aircraft or UAS

b. the management of operational airworthiness activities, and technical andsupport arrangements, is sufficient to ensure continuing airworthiness andthe safe operation of the aircraft or UAS in accordance with the approvedSOIU.

6.17 The evidence submitted in support of sub-paragraphs 6.16a and 6.16b should include the information and documents specified at http://drnet.defence.gov.au/DASA/AwB/Pages/AwB-Submission-Guidance.aspx. Checklists to assist with preparation of the supporting evidence are either accessible through the above website URL, or will be provided by the Authority along with the formal notification for each AwB.

6.18 The AwB should only convene, to consider the ongoing operation of Specified Type A UAS, following submission of supporting evidence by the MAO-AM which demonstrates that:

a. the key airworthiness restrictions, special conditions and operationalrequirements, that supported issue of the UAS Operating Permit (UASOP),remain valid for the approved configuration, ongoing roles and operatingenvironment of the UAS

b. the management of operational airworthiness activities, and technical andsupport arrangements, are sufficient to ensure continuing airworthiness andthe safe operation of the UAS in accordance with the approved roles9.

8 With concurrence from the MAO-AM, supporting evidence may be submitted directly to the DASA by other entities.

9 Where the Authority required an SOIU to be raised for the Specified Type A UAS, the arrangements should be sufficient to ensure continuing airworthiness and the safe operation of the UAS in accordance with the SOIU.

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6.19 The evidence submitted in support of sub-paragraphs 6.18a and 6.18b should include the information and documents specified at http://drnet.defence.gov.au/DASA/AwB/Pages/AwB-Submission-Guidance.aspx. Checklists to assist with preparation of the supporting evidence are either accessible through the above website URL, or will be provided by the Authority along with the formal notification for each AwB.

6.20 The AwB should only convene to consider an Aircraft, or Certified or Specified Type A category UAS being introduced into service, and Aircraft and Certified category UAS that are subject to a Major Change which has been designated by the Authority as requiring an AwB review, following submission of supporting evidence by the MAO-AM and organisation holding the MTC which demonstrates that:

a. compliance with applicable DASR has established the basis forairworthiness and safe operation of the Aircraft or UAS, when operated byappropriately qualified and competent personnel in accordance with theapproved SOIU 10

b. the management of operational airworthiness activities, and technical andsupport arrangements are sufficient to ensure continuing airworthiness andthe safe operation of the aircraft or UAS in accordance with the approvedSOIU.

6.21 The evidence submitted in support of sub-paragraphs 6.20a and 6.20b should include the information and documents specified in Part 3, Chapter 3, Annex C, Accomplishment Summary Preparation, along with any additional supporting information requested by the Authority. Checklists to assist with preparation of the supporting evidence will be provided by the Authority along with the formal notification for each AwB.


6.22 IBR for other reasons are to be convened as directed by the Authority, with consideration given to conducting the IBR in the most efficient manner that will deliver the required outcome.

OUTCOMES OF INDEPENDENT BOARDS OF REVIEW

AIRWORTHINESS BOARD

6.23 The AwB will raise any concerns, including recommending corrective actions for issue by the Authority, where it considers there are deficiencies with the effective management of airworthiness or aviation safety.

10 Where an SOIU was not required for a Specified Type A category UAS, the arrangements should be sufficient to ensure continuing airworthiness and the safe operation of the UAS in accordance with the approved roles.

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6.24 The AwB will only recommend to the Authority that a new Aircraft, or Certified or Specified Type A category UAS, be approved for operations, where:

a. any recommendations offered by the appropriate two star commander havebeen considered

b. the appropriate MAO-AM and the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA)have recommended issue or amendment of the MAOC

c. the AwB is satisfied that the Aircraft or UAS can be safely operated and itsairworthiness maintained, in the intended roles and environment, subject toany prescribed conditions and limitations.11

6.25 Where the Authority has designated that an AwB review a Major Change to an Aircraft or Certified category UAS, the AwB will only recommend that the Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC) be issued by the Director General of the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DGDASA) where:

a. any recommendations offered by the appropriate two star commander havebeen considered

b. the appropriate MAO-AM has recommended issue of the MSTC

c. the AwB is satisfied that the Aircraft or UAS can be safely operated and itsairworthiness maintained, in the intended roles and environment, subject toany prescribed conditions and limitations.

6.26 The AwB will only recommend continued operation of an aircraft or UAS to the Authority where:

a. any recommendations offered by the appropriate two star commander havebeen considered;

b. the appropriate MAO-AM has recommended continued operation of theAircraft or UAS; and

c. the AwB is satisfied that the Aircraft or UAS type will continue to be safelyoperated, and its airworthiness maintained, in the intended roles andenvironment, subject to any prescribed conditions and limitations.

11 Such conditions and limitations may include serious deficiencies resulting from a shortfall in the design against the certification design requirements, or shortfalls in support arrangements, that warrant documenting in the Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) and/or MAOC as appropriate.

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6.27 The DASA will record any concerns, corrective actions and recommendations raised by an AwB. The DASA will also ensure that appropriate action is taken to address any concerns, corrective actions or recommendations raised by an AwB.

6.28 The AwB may also make observations regarding the activities undertaken by the DASA to assure Defence Aviation safety. Any such observations will be formally addressed by the DGDASA at the next AwB convocation.


6.29 The outcomes of IBR for specific purposes are to address the aspects specified in the ToR, and be presented to the appointment(s) specified in the ToR.

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PART 2

CHAPTER 7

AVIATION SAFETY OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION

INTRODUCTION

7.1 In contemporary safety practice, hazard reporting and investigation are fundamental elements of aviation safety programs and aviation safety management systems. Experience has shown that accidents are often preceded by safety-related incidents, and deficiencies that indicate the existence of safety hazards. For every accident or serious incident, there will likely be numerous minor events or near-misses, many of which had the potential to become an accident but for the lack of conspiring circumstance at the time, or active intervention by personnel. Retention and analysis of safety information is therefore important, to assist with the detection of potential safety hazards. In addition, whilst the ability to learn from an accident is crucial, purely reactive systems have been found to be of limited use in pursuing ongoing safety improvements. Reactive systems should therefore be complemented by proactive systems, which use other types of safety information to make effective and enduring improvements in aviation safety.

PURPOSE

7.2 This chapter describes the mandatory Defence Aviation safety reporting and investigation responsibilities and processes, including the establishment of the Directorate of Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety (DDAAFS) as a functionally independent investigation organisation within the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA).

REPORTING AND SAFETY INFORMATION

THE NEED FOR OCCURRENCE REPORTING

7.3 Reporting and analysing safety occurrences enables action to be taken to prevent recurrence and, more importantly, to anticipate and prevent other, potentially more serious, outcomes across Defence Aviation. Every occurrence is an opportunity to learn valuable safety lessons. However, the lessons will only be understood if the relevant safety information is reported, collected, stored, protected, exchanged, analysed and disseminated. The collection of high quality data is not only required to inform immediate actions to prevent incident recurrence, but also to build a repository of information that facilitates wider action based upon trend analysis.

7.4 The DASA uses safety information from occurrence reporting principally to provide sufficient information to decide whether to initiate an independent investigation, and to maintain a database of safety occurrence information, so that trends in aviation safety can be detected and appropriate safety action initiated.

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SAFETY DATA COLLECTION AND QUALITY

7.5 Collection of high quality and complete data is essential, as analysis and trends derived from inaccurate or incomplete data will lead to erroneous results, and may misdirect efforts to remediate safety hazards. Additionally, inaccurate data may lead to a loss of confidence in the information produced by occurrence reporting mechanisms. In order to ensure the quality and completeness of occurrence reports, they must contain specific information, which may vary depending on the occurrence category. Moreover, procedures should be implemented to check the quality of information, to avoid potential inconsistency between an occurrence report and the details of the occurrence that were initially collected. Adequate guidance material should be available to ensure the quality and facilitate the completeness of data, and also enable the consistent and uniform integration of data into the database.

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY REPORTING PROCESS

7.6 The DASA occurrence reporting requirements are specified in Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) Basic Regulation Appendix 1 (and subordinate Implementing regulations (IR)), and are consistent with Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) in leading aviation States. It is also aligned with the following requirements of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Annex 19, Safety Management:

a. Standard 5.1.1: Each State shall establish a mandatory incident reportingsystem to facilitate collection of information on actual or potential safetydeficiencies.

b. Standard 5.2.1: Each State shall establish and maintain a safety database tofacilitate the effective analysis of information on actual or potential safetydeficiencies obtained, including that from its incident reporting systems, andto determine any actions required for the enhancement of safety.

c. Recommended Practice 5.3.1: State authorities responsible for theimplementation of the State Safety Program should have access toappropriate information available in the incident reporting systems.

7.7 In implementing the DASA occurrence reporting framework, all Defence personnel and contractors should be clear on the distinction between immediately notifiable occurrences (accidents and serious incidents) and other occurrences (incidents and events).1 The DASA requires immediate reporting of deaths, serious

1 The Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) refer to Serious Occurrences, comprising Accident and Serious Incident categories, and Occurrences, comprising Incident, Malfunction, Defect, Technical Defect, and Exceedance of Limitations categories. Australian Air Publication (AAP) 6734.001, Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM), categorises occurrences as an Accident, Serious Incident, Incident or Event. The descriptions of the Accident, Serious Incident and Incident categories are ostensibly the same in both the DASR and the DASM, and the remaining DASR occurrence categories all ostensibly constitute Events as defined in the DASM.

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injuries and serious damage to aircraft and property. The DASA also requires immediate reporting of any occurrence where personnel are exposed to a serious risk of death or serious injury, or there was the possibility of serious damage occurring. The ‘serious risk’ category encapsulates situations where there has been a near miss; ostensibly an accident was only avoided through chance. The requirement to report these types of occurrences apply to all civilian and Defence organisations involved with Defence Aviation.

7.8 DASR requirements address immediate reporting of high consequence occurrences (accidents and serious incidents), as well as the reporting of lower consequence events. As lower consequence events are often a precursor to higher consequence outcomes, this allows for the necessary monitoring mechanisms to assist in identifying and addressing potential high consequence hazards. The information from both immediately notifiable occurrences and other occurrences is collected so that it can be reviewed and analysed by safety personnel, to maintain and improve aviation safety.

7.9 Without a structured framework for safety reporting, the DASA is unable to collect, integrate and analyse all pertinent information, assess risks, and determine appropriate actions that would help improve Defence Aviation safety. Accordingly, Defence Aviation has mature and robust arrangements in place for the reporting of both immediately notifiable occurrences and other occurrences. These arrangements are facilitated in part by the Defence Aviation Hazard Reporting and Tracking System (DAHRTS), and are supplemented by Initial and Continuing Airworthiness occurrence reporting directly to the DASA. Australian Air Publication (AAP) 6734.001, Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM) provides detailed information relating to the safety reporting process (by way of DHARTS), which must be complied with by Defence Aviation personnel.2

INCIDENT AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

THE NEED FOR SAFETY INVESTIGATION

7.10 ‘Safety investigation’ is a process which includes the gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of cause(s) and/or contributing factors and, when appropriate, the making of safety recommendations for the purpose of accident and incident prevention. A safety investigation is not conducted in order to apportion blame or liability. It is essential that the impact of human factors is properly investigated when incidents and

2 DASM Section 3, Chapter 8, Annex G summarises the timeframes for reporting aviation safety occurrences and, except for reporting to external authorities (eg: Comcare and ARPANSA), requires that Incidents and Events be reported within seven days. This conflicts with DASR, which requires that Occurrences be reported within 72 hours. However, the DASR states that during Phase 1 of the DASR implementation, compliance with reporting requirements specified in the DASM, for Incidents and Events arising from Aircraft Flight Operations, Air Navigation Services, Aerodrome Facilities and Ground Services, meet the intent of the DASR. Accordingly, except for reporting requirements for external authorities, which must meet the timeframes summarised in the DASM Section 3, Chapter 8, Annex G, during Phase 1 of the DASR implementation all Incidents and Events are to be reported within seven days.

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accidents occur, to ensure that the organisation can learn from incidents and near misses, in order to protect itself against the consequences of failing to accommodate human limitations in the design and operation of aviation systems.

7.11 When an accident or serious incident occurs, the investigation process is initiated to identify any relevant and likely deficiencies within the aviation system, ascertain the factors contributing to the accident or serious incident, and generate the necessary countermeasures to prevent recurrence. Within Defence Aviation, the accident and incident investigation process has a distinct role; it is an essential process that is deployed when safety defences, barriers, checks and counterbalances in the system have been ineffective.

7.12 Safety investigations contribute to the continuous improvement of the aviation system, by analysing not only what happened, but also why it happened. This involves looking beyond the event and investigating the systemic, organisational and human factors that played a role in the occurrence. This enables cogent decisions regarding the development of corrective actions and the corresponding allocation of resources, and may identify necessary improvements to aviation safety, including safety management systems, safety programs and potentially the accident investigation process itself.

7.13 An effective investigation should identify all immediate and underlying systemic causes and contributing factors associated with the accident or incident. The investigation may also reveal other hazards or deficiencies within the aviation system that are not directly connected with the causes of the accident/incident, including systemic, latent or organisational factors within the wider aviation system. In today’s proactive safety management environment, there is an important and necessary integration between an organisation’s accident/incident investigation process and its’ hazard reporting/identification process. Investigation reporting should have a clear provision that hazards/threats uncovered during the investigation process, which would require separate follow-up action by the organisation’s hazard identification and risk management process, must be documented. It is possible for investigation reports to limit their conclusions and recommendations to immediate or direct causes only. If this occurs, any secondary or indirect hazards/threats can be overlooked, unless the accident/incident investigation is linked to the hazard identification and risk management process.

7.14 It is common for investigations conducted by an independent safety organisation to be limited to accidents and serious incidents. However, a mature safety management environment should provide for the investigation of lower consequence events as well. Further, to ensure compliance with legal obligations and sound safety management principles and practices, all aviation service providers are required to investigate all occurrences which put, or might put, at risk the safety of their services. Occurrence investigation is a major component of the organisation’s safety management system. Crucially, history has shown that the safety management value of an investigation is proportional to the quality of the investigative effort.

DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY INVESTIGATION PROCESS

7.15 The DASA investigation framework is consistent with ICAO SARPS in leading aviation States. The international standards and procedures for aviation

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safety occurrence investigation are outlined by ICAO in Annex 13, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, and Document 9756, Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation.

7.16 To protect and maintain safety, every facet of Defence Aviation’s investigation framework must operate and cooperate in an environment which enables and encourages constant learning and improvement. The Defence Aviation Safety Manual (DASM) contains detailed information on the conduct of safety investigations, and the requirements that must be met by Defence Aviation personnel.

INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION CAPABILITY

7.17 In order to discharge the DASA obligations in an effective and impartial manner, DDAAFS has been established as the independent Defence Aviation investigation organisation, with the necessary powers, resources and expertise to oversee Defence Aviation investigation processes and reporting systems. DDAAFS is functionally independent of the authorities responsible for Defence Aviation regulation and, in general, of any other party or entity that could conflict with, or influence, its objectivity. This enables DDAAFS to be strictly objective and totally impartial, and to also be perceived to be so.

7.18 The function of DDAAFS is to improve Defence Aviation safety by means that include the following:

a. independently investigating all accidents and serious incidents3

b. establishing and maintaining the Defence Aviation accident and incidentreporting system, including an aviation safety occurrence database tofacilitate effective analysis of safety information

c. conducting safety data analysis, safety related research, and review ofcontemporary practices in aviation safety

d. fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action through promotional andeducational programs.

7.19 The activities entrusted to DDAAFS may be extended to include support to Military Air Operators (MAO), particularly in supporting the development and implementation of safety management systems, and the integration of human factors principles/applications, insofar as these activities do not affect the independence of DDAAFS.

3 In the case of serious incidents, depending on the nature and circumstances, DDAAFS may elect to not undertake the investigation. In these cases, undertaking the investigation is the responsibility of the command chain.

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AVIATION SAFETY INVESTIGATION APPOINTING AUTHORITIES

7.20 Aviation safety investigations are conducted under the power of command, and are not subject to the constraints and legal requirements of inquiries under the Defence (Inquiry) Regulations. Safety investigations are therefore initiated by an Appointing Authority who is a commander at an appropriate level. This allows investigators, acting under the authority of the Appointing Authority, to compel any service member, within the chain of command of the Appointing Authority, to answer questions and provide evidentiary material.

7.21 Where a safety investigation is conducted by DDAAFS, the independence of the investigation must be maintained, notwithstanding that the Appointing Authority may be a senior ADF commander. While the Appointing Authority may establish the terms of reference for the investigation, and can reasonably expect updates and reports as the investigation proceeds, there is no scope for the Appointing Authority to influence any aspect of the conduct of the investigation.

7.22 Further detail relating to Appointing Authorities and the powers of investigating officers is contained in the DASM.

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF AVIATION SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS

7.23 The headquarters of the Appointing Authority is responsible for the payment, from its sub-program, of all costs associated with an aviation safety investigation. The DASM contains further detail regarding the funding of investigations.

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PART 2

CHAPTER 8

SPECIALIST AVIATION ENGINEERING TO BE ISSUED

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PART 2

CHAPTER 9

COMMAND AVIATION SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE ISSUED

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PART 3

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW OF AVIATION SAFETY ACQUISITION OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Acquisition is a management process through which Defence purchases and brings into service new items of capital equipment and appropriate supporting systems. The term is typically applied to completely new systems, such as a new class of ship or aircraft type; however, it may be equally applicable to capability modifications of significant scope and complexity. The acquisition process for a new aircraft type or capability upgrade begins during the capability development component of the capability life cycle, where operational requirements are defined and potential solutions investigated. The aviation safety management process commences concurrently with the acquisition process, and remains inextricably linked with the acquisition process before, during and following the introduction to service of the new or modified aircraft. While many of the broader tasks within the acquisition process, such as determination of operational requirements and assessment of the effectiveness of the acquired capability, are not within the scope of aviation safety management, the established aviation safety arrangements must support operation of the system in all its intended roles.

PURPOSE

1.2 This chapter provides an overview of the aviation safety requirements and recommended practices during the acquisition management process.

APPLICABILITY

1.3 This chapter is applicable to acquisition of new Defence Registered Aircraft, and Major Changes to the Type Design of a Defence Registered Aircraft.1

1 Changes in type design are classified as either minor or major. A 'Minor' change is one that has no appreciable effect on the mass, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics, or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product and considers, where applicable, environmental characteristics such as noise, fuel venting and exhaust emission. Without prejudice to Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A.19, all other changes are classified as 'Major' changes.

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DEFENCE REGISTRATION

1.4 An important decision, required early in the acquisition process of a new aircraft type, is to determine the registration requirements for aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence. In accordance with Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR), Defence registration should be considered when aircraft operated by, or on behalf of, Defence meet any of the following criteria:

a. the aircraft is predominantly operated in a military configuration, role orenvironment by Defence or non-Defence personnel

b. the aircraft is owned by Defence

c. the aircraft is predominantly operated by members of Defence in the courseof their duties.

1.5 The decision to include an aircraft type on the Defence Register is to be made in accordance with DASR ARO.60.A. Where any doubt exists regarding whether an aircraft type should be Defence registered, the Authority should be consulted.

1.6 An existing Defence Registered Aircraft undergoing a Major Change to its Type Design will continue to be Defence Registered, except where one or more individual aircraft are removed from the Defence Register2 for extensive development and test activity by an appropriately authorised entity3.

1.7 The determination and management of Defence aircraft registration is detailed in Part 3, Chapter 2.

APPOINTMENT OF KEY PERSONNEL

1.8 At the inception of an acquisition project, key appointments involved with the project are identified to manage aviation safety throughout the acquisition phase. Initially, this should include an operational representative, engineering manager and logistics manager, who are knowledgeable regarding the acquisition process and the configuration, role and environment of the likely aircraft type required to meet the approved capability. During the early stages of the project these appointments will be responsible for defining the acquisition aviation safety strategy, in consultation with the Authority and applicable Military Air Operator (MAO) staff. As the project activity increases, the Authority may delegate some safety assurance functions to a Delegate of the Safety Authority (Projects), and the MAO Accountable Manager (MAO-AM)

2 Removal of an aircraft from the Defence Register constitutes annotating the appropriate entry in the Defence Register as "Removed", and ensuring that the aircraft is recorded as "Active" on an appropriate alternative register (ie: Australian Civil Aircraft Register, USAF Register, US Federal Aviation Register etc).

3 Appropriately authorised entities include Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and organisations granted Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA) in accordance with DASR 21.J.

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may appoint a delegate, designated as the MAO Delegate – Acquisition (MAOD-Acq), to represent the MAO-AM for specific activities. However, this does not delegate the accountabilities of the MAO-AM. Appointment and management of an acquisition team to deliver aviation safety outcomes is detailed in Part 3, Chapter 3.

ACQUISITION AVIATION SAFETY STRATEGY

1.9 Development of an acquisition aviation safety strategy is recommended to underpin the plans and processes that will be implemented to support:

a. Type Certification of the aircraft for Defence use in the intended roles andenvironment

b. safe operation involving Defence personnel prior to issue of a TypeCertificate4 by the Authority

c. the issue of instruments5 by the Authority during the acquisition process

d. the appropriate management of aviation safety issues that arise during theacquisition process.

1.10 The acquisition agency may develop and maintain an Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP) for any new aircraft acquisition or Major Change to a Type Design6. If pursued, the ASAMP must document the strategy identified above, in conjunction with an MAO Compliance Management Plan, and a Certification Program Plan (CPP). The ASAMP should also identify the logistics strategy or plan necessary to support continuing airworthiness of the aircraft type, at the expected rate of effort, at the commencement of operations as a Defence Registered Aircraft.

1.11 The ASAMP should not duplicate the information contained within other plans, such as the MAO Compliance Management Plan, CPP or logistics support plan. Rather, the ASAMP should focus on bringing together the outcomes of operational, technical and logistics activities, to provide a cohesive basis for delivering the aviation safety requirements necessary throughout each stage of the acquisition process. Additional detail on the acquisition aviation safety strategy is contained in Part 3, Chapter 3.

4 Type Certificates comprise a Military Type Certificate (MTC), Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) and Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC).

5 Instruments include an MTC, MRTC, MSTC, Military Permit To Fly (MPTF), Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC), Airworthiness Directive (AD) and Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP).

6 An Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP) should only be developed for a Major Change where there are significant changes to the role or operation of the aircraft.

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DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY ENGAGEMENT

1.12 Formal aviation safety documentation is not normally required during definition of needs and requirements in the capability development component of the capability life cycle. However, Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) staff should be engaged during this stage of the acquisition process, to ensure there has been proper consideration of aviation safety regulations. Early involvement by DASA staff in the acquisition process will also assist in timely preparation and approval of aviation safety Instruments, thereby minimising any adverse impact this may have on an acquisition project’s schedule or outcome.

THE TYPE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

1.13 DASR BR.20(b) requires any new Defence Registered Aircraft, or Major Change to the Type Design, to be Type Certified. Figure 1-1 depicts the Type Certification process, and the following paragraphs amplify the elements of the process7.

DEFINE OPERATING INTENT AND USAGE

1.14 The Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) describes all intended aircraft roles, usage and the operating environment for the particular aircraft type being acquired, or modified through incorporation of a Major Change to the Type Design. The SOIU requirements are derived from the capability requirements, and provide the broad operating parameters within which the aircraft type must safely operate. Accordingly, the SOIU is a key document in development of the Function and Performance Specification (FPS), against which a new aircraft or Major Change to a Type Design is acquired. The SOIU also provides important information necessary for development of the Type Certification Basis (TCB). The SOIU is an aviation safety document required by DASR ARO 50(a). An SOIU template is available at http://www.defence.gov.au/DASP/Docs/DASR-Documents/DASR-Templates/SOIUTemplate.doc

DEVELOP CERTIFICATION PROGRAM PLAN

1.15 The CPP provides all the information required to undertake the necessary certification program, including:

a. the applicant's details

b. the certification project description

c. the Type Certification Basis (TCB) which ostensibly lists all of theairworthiness design requirements against which compliance must bedemonstrated

7 For an understanding of the specific regulatory requirements relating to Type Certification refer to DASR Part 21.

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d. the method and evidence that will be used to demonstrate compliance withthe TCB requirements

e. the DASA level of involvement in the certification project.

1.16 A CPP template is available at http://www.defence.gov.au/DASP/Docs/DASR-Documents/DASR-Templates/CertificationProgramPlan.docx.

Figure 1–1 Type Certification Process

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DESIGN

1.17 The design element of the process predominantly involves development of the aircraft or modification design to meet the TCB requirements. However, it also includes proposing Military Certification Review Items (MCRI) to vary the TCB requirements, where the organisation holding MDOA considers that this is warranted.

COMPLIANCE DEMONSTRATION

1.18 Compliance demonstration involves a declaration that the design complies with the TCB requirements, production of evidence to demonstrate compliance, and non-exhaustive inspection of selected evidence by the Authority. The process is described further in Part 3, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.30. Where deficiencies are identified during compliance demonstration, these need to be resolved before Type Certification is granted. Mechanisms available for resolution of certification deficiencies are detailed in Part 3, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.38.

ISSUE TYPE CERTIFICATE

1.19 When the Authority is satisfied that compliance with all TCB requirements has been demonstrated, including through resolution of any identified deficiencies, the Authority may issue an appropriate Type Certificate8.

ARRANGEMENTS TO SUPPORT AIRCRAFT OPERATION

1.20 In parallel with Type Certification activity, the acquisition agency should procure or sponsor sufficient infrastructure and logistics support, to allow the sustained safe operation of the aircraft type, at the expected rate of effort, within the approved SOIU roles and environment. This will include confirming that appropriate operational, maintenance, engineering, logistics and safety management arrangements are in place, and there are sufficient trained and qualified personnel to operate and maintain the aircraft type. This activity should be based on the intended operating purpose and roles documented in the SOIU.

1.21 When a Type Certificate has been issued, and adequate arrangements are in place to allow sustained safe operation of the aircraft type, within the approved SIOU roles and environment, the Authority will, if required, issue a new or amended Type Annex to the Operations Specification (OpSpec) of the applicable MAO Certificate (MAOC). If any deficiencies in demonstrated compliance with TCB requirements, or in the arrangements for sustained safe operation of the aircraft type, have been resolved by imposing appropriate conditions or limitations, these conditions or limitations should, as appropriate, be recorded in the Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) and/or the MAOC OpSpec.

8 Dependent on the assessed safety risk, an Airworthiness Board (AwB) may be convened to independently review the management of aviation safety for the capability being acquired. Where this occurs the Authority is unlikely to issue the Type Certificate pending satisfactory outcomes from the AwB.

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1.22 An aircraft may be operated within the approved SOIU roles and environment, subject to any limitations detailed in the OpSpec9 , after:

a. if an AwB was held, any issues raised in the AwB report, that require specificaction before the aircraft is flown, have been addressed

b. issue of a Type Certificate by the Authority

c. if required, issue of a new or amended OpSpec by the Authority

d. a valid Military Certificate of Airworthiness (MCoA) exists for the individualaircraft.

ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST AND AIRCRAFT OPERATION PRIOR TO AWARD OF A TYPE CERTIFICATE

1.23 Development activity during the acquisition process is likely to require the aircraft type to be flown under test conditions, to gather data and evaluate the compliance of the system with the specification. Additionally, prior to delivery to Defence, the aircraft type may be required to undergo a period of flight testing to demonstrate that the specification requirements have been met, and the aircraft type is acceptable for use, within the approved SOIU roles and environment, by suitably trained and qualified Defence personnel.

1.24 The location of such testing will largely determine how the aviation safety for these events is managed. For a new aircraft type, much of the early developmental flight test activity will occur at an overseas OEM or government facility. Such activity will usually be carried out under an experimental type certificate or exemption, issued by the National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) or a Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) of that country. Notwithstanding, the Capability Manager (CM) 10 or Group Head responsible for the acquisition project has a duty of care to ensure Defence personnel participating in such testing are afforded at least an equivalent level of safety to that provided by the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP).

9 It is not unusual for new aircraft to be introduced into service with limitations on the authorised roles, and a stepped approach to role expansion adopted to meet the full range of SOIU roles, through the resolution of identified airworthiness issues or implementation of additional supporting arrangements.

10 Chief of Air Force (CAF), Chief of Navy (CN) and Chief of Army (CA) are the Capability Managers (CM).

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1.25 For a new aircraft type, where flying operations are to be conducted within Australia, and the acquisition development activity does not yet warrant issue of a Type Certificate, the aircraft may only be operated by Defence personnel following issue of a temporary aviation safety instrument11. In these circumstances, the Authority may issue a Military Permit To Fly (MPTF) where an aircraft has not been shown to meet applicable airworthiness requirements, but the aircraft is assessed as capable of safe flight under defined conditions. An OpSpec will normally be issued to accompany the MPTF, to define the operational conditions and limitations under which safe flight may be conducted. As such, the approval of an MPTF specifies the applicable aircraft tail numbers, and requires separate approval of the associated flight conditions.

ROLE OF THE AIRWORTHINESS BOARD

1.26 At the discretion of the Authority, an Airworthiness Board may be convened to provide an independent review of the acquisition activities supporting the Type Certification and sustainable operation of a new aircraft type, or a Major Change to the Type Design12.

FLEET ADDITION AND NEW MODELS OF AN EXISTING AIRCRAFT TYPE

1.27 Occasions may arise where Defence may seek to augment an existing fleet, or introduce a new model of an existing aircraft type. In these situations, the process to introduce the additional aircraft into service may be tailored, depending on the degree of similarity of the new aircraft to those operating under the extant Type Certificate.13

11 The exception is when the aircraft is operated by another organisation, such as the OEM, with Defence personnel participating in the aviation activities of the organisation operating the aircraft. In these circumstances specific WHS requirements must be met – refer to Part 3, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.6 – 4.9.

12 Specific provisions regarding Airworthiness Boards are detailed in Part 2, Chapter 6.

13 Refer to Part 3, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.50 - 4.54.

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PART 3

CHAPTER 2

DEFENCE REGISTRATION INTRODUCTION

2.1 Under the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP), aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence will either be Defence Registered Aircraft (DRA) or Non-Defence Registered Aircraft (NDRA). Defence registration is a requirement for operation of those aircraft designated as DRA, and Certified category Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)1. In accordance with the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR), Defence registration should be considered when an aircraft will be predominantly operated in a military configuration, role or environment, the aircraft is owned by Defence or the aircraft is predominantly operated by Defence members in the course of their duties. 2

2.2 The type of registration will influence the overarching aviation safety requirements that are applied to aspects of the design, construction, maintenance and ongoing support of the aircraft. Whilst most aircraft operated by Defence will require Defence registration, there are some circumstances where the operation of NDRA will be appropriate.

2.3 The Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) require that Defence maintains a register of DRA; this register is known as the ‘Defence Register’3. In addition to the Defence Register being the authority for the registration status of each DRA, it also provides an appropriate means for recording pertinent details for DRA.

2.4 Where a DRA is undergoing a Major Change to the Type Design, with approval from the Authority the acquisition strategy may include removal of one or more individual aircraft from the Defence Register4. Where an acquisition strategy is implemented that includes removal of aircraft from, and subsequent reinstatement to, the Defence Register, specific requirements must be observed to ensure the airworthiness of the aircraft is not compromised.

1 Defence registration of Specified Type A category Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) is at the discretion of the Authority. Specified Type B and Open category UAS are not required to be Defence Registered.

2 Refer to Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) ARO.60(a).

3 Refer to DASR BR.120(a)2.

4 While not common, this may be an appropriate approach when significant development and testing will be undertaken overseas by a contractor or foreign Defence organisation. Removal of an aircraft from the Defence Register constitutes annotating the appropriate entry in the Defence Register as "Removed", and ensuring that the aircraft is recorded as "Active" on an appropriate alternative register (ie: Australian Civil Aircraft Register, USAF Register, US Federal Aviation Register).

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PURPOSE

2.5 This chapter describes the management of the Defence Register, the specific requirements for determining whether an aircraft is to be listed on the Defence Register, and the processes for inclusion, removal and reinstatement of aircraft on the Defence Register.

THE DEFENCE REGISTER

2.6 The Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) is the custodian of the Defence Register, and is responsible for ensuring its validity. Relevant agencies are to notify the DASA whenever additions or other changes to the Defence Register are required. The following specific information is required to be included in the Defence Register:

a. the permanent Aviation Safety Instrument number and issue date5

b. an Application Identifier (AI) unique to each Aircraft Type

c. the aircraft models designated within each Aircraft Type

d. the tail numbers of all aircraft associated with each Aircraft Type6

e. manufacturer name and current OEM authority

f. the engine and propeller model designations, as appropriate

g. details of when individual aircraft were added to the Defence Register and their current operational status

h. if an individual aircraft has been removed from the Defence Register, the date and reason for removal.

5 The permanent Aviation Safety Instrument (Military Type Certificate or Military Restricted Type Certificate) is normally issued a substantial time after an aircraft type is included in the Defence Register.

6 If known at the time that the Application Identifier is assigned to an aircraft type, the tail numbers may be included on the Defence Register with an operational status of ‘Not Active’. Alternatively, each aircraft tail number may be separately included on the Defence Register at a later date.

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DETERMINATION OF REGISTRATION TYPE

2.7 Most Aircraft Types acquired for Defence use are Defence Registered. However, there are situations where Defence registration may not be the most appropriate type of registration, for one or more aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence. The decision regarding the most appropriate registration type for an aircraft will be determined through consideration of two main factors:

a. configuration and role, and

b. duration and type of operation by Defence.

CONFIGURATION AND ROLE

2.8 Where an aircraft operated by or on behalf of Defence is predominantly operated in a military configuration, role or environment, the Aircraft would normally be Defence Registered, unless the military configuration, and all operations described in the approved Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU), are allowed under civil registration7. Examples of military roles include air combat, strike, reconnaissance, tactical airlift, maritime patrol, close air support etc. Where an Aircraft Type is not specifically performing these roles, but is of a configuration that clearly enables operation in a military role, then it may also be beneficial for the aircraft to be Defence Registered (eg: planned use of a transport aircraft solely in a strategic airlift role, although the aircraft configuration makes it suitable for use in tactical airlift roles).

2.9 Aircraft operated by Defence in a configuration, role and environment substantially similar to an equivalent civil Aircraft Type may, at the discretion of the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), and with the agreement of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), be operated as Australian civil registered aircraft8. In this instance, the Aircraft is regulated by CASA, and all operations and continuing airworthiness activities must comply with the requirements of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and subordinate CASA policy and regulations9, and applicable elements of DASR NDR.05 and NDR.10. Management of flight operations for any civil registered

7 Defence registration is likely to be required due to civil registration of the Aircraft Type being unlikely to include the military configuration, and/or allow all operations in the approved Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU).

8 Where Defence operation of a foreign registered aircraft is proposed, the DASA should be engaged to ascertain the specific requirements that must be satisfied prior to its operation. Refer also to DASR NDR.05 and NDR.10.

9 Under the Civil Aviation Act 1988, civil registered aircraft are State Aircraft while they are being operated by a Defence member as part of their duties. Notwithstanding that the Civil Aviation Act 1988 is generally not applicable to State Aircraft and navigation by State Aircraft, Defence operation of Australian civil registered aircraft shall comply with all CASA approved limitations and/or conditions for that aircraft, and any additional Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) requirements, unless the aircraft is being operated under a Command Clearance issued in accordance with DASR SPA.10.

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aircraft, used by Defence aircrew and flying organisations, remains the responsibility of the Military Air Operator (MAO) in command of the operating organisations.

DURATION AND TYPE OF OPERATION BY DEFENCE

2.10 Where non-Defence registration is considered most appropriate for an Aircraft being acquired by Defence, the Authority will consider applications for civil registration on a case by case basis. The most appropriate type of registration should be considered early in the acquisition process and the outcome, along with any requirement to apply for approval to pursue civil registration, should be documented in the Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP).

2.11 Where a civil Aircraft Type is leased for long term use by Defence, non-Defence registration may be more appropriate due to:

a. the conditions of the lease,

b. a civil Type Certificate having already been issued, and/or

c. existing civil accreditation of engineering and maintenance organisations.

2.12 Where the duration of a lease or agreement for operation by Defence personnel, or on behalf of Defence, is relatively short, Defence registration will most likely be impractical. Aviation safety requirements regarding Defence operation of leased civil aircraft are detailed in DASR NDR.

INCLUSION OF AIRCRAFT ON THE DEFENCE REGISTER

APPLICATION FOR AIRCRAFT TYPE APPLICATION IDENTIFIER ASSIGNMENT

2.13 Upon government approval of a project to acquire aircraft, the agency responsible for bringing a Defence Registered Aircraft Type into service is required to apply to the Authority for the issue of a unique AI. The AI is a key reference which is used to not only identify the Aircraft Type, but also as a key element of technical management codes within the logistics management system.

2.14 For new Aircraft Types, the agency responsible for bringing specific aircraft into service must determine the tail number for each individual aircraft. The tail numbers are to be listed on the Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS), and each tail number is appended to the AI to form each Aircraft’s specific registration number. A DRA registration number is formatted as the AI followed by a hyphen and then the tail number. For example, F/A-18F Aircraft are registered A44–201 to A44-224, where ‘A44’ is the AI that denotes the Aircraft Type as an F/A-18F Super Hornet, and the hyphenated three digit number identifies each individual aircraft of that type.

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2.15 If the Aircraft tail numbers are known when assignment of an AI for a new Aircraft Type is requested, the aircraft tail numbers may be listed against the Aircraft Type in the Defence Register, and annotated with an operational status of "Not Active"10. Alternatively, each Aircraft tail number may be separately included on the Defence Register at a later date.

APPLICATION FOR AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION

2.16 Aircraft registration is a mandatory pre-requisite for operation of an individual aircraft11. The acquisition agency is required to apply to the DASA for registration of each individual aircraft. The application is to include, where appropriate, the information detailed at paragraph 2.6.

2.17 The following documentation is, as a minimum, to be provided with an application for aircraft registration:

a. evidence that Defence has control of the specific aircraft, through either ownership or a contractual arrangement that transfers control of the aircraft to Defence

b. evidence that the aircraft conforms to its approved Type Design

c. confirmation that the Aircraft is not listed on any other register (ie: it has never been on another register or has been removed from any register that it was previously listed on)12.

2.18 Upon receipt of an application for aircraft registration, accompanied by acceptable supporting documentation, the DASA will:

a. include the aircraft tail number(s) against the assigned AI in the Defence Register (if this has not been done previously)

b. record the operational status of the aircraft as "Active"

10 The "Not Active" operational status is only used as a placeholder in advance of an aircraft being registered, and does not constitute registration of an aircraft. An aircraft only becomes registered when its operational status has been changed to "Active".

11 In this context ‘operation’ refers to any activity involving an aircraft which may lead to the aircraft becoming airborne. For a fixed wing aircraft, this is usually when the aircraft speed in a high speed taxi approaches a speed which may result in flight. For rotary wing aircraft, this is where the aircraft engine is turning and is engaged with the main rotor.

12 For an aircraft previously listed on another register, a written statement that it has been removed from the previous register should be sought from the registrar responsible for maintaining the previous register.

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c. advise the applicant, relevant Military Air Operator Accountable Manager (MAO-AM) (if not the applicant) and CASA that a new aircraft has been added to the Defence Register, including the date and time of the addition. The specified date and time recorded for an aircraft added to the Defence Register must be the date and time that the aircraft was included on the Defence Register, or the date and time of an event nominated by the Authority.

APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF ADDITIONAL FLEET AIRCRAFT

2.19 The acquisition agency, on behalf of the MAO, is required to apply to the DASA to add additional aircraft to an existing fleet already identified by an approved Military Type Certificate (MTC).13 The application is to include:

a. for new production aircraft, the information specified at paragraph 2.6 (as appropriate), and the supporting documentation specified at paragraph 2.17

b. for used aircraft, the information specified at paragraph 2.6, the supporting documentation specified at paragraph 2.17, and the documentation required for used aircraft specified at DASR 21.A.174(b).

2.20 When adding additional fleet aircraft to the Defence Register, the DASA will:

a. include the aircraft tail number(s) against the assigned AI in the Defence Register

b. record the operational status of the aircraft as "Active"

c. advise the applicant, relevant MAO-AM (if not the applicant) and CASA of the date and time of addition of the aircraft to the Defence Register.

REMOVAL OF AIRCRAFT FROM THE DEFENCE REGISTER

2.21 DRA will normally have a recorded operational status of "Active"14. However, the operational status of a DRA will be changed to ‘Removed’ when:

a. the aircraft or Aircraft Type will no longer be operated by Defence (permanent removal)

b. control of the aircraft will be temporarily transferred to a non-Defence entity who proposes to operate the aircraft on a different register (temporary removal).

13 Additional fleet aircraft are aircraft of the same type, either from new production or previously owned by another user, which are acquired after the initial aircraft acquisition is complete.

14 The operational status of "Active" is maintained even when the Aircraft is not airworthy for a protracted period of time (ie: major structural repair).

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2.22 When either of the criteria at paragraph 2.21 are satisfied, the MAO operating that aircraft is to apply to have the DASA change the operational status of the aircraft from "Active" to "Removed"15.

2.23 An application submitted for permanent removal must:

a. identify the reason for removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register

b. advise when removal of Defence registration markings and Defence insignia, where appropriate, will occur

c. where applicable, reference the plans and agreements which describe the process for aircraft disposal, endorsed by the Capability Manager of the aircraft type

d. where applicable, identify the subsequent owner and registrar of the aircraft.

2.24 An application submitted for temporary removal must:

a. identify the reason for removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register

b. advise when temporary removal of Defence registration markings and Defence insignia, where appropriate, will occur

c. where applicable, reference plans and agreements, endorsed by the Authority, which define the airworthiness requirements for returning the aircraft to the Defence Register

d. where applicable, reference the plans and processes, endorsed by the MAO-AM and the Authority, which describe the intended certification of any modification to the aircraft prior to return to the Defence Register.

2.25 Upon receipt of an application to remove an aircraft from the Defence Register, the DASA will change the operational status of the aircraft from "Active" to "Removed" when satisfied that:

a. for permanent removal, the aircraft will no longer be operated by Defence

b. for temporary removal:

(1) the Authority is satisfied that the aircraft will be returned in an airworthy condition

(2) where applicable, the Authority is satisfied that any modification to the aircraft will be adequately certified, prior to its return to the Defence Register.

15 With concurrence from the MAO-AM, the application may be submitted directly to the DASA by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG).

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2.26 When removing an aircraft from the Defence Register, the DASA will:

a. advise the applicant, Defence AA and CASA of the date and time of any temporary or permanent removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register, and

b. where applicable, advise the subsequent owner and registrar of the removal of the aircraft from the Defence Register, including the date and time of the removal.

REINSTATEMENT OF AIRCRAFT TO THE DEFENCE REGISTER

2.27 When there is a requirement to reinstate an aircraft to the Defence Register, the relevant MAO is to apply to have the DASA change the operational status of the aircraft from "Removed" to "Active"16. Upon receipt of an application to reinstate an aircraft to the Defence Register, the DASA will change the operational status of the aircraft from "Removed" to "Active" when satisfied that:

a. the aircraft has been removed from any other register

b. the MAO has been issued with a Military Certificate of Airworthiness (MCoA) or Military Permit To Fly (MPTF) for that aircraft.

2.28 When the DASA reinstates an aircraft to the Defence Register, it is to advise the applicant, relevant MAO (if not the applicant) and CASA of the date and time of reinstatement of the aircraft to the Defence Register.

16 With concurrence from the MAO-AM, the application may be submitted directly to the DASA by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG).

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PART 3

CHAPTER 3

PLANS AND KEY PERSONNEL INTRODUCTION

3.1 The acquisition of new aircraft, and major changes to existing aircraft, are complex processes that need effective management to ensure that the desired outcomes are achieved. A key means of managing the extensive, inter-related acquisition activities is through execution of a number of approved plans, and the use of key personnel with the skills and expertise to make appropriate decisions as they arise during the acquisition process.

PURPOSE

3.2 This chapter describes suggested plans and key personnel to manage the aviation safety related aspects of the acquisition process.

AVIATION SAFETY STRATEGY

3.3 While not a Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) requirement, development and documentation of a strategy, for management of the aviation safety aspects associated with the acquisition process, is recommended to ensure a comprehensive, coordinated and logical approach to management of the aviation safety aspects1. The strategy should be developed early in the acquisition process, and the resulting strategy documented in the Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP)2.

AVIATION SAFETY ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PLAN

3.4 The ASAMP should identify the overall strategy to address the aviation safety aspects associated with introducing a new aircraft type or Major Change3 into service. In particular, the ASAMP should identify the overarching aviation safety

1 Under the previous aviation safety regulatory system, the documentation of the airworthiness acquisition strategy was mandated in the form of an Airworthiness Acquisition Management Plan (AAMP).

2 The ASAMP replaces the AAMP required under the previous aviation safety regulatory system, and has been retitled to reflect the lexicon associated with introduction of the DASR. Where an acquisition activity has an approved AAMP there is no requirement to convert the extant AAMP to an ASAMP.

3 An ASAMP may only be necessary for Major Changes that are complex, and require coordination of numerous, diverse activities to achieve the required aviation safety requirements. If there is uncertainty regarding the need for an ASAMP, advice should be sought from the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA).

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acquisition strategy4 and bring together the planned outcomes of the operational, technical, logistical and safety management activities, to provide a coordinated approach to aviation safety requirements when introducing a new aircraft or Major Change into service.

3.5 The ASAMP should provide the context for development of detailed plans that support the aviation safety strategy, but should not duplicate their content. Additionally, the ASAMP provides a valuable reference for the acquisition agency, the relevant Military Air Operator (MAO), test organisations and the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA), which should significantly assist with achievement of the aviation safety requirements.

3.6 Although there is no regulatory requirement for the ASAMP to be endorsed by external organisations before being approved by the designated appointment in the acquisition agency, the applicable MAO, the DASA and relevant test organisations should be engaged during development of the ASAMP, and endorse the ASAMP before it is approved. This minimises the likelihood of additional aviation safety requirements being identified during the latter stages of the acquisition process, with the attendant impacts on schedule and/or cost.

3.7 The suggested elements for the content of an ASAMP include:

a. the scope of the acquisition activity

b. the acquisition schedule

c. the responsible organisations and personnel

d. reference to the Certification Program Plan (CPP)

e. the strategy to achieve issue of the aviation safety Instruments required forintroduction into service5

f. any planned aircraft operation prior to formal introduction into service

g. the process for transitioning an aircraft or Major Change into Defence service

h. a mechanism to manage and resolve aviation safety issues that arise duringthe acquisition activity.

3.8 Further detail on the suggested structure and content of an ASAMP is provided at Annex A.

4 The overarching strategy should ostensibly provide a high level ‘roadmap’, which defines the path to issue of the aviation safety Instruments required for introduction of a new aircraft or Major Change into service.

5 When drafting an ASAMP the DASA should be approached for an indication of whether an Airworthiness Board (AwB) is likely to be required, so that this can, if necessary, be incorporated into the strategy and schedule.

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DETAILED PLANS

MILITARY AIR OPERATOR COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN

3.9 With introduction of the DASR, the aspects previously addressed in Operational Airworthiness Management Plans (OAMP) are now detailed in the Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) Operations Specification (OpSpec) and associated Type Annexes. Additionally, development and approval of an OAMP is not required under the DASR. However, there is still a requirement to ensure that any extant MAO arrangements for management of operational aspects are appropriate for the new aircraft type or Major Change being introduced into service and, where necessary, that new or amended arrangements are established.

3.10 Through the MAO Compliance Statement6 , the MAO attests that the operational arrangements necessary for safe operation of an aircraft have been addressed and promulgated for use. As part of the introduction of a new aircraft or Major Change into service, the MAO Compliance Statement needs to be amended and resubmitted to the Authority as part of the request to amend the MAOC OpSpec7.

3.11 Preparation of an MAO Compliance Management Plan is recommended to effectively manage the activities associated with the review and, if necessary, subsequent amendment of the arrangements underpinning the MAO Compliance Statement. The MAO Compliance Management Plan should be prepared for approval by the Military Air Operator - Accountable Manager (MAO-AM), and should describe how compliance with the specific regulatory requirements detailed in DASR ARO.100 will be accomplished and documented. In this regard, the MAO Compliance Management Plan should explain the strategy and scope of activities required to achieve, and subsequently maintain, compliance with specific aviation safety regulatory requirements prior to and following introduction into service.

3.12 The MAO Compliance Management Plan should complement the ASAMP to provide a cohesive basis for managing introduction of a new aircraft type or Major Change into service. Consequently, as considered necessary it should reference the approved Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU), and identify the organisational arrangements, delegations, personnel, processes and supporting networks established to ensure MAO compliance with the regulations specified in the MAO Compliance Statement. Further detail on the suggested structure and content of an MAO Compliance Management Plan is provided at Annex B.

6 Refer to DASR ARO.100

7 This is only required for a Major Change where there are significant changes to the role or operation of the aircraft.

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CERTIFICATION PROGRAM PLAN

3.13 Introduction into service of a new aircraft or a Major Change to an existing aircraft requires a Type Certification activity to be undertaken. DASR 21.20.A requires that the applicant provide the Authority with a certification program detailing the means for compliance demonstration. A Certification Program Plan (CPP) template is available on the DASA website, to support approval of the certification program by the Authority.8

3.14 Further detail on the CPP is provided in Part 3, Chapter 4.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN

3.15 Before the Type Annex to the MAOC OpSpec is amended to allow sustained aircraft operations, in accordance with the approved SOIU, the adequacy of the logistics arrangements, implemented to support aviation safety, needs to be demonstrated. The MAO-AM must be satisfied that the planned support mechanisms, such as training devices and syllabi, aircrew publications and procedures, other flying management system arrangements, DASR initial and continuing airworthiness support requirements (inclusive of publications), and ground crew training are sufficient to support operations at the required rate of effort. The Logistics Support Plan may be used to document the support arrangements required to enable flight operations, and then manage their implementation.

ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY

3.16 While not a DASR requirement, an Accomplishment Summary (AS) is prepared to provide an Airworthiness Board (AwB)9 with an overview of the activities undertaken to establish the airworthiness of a new aircraft, or an aircraft subject to a Major Change, and the activities undertaken to establish the necessary support arrangements for flight operations in accordance with the approved SOIU. The AS, along with supporting data, is the key documentation considered by the AwB, when making a recommendation to the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA), regarding the suitability of the aircraft and supporting arrangements to commence operation. An AS should include:

a. a brief description of the project scope and activity to date

b. a summary of the certification history of the aircraft

8 Under the previous regulations a Project Design Acceptance Strategy (PDAS) was used to document the organisational arrangements, personnel, processes and supporting networks implemented to meet the required technical airworthiness outcomes. The PDAS also included the Certification Basis Description, which defined the specific airworthiness requirements against which compliance findings were made, and the means of compliance that were to be used to make a compliance finding. Under the DASR, the only regulated element of the PDAS is the certification program; the mechanism used to manage the remaining elements of the PDAS is at the discretion of the acquisition agency.

9 Refer to Part 2, Chapter 6 for specific information on the AwB.

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c. a summary of the activities and outcomes which demonstrate compliancewith applicable DASR, and any other specified requirements

d. a summary of the activities and outcomes which demonstrate that thesupporting arrangements are satisfactory for the commencement of theintended scope of operations

e. a description of any outstanding issues affecting the certification orsupporting arrangements, including the risk posed by these issues, and howthis will be managed to ensure that any risks are eliminated So Far As IsReasonably Practicable (SFARP) and, if it is not reasonably practicable toeliminate the risks, to minimise those risks SFARP

f. attestations regarding the status of operational, technical, logistics and safetymanagement aspects supporting introduction of the aircraft type or MajorChange into service, through endorsement of the AS by the relevantappointments.

3.17 Further detail on the structure and content of an AS is provided at Annex C.

KEY PERSONNEL

3.18 There are a number of key appointments required to address the aviation safety requirements associated with introduction of a new aircraft, or an aircraft undergoing a Major Change, into service. Of note, the importance of the key appointments may change throughout the acquisition process, and some key appointments may not be required except when specific activities are undertaken. The primary key appointments are described in the following paragraphs.

3.19 Project Manager. The Project Manager (PM) is normally a Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) appointment at the O5/O6 level, and is responsible for all aspects associated with delivery of the defined capability. This includes all activities undertaken to achieve specified aviation safety requirements necessary for introduction of a capability into service, and establishment of the ongoing arrangements required to effectively support the capability throughout its life.

3.20 Delegate of the Safety Authority (Projects). A Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA) (Projects)10 will normally be appointed for all aircraft acquisitions and for selected Major Changes to in-service aircraft. A DoSA (Projects) has two primary roles, namely:

a. provide informed input to support activities and decisions associated with thedesign activity by the Authority

10 It is expected that the Project Engineering Manager will be granted a delegation by the DASA to be the DoSA (Projects) for their specific project.

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b. confirm to the Authority that any project or design activities, that may affectthe Authority's decision regarding whether to issue and aviation safetyInstrument, have been disclosed to the Authority.

3.21 MAO Delegate – Acquisition. Under DASR ARO.100(c) the MAO-AM is required to attest to compliance with a range of flight operations and continuing airworthiness regulations, before the MAOC is amended to allow authorisation of a new aircraft type, or an aircraft type that has undergone a Major Change. In most cases it is not practical for the MAO-AM to personally undertake this function; consequently, the MAO-AM may appoint a delegate to manage activities necessary to ensure compliance with the specified DASR. While the specific responsibilities and any associated limitations of an MAO Delegate – Acquisition (MAOD-Acq) need to be appropriately documented, the MAOD-Acq does not need to be under the command of the MAO11.

3.22 Where there is a requirement for flight operations to be conducted under an aviation safety system, other than the aviation safety system promulgated by the MAO, appropriate arrangements must be established to ensure a level of safety equivalent to that afforded by the MAO's promulgated aviation safety system.12 The appropriate Capability Manager, in consultation with the DASA and the acquisition agency, should consider the options available to ensure the required level of safety, and then implement the most appropriate option. In these circumstances an MAOD-Acq may be appointed to determine the arrangements necessary to provide an equivalent level of safety, and subsequently ensure that they are established.

3.23 Commonwealth Test Representatives. At various stages throughout the acquisition process, it may be necessary to engage personnel with specialist flight test skills, who are collectively known as Commonwealth Test Representatives (CTR)13. Ostensibly, CTR are representing a DoSA (Flight Test (FT)) although, depending on the nature and duration of their engagement, it may be more practical for the CTR to be under the command of either the CASG PM or the MAO; regardless of the command arrangements, at all times CTR are under technical control of the DoSA (FT). Where the CTR is not under the command of the DoSA (FT), and particularly in situations where the CTR are significantly involved in design and development activities, care needs to be exercised to ensure that CTR independence is preserved during flight test activities undertaken to demonstrate compliance with Type Certification Basis (TCB) requirements. If there are any concerns regarding independence of a CTR when demonstrating compliance with TCB requirements, consideration should be given to engaging another CTR to

11 While there is no impediment to a suitably qualified and experienced person under command of the MAO being appointed as the MAOD-Acq, with agreement from the affected organisation it may be more appropriate for a suitably qualified or experienced person within CASG or the relevant Service Headquarters to be appointed as the MAOD-Acq.

12 An example of this is operation of the first F35 aircraft, as part of the pilot training system at Luke Air Force Base (AFB), under the USAF aviation safety system.

13 These CTR comprise test pilots, flight test system specialists and flight test engineers.

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undertake the flight test activities in support of demonstrating compliance with TCB requirements. Annexes: 3A

3B

3C

Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan

Military Air Operator Compliance Management Plan

Accomplishment Summary Preparation

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PART 3 - ANNEX 3A

AVIATION SAFETY ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PLAN INTRODUCTION

1. The Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP) is a document that describes the strategy to achieve airworthiness, manage flight operations, and achieve broader capability/logistics milestones associated with introducing an aircraft type or Major Change into Defence service. In particular, the ASAMP defines the intended pathway for the acquisition agency to attain the required aviation safety Instruments, by providing a clear understanding of the activities required to support this outcome.

2. While not a requirement under the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR), it is recommended that consideration be given to raising an ASAMP in at least the following circumstances:

a. when a project will introduce a new aircraft type into Defence service

b. when an aircraft type undergoes a Major Change to the Type Design1

c. when a project will introduce a Certified or Specific Type A category Unmanned Aviation System (UAS) into Defence service2

d. when a critical limitation in an Military Type Certificate/Military Restricted Type Certificate (MTC/MRTC) is to be amended or closed

e. when a new capability being introduced into Defence service will require an aviation safety Instrument, or approval from the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) or the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA).

PURPOSE

3. This annex describes the suggested structure and content of an ASAMP, to assist in its preparation.

1 An ASAMP may only be necessary for Major Changes that are complex, and require coordination of numerous, diverse activities to achieve the required aviation safety requirements. Where uncertain of the need for an ASAMP, DASA advice should be sought.

2 An ASAMP may only be necessary for larger Specific Type A category UAS that will be operated in a more challenging operating environment, and therefore require coordination of numerous, diverse activities to achieve the required aviation safety requirements. Where uncertain of the need for an ASAMP, DASA advice should be sought.

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AVIATION SAFETY ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PLAN STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

4. Where there is any doubt regarding the structure or content of an ASAMP, the DASA should be consulted for clarification. If considered necessary, the acquisition agency may appoint a coordinator to liaise with, and obtain the necessary inputs from the DASA, the applicable Military Air Operator (MAO), affected Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) elements, appropriate flight test organisations and, as necessary, the applicable Service headquarters.

5. Content of an ASAMP. An ASAMP should comprise the following sections:

a. Endorsement. While not a specific requirement, an ASAMP should be endorsed by DGDASA, and COMAUSFLT, COMD FORCOM and /or ACAUST (as appropriate), to ensure that the identified strategy is appropriate for the intended outcome. Where the strategy relies on substantial flight test by Defence agencies, the relevant Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA) Flight Test (FT) should also endorse the ASAMP.

b. Scope. The ASAMP should describe the scope of the acquisition activity being undertaken to meet the capability requirements. This section should include:

(1) a brief description of the system being acquired

(2) a summary of the intended Configuration, Role(s) and Environment (CRE)

(3) the intended arrangements and responsibilities for design, construction, operation, maintenance and logistics support of the system, both prior to and following its introduction into service.

c. Acquisition Schedule. The ASAMP should identify how the current acquisition fits into the overall acquisition program phasings, and provide a schedule of key milestones. The schedule should also show the sequence of the major activities required to support the system’s introduction into service, and identify when aviation safety Instruments are required.

d. Responsible Organisations. The ASAMP should identify the organisations and key personnel responsible for executing each element of the identified strategy.

e. Certification Program Plan. The ASAMP should provide reference to the Certification Program Plan (CPP).

f. Strategy. The ASAMP should identify the strategy being adopted to:

(1) draft and achieve Authority approval of a CPP

(2) introduce the aircraft, UAS, Major Change or system into service

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(3) establish appropriate arrangements to ensure continuing airworthiness and safe operation after the aircraft, UAS, Major Change or system is introduced into service

(4) achieve issue of the aviation safety Instruments required for introduction into service.

g. Operations during the Acquisition Phase. The ASAMP should identify any planned operations before the aircraft, UAS or Major Change has been transitioned into service. This should include any operations to be conducted under the proposed aviation safety Instruments, and detail the operational constraints to be managed in the MAOC Operations Specification (OpSpec) and associated Type Annex, including the build-up of Rate of Effort (RoE).

h. Resolution of Aviation Safety Issues. The ASAMP should identify a mechanism to manage and resolve issues that arise during the acquisition activity.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 3B

MILITARY AIR OPERATOR COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN

INTRODUCTION

1. The Military Air Operator (MAO) Compliance Management Plan should, if considered necessary, complement the Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP) and Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) Operations Specification (OpSpec), by explaining the strategy and scope of activities required to ensure that the MAO can safely conduct flight operations. The MAO Compliance Management Plan should address how compliance with the specific aviation safety regulatory requirements, that underpin the MAO Compliance Statement, will be established and/or maintained prior to and following introduction into service. This includes identifying the organisational arrangements, personnel, processes and supporting networks that have been, or will be, implemented to achieve the specified regulatory requirements. Additionally, the MAO Compliance Management Plan should identify the approved Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU)1, and may be used to detail the expected operational input to the development of the Functional and Performance Specification (FPS). An MAO Compliance Management Plan, developed as part of the acquisition process, should be structured to enable it to be used as the basis for the management of MAO compliance in service.

PURPOSE

2. This annex describes the suggested structure and content for an MAO Compliance Management Plan. Where is it determined that an MAO Compliance Management Plan is required to manage the activities associated with the review and, if necessary, subsequent amendment of the arrangements underpinning the MAO Compliance Statement, this annex should be used to guide development of the MAO Compliance Management Plan.

MAO COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

3. Where there is uncertainty regarding whether an MAO Compliance Management Plan should be raised, or the level of detail that should be included in an MAO Compliance Management Plan, the applicable Military Air Operator (MAO) and/or the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) should be consulted.

4. MAO Compliance Strategy and Scope. Identify the extent of the MAO Compliance Statement that requires review due to the acquisition of a new aircraft, Certified or designated Specific Type A category Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), or Major Change to a Type Design. Describe the strategy that will be employed to

1 The current, approved SIOU is required to be listed in the “Roles and Tasks” section of the appropriate Type Annex to the MAOC Operations Specification (OpSpec), and this should be referenced in lieu of repeating the approved version of the SIOU in the MAO Compliance Management Plan.

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undertake this review, and implement any required amendments to facilitate ongoing MAO compliance with the specified regulatory requirements2. The organisational arrangements, personnel, processes and supporting network responsible for addressing each aspect detailed in the MAO Compliance Statement should be included, and should cover both the periods before and after the aircraft/system is introduced into service3.

5. Statement of Operating Intent and Usage. Reference the approved SOIU and summarise developments or changes made to account for any change to the role(s), operating environment and planned usage, and how this relates to the approved requirements documentation.

6. Expected Operational Input to Requirements Development. Where it is expected that there will be substantial operational input to development of the acquisition project requirements documentation suite, it may be beneficial to include the likely extent of this input, including both its nature and the likely time when the input will be required, in the MAO Compliance Management Plan. In particular, the MAO Compliance Management Plan should identify those regulatory requirements that require the supplier to provide artefacts to enable completion of the MAO Compliance Statement. This should assist in development of the requirements documentation suite, provide visibility of the extent to which the MAO will be relying on the supplier to meet its compliance requirements, and aid in managing delivery of the artefacts in the required timeframe(s).

7. Expected Operational Involvement in Demonstrating Type Certification Basis Compliance. Operational involvement in the design process may occur through three avenues. First, the design organisation is responsible for demonstrating compliance with the requirements in the Type Certification Basis (TCB), and may require expert operational input or testing during that design process. Next, the Authority, in its non-exhaustive inspections of selected compliance demonstration evidence, may select elements that require operational knowledge, and therefore will engage an operational member with the required expertise. Finally, the MAO may decide to conduct additional operational assessments of the aircraft. While none of these activities specifically need to be included in the MAO Compliance Management Plan, it may provide a single useful repository to summarise all operational involvement in the design process.

8. Test and Evaluation. Provide a summary of the flight test and operational evaluation activities planned to be authorised under a Military Permit To Fly (MPTF) by either a Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA) Flight Test (FT), or by an entity

2 The specific regulatory requirements that need to be considered are detailed in the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) for Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) ARO.100(c).

3 If appropriate, this may be addressed be referencing extant arrangements such as the MAO’s Flying Management System, Flying Orders or Standing Instructions.

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with Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA)4 that has been granted a Privilege to issue an MPTF for flight test.

9. Waivers. Provide a list of any approved waivers to the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR). The list should include the approving authority and the scope and duration of the waiver.

10. Command Clearance Limitations. Provide a list of any limitations on the MAO issuing a Command Clearance.

4 Refer to DASR 21.J.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 3C

ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY PREPARATION INTRODUCTION

1. The Accomplishment Summary (AS) is the means through which an acquisition agency collates and summarises the acquisition activities leading to introduction into service of various platforms and systems. The AS is prepared to provide sufficient information for review by an Airworthiness Board (AwB)1, in order to provide independent assurance to the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) that aviation safety is being effectively managed2. AwB members are accountable to the Defence AA for reviewing Defence Aviation safety aspects as directed, and for providing findings3 regarding the management of aviation safety.

PURPOSE

2. This annex describes the structure and content of an AS.

3. Applicability. This annex is applicable to AwB consideration of acquisition activities undertaken to introduce into service new aircraft, Certified and designated Specific Type A category Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), an aircraft that has undergone a Major Change to the Type Design, or an Aviation Support System (AvSS) which the Defence AA determines requires independent review to assure aviation safety.

ACCOMPLISHMENT SUMMARY STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

4. The Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) should always be consulted to determine the Defence AA’s review requirements for changes to an aircraft’s design or role. The acquisition agency should appoint a coordinator to liaise with, and obtain the necessary inputs from the DASA, applicable Military Air Operator(s) (MAO), affected Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) elements and, as necessary, the applicable Service headquarters. The acquisition agency should regularly liaise with the DASA for guidance and clarification on submission requirements, including the evidence required to support the submission.

1 Depending on the acquisition activity, there may be more than one AwB held before an aircraft or Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is fully transitioned to the in-service phase of its life cycle. In this situation, an AS is required for every AwB held before the aircraft has fully transitioned.

2 Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) BR.60.F states that the Authority shall ensure mechanisms exist for the independent review of aviation safety.

3 Findings may include recommendations, corrective actions, concerns, notes and observations.

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5. Signatories and Attestations. The Military Air Operator Accountable Manager (MAO-AM), and the CASG Branch Head responsible for acquisition and sustainment of the new or modified aircraft, UAS or AvSS, are required to sign the AS4. In signing the AS these appointments are attesting that all aspects of the acquisition activity within their remit have been completed as described5.

INTRODUCTORY SECTION

6. Introduction. The introduction should provide a brief background to the submission and identify the aim of the AwB’s review.

7. Risk Summary. Provide a summary of the aviation safety risks described throughout the AS.

8. Project Scope and Activity to Date. Briefly identify the scope of the acquisition project, including the major equipment and capability under acquisition. Include a brief history of the major project activities or phases already completed, which led to award of the requested aviation safety Instruments, and operation under the Type Annex of the MAO Certificate (MAOC) Operations Specification (OpSpec)6.

9. Review of Previous Outcomes. If applicable, the status of findings from the previous AwB are to be reviewed, including the Observations, Notes and Concerns in the Airworthiness Board Report, the status of any Airworthiness Corrective Action Requests (ACAR), and any limitations or conditions listed against an Aviation Safety Instrument (ie. Military Type Certificate (MTC), Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC), Military Supplemental Type Certificates (MSTC), Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) or Military Permit to Fly (MPTF)), or in the applicable MAOC OpSpec Type Annex.

CERTIFICATION ASPECTS

10. The certification aspects of the submission include the following:

a. Military Design Organisation. Identify the Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.J organisation responsible for initial design and certification of the aircraft or system. Include a summary of compliance assurance outcomes throughout the design process.

4 In lieu of the MAO-AM, for an AvSS the AS should be signed by the equivalent position in the applicable supporting organisation.

5 Signature of the AS by the AM and the responsible CASG Branch Head obviates the need for each stakeholder within these organisations to provide separate attestations.

6 Where the acquisition involves multiple phases, the AS should outline the phased approach and then focus on the specific phase being reviewed by the AwB (ie: details for phases not being reviewed by the AwB should not be included).

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b. Military Air Operator(s). Identify the MAO responsible for operating the aircraft or system. Include a summary of the status of any required amendments to the MAO Compliance Statement and MAOC OpSpec.

c. Statement of Operating Intent and Usage. Reference the approved Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU), and summarise developments or changes made to account for the role(s), operating environment and planned usage and, where applicable, how this relates to the approved requirements documentation suite. Where a Major Change to the Type Design does not introduce or change any role(s) or the operating environment, identify how this was assessed and the determination approved.

d. Certification Status of the Aircraft Type. Identify the existing certification status of the Aircraft Type or Certified category UAS. Cite any extant MTC, MRTC, MSTC, UASOP or MPTF. Where the Type Certification strategy relies substantially on prior certification by a recognised airworthiness authority, identify the configuration, role and environment relevant to the prior certification, and cite any differences to that required by Defence. Additionally, identify the scope of any Defence unique certification activity to account for these differences.

e. Certification Program Plan. Provide reference to DASA approval of the Certification Program Plan (CPP), with specific attention to any amendments to the CPP (including amendments to the Type Certification Basis (TCB)) that reduced the level of safety established by the prescribed airworthiness design requirements.

f. Type Certification Basis. The TCB may be included as a separate document or as an annex to the AS. Additionally, the AS should:

(1) identify the status of design organisation activities to demonstrate compliance with the technical elements of the TCB; in particular, any TCB requirements for which compliance has not yet been demonstrated should be separately listed

(2) identify the status of Authority inspections of the compliance demonstration evidence produced by the design organisation

(3) include an assessment of the suitability of the TCB for the Defence configuration, role and operating environment, along with advice of the agencies involved in the assessment

(4) provide a list of approved Issue Papers (IP), both open and closed, that have been used to manage airworthiness issues during the design process.

g. Design Development. Briefly describe the outcomes of major steps in the design process, including design reviews, Functional Configuration Audits (FCA) and Physical Configuration Audits (PCA).

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h. Type Design. Provide an assessment of the acceptability of the Type Design (or definition of the Type Design if an interim product or system is to enter service).

i. Operational Input to the Design Process. Provide a summary of the operational input to the design process, including support for the design organisation in demonstrating compliance with the TCB, and support for the Authority in inspecting compliance demonstration evidence.

j. Test and Evaluation. Provide a summary of the Test and Evaluation (T&E) activities which demonstrated compliance with the TCB, and determined all necessary operating limitations and procedures. Include a summary of the agencies involved in the test and evaluation activities, and how the outcomes have been incorporated into the MAOC OpSpec Type Annex.

k. Aircraft Stores Capabilities. Confirm that any necessary stores clearances have been completed, and are appropriately reflected in operating instructions and limitations.

l. Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness. Provide an assessment of the acceptability of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (i.e. instructions to enable the aircraft or system to be maintained in accordance with its certification). The submission should also specify the organisation that undertook the assessment.

11. Throughout this section, where the certification activity or introduction to service arrangements remain incomplete or unresolved, or risks to aviation safety are identified, the AS must describe the mitigating activities and identify any resulting controls, conditions or limitations.

12. All recommended conditions and limitations are to be summarised in the conclusion.

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS

13. The operational aspects of the submission include the following:

a. Scope of Flying. Describe the scope of flying to be undertaken under the MAOC OpSpec.

b. Flying Management System. Provide a summary of the status of each element of the Flying Management System (FMS) required by DASR ORO.010 — Flying Management System. For a Major Change to the Type Design, include a brief summary of the changes made to the FMS to account for the new capability, roles or operating environment.

c. Training and Qualification Requirements. Identify the approval status of training and qualification requirements necessary to operate the new aircraft or capability in the required roles and operating environment.

d. Flight Simulation Training Device. Provide a description of any Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) to be used for aircrew training, including the status of the FSTD Installation Operating Permit (IOP).

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e. Aircrew Availability. Identify the availability of trained and competent aircrew to operate the aircraft under the MAOC OpSpec, at the expected Rate of Effort (RoE).

f. Orders, Instructions and Publications:

(1) Provide a summary of the assessment of aircrew publications, which demonstrates that all limitations and procedures necessary to safely operate the system have been promulgated. State the outcome of the assessment and the agencies involved in the process.

(2) Identify the approval status and availability at the operating organisation of Orders, Instructions and Publications (OIP) necessary to safely conduct flight operations, including those procedures and instructions implemented or modified as part of the FMS.

g. Human Factors. Provide a summary of human factors assessments which demonstrate that the system can be safely operated, in the intended roles and environment, by Defence aircrew. Identify the agencies and activities which have determined this outcome.

h. Aviation Safety. Provide a summary of any aviation safety hazards and occurrences, and a description of the mitigation activities which demonstrate that each hazard or occurrence has been adequately addressed.

i. Aviation Risk Management. Provide a summary of the Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) activity conducted to address initial operations, including the implementation of appropriate risk mitigation activities.

j. Waivers. Provide a list of any approved waivers to the DASR that have been identified (or are expected to be requested) in the MAO Compliance Statement. The list should include the approving authority, and the scope and duration of the waiver.

k. Limitations. If necessary, identify any MAOC OpSpec Type Annex limitations resulting from:

(1) the immaturity of the FMS

(2) technical issues affecting the aircraft’s suitability for the SOIU roles or operating environment

(3) operational restrictions following T&E activities to date.

14. Throughout this section, where any operational aspect remains incomplete or unresolved, or risks to aviation safety are identified, the AS must describe the mitigating activities and identify any controls, resulting conditions and limitations.


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CONTINUING AIRWORTHINESS ASPECTS

16. The continuing airworthiness aspects of the submission include the following:

a. Continuing Airworthiness Management Arrangements. Confirm that an appropriate DASR M organisation is available to manage continuing airworthiness, and detail the current implementation maturity of the proposed continuing airworthiness management arrangements.

b. Maintenance Organisations. Confirm that appropriate DASR 145 Maintenance Organisations are available, either within the Service(s) workforce or through appropriate contractual arrangements, to meet the continuing airworthiness maintenance requirements associated with the expected rate of effort after introduction into service.

c. Design Organisations. Confirm that appropriate DASR 21.J design organisations are available, either within the Service(s) workforce or through appropriate contractual arrangements, to meet ongoing design and certification activities for the aircraft or system, in support of continuing airworthiness requirements.

d. Technical Management Plans. Confirm that appropriate technical management plans, such as an Aircraft Maintenance Program, Reliability Program, and Aircraft Structural Integrity and Engine or Propulsion Structural Integrity Management Plans, are in place.

e. Military Type Certificate Holder Obligations. Confirm that appropriate arrangements are in place to undertake DASR 21 MTC holder obligations.

f. Military Certificates of Airworthiness. Confirm that there is an adequate process to manage Military Certificates of Airworthiness (MCoA), in accordance with DASR 21 and M, that provides ongoing assurance that each aircraft or system complies with the approved Type Design.

17. Throughout this section, where any continuing airworthiness aspect remains incomplete or unresolved, or risks to aviation safety are identified, the AS must describe the mitigating activities and identify any resulting controls, conditions or limitations.


LOGISTICS ASPECTS

19. The logistics aspects of the submission include the following:

a. Availability of Publications. Confirm that publications required for continuing airworthiness have been approved, and promulgated sufficiently to facilitate required continuing airworthiness activities. Confirm that there are processes in place to enable updates in acceptable timeframes.

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b. Tools and Facilities. Confirm that support equipment, tools, test equipment, material handling equipment and facilities are sufficient to enable necessary engineering, maintenance and other logistics functions to be undertaken.

c. Logistics Support Elements. Confirm that the established integrated logistics support arrangements (ie: continuing availability of repairable items and consumables, computer systems, competent logistics staff and appropriate training arrangements) are sufficient to support ongoing operation of the aircraft or system.

20. Any unique or special arrangements to account for the above elements should be included in the submission. Any deficiencies in the logistics management arrangements which are likely to impact aviation safety, and the mitigation strategies implemented to minimise the impact, should be identified.

21. Any recommended conditions or limitations should be summarised in the conclusion.

CONCLUSION

22. Summarise the case substantiating that the aviation safety requirements necessary to introduce the aircraft or system into service, for the approved roles and operating environment, and for the expected rate of effort, have been appropriately addressed. Where these requirements are unable to be addressed through demonstrated compliance with specified requirements, summarise the mitigation strategies, including imposition of conditions or limitations if necessary, employed to address the associated risk(s). Inclusion of a cross reference matrix, which reflects the evidence supporting demonstrated compliance against the certification, operational, continuing airworthiness and logistics requirements, should be considered, as this aids review by senior commanders, DASA staff and the AwB.

RECOMMENDATIONS

23. The AS should recommend issue of an MTC, MRTC, MSTC or MPTF as appropriate, and recommend that the MAOC OpSpec Type Annex be amended to authorise operation of the aircraft or system (as applicable), subject to any identified conditions and limitations. A draft of the MTC/MRTC/MSTC/MPTF and a draft of the MAOC OpSpec Type Annex should be enclosed with the AS.

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PART 3

CHAPTER 4

CERTIFICATION AND OPERATION OF DEFENCE REGISTERED AIRCRAFT

INTRODUCTION

4.1 Type Certification is the means through which the airworthiness of an aircraft type is established. A Type Certificate1 is issued when sufficient design, test and certification activities necessary to establish compliance with specified airworthiness standards, in order to operate safely within approved roles and environments, have been completed. The Type Certification process begins at the commencement of acquisition activities for a new aircraft type, or identification of a Major Change to the Type Design for an existing aircraft type.

4.2 Operation of Defence Registered Aircraft (DRA) is authorised through inclusion of the aircraft type on the appropriate Military Air Operators Certificate (MAOC) Operations Specification (OpSpec), based on an assessment that the infrastructure, personnel training and availability, organisations and supporting arrangements are sufficient to support operations, within the approved roles and environments, at a sustained rate of effort2.

PURPOSE

4.3 This chapter describes the processes to achieve Type Certification and authorisation for DRA3 and Certified category Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) to conduct flight operations, and the issue of an Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) for a Specified Type A category UAS.

1 Type Certificate includes a Military Type Certificate (MTC), a Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) and a Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC).

2 A new aircraft type is normally included on the MAOC OpSpec when the Application Identifier (AI) is assigned (refer to Part 3, Chapter 2). However, the MAOC OpSpec is annotated with “Flight operations not authorised” against the aircraft type until the arrangements necessary to safely operate the aircraft have been established.

3 With respect to the requirements of this chapter, Defence Registered Aircraft refers to both those aircraft that have already been included on the Defence Register, as well as those aircraft that are intended to be included on the Defence Register when control of the aircraft is transferred to Defence. It does not include aircraft that are intended to be operated in service as Non-Defence Registered Aircraft (NDRA).

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APPLICABILITY

4.4 Type Certification and the associated authorisation for an aircraft to conduct flight operations is applicable to all new DRA and Certified category UAS types, and DRA types undergoing a Major Change to the Type Design. Similarly, the issue of a UASOP is applicable to Specified Type A category UAS.

KEY CONCEPTS

4.5 Type Certification and authorisation to conduct flight operations for a DRA or Certified category UAS are based on the following fundamental principles:

a. a particular aircraft type or UAS is chosen for acquisition on the basis that it will satisfy the capability requirement, when undertaking approved roles in a specified operating environment

b. the design and operation of the aircraft type or UAS is such that the risks associated with undertaking the approved roles have been eliminated So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) or, where this is not reasonably practicable, the risks have been minimised SFARP

c. established airworthiness standards are used as the basis for assessing the adequacy of the design to safely perform the designated roles

d. the design is found to comply with the established airworthiness standards, when operated in the approved roles by appropriately qualified and competent aircrew

e. adequate infrastructure and support arrangements have been established to sustain ongoing operations.

4.6 While aircraft and Certified category UAS will normally be listed on the Defence Register before they are operated by Defence personnel, there are some circumstances where it will be desirable or necessary for Defence personnel to operate an aircraft before it is listed on the Defence Register4. These circumstances include:

a. flight test operations outside Australian airspace by the aircraft OriginalEquipment Manufacturer (OEM)

b. flying operations by the aircraft OEM within Australian airspace

c. flying training or other flying operations by a foreign flying organisationoutside Australian airspace.

4 In these situations the aircraft will be listed on another register (Defence or civil as appropriate).

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4.7 Specific requirements for the circumstances listed at paragraph 4.6 are detailed at Annex A.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TYPE CERTIFICATION AND AUTHORISATION OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS

4.8 For most acquisition projects seeking to introduce a new aircraft type, Certified category UAS or Major Change to a Type Design, much of the project activity which underpins Type Certification and authorisation for an aircraft type or Certified category UAS to conduct flight operations must occur concurrently, to achieve timely introduction to service. Consequently, the distinction between those activities contributing to Type Certification, and those related to authorisation for an aircraft type to conduct flight operations, can be unclear at times. In reality, Type Certification and authorisation for an aircraft type or Certified category UAS to conduct flight operations are distinctly different. Type Certification establishes compliance of the technical and operational aspects of the aircraft system design with specified standards, the accompanying instructions which define how the system is operated, and its maintenance requirements. Authorisation for an aircraft type or Certified category UAS to conduct flight operations relates to the ‘readiness’ of the supporting elements to commence and sustain operations with the aircraft at a designated rate of effort.

4.9 Importantly, in relation to the operation of a DRA, Type Certification and authorisation for an aircraft type or Certified category UAS to conduct flight operations are co-dependent. A Type Certificate must be issued prior to authorisation for an aircraft type or Certified category UAS to conduct flight operations; however, a Type Certificate does not provide authority to operate an aircraft type or Certified category UAS (ie: an aircraft type conforming to the Type Design cannot be operated as a DRA prior to flight operations being authorised, unless it has been authorised for temporary operation under a Military Permit To Fly (MPTF)5, or is being operated by Defence personnel under a foreign military aviation safety system)6. Consequently, aviation safety planning normally requires that Type Certification and authorisation for an aircraft type or Certified category UAS to conduct flight operations are progressed concurrently, to enable the capability of the system to be realised at the earliest possible opportunity.

5 An MPTF may be issued for aircraft that do not meet, or have not been shown to meet, applicable airworthiness requirements, but are capable of safe flight under defined conditions, for a variety of specified purposes (refer to Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A.701 for additional information).

6 Although it is not normal for DRA to be operated under a foreign military’s aviation safety system, this arrangement was established for operation of the first two Australian F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft operated as part of the Pilot Training System at Luke Air Force Base in the USA. In this circumstance the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) has no specific aviation safety obligations. However, the appropriate Service Chief has a duty of care to ensure that the obligations under the WHS Act are met, and may require an assessment of the aviation safety arrangements to achieve this.

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DETERMINING TYPE CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

4.10 Following a decision for a new aircraft type to be a DRA, the acquisition agency, in conjunction with the Authority, must determine the detailed Type Certification requirements, as part of a comprehensive aviation safety management strategy. For complex acquisition projects, preparation of an Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP)7 is recommended, to describe the aviation safety strategy adopted to achieve Type Certification and authorisation for an aircraft type or Certified category UAS to conduct flight operations. The ASAMP should reflect development and approval of the Certification Program Plan (CPP), including the Type Certification Basis (TCB) which details the specific Type Certification requirements.

4.11 The applicant for a Type Certificate must submit a CPP for approval by the Authority. The applicant for a Type Certificate is generally expected to be the acquisition agency Project Office (PO)8.

7 Refer to Part 3, Chapter 3.

8 Where the design organisation holds Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA) under DASR 21.J, it would normally be appropriate for the CPP to be developed by the MDOA holder (the'Applicant') and submitted to the Authority after contractual review by the acquisition agency ProjectOffice (PO). Where a Major Change is not being sourced from an MDOA, the Applicant wouldnormally be the acquisition agency Project Office.

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STATEMENT OF OPERATING INTENT AND USAGE

DEVELOPMENT OF A STATEMENT OF OPERATING INTENT AND USAGE

4.12 The Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU) underpins the Type Certification process. The SOIU lists all the roles and environments in which the aircraft type or Certified category UAS is intended to operate. For a new aircraft type or Certified category UAS, development of the SOIU should begin early in the capability development process, with the aircraft roles and environments derived from Defence capability requirements9. Following selection of an aircraft type to meet the capability requirement, the SOIU should be finalised by the Capability Manager10 in consultation with the Authority. After the SOIU is finalised it should be endorsed by the Authority before approval by COMAUSFLT, COMD FORCOMD and/or ACAUST as appropriate. The SOIU is often the starting point for determining Type Certification requirements because it defines:

a. the aircraft roles which, in conjunction with aircraft and mission subsystemequipment, are used to determine the applicable airworthiness requirementsto include in the TCB

b. the roles and environmental parameters against which compliance with theairworthiness requirements documented in the TCB must be achieved

c. the expected usage spectrum, to determine the aircraft and engine structuralcertification and continuing airworthiness management requirements

d. the likely stores, life support and role equipment necessary to meet thedesignated roles.

CHANGES TO THE SOIU

4.13 For a Major Change to the Type Design, the SOIU must be amended to incorporate any changes to the roles, environmental parameters or usage introduced by the new capability or modification. In such cases the existing TCB must be examined in conjunction with the SOIU amendment to determine:

a. any new airworthiness certification basis requirements which need to beadded to the TCB

b. those existing airworthiness certification basis requirements affected by thechange, against which compliance must be re-established.

9 As the SOIU will inform a significant component of the requirements documentation suite, it should be sufficiently mature to minimise the likelihood of changes to the requirements document suite after release of the Request For Tender (RFT) or Letter of Request (LOR).

10 The Capability Manager(s) may delegate responsibility for development or finalisation of the SOIU to the applicable MAO(s). Additionally, the Capability Manager(s) may require involvement by other agencies (eg: DSTG) during development and finalisation of the SOIU.

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4.14 All changes to the SOIU are to be endorsed by the Military Air Operator - Accountable Manager (MAO-AM) and the Authority, prior to being approved by COMAUSFLT, COMD FORCOMD and/or ACAUST as appropriate.

RECOGNITION OF CERTIFICATION BY OTHER AUTHORITIES

4.15 Certification activities already undertaken by a National Aviation Authority (NAA)/Military Aviation Authority (MAA) can greatly simplify the Defence Type Certification process. Where a new aircraft type11 has partially or completely undergone Type Certification by a recognised authority, Defence may accept that an adequate level of safety has already been demonstrated, providing that the configuration, role(s) and operating environment(s) are substantially similar to that required by Defence. As part of their acquisition strategy, the acquisition agency should always consider certification activities undertaken by recognised authorities, because this can significantly reduce the effort required by Defence agencies to establish the airworthiness of the aircraft type.

4.16 Recognition of certification activities undertaken by recognised authorities need not be restricted to the entire aircraft Type Design. A new aircraft type developed to meet the requirements documentation suite may comprise an existing Type Certified aircraft plus a role or capability modification to meet any new or unique Defence requirements. For example, the RAAF Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft is based on a Boeing 737–700 Increased Gross Weight (IGW) Type Design certified by the United States (US) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), plus equipment and mission system modifications to provide an airborne air defence capability. Where the existing Boeing 737–700 IGW certification basis requirements are unaffected by the AEW&C role or modification, the FAA Type Certificate may be used as evidence to demonstrate compliance with the unaffected certification basis requirements. Since the FAA is a recognised NAA, the Defence certification activity may therefore be reduced to those new certification basis requirements, and those affected by the role or modification against which compliance must be re-established. Such a strategy is contingent upon the provision by the aircraft manufacturer and/or supplier of the extant, applicable Type Certificate and sufficient supporting information, including a continuing level of disclosure, which confirms that the design configuration, role(s) and environment are sufficiently similar to the Defence aircraft type variant.

11 This specifically excludes UAS. The Authority does not yet recognise any civil or military Airworthiness Authority as a competent regulator for UAS.

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4.17 The recognition of certification activities undertaken by an NAA/MAA is based on assessment that an equivalent level of safety has been demonstrated by that authority. Whilst compliance with technical requirements can generally be demonstrated through the application of universal engineering principles, resulting in quantitative outcomes which can be measured against defined standards, this approach is not necessarily appropriate to satisfy Defence operational requirements, which can depend largely on qualitative factors such as operational culture, flying philosophy, training methods and human machine interfaces. In such cases, the MAO-AM, in consultation with a DoSA (Flight Test) (FT), should carefully consider whether further evaluation is warranted.

CONCURRENT CERTIFICATION BY RECOGNISED AIRWORTHINESS AUTHORITIES

4.18 Defence may consider the acquisition of a new aircraft type or Certified category UAS concurrent with a foreign military force of a recognised country. In this circumstance, the aviation safety acquisition strategy may include a collaborative approach to Type Certification for those aspects of the design that share the same configuration, and where the role and environment are substantially similar to that intended by Defence12. Such a concurrent Type Certification program requires the agreement of both aviation safety authorities. Where an acquisition agency seeks to utilise this approach as part of their aviation safety acquisition strategy, advice from the Authority should be sought prior to negotiating any such agreement.

COMPILING THE TYPE CERTIFICATION BASIS

4.19 Once the Type Certification strategy has been determined, the Applicant13 for the Type Certificate must ensure the TCB is properly compiled. Principally, the following two aspects are fundamental to compilation of the TCB:

a. each TCB element contains an airworthiness standard, or part of a standard,against which compliance must be demonstrated

b. each TCB element contains an acceptable verification method todemonstrate compliance with the specified airworthiness standard14.

12 For example a variant of the Eurocopter Tiger aircraft, acquired to meet Army’s Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) capability, was being acquired by the French Armed Forces in a similar configuration and role. The Defence acquisition airworthiness strategy included participation by the French military airworthiness authority, Directorate General de l’Armament (DGA). DGA compliance findings for the French Tiger variant were assessed as applicable to the ARH Tiger, and were therefore recognised by the Authority for the common aspects of the certification program.

13 The Applicant for the Type Certificate would normally be the design organisation. However, in certain circumstances the acquisition agency may perform this role as a conduit to the design organisation.

14 The design organisation will propose, and the Authority will approve the appropriate verification method. This approval is documented in the CPP.

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4.20 To facilitate future mutual recognition, the TCB for a Defence aircraft is to be structured in accordance with Annex A of the European Military Airworthiness Certification Criteria Guidebook (EMACC Guidebook), which uses the following basic template:

a. Overall Basis of Certification. Describes the Primary Certification Code(PCC) against which the whole aircraft is certified. This forms the defaultcertification code for all systems, sub-systems and elements not specificallycovered in the later sections.

b. Exceptions. Details the elements of the design that are certified to agreedalternative standards or codes.

c. Special Conditions. Details the elements for which a bespoke certificationspecification has been developed for the project.

d. Elect to Comply Items. Documents where a later version of the PCC oralternative standard used elsewhere has been used for certification, withagreement of the Authority.

e. Equivalent Safety Findings. Specifies where it is not possible to certifyagainst an accepted standard, and agreement has been reached with theAuthority to provide a safety argument to demonstrate that an equivalentlevel of safety has been achieved.

4.21 Primary Certification Code. Defence recognised PCC are detailed in Australian Air Publication (AAP) 7001.054, Airworthiness Design Requirements Manual (ADRM). Notwithstanding this, as Defence normally acquires a variant of an aircraft that has already been certified against a PCC, mandating a PCC other than the one which the aircraft was certified against may result in a significant increase in effort and cost, with no real additional benefit to Defence. Consequently, for all projects the acquisition agency should request that tenderers propose applicable airworthiness standards, and the associated verification methods, as a part of tendering activities.

4.22 Only the Authority is authorised to prescribe airworthiness standards for Defence aircraft. Consequently, any proposed use of a PCC and/or airworthiness standards, other than those specified in the ADRM, must be approved by the Authority. Approval of airworthiness standards not explicitly recognised in AAP 7001.054 will usually be sought as part of the process of the acquisition agency and the Authority agreeing to the TCB, prior to approval of the CPP by the Authority. Where there is any uncertainty regarding compilation of the TCB, particularly regarding applicable airworthiness standards or verification methods, advice should be sought from the Authority at the earliest opportunity.

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4.23 Variations to Airworthiness Standards. All variations to airworthiness standards are to be recorded as Military Certification Review Items (MCRI), which are approved by the Authority and appended to the TCB to provide a single list of the design standards (including any tailoring of those standards) that underpin the design of the aircraft. The variations requiring recording as a MCRI include:

a. Deviations

b. Special Conditions

c. new Means of Compliance

d. any other certification aspect which requires clarification and interpretation, orrepresents a major technical or administrative issue.

REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTATION SUITE

4.24 The requirements documentation suite is the basis upon which Defence establishes a formal contract with the supplier to develop (as required) and deliver an aircraft type, Certified category UAS or modification to meet the Defence capability requirements. The requirements documentation suite comprises the Function and Performance Specification (FPS) and the acquisition Statement of Work (SoW).15 The FPS contains the detailed functional and physical requirements of the aircraft system, whereas the SoW describes the Defence requirements of the supplier in developing and delivering the aircraft system, including all necessary data, instructions and support required to operate and maintain the system. While the requirements documentation suite is not a regulated suite of documents, the Authority remains available to review the requirements documentation suite before it is finalised by the acquisition agency.

4.25 Function and Performance Specification. The FPS details the intended roles and capability requirements, and the detailed design requirements supporting these functional aspects. It also includes all the airworthiness standards which form the TCB. Accordingly, the FPS must be consistent with both the SOIU and the TCB, and should contain an acceptable verification method for each TCB requirement.

4.26 Statement of Work. The SoW normally contains, inter alia, detailed requirements for delivered plans, procedures and reports, which will be used to demonstrate compliance with the FPS. It is recommended that the acquisition agency includes contractual provisions that enable appropriate Defence visibility of the design and test activities, and delivery of the resulting data. Where recognition of prior certification forms part of the aviation safety acquisition strategy, delivery of extant Type Certificates, configuration data and supporting documentation must be

15 Where the acquisition strategy involves a government to government agreement, such as the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangements, the SoW may be replaced by a Letter of Request (LOR) or similar government to government arrangement, or may be appropriately tailored to reflect the standard requirements associated with the applicable government to government agreement.

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included in the SoW. Importantly, performance of the verification activities listed against the TCB requirements must be identified in the SoW. This needs to include Defence involvement, where appropriate, to facilitate demonstration of compliance with the TCB elements.

4.27 Involvement of Flight Test. The acquisition agency should develop the SoW in close consultation with a DoSA (FT), to ensure that the scope of testing identified is sufficient to meet the verification requirements listed in the FPS. Defence involvement in the ground and flight testing identified in the SoW is likely to inform a significant proportion of the Type Certification activity. Specific information on flight test support for certification and operation of DRA is contained in Annex B.

4.28 Linkage of Financial and Aviation Safety Milestones. Linking financial milestones to aviation safety milestones should be avoided, as it places undue emphasis on the issue of an aviation safety Instrument, rather than on delivered capability. Ideally, the acquisition agency should identify the capability required at various milestones, and then implement an aviation safety strategy to support achievement of the required capability.

4.29 Changes to the Requirements Document Suite. The requirements document suite may require amendment during the life of the acquisition for a variety of reasons. The acquisition agency may approve an amendment to the requirements document suite, without reference to the Authority, provided that it does not involve any change to the CPP or TCB. Where a proposed amendment to the requirements document suite involves changing the CPP or TCB, the Authority is to be consulted, and must approve any proposed CPP or TCB changes before the requirements document suite is amended.

4.30 Compliance Demonstration. The compliance demonstration process involves the production of evidence to support an assessment that the design complies with the TCB requirements, through to the Authority’s actions to gain confidence that the design complies the TCB requirements. Consequently, demonstrating compliance requires the involvement of multiple organisations, who have the following different roles within the compliance demonstration process:

a. MDOA Holder (or Authority accepted equivalent). A MDOA holder willgenerally develop compliance demonstration evidence to demonstratecompliance with the TCB requirements. The MDOA holder (or Authorityaccepted equivalent) will also normally issue a Declaration of Compliancestating that the design complies with the TCB requirements.

b. Project Office. The acquisition agency PO should collate and presentcompliance demonstration evidence, developed by the MDOA holder (orAuthority accepted equivalent), to the Authority for inspection.16

16 The CPP identifies those elements selected by the Authority as warranting inspection of compliance demonstration evidence. Additional elements may be identified as the Type Certification program evolves.

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c. The Authority (including delegates). The Authority will inspect selectedcompliance demonstration evidence, on a non-exhaustive basis, to gainassurance that the design meets the TCB requirements.

4.31 The requirement for the designer or supplier to demonstrate compliance with TCB requirements, to Defence, is usually included in the requirements documentation suite. Additionally, Defence involvement in designer or supplier ground and flight test activities can also be included in the requirements documentation suite. Notwithstanding this, informal involvement or witnessing of test or developmental activities, by the acquisition agency PO, may assist the PO with their supplies acceptance responsibilities.

4.32 Many TCB requirements will require both technical and operational input to demonstrate compliance. These may include, for example, any aspect of the design which impacts cockpit layout, avionics symbology, warnings and cautions, engine performance, stores jettison envelopes, etc. Where the TCB requirement relates to aircraft handling qualities or crew workload, the Authority may identify this as an area warranting inspection of compliance demonstration evidence. If so, a Commonwealth Test Representative (CTR)17 would normally be engaged by the Authority to inspect that evidence.

COMPLIANCE DEMONSTRATION EVIDENCE

4.33 The design organisation is responsible for generating and managing the evidence that demonstrates compliance. When compliance with all TCB requirements has been demonstrated, an application can be made to the Authority for issue of a MTC. The evidence that demonstrates compliance against the TCB requirements for an aircraft type is to be retained with the Type Design when the MTC is issued.

4.34 The compliance demonstration evidence remains valid unless a modification is embodied, or there is a change to the role or environment which invalidates the compliance demonstration evidence. In these circumstances compliance demonstration against the affected TCB requirement(s) must be re-established.

MANAGING AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES

4.35 An airworthiness issue occurs where compliance with a TCB requirement has not been demonstrated in accordance with the approved Means of Compliance. Where this occurs, the design agency has the following two options:

a. undertake the activities necessary to demonstrate compliance with the TCBrequirement

17 Commonwealth Test Representatives include test pilots, flight test system specialists and flight test engineers.

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b. propose, for approval by the Authority, an MCRI that tailors the TCBrequirement18.

ISSUE PAPERS

4.36 Airworthiness Issue Papers (AwIP) were used under the previous regulations to describe and manage specific non-compliances with prescribed airworthiness standards. Under the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR)19, AwIP are normally replaced by MCRI, which are appended to the TCB. Consequently, when the Type Certification activities are completed, the TCB should reflect the actual basis against which the aircraft type was certified.

4.37 While AwIP are replaced by MCRI to manage specific variations from airworthiness standards, MCRI generally only reflect the outcome of the Authority’s decision to vary an airworthiness standard (ie: an MCRI doesn’t provide the rationale for the decision). Consequently, an Issue Paper (IP) may still be useful to support an MCRI, particularly where significant operational input and/or agreement is required in developing the MCRI. An IP may also be used to document risk decisions on aircraft safety issues that are not strictly within scope of the certification basis.

RESOLVING AIRWORTHINESS ISSUES

4.38 Airworthiness issues may be resolved through a number of means, including:

a. re-designing the deficient item to achieve compliance with the TCBrequirement

b. undertaking additional testing or analysis to subsequently demonstratecompliance with the TCB requirement

c. approval of a MCRI by the Authority after either:

(1) establishing an equivalent level of safety, through other means that areacceptable to the Authority

(2) demonstrating that the non-compliance does not appreciably reduce thelevel of safety of the aircraft

(3) imposing a permanent role or environmental restriction, to retain thelevel of safety of the aircraft

(4) recording a Command decision that the TCB must be tailored, whereadherence to the extant TCB would have an unacceptable effect oncapability.

18 Submission of an MCRI would normally be the preferred option where an equivalent level of safety can be demonstrated, or it can be established that the proposed tailoring of the TCB requirement does not appreciably increase the aviation safety risk.

19 Refer to Guidance Material for DASR 21.A.17(a).

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ISSUE OF A TYPE CERTIFICATE

4.39 The requirements for issue of a Type Certificate are detailed in DASR 2120 . Prior to issue of a Type Certificate, the Authority requires:

a. completion of all activities specified in the appropriate DASR Part 21regulation

b. for issue of an MTC or MRTC, compilation of a Type Certificate Data Sheet(TCDS) which summarises the aircraft certification basis

c. for issue of an MSTC, amendment of the TCDS which summarises thechanges to the aircraft certification basis

d. if an Airworthiness Board (AwB) is convened, a recommendation for issue ofa Type Certificate by the AwB

e. as appropriate, submission of a completed DASR Form 30, Application forType Certificate/Restricted Type Certificate or DASR Form 33, Application forApproval of Supplemental Type Certificate.

4.40 Type Certificate Data Sheet. The TCDS for a specific aircraft type or Certified category UAS complements the Type Certificate by documenting the approved Instruments and summarising the basis of certification. The TCDS identifies specific information contained in Defence approved records, or in records approved by other recognised airworthiness authorities, and should identify or reference:

a. the TCB, including all approved MCRI

b. the approved aircraft role(s) and environment(s)

c. the aircraft configuration

d. operating and maintenance instructions

e. any limitations and special conditions.

4.41 An example TCDS is available on the DASA website. Before issue of a Type Certificate, the Authority will ensure that the TCDS is appropriately compiled for the aircraft type. The organisation holding the MTC is responsible for ensuring the on-going validity of the TCDS.

20 Refer to DASR 21.A.21 (MTC), DASR 21.A.23 (MRTC) or DASR 21.A.115 (MSTC) as appropriate.

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INDIVIDUAL AIRCRAFT AIRWORTHINESS

4.42 DASR Basic Regulation (BR) 20.B(3) requires that no aircraft is operated unless it has a valid Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA)21. Issue of a CofA22 is contingent on the issue of the relevant Type Certificate, provision of a correctly completed Aircraft Statement of Conformity (DASR Form 52)23, and an appropriate level of inspection by the Authority to provide confidence that the aircraft conforms to the approved Type Design (except as documented on the Aircraft Statement of Conformity).

4.43 Aircraft or Certified category UAS are usually operated under a MPTF when they predominantly comply with the airworthiness standard(s) and it has been demonstrated that they are capable of safe flight under defined conditions, but it is not practicable to comply with the normal airworthiness requirements. In these situations issue of a CofA may not be appropriate, and any applicable airworthiness conditions, restrictions and limitations are to be included within the MPTF.

AUTHORISATION FOR AN AIRCRAFT TO CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS

4.44 Authorisation to conduct flight operations is dependent on an assessment of the ‘readiness’ of the supporting elements to commence and sustain flight operations with a type certified aircraft or Certified category UAS 24 at a designated rate of effort. The MAO-AM is responsible for undertaking this assessment25 , and is required to attest that the supporting elements are ready in the MAOC Compliance Statement (or amendment to the Compliance Statement for an extant MAO).

21 The exception to the requirement for a valid CofA before operation of an aircraft is when the aircraft is to be operated under an MPTF prior to issue of a Type Certificate.

22 Approved CofA are DASR Form 24, Military Certificate of Airworthiness (MCofA), and DASR Form 25, Military Restricted Certificate of Airworthiness (MRCofA).

23 If an Aircraft Statement of Conformity is unable to be obtained, other documentation that provides confidence that the aircraft conforms to the approved Type Design may, at the discretion of the Authority, be used in lieu of an Aircraft Statement of Conformity.

24 Aircraft and Certified category UAS that have been issued with, a MTC, MRTC or MSTC as appropriate. The Authority would not normally issue a MTC or MRTC before independent review by an Airworthiness Board (AwB) has been completed and the outcomes agreed by the Defence AA. In certain circumstances the Authority will issue an MSTC without first convening an AwB.

25 This would normally be undertaken in conjunction with the acquisition agency.

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REQUIREMENTS FOR AUTHORISATION TO CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS

4.45 The specific regulatory requirements that need to be addressed to support authorisation to conduct flight operations are detailed in the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) for DASR ARO.100, Preparation of a Compliance Statement. In addition to satisfying the requirements specified in the AMC for DASR ARO.100, before flight operations are authorised consideration should be given as to whether approved aircraft design and maintenance arrangements, and supply arrangements to replenish items of aircraft equipment, are adequate to support the planned Rate of Effort (RoE).

GRANTING OF AUTHORISATION TO CONDUCT FLIGHT OPERATIONS

4.46 The ASAMP should briefly describe the strategy to implement the arrangements required to support authorisation of flight operations, and should identify those plans which provide the specific details.

4.47 Prior to the granting of authorisation for an aircraft or Certified category UAS to conduct flight operations, the following activities are required to be completed:

a. issue of a Type Certificate26 ;

b. the requirements specified in DASR ARO.100 have been appropriatelyaddressed;

c. the the risks associated with conducting flight operations have beeneliminated SFARP or, where this is not reasonably practicable, the risks havebeen minimised SFARP, and conducting flight operations with the residualrisk has been authorised by the appropriate authority27;

d. issue of a DGDASA recommendation regarding acceptability of thearrangements supporting the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft, in theintended roles and environment; and

e. if an Airworthiness Board (AwB) is convened, any concerns that the AwB hasexpressed regarding authorisation to conduct flight operations have beenaddressed to the satisfaction of the Authority.

26 MTC, MRTC or MSTC (as appropriate).

27 The specific appointment(s) that must authorise flight operations are commensurate with the assessed level of residual risk, and are specified within procedures established by each Service.

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4.48 When the requirements detailed at paragraph 4.47 have been addressed, the AM should request, in writing, that the Authority amend the MAOC OpSpec to authorise the conduct of flight operations28. The procedure for requesting amendment of the OpSpec is provided at Annex C.

4.49 Limitations to Authorisation to Conduct Flight Operations. Issue of an MRTC and/or immature supporting arrangements may necessitate limitations to the authorisation to conduct flight operations, particularly where this is required to minimise the associated risk SFARP. Limitations may include restricting flying hours, roles or environments prior to completion of specific certification activities, flight envelope limitations, stores configuration limitations, or any other limitation deemed necessary in the interests of safety. Any limitations are to be approved by the Authority and COMAUSFLT, COMD FORCOMD and/or ACAUST as appropriate, and recommended by an AwB (if convened)29 , prior to authorisation to conduct flight operations being granted.

ADDITIONAL FLEET AIRCRAFT AND NEW MODELS OF FLEET AIRCRAFT

ADDITIONAL FLEET AIRCRAFT

4.50 Acquisition of additional fleet aircraft30 is undertaken to supplement a current capability. However, depending on the aircraft configuration and prior usage, additional aircraft may pose significant challenges from both initial and continuing airworthiness perspectives. Before MCoA are issued for the additional fleet aircraft, both of these aspects need to be appropriately addressed.

4.51 Aircraft Configuration. Where there are no significant configuration differences between the existing and additional aircraft, subject to confirmation that the additional aircraft conformed to the Type Design during production, the primary concerns are with any prior use of the aircraft, and the management of continuing airworthiness during any previous operating period. Where there are significant configuration differences particular attention will need to be given to the effect of these differences, and the certification activity undertaken to confirm that the configuration changes have not adversely impacted airworthiness.

28 In the event that a new MAO is being established to operate the aircraft type, the request may be for issue of an MAOC and associated OpSpec, rather than for amendment to the OpSpec.

29 Specific requirements regarding the AwB are detailed in Part 2, Chapter 6.

30 Additional fleet aircraft are aircraft that would be included under an MTC issued for an existing aircraft fleet.

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4.52 Previous Usage. Where additional fleet aircraft have been previously operated by other than Defence, the impact of this usage, and the previous arrangements to ensure continuing airworthiness, will need to be assessed to determine whether:

a. any remedial aircraft maintenance is required to establish and/or confirm theairworthiness of the aircraft

b. any specific conditions or limitations need to be applied to ensure continuingairworthiness of the aircraft.

4.53 To facilitate the assessments and minimise the effort required to support issue of MCoA for additional fleet aircraft, comprehensive records regarding any configuration differences (including certification of configuration changes), previous operation and continuing airworthiness arrangements should be obtained if possible. If acquisition of additional fleet aircraft is being contemplated, early engagement with the Authority is recommended to enable realisation of the additional capability at the earliest opportunity.

NEW MODELS OF FLEET AIRCRAFT

4.54 There are two strategies available to type certify and subsequently introduce a new model of an existing fleet aircraft; either introduce it as if it is an additional fleet aircraft, or introduce it as a new aircraft. The decision on which strategy to adopt is likely to be predominantly based on the configuration and role changes between the existing and new models of the aircraft, with introduction as a new aircraft fleet becoming more preferred as the extent and significance of configuration and role changes increases.31 Where introduction of a new model of an existing fleet aircraft is being contemplated, early engagement with the Authority is encouraged to assist in selecting the most appropriate strategy.

MILITARY PERMIT TO FLY

4.55 DASR 21.A.701 specifies that an MPTF is required for operation of aircraft that do not meet, or have not been shown to meet, applicable airworthiness requirements, but have been demonstrated as being capable of safe flight under defined conditions. DASR 21.A.701(a) provides a list of purposes for which an MPTF may be issued.

31 For example, while the A97 Application Identifier used for "A", "E" and "H" models of the Hercules aircraft was retained for the C-130J aircraft, the program to introduce the C-130J aircraft model predominantly reflected that of introducing a new aircraft type, due to the extent and significance of both configuration and role changes.

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4.56 Application for a MPTF. Where possible, any foreseeable requirement for an MPTF should be identified in the ASAMP, during development of the aviation safety strategy to introduce the aircraft type or Certified category UAS into service. An application for a MPTF is required to detail:

a. the purpose(s) of the flight(s), in accordance with DASR 21.A.701

b. the ways in which the aircraft or Certified category UAS does not comply withthe applicable airworthiness requirements

c. the flight conditions approved in accordance with DASR 21.A.71032.

4.57 The flight conditions specified in the application for an MPTF are to describe:

a. the required duration of the MPTF

b. any condition or restriction necessary for safe operation of the aircraft orCertified category UAS, including:

(1) the configuration(s) for which the MPTF is requested

(2) the conditions and restrictions placed on the flight crew assigned to flythe aircraft

(3) the conditions or restrictions put on flight plan(s) or airspace, or both,required for the flight(s)

(4) the restrictions regarding carriage of persons other than flight crew

(5) the operating limitations, specific procedures or technical conditions tobe met (which may include restrictions regarding carriage/release/firingof weapons)

(6) where flight test is planned under the MPTF, the required qualifications,training and experience of flight test personnel, the roles to beundertaken, environmental aspects, weather limitations, concurrenttasking, other aircraft requirements (air to air refuelling, chase aircraftetc) and any proposed ship-borne operation (eg first of class flighttrials).

c. the specific flight test program (if applicable)

d. the specific continuing airworthiness arrangements and the regime underwhich they will be executed

32 Where the flight conditions are not approved at the time of application for a MPTF, an application for approval of the flight conditions shall be made in accordance with DASR 21.A.709.

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e. substantiation that the aircraft or Certified category UAS is capable of safeflight under the conditions or restrictions of sub-paragraph (b)

f. the method used to control the aircraft or Certified category UASconfiguration, in order to remain within the approved conditions andrestrictions.

4.58 In addition to the requirements specified at paragraphs 4.56 - 4.57, to ensure compliance with WHS obligations, the application should include a risk assessment that demonstrates that all risks associated with the proposed MPTF have been eliminated SFARP or, if this is not reasonably practicable, have been minimised SFARP33. For any planned flight test activities, the risk assessment should be documented as part of the flight test plan.

4.59 Airworthiness Board Review. At the discretion of the Authority, an application for an MPTF may be reviewed by an AwB before the MPTF is issued34. The requirement for AwB review of an MPTF application should be clarified with the Authority during compilation of the ASAMP.

4.60 Approval of an MPTF. Dependent on the scope of the MPTF, it may be issued by the Authority, a DoSA (FT), a Military Production Organisation Approval (MPOA) holder with the appropriate privilege, or an MDOA holder with the appropriate privilege35.

4.61 All approved MPTF applicable to an aircraft type or Certified category UAS are to be managed by the relevant MAO36 in accordance with Annex D.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATING PERMIT

4.62 Defence UAS aviation safety management is predicated on UAS being designed, constructed, maintained and operated , such that the risk to personnel, other aircraft and property, associated with UAS operations, have been eliminated SFARP and, where this is not reasonably practicable, the risks have been minimised SFARP.

33 This should include an Aviation Risk Management (AVRM) assessment iaw AAP 6734.001, Defence Aviation Safety Manual.

34 Refer to Part 2, Chapter 6. MPTF applicants should expect that an AwB will be required for acquisition of new aircraft, or where the activity being undertaken involves complex, unique or high risk operations warranting an additional level of oversight.

35 Refer to DASR 21.A.711(a)

36 Where an aircraft type is operated by more than one MAO, the affected MAO are to determine which MAO will be responsible for managing the MPTF for that aircraft type.

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4.63 Any UAS operated in the Specified Type A category is required to be operated under an Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) issued by the Defence AA.37 Noting that a risk assessment is the primary basis for operation of a UAS in the Specified A category, the level of rigour applied to the planning for issue of a UASOP should be proportionate to the complexity and risk associated with the intended operations, and the maturity of the UAS.38 A UASOP template and example is available on the DASA Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Agency (ACPA) website. (http://drnet.defence.gov.au/raaf/ACPA/Community/Pages/Templates.aspx)

Annexes:

4A Operation of Aircraft Before Being Listed on the Defence Register

4B Flight Test Support for Aircraft Certification and Operation

4C Amendment of an Operations Specification

4D Management of Military Permits To Fly

37 UAS operated in the Specified category are either operated as a Type A or Type B UAS. When operated as a Specified Type B UAS, the UAS is restricted to operations in accordance with Standard Scenarios approved by the Authority, and operation must be authorised by the relevant Command or Defence Group.

38 DASR UAS.30(b), along with its associated Guidance Material (GM) and Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC), provides comprehensive requirements for issue of a UASOP for operation of a UAS as a Specified Type A UAS.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 4A

OPERATION OF AIRCRAFT BEFORE BEING LISTED ON THE DEFENCE REGISTER

INTRODUCTION

1. Aircraft are normally listed on the Defence Register before they are operated by Defence personnel. Operation of Defence Registered Aircraft (DRA) by Defence personnel invokes a level of aviation safety regulation and oversight that substantially satisfies Defence's obligations under the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (the WHS Act). However, under some circumstances it will be desirable or necessary for Defence personnel to operate an aircraft before it is listed on the Defence Register. These circumstances include:

a. flight test operations by the aircraft Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) outside Australian airspace

b. flying operations by the aircraft OEM within Australian airspace

c. flying training or other flying operations by any foreign flying organisation outside Australian airspace.

2. In the above circumstances the appropriate Capability Manager (CM)1 or Group Head responsible for the acquisition project retains significant obligations under the WHS Act, predominantly associated with a duty of care to provide and preserve a safe working environment. Consequently, for Defence personnel to operate aircraft that are not yet listed on the Defence Register, the Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) requires that those operations afford at least an equivalent level of aviation safety to that which would exist if the aircraft was on the Defence Register.

DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN OEM FLIGHT TEST OUTSIDE AUSTRALIA

3. The development of a new aircraft type or Major Change to the Type Design invariably requires an extensive program of ground and flight testing by the OEM. The involvement of Defence personnel in this testing is important to assist with the demonstration of compliance with Type Certification Basis (TCB) requirements, and design and contractual acceptance of the aircraft.

4. Depending on the extent or complexity of the test program, the involvement of Defence personnel could include any activity, from observation to captaincy of the aircraft, throughout multiple test flights. Additionally, during early development phases of the acquisition project, this flying activity will most likely occur at an OEM facility outside of Australia.

1 Chief of Air Force (CAF), Chief of Navy (CN) and Chief of Army (CA) are the Capability Managers (CM).

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5. The acquisition agency is responsible for ensuring that a level of aviation safety, at least equivalent to that provided by compliance with the Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR), is established prior to involvement of Defence personnel in OEM flight test operations. The relevant Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA) Flight Test (FT)2 should be consulted to confirm that the proposed flying management arrangements are adequate3.

6. Whilst the aircraft remains under the control of the OEM, and is not Defence registered, involvement of Defence personnel in operating such an aircraft is contingent on one of the following:

a. Type Certification of the aircraft by a recognised National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) 4 or Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) 5

b. issuance of an experimental Type Certificate or exemption by a recognised NAA or MAA applicable to the scope of developmental flying to be conducted.

7. In addition to the requirements at paragraphs 5 - 6, for OEM flight test activities the involvement Defence personnel is subject to the:

a. flight test organisation being certified to conduct an applicable scope of flight test operations under a recognised NAA or MAA, or the flight test organisation (including the participating Defence aircrew) having been assessed by the relevant DoSA (FT) as adequate to safely conduct the test operations

2 Delegates of the Safety Authority (DoSA) Flight Test (FT) replace the Flight Test Approval Authorities (FTAA) appointed under the previous Military Aviation Regulations (MILAVREG). DoSA (FT) are appointed by the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) to perform specific functions under the authority of the DASA.

3 The proposed flying management arrangements include those processes and procedures implemented by the OEM to control flight test operations, but may also include procedures and processes implemented by the acquisition agency governing the participation of the Defence personnel.

4 A recognised NAA is one whose aviation safety system has been assessed as providing an equivalent level of safety to that provided by the Defence Aviation Safety Program (DASP). The NAA recognised by Defence are listed on the DASA web site.

5 A recognised Military Airworthiness Authority (MAA) is one whose aviation safety system has been assessed as providing an equivalent level of safety to that provided by the DASP. The MAA recognised by Defence are listed on the DASA web site.

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b. flight test operations being conducted within the limitations and conditions specified by the aircraft certifying authority6, and any additional limitations and conditions specified by the relevant Military Air Operator Accountable Manager (MAO-AM) or DoSA (FT).

8. Aspects of the flight test flying management system that may be considered by the DoSA (FT), to confirm that the proposed flying management arrangements are adequate, include:

a. Flight Test Flying Management Processes. The existence of, and adherence by the flight test organisation to, adequate flight test flying management processes and procedures.

b. Interim Design Certificate. Interim Design Certificates, or similar artefacts to document the design configuration, should be presented by the OEM prior to the commencement of the phase of testing relevant to those particular elements of the design. The Design Certificates should identify that the specific design elements are considered airworthy for the planned test flights.

c. Aircraft Configuration Conformance. The OEM should identify the physical and functional configuration of the aircraft, and confirm that the aircraft conforms to the configuration identified in the Design Certificates.

d. Test Documentation. The test documentation should include:

(1) the flight test plan or procedures endorsed by the acquisition agency, including specific test points to be completed

(2) identification of instrumentation or data recording requirements

(3) identification of the required aircraft configurations to support each test flight

(4) identification of all applicable operating conditions and limitations relevant to the scope of the testing, or reference to appropriate operating manuals.

e. Safety Review. The OEM should ensure that hazards associated with a specific flight test activity have been identified, documented and appropriately mitigated. Such activity is typically addressed through the conduct of a flight test hazard (or risk) assessment, which is formally reviewed by the acquisition agency as part of the test plan or procedure endorsement. Importantly, the acquisition agency should ensure that appropriate approval authorities are identified for low, medium and high risk test activities.

6 Limitations and conditions for flight test operations are normally contained within a flight test plan addressing each test event. The management of test activities to support Type Certification is described in Part 3, Chapter 4, Annex B.

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f. Maintenance and Operating Manuals. The maintenance and operating manuals, including any temporary procedures and limitations, should be current for each flight test activity. Amendments to the maintenance and operating manuals should be prepared by the OEM and circulated for review. A provisional or draft flight manual and other operating instructions necessary to support aircraft operations should be available.

g. Test Readiness Review. The Test Readiness Review (TRR) may be tailored for the conduct of each flight test; however, in general the TRR should be equivalent to standard flight test practices normally expected by the DoSA (FT). The DoSA (FT) or representative should be consulted during the development of procedures defining the conduct of the TRR.

h. Pre–flight Briefing. A pre-flight briefing should be convened immediately before each flight in the test program, to verify that the participating aircrew, engineers and test specialists are prepared and understand the sequence of testing to be conducted.

i. Flight Authorisation. Flight authorisation for the participating Defence aircrew should be granted by an appropriate authorising officer.

j. Maintenance Release. The test aircraft should only be released from maintenance when the aircraft is serviceable for the intended flight and is configured as required in the applicable flight test plan or procedure.

DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN OEM FLYING ACTIVITIES WITHIN AUSTRALIAN AIRSPACE

9. Prior to Defence registration, operation of a new aircraft type may be required within Australian airspace for the purpose of production acceptance testing, limited flight testing, ferry flights or other limited flying operations. In such cases the requirements for involvement of Defence personnel are similar to those for involvement of Defence personnel in OEM flight test operations outside Australia, as detailed in paragraphs 5 – 8. Notwithstanding the similarity with OEM flight test operations undertaken outside of Australia, the following specific differences are associated with OEM flying activities in Australian airspace:

a. The OEM may require an exemption from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) from holding an Australian Type Certificate for the aircraft7.

7 An exemption will be required where the aircraft has not been Type Certified by either CASA or an NAA recognised by CASA, and there is no intention for the aircraft to be Type Certified by either CASA or an NAA recognised by CASA. Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) 200.010 provides an exemption for a limited range of specified flight operations, and CASR 11.170 (3) allows CASA to grant an exemption for flight operations that are not covered by CASR 200.010. In considering an exemption under CASR 11.170 (3), CASA ‘… must regard the preservation of a level of aviation safety that is at least acceptable as paramount.’

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b. The OEM may require an exemption from CASA from holding an AirOperators Certificate for the proposed scope of flying operations8.

10. Within Australian airspace, and following the granting of any exemptions (if required) by CASA, the acquisition agency is responsible for ensuring that a level of aviation safety, at least equivalent to that provided by compliance with the DASR, is established prior to involvement of Defence personnel in OEM flying activities. The relevant DoSA (FT) should be consulted to confirm that the proposed flying management arrangements are adequate; as appropriate, the aspects listed at paragraph 8 may be considered as part of the required confirmation.

DEFENCE INVOLVEMENT IN FOREIGN FLYING TRAINING

11. The aviation safety requirements for Defence aircrew participating in overseas flying training are similar to those required prior to Defence aircrew participation in flight test. The aircraft registration requirements and overarching aviation safety management requirements align with those detailed at paragraphs 5 -6. Notwithstanding this, in the case of aircrew training, the ADF Commander with responsibility for the Defence aircrew must be similarly satisfied that the flying management system arrangements, in support of the flying training, are adequate to provide at least an equivalent level of safety for the participating aircrew as that provided under the DASR.

12. Establishing that an equivalent level of safety exists may require assessment of the proposed training operations by the MAOD (Acq), or other representative appointed by the ADF Commander with responsibility for the Defence aircrew. The assessment should include examination of not only the extant operational procedures used by the foreign flying organisation, but also the impact on aviation safety of Defence aircrew participation within that flying organisation. Factors such as language, flying philosophy, safety culture and instructional techniques should be carefully considered to ensure the interaction of Defence aircrew with the established processes does not compromise safe operations.

8 Under Section 27 of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (as administered by CASA), unless an exemption is granted aircraft must not be operated in Australian airspace except by the holder of an Air Operators Certificate (AOC).

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PART 3 - ANNEX 4B

ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST SUPPORT INTRODUCTION

1. Most acquisition projects involving any developmental activity rely on some level of flight testing in the execution of their airworthiness strategy. In terms of airworthiness, flight testing often provides a large proportion of essential data necessary to demonstrate compliance with the Type Certification Basis (TCB). Additionally, flight testing provides the opportunity to demonstrate that an aircraft type is suitable for flight in the intended roles and environment, by appropriately qualified and competent Defence aircrew.

2. Flight testing is particularly important in establishing the airworthiness of a new aircraft or Major Change to the Type Design because:

a. test data is a critical element of the Type Design

b. test data is often used as evidence that compliance with a TCB requirement has been demonstrated

c. flight testing provides an opportunity for involvement of Defence personnel in supporting demonstration of compliance with TCB requirements

d. flight testing is used as a key mechanism to assess the acceptability for Defence use of operational aspects of the design, such as the Human-Machine Interface (HMI), handling qualities and cockpit workload.

PURPOSE

3. This annex describes the role of flight test during acquisition activities leading to Type Certification.

APPLICABILITY

4. This annex is applicable to acquisition activities involving the flight test of a new aircraft type, or a Major Change to the Type Design of an aircraft type.

THE ROLE OF FLIGHT TEST

5. For the purposes of Type Certification, flight testing includes any flight activity conducted for investigative, developmental or demonstration purposes, on a new aircraft or a Major Change to the Type Design that either:

a. supports issue of a Military Type Certificate (MTC)1

1 This includes issue of a Military Type Certificate (MTC), a Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) or a Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC).

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b. requires operating beyond existing approved operating limitations.

6. In an acquisition context, flight testing is utilised for several purposes including:

a. gathering of data to support design development

b. gathering of data to assess design performance

c. verification that a particular aspect of the design specification has been met

d. demonstration that the aircraft or Major Change satisfies those parts of the Function and Performance Specification (FPS) which require verification by flight testing.

7. Flight testing is also integral to demonstration of many of the capability requirements which are not part of the TCB, such as performance verification. Typically, flight testing for both airworthiness and capability related purposes is managed centrally, and thus some aspects of this annex will be applicable to both aspects of flight testing.

ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST PLANNING

THE ROLE OF THE DELEGATE OF THE SAFETY AUTHORITY (FLIGHT TEST)

8. Delegates of the Safety Authority (DoSA) Flight Test (FT) are delegated authority for the management of aircraft allocated for the purposes of flight testing. For acquisition flight test activity, the scope of this authority includes:

a. approving Military Permits To Fly (MPTF), including associated flight conditions2

b. appointing qualified and competent test personnel to participate in, and manage acquisition flight testing activities3

c. endorsing that the scope of test activities documented in the requirements documentation suite is adequate to support the Type Certification process

d. determining the adequacy of arrangements to manage flight operations for acquisition flight testing

e. determining the adequacy of specific flight testing activities to demonstrate verification of airworthiness requirements contained in the TCB

2 Refer to Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A, Sub-Part P.

3 This includes Commonwealth Test Representatives (test pilots, flight test system specialists and flight test engineers).

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f. determining the acceptability of operational elements of TCB compliance demonstrations which impact the aircraft’s suitability for flight, in the intended roles and environment, by Defence aircrew.

IDENTIFYING THE REQUIRED SCOPE OF TESTING

9. The acquisition agency develops and maintains an Aviation Safety Acquisition Management Plan (ASAMP), which identifies the strategy to achieve the necessary aviation safety Instruments4. The ASAMP should include reference to any necessary plans which identify the flight testing activities and tasks supporting the certification activity, such as verification against TCB requirements, and management arrangements for flight testing after introduction into service.

10. DoSA(FT) involvement in both the development and planned verification methodology of TCB requirements is necessary, to ensure that the scope of testing identified is sufficient to meet the verification requirements, which are normally issued as part of the Function and Performance Specification (FPS).

11. Test and Evaluation Master Plan. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) normally describes the Defence approach to satisfying all test related requirements. The TEMP should identify the program of testing required to meet the test obligations contained in the Statement of Work (SOW). The TEMP is normally developed from a Test Concept Document (TCD) offered as part of, or developed in conjunction with, tender documentation by the supplier, and which identifies the broad strategy proposed to meet both airworthiness and capability requirements. The TEMP should identify the mechanisms to carry out the required testing, and a schedule to satisfy all required flight testing to provide data in support of Type Certification. Of particular importance, the TEMP provides a means for the DoSA(FT) to assess the adequacy of the proposed scope of testing to meet all requirements contained in the TCB.

ACQUISITION FLIGHT TEST IMPLEMENTATION

12. The strategy and program of testing documented in the TEMP define the overarching test requirements to achieve verification of airworthiness and capability requirements. The TEMP is normally supported by flight test plans, which document the verification or acceptance test methods or processes to satisfy one or more FPS requirements, and provide the specific details necessary to support the safe and effective conduct of flight testing5.

4 Refer to Part 3, Chapter 3, Annex A

5 While flight test plans may be prepared by Defence, flight test plans supporting acquisition of a new aircraft are normally prepared by the manufacturer or suppler of the aircraft.

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13. Flight test plans developed by Defence are to be approved by either a DoSA(FT), or a person appointed by a DoSA(FT) to approve flight test plans. Flight test plans developed by other agencies, such as an aircraft supplier or manufacturer, should be reviewed by appropriate Defence test and engineering staff6, to ensure that the documented test process and, if necessary, each subordinate test procedure, is adequate to demonstrate compliance with the particular requirement being tested, and that the testing may be conducted safely. Subsequent test reports produced by the test agency are provided to enable the acquisition agency to demonstrate compliance with, and determine contractual acceptability against, FPS requirements.

14. Defence personnel may be approved to participate in a flight testing program being undertaken by a non-Defence agency. Approval is subject to the Head of the Defence organisation providing the approval ensuring that that risks to participating Defence personnel arising from the flight test activity have been eliminated So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP) or, if this is not reasonably practicable, minimised SFARP.

15. Further guidance on the methodology and conduct of flight testing, to satisfy TCB or other requirements, is available from the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA).

AIRCRAFT–STORES COMPATIBILITY CERTIFICATION

16. Aircraft which carry and employ stores require Aircraft–Stores Compatibility (ASC) certification requirements included as part of the TCB. The Defence approach to ASC certification relies substantially on a program of ground and flight testing to demonstrate compliance with technical and operational requirements when using the desired aircraft stores configurations in designated roles. The Certification Program Plan (CPP) should detail how compliance against the ASC requirements will be demonstrated. If compliance with the ASC requirements is to be demonstrated though a separate program7, the CPP should refer to a separate ASC Certification Plan which has been approved by the Authority. In these circumstances the ASC certification plan may be developed by the manufacturer, supplier or Defence, and may include capability requirements in addition to certification requirements.

17. Where possible, the likely ASC requirements should be determined during development of the requirements documentation suite. The Aircraft Stores Compatibility Engineering (ASCENG) agency is the Defence Subject Matter Expert for ASC related certification requirements and test procedures. ASCENG staff should be consulted during development of the requirements documentation suite

6 Appropriate Defence test staff will normally be appointed by a DoSA (FT).

7 Certification of stores already in ADF service is often undertaken separately from certification of the new aircraft being acquired (eg: certification of the ASRAAM missile with the F/A-18 aircraft). Additionally, certification of new stores with an in-service aircraft is also a common requirement.

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and ASC Certification Plan, and in the compilation of evidence demonstrating compliance with ASC requirements.

ACCEPTANCE TESTING

18. Relationship Between Airworthiness and Acceptance Testing. Acceptance testing is any test event used to demonstrate compliance with contractual FPS requirements. This includes both airworthiness requirements documented in the TCB, and other FPS requirements related to performance and capability. Acceptance testing is used as the mechanism through which the aircraft OEM offers the Type Design for formal assessment by Defence in the configuration intended for operational use. Acceptance testing therefore provides the opportunity for the acquisition agency to demonstrate compliance with Operational Airworthiness requirements associated with the use of the aircraft in the intended roles and environment. Demonstration of compliance with Human Factors (HF) requirements associated with Human-Machine Interface(s) (HMI), crew workload, performance and handling qualities is to be assessed by an appropriate Commonwealth Test Representative (CTR) appointed by a DoSA(FT). With respect to airworthiness, the outcome sought from acceptance testing is a determination that the aircraft is able to be operated, in the intended roles and environment, in flight and on ground, without significant hazard to aircrew, ground-crew, passengers (where relevant) or to other third parties.

19. Acceptance Testing Not Impacting Operational Airworthiness. Where the suitability for flight of a new aircraft or Major Change to the Type Design has been established in a specified configuration, aircrew who are not appointed as CTR may participate in or conduct acceptance test flights undertaken for performance or capability related assessments. The use of operational aircrew may be appropriate where those aircrew are intimately experienced with the context of operational use of the aircraft type (eg: a Qualified Flying Instructor assessing the contractual acceptability of a training aircraft performing designated training roles).

20. Changes to the Configuration, Role or Environment. Subsequent changes to the configuration, role or environment, beyond that already assessed by the CTR, are to comply with Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A Sub-Part D. Where the subsequent change requires compliance with HF requirements associated with HMI, crew workload or performance and handling qualities to be reassessed, this is to be undertaken by an appropriate CTR appointed by a DoSA(FT), to ensure that the previous demonstration of compliance with Operational Airworthiness requirements remains valid.

21. Role or environment changes, that are considered to constitute a substantial operational change, may only undergo acceptance testing by operational aircrew where the DoSA(FT), or their representative, is satisfied that the Operational Airworthiness characteristics of the change have been adequately considered, and the participating aircrew are suitably qualified and competent.

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

22. Further information and guidance on flight test techniques and procedures relevant to acquisition flight testing, including detailed guidance on ASC related testing, should be sought from the relevant DoSA(FT) staff within the RAAF Air Warfare Centre (AWC) or Navy Aircraft Maintenance and Flight Trials Unit (AMAFTU). If required, further guidance on the application of aviation safety policy to flight test activities should be sought from the DASA.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 4C

AMENDMENT OF THE MILITARY AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATE OPERATIONS SPECIFICATION

INTRODUCTION

1. A Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) is a single page certificate1 that authorises the Military Air Operator (MAO), usually a Force Element Group or equivalent, to perform military air operations as defined in the accompanying Operations Specification (OpSpec)2, and in accordance with Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR). Operation of all Defence Registered Aircraft, Non-Defence Registered Aircraft operated by an MAO, Certified category Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and designated Specific Type A category UAS must be conducted under the authority of an MAOC OpSpec.

2. The OpSpec is an integral component of the MAOC, and is approved by the Authority. The OpSpec details:

a. the key positions in the MAO (Accountable Manager (AM), Continuing Airworthiness Manager, Hazard Tracking Authorities and UAS Manager)3

b. the aircraft types the MAO is authorised to operate, and the associated operating provisions

c. the roles and tasks, specific approvals, and any limitations or conditions for each approved aircraft type operated by the MAO4.

3. The introduction of a new aircraft type, a Major Change to an aircraft Type Design, or the imposition or removal of any limitations or conditions, will most likely necessitate an amendment to the OpSpec.

PURPOSE

4. This annex describes the procedure for requesting amendment of the OpSpec resulting from the introduction of a new aircraft type, a Major Change to a Type Design, or the imposition or removal of any limitations or conditions.

1 Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) Form 138.

2 DASR Form 139.

3 Key positions should be listed by position title, not incumbent’s name, to prevent the need to amend the OpSpec when incumbents change.

4 This information is provided in a separate annex for each aircraft type operated by the MAO.

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AMENDING AN OPERATIONS SPECIFICATION

5. An OpSpec amendment can be issued at any time, subject to receipt ofauthoritative correspondence approving the required change5. Additionally, anOpSpec amendment is ostensibly administrative in nature, as it only replicates detailsof approved changes. Consequently, an MAO is able to operate in accordance withan approved change from the date of the authoritative correspondence, instead ofwaiting for the associated OpSpec amendment to be issued.

6. OpSpec amendments usually result from the following:

a. amendment/closure of recorded limitations or conditions

b. recommendations following the conduct of an Airworthiness Board (AwB)

c. recommendations following a compliance audit of an aircraft type operatedby the MAO.

7. Addition of a New Aircraft Types. Addition of a new aircraft type is normallynecessitated by an aircraft acquisition project. The OpSpec should be updated oncethe acquisition project receives Government approval and the aircraft type is issuedan Application Identifier (AI) by the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA)6. Aseparate annex to the OpSpec should also be created at that time for the new aircrafttype, and annotated ‘Flight operations not authorised’ until the criteria forauthorisation of flight operations have been met7, and flight operations havesubsequently been authorised.

8. Airworthiness Boards for New Aircraft Types. The DASA Project DeskOfficers are available to provide advice and support to acquisition project staff in thedrafting of the required OpSpec annex for a new aircraft type. The final draft requiresclearance by the MAO-AM, including their agreement to any proposed limitations orconditions, before inclusion in the AwB documentation pack by the DASA. Anysubsequent proposed changes (eg: changes to the authority to amend or close anyproposed imitations or conditions) are to be discussed and, if considered appropriate,agreed at the AwB. The final draft amendment to the OpSpec, including any changesagreed at the AwB, is to be attached to the AwB Report (ABR). Subject to the othercriteria having been satisfied, once any requirements specified by the Defence AA inresponse to the ABR have been appropriately addressed, the amended OpSpec maybe issued.

5 Authoritative correspondence includes written correspondence from the Authority annotated against each specified limitation or condition for an aircraft type, and Airworthiness Board (AwB) reports approved by the Defence AA.

6 Refer to Part 3, Chapter 2.

7 Refer to Part 3, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.44.

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9. Airworthiness Boards for Major Changes to an Aircraft Type Design. The DASA is available to provide advice and support to acquisition project staff, in the drafting of any required amendment to the OpSpec resulting from a Major Change to the aircraft Type Design. The final draft of any amendment requires clearance by the MAO-AM, including their agreement to any proposed limitations or conditions, before inclusion in the AwB documentation pack8 by the DASA. Any subsequent proposed changes (eg: changes to the authority to amend or close any proposed imitations or conditions) are to be discussed and, if considered appropriate, agreed at the AwB. The final draft of the amended OpSpec, including any changes agreed at the AwB, is to be attached to the AwB Report (ABR). Subject to the other criteria having been satisfied, once any requirements specified by the Defence AA in response to the ABR have been appropriately addressed, the amended OpSpec may be issued.

10. Airworthiness Boards for In-Service Aircraft. If considered necessary, a proposed amendment to the OpSpec aircraft type annex should be prepared for consideration as part of the periodic AwB held for each in-service aircraft. Where no amendment is considered necessary, the extant OpSpec aircraft type annex will be reviewed for currency, accuracy and relevance as part of the periodic AwB. The AwB agreed amended OpSpec aircraft type annex, or extant aircraft type annex if no changes are required, is to be attached to the ABR. Where an amendment to the OpSpec aircraft type annex is proposed, the amended OpSpec may be issued once any requirements, specified by the Defence AA in response to the ABR, have been appropriately addressed,

11. General Amendments. On receipt of authoritative correspondence approving the required amendment, and a request from the MAO-AM to amend the OpSpec, the DASA will prepare the proposed amendment and staff it for approval by the Authority9.

12. Publishing Amendments. Once an amendment to an OpSpec is approved, the amended OpSpec will be electronically ‘published’ on Objective, and the latest version will be available via the same link on the DASA web page. The DASA will also advise the MAO and all the relevant stakeholders of the amendment status, and details of changes made, via formal correspondence (eg: by a Minute to the MAO-AM).

8 While there is no regulatory requirement to hold an AwB to review a Major Change to an aircraft Type Design, an AwB is likely to be held unless there are exceptional, compelling circumstances.

9 For amendment or removal of a limitation or condition, the authority annotated against the specified limitation or condition, as detailed in the OpSpec aircraft type annex, can authorise the amendment or closure without any further review being required.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 4D

MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY PERMITS TO FLY INTRODUCTION

1. Aircraft that have not been granted a Type Certificate1, may be authorised to conduct flight operations under a Military Permit To Fly (MPTF). In accordance with Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A.701, an MPTF can be issued to aircraft that do not meet, or have not been shown to meet, applicable airworthiness requirements, but are capable of safe flight under defined conditions and for specific purposes2.

2. Dependent on the scope of the MPTF, it may be issued by either the Authority or a Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA). Consequently, it is possible for multiple MPTF, issued by different entities, to be valid concurrently for the same aircraft.

PURPOSE

3. This annex describes the requirements for management of MPTF to ensure that any potentially conflicting requirements, resulting from multiple MPTF being valid concurrently, are appropriately managed to prevent an increased risk to aviation safety.

MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS

4. Since concurrent MPTF may be issued for an aircraft type or individual tail number(s), it is important that the Military Air Operator (MAO) operating an aircraft is aware of all MPTF that are valid for each specific aircraft, and manages any conflicts between the requirements of concurrent MPTF3.

1 “Type Certificate” includes a Military Type Certificate (MTC), a Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) and a Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC).

2 Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A.701, lists several examples of where a Military Permit To Fly (MPTF) may be required.

3 For example, an aircraft authorised for flight test under an MPTF may have performance restrictions imposed in the flight conditions, but when authorised for aircrew training under an MPTF may have a requirement to exceed the flight test performance restrictions.

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5. To ensure continued aviation safety, the following requirements must be complied with regarding the management of MPTF:

a. The MAO operating an aircraft type4 is to:

(1) establish and maintain a register of all MPTF issued for that aircraft type, with each entry to contain at least:

(a) the entity that issued the MPTF

(b) the reference number assigned by the entity that issued the MPTF

(c) the specific aircraft against which the MPTF is applicable

(d) the purpose of the MPTF

(e) the period of validity for the MPTF

(2) when requested by an entity planning to issue an MPTF, review the planned MPTF against the register for any potential conflicts it may have with a currently valid MPTF

(3) if any potential conflict is identified:

(a) advise the entity who intends to issue the potentially conflicting MPTF of the potential conflict

(b) take any actions considered necessary to ensure that the potential conflict is managed appropriately to prevent any degradation of aviation safety.

b. Before issuing an MPTF, the entity planning to issue an MPTF must:

(1) confirm with the affected MAO that the planned MPTF does not conflict with any other currently valid MPTF

(2) if advised of a potential conflict by the affected MAO take any actions considered necessary, in conjunction with the affected MAO, to prevent any degradation of aviation safety associated with issue of the planned MPTF.

4 Where an aircraft type is operated by more than one MAO, the affected MAO are to determine which MAO will be responsible for managing the MPTF for that aircraft type.

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PART 3

CHAPTER 5

AVIATION SAFETY INSTRUMENTS INTRODUCTION

5.1 Aviation Safety Instruments are binding documents that are issued to certify, authorise or restrict operation of a Defence aviation system under specified conditions.

PURPOSE

5.2 This chapter describes the Aviation Safety Instruments, including their purpose, issuing authority and management requirements.

INSTRUMENTS ISSUED BY THE AUTHORITY

5.3 The following Aviation Safety Instruments are issued by the Authority:

a. Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC)

b. Military Type Certificate (MTC)

c. Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC)

d. Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC)

e. Military Permit To Fly (MPTF)

f. Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP)

g. Defence Aviation Authority Directive (DAAD)

h. Airworthiness Directive (AD)

i. Advisory Circular (AC).

5.4 Further details for each Aviation Safety Instrument issued by the Authority are provided at Annexes A to I.

INSTRUMENTS ISSUED BY OTHER APPOINTMENTS

5.5 The following Aviation Safety Instruments are issued by other appointments:

a. Approval To Operate (ATO)

b. Authority to Operate (AUTHOP)

c. Flight Simulation Training Device (FSTD) Installation Operating Permit (IOP).

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5.6 Further details for each Aviation Safety Instrument issued by other appointments are provided at Annexes J to L. Annexes:

Military Air Operator Certificate

Military Type Certificate

Military Restricted Type Certificate

Military Supplemental Type Certificate

Military Permit To Fly

Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit

Defence Aviation Authority Directive

Airworthiness Directive

Advisory Circular

Approval To Operate

Authority to Operate

5A

5B

5C

5D

5E

5F

5G

5H

5I

5J

5K

5L Flight Simulation Training Device Installation Operating Permit

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5A

MILITARY AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATE INTRODUCTION

1. Operation of all Defence Registered Aircraft (DRA)1 must be conducted under the authority of a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC). Additionally, Civil Registered Aircraft operated by a Military Air Operator (MAO) on an on-going basis should be conducted under the authority of an MAOC2.

2. An MAOC is a single page certificate to authorise the MAO to perform military air operations. Every MAOC has an accompanying Operations Specification (OpSpec), which includes a separate annex for each aircraft type operated by the MAO.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of an MAOC.

APPLICABLE DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY REGULATIONS

4. Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) ARO.100 is applicable to the MAOC.

ISSUE OF A MILITARY AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATE

ISSUING AUTHORITY

5. The Authority is the issuing authority for an MAOC. The Authority is also the issuing authority for the associated OpSpec and any subsequent amendments to the OpSpec.

REQUIREMENTS FOR ISSUE

6. An MAOC may be issued when the Authority is satisfied that the MAO can safely conduct flight operations. Readiness to conduct flight operations iaw the requirements of an MAOC shall be demonstrated by submission of a Compliance Statement iaw DASR ARO.100.C.

1 DRA includes all manned aircraft, all Certified category Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), and Specified Type A category UAS that are included on the Defence Register.

2 If the civil registered aircraft is included on the associated Operations Specification (OpSpec), authorisation to operate the aircraft is implicit and thus a separate Approval to Operate instrument is not required. Notwithstanding this, civil registered aircraft are to be operated in accordance with the civil regulations of their State of registration, and this may only be varied where there is an agreement in place between the applicable National Airworthiness Authority (NAA) and the Authority.

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MILITARY AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT

REVIEW CYCLE

7. The MAOC remains valid until withdrawn. The Authority may use the Airworthiness Board (AwB) to review the MAOC, including to:

a. provide recommendations on the issue of, or major variation to, an MAOC or OpSpec;

b. specifically review the proposed addition of an aircraft type to an OpSpec;

c. specifically review a Major Change to the Type Design of an aircraft type listed on an OpSpec; and

d. review ongoing safe operation of aircraft by an MAO.

INSTRUMENT WITHDRAWAL

8. The MAOC will be withdrawn when it is no longer required, or where the MAO can no longer demonstrate the safe conduct of flight operations.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5B

MILITARY TYPE CERTIFICATE INTRODUCTION

1. A Military Type Certificate (MTC) is issued to certify that the aircraft Type Design complies with the applicable Type Certification Basis (TCB) and environmental protection requirements (where applicable), when operated in the roles authorised in the Statement of Operating Intent and Usage (SOIU), and in accordance with the conditions and limitations specified in the associated Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS). Except for flight operations authorised under a Military Permit To Fly (MPTF), Defence Registered Aircraft (DRA)1 must have a valid Type Certificate2 before being authorised for flight operations.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of an MTC.


3. Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21, Sub-part B is applicable to the MTC.

ISSUE OF A MILITARY TYPE CERTIFICATE

ISSUING AUTHORITY

4. The Authority is the issuing authority for an MTC.


5. An MTC may be issued when the following requirements have been satisfied:

a. completion of all activities specified in the appropriate DASR 21 regulation; 3

1 This applies to all manned aircraft and Certified category Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). While selected Specified Type A category UAS are DRA, they do not require a Type Certificate.

2 Permissible Type Certificates are a Military Type Certificate (MTC), a Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) and a Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC)

3 Where the applicant for an MTC is an acquisition Project Office, the Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA) requirement is for the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) to hold a Design Organisation Approval (or equivalent) issued by a recognised authority.

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b. compilation of a Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) which summarises the aircraft certification basis;

c. if an Airworthiness Board (AwB) is convened, a recommendation for issue of a Type Certificate by the AwB; and

d. as appropriate, submission of a completed DASR Form 30, Application for Type Certificate/Restricted Type Certificate.

MILITARY TYPE CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT

6. Each MTC will be held by an organisation designated by the Authority. An organisation designated to hold an MTC is responsible for ensuring that the obligations, specified in DASR 21 for an organisation holding an MTC, are met.

REVIEW CYCLE

7. An MTC is issued for an unlimited duration and is not subject to a review cycle. Notwithstanding this, any applicant proposing to change an aircraft is required to apply for a new Type Certificate, if the Authority finds that the change in design, configuration, power, thrust or mass is so extensive that a substantially complete investigation of compliance with the applicable TCB is required.


8. An MTC may be surrendered or revoked under the applicable administrative procedures established by the Authority.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5C

MILITARY RESTRICTED TYPE CERTIFICATE INTRODUCTION

1. A Military Restricted Type Certificate (MRTC) may be issued for an aircraft that does not meet the requirements for the issue of a Military Type Certificate (MTC), but for which an equivalent level of safety has been demonstrated through both:

a. compliance with the appropriate Type Certification Basis (TCB) established by the Authority, and

b. the imposition of restrictions regarding the intended use of the aircraft.

2. An MRTC provides a useful way of highlighting a specific safety deficiency, and emphasises the essential treatments applied to effectively manage the associated risk. Circumstances where it may be appropriate to issue an MRTC include, but are not limited to a:

a. temporary, specific and significant design deficiency;

b. significant but temporary role restriction; or

c. significant and enduring design deficiency that is not consistent with Defence’s normal level of safety.

PURPOSE

3. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of an MRTC.


4. Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21, Sub-part B is applicable to the MRTC.

ISSUE OF A MILITARY RESTRICTED TYPE CERTIFICATE

ISSUING AUTHORITY

5. The Authority is the issuing authority for an MRTC.

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6. An MRTC may be issued when all of the following requirements have been satisfied:

a. the applicant for an MRTC holds Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA) issued by the Authority1;

b. the aircraft being certified meets the applicable TCB and environmental protection requirements (where applicable);

c. deficiencies precluding the issue of an MTC have been addressed, through restrictions on the aircraft’s intended use that provide an equivalent level of safety; and

d. the applicant for an MRTC has expressly stated that it is prepared to comply with the certificate holder obligations2.

MILITARY RESTRICTED TYPE CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT

7. Each MRTC will be held by an organisation designated by the Authority. An organisation designated to hold an MRTC is responsible for ensuring that the obligations, specified in DASR 21 for an organisation holding an MRTC, are met.

REVIEW CYCLE

8. An MRTC is issued for an unlimited duration and is not subject to a review cycle. Notwithstanding this, any applicant proposing to change an aircraft is required to apply for a new Type Certificate3, if the Authority finds that the change in design, configuration, power, thrust, or mass is so extensive that a substantially complete investigation of compliance with the applicable TCB is required.


9. An MTC may be surrendered or revoked under the applicable administrative procedures established by the Authority.

1 Where the applicant for an MRTC is an acquisition Project Office, the requirement is for the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) to hold a Design Organisation Approval (or equivalent) issued by a recognised authority.

2 Refer to Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A.44

3 This could either be a new MRTC or, if the deficiency that precluded the issue of an MTC has been resolved, an application for the issue of an MTC.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5D

MILITARY SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATE INTRODUCTION

1. A Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC) is issued to certify a MajorChange to the aircraft’s Type Design, by an organisation other than the originaldesign organisation1. A Major Change is defined as any technical or configurationchange to the Type Design that is not deemed to be a Minor Change2.

2. Classification of a change to type design as either major or minor is the remitof the Authority, or a Military Design Organisation Approval (MDOA) holder with theappropriate privilege3.

3. A Major Change may not require consideration by an Airworthiness Board(AwB) before it is incorporated and flight operations are authorised. The Authority willconsider the requirement for an AwB on a case-by-case basis4.

PURPOSE

4. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issueand management of an MSTC.


5. Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21, Sub-part E is applicable tothe MSTC.

ISSUE OF A MILITARY RESTRICTED TYPE CERTIFICATE

ISSUING AUTHORITY

6. The Authority is the issuing authority for an MSTC.

1 If a suite of modifications being implemented under a single Defence program includes several Major Changes, the Applicant may elect to pursue a single Military Supplemental Type Certificate (MSTC) to cover all changes, or to pursue separate MSTCs for each Major Change.

2 Changes in Type Design are classified as either minor or major. A Minor Change is one that has no appreciable effect on the mass, balance, structural strength, reliability, operational characteristics, or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product and considers, where applicable, environmental characteristics such as noise, fuel venting and exhaust emission. All other changes are classified as Major Changes.

3 Refer to DASR 21.A.263(c)(1).

4 Refer to Part 2, Chapter 6, paragraph 6.9.

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7. An MSTC may be issued when all of the following requirements have been satisfied:

a. the organisation applying for the MSTC holds an MDOA, issued by the Authority in accordance with DASR 21.J5;

b. the applicant declares that it has shown compliance with the applicable Type Certification Basis (TCB) and environmental protection requirements (where applicable);

c. where the applicant has entered into an arrangement with the Type Certificate holder:

(1) the Type Certificate holder has advised that it has no technical objection to the information submitted under DASR 21.A.93; and

(2) the Type Certificate holder has agreed to collaborate with the MSTC holder, to ensure discharge of all obligations for continued airworthiness of the changed product, through compliance with DASR 21.A.44 and DASR 21.A.118A.

MILITARY SUPPLEMENTAL TYPE CERTIFICATE MANAGEMENT

8. Each MSTC will be held by an organisation designated by the Authority. An organisation designated to hold an MSTC is responsible for ensuring that the obligations, specified in DASR 21 for an organisation holding an MSTC, are met.

REVIEW CYCLE

9. An MSTC is issued for an unlimited duration and is not subject to a review cycle.


10. An MSTC may be surrendered or revoked under the applicable administrative procedures established by the Authority.

5 Where the applicant for an MSTC is an acquisition Project Office, the requirement is for the organisation undertaking the design activity to hold a Military Design Organisation Approval (or equivalent) issued by a recognised authority.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5E

MILITARY PERMIT TO FLY INTRODUCTION

1. A Military Permit to Fly (MPTF) may be issued when an aircraft does not meet, or has not been shown to meet, applicable airworthiness requirements, but is capable of safe flight under defined conditions and for specified purposes. Examples of when an MPTF may be appropriate are provided at Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A.701(a), and include the conduct of flight test activities to test a change to an aircraft’s role and/or environment.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of an MPTF.


3. Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21, Sub-part P is applicable to the MPTF.

ISSUE OF A MILITARY PERMIT TO FLY

ISSUING AUTHORITY

4. An MPTF may be issued by the Authority or a Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA).


5. The Authority shall issue an MPTF:

a. upon presentation of the data required by DASR 21.A.707

b. when the conditions of DASR 21.A.708 have been approved in accordance with DASR 21.A.710

c. when the Authority, through its own investigations which may include inspections, or through procedures agreed with the applicant, is satisfied that, before flight, the aircraft conforms to the design defined under DASR 21.A.708.

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MILITARY PERMIT TO FLY MANAGEMENT

REVIEW CYCLE

6. As an MPTF is issued for a stated period of validity it is not subject to review. An MPTF shall remain valid for the stated period of validity subject to:

a. compliance with the conditions and restrictions specified for the MPTF1

b. the MPTF not being surrendered or revoked

c. the aircraft remaining on the same register.

7. Any required changes to an MPTF are to be processed in accordance with DASR 21.A.713.


8. An MPTF will be withdrawn under any of the following circumstances:

a. compliance with the conditions and restrictions specified for the MPTF cannot be met

b. the MPTF is surrendered or revoked under the applicable administrative procedures established by the Authority

c. the aircraft is removed from the register it was on when the MPTF was issued.

1 Refer to DASR 21.A.711(e).

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5F

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATING PERMIT INTRODUCTION

1. An Unmanned Aircraft System Operating Permit (UASOP) is issued to enable the relevant Command or Defence Group to authorise operation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) under the SPECIFIC Type A category.

2. In accordance with Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) Part UAS, all UAS are to be operated under either the:

a. CERTIFIED category,

b. SPECIFIC category, which has Type A and Type B sub-categories, or

c. OPEN category.

3. Operation of all UAS must be authorised by the relevant Command or Defence Group1. Additionally, operation of a UAS must comply with the following criteria:

a. For operation in the CERTIFIED category, a UAS is required to be type certified, registered and operated ostensibly as if it was a manned aircraft.

b. For operation in the SPECIFIC Type A category, a UAS is to be operated in accordance with a valid UASOP.

c. For operation in the SPECIFIC Type B category, the UAS is to comply with Standard Scenario in DASR.UAS.35.

d. For operation in the OPEN category, operation of the UAS is to comply with the Standard Operating Conditions (SOC) specified in DASR UAS.40.

PURPOSE

4. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of a UASOP.

1 In authorising operation of a UAS the relevant Command or Defence Group is confirming that the risks associated with UAS operation have been eliminated or, where this is not reasonably practicable, reduced So Far As Is Reasonably Practical (SFARP), as required by the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. Accordingly, Commands and Defence Groups should ensure that only personnel with appropriate authority to ensure risks are eliminated, or reduced SFARP, should be appointed to authorise operation of a UAS.

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5. Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) Part UAS is applicable to the UASOP.

ISSUE OF AN UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATING PERMIT

ISSUING AUTHORITY

6. The Authority is the issuing authority for a UASOP.


7. The Authority will issue a UASOP for operation of a UAS in the SPECIFIC Type A category, when the requirements specified in the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) to DASR.UAS.30(b) have been met.

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATING PERMIT MANAGEMENT

REVIEW CYCLE

8. The Military Air Operator (MAO) operating a UAS under the SPECIFIC Type A category must periodically review all UASOP applicable to their operations, to ensure that the criteria which underpin the UASOP remain valid. If a UAS is operated under the Specific Type A category by other than a MAO, the organisation authorising operation of the UAS iaw paragraph 3 is to periodically review all UASOP applicable to their operations, to ensure that the criteria which underpin the UASOP remain valid. Additionally, at its discretion the Authority may review any UASOP as part of the aviation safety assurance program.


9. A UASOP will be withdrawn when either:

a. operation of the UAS under the SPECIFIC Type A category is no longerapplicable, or

b. the MAO, or other organisation authorising operation of a UAS SPECIFICType A category, cannot ensure that operation of the UAS, in accordancewith the UASOP, does not compromise safety of flight.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5G

DEFENCE AVIATION AUTHORITY DIRECTIVE INTRODUCTION

1. A Defence Aviation Authority Directive (DAAD) is used to promulgate immediate and binding requirements, to authorise or restrict a course of action, in relation to an Aviation System.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of a DAAD.


3. Nil.

ISSUE OF A DEFENCE AVIATION AUTHORITY DIRECTIVE

ISSUING AUTHORITY

4. The Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA) is the issuing authority for a DAAD.


5. A DAAD will be issued when considered necessary by the Defence AA.

DEFENCE AVIATION AUTHORITY DIRECTIVE MANAGEMENT

REVIEW CYCLE

6. A DAAD is normally temporary in nature, and is therefore not usually subject to a review cycle. If a DAAD is issued with an extended duration, any review requirements will be included within the DAAD.


7. A DAAD will be withdrawn when it is no longer required or, if specified, at its expiry date.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5H

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE INTRODUCTION

1. An Airworthiness Directive (AD) is used to mandate action on an aircraft to restore airworthiness, when evidence shows that the safety of the aircraft may otherwise be compromised.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of an AD.


3. Defence Aviation Safety Regulation (DASR) 21.A.3B is applicable to the AD.

ISSUE OF AN AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

ISSUING AUTHORITY

4. The Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) or an appropriate Delegate of the Safety Authority (DoSA) are the issuing authorities for an AD.


5. An AD will be issued when:

a. An unsafe condition has been determined by the Authority to exist in an aircraft, as a result of a deficiency in the aircraft, or an engine, propeller, part or appliance installed on the aircraft

b. That condition is likely to exist or develop in other aircraft, including an engine, propeller, part or appliance installed on those aircraft, that may be affected by this unsafe condition.

AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE MANAGEMENT

REVIEW CYCLE

6. An AD is not subject to a review cycle.

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7. An AD may be withdrawn at the discretion of the DASA, or in accordance with any conditions contained in the AD which permit cancellation, extension or amendment.

8. An AD specifying a permanent limitation must, after review at the next scheduled Airworthiness Board (AwB), be cancelled following incorporation as a limitation or condition specified in the applicable Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC) Operations Specification (OpSpec) Type Annex or Military Type Certificate (MTC).

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5I

ADVISORY CIRCULAR INTRODUCTION

1. An Advisory Circular (AC) is used to promulgate important information to the Defence Aviation community, but does not mandate any action. Examples include information regarding aviation safety matters, information that enhances the understanding of compliance with existing regulations, and policy guidance for aviation issues that are not yet regulated.

PURPOSE

2. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of an AC.


3. Nil.

ISSUE OF AN ADVISORY CIRCULAR

ISSUING AUTHORITY

4. The Authority is the issuing authority for an AC.


5. An AC will be issued when considered necessary by the Authority.

ADVISORY CIRCULAR MANAGEMENT

REVIEW CYCLE

6. An AC is normally temporary in nature, and is therefore not usually subject to a review cycle. If an AC is issued with an extended duration, any review requirements will be included within the AC.


7. An AC will be withdrawn when it is no longer required or, if specified, at its expiry date.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5J

APPROVAL TO OPERATE INTRODUCTION

1. An Approval To Operate (ATO) is, after confirmation that Work Health and Safety (WHS) requirements have been met, issued to authorise operation of Non-Defence Registered Aircraft (NDRA) that are not operated under a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC).

2. Most aircraft acquired for use by Defence are operated under a Military Air Operator Certificate (MAOC)1. Where it is not practical or desirable to operate NDRA under an MAOC, Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) Directive 12/16 provides direction regarding specific requirements that must be met; in these circumstances Defence outcomes may be achieved through the flexibility of NDRA operation under an ATO.

3. Defence has an obligation to ensure that, in accordance with Work Health and Safety (WHS) legislation2, risks are either eliminated or, where this is not reasonably practicable, minimised So Far As Is Reasonably Practicable (SFARP). Operation and management of aircraft under an MAOC, combined with ongoing oversight by the Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA), provides a substantial contribution towards compliance with the legislated WHS requirements.

4. For aircraft that are not operated under an MAOC, Defence is still required to meet the mandatory WHS legislation, but does not have the benefit provided by a formally approved organisational aviation framework supported by a prescribed program of ongoing oversight. Consequently, the ATO provides a means to ensure that legislated WHS requirements are met, through a formalised process, to ensure that the risks associated with operation of NDRA are being managed, such that the level of safety is commensurate with that normally expected for both members of Defence and the public.

5. An ATO is required in the following circumstances:

a. For NDRA not operated under a MAOC:

(1) NDRA in which a Defence member is operating as crew for the purposes of flight test or initial flying training, including acquisition related flying activity

1 This is regardless of whether the aircraft is Defence registered or civilian registered (ie: non-Defence registered).

2 WHS legislation comprises the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (the Act) and the Work Health and Safety Regulations 2011.

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(2) NDRA temporarily operated by a Defence member in the course of theirduty, other than for the purposes listed at sub-paragraph (1)3

b. NDRA chartered by Defence in support of Defence activities

c. Foreign military aircraft operating in Australian airspace4.

PURPOSE

6. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issueand management of an ATO.


7. Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR) NDR.05 and NDR.15 areapplicable to the ATO.

ISSUE OF AN APPROVAL TO OPERATE

ISSUING AUTHORITY

8. An ATO is issued by the Sponsor of the activity that necessitates issue of anATO5. The Defence Aviation Safety Authority (DASA) should be consulted prior toissue of an ATO and, if considered necessary, the Sponsor may defer the decision toissue an ATO to the Authority.


9. The Sponsor of the activity may issue an ATO approving the operation of aNDRA that is not operated under an MAOC, when they are satisfied that its operationwill afford an equivalent level of safety to operation of a Defence Registered Aircraft(DRA). In particular, an NDRA operated under an ATO must be operated:

a. in approved roles appropriate to the certification basis of the aircraft, asdescribed in the applicable Type Certificate or authorised exemption

b. within the limitations and conditions, established by the certifying authority, inthe applicable aircraft operating instructions, Type Certificate and/orauthorised exemption

3 An ATO is not required for aircraft operated under the ADF Currency Flying Scheme (ACFS).

4 This includes foreign military aircraft in which a Defence member is operating as crew or travelling as a passenger during, or in support of, military operations.

5 This may be delegated to an appropriately authorised delegate, not below LTCOL (E) rank or EL1 level, commensurate with the assessed risk.

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c. in accordance with an applicable airworthiness regulatory framework,appropriate to the aircraft operating role and environment, and recognised bythe Defence Aviation Authority (Defence AA)

d. in accordance with any directives or requirements issued by the Authority

e. if applicable, in accordance with orders and instructions issued by therelevant Delegate of the Safety Authority - Flight Test (DoSA (FT))

f. in accordance with any directives issued by the relevant National AviationAuthority (NAA) or Military Aviation Authority (MAA), where applicable.

10. In addition to the requirements at paragraph 9, specific requirements that must be met for each of the circumstances listed at paragraph 5 are detailed in Part 4, Chapter 2.

MANAGEMENT OF AN APPROVAL TO OPERATE

REVIEW CYCLE

11. An ATO is issued for a specified period and is not subject to a review cycle.


12. An ATO is to be withdrawn, by the Sponsor, if the risks associated with operating the NDRA subject to the ATO change sufficiently such that safe flight operations may be compromised.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5K

AUTHORITY TO OPERATE INTRODUCTION

1. Aviation Support Systems (AvSS) that affect Suitability For Flight are required to comply with the relevant Defence Aviation Safety Regulations (DASR). The majority of AvSS are Air Navigation Services (ANS) related systems and, except for aerodromes and air capable ships, which are regulated under the DASR Aerodromes (ADR), are regulated under DASR ANS. Systems that are determined to be AvSS are listed in the Guidance Material (GM) for DASR ANS.GEN.05. AvSS may be:

a. ground-based, ship-based, aircraft-based or space-based

b. fixed or deployable.

2. An Authority to Operate (AUTHOP) confirms the ongoing operational suitability and effectiveness of an AvSS output, including its applicable sub-systems. Not all AvSS require the same rigour when determining AUTHOP requirements. AUTHOP requirements should be determined by the criticality of the AvSS to support Suitability For Flight, and the complexity associated with provision of the required AvSS output(s).

3. An AUTHOP is issued to the agency responsible for provision of the AvSS output.

PURPOSE

4. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of an AUTHOP.


5. DASR Parts ANS and ADR are applicable to the AUTHOP.

ISSUE OF AN AUTHORITY TO OPERATE

ISSUING AUTHORITY

6. COMAUSFLT, COMD FORCOMD and ACAUST are the issuing authorities for an AUTHOP.


7. An AUTHOP may be issued after an appropriate review provides sufficient confidence in the ongoing ability of the AvSS to support Suitability For Flight.

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MANAGEMENT OF AN AUTHORITY TO OPERATE

REVIEW CYCLE

8. Review of an AUTHOP is at the discretion of the issuing authority, but should at least be undertaken whenever there is any concern that the AvSS may compromise Suitability For Flight. Additionally, as part of the aviation safety assurance program, the Authority may review any AUTHOP, either at the Authority’s discretion, or at the request of the issuing authority.


9. An AUTHOP will be withdrawn if the issuing authority assesses that the AvSS output may compromise Suitability For Flight.

10. If appropriate, the issuing authority may restrict an AvSS capability, in order to minimise the impact to capability but still safeguard areas of concern1.

1 This is particularly applicable where an AvSS provides multiple services, such as an air capable ship or deployable system.

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PART 3 - ANNEX 5L

FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE INSTALLATION OPERATING PERMIT

INTRODUCTION

1. Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTD) are used to support flight crew training, qualification and/or currency. A Flight Simulation Training Device Installation Operating Permit (FSTD IOP) authorises the use of an FSTD for these purposes, to assure that aviation operations augmented by an FSTD will be adequately controlled and managed.

2. An FSTD IOP is required for Defence owned FSTD, and non-Defence owned FSTD operated by or on behalf of Defence1.

3. Issue of a FSTD IOP is the culmination of a process that formally examines and documents compliance of an FSTD against predefined FSTD management system requirements. The FSTD IOP assures that:

a. The FSTD intended purpose(s), including approved training outcomes, is clearly defined

b. the FSTD can be maintained and operated for its intended purpose(s)

c. the fidelity of the FSTD meets the required FSTD Qualification, as applicable

d. negative training is identified, and subsequently eliminated, mitigated or retained as appropriate

e. any necessary restrictions or limitations, if required, are identified.

PURPOSE

4. The purpose of this annex is to detail the requirements associated with issue and management of an FSTD IOP.


5. DASR Part FSTD is applicable to the FSTD IOP.

1 The FSTD IOP is specifically focused on FSTD used for training that directly impacts control of the aircraft in flight (eg: training where personnel interact with aircraft flight controls or power plant controls to manoeuvre the aircraft in flight). Accordingly, the requirement to issue an FSTD IOP for Mission Simulators or Weapon Tactical Trainers should be considered on a ‘case by case’ basis.

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ISSUE OF A FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE INSTALLATION OPERATING PERMIT

ISSUING AUTHORITY

6. ACAUST, COMD FORCOM and COMAUSFLT are the issuing authorities for an FSTD IOP.


7. An FSTD IOP may be issued after formal examination has documented the FSTD’s compliance with predefined FSTD management system requirements2, and the issuing authority is satisfied that issue of an FSTD IOP won’t compromise Suitability For Flight.

8. Where the FSTD is not operated solely for Defence use, the affected Military Air Operator (MAO) may seek appropriate documentation from the training provider to support issue of an FSTD IOP3.

MANAGEMENT OF A FLIGHT SIMULATION TRAINING DEVICE INSTALLATION OPERATING PERMIT

REVIEW CYCLE

9. An FSTD IOP is issued for an unlimited duration and is not subject to a review cycle. However, the FSTD must be reassessed against its Master Qualification Test Guide (MQTG), in accordance with the periodicity specified in the applicable National Aviation Authority (NAA) or Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Qualification Standard.

10. In addition to the requirement at paragraph 9, the FSTD IOP should be reviewed whenever there is a change to the FSTD significant enough to affect qualification of the FSTD.4 This may include:

a. a change in FSTD operator (ie: support contractor)

b. significant changes to the FSTD to match changes in the parent aircraft configuration, role or environment

c. a significant upgrade to address FSTD obsolescence

2 Refer to DASR FSTD.05 Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC).

3 This documentation may be the result of an assessment by the training provider that demonstrates compliance, or equivalent documentation issued by an approved National Aviation Authority (NAA) or Military Aviation Authority (MAA).

4 Refer to the applicable qualification standard for details regarding significant changes.

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d. the identification of additional negative training, or rectification of known negative training

e. incorporation of additional approved training outcomes, or

f. withdrawal of FSTD accreditation (eg: following a significant failure during a recurrent fidelity check).


11. An FSTD IOP will be withdrawn if:

a. it is no longer required, or

b. the issuing authority assesses that continued use of the FSTD may compromise Suitability For Flight.

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PART 4

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW TO BE ISSUED

1

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PART 4

CHAPTER 2

SAFETY MANAGEMENTOF CIVIL REGISTERED AIRCRAFT TO BE ISSUED

1

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PART 4

CHAPTER 3

MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

TO BE ISSUED

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CHAPTER 4

MANAGEMENT OF VISITING STATE AIRCRAFT TO BE ISSUED

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PART 5

CHAPTER 1

PROCEDURES FOR ISSUING OPINIONS, SPECIFICATIONS AND GUIDANCE

TO BE ISSUED

1

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PART 5

CHAPTER 2

PROCEDURES FOR TAKING INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO BE ISSUED

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PART 5

CHAPTER 3

AVIATION SAFETY INFORMATION COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

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PART 5

CHAPTER 4

AIRWORTHINESS DESIGN REQUIREMENTS TO BE ISSUED

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PART 6

EMERGING DEFENCE AVIATION SAFETY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

TO BE ISSUED

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