Danilo Vic Power Transition

8/12/2019 Danilo Vic Power Transition

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Global Power Transitions and Regional Interests

Vesna Danilovic

University at Buffalo, SUNY

Department of Political Science

520 Park Hall

Buffalo, NY 14260

[email protected]

and

Joe Clare

Department of Political Science

Louisiana State University

240 Stubbs Hall

Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5433

[email protected]

March 11, 2007

Forthcoming inInternational Interactions (2007).

NOTE: We would like to thank Christopher K. Butler, Chuck Finocciaro, Gregg Johnson, and

Jason Sorens for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.


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ABSTRACT

A number of studies have examined and largely validated power transitions as necessary

conditions for war, yet the second critical element of power transition (PT) theory---a

challengers dissatisfaction with the status quo---has been analyzed to a much lesser degree. This

paper is intended to address this research gap. Global power transitions between major powers

can indeed be destabilizing, potentially triggering major conflicts, but we also argue that violent

conflict is unlikely unless there is a clash of interests between the global contenders in the critical

regions of their vital interests. Our study thus provides a modification of the original PT theory

by identifying its two essential elements---(1) relative power and (2) attitude toward the status

quo---at two different structural levels. Power transitions between major powers are still seen as

critical at the global level, as originally stated by Organski and Kugler, whereas dissatisfaction

with the status quo concerns the regional context of their interests. The paper provides a

theoretical link between these two levels and quantitatively tests the argument, with suggested

implications for further refinements of PT theory.

Keywords: Power transition theory, regional interests, major powers, deterrence, status quo.


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THEORETICAL GAPS AND PUZZLES

With the exception of the democratic peace theory, power transition theory is perhaps one

of the most widely examined approaches to international conflict. At the core of the theory are

the dual propositions that (1) power transitions should constitute necessary conditions for war,

and (2) at least one states dissatisfaction with the status quo will determine whether these

transitions will be violent or peaceful. Despite numerous empirical studies, there are still a few

some research gaps and theoretical underspecifications. In this study we address one empirical

puzzlewhether static or dynamic power parity is a more potent predictor of major power

behaviorand one theoretical gapthe question of what exactly accounts for a major powers

dissatisfaction with the status quo.

Power Parity or Transitions?

As originally stated, a sheer balance of power without overtaking should not be expected

to give rise to wars according to the power transition argument, but rather the theory postulates a

power transition as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for war. This allows for peaceful

transitions, but also places no significance on the static notion of power parity in understanding

the causes of wars. To assess the validity of the power transition argument, it is, therefore,

essential to see how much previous research provides solid evidence for dynamic power parity

(parity with overtaking) as a necessary condition for war. Most studies look only at a static power

balance (i.e., whether the two sides are equal or unequal in their power regardless of the

transitional overtaking) and only a few attempts were made to include the transitional dynamic

component as well (Geller 1992; Kim and Morrow 1991; Kadera 1996; Lemke and Werner 1996;

Organski and Kugler 1980). Although each study used a somewhat different measure for


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dynamic relative power, the results do not seem to show that dynamic parity (i.e., transition) has

a greater predictive power than the static one.

Lemke and Werner (1996, 253), for example, report that both static and dynamic power

equality have a similar substantive impact on the probability of war. Others, such as Kim and

Morrow (1991, 914), actually report no significant impact of dynamic power transitions on the

likelihood of war, but a positive and significant impact for static power parity. Geller (1992)

further extends his analysis to dispute (as opposed to simply war) initiation. While his findings

show the importance in distinguishing the initiators with and without a power advantage, the

results overall indicate that as many as 52% of the dispute dyads occur under unequal power

distributions (see Geller 1992, 13). In general, then, these findings stand in a sharp contrast to the

initial power transition study indicating the significance of dynamic power transitions (Organski

and Kugler 1980).

Taken together, previous research is, at best, mixed regarding the differential impact of

static and dynamic power parity on the onset of wars and disputes in general. A potential

problem regarding the cited works is that their results might be suspect as biased because almost

all of them select on the dependent variable in the empirical analyses. For example, Geller (1992)

differentiates between initiators and targets, but looks only at dispute and war dyads. Others,

such as Kim and Morrow (1991) and Lemke and Werner (1996) compare war to no-war dyads,

but do not examine dispute initiation, nor do they differentiate between war initiators and targets.

While selection on the dependent variable should not taint the expectation about power parity

(static and/or dynamic) as a necessary condition for conflict, it is nevertheless important to see if

it also influences a states decision notto upset the status quo. As an attempt to solve some gaps


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in the past research and what appear to be inconsistent findings, out analysis will examine the

influence of relative powerboth static and dynamicas it affects the probability of an

attempted change to the status quo (i.e., dispute initiation) as well as the likelihood of escalation

to war.

Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo

A second component of power transition theory, and one that discriminates between

peaceful and violent transitions, concerns the rising powers evaluation of the status quo. Unlike

the power distribution component, however, the sources of dissatisfaction have not been as fully

specified theoretically. Previous analyses that directly address the impact of status quo evaluation

offer a few different indicators,most prominently, the similarity in alliance portfolios (Kim

1991; Lemke and Reed 1996) or relative military buildups (Werner and Kugler 1996; Lemke and

Werner 1996). In this respect, therefore, DiCicco and Levys (1999, 690) criticism about the

absence of conceptual refinement of the notion of satisfaction still holds to date.

Although DiCicco and Levy (1999) raise it as a conceptual issue, we would argue that the

issue of the challengers evaluation of the status quo has not been as fully theoretically specified

as is the power distribution component in the theory. In other words, there is a need for a theory

of status quo evaluations which should then direct toward valid measurement solutions as well.

One possible way of thinking theoretically about status quo evaluations, initially suggested by

Organski (1958), could be in terms of states satisfaction with the rules and norms governing the

global hierarchy and/or its regime similarity with the hegemon: The more other states are

similar in domestic composition and international outlook to the dominant power, the more they

too will benefit from the status quo(Organski 1958, 131). Besides Lemke and Reed (1996), who


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explore the connection between regime types and satisfaction, no theoretical and empirical

research has examined the relative position in the international hierarchy as a source of

satisfaction. More precisely, Lemke and Reed (1996) argue that the democratic peace is a subset

of a peace in which states are satisfied with the status quo because they share similar alliance

portfolios with the hegemon when the hegemon is also a democratic state. While not directly

speaking of the domestic sources of satisfaction with the international status quo, this study

points to one of the waysthat is, the regime similarity with the dominant nationto think

about thesourcesof discontent with the hegemons distribution of benefits in the system.

Another possible direction to think theoretically about reasons behind a states dissatisfaction

with the systemic status quo was briefly suggested in the context of the status inconsistency

theory, but left unexplored (e.g., Danilovic 1996).

Besides the thin theoretical development regarding the issue of status quo evaluations,

there is also the level-of-analysis problem as pointed out by DiCicco and Levy (1999). Perhaps

due to the proliferation of power transition studies in the variety of contexts (dyadic, regional,

systemic), scholars using the same concepts across different levels-of-analysis did not consider

the fact that it is likely that some states will be satisfied with the systemic status quo but

dissatisfied with the status quo of a particular bilateral relationship (DiCicco and Levy 1999,

690). That is, there is the need for further conceptual refinement of the status quo itselfis it

systemic, regional, or dyadic? This is again an equally conceptual and theoretical question.

A REVISED APPROACH TO STATUS QUO EVALUATIONS

To address these research gaps, we provide a theoretical attempt at developing one of the

ways to think about the sources of a major powers evaluation with the international status quo.


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Yet we go a step further and specify it at the regional level rather than just the global one. That is,

while trajectories in the overall power distribution between major powers are global in nature, it

is argued here that major powers generally think of their interests and influences at the regional

levelboth within and outside their home areas. Moreover, it is further contended here that the

notion of threat credibilityinherent resolve, in particularfrom deterrence studies can be

theoretically linked to the notion of status quo evaluation in the context of power transition

theory.

A theoretical link between deterrence and power transition theories was already validated

in previous formal models (e.g., Kugler and Zagare 1990, Zagare and Kilgour 1993, 2000),

though these studies have not directly specified the link between a states credibility (resolve)

and its status quo evaluations. Yet there is valid reason to believe that the same factors that1

influence a states resolve are also linked to their satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the status quo.

That is, since both concepts suggest the willingnessto challenge an opponent (and even fight if

necessary), we believe that theoretical and empirical validation of the inherent credibility

notion from deterrence studies (Danilovic 2002, Zagare and Kilgour 2000) provides solid

grounds for refining it in terms of a conceptual approach to status quo evaluations, which is

central to theories such as power transition.

Previous research confirms the validity to examine regional stakes as a principal source

of such inherent resolve in major power deterrence (Danilovic 2002), and we would further

suggest that such stakes can be seen as a source of major power satisfaction for purposes of

power transition theory as well, not just its resolve in the context of deterrence theory. More

specifically, Danilovic (2002) found that variable regional stakes account for both general and


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immediate deterrence failuresmore robustly than any other alternative source of a major

powers resolve. Hence, while the terminology is differentthat is, with deterrence scholars

referring to general deterrence failure and PT theorists preferring the term challenge to the

status quothe meaning is essentially the same. That is, if we generalize from the deterrence

studies focusing on the interests at stake in the context of power transition theory, then one of the

main premises of power transition theory could be restated as follows: major powers evaluate the

status quo primarily in the areas of their strong interests, and clashes of these interests can be a

major source of dissatisfaction. Based on such solid findings, and given the above discussion of2

a logical link between the notions of resolve and status quo evaluation, the main extension or

rather modification of the power transition theory can now be proposed: (a) major powers

primarily identify their international positions in terms of their influences in different world

regions; (b) not all regions are equally salient in major power policies; (c) dissatisfaction arises3

if two or more major powers clash over their influence in the same regional area.

The argument advanced here is only loosely related to the work on multiple hierarchies

(Lemke and Werner 1996, Lemke 2002) in terms of the regional level of analysis for

conceptualizing the status quo. However, although the term regional is common to the both

approaches, there are significant theoretical and conceptual differences between the multiple

regional hierarchies approach and the presented study. Firstly, the multiple hierarchies

approach considers the regional (local) status quo for understanding the behavior of regional

(local) states in the context of their regional hierarchy. The interference by external major powers

is exogenous to the model whereas this is precisely at the core of theoretical extension proposed

here. Secondly, Lemke (2002) hints at local territorial disagreements, but limits it to the


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measurement issue of satisfaction and ultimately opts for a relative military buildup. On the other

hand, disagreements between major powers over their regional influences is at the heart of the

theoretical extension of power transitions notion of status quo dissatisfaction proposed here.

Overall, then, the general thesis in this study as an extension (revision) of power

transition theory can be formulated as follows:

Whereas power transitions provide the necessary condition for war between major powers, their

willingness to fight is contingent upon their satisfaction with their influences across different

regions. If these clash, the willingness to revise the regional status quos in terms of their

influences leads them to fight given the ongoing transition in their overall power (global

capabilities).

In other words, this means that it is necessary to recast power transition theory in a

context of the major power contest over their influences in specific regional areas.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Based on the above discussion, we operationalize the dependent variable to allow us to

assess the impact of explanatory variables on the probability of a status quo challenge and

escalation to crisis, including wars, between major powers. The explanatory variables include

both static and dynamic power parity (the latter indicating the power transition) as well as

regional interests and joint democracy as these show to represent the only theoretically grounded

approaches to the sources of status quo evaluations (see the above discussion). Finally, consistent

with the initial formulation of power transition as a theory of major power conflict, we examine

major power behavior only. At the same time, we realize that probably the most faithful analysis

to the original theory should be the one that looks only at those dyads that involve a dominant


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nation (as Werner and Lemke 1996 did), but we opt for all major powers for practical reasons.

The number of observations would be substantially reduced had we looked only at those

involving the dominant nation and would hinder a reliable statistical analysis.

Dependent Variable and Estimation Methods

For the empirical analysis, we use Danilovics (2002) major power deterrence data set for

the 1895-1985 period as it seems best suited for our purposes. It provides greater precision in

identifying crisis actors, behavior, and, most importantly, geopolitical regions of disputes than

the MID data set. It is interesting to note that, historically, almost all cases of wars between major

powers have resulted from the failure of extended deterrence, when one major power (Defender)

came to the aide of a third party (Protege) in its dispute against another major power

(Challenger). Her data set is thus useful for our purposes as it includes both extended and direct

deterrence failures between major powers that either escalated into a more serious dispute

between major powers (including major wars) or remained limited to an initial major power-

minor power conflict.

We first examine what factors trigger an attempted change in the status quo (general

status quo change) when one major power initiates a dispute against another state, either a minor

or major power. The cases ofgeneral status quo change (i.e., general deterrence failure between4

major powers) refer to all instances in which at least one major power (Challenger) upsets the

status quoby getting involved in a conflict with another state. We look at all major power

directed dyads per year and per region as the unit of analysis (total of 41046 dyads). If any power

in a dyad is involved in a dispute, the dependent variable general status quo change is coded 1,

otherwise 0. Binomial logit is used as an estimation model.


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If the status quo challenge indeed occurs, we then analyze the effect of the same causal

factors in predicting whether the situation is likely to escalate into a serious major power crisis

and eventual major war. Not all breakdowns of the general status quo lead to a major power

crisis(i.e., immediate deterrence between major powers), but only when another major power

(Defender) demands that the Challenger pull out from the conflict against another state (Protege).

Another scenario for the outbreak of major power crisis results from the so-called direct

deterrence failure, that is, when the initial challenge to the status quo is issued directly against

another major power, rather than a third party. In both cases, the unit of analysis is a major-major

power dyad per each crisis in which the challenger attempted to upset the status quo. Note that

each crisis has multiple major power dyad combinations, since we are interested in examining

whether another major power would step in as a defender and not only the level of violence if it

does so (total of 887 dyads). The dependent variable is a trichotomous categorical variable

measured as follows: no escalation to a major power crisis (0), escalation to a major power crisis

without war (1), escalation to a major power war (2). Due to the categorical nature of this5

variable, we accordingly use multinomial logit as an estimator.6

Explanatory Variables

Balance of Power.A direct way to estimate the effect of power parity or disparity on

deterrence outcomes can be calculated as follows:

Def Ch Def ChPower Parity = 1 - abs|(Power - Power )/(Power + Power )|

DefWhere: Power = Defenders capability

ChPower = Challengers capability

The resulting value ranges from 0 (exact disparity) to 1 (exact parity), with lower values

indicating a larger distance from parity and higher values indicating a greater proximity in


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relative power. While this measure serves our purposes for analyzing the effect of static power

parity, we also stressed above the need to examine it in a dynamic sense as well (i.e., as power

transitions). Therefore, we additionally include a separate measure of power transition over a

five-year period. We coded it by subtracting the power parity measure at time t-5 from the power

parity at time t.Positive values indicate changes toward parity over the preceding five years,

while negative values indicate movements away from parity. Data on power capabilities were

obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) National Capabilities Data Set.

Balance of Interests.We assume that the main indicator of major powers interests

extending beyond their borders is reflected by the intensity of their linkages with different

regions around the world. For this measure, as mentioned above, we use Danilovics (2002)

dataset on the ties between major powers and world regions. This index of major powers

regional ties includes a varying number of indicators such as alliances, trade, colonies, and

diplomatic exchanges. Given the varying significance of these different forms of linkages over

the period 1895 to 1985, she develops the index of regional ties by including alliances for the

entire time span (1895-1985), while adding colonial possessions and diplomatic exchanges to the

alliance bonds only for the period 1895-1939. They are replaced by the level of foreign trade for

the period from 1945 and 1985. Foreign trade is also included for the 1920-1941 period. Since

the composite score of regional ties or stakes is an additive index, it is constructed as a sum of

the components and then averaged out by dividing the sum by the number of included

components (for more details, see Danilovic 2002).7

After obtaining the values of this variable indicating a major powers interests vis-a-vis

each region on annual basis, we use the computational method for estimating the balance of


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interests between major powers with respect to the region of conflict that is a modified version of

Tuckers (1989) estimation for joint democracy (see below). After multiplying the values of

regional interests between two major powers for each region, we then take the square root and

add these values for each region per dyad and then divide by the number of regions. This variable

(jointly strong interests, all areas) yields a value for jointly strong interests between major

power (actual and/or potential Challenger and Defender) for all regions, ranging from zero (0)

indicating jointly weak interests to one (1) indicating jointly strong interests. That is, the higher

the value, the more mutually contested regions of influence between major powers in a dyad. We

also employ a more specific measure for their joint interests in the region where the initial status

quo breakdown occurred, by dividing their respective joint interests in that region by their total

joint interests for all regions. This variable (jointly strong interests, dispute area) gives a better

estimate as to whether the crisis occurs in the area of their mutually vital and conflicting interests

as opposed to being a result of their conflicting overall global interests.

Joint Democracy. As discussed above, an alternative way to think about the sources of

status quo satisfaction concerns regime type and similarity. More specifically, to examine the

impact of joint democracy, we employ the Polity indicators of institutionalized democracy and

autocracy levels. A nations overall regime score is calculated by subtracting a states autocracy

score from its democracy score. As the resulting regime score ranges from -10 (complete

autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy), we add 11 to the overall regime score to obtain positive

values ranging between 1 and 21. Following Tucker (1998), we obtain the joint democracy

variable by multiplying the overall democracy scores for each side in a dyad and then taking the

square root, which is then divided by 21 (Tucker 1998). The resulting value ranges between 0


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and 1 on the continuous scale from joint autocracy (0) to joint democracy (1).

Alliance. Finally, another alternative to regional interests, often utilized as a measure of a

defenders credibility in extended deterrence, concerns the alliance ties between the potential

defender and another state (Protege). Data on alliances were taken from Small and Singer (1969)

for the period until 1965, and from Oren (1990) for the 1965-1980 update. A simple dichotomous

measure of alliances, indicating their absence (coded 0) or presence (coded 1) of an alliance

between the Defender and its Protege, was then constructed.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We use binomial logit to estimate whether there will be the status quo challenge and, due

to polychotomous nature of the crisis outcome, we estimate this second stage (if the challenge

occurs) with the multinomial logit.8

[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]

Regarding the probability of initiating the status quo change (Table 1), one of the most

puzzling findings concerns the opposite effect of static and dynamic power parity: while the

balance of power, regardless of whether the transition takes place, seems to deter against

changing the status quo, power transition actually makes it more likely. Further investigation into

the impact of these variable on the probability of subsequent escalation might give us a clue into

solving this puzzling result. As for mutually conflicting interests as a source of status quo

dissatisfaction, the findings strongly support the expectation that the attempt to change the status

quo is indeed more likely if there is a conflict of regional interests for major powers in the dyad,

both in the specific area of dispute and their overall regional interests. Finally, joint democracy in

the major power dyad and alliance ties between the protg and potential defender have a


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deterring effect against the attempted status quo change. In terms of the substantive impact, Table

2 clearly indicates the strongest impact of jointly strong interests, most notably the overall

conflict in regional interests between major powers, but in the disputed area as well.

[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here]

Note that positive coefficients in Table 3 indicate a positive correlation between the

variable and the probability for the first-listed outcome relative to the second-listed outcome. The

reverse holds for negative coefficients. For example, the negative and statistically significant

coefficient for power parity (-2.379) in the first column indicates that under power parity a major

power crisis short of war is more likely than no crisis at all. Since the coefficient for power parity

is uniformly negative and statistically significant for the remaining pairs of outcomes that include

war as an option, we can interpret the results to indicate that war is more likely than any other

outcome under power parity. However, since both crisis short of war and war are more likely

than no crisis at all, we still need to look at the substantive impact to determine which of these

two outcomes (that is, major power crisis with or without major war) are better predicted by the

power parity variable.

Table 4 provides us with a straightforward interpretation of the multinomial logit results

reported in Table 3. As is routinely done in the multinomial logit analyses, it shows the

substantive change in the impact of the explanatory variables (that is, those that were statistically

significant in the model) on each outcome if we change its value from minimum to maximum

while holding other variables at their mean or modal values. Here we can see that power parity is

a much stronger predictor of crisis short of war than war itself. The impact on the probability of

war is still positive but, nevertheless, much weaker than the one on the probability of major crisis


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that gets resolved peacefully. These findings are consistent with the logic of the power transition

argument in that they suggest power parity to be a destabilizing factor if there is indeed an

attempt to change the status quo. However, it is alone insufficient for explaining whether such an

instability is likely to escalate into a major power warfare or rather be resolved peacefully.

The dynamic power transition variable, however, is not statistically significant with the

exception of only one pair of outcomes (and the statistical significance is relatively low even in

this case). All that we can conclude is that an attempt to change the status quo is less likely to

escalate into a major power crisis under the conditions of power transition. Combined with the

findings reported in Table 1, we can generally conclude from this analysis that the results are

mixed concerning the impact of dynamic power parity on major power conflict. While it may

tempt a major power to upset the status quo, it has a much weaker impact on the subsequent

unfolding of events in the crisis.

Once we turn to regional interests as a source of status quo dissatisfaction, some of the

puzzling findings regarding the effects of power parity become interpretable in a more coherent

manner. First note that, similar to the power parity variable, the coefficients for jointly strong

interests in the disputed area are negative and statistically significant for the outcomes comparing

no crisis to war and crisis (no war) to war. Table 4 gives us further refined insight into

the impact of this variable on the probability of each outcome. Like power parity, it has a positive

impact on the probability of major power crisis as well as major power war and a negative impact

on the probability of no escalation. Yet, unlike the power parity variable, it shows a much

stronger substantive impact on the probability of war than crisis short of war. If we are to

combine these two variables, and examine their mutually conditional effects, we might put these


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pieces of the puzzle together.

[Insert Table 5 here]

In Table 5, the results are reported from the calculation of predicted probabilities for each

outcome under the joint effect of power parity and jointly strong interests in the disputed area.

More precisely, the substantive impact of a change in the jointly strong interests variable from

minimum to maximum is reexamined under three different levels of power parity: the first row

shows its impact under complete disparity (power parity=0), the second row shows it under the

mean parity value (approximately around .5), and the third row indicates it under the conditions

of exact power parity (its value is 1). The results clearly show that the conflict of interests in the

disputed region have a much stronger impact on the probability of conflict and especially war

under power parity. In other words, while regional interests as a source of status quo evaluation

have a strong independent impact on the likelihood of war, its effect is the strongest under

conditions of parity. This is consistent with the logic of power transition theory, which states that

both power parity and dissatisfaction are needed for war to occur.

Finally, joint democracy proves to be a weaker predictor of the probability for escalation

than regional interests if we are to compare these two variables as alternative sources of

dissatisfaction with the status quo. Note also that if we are to measure jointly strong interests for

all areas, not just the disputed one, then the results are much less coherent.

CONCLUSION

In light of our empirical analysis, we can conclude that a modified form of the general

assumption in this studyprimarily, a theoretical reformulation of the status quo

dissatisfactionhas been confirmed. More precisely, though we have used a different measure


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for power transition, the findings here are consistent with those in Kim and Morrow (1991) that

found no impact for power transition but only for static power parity. Unlike their study,

however, ours shows a more detailed insight into the conditional effect of power parity and status

quo dissatisfaction. Specifically, our findings support the argument that dissatisfaction can be

seen as stemming from the conflicting interests of major powers in the regional area of dispute.

Our empirical results thus validate our restatement of the main power transition argument (see p.

7 above), that is, whereas power parity provides the necessary condition for war between major

powers, their willingness to fight is contingent upon their satisfaction with their influences across

different regions. If these clash, the willingness to revise the regional status quo in terms of their

influence in the disputed area leads them to fight given the balance in their overall global

power capabilities.


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REFERENCES

Danilovic, Vesna (1996). Modeling Power Transition: An Extended Version. InParity and

War: A Critical Evaluation of the War Ledger, Jacek Kugler and Doug Lemke, eds. Ann

Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 117-126.

Danilovic, Vesna (2002). When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major

Powers. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

DiCicco, Jonathan M. and Jack S. Levy (1999). Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution

of the Power Transition Research Program.Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 43, pp.

675-704.

Fearon, James D. (1994). Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical

Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model.Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 38, pp. 236-269.

Geller, Daniel S. (1992). "Capability Concentration, Power Transition, and War."International

Interactions Vol. 17, pp. 269-84.

Kim, Woosang (1991). Alliance Transitions and Great Power War.American Journal of

Political Science Vol. 35, pp. 833-850.

Kim, Woosang, and James D. Morrow (1992). When Do Power Shifts Lead to War?American

Journal of Political ScienceVol. 36 pp. 896-922.

Lemke, Douglas (2002).Regions of War and Peace. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University

Press.

Lemke, Douglas, and William Reed (1996). Regime Types and Status Quo Evaluations: Power

Transition Theory and the Democratic Peace.International Interactions Vol. 22, pp.

14364.


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Lemke, Douglas, and Suzanne Werner (1996). Power Parity, Commitment to Change, and

War.International Studies Quarterly Vol. 40, pp. 235-260.

Organski, A. F. K. (1958). World Politics.New York: Knopf.

Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler (1980). The War Ledger.Chicago: University of Chicago

Press.

Oren, Ido (1990). The War Proneness of Alliances.Journal of Conflict ResolutionVol. 34, pp.

208-33.

Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer (1969). Formal Alliances, 1816-1965: An Extension of the

Basic Data.Journal of Peace ResearchVol. 3, pp. 257-82.

Tucker, Richard (1998). The Robustness of the Dyadic Democratic Peace Result. Typescript.

Emory University.

Werner, Suzanne, and Jacek Kugler (1996). Power Transition and Military Buildups: Resolving

the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War." InParity and War: A Critical

Evaluation of the War Ledger, Jacek Kugler and Doug Lemke, eds. Ann Arbor:

University of Michigan Press, pp. 187-207.


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Table 1. General status quo change, logit coefficients

Variable Coefficient

Power Parity -.249*

(.165)

Power Transition

(5 years)

1.560***

(.940)

Jointly Strong Interests,

Dispute Area

3.456***

(.241)


All Areas

.858***

(.076)

Joint Democracy -.420***

( .136)

Potential Defender-Protege

Alliance

-.125*

(.076)

Constant -4.350***

( .139)

Model Chi-Square = 282.07***

Log Likelihood Function = -4137.604

N = 41046

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

*p < .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 (one-tailed t-tests)


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Table 2. Marginal change in the probability of general status quo change

Variable SQ Change

Power Parity

From min (imbalance) to max (balance)

-0.44

Power Transition (5 years):

From min to max

+1.61

Jointly Strong Interests, Dispute Area:

From min to max

+12.98

Jointly Strong Interests, All Areas:

From min to max

+57.61

Joint Democracy: From min to max

-0.73

Potential Defender-Protege Alliance:

From min to max

-0.24

NOTE: The marginal effect of each explanatory variable is calculated by changing its value while

holding the other variables at their mean or modal value.


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Table 3. Major power crisis: onset and hostility levels, multinomial logit coefficients

Variable No Crisis

vs. Crisis

(No War)

No Crisis

vs. War

Crisis

(No War)

vs. War

Power Parity -2.379***

(.749)

-2.690*

(1.93)

-.3110***

(2.034)

Power Transition

(5 years)

4.862*

(3.704)

75.671

(100.129)

70.809

(100.180)


Dispute Area

-3.118***

(1.308)

-10.712***

(2.715)

-7.594***

(2.882)


All Areas

2.056***

(.854)

-.794***

(.462)

-2.890***

(.9634)

Joint Democracy .684

(.629)

-.304

(1.502)

-.9876

(1.603)

Defender-Protege Alliance 1.280**

(.463)

3.081**

(1.399)

1.801*

(1.463)

Constant 2.424***

(.778)

8.014***

(1.779)

5.5902***

(1.924)

Model Chi-Square = 68.55***

Log Likelihood Function = -241.08343

N = 887

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

*p < .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01 (one-tailed t-tests)


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Table 4. Percentage change in the probability of major power crisis and hostility levels

Variable Change No Crisis

Crisis

(No War)

War

Change in Power Parity:

From min (imbalance) to max (balance)

-8.88 +8.41 +0.48

Change in Jointly Strong Interests,

Dispute Area:

From min to max

-28.63 +9.16 +19.48


All Areas:

From min to max

+4.92 -13.51 +8.59

Change in Defender-Protege Alliance Ties:

From min (0) to max (1)

+4.75 -4.23 -0.51

NOTE: The marginal effect of each explanatory variable is calculated by changing its value

while holding the other variables at their mean or modal value. Changes in power transition

and joint democracy are not statistically significant for most pairs of outcomes and thus not

calculated.


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Table 5. Percentage change in the probability of major power crisis and hostility levels:

the conditional effects of regional interests and power parity

Variable Change No Crisis

Crisis

(No War)

War


Dispute Area: From min to max

Power Disparity (min=0) -8.36 +3.15 +5.21

Power Distribution, mean value (.59) -28.63 +9.16 +19.48

Power Parity (max=1) -49.38 +12.82 +36.56

NOTE: All other variables are held at their mean or modal value.


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1. Zagare et al.s models explore the impact of capability, credibility, and status quo

dissatisfaction on conflict probability.

2. In this sense, for example, Japans decision to attack the United States in 1941 should

not be seen as the result of their dissatisfaction with the global status quo. Rather, it resulted from

their own rising interests in Asia and the clash of these interests with the United States.

3. As Danilovic (2002) reports, the Cold War containment policy as an indiscriminate

global policy was rather a lone exception for the United States as a major power. Even in the case

of U.S. , she reports different behavior across regions.

4. As these challenges and demands can be manifested both verbally and behaviorally,

Danilovic (2002) bases the typology of such moves on the MID coding rules as follows: (1) the

threat of force; (2) the display of force; or (3) the use of force short of war.

5. Note that only the latter two categories of this dependent variable apply to situations

where another major power stepped in to resist the challengers attempt to change the status quo.

6. It is reasonable to object to this two-stage estimation for not accounting for possible

selection effects. Indeed we also use Heckmans censored probit to estimate whether the status

quo challenge is likely to occur (selection equation) and, if it does, whether it is likely to escalate

to major power crisis and/or major war (outcome equation). Note that Heckmans probit is

disadvantaged by requiring binary dependent variables in both equations. If the correlation

between the error terms is not statistically significant, then we can proceed with the standard

approach of assessing both stages as statistically independent events as described above since the

coefficients should not be suspected of statistical selection bias.

NOTES


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7. In her dataset, Danilovic (2002) classifies geopolitical regions as follows: West Africa,

Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, North Asia , South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia,

North America, South America, Central American and the Caribbean, Western Europe, Eastern

Europe, Middle East, and Oceania.

8. To address the concerns regarding potential selection bias, the onset and outcomes of

crises were estimated with Heckmans censored probit and the results showed a statistically

insignificant correlation in the error terms () . Since there is no evidence of statistical selection

effects between the selection and outcome models, the standard probit or logit estimates would

not be affected by selection bias. Since Heckmans probit is disadvantaged by requiring binary

choices for both the selection and outcome equations, we opt to estimate them with separate

models due to the polychotomous nature of our crisis outcome variable.

Danilo Vic Power Transition

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