Crossing the Great Divide: Dilemmas of U.K. Voluntary-Sector Leaders Who Move into Government

Crossing the Great Divide: Dilemmas of U.K. Voluntary-Sector Leaders Who Move intoGovernmentAuthor(s): Amanda LittleSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 64, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2004), pp. 618-624Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542542 .

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The Reflective Practitioner

Amanda Little University of Surrey-Roehampton

Crossing the Great Divide: Dilemmas of

U.K. Voluntary-Sector Leaders Who

Move into Government

Evidence suggests the boundaries between the U.K. government and the voluntary sector are blur- ring because of an increasing emphasis on partnership between the two. One symptom of this changing relationship-or a contributing cause of it-is the practice of recruiting senior managers from the voluntary sector into government service. The intention is that these managers should play a significant role in formulating and implementing government strategy with regard to the voluntary sector and in other policy areas where voluntary-sector organizations are seen as key players. This article addresses the issues that voluntary-sector leaders face when they move into government-to what extent are they insiders, outsiders, or critical friends, and to whom? It concludes that the madness of the government machine is more than the sum of its parts: people, policy, and process.

If you can keep your head when all about you Are losing theirs and blaming it on you, If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you But make allowance for their doubting too, If you can wait and not be tired by waiting, Or being lied about, don't deal in lies, Or being hated, don't give way to hating, And yet don't look too good, nor talk too wise ...

-"If," Rudyard Kipling

In 1998 the U.K. government introduced a compact set- ting out a framework for relations between the government and the voluntary sector that "endorses voluntary organisations as partners with government, not merely as agents in a contractual relationship" (Young 2000). In addition, the government has published two major reviews of the voluntary sector: The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector in Service Delivery: A Cross-Cutting Review (HM Treasury 2002) and Private Action, Public Benefit: A Re- view of Charities and the Wider Not-for-Profit Sector (Strat- egy Unit, Cabinet Office 2002). These form the context for the government's current impetus to review its rela-

tionship with and funding of the United Kingdom's voluntary sector, particularly with regard to building that sector's capacity to deliver public services.

There is a considerable body of literature on both sides of the Atlantic that deals with the role of the advocate with reference to the insider-outsider and critical-friend relationship (Kramer 1994; Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin 1994; Evers 1996; Taylor 1998; Najam 2000; Young 2000). The role of the voluntary-sector advocate as a critical friend to government is a "specialist or core insider" (Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin 1994) and works within terms and conditions under which voluntary-sector advocacy takes place, paving the way for "agreements and compro- mises, exchanging and balancing viewpoints and interests" (Evers 1996, 166).

Amanda Little joined London's Regional Economic Development Agency in July 2002 and leads voluntary- and community-sector and social enterprise policy and strategy regionally and nationally. She previously worked in the private sector and in the voluntary sector. Over the past 10 years, Amanda has worked in fundraising, corporate planning and strategy, and policy advocacy in a range of national charities. She holds a master's degree in voluntary-sector organization from the London School of Economics. E-mail: amandaleaves @aol.com.

618 Public Administration Review * September/October 2004, Vol. 64, No. 5



The literature has focused on the uneasy relationship between government and the voluntary sector-with civil servants' resentment of the intrusion of the voluntary sector (Kramer 1994) and the idea of the voluntary-statutory relationship as one of "conflictive co-operation" (Evers 1996).

Little attention has been paid to the comparatively re- cent and growing phenomenon of voluntary-sector leaders being drafted into government to develop and imple- ment the government's policy and funding toward the sector. What the literature has not explored is the nuanced effect on the voluntary-statutory relationship of these new recruits and whether voluntary-sector leaders continue as critical friends when they make the transition from being partners to being part of government-and if this role is retained, how it is exercised. This article will address this gap in our knowledge.

Research Design and Methodology This exploratory study employs a qualitative approach

based on in-depth, semistructured interviews with a small number of individuals who moved from a voluntary-sector leadership role into government. The interviewees were directly engaged in producing strategies and implementa- tion plans that related specifically to the U.K. government's policy toward the voluntary and community sector.

The research method was designed to address the fol- lowing questions: 1. To what extent are voluntary-sector leaders who move

into government insiders or outsiders? 2. Are they a symptom or a cause of co-option of the vol-

untary sector into government? 3. Do they maintain their role of critical friend and advo-

cate, and for whom? Six people were interviewed who had moved from the

sector into either central or regional government. Their experience of working directly in the voluntary sector ranged from three years to more than 20 years. The major- ity, however, had been involved with the sector throughout their professional careers, whether working in education and training or in local government. Their experience en- compassed a broad range of areas, including regeneration, arts, education and training, second-tier and third-tier organizations, health and social care at the local, subregional, regional, or national levels. Two of the interviewees were on long-term contracts and four were either on short-term contracts or on secondment.

Findings All of the interviewees had been recruited into govern-

ment because their particular knowledge and expertise in the sector translated into policy expertise within govern-

ment. All were motivated by wanting to make a difference and contribute to the way government formulates policy and works with the sector. There was a consensus among them that the move into government offered the opportu- nity to develop and learn new skills, to acquire new expertise, and to do so at an exciting time of policy change. Their expectations of their future career paths tended to diverge: Those on long-term contracts had decided to stay in government, while the others saw themselves as either returning to the voluntary sector or moving into the private sector (although they did not rule out extending their short-term contracts or moving into a different government department).

The key finding from the research is that the voluntary-sector leaders who moved into government faced dilemmas that were directly attributable to three interrelated factors. The first factor is the complexity of their interaction with other people-both within the sector and with colleagues inside government. Second, there are inherent contradictions within stated government policy with regard to partnership between the voluntary sector and government. Finally, the process that defines the government machine presented obstacles with regard to relationships with people, policy formulation, and the delivery of policy objectives.

Interaction with Other People Interaction with people from the voluntary sector and

with colleagues in government involved dilemmas that can be viewed as negative, positive, or ambiguous.

Several interviewees reported there were negative as-

pects to their relationships with people in the voluntary sector. This is partly attributable to the more objective perspective of the sector the interviewees developed from their move into government, and to expectations from those within the voluntary sector itself. This created an uneasy mix of deference and a belief the interviewees had more influence than they did: "There's a kind of psychological thing out there that if you move into government ... you've entered the fortress and made it there so you must know what's going on ... they don't know this but I have abso-

lutely no role to play in any money that's disbursed any- where here ... they think you have some influence over those things, but actually I don't" (Gov 2).

For some interviewees, this translated into a newfound popularity that was double edged, and, in one instance, an interviewee felt the attitude adopted by some from the sector was forceful, manipulative, and even bullying. Several felt their new role created barriers with the sector, notably though not exclusively with regard to funding: "It just feels people talk to you because they want money ... it just puts up a complete barrier sometimes ... it almost closes you down ... you're not really listening to-is the idea good?

The Reflective Practitioner 619



Is it meeting some demonstrable need, going to make some difference?" (Gov 5).

Ambiguity was a feature of the relationship. The critical-friend role had two very different dimensions, one where interviewees were clearly acting as internal advo- cates for the sector, and the other where they acted as government watchdogs. While identifying with the role of the internal advocate, interviewees felt their insider knowledge of the sector enabled them to distinguish when voluntary- sector organizations would attempt to "try it on": "There's an interesting balance about making sure that I represent the voluntary sector's views but also don't let them get away with it, because I know what they'll try and get away with as well, so it's making sure that I give an objective view [to government colleagues] of what's achievable and what's reasonable" (Gov 4).

Several interviewees referred to their ability to act as an introduction for key people in the sector to inform government thinking: "Maybe people here don't know where to start because they don't have the same links ... I'd say well, there's this person or there's that one ... you've just got names in your head because that's what you do in the voluntary sector. So, on a very personal level, things can get done because we can talk to a few people and get it sorted" (Gov 4).

Interaction with government colleagues presented its own dilemmas, both negative and positive. All of the interviewees referred to the obsession with grade and hierarchy among career civil servants. More than one interviewee compared the discipline within government as akin to the armed forces, while another contrasted his own way of working with the prevailing attitude: "I did my job in a way that was informed by my experience in the sector. A traditional civil servant operates in a command and con- trol structure ... it's not a million miles removed from the

army" (Gov 6). The concomitant of this aspect of government culture

was to destroy initiative and undermine the ability to challenge and to change procedures to be more effective-a contrast to what they saw as the prevailing culture of the voluntary sector: "If you're in the voluntary sector you have no choice ... otherwise you won't survive, so you develop lobbying skills, you learn how to try and influence those who have an impact on your work, and you can apply some of that ... and it can work here" (Gov 6).

However, several interviewees referred to their percep- tion that policy expertise is not valued, and that it is knowledge of the bureaucratic process that confers promotion and seniority. Furthermore, the voluntary sector was not perceived as career enhancing within government: "[The] culture is about people's status, not their ability or their skills or what they can say ... if you're ... a bright civil servant, you don't go and work [there] because it's not hard

policy. If you want to make your mark ... you do hard

policy ... so you don't get a tonne of bright civil servants," although the area attracted "bright people from the voluntary sector" (Gov 5).

This was not, however, an unconditional vote of confi- dence in those from the voluntary sector who had crossed into government: "Someone who's ex-voluntary sector can be the most rabid civil servant because they've got more to prove, that they are fitting in, especially if they're ambitious and ... want to get to a higher grade ... they've got to demonstrate to their peer group that they know how to handle that macho civil service culture" (Gov 3).

The macho nature of civil service culture was also de- scribed by others as selfish, risk averse, and lacking in personal commitment, humanity, respect, and trust in working with colleagues. One interviewee summarized, "Never say thank you to people for their work ... when

you look at someone else's work always criticise it and point out what's wrong ... the first piece of advice [I was

given] ... is to cover your back ... because there are al-

ways people looking to offload failed projects ... or take

your credit ... you can get drawn into that culture, but I

try and carry on as if the only thing that matters is doing a good job" (Gov 3).

This attitude was balanced by the interviewees' acknowledgement that, within government at all levels and across all departments, there are civil servants who are committed to advancing the voluntary-sector agenda within government and who share the sector's values, regardless of whether they have worked in the sector. The defining characteristic of these civil servants was identified as "social conscience more than anything else ... an assumption that by and large it is voluntarism [and the voluntary and community sector] that best encapsulates the best parts of humanity, it's where we not only express concern about other people but actually do something about it" (Gov 6).

All interviewees felt the way to challenge the negative aspects of civil service attitudes toward the sector was to create opportunities for career civil servants to learn from or work with the voluntary sector. There was an awareness though that those most likely to be in need of exposure to the sector would be the least likely to sign up for such a program, "some of those people [who would benefit from the experience of working with the sector] tend to be the most power-crazy and the most ambitious, the most difficult people" (Gov 3).

The Policy Arena Three key areas within the policy arena presented them-

selves as dilemmas. The first was that government was, in effect, encouraging the voluntary sector to compete directly with government providers of services. Second, policy making was essentially reactive rather than proactive. Third,




the quality of policy formulation was compromised by the disappearance of institutional knowledge when civil servants were transferred to other policy areas.

More than one interviewee pointed out the inherent con- tradiction of current government policy driving greater voluntary sector involvement in public service delivery. This not only invited a "gatekeeper" response from the public sector, it was ultimately identified as an invitation to local government to take forward a program that could result in their own or their peers' redundancy and unemployment: "Quite a few voluntary organisations have found that they are essentially in competition with local government and that makes the relationship quite difficult" (Gov 6).

Several interviewees expressed a concern that policy was being "made up"-that it was essentially a reactive rather than a proactive process. While there was a positive aspect to this with scope for an individual to create a policy to fill a perceived gap, a more negative aspect related to the per- ception that if a policy was seen as not delivering, a new policy would take its place: "A new policy will come out or a realignment that's not properly embedded, the old stuff is still running ... and yet there's an attempt that isn't fully seen through to change direction or develop a new policy" (Gov 1).

Another aspect was that policies may be produced in reaction to an external event and are often ill-thought-out, while some policy areas remain untouched. Both function to the detriment of the voluntary sector and working with the sector: "That isn't good in terms of partnership working and for voluntary and community groups who actually, from my experience, are less concerned about the headline news but more concerned about the day-to-day things that concern their members [and] communities and want to get on with them. But often those agendas ... don't mesh with what's the flavour of the month up here" (Gov 2).

The third factor that was identified as wholly negative with regard to the policy arena was the practice of civil servants changing government departments every two or three years. This loss of institutional intelligence was a source of frustration for all of the interviewees: "A big issue for the civil service is that people don't stay in post very long and they're not meant to ... often I find I've got to re-educate somebody, you just get a working relationship with somebody and they're gone, you have to start again from scratch ... you don't get continuity in working relationships ... that does have a genuinely negative im-

pact and is, in my view, a really serious issue for the civil service" (Gov 1).

The Process All the interviewees highlighted the dilemmas and bar-

riers involved in the way government's business is under- taken. Most of them had anticipated the civil service would

provide an orderly environment in which both people and work are well managed. All found this was not the case, and there was a gulf between their expectation and reality.

There were significant obstacles to effective policy making in the form of language and jargon, team and depart- mental "silos," and poor communications within and between departments and teams. These gave rise to rigidity and inconsistency in the interpretation of rules, a lack of consensus and clarity on key aspects of policy, and a lack of communication between those sharing common policy areas.

Other key obstacles were related to the performance of the bureaucratic machinery, including poor management of staff performance and, for all but one interviewee, marked inadequacies in the management of facilities, tech- nical tools, and-most important-knowledge.

For one interviewee, the paucity and poor quality of communication between teams and departments with regard to the policy-making process not only gave rise to what amounted to an almost willful misunderstanding of how different policy areas operated, but ultimately dam- aged the delivery of policy: "[There exists] un-thought- through imposition of policies and policy targets without adequate reflection on what we need to do jointly to deliver and with some major misunderstandings of other government departments' policy areas ... [what is not

being asked is] will this ultimately deliver a good prod- uct for people in communities, not will it be easy for us to do in central government, that's not the ultimate crite- ria" (Gov 1).

For more than one interviewee, this created what might be termed a "pass the parcel" syndrome: "Every time some-

thing comes up I have to check, what's the best way of

doing this so that I don't actually tread on anyone's toes" (Gov 4).

For those who had moved into government, the policy process represented a steep learning curve that was climbed with the help of several stratagems. Interviewees drew on their previous experience of government processes from an informed outsider's perspective; they formed relation-

ships with colleagues in their own sections and departments and with those in other government departments; and they used their initiative and negotiated with others on the basis of contributing to shared aims. "If you go to that department having done a little bit of work and you say I'm here to talk to you about how I can help you deliver x, y, and z, what's what I mean by negotiation...." They countered the lack of humanity referred to previously by extending this relationship building to the informal sphere: "Even now some of the blockages that I've got over by [going to] the pub ... [I'll] find out where certain people in a certain team drink and I will turn up ... I won't talk business for the first week, but I'll turn up the next week and then we'll




start talking ... these are approaches I've learnt in the past because you build up that rapport with people" (Gov 2).

The language and jargon of government and its many variations within and between departments, together with the complexity of the interrelationship between process and hierarchy, were felt to place huge barriers in the way of the sector's efforts to work in partnership with government. They also created unrealistic expectations of what a partnership relationship might actually mean in reality: "Ev- ery policy area has its own set of acronyms and its own set of meanings about different things ... you can standardise much of that process ... one of the mistakes that government makes is using terminology which creates the im- pression that it can deliver something when it can't. Joined- up government suggests an outcome can be achieved which actually is probably impossible" (Gov 6).

All interviewees found that the servicing of the government machine presented barriers while purporting to be the mechanism by which work could be managed and policy delivered effectively on the ground. For one interviewee, the bureaucratic obstacles were particularly acute. "We are less and less interested in what goes on outside and who's on the receiving end of what we do and we're more and more interested in performance management and process. You know, we're getting to the stage now where we're performance managing performance management" (Gov 1).

Simultaneously, the driving force behind government policy with regard to the voluntary and community sec- tors continued to proclaim the need to increase partnership and to celebrate the comparative advantage of the sector in public service delivery:

I'm caught between a government system that's ask- ing for loads and loads of information in order to performance manage and hit its targets and another bit of the government machine that's saying we must learn to work better with the voluntary and community sector and be sensitive to their culture ... [while] this obsession with process seems to me to be increasing. (Gov 1)

The irrationality of the labyrinthine process, while breed- ing confusion, did lead to camaraderie.

I probably [enjoy working more with] voluntary sector people because there's a degree of shared experience ... both in terms of a hinterland and in terms of being new to this and [being able to say] this is a bit bonkers, this is a bit mad-that's quite difficult to say to someone who's a career civil servant who doesn't think it's mad. (Gov 3)

It was evident there were those who, by custom and habit, were inured to the vagaries of the government machine, and they were identified as the very few, very senior civil servants who possessed an overall perspective and

whose seniority in the hierarchy was inextricably linked to the fact that they knew how to make the machinery work.

There are people who get paid loads of money in government because they know how the machinery works and they know how to make the machinery work, more importantly-and that doesn't come overnight, it can't do when the machinery is as big as government-I think the civil service in that sense looks after itself very well ... [once you understand how government works] ... that's pretty much the same process, irrespective of which government's in, irrespective of the issues ... and I don't think I often meet many of those. (Gov 2)

Discussion and Conclusions If you can dream-and not make dreams your master, If you can think-and not make thoughts your aim; If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster And treat those two impostors just the same: If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools, Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken, And stoop and build 'em up with worn-out tools ...

-"If," Rudyard Kipling In light of the research findings, to what extent have the

three research questions been addressed? First, all of the interviewees clearly saw themselves as government insiders with an external perspective, and all of them made reference to their advocacy role. This role had three dimensions: advocating for the voluntary sector within government, advocating on behalf of government in the voluntary sector, and focusing on how each should work with the other. There were additional dimensions to this, with interviewees occasionally acting as matchmakers between government and the voluntary sector and/or creat- ing an environment in which voluntary-sector workers could advocate for themselves.

Second, the findings suggest the answer to the question of whether the voluntary-sector leaders who have joined the government service are symptoms or causes of the co- option of the sector by government is so elusive and com- plex that the question needs to be reformulated. The government's policy toward the sector is clearly and ex- plicitly framed in terms of partnership; this is a feature of both the overarching policy framework of modernizing government and the concrete recommendations arising from the development of the government's "Compact" with the voluntary sector (Home Office 1998). The latter and the government reviews of 2002 flowing from it represent a reworking of the contract culture with the voluntary sector as an alternative or substitute provider of services (Kendall and Knapp 1996)-albeit a potentially better-




resourced sector with some measures to improve its capacity to deliver government policies.

There remains, however, a gap between the rhetoric of partnership and the reality of government-voluntary sector relationships. Voluntary-sector leaders who have crossed the great divide can be seen as working, often uneasily, within this space to promote a more participative and in- clusive approach based on their own experience.

They do not, however, have a primary role in changing the main thrust of government policy, nor, more importantly, are they able to make substantial inroads into how the process of government bureaucracy militates against meaningful partnership with the sector. Their attempts to mediate policy employ the skills and experience they have acquired-cooperation, mutuality, a person- or user-cen- tered approach, and advocacy skills-to build bridges between government and the sector on an individual rather than a corporate or institutional basis.

Third, all of the interviewees were clear that they had maintained their role of critical friend and, notwithstand- ing that they were employed by government and owed their first loyalty to their employer, they acted as critical friends within government and in their interaction with the voluntary sector. All of the interviewees found that moving from the sector lent a different perspective to their view of it, which was generally one of (more) critical appreciation. As critical friends of government, they appeared to exer- cise most leverage in terms of shaping policy and influ- encing people-and either as individuals or through policy initiatives, ameliorating some of the adverse impact of the bureaucratic process on the sector. However, they had a negligible impact in reconciling the built-in contradictions in the way the bureaucratic process interacts with and often negates the stated desire of the government to work more closely with the sector.

Finally, how and to what extent were voluntary sector leaders who moved into government able to address the dilemmas they faced, work with them, or overcome them?

The overwhelming barrier for the interviewees and for all of those who work in government was the machine itself, which appears to have a life and existence that far exceeds its component parts of people, policy, and process. If the machinery of government were simpler, better integrated, and more accessible, it would be better under- stood. For this to happen, however, there needs to be a sea change to make explicit internally and externally the rules by which the machine operates. To do so would undermine the hierarchical system of government service, which is predicated on acquiring the knowledge of what it takes to make the machine work-which is enshrined in the high- est echelons of the civil service, among those who have an

This system determines the promotion of individuals and, as such, invites complicity from all civil servants who are concerned with their career prospects: "My view is it's a closed shop and that's ridiculous in this day and age, but the people here are very attached to the closed shop ... in the civil service, because it's a job for life, you expect to get on in time, people who come in [for their policy not their process expertise] without going through all the [usual] assessments ... it's not considered right" (Gov 5).

The implications for policy and practice are that voluntary-sector leaders who move into government ameliorate the way government works in partnership with the sector rather than shape what the partnership is actually based on, a policy agenda which has already been set. They add weight and numbers to the "social conscience society" that exists at all levels of government.

They can, however, do little to remedy the irrationality of the government machine which manifests itself in a va- riety of ways. Policy is made "on the hoof." This com- bines with an inflexible culture that affects both the new recruits and their colleagues. It produces a restrictive bureaucratic process-into which they risk being drawn. One can negotiate with people. It is possible to develop and shape policy. But what can be done with a machine? Or to paraphrase, though this be method, yet the madness remains within it.

interest in seeing the continuation of the system that en- sures their oligarchy.




References

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Kramer, Ralph. 1994. Voluntary Agencies and the Contract Cul- ture: "Dream or Nightmare?" Social Service Review 68(1): 33-60.

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Crossing the Great Divide: Dilemmas of U.K. Voluntary-Sector Leaders Who Move into Government

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