Criminal Law Rev Part 1

7/28/2019 Criminal Law Rev Part 1

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Criminal Law Reviewer

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Criminal Law Review

I. Fundamental Principles

A. Definition of Criminal Law

Criminal Law is that branch of public substantive law which definescrimes, treats of their nature and provides for their punishment.

1. Principle ofnul lum cr imen nul la poena sine lege

a. Villar eal vs Peo ple. G.R. No. 151258, Febru ary 1, 2012

Although courts must not remain indifferent to publicsentiments, in this case the general condemnation of a

hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe afundamental principle in our criminal justice system "[N]oact constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law."Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act isviewed by a large section of the populace as immoral orinjurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any lawprohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judgesare called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayedby strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on theelements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.

b. Rub rico vs Arr oyo . G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010

Doctr ine of command responsib i l i ty

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine findsits context in the development of laws of war and armedcombats. According to Fr. Bernas, "commandresponsibility," in its simplest terms, means the

"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed bysubordinate members of the armed forces or other personssubject to their control in international wars or domesticconflict." In this sense, command responsibility is properly aform of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superioraccountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinatesshould he be remiss in his duty of control over them. Asthen formulated, command responsibility is "an omissionmode of individual criminal liability," whereby the

superior is made responsible forcrimes committed by his


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subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators(as opposed to crimes he ordered).

Doctr ine of command responsib i l i ty ; par t of

in ternat iona l law but no Phi l ipp ine law prov ides for

cr imina l l iab il i ty under the d oct r ine

The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statuteof the International Criminal Court (ICC) to which thePhilippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute imposesindividual responsibility on military commanders for crimescommitted by forces under their control. The country is,however, not yet formally bound by the terms and provisionsembodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet toextend concurrence in its ratification.

While there are several pending bills on commandresponsibility, there is still no Philippine law that provides forcriminal liability under that doctrine.

It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility,as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable forextra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats,may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theorythat the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes aprinciple of international law or customary international lawin accordance with the incorporation clause of theConstitution.

No ru l ing o n cr im ina l liab i li ty based on do ct r ine of

command responsib i l i ty in Amp aro proceed ings

Xxx it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings(Amparo) the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CAseemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicitythrough omission, for individual respondents criminalliability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. Xxx

the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue ofcriminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or aninfraction of an administrative rule may have beencommitted. As the Court stressed in Secretary of NationalDefense v. Manalo (Manalo), the writ of amparo wasconceived to provide expeditious and effective proceduralrelief against violations or threats of violation of the basicrights to life, liberty, and security of persons; thecorresponding amparo suit, however, "is not an action todetermine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonabledoubt x x x or administrative liability requiring substantial

evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings."Of the same tenor, and by way of expounding on the nature


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and role of amparo, is what the Court said in Razon v.Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpabilityfor the disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial

killings]; it determines responsibility, or at leastaccountability, for the enforced disappearance [threatsthereof or extra-judicial killings] for purposes of imposingthe appropriate remedies to address the disappearance[or extra-judicial killings].

x x x x

As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforceddisappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimespenalized separately from the component criminal acts

undertaken to carry out these killings and enforceddisappearances and are now penalized under theRevised Penal Code and special laws. The simple reasonis that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; thedetermination of what acts are criminal x x x are mattersof substantive law that only the Legislature has the powerto enact. x x x

Impo rt of command respons ib i l ity in Amparo

proceed ings for enforced d isappearances

If command responsibility were to be invoked and appliedto these proceedings, it should, at most, be only todetermine the author who, at the first instance, isaccountable for, and has the duty to address, thedisappearance and harassments complained of, so as toenable the Court to devise remedial measures that maybe appropriate under the premises to protect rightscovered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,however, the determination should not be pursued to fixcriminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal

prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinaryproceedings under existing administrative issuances, ifthere be any.

B. Characteristics of Criminal Law

1. GeneralityCriminal law is binding on all persons wholive or sojourn in the Philippine territory, regardless ofnationality, gender, or other personal circumstances.

a. Art 14, Civil Code


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Penal laws and those of public security and safetyshall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn inthe Philippine territory, subject to the principles ofpublic international law and to treaty stipulations.

b. Rule applied to foreigners

People vs Galacgac, C.A. O.G. 1027

Facts: Enrique Galacgac was a naturalized U.S.citizen. He visited his wife in the Philippines and inhis possession was a gun which he intended togive to his wife as a gift. Upon reaching his in-lawshome, he and his wife had a fight, which causedhis brother-in-law to hit him in the head. In

retaliation, he fired indiscriminately wounding hiswifes brothers and sisters. He was charged withattempted parricide but defended that thePhilippines had no jurisdiction over him since he isan American citizen.

Issue: Whether Galacgac, a US citizen, may beprosecuted under Philippine law.

Held: Yes. No foreigner in this country enjoysextra-territorial rights so as to be exempted from itslaws and jurisdiction, with the exception of headsof states and diplomatic representatives who, byvirtue of customary law of nations, are not subjectto Philippine territorial jurisdiction.

c . Rule as applied to military personnel

U.S vs Sweet, G.R. No. 448, Septem ber 20, 1901

Facts: Sweet was an employee of the US Army

stationed in the Philippines. He assaulted aprisoner of war for which he was charged with thecrime of physical injuries. Sweet interposed thedefense that the fact that he was an employee ofthe US military deprived the court of the jurisdictionto try and punish him.

Issue: Whether the Philippine courts havejurisdiction to try a military personnel of the UnitedStates.

Held: Yes. An assault committed by a militarypersonnel upon a prisoner of war is a violation of


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the general penal law. As such, criminal liability isincurred. Jurisdiction of the civil tribunals isunaffected by the military or other specialcharacter of the person brought before them fortrial, unless controlled by special legislation to the

contrary.

NOTE: Under the RP-US Visiting Forces Accord(VFA) signed on February 10, 1998, the citizenshipis immaterial on the issue of whether one may beprosecuted or not for offenses not against thesecurity, property or person of US personnel. Whatis material is ones membership to the U.S. ArmedForces (either as a military personnel or a civilianpersonnel connected to the US militaryoperations).

d. Exceptions

(1) Principles of international law

By virtue of the principles of international law,the following people possess immunity from thecriminal jurisdiction of the country of theirsojourn and cannot be sued, arrested orpunished by the law of that country:

Absolute exemptions

i. Sovereigns and other chiefs of stateii. Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary,

ministers resident, and chargesdaffaires, ambassadors extraordinary(under the Vienna Convention onDiplomatic Relations and Protocol)

Relative exemptions

iii. Consuls and vice consuls: honoraryconsuls not exempted.

NOTE:

i. Public international law and treaties aredeemed part of the law of the land;

ii. For a person to be immune, he/she mustbe able to invoke a provision of publicinternational law/treaty, law of

preferential application or customaryinternational law.


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(a) Schnecken burg er vs Moran, G.R. No.

L-44896, July 31, 1936

Facts: Schneckenburger was a duly

accredited honorary consul of Uruguayat Manila. He was charged in the CFIof Manila with the crime of falsificationof a private document. He objected tothe jurisdiction of the court on theground that both under the Constitutionof the United States and theConstitution of the Philippines the courthad no jurisdiction to try him.

Issue: Whether the Philippine courts

have jurisdiction to try a consul.

Held: It is well settled that a consul isnot entitled to the privileges andimmunities of an ambassador orminister, but is subject to the laws andregulations of the country to which he isaccredited. A consul is not exempt fromcriminal prosecution for violations of thelaws of the country where he resides.Courts of First Instance were vestedwith original jurisdiction over all criminalcases in which a penalty of more thansix months imprisonment or a fineexceeding one hundred dollars mightbe imposed. Such jurisdiction includedthe trial of criminal actions broughtagainst consuls.

(2) Treaty stipulationsExample: Bases agreement between the RP

and US and RP-US Visiting Forces Accord(1998)

(a) Nicholas vs Romulo, G.R. No.

175888, Febr uary 11, 2009

Facts: Lance Corporal Daniel Smith,member of the US Armed Forces, wasfound guilty beyond reasonable doubtof the crime of rape in the RTC ofMakati. The court ordered Smith

detained at the Makati City Jail untilfurther orders.


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On December 19 and 22, 2006,Philippine Foreign Affairs SecretaryAlberto Romulo and US AmbassadorKristie Kenney executed agreements

that pursuant to the VFA, Smith bereturned to the US military custody andbe detained at the first floor, RoweBuilding, US Embassy Compound.

Held: The Court ruled that theRomulo-Kenney Agreements ofDecember 19 and 22, 2006, which areagreements on the detention of theaccused in the United StatesEmbassy, are not in accord with the

VFA itself because such detention isnot by Philippine authorities. ArticleV, Section 10 of the VFA provides thatthe confinement or detention byPhilippine authorities of the UnitedStates personnel shall be carried out infacilities agreed on by appropriatePhilippines and United Statesauthorities.

NOTE: Art. 5, Sec 10 of the VFAprovides that the confinement ordetention by Philippine authorities ofUS personnel over whom thePhilippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall be carried out in facilities agreedon by appropriate Philippines andUnited States authorities. UnitedStates personnel serving sentences inthe Philippines shall have the right tovisits and material assistance.

(3) Laws of preferential application

An example of laws of preferential applicationis Republic Act No. 75, An Act to PenalizeActs Which Would Impair the ProperObservance by the Republic and Inhabitants ofthe Philippines of the Immunities, Right, andPrivileges of Duly Accredited ForeignDiplomatic and Consular Agents in thePhilippines


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(a) R.A. 75extended the diplomatic privilege tothe members of the household and domesticservants of those enjoying exemptions (seeI.B.1.d.(1)) that were registered with the DFA.

2. Territoriality

As a rule, penal laws of the Philippines are enforceableonly within its territory. If the power to define crimes is thepower of the sovereign, it must be followed that suchsovereign can only exercise such power within itsjurisdiction/territory.

NOTE : For purposes of criminal law, jurisdiction onlyextends to the territorial sea (i.e. 12 miles plus 12 miles

contiguous zone)

a. Art. 2, RPC

Art. 2. Application of its provisions. Except asprovided in the treaties and laws of preferentialapplication, the provisions of this Code shall beenforced not only within the PhilippineArchipelago, including its atmosphere, its interiorwaters and maritime zone, but also outside of itsjurisdiction, against those who:

1. Should commit an offense while on aPhilippine ship or airship

2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin orcurrency note of the Philippine Islands orobligations and securities issued by theGovernment of the Philippine Islands;chanrobles virtual law library

3. Should be liable for acts connected withthe introduction into these islands of theobligations and securities mentioned in thepresiding number;

4. While being public officers or employees,should commit an offense in the exercise oftheir functions; or

5. Should commit any of the crimes against

national security and the law of nations,


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defined in Title One of Book Two of thisCode.

b. Foreign merchant vessels

(1) In trans it

U.S. vs Lo ok Chaw , G.R. No. L-

5889, July 12, 1911

Facts: The defendant was chargedwith unlawful possession and sale ofopium while aboard the steamshipErrol, which was of Englishnationality, coming from Hong Kong

and bound for Mexico via the port ofManila. The defense moved for thedismissal of the case on the groundthat the courts have no jurisdictionsince the act does not constitute acrime.

Issue: Whether the courts havejurisdiction over the defendant.

Held: Mere possession of opiumaboard a foreign merchant vessel intransit is not triable in the Philippines,because that fact alone does notconstitute a breach of public order.The mere possession of opium onsuch a ship, without being used inour territory, does not bring about inthis country those disastrous effectsthat our law contemplates onavoiding. But our courts acquire

jurisdiction when the opium arelanded from the vessel on Philippinesoil. Landing or using opium is anopen violation of Philippine laws.

(2) Not in tr ansit

U.S. vs A h Sin g, G.R. No . L -13005,

Octo ber 10, 1917

Facts:Ah Sing is a fireman of the

steamship Shun Chang, a foreignsteamer, docked at the port of Cebu.


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Defendant brought eight cans ofopium and upon inspection,authorities found said substances inhis person. A charge of illegalimportation was served against him.

Issue: Whether the crime of illegalimportation of opium in thePhilippines was committed

Held: When a foreign merchantvessel is not in transit because thePhilippines is its terminal port, theperson in possession of opium onboard the vessel is liable forimportation of opium. Importation is

completed when the ship anchored inthe Philippine port. It is notnecessary that the opium bedischarged or taken from the ship.

(3) People v s Wong Cheng , G.R. No.

L-18924, Octob er 19, 1922

Facts: Wong Cheng was accused ofhaving illegally smoked opiumaboard the merchant vesselChangsa of English nationality whilethe said vessel was anchored inManila Bay two and a half miles fromthe shores of the city. In hisdemurrer, the defendant contendedlack of jurisdiction of the court of thesaid crime.

Issue: Whether the Philippine courthad jurisdiction over the crime

committed by Wong Cheng

Held: Yes. The crime was committedin our internal waters thus our courtshave jurisdiction over the offensecommitted. The court said havingthe opium smoked within ourterritorial limits, even though aboarda foreign merchant ship, is a breachof public order, because it causessuch drugs to produce pernicious

effects in our territory.


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NOTE : Compare with US vs Ah Singwhere mere possession within ourterritory does not constitute anoffense triable in our courts.

3. Prospectivity

Penal laws cannot make an act punishable in a manner inwhich it was not punishable when committed.

a. Art. 22, RPC

Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. PenalLaws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as theyfavor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not ahabitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5

of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time ofthe publication of such laws a final sentence hasbeen pronounced and the convict is serving thesame.

b. People vs Mo ran, G.R. No. L-17905, Janu ary 27.

1923

Facts: Moran was found to have violated theelection code and was sentenced by the lowercourt. He sought reconsideration and filed aspecial motion alleging that the crime complainedof had prescribed under the provision of Sec 71,Act 3030, enacted by the legislature after hisconviction.

Issue: Whether penal laws providing prescriptionmay be given retroactive effect.

Held: Yes. The provisions of Act 3030 declaringthe offenses resulting from the violations of the

Administrative Code shall prescribe one year aftertheir commission must be given retroactive effectthe same being favorable to the accused. Anexception to the prospectivity of penal laws iswhen giving retroactive effect would favor theaccused.

c. People vs Felo teo, G.R. No. 124212, Ju ne 5,

1998

Facts: In 1995, Wilfredo Feloteo was found guilty

by the trial court of murder under Art 248 of theRPC and illegal possession of firearms, a violation


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of Sec 1 of PD 1866 and was sentenced toreclusion perpetua and 20 years respectively.

15 days after the June 21, 1997 publication, R.A.8294 took effect, amending P.D. 1866 and

reducing the penalties for simple and aggravatedforms of illegal possession of firearms.

Issue: May the law be given retroactive effect

Held: Yes. The enactment of R.A. No. 8294 canbe given retroactive effect as it favors theappellant. XXX The plain precept contained inarticle 22 of the Penal Code, declaring theretroactivity of penal laws in so far as they arefavorable to persons accused of a felony, would be

useless and nugatory if the courts of justice werenot under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespectiveof whether or not the accused has applied for it,just as would also all provisions relating to theprescription of the crime and the penalty.

C. Theories of Criminal Law

1. Classical Theory

An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. oculo prooculo, dente pro dente.

Man is a moral creature with absolute free will tochoose between good and evil, thereby placing morestress upon the effect or result of felonious acts thanupon the man.

Endeavored to establish a mechanical and directproportion between crime and penalty.

The purpose of penalty is retribution. The offender ismade to suffer the wrong he has done. There is scant

regard for the human element.

2. Positivist Theory

Man is occasionally subdued by a strange and morbidphenomenon which pushes him to do wrong in spiteor contrary to his volition.

Crime is a social and natural phenomenon, it cannotbe created and checked by application of abstractprinciples of law and jurisprudence nor imposition ofpenalties, fixed and determined a priori.

Rehabilitation by means of individual measures on

case to case basis.


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3. Mixed

A mix of the classical and positivist theories

D. Sources of Criminal Law

1. Revised Penal Code

2. Special Penal Laws

a. Penal provisions of non-penal laws (e.g. LaborCode, NIRC, etc)

b. Penal ordinances

3. Distinctions between crimes punished under the RPC andcrimes punished under special laws.

a. As to the moral trait of the offender

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code,the moral trait of the offender is considered. That iswhy liability would only arise when there is dolo orculpa in the commission of the punishable act.

Dolo (or malice) with deliberate intentCulpa(or fault) imprudence, negligence, lack offoresight, or lack of skill

In crimes punished under special laws, the moraltrait of the offender is not considered; it is enoughthat the prohibited act was voluntarily done.

b. As to good faith as a defense

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code,good faith or lack of criminal intent is a validdefense; unless the crime is the result ofculpa.

In crimes punished under special laws, good faithis not a defense.

(1) Mala in sevs mala proh ib i ta

Mala in se- Generally, mala in sefelonies are defined and penalized inthe Revised Penal Code. When theacts complained of are inherentlyimmoral, they are deemed mala inse, even if they are punished by a

special law. Accordingly, criminalintent must be clearly established


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with the other elements of the crime;otherwise, no crime is committed.

Mala pro hib i tathose acts definedand penalized by special penal laws

and where criminal intent is not, as arule, necessary, it being sufficientthat the offender has the intent toperpetrate the act prohibited by thespecial law. It is punishable becausethe prohibited act is so injurious tothe public welfare that it is the crimeitself.

(2) Garcia vs CA. G.R. No. 157171,March 14, 2006

c. As to degree of accomplishment/stages in thecommission of the crime

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code,the degree of accomplishment of the crime istaken into account in punishing the offender; thus,there are attempted, frustrated, and consummatedstages in the commission of the crime.

In crimes punished under special laws, the actgives rise to the crime only when it isconsummated; there are no attempted orfrustrated stages, unless the special law expresslypenalizes the mere attempt or frustration of thecrime.

d. As to mitigating and aggravatingcircumstances

In crimes punishable under the Revised PenalCode, mitigating and aggravating circumstancesare taken into account in imposing the penaltysince the moral trait of the offender is considered.

In crimes under the special laws, mitigating andaggravating circumstances are not taken intoaccount in imposing the penalty.

e. As to degree of participation

In crimes punished under the Revised Penal Code,when there is more than one offender, the degree


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of participation of each in the commission of thecrime is taken into account in imposing thepenalty; thus offenders are classified as principal,accomplice and accessory.

In crimes punishable under special laws, thedegree of participation of offenders is notconsidered. All who perpetrated the prohibited actare penalized to the same extent. There is noprincipal, or accomplice or accessory to consider.

4. Suppletory application of RPC

a. Ar t. 10, RPC

Article 10. Offenses not subject to the

prov is ions of th is Code. -Offenses which are orin the future may be punishable under special lawsare not subject to the provisions of this Code. ThisCode shall be supplementary to such laws, unlessthe latter should specially provide the contrary.

b. People vs Sim on , G.R. No. 93028, Ju ly 29, 1994

Facts: Oct. 22, 1988, Pampanga. Martin Simonwas convicted of violating RA 6425 AII 4(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) through aNARCOM poser-buyer. It was appealed forreversal alleging it was a frame-up & evidence wasinadmissible.

Issue: Whether the correct penalty was applied.

Held: No. There was an overlapping error in theprovisions on the penalty ofreclusion perpetua byreason of its dual imposition, that is, as themaximum of the penalty where the marijuana is

less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum ofthe penalty where the marijuana involved is 750grams or more. The same error has beencommitted with respect to the other prohibited andregulated drugs provided in said Section 20. Toharmonize such conflicting provisions in order togive effect to the whole law, the Court held that thepenalty to be imposed where the quantity of thedrugs involved is less than the quantities stated inthe first paragraph shall range from prisioncorreccionalto reclusion temporal, and not

reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant withthe fundamental rule in criminal law that all doubts


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should be construed in a manner favorable to theaccused.

E. Construction of penal laws

1. Strictly against the state and liberally in favor of theaccused

People v s Pu risim a. G.R. No. L-42050-66,

Novemb er 20, 1978

Ratio: Penal statutes must be construed strictlyagainst the state and liberally in favor of theaccused. The reason for this is that "thetenderness of the law of the rights of individuals;

the object is to establish a certain rule byconformity to which mankind would be safe, andthe discretion of the court limited." The purpose isnot to enable a guilty person to escapepunishment through a technicality but to provide aprecise definition of forbidden acts. Criminalstatutes are to be construed strictly. No personshould be brought within their terms who is notclearly within them, nor should any act bepronounced criminal which is not made clearly soby the statute.

2. Spanish text controlling

a. People vs Mangulabn an, G.R. No. L-8919,

September 28. 1956

Facts: During a robbery in a dwelling house, one ofthe culprits fired his gun upward in the ceiling, notknowing that the owner of the house was there.The slug penetrated the ceiling, hit the owner and

was killed.

Art 294 par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides,according to English text, that the crime is robberywith homicide when by reason or on occasion ofa robbery the crime of homicide shall have beencommitted.

The Spanish text of the same provision reads asfollows: Cuando con motive o con ocasion delrobo resultare homicido.


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Held: In view of the Spanish text which mustprevail, the crime committed is homicide, even ifthe homicide supervened by mere accident.

3. Repeal is the abrogation or destruction of a law by a

legislative act.

Effects of Repeal

1. If the new law makes the penalty lighter, it shall beapplied except if the offender is a habitual delinquentor when the new law is inapplicable to a pendingaction or existing causes of action.

2. If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law inforce at the time of the commission of the offenseshall be applied.

3. If the new law totally repeals the existing law makingthe act not punishable, the crime is obliterated.

a. Absolute repeal

People v s Pim entel. G.R. No. 100210, Apr il 1,

1998

Facts: 1983. Tujan was charged with subversionunder RA 1700. On June 5, 1990, Tujan wasarrested and found in his possession was a .38caliber revolver. He was subsequently chargedwith illegal possession of firearms and ammunitionin furtherance of subversion under PD 1866.Tujanfiled a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether a charge under PD 1866 may bequashed on the ground of double jeopardy in viewof the previous charge under RA 1700.

Held: No.1. Art III of the Constitution & Rule 117 ofthe Rules of Court state that for double jeopardy toattach, acquittal, conviction or dismissal inprevious cases must have occurred. In this case,the first charge was not even arraigned yet.

2. They are different offenses. RA 1700 punishessubversion while PD 1866 punishes illegalpossession of firearms.

But, RA 7636 totally repealed subversion or RA

1700, and since this is favorable to the accused,Tujan can no longer be charged with a violation of


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RA 1700 even if the defense did not raise this asan issue.

b. Repeal with re-enactment

Benedict o vs CA, G.R. No. 125359, Septemb er4, 2001

Facts: On December 27, 1991, Mrs. ImeldaMarcos and Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera wereindicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No.960 1 in relation to Section 34 of the Central BankAct (Republic Act No. 265, as amended) in fiveInformations filed with the Regional Trial Court ofManila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets alleged

that the trio failed to submit reports of their foreignexchange earnings from abroad and/or failed toregister with the Foreign Exchange Department ofthe Central Bank within the period mandated byCircular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited naturaland juridical persons from maintaining foreignexchange accounts abroad without priorauthorization from the Central Bank.

On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quashall the Informations filed against them in CriminalCases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; 91-101884to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-101969. Theirmotion was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forumshopping, absence of a preliminary investigationand extinction of criminal liability with the repeal ofCircular No. 960.

On September 6, 1994, the trial court deniedpetitioners' motion. A similar motion filed on May23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to dismiss the

dollar-salting cases against her due to the repealof Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by thetrial court in its order dated June 9, 1994.Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration,but the trial court likewise denied this motion onOctober 18, 1994.

Issue: Whether the repeal of Central Bank CircularNo. 960 and Republic Act No. 265 by Circular No.1353 and Republic Act No. 7653 respectively,extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners.


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Held: No. In the instant case, it must be notedthat despite the repeal of Circular No. 960, CircularNo. 1353 retained the same reportorialrequirement for residents receiving earnings orprofits from non-trade foreign exchange

transactions. Even the most cursory glance at therepealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353shows that both contain a saving clause, expresslyproviding that the repeal of Circular No. 960 shallhave no effect on pending actions for violation ofthe latter Circular. A saving clause operates toexcept from the effect of the repealing law whatwould otherwise be lost under the new law. In thepresent case, the respective saving clauses ofCircular Nos. 1318 and 1353 clearly manifest theintent to reserve the right of the State to prosecute

and punish offenses for violations of the repealedCircular No. 960, where the cases are eitherpending or under investigation.

F. Limitations of the power of Congress to enact penal laws1. Due process and equal protection

a. Secs. 1 and 14(1), Art III, 1987 Constitution

Sect ion 1. No person shall be deprived of life,liberty, or property without due process of law, norshall any person be denied the equal protection ofthe laws.

Section 14. (1)No person shall be held to answerfor a criminal offense without due process of law.

2. Prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of

attainder

a. Sec. 22, Art III, 1987 Constitution

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attaindershall be enacted.

Ex-post facto law is a law that:

1. Makes criminal an act done before the passageof law and which was innocent when done, and

punishes such act;


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9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005.BOCEA filed a petition for certiorari and prohibitionto declare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335, otherwiseknown as the Attrition Act of 2005, and itsImplementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)

unconstitutional, and the implementation thereofbe enjoined permanently.

BOCEA argued that RA 9335 is unconstitutionalbecause it violates Sec 22, Art III of the 1987Constitution.

Held: R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A billof attainder is a legislative act which inflictspunishment on individuals or members of aparticular group without a judicial trial. Essential to

a bill of attainder are a specification of certainindividuals or a group of individuals, the impositionof a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lackof judicial trial.

Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument oftyranny. In England a few centuries back,Parliament would at times enact bills or statuteswhich declared certain persons attainted and theirblood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality(Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366[1867]). In more modern terms, a bill of attainder isessentially a usurpation of judicial power by alegislative body. It envisages and effects theimposition of a penalty the deprivation of life orliberty or property not by the ordinary processesof judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast inthe form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (orbill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penaltyother than death) is in intent and effect a penaljudgment visited upon an identified person or

group of persons (and not upon the generalcommunity) without a prior charge or demand,without notice and hearing, without an opportunityto defend, without any of the civilized forms andsafeguards of the judicial process as we know it

3. Prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments,excessive fines

a. Sec. 19, Ar t III, 1987 Con sti tu tio n

Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not beimposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman


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punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penaltybe imposed, unless, for compelling reasonsinvolving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafterprovides for it. Any death penalty already imposedshall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, ordegrading punishment against any prisoner ordetainee or the use of substandard or inadequatepenal facilities under subhuman conditions shall bedealt with by law.

b. Perez vs Peopl e, G.R. No . 164763, Febr uary 12,2008

What constitutes cruel and unusual punishmenthas not been exactly defined. The EighthAmendment of the United States Constitution, thesource of Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rightsof our own Constitution, has yet to be put to thetest to finally determine what constitutes cruel andinhuman punishment.

Cases that have been decided described, ratherthan defined, what is meant by cruel and unusualpunishment. This is explained by thepronouncement of the United States SupremeCourt that "[t]he clause of the Constitution, in theopinion of the learned commentators, may betherefore progressive, and is not fastened to theobsolete, but may acquire meaning as publicopinion becomes enlightened by a humanejustice."

In Wilkerson v. Utah, Mr. Justice Clifford of theUnited States Supreme Court opined that

"[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define withexactness the extent of the constitutional provisionwhich provides that cruel and unusualpunishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe toaffirm that punishments of torture, x x x and allothers in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, areforbidden by that amendment to the constitution."

In In Re: Kemmler, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller of thatsame Court stated that "[p]unishments are cruelwhen they involve torture or a lingering death; but

the punishment of death is not cruel within themeaning of that word as used in the constitution. It


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implies x x x something more inhuman andbarbarous, something more than the mereextinguishment of life."

c. R.A. 9346, AN ACT PROHIBITING THEIMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THEPHILIPPINES

Republic of the PhilippinesCongress of the Philippines

Metro Manila

Thirteenth CongressSecond Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand and five.

Republic Act No. 9346 June 24, 2006

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congressassembled:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, RepublicAct No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as theAct Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven ThousandSix Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and allother laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are herebyrepealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.

(a) the penalty ofreclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of thenomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use ofthe nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences willbe reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under ActNo. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week forthree consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation of the names of personsconvicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment by reason of this Actwho are being considered or recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided, however, Thatnothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section

19, Article VII of the Constitutions.


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SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers ofgeneral circulation.

Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILONPresident of the Senate JOSE DE VENECIA JR.Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2254 and House Bill No. 4826 was finallypassed bu the Senate and the House of Representative on July 7, 2006.

OSCAR G. YABESSecretary of Senate

ROBERTO P. NAZARENOSecretary General

House of Represenatives

Approved: June 24, 2006

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOPresident of the Philippines

Criminal Law Rev Part 1

Documents

Transcript of Criminal Law Rev Part 1