Here are select October 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and jurisprudence:1.REVISED PENAL CODEConspiracy; concept; proof of conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence. Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano. On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money. The Supreme Court held otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the Tamaraw FX at the Nichols Tollgate. Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested during the rescue operation. It has been held that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. Further, proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victims house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted. Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.People of the Philippines v. Halil Gambao, et al,G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013.Murder; treachery. The Supreme Court (SC) found that the qualifying circumstance of treachery wasproperly appreciated by the lower courts. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense that the offended party might make. The SC has ruled that treachery is present when an assailant takes advantage of a situation in which the victim is asleep,unaware of the evil design, or has just awakened.It has been established by the prosecution, and even confirmed by the defense, that the victims were sleeping when they were shot. To be precise, it was Emeterio who was asleep when he was shot, considering that the women were able to cry for help before the rapid firing that silenced them. In any case, it was clear that the women were in no position to defend themselves, having been rudely awakened by the shooting of theircompanion. The fact that they shouted for help also showed their loss ofhope in the face of what was coming rapid gunfire from long firearms. Thus, it has been established that appellants killed Emeterio, Porferia and Analiza. Appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the crime is properly denominated as murder.People of the Philippines v. Ricardo Dearo, Paulino Luage and Wilfredo Toledo,G.R. No. 190862, October 9, 2013.Rape; delay in reporting the crime.The failure of AAA to report her ordeal is not unique in her case. Many victims of rape would choose to suffer in silence rather than put the life of their loved ones in danger. It is well entrenched that delay in reporting rape cases does not by itself undermine the charge, where the delay is grounded in threats from the accused. Delay in revealing the commission of a crime such as rape does not necessarily render such charge unworthy ofbelief. This is because the victim may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit the complainant.People of the Philippines v. Florentino Galagar, Jr.,G.R. No. 202842, October 9, 2013.Rape; medical examination as corroborative evidence; the examining physician is expected to testify only on the fact that he examined the victim and on the results of the examination. The Supreme Court did not give credence to appellants imputation that the examining physician was unsure as to what caused AAAs hymenal lacerations. It must be stressed that the examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined the victim and on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on the nature, extent and location of the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial) found, among others, that AAA suffered hymenal lacerations. This refers to the location and nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be expected to establish the cause of such lacerations with particularity because he has no personal knowledge of how these hymenal lacerations were inflicted on AAA. He could only surmise that the lacerations could have been caused by activities like cycling, horseback riding or the insertion of [a] hard object into the vagina of the victim such as the penis. In any case, a medical examination is not even indispensable in prosecuting a rape charge. In fact, an accuseds conviction for rape may be anchored solely on the testimony of the victim. At best, the medical examination would only serve as corroborative evidence.People of the Philippines v. Marciano Cial y Lorena,G.R. No. 191362, October 9, 2013.Rape; statutory rape; elements. Rape of a minor under 12 years of age is statutory rape. The elements ofstatutory rape are that: (a) the victim is a female under 12 years or is demented; and (b) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim. Neither the use of force, threat or intimidation on the female, nor the females deprivation ofreason or being otherwise unconscious, nor the employment on the female offraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority is necessary to commit statutory rape. In statutory rape, there are only two elements that need to be established, to wit: 1) carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse; and 2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily established the fact of carnal knowledge. It is likewise beyond dispute that AAA was only 11 years of age at the time she was raped. Her Certificate of Live Birth showed that she was born on November 26, 1992. The lower courts therefore correctly held appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo De Jesus y Mendoza,G.R. No. 190622, October 7, 2013.2.SPECIAL PENAL LAWSComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act; chain of custody; a 45% difference in the reported weight of the drugs from the time of the arrest to the time of the receipt by the laboratory for testing implies tampering of evidence. The Court of Appeals said that the chain ofcustody of the seized drugs does not appear to be unbroken. The Supreme Court (SC) held otherwise. The PDEA report to the Provincial Prosecutors Office, the booking sheet and arrest report, the Certificate of Inventory, and the laboratory examination request all put down the seized shabu as weighing 0.4 gram. The forensic chemist reported and testified, however, that the police actually submitted only 0.2204 gram ofshabu for laboratory testing, short by 0.1796 gram from what the police inventoried. It therefore suffered a loss of 45% or nearly half of the original weight. The prosecution has three theories: only two chemists served the entire region giving rise to possible error; the police and the crime laboratory used different weighing scales; and the failure of the laboratory to take into account the weight of the sachet container. But these are mere speculations since none of those involved was willing to admit having committed weighing error. Speculations cannot overcome the concrete evidence that what was seized was not what was forensically tested. This implies tampering with the prosecution evidence. Hence, because of the compromised evidence, the SC did not affirm the conviction of Pornillos.People of the Philippines v. Jovi Pornillos y Hallare,G.R. No. 201109, October 2, 2013.3.CRIMINAL PROCEDURECriminal case; when appeal is to be taken.Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. In this case, the judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime of Estafa was promulgated on March 25, 2009. Instead of filing a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of judgment, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a motion to lift warrant of arrest and to reinstate bail bond three (3) months later. It was only in November 2010 or more than a year later since the RTC denied her motion that the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) her motion to admit notice of appeal. At that point, her judgment of conviction has already attained finality and cannot be modified or set aside anymore in accordance with Section 7, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error in denying the petitioners motion inasmuch as by the time the petitioner filed the same, the appellate court was already bereft of any jurisdiction to entertain the motion.Anita Ramirez v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 197832, October 2, 2013.Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and procedure:1.REVISED PENAL CODEEstafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; elements. In order to constitute estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender. The essential elements of this crime are the following: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas,G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; what the law punishes is fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check. Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases.People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas,G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.Evident premeditation; requisites. In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and, (3) sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, the courts below based their finding of evident premeditation on the entries in the Dispatch Logbook, the alleged pretense made by the appellant and cohorts that they were going to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, as well as the telephone call made by the victim to his friend Reyes before the incident. To the Supreme Courts mind, however, these circumstances do not constitute clear and positive evidence of outward acts showing a premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are indicative only of conspiracy among the accused. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt. Notably, even the Office of the Solicitor General admitted that the lapse of time from the moment the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient for appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act.People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig,G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.Qualified rape; knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim. Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However, such knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in the Information since a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. In this case, appellants knowledge of the mental disability of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime of rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. As found by the lower courts, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the mental retardation of AAA. Appellant testified that he knew AAA and that he even used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In fact, he regarded AAA as his niece. His boarding house was also a few minutes away from the residence of AAA. He also admitted that AAA was known to be mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA was easily noticeable to the trial court from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the course of her testimony. Further, the Supreme Court stressed that from the filing of this case until its appeal, appellant did not assail AAAs mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her intellectual inadequacy. Thus, appellants knowledge of AAAs mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified rape.People of the Philippines v. Jojie Suansing,G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013.Rape; the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina is not a defense. In an effort to secure his exoneration from the charge of rape, Rivera pointed out that the records were bereft of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal lacerations. The Supreme Court held that the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina, however, does not negate sexual intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Accordingly, granting arguendo that AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it was clearly established that he did succeed in having carnal knowledge of her. At any rate, it has been repeatedly held that the medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to a conviction.People of the Philippines v. Christopher Rivera y Royo,G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013.Self-defense; burden of proof in self-defense. Appellant faults the Court of Appeals (CA) when it imposed on him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. He claims it was PO3 Ventinilla who acted in self-defense and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the latter to establish such fact. He avers that his defense is denial as found by the trial court. Obviously, appellant was confused. It must be noted that he was the only witness who testified on the circumstances surrounding the tragic death of the victim. It was he who supplied the necessary evidence showing that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding of Dr. Bernales that there are more than one assailant in view of the multiple bullet wounds on the body of the victim, appellant insists it was only PO3 Ventinilla who killed the victim. However, neither PO3 Ventinilla nor the victim could be resurrected from their graves to controvert appellants version of the story. Besides, in the Counter-Affidavit of SPO4 Miraples, appellants co-accused, he stated therein that appellant acted in self-defense when the victim allegedly went berserk. More important, in his Answer to the administrative complaint filed by the victims widow, appellant interposed self-defense by alleging that it was the victim who initiated the attack through unlawful aggression. Hence, the CA committed no error in imposing upon him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense.People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig,G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.2.SPECIAL PENAL LAWSAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. In all, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding him guilty of the violating section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the following elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,judicial or official functions; 2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith orgross inexcusable negligence; and3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those mandatedunder theLocal Government Code of 1991 were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing badfaith and manifest partiality. It must be borne to mind that any procurement or acquisition ofsupplies or property by local government units shall be through competitivepublic bidding. The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a negotiatedcontract a representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in without any verification. As a Governor, he must know that negotiatedcontract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is, there is no public bidding to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on his own initiative andwithout authorization from the Provincial School Board.Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. The same thing can be said about the act of petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft knowing that such documents would cause the withdrawal by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit. It must be noted that any withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) must be accompanied by the appropriate document evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft and sales invoice, petitioner made it possible for CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw the entire P5,666,600.00 without any delivery of the items. As the records would bear, the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16 April 1997, contains the signature of the accused as customer. Above the customers signature is the phrase: Received and accepted the above items in good condition. The significance of the customers signature on the invoice is that it initiates the process of releasing the payment to the seller. This is all that the LBP needs in order to release the money alloted for the purchase. Unfortunately, despite receipt of payment, it was almost a year after when delivery of the items was made on a piece meal basis-some of which were even defective. The Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be exonerated. On the contrary, evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique and giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz committed through gross inexcusable negligence was proven beyond reasonable doubt.Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.Chain of custody rule; legal effect of failure to prove chain of custody. The chain of custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In this case, the Supreme Court found reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody. First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the police station, was made in the presence of the accused or his representative. Thus, there is already a gap in determining whether the specimens that entered into the chain were actually the ones examined and offered in evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to the law. There is nothing in the records that would show at least an attempt to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither was there any justifiable reason propounded for failing to do so. Third, the Supreme Court found conflicting testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs. The material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. The gaps in the chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the specimens seized from the accused were the same specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence. Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand.People of the Philippines v. Freddy Salonga y Afiado,G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013.3.CRIMINAL PROCEDUREArraignment; purpose. Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime.Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.Arraignment; the need for arraignment where the complaint or information is amended. The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This, however, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense. Further, an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution. Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner.Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.Preliminary investigation; the conduct of preliminary investigation belongs to the public prosecutor. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. Thus, the rule is that the Supreme Court (SC) will not interfere in the findings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the other complaints, the SC agreed with the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately supported by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors discretion with its own. Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous conclusions, this error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion.Rosalinda Punzalan, Randall Punzalan and Rainier Punzalan v. Michael Gamaliel J. Plata and Ruben Plata,G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013.Here are select September 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and procedure:1.REVISED PENAL CODEEstafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; elements. In order to constitute estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender. The essential elements of this crime are the following: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to the payee thereof.People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas,G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code; what the law punishes is fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of a worthless check. In this case, the Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Caada because of the postdated check the latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the insufficiency of funds. In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that it was accused Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check. Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over the telephone. Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like Caada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Caada. It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check. Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases.People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Reyes Wagas,G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013.Evident premeditation; requisites. In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) the time when accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has clung to his determination; and, (3) sufficient lapse of time between such a determination and the actual execution to allow the accused time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, the courts below based their finding of evident premeditation on the entries in the Dispatch Logbook, the alleged pretense made by the appellant and cohorts that they were going to conduct a police operation regarding illegal drugs, as well as the telephone call made by the victim to his friend Reyes before the incident. To the Supreme Courts mind, however, these circumstances do not constitute clear and positive evidence of outward acts showing a premeditation to kill. At most, these circumstances are indicative only of conspiracy among the accused. Settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. It must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or persistent attempt. Notably, even the Office of the Solicitor General admitted that the lapse of time from the moment the victim was fetched until the shooting cannot be considered sufficient for appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act.People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig,G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.Qualified rape; knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim. Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape qualifies and makes it punishable by death. However, such knowledge by the rapist should be alleged in the Information since a crime can only be qualified by circumstances pleaded in the indictment. In this case, appellants knowledge of the mental disability of AAA at the time of the commission of the crime of rape was properly alleged in the Amended Information. As found by the lower courts, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the mental retardation of AAA. Appellant testified that he knew AAA and that he even used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated as a member of their family. In fact, he regarded AAA as his niece. His boarding house was also a few minutes away from the residence of AAA. He also admitted that AAA was known to be mentally retarded in their community. The low intellect of AAA was easily noticeable to the trial court from the answers she gave to the questions propounded to her in the course of her testimony. Further, the Supreme Court stressed that from the filing of this case until its appeal, appellant did not assail AAAs mental disability and even admitted knowledge of her intellectual inadequacy. Thus, appellants knowledge of AAAs mental disability at the time of the commission of the crime qualifies the crime of rape. Appellant is therefore guilty of the crime of qualified rape.People of the Philippines v. Jojie Suansing,G.R. No. 189822, September 2, 2013.Rape; the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina is not a defense. In an effort to secure his exoneration from the charge of rape, Rivera pointed out that the records were bereft of evidence to prove that AAA suffered vaginal lacerations. The Supreme Court held that the lack of lacerated wounds in the vagina, however, does not negate sexual intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, even if considered the most telling and irrefutable physical evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of rape. In the context used in the Revised Penal Code, carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured. Accordingly, granting arguendo that AAA did not suffer any laceration, Rivera would still be guilty of rape after it was clearly established that he did succeed in having carnal knowledge of her. At any rate, it has been repeatedly held that the medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to a conviction.People of the Philippines v. Christopher Rivera y Royo,G.R. No. 200508, September 4, 2013.Self-defense; burden of proof in self-defense. Appellant faults the Court of Appeals (CA) when it imposed on him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense. He claims it was PO3 Ventinilla who acted in self-defense and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the latter to establish such fact. He avers that his defense is denial as found by the trial court. Obviously, appellant was confused. It must be noted that he was the only witness who testified on the circumstances surrounding the tragic death of the victim. It was he who supplied the necessary evidence showing that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Contrary to the undisputed finding of Dr. Bernales that there are more than one assailant in view of the multiple bullet wounds on the body of the victim, appellant insists it was only PO3 Ventinilla who killed the victim. However, neither PO3 Ventinilla nor the victim could be resurrected from their graves to controvert appellants version of the story. Besides, in the Counter-Affidavit of SPO4 Miraples, appellants co-accused, he stated therein that appellant acted in self-defense when the victim allegedly went berserk. More important, in his Answer to the administrative complaint filed by the victims widow, appellant interposed self-defense by alleging that it was the victim who initiated the attack through unlawful aggression. Hence, the CA committed no error in imposing upon him the burden of proving the elements of self-defense.People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Alfredo Alawig,G.R. No. 187731, September 18, 2013.2.SPECIAL PENAL LAWSAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. In all, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding him guilty of the violating section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the following elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,judicial or official functions; 2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith orgross inexcusable negligence; and3) That his action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those mandatedunder theLocal Government Code of 1991 were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the school desks and armchairs, despite non-delivery an act or omission evidencing badfaith and manifest partiality. It must be borne to mind that any procurement or acquisition ofsupplies or property by local government units shall be through competitivepublic bidding. The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a negotiatedcontract a representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in without any verification. As a Governor, he must know that negotiatedcontract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is, there is no public bidding to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to protect government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that petitioner acted on his own initiative andwithout authorization from the Provincial School Board.Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. The same thing can be said about the act of petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft knowing that such documents would cause the withdrawal by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit. It must be noted that any withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) must be accompanied by the appropriate document evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft and sales invoice, petitioner made it possible for CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw the entire P5,666,600.00 without any delivery of the items. As the records would bear, the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16 April 1997, contains the signature of the accused as customer. Above the customers signature is the phrase: Received and accepted the above items in good condition. The significance of the customers signature on the invoice is that it initiates the process of releasing the payment to the seller. This is all that the LBP needs in order to release the money alloted for the purchase. Unfortunately, despite receipt of payment, it was almost a year after when delivery of the items was made on a piece meal basis-some of which were even defective. The Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be exonerated. On the contrary, evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique and giving of unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz committed through gross inexcusable negligence was proven beyond reasonable doubt.Jovito C. Plameras v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013.Chain of custody rule; legal effect of failure to prove chain of custody. The chain of custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In this case, the Supreme Court found reasonable doubt on the evidence presented to prove an unbroken chain of custody. First, it is not clear from the evidence that the marking, which was done in the police station, was made in the presence of the accused or his representative. Thus, there is already a gap in determining whether the specimens that entered into the chain were actually the ones examined and offered in evidence. Second, the prosecution failed to duly accomplish the Certificate of Inventory and to take photos of the seized items pursuant to the law. There is nothing in the records that would show at least an attempt to comply with this procedural safeguard; neither was there any justifiable reason propounded for failing to do so. Third, the Supreme Court found conflicting testimony and glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity of the handling of the seized drugs. The material inconsistency of who actually received the specimens in the Crime Laboratory creates a cloud of doubt as to whether the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. The gaps in the chain of custody creates a reasonable doubt as to whether the specimens seized from the accused were the same specimens brought to the laboratory and eventually offered in court as evidence. Without adequate proof of the corpus delicti, the conviction cannot stand.People of the Philippines v. Freddy Salonga y Afiado,G.R. No. 194948, September 2, 2013.3.CRIMINAL PROCEDUREArraignment; purpose. Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. It is at this stage that the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is only imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime.Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.Arraignment; the need for arraignment where the complaint or information is amended. The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or complaint. This, however, pertains only to substantial amendments and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in the date of the commission of the offense. Further, an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense nor alter the theory of the prosecution. Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner.Letecia I. Kummer v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013.Preliminary investigation; the conduct of preliminary investigation belongs to the public prosecutor. The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. Thus, the rule is that the Supreme Court (SC) will not interfere in the findings of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it characterized the complaint for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the other complaints, the SC agreed with the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately supported by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors discretion with its own. Evidently, the conclusions arrived at by the DOJ were neither whimsical nor capricious as to be corrected by certiorari. Even on the assumption that the DOJ Secretary made erroneous conclusions, this error alone would not subject his act to correction or annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. After all, not every erroneous conclusion of law or fact is an abuse of discretion.Rosalinda Punzalan, Randall Punzalan and Rainier Punzalan v. Michael Gamaliel J. Plata and Ruben Plata,G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013.Here are select August 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and procedure:1.Revised Penal CodeCrime of Open Disobedience; elements. The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 46400 for lack of probable cause. The dismissal ought to be sustained since the records clearly disclose the unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the crime of Open Disobedience. While the first element, i.e., that the offender is a judicial or executive officer, concurs in view of Atty. Frias position as Branch Clerk of Court, the second and third elements of the crime evidently remain wanting. To elucidate, the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience is that there is a judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued with all legal formalities. In this case, it is undisputed that all the proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 have been regarded as null and void due to Branch 203s lack of jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, since it is explicitly required that the subject issuance be made within the scope of a superior authoritys jurisdiction, it cannot therefore be doubted that the second element of the crime of Open Disobedience does not exist. Proceeding from this discussion, the third element of the crime, i.e., that the offender, without any legal justification, openly refuses to execute the said judgment, decision, or order, which he is duty bound to obey, cannot equally exist. Indubitably, without any jurisdiction, there would be no legal order for Atty. Fria to implement or, conversely, disobey.The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda and Aseoche, et al v. Atty. Josejina C. Fria,G.R. No. 183014, August 7, 2013.Extinguishment of criminal liability by the death of the accused prior to final judgment; effect of death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction on his civil liability ex delicto. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code states that, Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Supreme Court (SC) of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the SC was still pending and unresolved. The SC ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death. Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the SCs Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the SC still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.People of the Philippines v. Anastacio Amistoso y Broca,G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013.Rape; the absence of laceration and semen; complete or full penetration of the complainants private parts not necessary. With regard to the results of the medical examination, the Supreme Court ruled that the absence of laceration and semen does not preclude the fact that rape has been committed. In the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the complainants private part is not at all necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen essential. What is fundamental is that the entry or at the very least the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the complainants vagina, consummates the crime. Likewise, the absence of semen in AAAs vaginal area would not preclude a finding of rape. The presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial because the presence of spermatozoa is not an element of rape. Moreover, it has been held that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina could be due to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the vagina, the acidity of the vagina or the washing of the vagina immediately after sexual intercourse.People of the Philippines v. Apolinario Manalili y Jose,G.R. No. 191253, August 28, 2013.2.Special Penal LawsIll-gotten Wealth; E.O. No. 1, Series of 1986; the mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate of Marcos. There are two concurring elements that must be present before assets or properties can be considered as ill-gotten wealth, namely: (a) they must have originated from the government itself, and (b) they must have been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal means. As can be gleaned from the above, evidentiary substantiation of the allegations of how the wealth was illegally acquired and by whom was necessary. For that purpose, the mere holding of a position in the Marcos administration did not necessarily make the holder a close associate within the context of E.O. No.1. Indeed, a prima facie showing must be made to show that one unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of a close association or relation with President Marcos and/or his wife. It would not suffice, then, that one served during the administration of President Marcos as a government official or employee. In this case, the Republic particularly insists that Luz Bakunawa served as the Social Secretary or the Assistant Social Secretary of First Lady Marcos, and mentions several other circumstances that indicated her close relationship with the Marcoses. However, Luz Bakunawa maintains that she was not First Lady Marcos Social Secretary, but a mere member of the staff of the Social Secretary; and that the assets of the Bakunawas were honestly earned and acquired well within the legitimate income of their businesses. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the evidence of the Republic was able to establish, at best, that Luz Bakunawa had been an employee in Malacaang Palace during the Marcos administration, and did not establish her having a close relationship with the Marcoses, or her having abused her position or employment in order to amass the assets subject of this case. Consequently, Luz Bakunawa could not be considered a close associate or subordinate of the Marcoses within the context of E.O. No. 1 and E.O. No. 2.Republic of the Philippines represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Luz Reyes Bakunawa, et al,G.R. No. 180418, August 28, 2013.Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; chain of custody. The Supreme Court here held that while there were indeed five sachets of suspected shabu sold to the poseur-buyer, there were still more broken links in the chain of custody. In this case, one broken link was that of the turnover of the seized items from the buy-bust team to the police investigator, SPO1 Doria. PO2 Dizon testified that after he placed the marking on the five sachets of suspected shabu, he turned them over to SPO1 Doria and the specimens were submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. However, SPO1 Doria did not testify before the trial court so as to shed light on this matter. Still another broken link was that involving the transfer of the drug specimens from SPO1 Doria to the crime laboratory. P/Sr. Insp. Perez testified that the request for laboratory examination and drug specimens were first received by PO2 Bagaoisan, the Duty Desk Officer. The latter then called her to physically receive the same. However, P/Sr. Insp. Perez stated that she did not actually see if it was SPO1 Doria who transmitted the specimens. She merely relied on the stamp of PO2 Bagaoisan. Furthermore, PO2 Bagaoisan was not presented in court to prove that it was indeed SPO1 Doria who delivered the drug specimens to the crime laboratory. In view of the evident breaks in the chain of custody, very serious doubts arise as to the identity of the seized illegal drugs in this case. Apparently, there can be no absolute certainty if the sachets of shabu seized from the informant were the very same drugs handed by accused-appellant, or, later on, the same drugs transmitted to the crime laboratory and eventually presented before the trial court. Accused-appellant was thus acquitted of the crime charged.People of the Philippines v. Rogelia Jardinel Pepino-Consulta,G.R. No. 191071, August 28, 2013.Illegal Sale Of Dangerous Drugs; elements. For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti. The prosecution duly established the identity of accused-appellant as a drug seller or pusher, through the testimonies of PO2 Ibaez, the poseur-buyer, and PO3 Allauigan, as back-up officer. PO2 Ibaez testified that it was to accused-appellant that he handed the marked Php100.00 bill for the shabu that he bought on March 23, 2007; and that accused-appellant was the one who took out of his coin purse a plastic sachet containing shabu. Both PO2 Ibaez and PO3 Allauigan identified accused-appellant as the one they arrested during the buy-bust operation. Indeed in the instant case, all the elements constituting the illegal sale of dangerous drug are present. The sale of shabu was consummated. The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are mere minor matters, which do not detract from the fact that a buy-bust operation was conducted.People of the Philippines v. Ryan Blanco y Sangkula,G.R. No. 193661, August 14, 2013.RA 3019, Sec. 3(e); elements. The elements of the crime charged under section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as follows: 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan correctly found the concurrence of the three elements. First, petitioner, being the city engineer of Cebu, is undisputedly a public officer. Second, the failure of petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the canal was to be built because of his unfounded belief that it was public land constitutes gross inexcusable negligence. In his own testimony, petitioner impliedly admitted that it fell squarely under his duties to check the ownership of the land with the Register of Deeds. Yet he concluded that it was public land based solely on his evaluation of its appearance, i.e. that it looked swampy. Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established. The cutting down of her palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to private complainant did not end with the canals construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private property by using the canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and waste disposal site.Antonio B. Sanchez v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 187340, August 14, 2013.3.Criminal ProcedureConsolidation of Criminal Cases; when consolidation of cases is not advisable. As can be gleaned from the summary of charges in the Neri case and the Abalos case, the inculpatory acts complained of, the particulars and specifications for each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they were allegedly done in connection with the negotiations for and the implementation of the NBN Project. Due to this variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in the pre-trial order in the Neri case are also different from the list of the peoples witnesses lined up to testify in the Abalos case, albeit some names appear in both the pre-trial orders. This can be easily seen by a simple comparison of the list of witnesses to be presented in the cases consolidated. A consolidation of the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute thereby delaying the resolution of his case. What is more, there is a significant difference in the number of witnesses to be presented in the two cases. In fact, the number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just half of that in Abalos. Awaiting the completion in due course of the presentation of the witnesses in Abalos would doubtless stall the disposition of the case against petitioner as there are more or less 35 prosecution witnesses listed in People v. Abalos who are not so listed in People v. Neri. In the concrete, this means, in the minimum, awaiting the completion of the testimonies of 35 additional witnesses, whose testimonies are unrelated to the charges against him, before the case against petitioner may finally be disposed of, one way or another. Also, petitioner will be exposed to an extra 35 irrelevant testimonies which even exceed those relating to his case, since the prosecution only has roughly about 26 witnesses for his case. Further still, any delay in the presentation of any of the witnesses in People v. Abalos would certainly affect the speedy disposition of the case against petitioner. At the end of the day, the assailed consolidation, instead of contributing to the swift dispensation of justice and affording the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases, would achieve the exact opposite.Romulo L. Neri v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 202243, August 7, 2013.Intervention of Private Prosecutor In Perjury Case. Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), it is nonetheless erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor. In the light of the foregoing, the MTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion to exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor.Lee Pue Liong a.k.a. Paul Lee v. Chua Pue Chin Lee,G.R. No. 181658, August 7, 2013.Probable Cause; concept.Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged should be present.Masayuki Hasegawa v. Leila F. Giron,G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.Preliminary Investigation; only evidence to support a finding of probable cause, not a conviction, needed for preliminary investigation. All elements of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code were sufficiently averred in the complaint-affidavit in this case and were sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime may have been committed and petitioner may have committed it. Respondent, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a vehicle. They were detained for more than 24 hours. Whether or not the accusations would result in a conviction is another matter. It is enough, for purposes of the preliminary investigation that the acts complained of constitute the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The Investigating Prosecutor, however, ruled that the kidnapping and serious illegal detention charge is a mere fabrication. The Supreme Court said that the Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of probable cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be passed upon in a full-blown trial where testimonies and documents could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of prosecutions evidence in support of the charge. The validity and merits of a partys defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.Masayuki Hasegawa v. Leila F. Giron,G.R. No. 184536, August 14, 2013.Here are select April 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and procedure:1.REVISED PENAL CODEConspiracy; conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interest. Spouses Betty and Monico were among the ten accused convicted by the trial court for kidnapping a certain Albert Yam for ransom. Although Betty and Monico did not participate in actually abducting Albert, it was in their abandoned house where Albert was brought to by the eight other accused. Also, Betty and Monico twice visited the safehouse where Albert was brought, with Betty serving food for Albert and Monico assisting the latter in climbing up and down the stairs. The Supreme Court considered them as co-conspirators. In a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the place where the victim is to be detained is logically a primary consideration. In the case of Betty and Monico, it can be reasonably inferred that the house fitted the purpose of the kidnappers. Alberts detention was accomplished not solely by reason of the restraint exerted upon him by the presence of guards in the safehouse, but by the circumstance of being put in a place where escape became highly improbable. In other words, Betty and Monico were indispensable in the kidnapping of Albert because they knowingly and purposely provided the venue to detain Albert. The spouses ownership of the safehouse, Monicos presence therein during Alberts arrival on the evening of April 7, 2002 and Bettys visits to bring food reasonably indicate that they were among those who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and participated in the execution of the criminal design. The conviction of Betty and Monico was affirmed.People of the Philippines v. Betty Salvador y Tabios, et al,G.R. No. 201443, April 10, 2013.Rape; the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim. The accused was charged and convicted for raping his 13-year old daughter. On appeal, the accused reiterated his defense that the testimony of the victim was highly incredible and illogical. The Supreme Court disagreed with the contention of the accused. The victim was able to describe in detail how accused mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against her will, one night in April 1998. The testimony being frank, probable, logical and conclusive, the Court gave credence to it. There is a plethora of cases which tend to disfavor the accused in a rape case by holding that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been committed and, where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof. Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family, including herself, to a lifetime of shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape. Hence, the Supreme Court sustained the conviction of the accused.People of the Philippines v. Edmundo Vitero,G.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013.Robbery with homicide; all felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into felony of robbery with homicide. The accused were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, after accosting sisters AA and BB along a street in Olongapo City one evening, taking the bag of AA which contained money and fatally stabbing BB. On appeal, the accused argued that robbery was not sufficiently proved and that they should only be convicted for homicide. The Supreme Court ruled that in robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. The actions of the three accused, from the deprivation of the AA of her personal belongings by one of the accused to the stabbing of the victim BB by the other two accused are clear and indubitable proofs of a concerted effort to deprive AA and BB of their personal belongings, and that by reason or on the occasion of the said robbery, stabbed and killed victim BB.People of the Philippines v. Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al.,G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013.Self-defense; no self-defense where there is no unlawful aggression. The accused alleged that he stabbed the victim out of self-defense, i.e., after the latter took hold of a soldering iron, but was nonetheless convicted for the crime of homicide. That the victim indeed attempted to attack him using the soldering iron was however belied by two witnesses of the prosecution. The Supreme Court did not give credence to the allegation of self-defense and affirmed his conviction. For the first element of unlawful aggression to be present, jurisprudence dictates that there must be an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to ones life. Having failed to prove that the victim attacked him with the soldering iron, the accused cannot be said to have acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim.Sergio Sombol v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 194564, April 10, 2013.2.SPECIAL PENAL LAWSP.D. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law); presentation of sales invoice or receipt provides proof of a legitimate transaction which is disputable. The accused was charged with violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law, after he was found, in a buy-bust operation, to have possessed 13 of the 38 Firestone tires stolen from the owner AA. In his defense, accused alleged that he bought the tires from a certain store named Gold Link, as evidenced by a sales invoice issued in his name. The Supreme Court ruled that the defense of legitimate transaction is disputable and has in fact been disputed in this case. The validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. Ong failed to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut theprima faciepresumption under section 5 of P.D. 1612.Jaime Ong y Ong v. People of the Philippines,G.R. No. 190475, April 10, 2013.R. A. 6426; Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; the crime of unlawful sale ofmarijuananecessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. The accused invoked on appeal his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him because the trial court convicted him for the crime of unlawful possession of marijuana under section 8 of R.A. 6426, although the information had charged him for unlawful sale of marijuana under section 4 of R.A. 6426. The Supreme Court held that the crime of illegal sale ofmarijuanaimplied prior possession of themarijuana.As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was not violated simply because the information had precisely charged him with selling, delivering, giving away and distributing more or less 750 grams of driedmarijuanaleaves. Thus, he had been sufficiently given notice that he was also to be held to account for possessing more or less 750 grams of driedmarijuanaleaves.People of the Philippines v. Chad Manansala y Lagman,G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013.R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; chain of custody must be proved for a charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to succeed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of the accused where the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs alleged to have been sold by the accused to the poseur buyer. Although the police officer testified that he had marked the sachet of shabu with his own initials following arrest of the accused, he did not explain, either in his court testimony or in the joint affidavit of arrest, whether his marking had been done in the presence of the accused, or done immediately upon the arrest of the accused. Nor did he show by testimony or otherwise who had taken custody of the sachet of shabu after he had done his marking, and who had subsequently brought the sachet of shabu to the police station, and, still later on, to the laboratory. Given the possibility of just anyone bringing any quantity of shabu to the laboratory for examination, there is now no assurance that the quantity presented here as evidence was the same article that had been the subject of the sale by the accused. The indeterminateness of the identities of the individuals who could have handled the sachet of shabu after the police officers marking broke the chain of custody, and tainted the integrity of the shabu ultimately presented as evidence to the trial court.People of the Philippines v. Alberto Gonzales y Santos aka Takyo,G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013.R.A. No. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; presence of the barangay captain or any elected official notrequiredduring the buy-bust operation, but only during the physical inventory conducted immediately thereafter. The accused argued on appeal that the trial court failed to consider the procedural flaws committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Among others, accused alleged that the barangay captain, was not present during the alleged buy-bust operation. He was only asked to sign the inventory of the seized items shortly after his arrival at the scene of the buy-bust operation. Thus, he has no personal knowledge as to whether the drugs allegedly seized from the accused were indeed recovered from them. The Supreme Court ruled that it is enough that the barangay captain is present during the physical inventory immediately conducted after the seizure and confiscation of the drugs and he signs the copies of the inventory and is given a copy thereof. Also, thebarangaycaptain, not only positively identified both accused, but also identified the items contained in the inventory receipt. Such testimony clearly established compliance with the requirement of Section 21with regard to the presence and participation of the elected public official.People of the Philippines v. Gerry Octavio y Florendo and Reynaldo Cario y Martir,G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013.R.A. 9165;Dangerous Drugs Law; where noncompliance of the chain of custody rule is justified. The accused argued that the chain of custody of the illegal drug, which was confiscated upon her arrest, was not strictly followed. Specifically, the illegal drug was marked only in the police station, not in the place where the buy-bust operation took place. The prosecution explained that the police officers did not have the opportunity to mark the illegal drug in the place where accused was arrested because the latter had become hysterical and had caused a commotion. The Supreme Court ruled that while the procedural guidelines laid out in section 21(1), Article II of R.A. 9165 were not strictly complied with, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in evidence in this case were duly preserved in consonance with the chain of custody rule. The arresting officer was justified in marking the seized plastic sachet ofshabuat the police station, instead of at the scene of the buy-bust operation because he had no choice but to immediately extricate himself and the accused from the crime scene in order to forestall a potentially dangerous situation. Thereafter, the arresting officer turned the illegal drug over to the investigating officer, who then had it tested in the Crime Laboratory Office of the Manila Police District. Substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible. The conviction of the accused was affirmed.People of the Philippines v. Lolita Quesido y Badarang,G.R. No. 189351, April 10, 2013.R.A. 9165; Dangerous Drugs Law; where seized items deemed admissible in evidence despite failure of arresting officers to comply strictly with the procedural requirements relative to the seizure and custody of the drugs. The accused argued on appeal that the trial court failed to consider the procedural flaws committed by the arresting officers in the seizure and custody of drugs as embodied in section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, of R.A. 9165. Among others, accused allege that no photograph was taken of the items seized from them. In dismissing the appeal of the accused, the Supreme Court held that even if the arresting officers failed to take a photograph of the seized drugs as required, such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural requirements provided for in section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused will not be affected.People of the Philippines v. Gerry Octavio y Florendo and Reynaldo Cario y Martir,G.R. No. 199219, April 3, 2013.3.CRIMINAL PROCEDUREAppellate review;the trial courts factual findings are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect; these factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The accused were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide, after accosting sisters AA and BB along a street in Olongapo City one evening, taking the bag of AA which contained money and fatally stabbing BB. On appeal, the accused attacked the credibility of AA as a witness by citing the alleged inconsistencies in her testimony. In finding against the accused, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that findings of the trial court on such matters involving the credibility of witnesses cannot be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case. AA is more than just an eyewitness, she is a surviving victim of the crime. Her testimony, as described by the RTC, was categorical and straightforward. AA had positively identified all the accused. There is therefore no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court.People of thePhilippines v.Welvin Diu y Kotsesa, et al.,G.R. No. 201449, April 3, 2013.Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged. In this case, accused was convicted by the trial court for carnapping with homicide, aggravated by the circumstance that the offense was committed by a member of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the Revised Peanal Code, as amended by RA 7659, although the said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the information. As a result, on appeal, the Supreme Court held that since there is no allegation in the information that accused was a member of a syndicate or that he and his companions had formed part of a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group, the same cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance against him. The Supreme Court thus modified the judgment by not considering the said aggravating circumstance.People of the Philippines v. Arnel Nocum, et al,G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013.Information; aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged. Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information. This new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases since it is favorable to the appellant.People of the Philippines v. Arnel Nocum, et al,G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013.Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act; requirements under R.A. No. 6981. A certain Kenny Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice (DOJ) under R.A. 6981, otherwise known as The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, in connection with the prosecution of the crime of murder filed against 196 accused in what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre. Petitioner, one of the accused, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. After the DOJ denied his request, petitioner filed a case for mandamus seeking to compel respondents to include Dalandag in the informations. The RTC denied the petition. In affirming the decision of the RTC, the Supreme Court held that there is no requirement under R.A. 6981 for the prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under R.A. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information.Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. v. Sec. Leila De Lima, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, et al,G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013.

Here are select March 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law and procedure:1.REVISED PENAL CODERape; medical examination of victim not indispensable to prove rape. An inconclusive medical report does not negate the finding that the accused (Penilla) raped AAA. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. In fact, a doctors certificate is merely corroborative in character and not an indispensable requirement in proving the commission of rape.People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia,G.R. No. 189324,March 20, 2013.Rape; moral character of the victim is immaterial. Accused Penillas insistence that he was then a virile young man of twenty-three years, lusted after by a separated and older woman, loses significance in light of the dictum that in rape cases, the moral character of the victim is immaterial. Rape may be committed not only against single women and children but also against those who are married, middle-aged, separated, or pregnant. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape. Correlatively and more importantly, the libidinousness of the victim here, AAA, which is not accepted as a common attribute, should have been proven outside of the incident on the midnight of 22 October 1999.People of the Philippines v. Gilbert Penilla y Francia,G.R. No. 189324,March 20, 2013.Rape; when absence of physical resistance unavailing as a defense.Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that AAA did not cry for help given that the area where they lived was densely populated, the houses thereat were literally only divided by thin walls, and any commotion could easily be