FROM EFFICIENT MARKET THEORY TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE

By

Robert J. Shiller

October 2002

COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1385

COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS

YALE UNIVERSITY Box 208281

New Haven, Connecticut 06520-8281

http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/

From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance

Robert J. Shiller

October 14, 2002

Abstract. The efficient markets theory reached the height of its dominance in academic circles

around the 1970s. Faith in this theory was eroded by a succession of discoveries of anomalies,

many in the 1980s, and of evidence of excess volatility of returns. Finance literature in this

decade and after suggests a more nuanced view of the value of the efficient markets theory, and,

starting in the 1990s, a blossoming of research on behavioral finance. Some important

developments in the 1990s and recently include feedback theories, models of the interaction of

smart money with ordinary investors, and evidence on obstacles to smart money.

Key words: Speculative markets, Rational expectations, Psychology, Anomalies, Excess

volatility, Feedback, Smart money, Limits to arbitrage, Short sales

JEL Classification: G14

Robert J. Shiller is the Stanley B. Resor Professor of Economics, and also affiliated with the

Cowles Foundation and the International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven,

Connecticut. He is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research,

Cambridge, Massachusetts. His e-mail address is .

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Academic finance has evolved a long way from the days when the efficient markets

theory was widely considered to be proved beyond doubt. Behavioral finance -- that is, finance

from a broader social science perspective including psychology and sociology -- is now one of

the most vital research programs, and it stands in sharp contradiction to much of efficient

markets theory.

The efficient markets theory reached its height of dominance in academic circles around

the 1970s. At that time, the rational expectations revolution in economic theory was in its first

blush of enthusiasm, a fresh new idea that occupied the center of attention. The idea that

speculative asset prices such as stock prices always incorporate the best information about

fundamental values and that prices change only because of good, sensible information meshed

very well with theoretical trends of the time. Prominent finance models of the 1970s related

speculative asset prices to economic fundamentals, using rational expectations to tie together

finance and the entire economy in one elegant theory. For example, Robert Merton published

“An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model” in 1973, which showed how to generalize the

capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to a comprehensive intertemporal general equilibrium

model. Robert Lucas published “Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy” in 1978, which showed

that in a rational expectations general equilibrium rational asset prices may have a forecastable

element that is related to the forecastability of consumption. Douglas Breeden published his

theory of “consumption betas” in 1979, where a stock’s beta (which measures the sensitivity of

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its return compared to some index) was determined by the correlation of the stock’s return with

per capita consumption. These were exciting theoretical advances at the time. In 1973, the first

edition of Burton Malkiel’s acclaimed book A Random Walk Down Wall Street appeared, which

conveyed this excitement to a wider audience.

In the decade of the 1970s I was a graduate student writing a Ph.D. dissertation on

rational expectations models, and an assistant and associate professor, and I was mostly caught

up in the excitement of the time. One could easily wish that these models were true descriptions

of the world around us, for it would then be a wonderful advance for our profession. We would

have powerful tools to study and quantify the financial world around us.

Wishful thinking can dominate much of the work of a profession for a decade, but not

indefinitely. The 1970s already saw the beginnings of some disquiet over these models, and a

tendency to push them somewhat aside in favor of a more eclectic way of thinking about

financial markets and the economy. Browsing today again through finance journals from the

1970s, one sees some beginnings of reports of anomalies that didn’t seem likely to square with

the efficient markets theory, even if they were not presented as significant evidence against the

theory. For example, Eugene Fama’s 1970 article, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of

Empirical Work,” while highly enthusiastic in its conclusions for market efficiency, did report

some anomalies like slight serial dependencies in stock market returns, though with the tone of

pointing out how small the anomalies were.

The 1980s and Excess Volatility

From my perspective, the 1980s were a time of important academic discussion of the

1A good discussion of the major anomalies, and the evidence for them, is in Siegel(2002).

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consistency of the efficient markets model for the aggregate stock market with econometric

evidence about the time series properties of prices, dividends and earnings. Of particular concern

was whether stock these show excess volatility relative to what would be predicted by the

efficient markets model.

The anomalies that had been discovered might be considered at worst small departures

from the fundamental truth of market efficiency, but if most of the volatility in the stock market

was unexplained, it would call into question the basic underpinnings of the entire efficient

markets theory. The anomaly represented by the notion of excess volatility seems to be much

more troubling for efficiency markets theory than some other financial anomalies, such as the

January effect or the day-of-the-week effect.1 The volatility anomaly is much deeper than those

represented by price stickiness or tatonnement or even by exchange-rate overshooting. The

evidence regarding excess volatility seems, to some observers at least, to imply that changes in

prices occur for no fundamental reason at all, that they occur because of such things as

“sunspots” or “animal spirits” or just mass psychology.

The efficient markets model can be stated as asserting that the price Pt of a share (or of a

portfolio of shares representing an index) equals the mathematical expectation, conditional on all

information available at the time, of the present value Pt * of actual subsequent dividends

accruing to that share (or portfolio of shares). Pt * is not known at time t, and has to be

forecasted. Efficient markets says that price equals the optimal forecast of it.

Different forms of the efficient markets model differ in the choice of the discount rate in

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the present value, but the general efficient markets model can be written just as that Pt = EtP t*

where Et refers to mathematical expectation conditional on public information available at time t.

This equation asserts that any surprising movements in the stock market must have at their origin

some new information about the fundamental value Pt *.

It follows from the efficient markets model that Pt* = Pt + Ut where Ut is a forecast error.

The forecast error Ut must be uncorrelated with any information variable available at time t,

otherwise the forecast would not be optimal; it would not be taking into account all information.

Since the price Pt itself is information at time t, Pt and Ut must be uncorrelated with each other.

Since the variance of the sum of two uncorrelated variables is the sum of their variances, it

follows that the variance of Pt* must equal the variance of Pt plus the variance of Ut, and hence,

since the variance of Ut cannot be negative, that the variance of Pt* must be greater than or equal

to that of Pt .

Thus, the fundamental principle of optimal forecasting is that the forecast must be less

variable than the variable forecasted. Any forecaster whose forecast consistently varies through

time more than the variable forecasted is making a serious error, because then high forecasts

would themselves tend to indicate forecast postive errors, and low forecasts indicate negative

errors. The maximum possible variance of the forecast is the variance of the variable forecasted

and this can occur only if the forecaster has perfect foresight and the forecasts correlate perfectly

with the variable forecasted.

If one computes for each year since 1871 the present value subsequent to that year of the

real dividends paid on the Standard & Poor’s Composite Stock Price Index, discounted by a

constant real discount rate equal to the geometric average real return 1871-2002 on the same

2The present value, constant discount rate, is computed for each each year t as:

where is a constant discount factor, and Dt is the realP Dconst tt

t,

* ( )= −= +

∞

∑ ρ ττ

τ1

dividend at time t. An assumption was made about real dividends after 2002. See note to Figure1.

3It should be pointed out that dividend payouts as a fraction of earnings have shown agradual downtrend over the period since 1871, and that dividend payouts have increasingly beensubstituted for by share repurchases. Net share repurchases reached approximately 1% of sharesoutstanding by the late 1990s. However, share repurchases do not invalidate the theoreticalmodel that stock prices should equal the present value of dividends. See Cole, Helwege andLaster [1996].

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Standard & Poor Index, one finds that the present value, if plotted through time, behaves

remarkably like a stable trend, see Figure 1.2 In contrast, the Standard & Poor’s Composite Stock

Price Index gyrates wildly up and down around this trend, see also Figure 1.

How, then, can we take it as received doctrine that, according to the simplest efficient

markets theory, the stock price represents the optimal forecast of this present value, the price

responding only to objective information about it? I argued in Shiller (1981), as did also Stephen

LeRoy and Richard Porter (1981), that the stability of the present value through time suggests

that there is excess volatility in the aggregate stock market, relative to the present value implied

by the efficient markets model. Our work launched a remarkable amount of controversy, from

which I will recall here just a few highlights.

The principal issue regarding our original work on excess volatility was in with regard to

thinking about the relationship between dividends and stock prices. My own work in the early

1980s had followed a tradition in the finance literature of assuming that dividends fluctuated

around a known trend.3 However, one might also argue, as do Marsh and Merton (1986), that

dividends need not stay close to a trend, and that even if earnings followed a trend, share

4 In more technical terms, this argument is over whether dividends could be viewed as astationary series. The discussion was often phrased in terms of the “unit root” property of thetime series, where a unit root refers to notion that when a variable is regressed on its own lags,the characteristic equation of the difference equation has a root on the unit circle. West (1988)can be viewed as a way of addressing the unit root issue. In our 1988 paper, Campbell and Ihandled nonstationarity by using a vector autoregressive model including the log dividend-priceratio and the change in log dividends as elements.

7

issuance or repurchase could make dividends depart from a trend indefinitely. In addition, if

business managers use dividends to provide a smoothed flow of earnings from their businesses,

then the stock prices might be expected to shift more rapidly than dividends. In such a model,

dividends are no longer a stochastic process, but a smoothed process, and rather than stock prices

depending on dividends, the two time series are cointegrated.

Thus, the challenge became how to construct a test for expected volatility that modelled

the relationship between dividends and stock prices in a more flexible way. But as such tests

were developed, they tended to confirm the overall hypothesis that stock prices had more

volatility than an efficient markets hypothesis could explain. For example, West (1988) derived

an inequality that the variance of innovations in stock prices must be less than or equal to the

variance of the innovations in the forecasted present value of dividends based on a subset of

information available to the market. This inequality is quite flexible: it holds even when

dividends and stock prices are cointegrated, even when the two times series are autoregressive

moving averages, and even in the case of infinite variances of prices. Using long-term annual

data on stock prices, West found that the variance of innovations in stock prices was four to 20

times its theoretical upper bound.4 John Campbell and I (1988) recast the time series model in

terms of a cointegrated model of real prices and real dividends, while also relaxing other

5 Barsky and De Long (1993) , however, later showed that if one assumes that realdividends must be twice differenced to induce stationarity, (so that dividends are even moreunstationary in the sense that dividend growth rates, not just levels, are unstationary), then theefficient markets model looks rather more consistent with the data.

6The present value, discounted by interest rates, is a plot for each year t of

.See note to Figure 1.P r D r Pr t t jjt

t jj t

const,*

,*/ ( ) / ( )= + + + + ++

==+

=∏∑ ∏1 1 1 1

0

2002 2002

2003φ φτ

ττ

8

assumptions about the time series, and again found evidence of excess volatility.5 Campbell

(1991) provided a variance decomposition for stock returns that indicated that most of the

variability of the aggregate stock market conveyed information about future returns, rather than

about future dividends.

Another contested issue regarding the early work on excess volatility questioned the

assumption of the early work that the efficient markets model was best conveyed through an

expected present value model in which the real discount rate is constant through time. The

assumption of a constant discount rate over time can only be considered a first step, for the

theory suggests more complex relationships.

One such efficient markets model makes the discount rate correspond to interest rates;

see the line labeled “present value, discounted by interest rates” in Figure 1.6 Unfortunately for

efficient markets theory, allowing time-varying interest rates in the present value formula does

little to support the efficient markets model. The actual price is still more volatile than the

present value, especially for the latest half century. Moreover, what changes through time there

are in the present value bear little resemblance to the changes through time in the stock prices.

Note for example that the present value is extremely high throughout the depression years of the

1930s, not low as was the actual stock market. The present value is high then because real

7 Campbell and I (1989) recast the argument in terms of a vector autoregressive model ofreal stock prices, real interest rates and real dividends, in which each of these variables wasregressed on lags of itself and lags of the other variables. We found that the dividend-price rationot only shows excess volatility but shows very little correlation with the dividend divided by theforecast of the present value of future dividends.

8The present value, consumption discounted, is a plot for each year t of

, where Ct. is real per capita real consumption at time t.P C C D C C Pc t tt

t const,*

,*( / ) ( / )= +

= +∑

ττ τ

1

20023

20033

2003

This expression is inspired by Lucas [1978] and derived in Grossman and Shiller [1981] assuming a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3. See note to Figure 1.

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interest rates were at extreme lows after 1933, into the early 1950s, and since real dividends

really did not fall much after 1929. After 1929, real Standard & Poor’s dividends fell to around

1925 levels for just a few years, 1933-5 and 1938, but, contrary to popular impressions, were

generally higher in the 1930s than they were in the 1920s.7

An alternative approach to the possibility of varying real discount rates looks at the

intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for consumption; see the line labeled “present value

consumption-discounted in Figure 1.8 The Merton (1973), Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979)

models of efficient financial markets from the 1970s concluded that stock prices are the expected

present value of future dividends discounted using marginal rates of substitution of consumption,

and in these models the equations for stock returns were derived in the context in a model of

maximizing the utility of consumption. Grossman and Shiller (1981) produced a plot of that

present value since 1881, using Standard & Poor dividend data and using aggregate consumption

data to compute the marginal rates of substitution as discount factors, and it is this plot that is

updated here and shown in Figure 1. We found, as can also be seen here in Figure 1, that the

present value of dividends as discounted in this model had only a tenuous relation to actual stock

9See for example John Cochrane’s new book Asset Pricing, which surveys this literature.Much of the older literature is summarized in my 1989 book Market Volatility.

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prices, and was not volatile enough to justify the price movements unless we pushed the

coefficient of relative risk aversion to ridiculously high levels, higher than the value of 3 that was

used for the plot.

Grossman and I stressed that there were some similarities between the present value and

the actual real price, notably the present value peaks in 1929 and bottoms out in 1933, close to

the actual peak and trough of the market. But, the present value does this because consumption

peaked in 1929 and then dropped very sharply, bottoming out in 1933, and the present value

takes account of this, as if people had perfect foresight of the coming depression. But in fact it

appears very unlikely that people saw this coming in 1929, and if they did not then the efficient

model does not predict that the actual real price should have tracked the present value over this

period.

Actually, the consumption discount model, while it may show some comovements at

times with actual stock prices, does not work well because it does not justify the volatility of

stock prices. I showed (1982) that the theoretical model implies a lower bound on the volatility of

the marginal rate of substitution, a bound which is with the U.S. data much higher than could be

observed unless risk aversion were implausibly high. Hansen and Jagannathan later generalized

this lower bound and elaborated on its implications, and today the apparent violation of this

“Hansen-Jagannathan lower bound” is regarded as an important anomaly in finance.9

It should be inserted into this history of thought section that some very recent research has

emphasized that, even though the aggregate stock market appears to be wildly inefficient, there is

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evidence that individual stock prices show some correspondence to efficient markets theory. That

is, while the present value model for the aggregate stock market seems unsupported by the data,

there is some evidence that cross-sectional variations in stock prices relative to accounting

measures to show some relation to the present value model. Paul Samuelson some years ago

posited that the stock market is “micro efficient but macro inefficient,” since there is

considerable predictable variation across firms in their predictable future paths of dividends but

little predictable variation in aggregate dividends. Hence, Samuelson asserted, movements

among stocks make more sense than do movements in the market as a whole, and there is now

evidence to back up this assertion.

Vuolteenaho [2002] showed, using vector-autoregressive methods, that the book to

market value of U. S. firms explains a substantial fraction of changes in future firms’ earnings.

Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho [2002] concluded that 75% to 80% of the variation across firms in

their book to market ratios can be explained in terms of future variation in profits. Jung and

Shiller [2002] show that, cross sectionally, for U. S. stocks that have been continually traded

since 1926, the price-dividend ratio is a strong forecaster of the present value of future dividend

changes. So, dividend-price ratios on individual stocks do serve as forecasts of long-term future

changes in their future dividends, as efficient markets asserts.

This does not mean that there are not substantial bubbles in individual stock prices, but

that the predictable variation across firms in dividends is so large as to swamp out the effect of

the bubbles overall. A lot of this predictable variation across firms takes the form of firms’

paying zero dividends for many years, and investors correctly perceiving that eventually

dividends will be coming, and of firms in very bad shape and investors correctly perceiving they

10Other factors are considered by McGrattan and Prescott (2001), who emphasize tax ratechanges, and Siegel (2002) who considers not only tax rate changes but also changes in thevolatility of the economy, changes in the inflation rate, and changes in transactions costs. Neitherof these studies shows a “fit” between present value and prices over the long sample, however.Notably, the factors they use do not go through sudden changes at the time of the stock marketbooms and crashes surrounding 1929 and 2000.

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will not be paying substantial dividends much longer. Apparently, when it comes to individual

stocks, such predictable variations, and their effects on price, are often far larger than the bubble

component of stock prices.

There is a clear sense that the level of volatility of the overall stock market cannot be well

explained with any variant of the efficient markets model in which stock prices are formed by

looking at the present discounted value of future returns. There are many ways to tinker with the

discount rates in the present value formulas, and, someday someone may find some definition of

discount rates that produces a present value series that “fits” the actual price better than any of

the series shown in Figure 1.10 But, it is unlikely that they will do so convincingly, given the

failure of our efforts to date to capture the volatility of stock prices. To justify the volatility in

terms of such changes in the discount rates, one will have to argue that investors also had a great

deal of information about changes in the factors influencing these future discount rates.

After all the efforts to defend the efficient markets theory there is still every reason to

think that, while markets are not totally crazy, they contain quite substantial noise, so substantial

that it dominates the movements in the aggregate market. The efficient markets model, for the

aggregate stock market, has still never been supported by any study effectively linking stock

market fluctuations with subsequent fundamentals. Already seeing this by the end of the 1980s,

the restless minds of academic researchers had to turn to other theories.

11For a list of our programs since 1991, with links to authors’ websites, see.

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The Blossoming of Behavioral Finance

In the 1990s, a lot of the focus of academic discussion shifted away from these

econometric analyses of time series on prices, dividends and earnings towards developing models

of human psychology as it relates to financial markets. The field of behavioral finance developed.

Researchers had seen too many anomalies, too little inspiration that our theoretical models

captured important fluctuations. An extensive body of empirical work, summarized in Campbell,

Lo and MacKinlay’s 1996 book The Econometrics of Financial Markets, laid the foundation for

a revolution in finance.

Richard Thaler and I started our National Bureau of Economic Research conference series

on behavioral finance in 1991, extending workshops that Thaler had organized at the Russell

Sage Foundation a few years earlier.11 Many other workshops and seminars on behavioral finance

followed. There is so much going on in the field that it is impossible to summarize in a short

space. Here, I will illustrate the progress of behavioral finance with two salient examples from

recent research: feedback models and obstacles to smart money. For overall surveys of the field

of behavioral finance, the interested reader might begin with Hersh Shefrin’s Beyond Greed and

Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing or Andrei Shleifer’s

Inefficient Markets. There are also some new books of collected papers in behavioral finance,

including a three-volume set Behavioral Finance edited by Hersh Shefrin (2001) and Advances

12Descriptions of new era theories attending various speculative bubbles are described inmy book (2000). Popular models that accompanied the stock market crash of 1987, the real estatebubbles peaking around 1990, and various IPO booms are discussed in my paper in this journal(1990).

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in Behavioral Finance II, edited by Richard H. Thaler (2003).

Feedback Models

One of the oldest theories about financial markets, expressed long ago in newspapers and

magazines rather than scholarly journals, is, if translated into academic words, a price-to-price

feedback theory. When speculative prices go up, creating successes for some investors, this may

attract public attention, promote word-of-mouth enthusiasm, and heighten expectations for

further price increases. The talk attracts attention to “new era” theories and “popular models” that

justify the price increases.12 This process in turn increases investor demand, and thus generates

another round of price increases. If the feedback is not interrupted it may produce after many

rounds a speculative “bubble,” in which high expectations for further price increases support very

high current prices. The high prices are ultimately not sustainable, since they are high only

because of expectations of further price increases, and so the bubble eventually bursts, and prices

come falling down. The feedback that propelled the bubble carries the seeds of its own

destruction, and so the end of the bubble may be unrelated to news stories about fundamentals.

The same feedback may also produce a negative bubble, downward price movements propelling

further downward price movements, promoting word-of-mouth pessimism, until the market

reaches an unsustainably low level.

Such a feedback theory is very old. As long ago as 1841, Charles MacKay in his

13 Garber questions MacKay’s facts about the tulipmania in his 1990 article in this journaland in his book Famous First Bubbles. The crash was not absolutely final; Garber documentsvery high tulip prices in 1643. The actual course of the bubble is ambiguous, as all contracts weresuspended by the States of Holland in 1637 just after the peak, and no price data are availablefrom that date.

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influential book Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions described the famous tulipmania

in Holland in the 1630s, a speculative bubble in tulip flower bulbs, with words that suggest

feedback and the ultimate results of the feedback (pp. 118-119):

Many individuals grew suddenly rich. A golden bait hung temptingly out before the

people, and one after another, they rushed to the tulip marts, like flies around a honey-pot.

. . . At last, however, the more prudent began to see that this folly could not last forever.

Rich people no longer bought the flowers to keep them in their gardens, but to sell them

again at cent per cent profit. It was seen that somebody must lose fearfully in the end. As

this conviction spread, prices fell, and never rose again.13

The feedback theory seems to be even much older than this. Note of such feedback, and the role

of word-of-mouth communications in promoting it, was in fact made at the time of the

tulipmania itself. One anonymous observer publishing in 1637 (the year of the peak of the

tulipmania) gives a fictional account of a conversation between two people, Gaergoedt and

Waermondt , that illustrates this author’s impression of the word-of-mouth communications of

that time:

Gaergoedt: “You can hardly make a return of 10% with the money that you invest

in your occupation [as a weaver], but with the tulip trade, you can make returns of

10%, 100%, yes, even 1000%.

Waermondt: “ . . . .But tell me, should I believe you?”

14Anonymous, “Samen-spraeck tusschen Waermondt ende Gaergoedt nopende deopkomste ende ondergangh van flora, Haerlem: Adriaen Roman, 1637, reprinted in EconomischHistorisch Jaarboek, 12 (1926):20-43, pp. 28-29. (translation by Bjorn Tuypens)

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Gaergoedt “I will tell you again, what I just said.”

Waermondt: But I fear that, since I would only start now, it’s too late, because

now the tulips are very expensive, and I fear that I’ll be hit with the spit rod,

before tasting the roast.”

Gaergoedt: “It’s never too late to make a profit, you make money while sleeping.

I’ve been away from home for four or five days, and I came home just last night,

but now I know that the tulips I have have increased in value by three or four

thousand guilder; where do you have profits like that from other goods?”

Waermondt: “I am perplexed when I hear you talking like that, I don’t know what

to do; has anybody become rich with this trade?

Gaergoedt: “What kind of question is this? Look at all the gardeners that used to

wear white-gray outfits, and now they’re wearing new clothes. Many weavers, that

used to wear patched up clothes, that they had a hard time putting on, now wear

the glitteriest clothes. Yes, many who trade in tulips are riding a horse, have a

carriage or a wagon, and during winter, an ice carriage, . . . .”14

Casual observations over the years since then are plentiful that such talk, provoking a sense of

relative futility of one’s day-to-day work and envy of the financial successes of others, and

including some vacuous answer to doubts that the price rise may be over, is effective in

overcoming rational doubts among some substantial number of people, and tends to bring

successive rounds of them into the market.

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In my book Irrational Exuberance, published, with some luck, at the very peak of the

stock market bubble, in March 2000, I argued that very much the same feedback, transmitted by

word-of-mouth as well as the media, was at work in producing the bubble we were seeing then.

And I argued that the natural self-limiting behavior of bubbles, and the possibility of downward

feedback after the bubble was over, suggested a dangerous outlook for stocks in the future.

One might well also presume that such simple feedback, if it operates so dramatically in

events like the tulip bubble or the stock market boom until 2000, ought often to recur at a smaller

scale, and to play an important if lesser role in more normal day-to-day movements in speculative

prices. Feedback models, in the form of difference equations, can of course produce complicated

dynamics. The feedback may be an essential source of much of the apparently inexplicable

“randomness” that we see in financial market prices.

But the feedback theory is very hard to find expressed in finance or economics textbooks,

even today. Since the theory has appeared mostly in popular discourse, and not in the textbooks,

one might well infer that it has long been discredited by solid academic research. In fact,

academic research has until recently hardly addressed the feedback model.

The presence of such feedback is supported by some experimental evidence.

Psychologists Andreassen and Kraus (1988) found that when people are shown real historical

stock prices in sequence (and which they knew were real stock prices), and invited to trade in a

simulated market that displays these prices, they tended to behave as if they extrapolate past price

changes when the prices appear to exhibit a trend relative to period-to-period variability. Smith,

Suchanek and Williams (1988) were able to create experimental markets which generated

bubbles that are consistent with feedback trading. Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) showed

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experiments in which repeating bubbles were generated if subjects were preconditioned by past

experience to form expectations of bubbles.

The presence of such feedback is also supported by research in cognitive psychology,

which shows that human judgments of the probability of future events show systematic biases.

For example, psychologists Tversky and Kahneman have shown that judgments tend to be made

using a representativeness heuristic, whereby people try to predict by seeking the closest match to

past patterns, without attention to the observed probability of matching the pattern. For example,

when asked to guess the occupations of people whose personality and interests are described to

them, subjects tended to guess the occupation that seemed to match the description as closely as

possible, without regard to the rarity of the occupation. Rational subjects would have chosen

humdrum and unexceptional occupations more because more people are in these occupations.

(Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). By the same principle, people may tend to match stock price

patterns into salient categories such as dramatic and persistent price trends, thus leading to

feedback dynamics, even if these categories may be rarely seen in fundamental underlying

factors.

Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subramanyam (1999) have shown that the psychological

principle of “biased self-attribution” can also promote feedback. Biased self-attribution,

identified by psychologist Daryl Bem (1965), is a pattern of human behavior whereby individuals

attribute events that confirm the validity of their actions to their own high ability, and attribute

events that disconfirm their actions to bad luck or sabotage. Upon reading the above passage

from the time of the tulipmania, one easily imagines that Gaergoedt is basking in self-esteem and

relishing the telling of the story. And many readers today can probably easily recall similar

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conversations, and similar ego-involvement by the spreaders of the word, in the 1990s. Such

human interactions, the essential cause of speculative bubbles, appear to recur across centuries

and across countries: they reflect fundamental parameters of human behavior.

There is also evidence supportive of feedback from natural experiments, which may be

more convincing than the lab experiments when they occur in real time, with real money, with

real social networks and associated interpersonal support and emotions, with real and visceral

envy of friends’ investment successes, and with communications-media presence. Ponzi

schemes may be thought of as representing such natural experiments. A Ponzi scheme (or

pyramid scheme or money circulation scheme) involves a superficially plausible but unverifiable

story about how money is made for investors, and the fraudulent creation of high returns for

initial investors by giving them the money invested by subsequent investors. Initial investor

response to the scheme tends to be weak, but as the rounds of high returns generates excitement,

the story becomes increasingly believable and enticing to investors. These schemes are often very

successful in generating extraordinary enthusiasms among some investors. We have seen some

spectacular Ponzi schemes recently in countries that do not have effective regulation and

surveillance to prevent them. A number of Ponzi schemes in Albania 1996-97 were so large that

total liabilities reached half a year’s GDP; their collapse brought on a period of anarchy and civil

war in which 2000 people were killed (Jarvis, 1999). Real world stock-market speculative

bubbles, I argued in my 2000 book Irrational Exuberance, resemble Ponzi schemes in the sense

that some “new era” story becomes attached to the bubble, and acquires increasing plausibility

and investor enthusiasm as the market continues to achieve high returns. Given the obvious

success of Ponzi schemes when they are not stopped by the law, we would need a good reason to

20

think that analogous phenomena of speculative bubbles are not also likely.

The stock market boom that ended in early 2000 is another relevant episode. According to

my survey data, now expressed in the form of stock market confidence indexes produced by the

Yale School of Management and available at , the

confidence of individual investors that the stock market will go up in the next year, and will

rebound from any drop, rose dramatically 1989-2000. As in the tulipmania centuries before, there

was a focusing of public attention and talk on the speculative market, and a proliferation of

wishful-thinking theories about a “new era” that would propel the stock market on a course that,

while uneven, is relentlessly upward, theories that were spread by word of mouth as well as the

media.

It is widely thought that there is a problem with the feedback theories: the theories would

seem to imply that speculative prices are strongly serially correlated through time, that prices

show strong momentum, continuing uniformly in one direction day after day. This seems

inconsistent with the evidence that stock prices are approximately a random walk.

But simple feedback models do not imply strong serial correlation, as I stressed in Shiller

(1990). There, I presented a model of the demand for a speculative asset as equaling a

distributed lag with exponentially declining weights on past price changes through time (the

distributed lag representing feedback distributed over time), plus other factors that affect

demand. The model asserts that people react gradually to price changes over months or years, not

just to yesterday’s price change. A history of price increases over the last year may encourage

buying today even if yesterday’s price change was down. And the model recognizes that there are

other shocks, besides feedback, influencing price.

15The feedback model is Here, pt isp c e dp ctt

t

t

= + < <

16 Grinblatt and Han (2001) have argued that this tendency of stock prices to showmomentum for a while and then reverse themselves might be related to the phenomenon thatinvestors tend to hold on to losers and sell winners (Statman and Shefrin, 1985; Odean, 1998).

22

Center for Research in Security Prices data set of the University of Chicago whose returns had

been in the top decile across firms over three years (thus, “winner” stocks) tended to show

negative cumulative returns in the succeeding three years. They also found that “loser” stocks

whose returns had been in the bottom decile over the prior three years tended to show positive

returns over the succeeding three years. Thus, there is a tendency for stock prices to continue in

the same direction over intervals of six months to a year, but to reverse themselves over longer

intervals. Campbell Lo and Mackinlay document this fact carefully.16 A pattern like this is

certainly consistent with some combination of feedback effects and other demand factors driving

the stock market largely independently of fundamentals.

Smart Money vs. Ordinary Investors

Theoretical models of efficient financial markets that represent everyone as rational

optimizers can be no more than metaphors for the world around us. Nothing could be more

absurd than to claim that everyone knows how to solve complex stochastic optimization models.

For these theoretical models to have any relevance to the stock market, it must somehow be the

case that a smaller element of “smart money” or the “marginal trader” is able to offset the

foolishness of many investors and make the markets efficient.

The efficient markets theory, as it is commonly expressed, asserts that when irrational

optimists buy a stock, smart money sells, when irrational pessimists sell a stock, smart money

17A nice summary of these themes is in this journal, Shleifer and Summers (1990).

23

buys, thereby eliminating the effect of the irrational traders on market price. But, finance theory

does not necessarily imply that smart money succeeds in fully offsetting the impact of ordinary

investors. In recent years, research in behavioral finance has shed some important light on the

implications of the presence of these two classes of investors for theory and also on some

characteristics of the people in the two classes

. From a theoretical point of view, it is far from clear that smart money has the power to

drive market prices to fundamental values. For example, in one model with both feedback traders

and smart money, the smart money tended to amplify, rather than diminish, the effect of feedback

traders, by buying in ahead of the feedback traders in anticipation of the price increases they will

cause (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman, 1990b) . In a related model, rational,

expected-utility-maximizing smart money never choose to offset all of the effects of irrational

investors because they are rationally concerned about the risk generated by the irrational

investors, and do not want to assume the risk that their completely offsetting these other investors

would entail (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman, 1990b).17

Often, speculative bubbles appear to be common to investments of a certain “style,” and

the bubbles may not include many other investments. For example, the stock market bubble that

peaked in the year 2000 was strongest in tech stocks or Nasdaq stocks. Barberis and Shleifer

(2002) have presented a model in which feedback traders’ demand for investments within a

particular style is related to a distributed lag on past returns of that style class. By their budget

constraint, when feedback traders are enticed by one style, they must move out of competing

styles. The smart money are rational utility maximizers. Barberis and Shleifer presented a

24

numerical implementation of their model and found that smart money did not fully offset the

effects of the feedback traders. Style classes go through periods of boom and bust amplified by

the feedback.

Goetzmann and Massa (1999) provided some direct evidence that it is reasonable to

suppose that there are two distinct classes of investors: feedback traders who follow trends and

the smart money who move the other way. Fidelity Investments provided them with two years of

daily account information for 91,000 investors in an Standard and Poor 500 index fund.

Goetzmann and Massa were able to sort these investors into two groups based on how they react

to daily price changes. There were both momentum investors, who habitually bought more after

prices were rising, and contrarian investors, or smart money, who habitually sold after prices

were rising. Individual investors tended to stay as one or the other, rarely shifted between the two

categories.

Short-Sale Issues as Obstacles to Smart Money

Recent research has focused on an important obstacle to smart money’s offsetting the

effects of irrational investors. The smart money can always buy the stock, but if the smart money

no longer owns the stock and finds it difficult to short the stock, then the smart money may be

unable to sell the stock. Some stocks could be in a situation where zealots have bought into a

stock so much that only zealots own shares, and trade is only among zealots, and so the zealots

alone determine the price of the stock. The smart money may who know that the stock is priced

ridiculously high may well use up all the easily-available shortable shares, and then will be

standing on the sidelines, unable to short more shares and profit from their knowledge. Miller

18 Put option prices on Palm also began to reflect the negative opinions, and became soexpensive that the usual relation between options prices and stock price, the so-called “put-callparity” failed to hold. One must remember that options markets are derivative markets that clearseparately from stock markets, and overpriced puts have no direct impact on the supply anddemand for stock unless arbitrageurs can exploit the overpricing by shorting the stock.

25

(1977) pointed this out this flaw in the argument for market efficiency and his paper has been

discussed ever since.

It seems incontrovertible that in some cases stocks have been held primarily by zealots

and that short sellers have found it very difficult to short. One example is the 3Com sale of Palm

near the peak of the stock market bubble (Lamont and Thaler, 2001). In March 2000, 3Com, a

profitable provider of network systems and services, sold to the general public via an initial

public offering 5 percent of its subsidiary Palm, a maker of handheld computers. 3Com

announced at the same time that the rest of Palm would follow later. The price that these first

Palm shares obtained in the market was so high, when compared with the price of the 3Com

shares, that it if one subtracts the implied value of the remaining 95% of Palm from the 3Com

market value, one finds that the non-Palm part of 3Com had a negative value. Since the worst

possible price for 3Com after the Palm sale was completed would be zero, there was thus a

strong incentive for investors to short Palm, and buy 3Com. But, the interest cost of borrowing

Palm shares reached 35 percent by July 2000, putting a damper on the advantage to exploiting

the mispricing.18 Even an investor who knew for certain that the Palm shares would fall

substantially may have been unable to make a profit from this knowledge. The zealots had won

with Palm and had control over its price, for the time being.

The Palm example is an unusual anomaly. Shorting stocks only rarely becomes so costly.

But the example proves the principle. The question is, how important are obstacles to smart

26

money’s selling in causing stocks to deviate from fundamental value.

Of course, in reality, there is not always a sharp distinction between zealots and smart

money. Instead, there are sometimes all gradations in between, especially since the objective

evidence about the fundamental value of individual stocks is always somewhat ambiguous. If

selling short is difficult, a number of individual stocks could become overpriced. It would also

appear possible that major segments of the stock market, say the Nasdaq in 1999, or even the

entire stock market, could wind up owned by, if not zealots, at least relatively optimistic people.

Short-sale constraints could be a fatal flaw in the basic efficient markets theory.

The problem with evaluating Miller’s (1977) theory that a lack of short selling can cause

financial anomalies like overpricing and bubbles is that there has been little or no data on which

stocks are difficult to short. There are long time-series data series on “short interest,” which is

the total number of shares that are shorted. Figlewski (1981) found that high levels of short

interest for individual stocks predicts low subsequent returns for them, a direction that would be

predicted by Miller’s theory. But the predictability was weak. On the other hand, differences in

short interest across stocks do not have an unambiguous connection with difficulty of shorting.

Stocks differ from each other in terms of the fraction of shares that are in accounts that are

shortable. Differences across stocks in short interest can also reflect different demand for

shorting for hedging needs. Thus, there is a significant errors-in-variables problem when using

short interest, which is a quantity variable, as an indicator of the cost of shorting.

Some recent papers have sought to detect the presence of barriers that might limit short

sales indirectly by observing the differences of opinion that can have an impact on price if there

is a difficulty shorting stocks. Without observing barriers to shorting stocks directly, we can still

27

infer that when differences of opinion are high about a stock, it is more likely that short-sale

restrictions will be binding for that stock, and thus that the more pessimistic investors will not

prevent the stock from becoming overpriced and hence subject to lower subsequent returns.

Scherbina (2000) measured differences of opinion by calculating the dispersion of

analysts’ earnings forecasts. She found that stocks with a high dispersion of analysts’ forecasts

had lower subsequent returns, and she linked the low returns to the resolution of the uncertainty.

Chen, Hong and Stein (2000) measured difference of opinion by a breadth of ownership measure

derived from a database on mutual fund portfolios. The breadth variable for each quarter is the

ratio of the number of mutual funds that hold a long position in the stock to the total number of

mutual funds for that quarter. They find that firms in the top decile by breadth of ownership

outperformed those in the bottom decile by 4.95 percent per annum after adjusting for various

other factors.

What we would really like to have to test the importance of short sales restrictions on

stock pricing is some evidence on the cost of shorting. If those stocks that have become very

costly to short tend to have poor subsequent returns, then we will have more direct confirmation

of Miller’s (1977) theory. There is surprisingly little available information about the cost of

shorting individual stocks. Such data have not been available for economic research until

recently. A number of recent unpublished papers have assembled data on the cost of shorting

individual stocks, but these papers have assembled data for no more than a year around 2000.

Recently, Jones and Lamont (2001) discovered an old source of data on the cost of

shorting stocks. In the 1920s and 1930s in the United States, there used to be a “loan crowd” on

the floor of the New York Stock Exchange, where one could lend or borrow shares, and the

19See

28

interest rates at which shares were loaned were reported in the Wall Street Journal. Jones and

Lamont assembled time series of the interest rates charged on loans of stocks from 1926 to 1933,

eight years of data on an average of 80 actively traded stocks. They found that, after controlling

for size, over this period the stocks that were more expensive to short tended to be more highly

priced (in terms of market-to-book ratios), consistent with the Miller (1977) theory. Moreover,

they found that the more expensive-to-short stocks had lower subsequent returns on average,

again consistent with the Miller theory. Of course, their data span only eight years from a remote

period in history, and so their relevance to today’s markets might be questioned.

Why has there not been more data on cost of shorting? Why did the loan crowd on the

New York Stock Exchange disappear, and the loan rates in the Wall Street Journal with it?

Perhaps after the crash of 1929 the widespread hostility to short sellers (who were widely held

responsible for the crash) forced the market to go underground. Jones and Lamont (2001)

document a consistent pattern of political opposition to short sellers after 1929, and point out that

J. Edgar Hoover, the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was quoted as saying that he

would investigate a conspiracy to keep stock prices low. By 1933, the rates shown on the loan list

become all zeros, and the Wall Street Journal stopped publishing the loan list in 1934.

Fortunately, this long drought of data on the cost of shorting stocks may be over, and

stocks should become easier to short. In 2002 a consortium of financial institutions established

an electronic market for borrowing and lending stocks online via a new firm EquiLend, LLC. The

new securities lending platform exceeded $11 billion in transactions in its first two weeks, and

daily availability posting exceed $1 trillion.19

29

But it should be recognized that the true cost of shorting stocks is probably much higher

than the explicit interest cost of borrowing the shares. There is probably also a psychological cost

that inhibits short selling. Most investors, even some very smart investors, have probably never

even considered shorting shares. Shorting shares is widely reputed to involve some substantial

risks and nuisances. For example, the short-seller always stands the risk that the ultimate owner

of the shares will want to sell the shares, at which time the short-seller is forced to return the

shares. This detail may be little more than a nuisance, for the short seller can likely borrow them

again from another lender, but it may figure largely in potential short-sellers’ minds. A more

important consideration that may weigh on short sellers’ minds is the unlimited loss potential

that short sales entail. When an investor buys a stock, the potential loss is no greater than the

original investment. But when an investor shorts a stock, the potential losses can greatly exceed

the original investment. An investor can always terminate these losses by covering the shorts, but

this action typically brings considerable psychological anguish. Deciding to cover one’s shorts

and get out of a short position after losses is psychologically difficult, given the evidence on the

pain of regret. Psychologists Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979) suggests that

individuals are far more upset by losses than they are pleased by equivalent gains; in fact,

individuals are so upset by losses that they will even take great risks with the hope of avoiding

any losses at all. The effects of this pain of regret have been shown to result in a tendency of

investors in stocks to avoid selling losers, but the same pain of regret ought to cause short sellers

to want to avoid covering their shorts in a losing situation. People prefer to avoid putting

themselves in situations that might confront them with psychologically difficult decisions in the

future.

30

The stock market that we have today always limits the liability of investors. As Moss

(2002) has documented, the idea that all publicly traded stocks should have limited liability for

their investors was the result of experimenting with different kinds of stockholder liability in the

United States in the early nineteenth century, and the discovery of the psychological

attractiveness of limited liability stocks. The debates in the early nineteenth century were

concerned with the balancing of the agency costs of limited liability, which encourages

businesses to take greater risks, against the benefits in terms of peace of mind to investors.

Various alternatives were considered or experimented with, including unlimited liability,

unlimited proportional liability (where individual investors in a company are limited to their

proportionate share of the company’s losses according to their share in the company), and double

liability (where individual investors are accountable for the capital subscribed once again). By

around 1830, it was apparent from experiments in New York and surrounding states that

investors found it very appealing that they could put money down to buy a stock today, and from

that day forward face no further losses beyond what they already put down. It allowed them, once

having purchased a stock, to concentrate their emotions on the small probability of the stock

doing extremely well, rather on the small probability that someone would come after them for

more money. People have always been very attracted to lottery tickets, and the invention of

limited liability, Moss concludes, turned stock investments psychologically into something a lot

like lottery tickets. By the same theory, then, investors will not find shorting stocks very

attractive.

Remarkably few shares are in fact sold short. According to New York Stock Exchange

data, from 1977 to 2000 year-end short interest ranged from 0.14 percent 1.91 percent of all

31

shares. According to Dechow, Hutton, Muelbroek and Stone (2001), less than 2 percent of all

stocks had short interest greater than 5 percent of shares outstanding 1976-83. Given the

obviously large difference of opinion about and difference of public attention to different stocks,

it is hard to see how such a small amount of short selling could offset the effect on stock price of

the extra demand of investors who develop an irrational fixation on certain stocks.

Conclusion

The collaboration between finance and other social sciences that has become known as

behavioral finance has led to a profound deepening of our knowledge of financial markets. In

judging the impact of behavioral finance to date, it is important to apply the right standards. Of

course, we do not expect such research to provide a method to make a lot of money off of

financial market inefficiency very fast and reliably. We should not expect market efficiency to be

so egregiously wrong that immediate profits should be continually available. But market

efficiency can be egregiously wrong in other senses. For example, efficient markets theory may

lead to drastically incorrect interpretations of events such as major stock market bubbles.

In his review of the literature on behavioral finance, Eugene Fama (1998) found fault for

two basic reasons. The first was that the anomalies that were discovered tended to appear to be as

often underreaction by investors as overreaction. The second was that the anomalies tended to

disappear, either as time passed or as methodology of the studies improved. His first criticism

reflects an incorrect view of the psychological underpinnings of behavioral finance. Since there is

no fundamental psychological principle that people tend always to overreact or always to

underreact, it is no surprise that research on financial anomalies does not reveal such a principle

32

either. His second criticism is also weak. It is the nature of scholarly research, at the frontier, in

all disciplines, that initial claims of important discoveries are often knocked down by later

research. The most basic anomaly, of excess volatility, seems hardly to have been knocked down,

it is in fact graphically reinforced by the experience of the past few years in the stock markets of

the world. Moreover, the mere fact that anomalies sometimes disappear or switch signs with time

is no evidence that the markets are fully rational. That is also what we would expect to see

happen even in highly irrational markets. (It would seem peculiar to argue that irrational markets

should display regular and lasting patterns!) Even the basic relation suggested by market

inefficiency, that stocks whose price is bid up by investors will tend to go back down later, and

stocks that are underpriced by investors will tend to go up later, is not a relation that can be easily

tested or that should hold in all time periods. The fundamental value of stocks is hard to measure,

and, moreover, if speculative bubbles (either positive bubbles or negative bubbles) last a long

time, then even this fundamental relation may not be observed except in very long sample

periods.

In further research, it is important to bear in mind the demonstrated weaknesses of

efficient markets theory, and maintain an eclectic approach. While theoretical models of efficient

markets have their place as illustrations or characterizations of an ideal world, we cannot

maintain them in their pure form as accurate descriptors of actual markets.

Indeed, we have to distance ourselves from the presumption that financial markets always

work well, and that price changes always reflect genuine information. Evidence from behavioral

finance helps us to understand, for example, that the recent stock worldwide stock market boom,

and then crash after 2000, had its origins in human foibles and arbitrary feedback relations, and

33

must have generated real and substantial misallocation of resources. The challenge for

economists is to make this reality a better part of their models.

34

10

100

1000

10000

1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020

Year

Pri

ce

Real Stock Price (S&P

PDV, Constant Discount

PDV, Interest

PDV, Consump.

35

Figure 1. Real Stock Prices and Present Values of Subsequent Real Dividends, annual data. The

heaviest line is the Standard & Poor 500 Index for January of year shown The less-heavy line is

the present value for each year of subsequent real dividends accruing to the index discounted by

the geometric-average real return for the entire sample, 6.61%. Dividends after 2002 were

assumed equal to the 2002 dividend times 1.25 (to correct for recent lower dividend payout) and

growing at the geometric-average historical growth rate for dividends, 1.11%. The thin line is the

present value for each year of subsequent real dividends discounted by one-year interest rates

plus a risk premium equal to the geometric average real return on the market minus the geometric

average real one-year interest rate. The dashed line is the present value for each year of

subsequent real dividends discounted by marginal rates of substitution in consumption for a

representative individual with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 3 who consumes the real

per capita nondurable and service consumption from the U. S. National Income and Product

Accounts.

Real values were computed from nominal values by dividing by the consumer price index

(CPI-U since 1913, linked to the Warren and Pearson producer price index before 1913) and

rescaling to January 2003=100. Some of the very latest observations of underlying series were

estimated based on data available as of this writing, for example the consumer price index for

36

January 2003 was estimated based on data from previous months. Source data are available on

http:/www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller, and the further descriptions of some of the data are in Shiller

(1989). See also footnotes 1,5 and 6.

37

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