3tt tYjeffiuprenme Court of ®biu

CINDY L. GOODRICH

Appellant,

V.

DIRECTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENTOF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al.,

Case No: l12'^° - O ^

On Appeal from theFranklin CountyCourt of Appeals,

Tenth Appellate District

Court of AppealsCase No. 11AP-473

Appellees,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONOF APPELLANT CINDY L. GOODRICH

CINDY L. GOODRICH, Pro Se Mike DeWine2705 West Canyon Ave Apt 115 Attorney General of Ohio

San Diego, CA 92123(607) 279-0798 (Phone) DAVID E. LEFTON (0029438)(646) 356-7044 (Fax) Senior Assistant Attorney General

Appellant

MAY 20 Lt11Z

CLERK OF COURTSOPREME COURT OF OHIO

Health and Human Services SectionUnemployment Compensation Unit30 E. Broad Street, 26`' FloorColumbus, OH 432 1 5-3 42 8(614) 466-8600 (Phone)(614) 466-6090 (Fax)

Attorney for Appellee, Director, OhioDepartment of Job and Family Services

QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC.TALX EMPLOYER SERVICESPO BOX 429503CINCINNATI, OH 45242

Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OF PUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL IN-TEREST AND INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION ............... 1-2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS ............................................................................ 2-6

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITION OF LAW .................................................... 6-15

Proposition of Law No. I: That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) places unconstitutional restrictions

on U.S. Citizens fundamental rights to marriage, Interstate Movement, and practice thetrade of their choice in the State of their choosing with no substantial reason for denying

temporary unemployment benefits to Citizens who exit the state under the FourteenthAmendment Rights to Due Process, Equal Protection, and the Privileges and Immunities

Clause. ....................................................................................................................................... 6-10

Proposition of Law No.II: The State of Ohio acting through Ohio Department of Job and

Family Services (ODJFS), Unemployment Review Compensation Commission (UCRC),

The Court of Common Pleas, and the 10r" District Court of Appeals, denying unemploy-

ment seekers Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection under the law by setting up asystem which does not fundamentally provided minimal due process. ............................ 10-12

Proposition of Law No. III: That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) violated the United States Consti-

tution First Amendment Free Exercises and Establishment Clauses, by denying Atheist

benefits while awarding benefits to Christians . .................................................................. t2-15

Proposition of Law No. IV: Appellant also realleges all claims and arguments made in her 6

assignment of errors and the motion to reconsider filed in the 10th District Court of ap-

peals, but devotes no time to those arguments in this jurisdictional memo due to the pagel imit ................................:...............................................................................................................15

CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................................15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................................16

APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................... 17-56

Judgment Entry of the Frankly County Court of Appeal (February 9, 2012) ..... ..... ........ ..17

Opinion of the Franklin County Court of Appeals (Febiuary 9, 2012) ....................... 18-35

Judgment Entry of the Frankly County Court of Appeal (April 24, 2012) .......................36

Denial of Reconsideration Opinion of the Franklin County Court of Appeal(April 24, 2012) ........................................................................................................... 37-42

Opim^ ^^ of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas( P 2011 ) ............... ......... ........... ............................. .. ..................................... 42 -56...

EXPLANATION OF WHY THIS CASE IS A CASE OFPUBLIC OR GREAT GENERAL INTEREST AND

INVOLVES A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

This case present's four critical issue for the future of employees seeking property rights

in the Unemployment Compensation Systems in Ohio: (1)'That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) places

unconstitutional restrictions on U.S. Citizens fundamentairights to marriage, Interstatc Move-

ment, and to practice the trade of their choice in the State of their choosing with no substantial

reason for denying temporary unemployment benefits to Citizens who exit the state under the

Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Due Process, Equal Protection, and the Privileges and Immrmi-

ties Clause. (2)The State of Ohio acting through Ohio Department of Job and Family Services

(ODJFS), Unemployment Review Compensation Commission (UCRC), the Court of Common

Pleas, and thc 10"' District Court of Appeals, denying unemployment seclcers Procedural Due

Process and Equal Protection under the law by setting up a system which does not fundamentally

provide minimal due process. (3) That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) violated the United States Con-

stitution First Amendment Free Exercises and Establishment Clauses, by denying Atheist bene-

fits while awarding benefits to Christians. (4) Appellant also re-alleges all claims and arguments

niade in her six assignments of errors and the motion to reconsider filed in the 10`' District Court

of appeals, but devotes no time to those arguments in this jurisdictional memo due to the page

limit.

The implications of the decision of the Court of Appeals affect the ability of ODJFS and

^^:^^_, ^^ ^^:."UCRC too fairly and equally alministrate unemployment compensatioii^oer,e^^^.;L s ^a^^^y I ^ c^u.^.,-

ants. The rules laid out by the Appellate Court will hinder future claimant's ability to seek sub-

poenas and appellate review of their case. The results of these rules would be preposterous and

abhorrent to the U.S. Constitution. Not surprisingly, the conclusion of the court of appeals is

contrary both the statutory scheme of the United States Constitution.

1

The judgment of the court of appeals has great general significance also because it un-

dermines the public's perception of the neutrality of the courts to administer justice. Finally this

case involves Substantial Constitutional questions. The decision offends the United States Con-

stitufion's First Amendment Free Exercises and Establishment Clauses, the Fourteenth Amend-

ments Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities, and the Due Process Clauses.

If allowed to stand, the decision of the court of appeals would ravage mnemployment

claimants Constitutional Rights. The ruling places ODJFS and UCRC in an unattainable position

not to have to respond to request for subpoena as the only Due Process required is that a of no-

tice and hearing. It also allows ODJFS and UCRC to ignore Atheist's "way of life" religious pro-

tection that the U.S. Supreme Court has held as protected.

In sum, this case puts in issues the essence of the right to religious freedom, the right to

marriage, the right to practice ones craft, the right to travel, and the right to have a fair hearing.

To promote the purposes and preserve the fundamental rights of Citizens of Ohio and Citizens of

the United States, and to promote fair awarding of benefits to all workers, this court must grant

jurisdiction to hear this case and review the erroneous and dangerous decision of the court of ap-

peals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

This case arises from the failed attempt of Appellant Cindy L. Goodrich ("Goodrich") to

obtain unemployment insurance benefits, when economic forces outside her control caused her

nuclear family to suffer the long-term unemployment of her husband, and thus forced him to

seek employment outside the state of Ohio. After a failed attempt by the Appellant and her hus-

band to live in two separate locations, her Husband in California, and herself in Ohio. After be-

ing unable to afford the cost of two homes the Appellant was forced to choose her marriage or

job. She made the lifestyle choice of her marriage, which to her and her husband they hold more

2

faith in each other than faith in an "invisible space alien" there is no proof of. Appellant had go-

ing talks with her boss's boss and her boss about her lifestyle choice. This can be seen as far

back as on June 3, 2009. Her employer was very aware of her "lifestyle choice."

Appellant was employed by Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest"), from November 7, 2007

through March 16, 2010 as a phlebotomist. In January 2010, Appellant started to have trouble

maintaining two houscholds, and started the process to become a certified phlebotomist in Cali-

fornia, and had her former employer prior to Quest on January 21, 2010 sign and document her

employment in New York as a phlebotomist. As she was told she would have to be certified to

get a transfer to California. The State of California Certified her as Phlebotomy Tech I on March

9, 2010. On March 12, 2010 Appellants supervisor signed Appellants request to transfer to San

Diego, for three jobs in the San Diego, CA Business Unit, on that request Appellant detrimental-

ly relied on that approved transfer request, on February 25, 2010 submitted a"resignation letter"

for her last day with the Cincinnati Business Unit for Quest would be on March 16, 2010.

After not hearing anything from her employer on her transfer, on March 22, 2010, Appel-

lant applied for unemploytnent benefits. The application was eventually denied, then allowed,

then denied in ODJFS administrative process. In May 2010, the ODJFS issued a re-

determination disallowing the application, finding appellant quit work due to "marital obliga-

tions." A hearing was held on August 16, 2010 before a hearing officer at the UCRC, over thc

objection of Appellant, after she had timely requested subpoenas that the UCRC made, filed, but

never mailed. Appellant asked for anew hearing with UCRC Commissionwhich was denied on

Septetnber 21, 2010.

On October 19, 2010, Appellant, pro se, filed a timely appeal with the Franklin County

Court of Common Pleas. Appellant filed her brief on January 19, 2011 with four assignments of

errors. The State filed the Appellees brief on February 4, 2011 which violated Appellate Rule 16.

3

The Appellees brief failed to address any of the issues on the merits and stood silent on all points

raised by the Appellant. Even though the proof of the subpoena request was in the "trial record"

within the administrative agency. The State Attorney aiid UCRC failed by incompetence or dc-

liberate fraud to file or talk about those documents with the first Appellate Court in the Franklin

County Court of Common Pleas.

On April 28, 2011 the Court of Common Pleas setting as an appellate court (not a trial

court as the court of appeals stated) issued a decision and entered a judgment denying Appellants

Appeal and affirming the decision of the UCRC. On May 24, 2011 Appellant filed a timely ap-

peal with the 10`" District Court of Appeals in Franklin County. Appellant submitted her brief to

the 10"' District Court of Appeal on July 29, 2011. The Appellee State Attorney Filed another

non-conforming brief in this case again in Violation of Appellant Rule 16. Appellant listed 6 as-

signments of errors the State Attorney General failed to address any of the assignments of errors

in violation of the court rule. Again through incompetence or deliberate fraud the Statc Attorney

General again did not discuss the subpoena that Appellant had states she request from the date of

the hearing forward. On February 9, 2012 the Court of Appeals issued a decision affinning both

the UCRC Commission Finding and the Court of Common Pleas upholding denial of benefits.

Thus starting the 45 day Appeal window to this Honorable Court.

Appellant upset with the ruling asked her husband to try and secure any documents from

the State of Ohio about her case to meet the 10 day reconsideration deadline. Her husband was

able to find an honest civil servant that not only admitted that there was proof the subpoenas

which appellant had requested, provided a copy of them to the Appellant. Armed with this con-

clusive irrefutable proof that UCRC had the request for subpoenas which this information was in

the sole care custody and control of the State up-until February 14, 2012. This showed incompe-

tence or fraud on the part of the State Attorney General Office. Appellant asked the Appellee

4

court to reconsider under Appellate Rule 26 and to certify a conflict with two other appellate

court cases under Appellate Rute 25. Both motions were timely files under the Appellate Rules

on February 22, 2012. Thus tolling the filing deadline under Appellate Rule 26 in this Honorable

Court to seek review of the detemlination. While outside the 10 day window, were timely be-

cause the ten day deadline fell on a Sunday before Presidents Day. The Appellants motion was

not due till close of business on February 22, 2012.

On March 5, 2012 the State Attorney General filed a motion that violated Appellate Rule

11, which had no basis in law or fact, ciaiming that Appellant's motion was untimely again fail-

ing to argue any point on the merits. The Appellant then emailed the State Attorney's office, and

he withdrew the motion on March 8, 2012. However the State Attorney General filed with it, and

untimely opposition in the motion to withdraw. Appellant filed a response and asked the court to

sanction the States Attorney General for his conduct in violating the Appellate Rules on March

20, 2012.

On April 24, 2012 the 10`h District Court of Appeal issued a ruling denying both motion

to reconsider and ceitify a conflict. It should be noted that the r-uling on Motion to certify a con-

flict was 2 days late from the required deadline under the Appellate Rule, the court claimed this

was because of an internal eiror. Appellant could find nothing that allows for a remedy of the

error of the Court of Appeals. The 10"' District Court of Appeals reftised to issue sanctions

against the state Attorney General claiming the only power to discipline attorney is witli this

Ilonorable Court, tluis giving up all sanctioning power of the 10`h District court from April 24,

2012 forward.

The April 24 ruling from the court of appeals ended the tolling tiine to file with this Hon-

orable Court. With 33 days left on the clock the filing deadline was due on Sunday May 27,

2012. Becausc Monday May 28, 2012 is Memorial Day and the court is closed the deadline for

5

filing moves the Appeal to Tuesday May, 29, 2012, thus making this appeal timely filed.

ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSITION OF LAW

Proposition of Law No. I: That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) places unconstitutional re-

strictions on U.S. Citizens fundamental rights to marriage, Interstate Movement,

and practice the trade of their choice in the State of their choosing with no substan-tial reason for denying temporary unemployment benefits to Citizens who exit the

state under the Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Dne Process, Equal Protection,

and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Right to Marry

O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c), on it "Such individual quit work to marry or beeause of marital,

parental, filial, or other domestic obligations." The law on its face states that it is a law that af-

fects the marital property rights of Citizens of the United States. The Appellant and her husband

were married under the Laws of the State of Michigan, they were in Ohio only because economic

forces forced them to move. The United States Supreme Court has held that the right to marriage

is a fundamental right that is protected under the United States Constitution. Loving v Virginia,

388 U.S. 1 (1967).

I'he right to marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man" and is fundamental "to our

very existence and survival." Here the State of Ohio asks that Appellant be forced to live apart

f,-om her husband, even though her family could not afford it or lose the property right of Uncm-

ployment. Here the O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) states that if a person quits employment for any

marital, filial, or other domestic obligations they are denied unemployment benefits as a blanket

denial and without due process. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "When the

Govcrnment intrudes on choices concerning famiiy iivirig aiiangernents, the usual deference to

the legislature is inappropriate" Moore v. East Clevetand, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).

Hcre the Ohio Law in question affects both the liberty of a family and the property right

of unemployment. A person's right to liberty under the Due Process Clause is supposed to allow

a person the ftitll right to engage their conduct without intervention by the government unless

6

there is due process of law. "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law." United States Constitution Amendment 14". The U.S. Suprcme

Court in addressing these issues has applied the doctrine that is called "substantive due process."

"I'lris legal doctrine prohibits States from infringing "fundamental liberty interests, unless the in-

fringement is narrowly tailored to serve a eompelling state interest." Lawrencev. Texas, 539

U.S. 558, 593 (2003) citing WashinQton v Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 at 721 (2009).

Here the state of Ohio wants to force an economic sword in-between married couple.

Here the Appellant and her husband were looking at the failure of their marriage over money.

Faced with an impossible choice, the couple decided to preserve the marriage. At the time the

couple had been married for 7 years, the couple valued their marriage and wanted to preserve it.

In the United States marriages are in trouble. Not because of gay malriage, but because people

cannot afford marriage, thus leads mostly to divorce. Other reasons mat-riages are in trouble are

the unreasonable restraints that are placed on marriage by government. For the first time in the

history of the United States married couples have dropped below 50%.1

Here the law in question forces people to stay in jobs and risk the breakup of their mar-

riages, for no compelling state interest. Here the State of Ohio should have a coinpelling interest

to preserve marriages even at the limited cost of a "temporary benefit" of unemployinent.

Right to Interstate Movement

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that U.S. Citizens have a"fundamentat right" to travel

from states to state, this inctudes the right to leave and enter another state, and to be treated

equally if they become permanent residents of that states. Saenz v Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).

Here the State of Ohio denies U.S. Citizens a property right to unemployment who want to exit

the state for marital, filial or other domestic obligations. While the Appellant admits that people

1 Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds by Sabrina Taverinse?1tn1,1,Imp t,,^n,riit rs^^.t_^+,>> ,',011'aF ?fti tts 2(^niaE'7

who both quit for martial, filial or other domestic obligations and who movc interstate and intra-

state should be treated equal in they are both denied, but people who exit the state are treated dif-

ferent than people who enter the state. However, under the current interstate processing of claims

of unetnployment, if a new resident of Ohio comes from California, who followed her husbaild,

she can and is awarded Ohio Unemployment under an interstate claim.

Here the Ohio Law atlows for discrimination of exiting U.S. Citizens on the Ohio Law

and not that of new citizens. Here the Appellant is not treated equally under the law as a new

citizen to the state of Ohio, thus she is denied the Equal Protection as required midcr the 14`h

Amendment. This violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.

The Right to Practice Ones Trade

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Art. IV, § 2, ac-

cording to the U.S. Supreme Court is to create a national economic union. The L7nited States Su-

preme Court case looked at it if practicing a trade such as the practice of law, is a fundamental

right, and they found that it was. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v Piper, 470 U.S. 274

(1985). They held that the practice of law was important to the national economy and was a fun-

damental right. Id. at 280. Here the Appellant was a member of the medical community, thus her

skills are in high dcmand. This is demonstrated by the short term of her unemployment, unlike

that of her husband's. Her right to earn a living in the trade of her choice should also be held as

a "fundamental right".

Here, the Appellant filed her unemployment claim after she left the State of Ohio, thus

she was a non-resident. Thus invoking the Privilege and Immunities Clause on the infringcment

of her rights to practice her trade, and earn a living. When she moved to California her salary al-

most doubled after a short period of unemployment. Here, her husband and herself have the right

to try and iniprove their economic situation to reach for the American Dream. Had the State of

8

Ohio's economy been better, and her husband could have found work, economic forces would

not have forced them to move out of the state. Because Uie state imposes a burden on exiting

U.S. Citizens the state must show they can meet a more stringent standard of review.

Discriminatory Impact on Women

While the Appellant does not have the space needed to fully address this problem.

O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c), effects mostly women. Appellant has asked ODJFS to thn-n over the

numbers, under a freedom of information request and they have failed on three accounts to do so.

The Appellant has listed in her assignments of errors below the full reasons. Ohio is oniy one of

five states that still have this law on the books.

The National Employment Law Project (NELP) did a study called Between a Rock and a

Hard Place in July of 2003. In the study they found that only 5 states had laws that denied beuc-

fits to women or spouse's who quit work for Family reloca.tion, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio,

Utah, and Virginia. In 1945 when Farloo was decided, Justices Matthis looked at what other

states did with "Marital obligation and unemployment" at that time, most states had statues simi-

lar to Ohio which disallowed benefits. Justices Matthis, also noted that to rule otherwise would

be "In our view, a contrary construction and application would be tantainount to legislative ac-

tion, which is the province of the legislative and not the judicial branch of the government." Far-

loo v Champion Spark PlugCo (1945), 145 Ohio St. 263 at 269.

the Court of Appeals for the Third District of California in Boren v Departmen[ ofEm-

ployment Development (1976), 59 Cal.App 3d 250 found that the Cal UI Code § 1264 which de-

nied "Any person leaving his or her job because of marital or domestic duties" disqualified for

memployment unconstitutional. The Court held that California Law classified applicant by sex

violating title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 and denied female claimants equal pro-

tection of the law under the 14`" Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Id at 255) Following

9

California's lead a Pennsylvania court struck down a similar law to California and Ohio holding

that it was a violation of Equal Protection in Wallace v Com., Unemployment Compensation

Bde. OfReview (1978), 38 Pa. Cmwlth 342;

Proposition of Law No. II: The State of Ohio acting throagh Ohio Department of

Job and Family Services (ODJFS), Unemployment Review Compensation Commis-

sion (UCRC), The Court of Common Pleas, and the 10rs District Court of Appeals,

denying unemployment seekers Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection un-dei- the law by setting up a system which does not fundamentally provided minimal

due process.

ssue here are the rights of a deprivation of liberty and a

property interest. White the Court of Common Pleas has stated that the Fundamental require-

ments of procedural due process are notice, hearing and ultimately, the opportunity to be heard;

only this is not true for the property rights of uneinptoyment. Providing that person with a notice

and a hearing is all that is necessary in order to comply with due process in an administrating

proceeding. See Coleman v State Medical Board of Ohio, 1993 Ohio App. Lexis 2029. While

there can be no question here, Appellant was given notice of the hearing, and she was given a

hearing. Because she was given notice, and she was given a procedure to request subpoena

which she did. The state failed to respond to this request, even thought it was timely filed, and

orenared. She was given a "kangaroo court" only, and the United State Supreme Court has held

that "[A] kangaroo court proceedings in [a] case involve[s] a more subtte but no less real depri-

vation of due process of law. Rideau v. State of La., 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963).

The Court of Common Pleas failed to do the balancing for fairness as required. Here the

Appeltant had requested a continuance to get tne subpoenas sl-ie requested, and were in the sole

care custody and control of the State. (1) the severity of the harm to the titigant if the requested

procedures are not granted; (2) the risk of error if the procedures are not affordcd; and (3) the

administrative difficulty and cost of providing the added procedure's. Mathews v Eldridgc, 424

U.S. 319 (1976). This Honorabte Court has atso held this to be the standard. State ex ret. 1-iaylett

10

v Ohio Bur. Of Workers' Comp. 87 Ohio St. 3d 325 (1999).

Here the hann was that the Appellant was unable to present the evidenced needed to meet

her burden of proof to have a hearing that was fair. This is the worst kind of harm that can oc-

cur, because the hearing was nothing more than a "kangaroo court" as she was there but not able

to be heard and present her case to an inipartial trier of fact, the denying her the due process of

law. Even during the hearing the hearing officer threatened to not listen to her, when she tried to

have her husband act as the "representative." Only once her husband forced the issue, was he

allowed torepresent her.

Moving the 2°`i element that should be looked is the risk of error if the procedures are not

afforded. Here, the Appellant 2 years ago, would have argued that to get to the truth and the real

facts of the matter the risk of error is great if subpoenas are not issued as requested. However in

two years and the second ever litigation that the appetlant has ever been in, have shown that

judges and tawyers make up the law as they go along. The Appellant took to the court of Appeals

rock solid proof of incompetence or fraud on the courts, by an officer of the court. The Appe[late

court said we don't care. They claimed that she did not have it in the record on appeal. However,

the appetlate court looked at the wrong record. The Subpoenas where in the "triat court" record

in the administrative agency, not the first Appellate review by fraud of the UCRC by the Court of

Common Pleas. So the Court of Appeals could have looked at the records, but they said no. So

the ideas that courts are to find the truth or provide justice are nothing but a myth. Here the error

is so great that to this state the appellant has yet to overcome the hurdle placed before her.

Moving to the third and final element under the test is the administrative difficulty and

cost of providing the added procedures. Here this will not even take up but a few lines. The

UCRC has a process in place for subpoena request, they hire a person to staff the request, they

have the forms, and account to mail them out. Only through government laziness was it not done,

11

thus thc cost and time of providing is not a factor.

For the above reasons, the Appellant was not given a true and required due process hear-

ing. Having spent all the time typing up and filing this request for appeal, I have no hope this

Court will take the appeal. My only hope is that the United States Supreme Court sees how bad

the State of Ohio has treated the rights of citizens from another state and accepts review.

Proposition of Law No. III: That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) violated the United States

Constitution First Amendment Free Exercises and Establishment Clauses, by deny-

ing Atheist benefits while awarding benefits to Christians.

Appellant is an Atheist, while meinbers of thc this Honorable Court, and a majority of the

members of the pubic, may not share this religious view; the First Amendment's Free Exercises

and Establishment Clause protect this view. "[T]he Establishment Clause requires the same re-

spect for the atheist as it does for the adherent of a Christian faith. As we wrote, "the Court has

unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First

Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all." Van Orden v. PcrrY.

545 U.S. 677, 711 (2005) citing Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38 at 52-53. "Atheism falls within

protection of First Amendment." Warner v. Oran>Te County Dept. of Probation, S.D.N.Y. 1993,

827 F.Supp. "State prison irunate's atheism qualified as a"retigion" for purposes of First

Amendment; inmate maintained that his atheistic beliefs played central role in his life, and therc

was no dispute that those beliefs were deeply and sincerely held." Kaufman v McCau h^ytr ,

C.A.7 (Wis.) 2005, 419 F.3d 678, and rehearing denied, on remaud 2005 WL 2848395.

The Appellant showed the ODJFS and UCRC for almost 30 years has been allowing un-

employ nent claims for people who quit work "Marital, filial, or other domestic obligatious." If

thcy showed that God told them to do so. The 1" Appellate court held that a claimant who left

his employment after he had a religious experience telling him to move to his sister's home in

Alabama to care of his deceased sibling's children was entitled to unemployment compensation.

12

Marvin v Giles, 11 Ohio App.3d 57 (1983), ODJFS and UCRC have been operating under these

guidance's for the administration ofunemployment for almost 30 years. However, now with the

ruling of the IO`h District Court of Appeal rejecting Marvin now places ODJFS in the untenable

position of having two conflicting court cases and which to follow.

Courts have recognized "the possibility of charlatans unlawfutly faking religious beliefsfor their own nefarious purposes," and have stated that the detemiination of whethersomet.hing is a s'nicerely held religious belief is a "difficult and delicate task." See e.g.,Marvin v. Giles (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 57 (holding that a claimant quit with causewhen he had a vision and was instnicted by God to relocate to Alabama)."2

In the instant case the court of Appellees stated. "However, Marvin was not decided by

this appellate district, and is not controlling." Goodrich v ODJFS, 2012 Ohio 467 at 11. This

holding by the court did two things. (1) Setup the establishment for Christian Faiths for dcter-

mining unemployrnent benefits over Atheist in violation of the Highest Courts Rulings on the

rnatter under the I" Amendment to the United States Constitution. (2) Denies the Appellant tha

right to practice her own religious choice, that of the lifestyle and the belief in her marniage over

an "invisible space alien"

Under the Establishment Clause the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "The Suprcnie

Court found that an individual need not be responding to the commands of a particular religious

organization to claim the protection of the free exercise clause of the First Amendnient." Frazee

v Illinois Department of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). The Appellate cornt also

failed to apply the proper test, on the Appellants claim to her religious view. Here Appellate

court summarily dismissed the Appellants Claim, stating "There is nothing in the record demon-

strating that appellant quit her job based on her religious views. Therefore, we find Marvin i-S ir-

relevant to this case, and whether a claimant may receive unemployment compensation aftcr

leaving her job based upon religious conviction is inapposite to the matter before us." However

the problem is the court looked at the word "religious" and did not look to the proper test of

Ai5 i7act chaPK 4Jilt13

"way of life." Here the Appellants ongoing emails, with her employer, conversations about her

transfer, and moving to be with her husband show a "way of life." and decision to belief in her

maniage and her husband over everything. "The Supreme Court has said that a religion, for pur-

poses of the First Amendment, is distinct from a "way of life," even if that way of life is inspired

by philosophical beliefs or other secular concerns. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-

16, (1972). Here the Appellants desire to keep her marriage, and live in union with her husband,

and her views that there is no God supports her claim to move because of her "way of life" view

and that is being denied under the I" Amendment.

"The Supreme Court has recognized atheisrn as equivalent to a "religion" for purposes of

the First Amendment on numerous occasions, most recently in McCreary County Ky v Ameri-

can Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545U.S. 844 (2005). In keeping witli this idea, the Court has

adopted a broad definition of "religion" that includes non-atheistic and atheistic beliefs, as well

as theistic ones. Thus, in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488. The Supreme Court has also stated

that "Under tlre Establislrment Ctause, the government may not aid one religion, aid all religions

or favor one religion over another."

The case law on unemployment benefits and religion by the United States Supreme Court

has been held numerous times, that a claimant may not be denied unemptoyment because of reli-

gious belief. Just because ODJFS, UCRC, or the lower courts do not agree with religious views

of the appellant, it does not mean that her "way of life" is not protected. The United States Su-

preme Court held that, a denial of government funded benefits to those who are otherwisc eligi

ble, but leave their place of ernployment because of religious reasons, unconstitutionally infring-

es on their right to free exercise of refigion. Sherbert v Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

The Appellate Court failure to address a valid claim by the Appellant when she raiscd

this issue with her supervisor and with ODJFS, with UCRC, the Court of Common Pleas, and

14

then the Appellate Court. Here the Appellant had done everything to perfect the record on ap-

peal. The court showed its Establishment of Christian Faith over atheists by summarily dismiss-

ing the Appellants arguments and rejecting Marvin. ODJFS and UCRC having been paying out

claims under Marvin and Sherbet for between 40 and 30 years. However, when a person tries to

claim protection under the law for the belief in no God, they are dismissed and told your reli-

eious views don't count. For this reason alone, this court should accept jurisdiction.

White the Marvin court in the 1` District court of appeals was not the only case that hcld

a person who quit work because of a religious belief. In the 12`h District court of Appeals, the

court hetd that a woman who qnit work because of her religious views was allowed, another

Christiancase. Caudill v Admi. Of the Bureau of Employment Serv., No. CA84-08-05.

Prouosition of Law No. IV: Appellant also realleges all claims and arguments madein her 6 assignmenY of errors and the motion to reconsider filed in the 1,0"' District

Court of appeals, but devotes no time to those arguments in this jurisdictional niemo

due to the page limit.

The Appellant has reframed some of her arguments for her request for a grant ofjurisdic-

tion before this Iionorable Court, however the Appellant wants to stress slre thinks this court

could accept review on this case on any grounds in this jurisdictional memo, or any of the six

P r P„-n,.q in the court of Anneals below. However, due to the 15 page limit, she is unableassigt .............- - ..

to re-raise them in this memo.

CONCLUSION

For the reason discussed above, this case involves matters of public and great general in-

1, Goodr ich tt) ^^ thisterest and substantial constitutional questions. Therefore, Appeirant ^oo^^, reques+1 s ^..

Honorable Court accept jurisdiction in this case so that the important issues presented will be

reviewed on the merits, and all Ohio Unemployment Claimants will be treated fairly under the

law no matter their gender or religious views and ODJFS and the lower courts will have thc ap-

propriate guidance and decision from this Honorable Court on these issues going forward.

15

Respectfully submitted,Dated this May 26, 2012

CINDY L 00 RTCH, Pro Se2705 Wes Canyon Ave Apt 115San. Diego, CA 92123(607)279-0798(Phone)(646) 356-7044 (Fax)clgoodrich@gma'rl.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I cerkify that on May 26, 2012 a copy of foregoing Notice of Appeal was sent by U.S.

First Class Mail postage prepaid to the following persons:

DAVID E. LEFTONSenior Assistant Attorney GeneralHealth and Human Services SectionUnemployment Compensation Unit30 E. Broad Street, 26th FloorColumbus, OH 43215dleftonna ae. state.oh.us

QUEST DIAGNOSTICS INC.,TALX EMPLOYER SERVICESPO BOX 429503CINCINNATI, OH 45242

Dated this May26, 2012

16

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Cindy L. Goodrich, rrrI

^--n

Appellant-Appella nt, ;:0 m°JNo. 11AP-473 ' o ,

^iV

^(C. P.C. No, 10CVF-10-1 s888) w s

. C-)o

-o

Ohio Unemployment CompensationReview Commission et al.,

Appellees-Appellees.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

(REGULAR CALENaR}`-'w

For the reasons stated in the decision of this court rendered herein on

February 9, 2012, appellant's six assignments of error are overruled, and it is the

judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Franklin County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs are assessed against appellant.

BPnI.nllJ P ] R. rl(IRRfAN, J

C^ f\\S \

Judge Susan Brown

17

,^lp ^ :.,:IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Cindy L. Goodrich,

Appellant-Appellant,

t;ii2 FEB - 9 PP9 12: 43

LLGi^i\ Ui ^+lJ^i\ I J

No. 11 AP-473V (C.P.C. No. 10CVF-10-15888)

Ohio Unemployment CompensationReview Commission et al.,

Appellees-Appel lees.

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

D E C I S 1 O N

Rendered on February 9, 2012

Cindy L. Goodrich, pro se.

Michael DeWine, Attomey General, and David E. Lefton, fora.,npuPP niractor O- hio Deoartment of Job & Family Services.„r.,,._ _. ---- , Ir

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

BROWN, P.J.

{ql} Appellant, Cindy L. Goodrich, has filed an appeal from the judgment of the

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, in which the court affirmed the decision of the

Unemployment Compensation Review Commission ("commission"), appellee, a division

of the Ohio Department of Job & Family Services ("ODJFS"), appeflee.

18

No. 11 AP-4732

{¶2} Appellant was employed by Quest Diagnostics, Inc. ("Quest"), from

November 7, 2007 through March 16, 2010 as a phlebotomist. On February 25, 201LI,

appellant submitted a "resignation" letter to Carolyn Smith, a supervisor at Quest. In the

letter, appelfant informed Smith that her last day with the Cincinnati Business Unit for

Quest would be March 16, 2010. She indicated that she was relocating to San Diego,

California with her husband.

{¶3} On March 22, 2010, appellant applied for unemployment benefits. The

application was eventually allowed, with benefits commencing March 21, 2010. In May

2010, the commission issued a re-determination disallowing the application, finding

appellant quit her employment due to marital obligations. On June 4, 2010, appellant, pro

se, filed an appeal with the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

{¶4} On April 28, 2011, the trial court issued a decision and entry denying

appellant's appeal. The trial court found (1) appellant quit her employment under

disqualifying circumstances due to a marital obligation pursuant to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c);

(2) due process requirements were met when appellant was given the opportunity to

appear before an independent hearing examiner and present her case; (3) the

commission did not violate appellanPs due process rights when the hearing officer

refused to continue the hearing and issue subpoenas that appellant purportedly

14, 00rD"2 rc^ i= not unconstitutional and does not violaterequested; (4) R.C.n^»1 ^^k n ik^/

appellant's rights to due process and equal protection; (5) appellant's First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights were not violated based on religious grounds because she is an

atheist; and (6) ODJFS and the commission did not violate her rights under the

19

No. 11AP-4733

Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Appellant

appeals the judgment of the trial court, asserting the following assignments of error:

[I.] The decision of the Hearing officer finding that "Claimantcontends that she submitted subpoena request to theUnemployment Compensation Review Commission to requirethe employer to produce documents and witness to prove thatshe had a right to transfer to San Diego, California. TheseSubpoenas were not issued. The evidence clearlydemonstrates that claimant was an at-will employee. She hadno contractual right to transfer to another state. Therefore, theHearing officer refused to continue the hearing in order tohave the subpoenas issued." The Hearing officer in refusingto issue the requested subpoena(s) and to continue thehearing violated Appellant[']s Fourteenth Amendment Right toDue Process. Was unlawful, unreasonable and against themanifest weight of the evidence and should be reversedunder O.R.C. 4141282(H).

[II.] That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) Denying unemployment toall individuals who "quit work to marry or because of marital,parental, filial, or other domestic obligations." Is a violation ofAppellant[']s Fourteenth Amendment rights to Due Processunder the United States Constitution and a violation of theOhio Constitution Article 1 Section 2 to Equal Protection. Wasunlawful, unreasonable and against the manifest weight of theevidence and should be reversed under O.R.C. 4141.282(H).

[III.] That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) Denying unemployment toall individuals who "quit work to marry or because of marital,parental, filial, or other domestic obligations." While allowingexceptions for some religious reasons and not other religiousviews is a violation of Appellant[']s First Amendment Rights asapplied to the States thought [sic] the Fourteenth AmendmentRights under the United States Constitution and a violation ofthe Ohio Constitution Articie 1 Section 1, 2, & 7. Whichcreates a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of bothFederal and State Constitutions. Was unlawful, unreasonableand against the manifest weight of the evidence and shouldbe reversed under O.R.C. 4141.282(H).

[IV.] That ODJFS and UCRC violated Appellant[']s rightsunder Americans with disabilities Act U.S.C. § 12132 and 28

C.F.R. § 35,130(b)(7) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29

20

No. 11 AP-473

(¶5}

U.S.C. § 794 by refusing to address or respond toAppellant[']s repeated and continued request foraccommodations of her reading disability. This was unlawful,unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the evidenceand should be reversed under O.R.C. 4141.282(H).

[V.] The court of common pleas incorrectly stated that pro selitigants are to be held to the same standard as an attorney.When the U.S. Supreme Court has held that is not to be thecase.

4

[VI.] That ODJFS, UCRC, and the court of common pleasrulings that Appellant did not have an implied contract and alegal right to transfer, after being transfer[ed] by employermonths prior to her request. Was unlawful, unreasonable andagainst the manifest weight of the evidence and should bereversed under O.R.C. 4141.282(H).

In all of appellant's assignments of error, appellant contests the trial court's

affirmance of the commission's decision. A trial court and an appellate court employ the

same, well-established standard of review in unemployment compensation appeals: "[A]

reviewing court may reverse the board's determination only if it is unlawful, unreasonable,

or against the manifest weight of the evidence." Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur.

of c,,,., con,^ 73 C)hin St.3d 694. 697 (1995); R.C. 4141.282(H). When a reviewingvr u,rN. ...... , ... _..._ ____ . . . .

court (whether a trial or appellate court) applies this standard, it may not make factual

findings or determine witness credibility. Irvine v, State Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 19

Ohio St.3d 15, 18 (1985). Factual questions remain solely within the commission's

province. Tzangas at 696. Thus, a reviewing court may not reverse the commission's

decision simply because "reasonable minds might reach different conclusions." Irvine at

18. The focus of an appellate court when reviewing an unemployment compensation

appeal is upon the commission's decision, not the trial courts decision. Moore v.

Comparison Mkt., Inc., 9th Dist. No. 23255, 2006-Ohio-6382, ¶ 8.

21

No. 11 AP-4735

{¶6} The Unemployment Compensation Act "was intended to provide financial

assistance to an individual who had worked, was able and willing to work, but was

temporarily without employment through no fault or agreement of his own. * '" The Act

does not exist to protect employees from themselves, but to protect them from economic

forces over which they have no control. When an employee is at fault, he is no longer the

victim of circumstances but is instead directly responsible for his own predicament. Fault

on the employee's part separates him from the Act's intent and the Act's protection. Thus,

fault is essential to the unique chemistry of a just cause termination." Tzangas at 697-698.

Nevertheless, the unemployment compensation statutes must be liberally construed in

favor of awarding benefits to the applicant. Clark Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev.

Disabilities v. Griffin, 2d Dist. No. 2006-CA-32, 2007-Ohio-1674, ¶ 10, citing R.C.

4141.46; Ashwell v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2d Dist. No. 20522, 2005-Ohio-

1928, ¶ 43.

{¶7} Appellant argues in her first assignment of error that the hearing officer

..14..^..

14^LG...^

UG,ICor

+wr1^ ia nrnCP4C rinhts when he refused to continue the hearing so the

V u^.. p•^^^-- .^-- -

commission could issue subpoenas that appellant had previously requested. The trial

court concluded that appellant received proper notice and a hearing consistent with due

process. Appellant does not contest this finding. The trial court then found that there was^ .^.

no documentation in the record, other than appellant's testimony, that she requested ^I c_

issuance of subpoenas. Appellant contends this is not true, and, thus, she was not given

the opportunity to present the facts to demonstrate that she was entitled to unemployment

benefits, citing Atkins v. Ohio Dept of Job & Family Servs., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-182,

2008-Ohio-4019, citing Bulatko v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 7th Dist. No. 07

22

No. 11 AP-4736

MA 124, 2008-Ohio-1061 (finding the key factor in deciding whether the hearing satisfied

procedural due process is whether the claimant had the opportunity to present the facts

which demonstrate that she was entitled to unemployment benefits). In support of her

claim that the record does, in fact, show that she requested subpoenas, appellant cites

the following portion of the hearing transcript:

Hearing Officer: Well (inaudible) our records [sic] I don't seethere was ever a subpoena request made.

Mr. Goodrich: We, we mailed on the 4th uh I'm sorry weemailed on the 3rd, received a response on the 4th that wehad to call in number. Uh the number we called we were toldthat the person who does subpoena was out till Monday. Wecalled on Monday and requested the subpoena of uh thisweek of the person who was doing them.

Hearing Officer: Well I understand how it (inaudible) issuedbut no record of being issued. We have to have uh at leastfive full business days to process the subpoena.

{¶8}

Mr. Goodrich: Right.

Appellant claims that it was during the second "inaudible" section of the

that U^ Ft o .+n+oc nnnouan+ ranuasted the subDoenas but theyabove eXcerpt u^a^ 10 i GP y vitn cr o.v. p

were never issued. However, we cannot rely upon appellant's unsupported claim that the

inaudible section of the transcript contained the hearing officer's acknowledgment that

appellant had requested the subpoenas. The language surrounding the "inaudible"

notation does not illuminate the issue to any extent. We cannot say that appellant has

shown that she requested subpoenas. Therefore, appellant's first assignment of error is

overruled.

{$9} Appellant argues in her second assignment of error that R.C.

4141.29(D)(2)(c) is unconstitutional, as it violates her right to due process and equal

23

7No. 11AP-473

protection. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) provides that no individual may be paid benefits if the

individual quit work to marry or because of marital, parental, filial, or other domestic

obligations. The trial court here concluded that appellant received due process because

she was given notice and a full opportunity to be heard. We agree, as discussed under

appeUant's first assignment of error. As for equal protection, the trial court found appellant

was not denied such because appellant failed to identify the protected class to which she

belonged. If her claim is based upon gender and her status as a married women, R.C.

4141.29(D)(2)(c) is written as gender neutral.

{¶10} We note first that there is a strong presumption in favor of the

constitutionality of statutes. State v. Dario, 106 Ohio App.3d 232 (1st Dist.1995), citing

State v. Anderson, 57 Ohio St.3d 168 (1991); R.C. 1.47. It is a well-settled principle of

statutory construction that, where constitutional questions are raised, courts will liberally

construe a statute to save it from constitutional infirmities. Woods v, Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d

504 (2000). The party challenging a statute must prove that it is unconstitutional beyond a

doubt.reasonable dou. rlla.rr^.

(¶11} Here, appellant cites a 2003 study surveying the states that have laws that

deny benefits to spouses who quit work due to family relocation, with Ohio being in the

small minority of states with such laws. Appellant argues that Ohio's laws are in the

minority and outdated. Appellant also cites a Califomia case, Boren v. Catifornia Dept. of

Emp. Dev., 59 Cal.App.3d 250, 130 Cal.Rptr. 683 (1976), and a Pennsylvania case,

Wallace v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 38 Pa,Cmmw. 342, 393 A.2d 43 (1978), both of

which found violative of equal protection their respective unemployment compensation

24

No. 11 AP-473 8

statutes that disqualified from benefits claimants who voluntarily terminated their

employment for marital, filial, or domestic reasons.

{¶12} Initially, none of these authorities are controlling upon this court. Thus, we

may reject them outright. Notwithstanding, many of appellant's arguments in her brief,

especially those relating to the 2003 study, concern legislative prerogative, philosophy,

and lawmaking, which are not within the province of this court. Questions regarding the

wisdom of legislation are left to the General Asserribly. If the General Assembly has the

constitutional power to enact a law, its wisdom is of no concern to the court. Ohio Pub.

Interest Action Group v. Pub. Util. Comm., 43 Ohio St.2d 175, 183 (1975), citing State Bd.

of Health v. Greenville, 86 Ohio St. 1, 20 (1912); Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh, 97 Ohio St.

171, 183 (1918). As for Boren, it is distinguishable from the present case. In Boren, the

claimant's statistics showed that 99 percent of the applicants rejected under that state's

unemployment provision were women. From this, the court concluded that the section

affected women only and "was designed to disqualify a selected group of female

claimants." There is no such statistical evidence regarding R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c)

presented by appellant here. Id. at 258.

{^13} Although the circumstances in Wallace are more closely akin to those in the

present case, we decline appellant's invitation to strike down R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) as

unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Ohio, in rariou v. Champion Spaf* Plug Cc.,r 145

Ohio St. 263 (1945), addressed the predecessor statute to R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c),

Gen.Code, 1345-6(d)(7), which similarly provided that "no individual may "'" be paid

benefits for the duration of any period of unemployment with respect to which the

administrator finds that such individual * * * quit work voluntarily to marry or because of

25

No. 11 AP-4739

marital obligations." The court in Farloo held that, "when a wife definitely quits her work to

live with her husband in another part of the country, it is pursuant to her marital obtigation.

Therefore, under the provisions of Section 1345-6, part 'd,' General Code, Mrs. Farloo

was completely ineligible for unemployment benefits." Id. at 268. The court went on to

explain that it believed this issue was within the province of the legislature:

Other states have had a variety of statutory provisionscovering the subject of unemployment compensation, some ofwhich, in dealing with the question of disqualification,particularly as to the effect of quitting work because of maritalobligation, are substantially the same as the provisions of theOhio statute above quoted. Although there appears to havebeen no decisions of courts of last resort construing andapplying those provisions, they have generally beenadministered in accordance with the conclusion to which weare impelled by force of the clear and unequivocal languageemployed in these statutory provisions. In our view, a contraryconstruction and application would be tantamount tolegislative action, which is the province of the legislative andnot the judicial branch of the government.

Id. at 269.

{114} Judge Rogers, in his dissenting opiriion in Wallace, agreed that any

conferring of unemployment benefits upon those who quit work for marital reasons

belongs to the legislature. Judge Rogers stated, "the history of unemployment

compensation in Pennsylvania is one of increasingly larger benefits conferred on more

and more people. This history, together with the exception made for domestic causes for

quitting, convince me that the Legislature is aware both of the needs of the unemployed

and of the problems of funding the program. We should not interfere with the Legislature's

policy in this case on this record." Id. at 354-355.

26

No. 11AP-47310

{¶15} Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained the rationale behind

denying unemployment benefits under such circumstances in Brown-Brockmeyer Co. v.

Holmes, 152 Ohio St. 411 (1949). In that case, the court, citing Far/oo, explained "[t]his

court and other courts look with disfavor on the allowance of unemployment

compensation where work is available but is refused upon some caprice of the employee.

Where a person regularly employed removes himself to a point or causes a situation

where work is unavailable, while hi[s] former type of employment is continuously

available, he, in the opinion of this court, waives his right to unemployment compensation

benefits as to an employer offering such employment." Id. at 415.

{116} In his dissenting opinion in Wallace, Judge Rogers shared the same

rationale discussed in Brown-Brockmeyer. Judge Rogers contended the majority "entirely

overlooks the reason why the disqualification of persons who quit their work for domestic

reasons passes constitutional muster carefully explained in [Unemp. Bd. of Rev, v.

Jenkins 23 Pa.Cmmw. 127, 350 A.2d 447 (1976)] that the purpose of unemployment

cornoensation is to provide temporary assistance to persons who are suddenly without

employment for causes over which they have little or no personal control." ld. at 354,

{¶17} In addition, the decision in Wallace has been recently criticized by one

member of the same court. In Procito v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev., 945 A.2d 261 (2008),

Judge Leavitt stated in his concurrence that he believed WaifBce was wrongiy uecided.

After noting that Wallace was decided by a close four-to-three vote, with one of the four

votes a concurrence in the result, he stated the jurisprudence expressed in Wallace was

dated and not consistent with more recent holdings of the United States and

Pennsylvania Supreme Courts that economic legislation nearly always survives a

27

11No. 11AP-473

rational-reiationship challenge. See id. at 269. Judge Rogers, in his dissenting opinion in

Wallace,also explained the economic reasons behind the legislation. He stated, "it seems

to me that the added cost of providing benefits to persons who leave work for domestic

reasons is a reason for denying them benefits, and a very good one indeed. The payment

of benefits to spouses who follow their partners to new places of employment or to

persons with one or more of a myriad of other domestic reasons for quitting employment

which could be conjured, could place an unimaginable burden on the program." Id.

{¶18} These authorities convince us that any change in Ohio law, in this respect,

should be left to the legislature. We have no indication that the Supreme Court of Ohio

has changed its view on this type of legislation, and we decline to find R.C.

4141.29(D)(2)(c) unconstitutional without some suggestion from that court in this regard.

Therefore, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.

{919} Appellant argues in her third assignment of error that allowing exceptions to

R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) for some religious reasons while not allowing exceptions for other

ror„inl Q „iPws, is a violation of her First Amendment and equal protection rights, citing the

decision of the First District Court of Appeals in Marvin v. Giles, 11 Ohio App.3d 57 (1 st

Dist.1983). In Marvin, the appellate court found that a claimant who left his employment

after he had a religious experience telling him to move to his home in Alabama to take

ccmpensa±ion_care of his deceased sibling's children was eniitied to unemployment

Here, appellant claims that she is a professed atheist, and Marvin grants an exception to

R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) that permits benefits for those people who believe in a God but not

for those who do not believe in a God.

28

No. 11 AP-47312

{¶20} However, Marvin was not decided by this appellate district, and it is not

controlling. Notwithstanding, we agree with the trial court that there is nothing in the

record showing that her employer was aware of or considered appellant's religious views.

The commission was also not aware of appellant's religious views until she raised them in

her June 3, 2010 letter appealing her denial of benefits. The commission never cited her

religious views in any determination, and appellant fails to show that it considered them in

any way. Importantly, unlike Marvin, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that

appellant quit her job based upon her religious views. Therefore, we find Marvin is

irrelevant to this case, and whether a claimant may receive unemployment compensation

after leaving her job based upon religious convictions is inapposite to the matter before

us. Appellant's third assignment of error is overruled.

{¶21} Appellant argues in her fourth assignment of error that the commission and

ODJFS violated her rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 when it

refused to address or respond to her repeated requests for accommodations of her

reading disability. Appellant asserts she was diagnosed with dyslexia, a disability under

DSM-IV-TR 315.00, and she requested an exception to the policy of ODJFS and the

commission that requires claims and appeals to be in writing. She contends that her

disability hinders her ability to fully express herself in writing and comprehend writing.

{fi221 I Itie ii Gf ihe ADr^i prGhibitI publlC enfi4iee frnm tiigrrimiflatinc^ based on

disability. In pertinent part, the ADA states: "no qualified individuai with a disability shall,

by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by

any such entity." 42 U.S.C. 12132. Similarly, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) of the Rehabilitation Act

29

No. 11AP-47313

provides that no otherwise qualified individual with a disability shall be excluded from,

denied benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving federal financial assistance.

{¶23} In the present case, the trial court concluded that these claims are matters

for a separate lawsuit and were not part of the claims litigated before the commission.

Appellant does not contest such under this assignment of error, and she acknowledges

that she may pursue a separate legal action based upon these alleged violations.

Appellant claims, rather, that she raises the commission's lack of accommodation to

demonstrate she was denied full and fair access to an appeal. However, even if we could

address this issue in the present appeal, we would find it unavailing. Appellant does not

specifically explain how she was disadvantaged by her dyslexia or how she was denied

full and fair access to an appeal. She states that the commission may not have fully

understood her and may have been confused by her inability to understand the rules and

procedure, but she gives no further explanation or examples. There is also no indication

11..1 U^.^,.c^,,,..,r,Gtw,v a that rr,.. _....P .^^mmission did not understand appellant's filings. Our own review: u,. ... ...__._ .

of her filings demonstrates that appellant ably expressed her contentions and views

thro(ighout this matter, and she filed detailed documents that included legal citations and

authority to support her claims. Appellant's vague and non-specific claims are insufficient

to demonstrate that she was actually prejudiced by the commission's actions or inactions

in this respect. For these reasons, we overrule appellant's fourth assignment of error.

{124} Appellant argues in her fifth assignment of error that the court of common

pleas erred when it stated that pro se litigants are held to the same standard as an

attorney, when the United States Supreme Court has held that pro se litigants are to be

30

No. 11 AP-473 14

held to less stringent standards. In finding that appellant was afforded procedural due

process, the trial court noted that Ohio law is clear that pro se litigants are held to the

same standard as far as the requirement that they must follow procedural law and adhere

to court rules.

{¶25} We agree with the trial court that it is well-established that pro se litigants

are held to the same rules, procedures, and standards as litigants represented by

counsel. The Suprenie Court of Ohio has specifically held so in many cases. See, e.g.,

Zukowski v. Brunner, 125 Ohio St.3d 53, 2010-Ohio-1652; State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel,

100 Ohio St.3d 352, 2003-Ohio-6448; Sabouri v. Ohio Dept of Job & Family Servs., 145

Ohio App.3d 651 (10th Dist.2001). This court has held likewise in countless cases. See,

e:g., Fields v. Stange, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-48, 2004-Ohio-1134, ¶ 7; Dailey v. R& J

Commercial Contracting, 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1464, 2002-Ohio-4724, ¶ 17. It is true that

a court may, in practice, grant a certain amount of latitude toward pro se litigants. Robb v.

Smallwood, 165 Ohio App.3d 385, 2005-Ohio-5863, ¶ 5 (4th Dist.). However, the court

cannot simply disregard the rules in order to accommodate a party who fails to obtain

counsel. Id. "The rationale for this policy is that if the court treats pro se litigants

differently, 'the court begins to depart from its duty of impartiality and prejudices the

handling of the case as it relates to other litigants represented by counsel.' " Pinnacle

Credit Servs., LLC v. Kuzniak, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 111, 2009-Ohio-1021, ¶ 31, quoting

Karnofel v. Kmart Corp., 11 th Dist. No. 2007-T-0036, 2007-Ohio-6939, ¶ 27.

{¶26} Appellant here cites to Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972)

in support of her position that, as a pro se litigant, she is not held to the same procedural

standards as an attorney. However, Haines is inapposite. In Haines, the Supreme Court

31

No.11AP-47315

concluded thatallegations in a pro se complaint, made by a prison inmate, would be held

to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and that in

construing the complaint in such a strict manner, the trial court's dismissal was

inappropriate. Id. at 520. To the contrary, in the present case, appellant seems to be

arguing that she should be held to less stringent standards throughout the entire

proceedings. However, as explained above, appellant is held to the same standards

when it comes to procedures and rules. See Monus v. Day, 7th Dist. No. 10 MA 35, 2011-

Ohio-3170, ¶ 32-35 (acknowledging that, although some latitude might be granted in the

construction and formal requirements of pleadings, f-iaines does not stand for the

proposition that pro se litigants should be held to a lesser standard throughout the entire

proceedings). See also Maguire v. Natl. City Bank, 2d Dist. No. 24146, 2011-Ohio-387

(Haines does not alter the well-established tenet that pro se litigants are held to the same

standard as licensed attorneys); State v. Briscoe, 8th Dist. No. 83471, 2004-Ohio-4096

(affirming that pro se litigants are held to the same standard as licensed attorneys and

olarrlnn^..^....^, ^^ uai„Pq a-q hPina a federal case that is not controlling over the court).

Furthermore, as this court noted in Fields, Haines is a criminal case, and the United

States Supreme Court, in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826, 100 S.Ct. 2486

(1980) clarified that it never suggested in Haines that procedural rules in ordinary civil

litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those wi'lo proceed without

counsel. For all of these reasons, appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled.

{927} Appellant argues in her sixth assignment of error that the commission erred

when it found that she did not have an implied contract and a legal right to transfer.

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it stopped its analysis after finding

32

No.11AP-47316

she was an at-wili employee. Appellant maintains that case Iaw establishes that at-will

employees may still have an implied contract for employment, citing Mers v. Dispatch

Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100 (1985), and Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 46 Ohio St3d

134 (1989). In Mers, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized that the terms of an at-will

employment relationship could be transformed into an implied contract for a definite term.

Mers, at 103-104. In Kelly, the court found evidence that may demonstrate parties

mutually assented to something other than at-will employment to include employee

handbooks, company policies, and some oral representations. Thus, to this extent, we

agree with appellant's argument.

11128} Appellant then argues that she proved by documentary and testimonial

evidence that her transfer was approved but never complied with by Quest. Appeilant

asserts that Smith admitted she signed appeilant's request-to-transfer form, and company

policy and past history provided employees the right to transfer. We agree that Smith

testified that she signed appellant's form requesting a transfer. However, we disagree

.,,,M^ni a.,,..,oNy.,,,n^.., ^t-,., r.,..narartPrizatinn of Smith's testimony that she stated company policy and,n

past history provided employees the right to transfer. Smith only agreed with the question

posed by appellant's representative that, "[I]n regards to transfer, have you ever seen an

employee be able to transfer from one place to another, one business unit to another?"

.. ....l.LL.

Thus, Smith only testified that she had seen empioyees transfer from one uria< to al I^^I 1er.

Smith did not testify that company policy and past history provided employees any

particular right to such a transfer. In fact, Smith testified, "[I]t's not a given that she will

transfer. Its just a request." In addition, appellant has cited no evidence to support her

assertion that appellant's transfer was approved in any manner by anyone at Quest.

33

No. 11AP-473 17

Therefore, appellant's evidence, in these respects, did not support her claims, and these

arguments are without merit. We also note that appellant again raises under this

assignment of error the hearing officer's alleged denial of her right to issue subpoenas to

produce an empioyee handbook and policies to support her claims. However, we have

already addressed this subpoena argument above and rejected it. For these reasons,

appellant's sixth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶29} Accordingly, appellant's six assignments of error are overruled, and the

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

DORRIAN, J., concurs.TYACK, J., dissents.

TYACK, J., dissenting.

{¶30} I believe that Cindy Goodrich's and her counsel's own statements about her

attempts to get subpoenas issued, especially with the detailed history about the attempts

to issue the subpoenas, are sufficient to show that she tried to present her case and was

. . the _._♦ .. ^.

prevented from doing so by bureaucratic propiems in tngovernment age ,cy. T L.C

assertion that the person responsible for issuing subpoenas was "out until Monday" is

certainly believable. I do not believe that her claim was an unsupported claim.

{¶31} I am also slow to discard her claims where the governmental agency

responsible for generating a record of the hearing generates a transcript with the word

"inaudible" at key places.

{¶32} Due Process of Law involves both the right to be aware of the issues to be

determined and the right to contest the issues.

34

No. 11AP-47318

{¶33} Here, the government bureaucracy established the system for presenting

evidence via the use of subpoenas and then issued no subpoenas. The government

bureaucracy set up the systems for addressing entitlement to unemployment

compensation through a hearing at which an accurate record is to be created for

purposes of an administrative appeal and then failed to generate a complete record.

{¶34} I cannot say that Cindy Goodrich is entitled to unemployment benefits. I

cannot say she is not. However, I can say she was not given the opportunity to fully

develop her case. Due Process of Law, to me, requires that she be given that

opportunity.

{¶35} I would reverse the judgment of the triat court and remand the case so a

complete evidentiary hearing can be conducted.

{¶36} Since the majority does not do so, I respectfully dissent.

35

20855 - U90

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

t=1`.Ez U

7T? APR 94 pm 11)' 04NTH APPELLATE DISTRICTTE

Cindy L. Goodrich,

Appellant-Appellant,

Ohio Uneniployment CompensationReview Commission et al.,

Appellees-Appellees.

CLEiZ'ti OF COURTS

No. 11AP-473(C.P.C. No. ioCVF-10-15888)

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

JOURNALENTRY

For the reasons stated in the memorandum decision of this court rendered

on April 24, 2012, it is the order of this court that appellant's February 21, 2012 motion

to certify a conflict and application for reconsideration are denied.

BROWN, P.J., and DORRIAN, J.

Judge Susan Brown, P.J.

TYACK, J., concurs in part.

36

IO-iIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OH., ,. . ,_ ;•i . ^ .i1i

TENTH APPELI.ATE DISTRICT

Cindy L. Goodrich,

Appella nt-Appellant,

Y.

Ohio Unemployment CompensationReview Commission et al.,

Appellees-Appellees.

21,I2 APft 24 PH 12: 4 3

CLEk4t Or COURTS

No. iiAP-473(C.p.C. No. 1oCVF-i0-15888)

(REGUI.AR CALENDAR)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Rendered on April 24, 2012

Cindy L. Goodrich, pro se.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Dnuid E. Lefton, for

appellee Director, Ohio Department of Job & Family Services.

ON APPLICATION FOR RECONSIDERATION ANDMOTION TO CERTIFY CONFLICT

BROWN, P.J.

{¶ 1) On February 21, 2012, pursuant to App.R. 26(A), appellant, Cindy L.

Goodrich, filed an application for reconsideration. Appellant seeks reconsideration of the

judgnient rendered by this court on February 9, 2oi2 in Goodrich v. Ohio Unemp. Comp.

Rev. Comm., ioth Dist. No. uAP-473, 2ot2-Ohio-467. In our decision, we affirnied the

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas which affiri-ned the decision of

the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission ("commission"), appellee, a

division of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services ("ODJFS"), appellee.

(¶ 2) Appellant has also filed a February 21, 2012 motion to cei-tify a conflict.

Appellant contends a conflict exists with this court's judgment in Goodrich and the

37

20855 - U60

No. tu1P-4732

judgments rendered in Marvin v. Giles, 1i Ohio App.3d 57 (lst Dist.1983), and Caudill u.

Bur. ofEmp• Sews., 12th Dist. No. CA84-08-051 (Dec. 31, i984).

{¶ 3} We first address appellant's application for reconsideration, The test to be

applied in ruling on an App.R. 26(A) application for reconsideration in the court of

appeals is whether the niotion calls to the attention of the court an obvious error in its

decision or raises an issue for consideration that was either not considered at all or was

not fully considered by the court when it should have been. State u. Rowe, 92 Ohio

App.3d 652, 677 (ioth Dist.1993)•{T 4) Here, appellant presents two arguments in her application. Appellant first

argues that we were incorrect in our conclusion that she provided only unsuppotted

statements that she requested several subpoenas be issued for the hearing before the

commission hearing officer. Appellant believes that, in our decision, we found her to be

intentionally untruthful and implied she committed perjury by bringing an unsupported

claini. After receiving our decision, appellant requested the commission's file on

February 14, 2012, and the comniission sent her copies of tie subpoenas in question that

should have been included in the commission's file but seemingly were not. Appellant has

attached to her application the subpoenas, which she says denionstrates that she

requested such and the commission mailed them to their intended recipients on August 9,

2oto for the August 13, 2oio hearing before the hearing officer.

{¶ 51 Initially, we note that we did not find appellant to be intentionally- s_L^

untruthful, and we did not iinply that appellant had comniitted perjury by arguing ,ie

had, in fact, requested the subpoenas. Our decision was grounded upon the lack of any

evidence in the record before us that she had requested the subpoenas. The only evidence

appellant relied upon in her original appeal was an "inaudible" portion of the transcript

from the hearing before the hearing officer. Appellant claimed that it was during this

";na„dihle" section that the hearing officer stated she requested the subpoenas but they

were never issued. We concluded that we could not rely upon appellant's unsupported

claim that the inaudible section of the transcript contained the hearing officer's

acknowledgment that appellant had requested the subpoenas. Thus, with no other

evidence before us, we had no option but to find appellant had failed to show that she

requested the subpoenas.

38

20855 - U61

No.isAP-473

(116) Although appellant now attaches apparent copies of these subpoenas to her

application, we can neither consider thent at this juneture nor could we have considered

these subpoenas as attachments in the original appeal. It is well-settled that a reviewing

court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court's

proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter. State v. 7shmait

54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. Rather, appellate review is

limited to the record as it existed at the time the trial court rendered its judgment.

Chickey v. âVatts, loth Dist. No. o4AP-818, 2005-Ohio-4974, 114, citing Van Meter v.

Stebner, 9th Dist. No. 2348-M (Dec. 28, 1994), citing McKay u. C.ttfip, 8o Ohio App.3d

487,490 (gth Dist.1992), fn. 3.

{¶ 7} In the present case, the subpoenas were not a part of the record before the

common pleas court. Furthermore, appellant did not even attempt to request a copy of

her commission file until February 14, 2012, which was five days after this court's

decision. There is no indication that appellant took any steps at either the administrative

level or comnion pleas level to attempt to remedy this situation. There is also no

indication that appellant took any steps to obtain these documents prior to her appeal

before this court or attempted to supplement the record, despite that the common pleas

court also found there was no docunientation in the record that she requested the

issuance of subpoenas. Appellant's attempt to submit these documents at this late

juncture via attachments to her application for reconsideration bars our consideration

thereof. Therefore, this argument is without merit.

{¶ S} Insofar as appellant also urges this court to discipline ODJFS' attorney for

withholding the subpoenas, we must decline to do so. Discipline of lawyers falls within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Mentor Lagoons, Inc. u. Rubin, 31

Ohio St.3d 256, 259-6o (1987). Furtherinore, appellant admits that she has no evidence

that the attorney for ODJFS intentionally witllheld evidence of the subpoenas or engaged

in any other inlproper conduct. Therefore, this argunient is without nierit.

{¶ 9) Appellant also argues in her application for reconsideration that, although

this court cited the correct standard of review from Moore u. Comparison Mkt., Inc., 9th

Dist. No 23255, 2oo6-Ohio-6382, that the focus of an appellate court when reviewing an

unemployment conipensation appeal is upon the commission's decision and not the trial

39

20853 - U62

4

court's decision, we failed to properly apply this standard. Appellant points out that this

court referenced the comnion pleas court's findings 17 times and did not focus on the

commission's ruling. However, we can find no error in our mere references to the trial

court's conclusions on the saine issues appellant raised on appeal to this court. See, e.g.,

C(zen u. Ohio Dept. of Job & Fantily Serus., t2th Dist. No. CA2011-04-o26, 2oi2-Ohio-

994, ¶ 28, 48 (the appellate court indicated its agreement with common pleas court's

findings on various issues). We do note, though, that appellant specifically asserted error

with respect to findings by the conimon pleas court in her fifth assignment of error, and

we addressed such. We recognize that we could have disregarded this argument on the

basis our focus is not upon the trial court's findings. See, e.g., Lafayette Twp. u.

Sheppard, 9th Dist. No. 1oCAos24-M, 2oii-Ohio-6i99, 113 (finding it need not address

assignments of error related to errors by the trial court because the proper standard of

review is focused upon the commission's decision); Haynes v. Ohio Tarnpike Conim., 8th

Dist. No. 92981, 2oio-Ohio-665, ¶ 7 (even if trial court used the wrong standard of

review, an appellate court need not address it because the focus of its review is not on the

trial court's decision). However, in her appellate brief, appellant also seemed to be

arguing that she should be held to a lesser standard as a pro se litigant in the proceedings

before this court, as well, making it an appropriate issue for us to address. For these

reasons, appellant's application for reconsideration is denied.

{¶ lOj With regard to appellant's motion to certify a conflict, stich motions are

governed by the Ohio Constitution, Articie iJ, 8eciio,-, 6tnx4j, ^••^ rm^^^

Whenever the judges of a court of appeals find that ajudgment upon which they have agreed is in conflict with ajudgnaent pronounced upon the same question by any othercourt of appeals of the state, the judges shall certify the recordof the case to the supreme coort for review and finaldetermination.

See also Whitelock u. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 66 Ohio St.3d 594 (1993), syllabus; App.R. 25;

and S.Ct.Prac.R. IV.

(1111) Before and during the certification of a case to the Supreme Court of Ohio,

pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(4), three conditions must be

inet. Whitelock at 596. The court in Whitelock instructed:

40

20855 - [J63

-5

First, the certifying court must find that its judgment is inconflict with the judgment of a court of appeals of anotherdistrict and the asserted conflict niust be "upon the samequestion." Second, the alleged conflict must be on a rule oflaw-not facts. Third, the journal entry or opinion of thecertifying court must clearly set forth that rule of law whichthe certifying court contends is in conflict with the judgmenton the same question by other district courts of appeals.

(Emphasis sic.) Id.{1) 12) As explained above, appellant contends a conflict exists with this eouit's

judgment in the current case and the judgments rendered in Marvin and Caudill. In

161aruin, the claimant was found to be entitled to unemployment compensation after he

voluntarily terminated his employment because of religious beliefs. In Caudill, the

claimant was found to be entitled to unemployment compensation after the eniployer

discharged the claimant for reasons predicated upon her religious beliefs.

11113) However, Maruin and Caudill are distinguishable from the present case. As

we explained in Goodrich at I 2o:

[T]here is nothing in the record showing that appellant'semployer was aware of or considered appellant's religiousviews. The commission was also not aware of appeDant'sreligious views until she raised them in her June 3, 2oio letterappealing her denial of benefits. The commission never citedher religious views in any determination, and appellant fails tosliow that it considered them in any way. Importantly, unlikeIY[1TVi

^.c..

ac_,. •ia nv y..stiia g in tho rarnrd rlPmnnstrating that

if'^, tu^

appellant quit her job based upon her religious views.Therefore, we find Marvin is irrelevant to this case, andwhether a clainiant may receive unemployment compensationafter leaving her job based upon religious convictions isinapposite to the matter before us.

{¶ 14) Appellant claims this court and the common pleas court found incorrectly

that neither the commission nor her eir^pioyer was nv+are of her relia ous views. I'-r

support, appellant first points to tltree request-for-transfer fornis she submitted to ller

employer included in the record. However, these fornis do not refer to appellant's

religious views or indicate she was requesting a transfer based upon religious grounds.

Appellant also points to e-mails between her and her immediate supervisor and between

her and her supervisor's supervisor, in which appellant asserts she discussed her views on

41

2oBSS - U6a.

No: i1AF-473 6- - - --

keeping her niarriage intact and moving with her husband. Although it is apparent in

both e-mails that the underlying reason for appellant possibly leaving her employment

was so that she could relocate with her husband if he was accepted to law school in

another state, we fail to see how this cited reason communicated any religious view to her

employer. Furthermore, we discussed the issue of unemployment benefits for spouses

who quit their jobs under appellant's third assignment of error in our original decision.

We explained that R.C. 4141.29(ll)(2)(c) provides that no individual may be paid benefits

if the individual quit work because of niarital obligations, Goodrich at 1 9, and the

Supreme Court of Ohio has found that, when a wife quits her job to move with her

husband to another part of the country, it is pursuant to her marital obligation. Id. at ¶ 13,

citing Farloo u. Champion Spark Plug Co., 145 Ohio St. 263, 268 (1945). Thus, unlike

Marvin and Caudill, in the present case there is no indication that appellant quit her job

for religious reasons. Therefore, we find no conflict exists between our decision in the

present case and the decisions in Marvin and Caudill, and we deny appellant's motion to

certify a conflict.

(1115) Accordingly, appellant's application for reconsideration and motion to

certify a conflict are denied.Motions derzied.

DORRIAN, J., concurs.TYACK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

TYACK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

111161 For the reasons set forth in niy original dissent, I would reconsider the

original opinion of the majority and grant Cindy Goodrich a new hearing. Since a

majority of the panel does not do so, I respectfully dissent fronx the decision not to

reconsider.

{¶ 17} I see no basis for asserting that Cindy Goodrich lost her job due to her

religious beliefs, at least upon the record before us. I, therefore, do not see a basis for

certifying a conflict to the Ohio Supreme Court. To that extent, I agree with the majority.

42

E0968 - N6 FI LE=OCOMMOti PLEAS COUR I

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FRANKLIN COUNTY, Ofif'O11ALINC0. OfilO

CINDY L. GOODRICH

Appellant,

-vs-

p ►tii o S-Lco-t.e.1)IRF.CTOR, OHIO DEPARTMENT OFJOB AND FAMILY SFRVICES, et al.,

Appollces.

CIVIL DIVISION 2411 APR 23 Ah 10t 22

CLERK OF COUR i'S

CASE NO. 10 CVF 1015888

JUDGF, JOHN BENDFR

I)F.C(SION AND ENTRY

Rcndercd this^ day of April 2011

BENDER, JUDGE

This matter comes before this Court upon an appcal pursuant to R.C. § 4141.282(FI) from

a Septcmbcr 21, 2010 Dccision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission

("Review Commission"). The appellant (claimant), Cindy Goodrich, was employed as a

phlcbotomist by Qucst Diagnostics, Inc. from November 7, 2007 through March 16, 2010. In a

resignation letter dated February 25, 2010, the appellant informcd her employer that her "last day

with the Cincinnati Business Unit for Quest Diagnostics will be Tuesday March 16, 2010." See

February 25, 2010 Letter. "l'hcrcafler, appcllant flled a claim for unemployment bcneGts. 'fhe

claimant's application was allowed with a benefit year beginning March 21, 2010.

In May 2010, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) issued a

redetermination disallowing the application because of a disqualifying separation froni

employmcnt. Spccifically, the redetermination held that the appcllant quit her employment with

Quest Diagnostics under disqualifying circumstances because of a marital obligation. On June 4,

2010, the appellant filed a timely appeal.

I

E0968 - N7

On June 7, 2010 the matter was transferred to the Unemployment Compensation Review

Commission (UCRC) pursuant to R.C. 4141.281. On August 13, 2010, Hearing Of7icer Denis J.

I3owshicn held an evidentiary hcaring via telephone. 'I'hc employcr, Quest Diagnostics, inc., was

represented by Carolyn Sniith, supervisor of patient services. The appellant appeared and

testified on her own behalf and was rcpresented by her husband, Joshua Goodrich.,

In his August 16, 2010 l)ecision, the hcaring officer affirmed the director's May 2010

rcdctermination and held that the appcllant "quit cniploymcnt with Quest Diagnostics, Inc.,

because of a marital obligation." Scc August 16, 2010 Decision. The appcllant fi ►cd a request

for review. '1•hcreaRer, the Review Commission disallowed the appellant's request for review

and issued a decision affirming the Gndinys and determination of the hearing officer. See

Scptetnbcr 21, 2010 Decision.

In thc August 16, 2010 Decision, the hearing officer madc the following factual findings:

Quest Diagnostics, Inc., employed clainiant as a phlebotomist from November 7,2007,through March 16, 2010. In this position, she verified information, made sure thatorders were coniplete, drew blood, collected samples, froze blood, spinned blood in accntrifugc, and dealt with customers.

Claimant's husband relocated to California to seek employment. 1'hc couple could notClaimant was facina eviction from her house in Ohio.

auaru tv mawaau, ...., ...,».............. ^.,._.._._.._ .- .. „

On Pcbruary 25, 2010, claimant voluntarily submittcd a written resignation to QuestDiagnostics, Inc., (sic) She explained that her final day of work would bc March 16,2010, because shc was rclocating to San Diego, Califomia, to be with her husband.

Claimant liled a request with the employcr to be allowed to transfer to San Diego,California. The employer denied this request.

Quest Diagnostics, Inc., had continuing work available for claimant in Ohio.

Whilc employcd by Qucst 1)iagnostics, Inc., claimant did not have a vtiTitten contract ofemployment providing that shc had a right to transfer from Cincinnati, Ohio to a QuestDiagnostics, lne., facility in anothcr state. She did not belong to a union that had a laborcontract with the cmplover providing that a person in claimant's circumstanecs had a

' Mr. Goodrich is not a licensed attorney.

2

44

E0968 - N8

right to transfer from Cincinnati to another company location.Scc Findings of Fact, August 16, 2010 Decision.

Set forth in the record, and pertinent to this appeal, is the February 25, 2010 Icttcr sent

front the appellant to Carolyn Smith, supervisor of patient scrvices. 'nce Icttcr states as follows:

February 25, 2010

Attn: Carolyn SmithQucst Diagnostics6700 Steger DriveCincinnati, O1-145237

Subjcct: Rcsignation from Cincinnati Business Unit

Dear Ms. Smith,

"I'his resignationietter is to inform you that my last day with the Cincinnati Busincss Unitfor Qucst Diagnostics will be Tuesday March 16, 2010. 1 am relocating to San Diego,

CA with my husband.

I havc appreciated the opportunities and cxperiences that have been provided to mcduring my almost 3 years of services for Quest. If there is anything I can do to be ofassistance during the transition, please let me know.

Attachcd to the resignation letter is a form, which is required by the State of' California tobeeome Phlebotomy Certified. It is called the "California Statcment of PhlcbotomyPractical Training; Docuntentation ol'Training/Gxperience." I request that this form beconiplctcd to allow me to apply for ccrtification in California.

'I'his form nceds to be signed by both yoursclf, and the Laboratory Director for ourbusiness unit. Ifi could get two copies, both need to be placed in scparate scaled Questenvelops (sic)• 'fhe sooner that this can be done, the faster I will be able to process myapplication for ccrtification in Califomia.

I would likc to try to stay with Quest Diagnostics in the San Diego Business Unit. Ifanything can be done so I can transfer to that Business Unit, I would be very grateful.

'fhank you for your time on this matter, and I wish you the best of luck

Sincerely/s/ Cindy Goodrich

Cindy L. Goodrich

3

45

E0968 - N9

Cc: Mardia Shands, Dircctor of I.I.R.Maguire & Schneider, LLPJoshua S. Goodrich

Standard of Review

This Court must uphold the dccision of the Review Commission unless it concludes,

upon a rcview of the record, that the decision is unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifcst

weight of the evidencc. Sec R.C. 4141.282(FI); see also Tzangas, Plakas & Alannos v. Ohio Bur.

Emp. Serv., (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 694, and Irvine v. Uneinp. Cvmp. Bd. of Rcv. (1985), 19 Ohio

St. 3d 15. While a reviewing court is "not permitted to make factual findings or to determine the

credibility of witnesses, [it does] have a duty to determinc whether the [review commission's]

decision is supported by the evidence in the record " Tsangas, Plakas & Nlannos, Ohio St. 3d at

696.

The Unemployment Compensalion Act ("Act") does not exist to protect employccs from

their own conduct, but rather to protcct employees fiom economic forces over which they have

no control. When an employee is at fault, he or she is no longer the victim of fortune's whims

but instead is dircctly rcsponsible for his or her own predicament. Fault on the employec's part

__ ^.:_. .._ {.... C-,.•., t6•. AMe i„tnnt 5mr1 the act's nrotection. Therefore, the claimant hastieparatG.l 111111 vl .11t aav,a, ,••i, ....- ...- . --- -- ,-- -- -

the burden of proving that he or she is entitlcd "to unemploynient compensation benefits,

including the existence ofjust cause for quitting work." lrvinc, at 17. If the individual quit work

without just causc he or she may not be paid benelits. See R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a).

In Irvine, the Supremc Court of Ohio held that just cause is "that which, to an ordinary

intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act." Irvine at 15.

Thc determination of whether just cause exists dcpcnds upon the unique factual considerations of

the particular casc. Id at 17-18.

4

46

•E0968 - N10

Appellant's Argument

The appellant asserts the following four assignments of error in her bricf:

A. Assignment of Error Number One

The decision of the l-lcaring of7icer Gnding that "Claimant contends that shesubmitted subpoena request to the Uncmploymcnt Contpcnsation ReviewCommission to rcquire the employer to produce documents and witness to prove thatshe had a right to transfer to San Dicgo, California. Thesc Subpoenas were notissued. The evidenec clearly demonstrates that claimant was an at-will employee.She had no contractual right to transfcr to anothcr state. Thercfore, the HcaringoRiccr refuscd to continue the hearing in order to have the subpocnas issued." The

Hearing officer in refusing to issue subpoena and to continue the hearing violated

Appellants Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Due Process. Was unlawful,unreasonable and against the manifest weight of the cvidencc and should be reversed

undcr O.R.C. 4141.282(H).

B. Assignment of Error Number Two

That O.R.C. 4141(D)(2)(c) Denying unemployment to all individuals who "quit workto mam or because of marital, parental, filial; or other domestic obligations." Is aviolation of Appellants Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Due Process under theUnitcd States Constitution and a violation of the Ohio Constitution Article 1 Section2 to Equal Protection. Was unlawful, unreasonable and against the manifcst weightof the evidence and should be reversed under O.R.C. 4141.282(H).

C. Assignment of Error Number Thrce

That O.R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) Denying unemplovment to all individuals who "quitwork to marry or because of marital, parental, tilial, or other domestic obligations."While allowing esccptions for somc religious reasons and not other religious views ss(sic) a violation of Appcllants Frist (sic) Amendment Rights as applied to the States

thought ( sic) the Fourteenth Amendment Rights under -the United States Constitution

and a violation of the Ohio Constitution Article I Section l, 2, & 7. Which creates a

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of both Federal and State Constitutions. Wasunlawful, unreasonable and against the manifcst weight of the evidence and should be

reversed under O.R.C. 4141.282(H).

D. Assignment of Error Number Four

That ODJFS and UCRC violated Appcllants rights under American with d'rsabiliticsAct U.S.C.sec. 12132 and 28 C.F.R. sec. 35.130(b)(7) and the Rchabilitation Act of1973, 29 U.S.C. scc. 794 by refusing to address or respond to Appcllants repeated and

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continued request for accommodations ol' her reading disability. This was unlawful.unrcasonable and against the manifcst weight of the cvidcnce and should be reversedundcr O.R.C. 4141.282(1'1).

This Court will revicw the rccord to dctermine whcthcr the Review Conimission's

September 21, 2010 Decision is unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the

evidence. See R.C. 4141?82(1-1); see'also "/'zangas. Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. Isnip. Serv.,

(1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 694, and Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. 13r1 nfRev. (1985), 19 Ohio St. 3d 15.

Appellee's Argument

The appcllcc, Director of thc Ohio I)epartment of Job and Family Services, asserts that

the Scptcmbcr 21, 2010 Order of the Review Commission is lawful, rcasonable and not against

the manif'est weight of the evidence. The appellee urges this Court to at7irm the Review

Commission's Scptcmbcr 21, 2010 Order.

Law and Analysis

In ornler to receive unemployment compensation bcncfits, an individual must have quit

work with just causc. R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). 'fhe Supreme Court of Ohio defined just cause to

be "that which, to an ordinary intclligent person, is a justiliable reason for doing or not doing a

F,..,,,:...,la. ..,.,...I ^ cPe ai 17. In that casc, the Court also held that "[t]he determination ofr.,.,..^,o. .. ..__ .. ... _, __ _ - _ __ . .

whether just cause exists ... depcnds upon the unique factual considerations of the particular

case." Id. A revietiving court is without jurisdiction to weigh the evidence or assess credibility

and may not substitute its judgment to weigh the evidence or assess credibility and may not

n • ' .c..°..°substitute its judgment Ipr that of the hearing otitccr or Revicw ..,om-^tsstcn- ..

Broc•kmeyer Co. v. Roach ( 1947), 148 Ohio St. 511.

Upon review, there is competent, credible evidence in the record to support that the

Review Comniission's Scptcmber 21, 2010 Ordcr is lawful, reasonable and is not against the

•

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manifest weight of the evidence. See R.C. 4141.282(H); see also Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v.

Ohio Bur. Emp. Serv., (1995), 73 Ohio St. 3d 694. The record supporis the fact that the appellant

was dcnied benefits on the ground that she quit her employment under disqualifying

circumstanccs due to a marital obligation. See Findings of Fact, August 16, 2010 Decision. R.C.

4141.29(D')(2)(c) statcs, in relevant part:

(D) Notwithstanding division (A) of this section, no individual may servc a waitingperiod or be paid bencfits undcr the following conditions:

(2) For the duration of the individual's unemployment if the director finds that:

(c) Such individual quit work to marry or because of marital, parental, filial, orothcr domestic obligations.

The record substantiates that the appellant voluntarily quit her empluynient. In the

February 25, 2010 letter the appellant sent to her cmployer she, herself, designates the document

as a "resignation letter." See February 25, 2010 Letter. She informs Ms. Carolyn Smith, the

supervisor for patient services, that her "last day with the Cincinnati I3usiness Unit for Quest

Diagnostics will be 'fuesday March 16, 2010." Sce February 25, 2010 Letter. She also informs

her employer that she is "relocating to San Diego, CA with my husband." See February 25, 2010

t ^nrr 2

Accordingly, the record supports that the appellant is not eligible for uncmployment

benefits because she voluntarily resigned her job in order to relocate to San Diego, California

with her husband. "t'his court concludes that, as a matter of law, that the record supports that the

employcr was reasohable in finding that the appellant quit her employment with Quest

I)iagnostics under disqualifying circumstances because of a marital obligation. See R.C.

4141.29(D)(2)(c).

' The February 25, 2010 Letter demonstrates by the "Cc" notation that the appellant sent a copy of the letter to"Marc ia Shands. Director of FI.R., Maguire & Schneider, LLP, and Joshua Goodrich."

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The appcllant chose to represent herself in this case. Ohio law is clcar that prose litigants

are to be held to the sarnc standard as an attomey. 'I'hc pro se litigant is to be treated the same as

onc trained in the law as far as the requirement to follow procedural law and adhere to court

rules. If the court trcats a pro se litigant differently, the court begins to depart from its duty of

impartiality and prejudiccs thc handling of the case as it relates to other litigants representcd by

counsel. Sce Justice v. Lutheran Social Serm., 1993 Ohio App. LI:XIS 2029.

'I'hc fundamental requirements of procedural duc process are notice and hcaring and

ultimately, an opportunity to bc heard. I'roviding that person wtith notice and a hcaring is all that

is necessary in order to comply with due process in an administrative proceeding. See Coleman

v. Srate Medical 13otrrd of Ohfo (I0`h Dist. App. 2007), 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 4916.

In the context of an administrativc law hearing, the due process afforded to the individual

is an opportunity to be heard. 'I'he record denionstrates that the appellant was sent notice of the

August 13, 20 10 telephone hearing date on August 3, 2010 and participated in that hearing. Scc

August 3, 2010 Notice of l-Iearing. The Notice of 1-learing included full instructions explaining

how the appellant was to procecd and includcd a paragraph regarding witnesses and documents,

as well as instructions on how to obtain subpoenas. This Court concludcs, as a matter of law, that

due process requirements were met when the appellant was given the opportunity to appear

before an independent hearing examincr and present her case.

l'irst Assignment of Error

r..,......,The appciiant asserts in her first assibiuTient of e ior ihai s he was dertl8d dLLe. ^mrrec

whcn the hearing officer refused to continue the hearing and issue the subpoenas that she

purportedly requested. In this assignmcnt of crror, the appellant seems to assert that she is a

mcmber of a protected class. Howcvcr, the appcilant never specifically defines the protected

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class, nor is there anything in the record establishing that the appellant is a member of a

protected class. Furthermore, there is no documentation in thc record, other than the appcllant's

testimony, that she requcstcd the issuance of subpoenas. 'fhus, the matter became one of

credibility which is within the sole discretion of the hearing officer. Thc appellant proffered into

the record that she needed the documents and witness (Carolyn Smith) in ordcr to prove that she

had a right to transfer her employment from Ohio to a Quest Diagnostics' facility in Califomia.

However, there is competent, credible evidence in the record to refute that assertion.

The single most convincing piece of evidence in this case is the appellant's February 25,

2010 resignation letter which demonstrates that the appellant had control over her job

termination when she informed her employer that her last day of' work would bc March 16, 2010.

See February 25, 2010 Lettcr. Morcover, the appcllant admitted at the hcaring, undcr oath, that

her employment was "at-will." Sec 'fr. 13. Likewise, the appellant testificd that she did not

have a written employnient contract with Quest Diagnostics nor did she belong to a union. See

"1'r. 13. Consequently, the appellant did not meet her burden of proof in demonstrating that she

had a contractual right to transPer to a Quest Diagnostics facility in California cither through the

.1er1113 Jia lI_v1-ULl

:u_, ..

a ..1.a..^ :...... employment rontrACt nr throueh terms set forth in a union contract...........,r....^..._.._

Without any legal basis for doing so, issuing a subpoena for an employee handbook or

other documents, or a witness tci provide cumulative testimony to support the appellant's proflcr,

would have been an exercise in futility. When considering the fact that the appellant admitted

,__., ,.l._. ..^,under oath that she was an "at-will" employee, in conjunction with the appe ilnl,l s rcw,uary 'Ic

2010 resignation letter, there was competent, credible evidence to support that the appellant

voluntarily quit hcr cniployment. Sec Srnnet v. Ohro Depi. of 1/ecilt/r, 2009-Ohio-6990.

Moreover, the witness that the appcllant wanted to subpoena, Carolyn Smith, did participate in

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the hearing and the appellant had an opportunity to cross exam her. Ms. Sniith's testimony is

included in the record.

1t is the appellant's contention that hcr Fcbruary 25, 2010 resignation Icttcr was only a

resignation from the local business unit and not a resignation from the company. However, the

record clcarlv demonstrates the appellant submitted her resignation letter prior to any transfer

being approved by her employer. She. acknowledged the uncertainty of a transfer by stating in

the letter "1 would likc to try to stay with Qucst Diagnostics in thc San Dicgo Busincss Unit. If

anything can he done so I can transfer to that I3usincss Unit, I would be grateful." Sce February

25, 2010 Letter.

The fact most contrary to the appellant's assertion that she possessed a transfer right as of

February 25, 2010, is that she acknowledges in the letter that she is not even qualified to be a

phlebotomist in the state of Califomia since she lacks the proper certification.3 See February 25,

2010 Letter. Thus, as of February 25, 2010, the appellant was not certified under California law

to bc a phlebotomist and thus, was not qualified. Therefore, she would not have bcen eligiblc to

accept a transfer since shc lacked the proper certification. Accordingly, the appellant's first

nn,t ie nvemtle[l_

Second Assignment of Error

In her sccond assignment of error, the appellant asserts that R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(c) is

unconstitutional and violates her rights to due process and equal protection. This Court

previously discussed and concludcd, as a mattcr of law, that due process requirements were ntct

when the appellant was given the opportunity to appear before an independent hearing examiner

Thc appetlant's rebruary 25, 2010 resignation letter states as follows: "Attached to this resignation letter is a form,

which is required by the State of California to become Phletbotomy Certified. It is called the "Califomia Statement

of l'hiebotomy Practicial Training: Documentation of Training/Experience." I request that this form be completed

to allow mc to apply for certification in Califomia."

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and present her case. The appellant asserts that she was denied equal protection because she

chose to voluntarily resign her job and relocatc with her husband to Calitornia. The appellant

docs not idcntil'y the protected class to which she belongs which, in tum, providcs her with

l:ighth Amendment Equal I'rotection. "rhe appellant scems to imply that her right to Eighth

Amendment Equal Protection is based on hcr gender and her status as a married woman.

I-lowever, the language of R.C. 4141.29(p)(2)(c) is writtcn as gender ncutral. 'fhc law, as

written, applies equally to both married men and marricd women. Clearly, the same language

would also apply to a married man who voluntarily terminated his employment to relocate with

his wifc to another locale. Morcover, the law, as written, applics equally to married or single

individuals and covers many diflerent factual scenarios. Consequently, the appellant has not met

hcr burden of proof in demonstrating to this Court that this law, as applied to her, was

unconstitutional.

Again, the Court must reiterate, that the cntploycr did not terminatc the appellant from

her employment. '1'hc appellant quit her entployment as evidenced by hcr resignation letter. See

February 25, 2010 Letter.

TL•vt.... _,,.r^:.^^^.I IIifU ff,}°jibnu^ae,u ^,. ^:^^vi

In the third assignment of error, the appcllant asserts that her First and fourtcenth

Amendment rights werc violated based on religious reasons. The appcllant asscrts that she was

denied bcnctits becausc she is an atheist. 1•lowevcr, there is nothing in the record before the

Review Commission to substantiate that either the commission or the employer were awarc or

even considered the appellant's views on religion. '1"here is nothing in the record showing that

the appellant was experiencing a problcm or that she brought the issue to her cmployer's

attention so that the employer could have had the opportunity to address it and remedy it.

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Likewise, thcre is nothing in the record to demonstrate that this issuc was presented to the

hearing officer or the Review Commission and is now, for the first time, being raised on appcal.

See Marvin v. Giles (1983), 11 Ohio App. 3d 57.4 'I'hus, this issue is not properly before this

Court for revicw.

This issue may bc relevant under different circumstances, wherein the appellant was

tcrminatod by her employer. However, under the facts sub Judicie, thc appellant was not

terminated by hcr employer. The evidence ovcrwhclmingly demonstrates that it was the sole

decision of the appellant to voluntarily quit her employment as evidenced by her submitting a

resignation letter to her employer. See February 25, 2010 Letter.

It is well established that laws are "entitled to a strong presumption of constitutionality

and that a party challenging the constitutionality ol' a law bears the burden of proving that the

law is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." Scc "I'radieions Tavern v. City of Columbus

(2006), 171 Ohio App. 3d 383, 392. Accordingly, the appellant's third assignment of error is not

well-taken and is overruled.

Fourth Assignment of Error

in- her C-..,w.^t, ... .^..t of P^r thr annellant asserts that the ODJFS and UCRC..u. .,.sibn ....... .,. _....., -rr--

violated her rights under the Americans with Disabilitics Act (ADA) and the ltehabilitation Act

of 1973. The appellant asserts that during the course of the proceedings bclow, she requested

and was denied, an accommodation. The appellant asserts that she has a qualifying disability

that provides hcr with ADA protection and protection undcr the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

Clearly, these purported claims are a matter for a separatc lawsuit and are not part of the claims

` The facts in the case before this Coun overwhelmingly demonstrate that the appellant voluntarily resigned herposition so that she could relocate to Califomia with her husband. 'I'here is nothing in the record to substantiateappellant's claim that her religious views were even a factor in her decision to resign herjob. Likewise, there isnothing in the record to indicate that the Revicw Commission or the hearing officer were even aware of appcllant'sretigious and considered those vicws in making a deeision regarding unemployment compensation.

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that were litigated before the Review Commission and for which this reviewing court has

jurisdiction and can revicw as part of the proceedings below. The appellant has the opportunity,

ifiintely filcd, to asscrt her ADA and other claims against the ODJI'S and UCRC in a separate

lawsuit in thc proper forum. .

Upon rcvicw ol' the record, the Court concludcs, as a matter o!' law, that the Review

Commission complied with R.C. 41412.281(C)(5). In its Septentber 15, 2010 Order the Review

Commission statcs, in pertinent part:

'1`hc appellant shown above Gled a Request for Review to the Rcvicw Commission,pursuant to the provisions of Section 4141.281(A)(3), Revised Code of Ohio, from theHearing Ot)icer's decision indicated.

Upon considcration thcrcof, and upon a review of the entire record, the Commissionconcludcs that the Requcst for Rcvicw should be disallowed.

DF.C1S1oN

Accordingly, the Review Commission was well within its discretion to disallow further

review of the appellant's case. See R.C. 4141.281(C)(5). 7'his Court concludes that the Review

Commission's September 21, 2010 Decision is lawful, reasonablc, and supported by the manifest

weight ol'the evidencc. Accordingly, the Review Comnrission's September 21, 2010 Decision is

hercby AFFIRNIED.

Rule 58(B) of the Ohio Rulcs of Civil Proccdurc provides the following:

(B) Notice of filing. Whcn the court signs a judgment, the courtshall cndorse thercon a direction to the clerk to serve upon allparties not in default for failure to appear notice of thejudgment and its date of entry upon the joumai. Within threedays of entering the judgment on the joutnal, the clerk shallserve the parties in a manner prescribed by Civ. R. 5(B) andnote the service in the appearance docket. Upon serving thenotice and notation of thc service in the appearancc docket, thescrvice is complete. The failurc of the clerk to servc noticedoes not affect the validity of the judgment or the running ofthe time for appeal except as providcd in App. R. 4(A).

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THE COURT FINI)S THAT THF.RE 1S 1\O .IUST REASON FOR DELAY. TI11S

IS A FINAL APPEALABLE ORDF.R. I'ursuant to Civil Rule 58, the Clerk of Court shall

serve notice upon all parties of this judgment and its date of cntry.

IT IS SO ORDL'•RED.

Copies to:

Cindy L. Goodrich2705 West Canyon Avenue, Apt. 115

San Diego, California 92123Appellant pro se

Quest Diagnostics, Inc.TALX Employnient ServicesP.O. Box 429503Cincinnati, Ohio 45242Appcllcr

Michael De W ine, Esq.David Lefion, Esq.

GeneralOf IieC of ihc Aiiomcy vcnc,u^

Hcalth and Human Services SectionUnemployment Conipensation Unit30 E. Broad Street, 26`h floorColumbus, OI•I 43215-3400Counsel for Appellee Director, Ohio Department of Job and Family Services

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