Corrupt collaboration Ori Weisel + Shaul Shalvi § + University of Nottingham § Ben-Gurion...
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Transcript of Corrupt collaboration Ori Weisel + Shaul Shalvi § + University of Nottingham § Ben-Gurion...
Corrupt collaboration
Ori Weisel+ Shaul Shalvi§
+University of Nottingham §Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
ICSD Hong Kong June 2015
Funding: Max Planck SocietyThe European Research Council (ERC-AdG 295707 COOPERATION)The European Union’s Seventh Framework Program (FP7/2007-2013; REA 333745)
Cooperation is good; can it also be bad?
›A cooperative species; deeply ingrained moral sentiment to cooperateBowles and Gintis 2011
›Establishing sustainable cooperative relationships can set successful individuals and groups apart from less successful ones
›Little is known about negative aspects of cooperationVan Lange and Joireman 2008
›In intergroup conflict there are negative externalities to the outgroupBornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994
›Can (moral) cooperative tendencies—or a cooperative corporate culture—encourage the violation of (other) moral rules?
Lying
›To benefit self: People lie, but maintain self-concept› Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008; Shalvi, Dana, and Handgraff 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi 2013; Gächter and Schulz 2015
›To benefit others: People lie more, still maintain self-concept› Wiltermuth 2011; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely 2013; Conrads, Irlenbusch, Rilke and Walkowitz
2013; Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun and Murnighan 2009; Gneezy 2005; Gino and Pierce 2010; Atanasov and Dana 2011
›group-serving dishonesty is modulated by oxytocin› Shalvi and DeDreu 2014
›Self-concept maintenance
Corrupt collaboration
›Corrupt collaboration: The attainment of profits by joint immoral acts
›Our interest is in cases in which the collaborative effort of individuals necessarily and directly entails the violation of moral rules (lying).
Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Procedure and design
Procedure
1. Player A privately rolls a die and reports the outcome
2. Player B learns about A’s report
3. Player B privately rolls a die and reports the outcome
4. Player A learns about B’s report
Payment
If the reported outcomes are equal each player receives the reported amount in Euros.
If the reported outcomes are not equal both players receive nothing.
Example 2 – No Double
Player A reported
Player B reported
Payment: A gets €0, B gets €0
Example 1 - Double
Player A reported
Player B reported
Payment: A gets €5, B gets €5
Treatment:Aligned Outcomes
Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Results – Aligned Outcomes
Hypothetical honesty baseline Actual behaviour (20 dyads, 20 trials)
16.67% doubles 82% doubles
Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Brazen (i.e., bold and shameless) behaviour
A always ‘sets the stage’,B always ‘gets the job done’
A is honest,B always ‘gets the job done’
A mostly ‘sets the stage’,B always ‘gets the job done’
50% totally brazen B’s
Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Varying incentives
›Remove B’s interest in the value of the double› Treatment B-High – B earns 6 for any double› Treatment B-Low – B earns 1 for any double
›Remove B’s interest in reporting a double› Treatment B-Fixed – B earns 1 regardless of the report
›Remove A’s interest in the value of the double› Treatment A-High – A earns 6 for any double› Treatment A-Low – A earns 1 for any double
›Remove A’s interest in reporting a double› Treatment A-Fixed – A earns 1 regardless of the report
B treatments
A treatments
Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Varying incentives
›B’s are sensitive to the incentives of A players
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Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Singnaling
›B’s are sensitive to the incentives of A players
›They are also sensitive to the behaviour of A players
› B’s are more likely to be brazen when A is brazen as well
› Aligned Outcomes: 100% brazen B’s when A is brazen33% when A is not brazen
› All other treatments: 36% brazen B’s when A is brazen13% when A is not brazen
Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Results – comparison of all treatments (n=316)
A lot of lying in Aligned Outcomes
A lot of lying in general
Changing B’s incentive has the same effect as changing A’s incentives
Collaboration leads to more lying than working alone
More totally brazen B-players in Aligned Outcomes than in any other treatment
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Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Robustness experiment
›Comparisons of Aligned Outcomes and B-fixed in a different location and with different parameters
›Three pairs of treatment:
› Replication: like original, payment in £ instead of €
› Multiplication: all payoffs are doubled
› Addition: £2 added to all payoffs
Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Results – robustness experiment (n=236)
Replication and Multiplication – like Original data
Less lying in Addition
Less brazen B’s in Addition
Ori Weisel University of Nottingham
Conclusions
›A dark side of cooperation – corrupt collaboration
›Collaboration reduces concern for self-concept maintenance
›Corrupt collaboration is
› More likely when incentives are aligned
› More likely than individual corruption
›In some cases collaboration should be monitored, rather than encouraged