Constitutional Law 1

Ass. Jan 11, 2014

1. Code: Memorize Sections 5, 6 and 72. Read in the texts/references the pages corresponding to the Code assigned.3. Read and make digests of the following cases:

1. Aglipay vs. Ruiz 64 Phil 2012.Garces vs. Estenzo 104 S 5103. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila 101 Phil 3864. Gerona vs. Sec. of Educ. 106 Phil 25. Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent 219 S 2566. Centeno vs. Villalon 236 S 1977. German vs. Barangan 135 S 5148. Pamil vs. Teleron 86 S 4139. Taruc vs. Bishop de la Cruz GR 144801, Mar 10, 200510. Estrada vs. Escitor AM No. P-02. 1651 and its Final Resolution dated June 22, 200611. Caunca vs. Salazar 82 Phil 85112.Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro 39 Phil 66013. Villavicencio vs. Lukban 39 Phil 77814.Manotoc vs. CA 142 S 14915. Silverio vs. CA 195 S 76116. Yap vs. CA GR 141529, June 6, 200117. Legaspi vs. CSC. 150 S 53018. Valmonte vs. Belmonte 170 S 25619. Aquino vs. Morato 203 S 51520. Chavez vs. PCGG 299 S 74421. Chavez vs. PEA and AMARI GR 133250,Jul 9, 2002:1. AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937]

Facts:Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and sellingpostage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International EucharisticCongress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that nopublicfunds shall be appropriated or used in thebenefitof any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of theseparationof church and state, forthe purposeof avoiding the occasion wherein the state will usethe church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance ofpostage stampsas would be advantageous to the government.

Issue:Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held:What is guaranteed by ourConstitutionis religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religiousdenomination. They were not sold for thebenefitof theRoman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International EucharisticCongress. The focus of the stamps was not the EucharisticCongressbut the city of Manila, being the seat of thatcongress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, anybenefitand propaganda incidentally resulting from it was not the aim or purpose of the Government2. GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]

Facts:Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations.

b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saints feast day.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds were used in its acquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue:Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution is violated.

Held:No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the councils funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.3. American Bible Society vs. City of ManilaGR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957Facts:American Bible Societyis a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898City of Manilais a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of ManilaAmerican Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialectCity Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it was violating several Ordinances for operating without the necessary permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the City of Manila its permit and license fees under protestAmerican Bible filed a complaint, questioning the constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They contended:a.They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not required to pay any license fee or sales tax

b.it never made any profit from the sale of its biblesCity of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed, reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in questionTrial Court dismissed the complaintAmerican Bible Society appealed to the Court of AppealsIssue:WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of biblesRuling: NOUnderSec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in question, person or entity engaged in any of the business, trades or occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayors permit and license from the City Treasurer. American Bible Societys business is not among those enumerated

However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all other businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned, except those upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or occupation.2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:

a.Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax and fix the license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books

b.Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: totax and fix the license fee on dealers in general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles, (3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate license shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by ordinanceThe only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as to the amount of tax or license fee that a retail dealer has to pay per annum

As held inMurdock vs. Pennsylvania,The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms provided for in the Bill of Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors to all those who do not have a full purseUnderSec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the National Internal Revenue Code,Corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively forreligious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed under this Codeshall not be taxedThe price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profitTherefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it would impair American Bible Societys free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5, 891.45 unduly collected from it4. Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959FACTS:

1. Petitioners belong to the Jehovas Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied.2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutionalDO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony.

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority.In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.5. Ebranilag, et. al. v. The Division Supt. of Schools

March 1, 1993FACTS:1. In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in several towns of in Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witness. This is a consolidated petition.2. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by DO No. 8 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions3. In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.4. The Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion only given to God.They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State . They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control

5. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.6. The students and their parents filed these special civil actions forMandamus,Certiorariand Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship

7. The Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders.ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion is validNO. The court upheldthe petitioners' right under the Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs. Religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and amplest protection among human rights. It reversed the expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens to education under the 1987 Constitution.Although the Court upholds in this decision nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.6. G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994

MARTIN CENTENO, vs. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS236 SCRA 197

Facts:The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization known as theSamahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law. Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No. 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel.

Issue:Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose?

Ruling:No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.

7. German v. BaranganG.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985

Facts:1. In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacaang grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow T-shirts, they started to march down with raised clenched fistsand shouts of anti-government invectives. The marchers were barred by respondent Major Lariosa, upon orders of his superiors and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacaang security area. Despite plea, they were not allowed in the church.2. Because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse.3.Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the Republic.4.Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the issuance of [1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into and praying in said church.

ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction to petitioners to attend church is a violation of their freedom to religious worshipNO.

1. The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was established in the interest of national security. Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court inGerona v. Secretary of Education.2. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties ... observe honesty and good faith."8.Pamil v. TeleronG.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978Facts:1. In 1971, Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was elected and duly proclaimed as mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol.Petitioner filed a suit forquo warranto, to disqualify respondentbased on Section 2175 of the Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality."2.The suit did not prosper, with the lower court held that the ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.ISSUE: Whether or notan ecclesiastic was eligible to an elective municipal position

NO. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application.Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances,certiorarilies.Pamil vs. Teleron

Facts: The novel question in this case concerns the eligibility of an ecclesiastic to an elective municipal position. Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality."

Issue: Is the prohibition imposed on ecclesiastics from holding appointive or elective municipal offices a religious test?

Held: No. The vote is thus indecisive. While five members of the Court constitute a minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. That is the conclusion arrived at by the writer of this opinion, joined by Justice Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, and Guerrero. They have no choice then but to vote for the reversal of the lower court decision and declare ineligible respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor. With the aforesaid five other members, led by the Chief Justice, entertaining no doubt as to his lack of eligibility, this petition for certiorari must be granted.

It would be an unjustified departure from a settled principle of the applicable construction of the provision on what laws remain operative after 1935 if the plea of petitioner in this case were to be heeded. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test.

Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate. It is not a valid argument against this conclusion to assert that under the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, there was such a prohibition against a religious test, and yet such a ban on holding a municipal position had not been nullified. It suffices to answer that no question was raised as to its validity.

9. Taruc vs. Bishop Dela Cruz

Facts: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church. Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of law.

Issue: What is the role of the State, through the Courts, on matters of religious intramurals?

Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.

Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church property.

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

10. Estrada vs. Escritor

Facts: Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Caoibes, Jr., requesting for an investigation of rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. He filed the charge against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

Issue: What is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality? Is respondent entitled thereto? Is the doctrine of benevolent neutrality consistent with the free exercise clause?

Held: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. It still remains to be seen if respondent is entitled to such doctrine as the state has not been afforded the chance has demonstrate the compelling state interest of prohibiting the act of respondent, thus the case is remanded to the RTC.

Benevolent neutrality is inconsistent with the Free Exercise Clause as far as it prohibits such exercise given a compelling state interest. It is the respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondents claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the compelling state interest test. The government must be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of demonstrating the states compelling interest which can override respondents religious belief and practice.

11. CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]Facts:This is an action forhabeas corpusbrought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by theemployment agency,for herto work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted totransfer toanother residence, which was disallowed by theemployment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. Theemployment agencywanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.Issue:Whether or Not anemployment agencyhas the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?Held:Anemployment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her inthe house of therespondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom totransferfrom one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as theindividualwho is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.12. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]Facts:The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that undersection2077 of theAdministrativeCode, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincialgovernor.

In that case, pursuant toSection2145 of the RevisedAdministrativeCode, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in thedistrictsof Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance withsection2759 of the revisedAdministrativeCode.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue:Whether or NotSection2145 of theAdministrativeCode deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WONSection2145 of theAdministrativeCode of 1917 is constitutional.

Held:The Court held thatsection2145 of theAdministrativeCode does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection ofthe laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with saidsectiondoes not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion thatsection2145 of theAdministrativeCode is a legitimate exertion of the police power.Section2145 of theAdministrativeCode of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty ofthe citizenis unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good andthe generalgood of thePhilippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order ofsocietyandthe generalwell-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.

None ofthe rightsofthe citizencan be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.

13. G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

Issue:The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

14. Manotoc v CA 142 SCRA 149 (1986)

Facts:This is a consolidated case of members of the AFP who were charged with violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.

The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines

HYPERLINK "http://www.amazon.com/Constitution-Republic-Philippines-explained/dp/971083827X?ie=UTF8&tag=heatidnew-20&link_code=btl&camp=213689&creative=392969" \t "_blank" The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines explained

Issue:Whether or not military men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.

Cases on constitutional law (Philippine casebook series)

HYPERLINK "http://www.amazon.com/historical-juridical-study-Philippine-rights/dp/B0000EE2VQ?ie=UTF8&tag=heatidnew-20&link_code=btl&camp=213689&creative=392969" \t "_blank" A historical and juridical study of the Philippine Bill of rights

Held:The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not available in the military as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thusthe right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.

15. Silverio v. CA

Facts: The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate.

On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.

On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3,Intsia Road,ForbesPark,MakatiCity. She received a copy of the said Order onJune 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005.This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.

Thus, onApril 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order datedMay 31, 2005against private respondent to vacate the premises. Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition datedMay 2, 2007with the CA. OnMay 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO.

Issue: W/Nthe Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.

Held: The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed.

The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.

Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead.

A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, whilean interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon.

Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located atNo. 3 Intsia Road,ForbesPark,MakatiCity. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located atNo. 3 Intsia Road,ForbesPark,MakatiCity. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have been dismissed.

The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC.

16. Yap vs. CA

Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.

Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?

Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

17. Legaspi vs. CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)Facts:The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a special civil action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information ofcivil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought.Issue:Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.Held:The court held thatwhen the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.

20. Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744

FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the peoples constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGGs task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth.

ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general -- such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.

21. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZvs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FACTS: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."

ISSUE: Are negotiations leading to a settlement with PIATCO within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to information?

HELD: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern: Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Further, The State policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to information on matters of public concern.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.

Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.

Republic of thePhilippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR.G.R. No. 178933Petitioner,

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,

Chairperson,

- versus -VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*and

PERALTA,JJ.COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division)Promulgated:

and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,Respondents.September 16, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR.,J.:

The CaseThis Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the May 4, 2007 Resolution[1]and July 6, 2007 Decision[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98764, entitledNelia S. Silverio-Dee and Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (impleaded as necessary party) v. Reinato G. Quilala, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 57, Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Edmundo S. Silverio, represented by Nestor Dela Merced II, and Sheriff Villamor R. Villegas.

The assailed resolution granted private respondents prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order against public respondent Judge Quilala. On the other hand, the assailed decision set aside the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007 and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 while directing the respondent lower court to give due course to the appeal of herein private respondent.

The Facts

The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for the settlement of her estate. The case was docketed as SP. PROC. NO. M-2629 entitledIn Re: Estate of the Late Beatriz D. Silverio, Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. v. Ricardo S. Silverio Jr., et al.pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakatiCity, Branch 57 (RTC).

On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new administrator.

On January 3, 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator.

On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.

On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable Court.[3]

Then, on May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[4]affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying private respondents motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia,ForbesPark,MakatiCitywithin fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.

Nelia Silverio-Dee received a copy of the Omnibus Order datedMay 31, 2005onJune 8, 2005.

OnJune 16, 2005, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration datedJune 15, 2005[5]of the Omnibus Order. This was later denied by the RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005, which was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005.

Notably, the RTC in its Order dated December 12, 2005[6]also recalled its previous order granting Ricardo Silverio, Jr. with letters of administration over the intestate estate of Beatriz Silverio and reinstating Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as the administrator.

From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order datedOctober 31, 2006. In the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due thereon. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located atNo. 3 Intsia Road,ForbesPark,MakatiCity.[7]

Meanwhile, on January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5, 2006[8]from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20, 2006[9]was filed on January 23, 2006.

Thereafter, on October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for Issuance of a Writ of Execution[10]against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, onApril 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order[11]denying the appeal on the ground that it was not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the enforcement of the Order datedMay 31, 2005against private respondent to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia,ForbesPark,MakatiCity. The writ of execution was later issued onApril 17, 2007[12]and a Notice to Vacate[13]was issued onApril 19, 2007ordering private respondent to leave the premises of the subject property within ten (10) days.

Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) datedMay 2, 2007[14]with the CA.

OnMay 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the fresh rule period enunciated by this Court inNeypes v. Court of Appeals[15]as reiterated inSumaway v. Union Bank.[16]

Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of private respondent. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition isGRANTEDandGIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, theOrder, datedApril 2, 2007, thewrit of execution, datedApril 17, 2007, and theNotice to Vacate, datedApril 19, 2007, areANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. Further, the court a quo is hereby directed to give due course to the appeal of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

-A-

The Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 (Annex G of Annex C) and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41;

-B-

The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in deliberately failing to decide that the basis of the occupancy of Nelia S. Silverio-Dee are fraudulent documents, without any authority from the Intestate Court;

-C-

The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing precipitately the temporary restraining order (TRO) in its Resolution dated May 4, 2007 (Annex A-1);

-D-

The respondent Court seriously erred and/or committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in annulling the Order dated April 2, 2007, the Writ of Execution dated April 17, 2007, and the Notice to Vacate dated April 19, 2007 because the respondent Silverio-Dees occupancy of the Intestate property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City (Annex N of Annex C) will prevent the sale authorized by the Order dated October 31, 2006 to secure funds for the payment of taxes due which are now high and rapidly increasing payment of which must not be enjoined.[17]

The Courts Ruling

This petition is meritorious.

The May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC Isan Interlocutory Order, Not Subject to an Appeal

To recapitulate, the relevant facts to the instant issue are as follows:

On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3,Intsia Road,ForbesPark,MakatiCity. She received a copy of the said Order onJune 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005.This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.

Thus, in denying due course to the Notice/Record on Appeal, the RTC, in its Order dated April 2, 2007, ruled:

Verily, the appeal taken by the movant Nelia Silverio-Dee from the Order of this Court dated December 12, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration is misplaced as no appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion for reconsideration (see Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Section 1(f), Rule 109 of the Rules of Court). Furthermore, assuming that what said movant had appealed is the final Order dated May 31, 2005, still, the appeal cannot be given due course as the Record on Appeal had been filed beyond the thirty-day period to appeal (see Section 3 Rule 41 of the Rules of Court)

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by Nelia Silverio is herebyDENIEDdue course.

Let a writ of execution issue to enforce the Order datedMay 31, 2005against Nelia Silverio-Dee requiring her to vacate the premises at No. 3 Intsia,ForbesPark,MakatiCity.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, the denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.

Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006FACTS:Escritor is acourt interpretersince 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twentyfive yearsand had a son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs Witnesses and theWatchTowerand the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right tofreedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. AsJeffersonput it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by theFree Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right tofreedom of religion.