Conflict Resolution and Patronage in Provincial Towns, 1590-1640

Conflict Resolution and Patronage in Provincial Towns, 1590-1640Author(s): Catherine PattersonSource: Journal of British Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Jan., 1998), pp. 1-25Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The North American Conference on BritishStudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/176033 .

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Conflict Resolution and Patronage in Provincial Towns, 1590-1640

Catherine Patterson

Historians of early modern England, just like the people they study, are preoccupied with order and disorder. Particularly for the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, attention has focused on how a government and political nation whose prescriptions demanded unanimity and stability descended into civil war and revolution, the ultimate disorder. The period saw rising populations, social mobility, economic change, and religious division, all of which placed stress on the traditional order.1 These agents of turmoil deserve close attention. But in focusing so in- tently on breakdown, we tend to miss seeing how Elizabethan and early Stuart government actually worked. For most of these years, a reasonably stable and increasingly integrated royal government ruled peacefully over the English people. By shifting our attention away from breakdown, we can begin to ask critical new questions. How, precisely, did the leaders of this society work to create order in the face of difference? How did the nature of government affect the ways that people sought stability?

Evidence from urban government-provincial borough corporations-provides critical insight into these questions. Civic leaders found that the best way to maintain order and authority in their own communities was by participating in the wider governing structures of the state. London's attempts at the "pursuit of stability" have received serious

CATHERINE PATTERSON is assistant professor of history at the University of Houston. This article is a much revised and expanded version of a paper delivered at the North American Conference on British Studies in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, October 1993. The author would like to thank Paul Halliday, Mark Kishlansky, Robert Palmer, and the anonymous readers for the Journal for their helpful comments on this article.

1 Susan Amussen, An Ordered Society: Gender and Class in Early Modem England (New York, 1988), pp. 2, 134-35; Keith Wrightson, English Society, 1580-1680 (New Brunswick, N.J., 1982), pp. 66, 149, 184, 222. See also many of the essays in A. Fletcher and J. Stevenson, eds., Order and Disorder in Early Modern England (Cambridge, 1985), particularly the editors' introduction.

Journal of British Studies 37 (January 1998): 1-25 ? 1998 by The North American Conference on British Studies. All rights reserved. 0021-9371/98/3701-0001$02.00


Catherine Patterson







Catherine Patterson






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treatment in recent years.2 Provincial towns, however, have less often been studied as a means to understand the polity as a whole. They have in the past been characterized as quite insular, either abjectly dependent on a great lord or gentleman or else "independent" and unwilling to brook outside influences; they sought stability and control by looking inward, reinforcing their own authority.3 A fresh look at borough corporations calls that interpretation into question.

Newer studies of Elizabethan and early Stuart towns emphasize that townsmen saw their localities as part of the larger commonwealth, not just as "little commonwealths."4 A careful examination of how borough corporations dealt with moments of internal conflict and stress reveals the degree to which urban magistrates relied on interconnection rather than isolation in preserving order. Civic leaders strove to uphold their own stable authority, but they also reached beyond traditional borough boundaries when that stability faltered.5 The range of responses used when confronting internal strife-from relying on borough institutions

2 Ian Archer, The Pursuit of Stability: Social Relations in Elizabethan London (Cam- bridge, 1991); Steven Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds: Structures of Life in Sixteenth Century London (Cambridge, 1989); James C. Robertson, "London, 1580-1642: The View from Whitehall, the View from Guildhall" (Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 1993).

3 The independence-dependence polarity is most strongly argued by Sir John Neale in The Elizabethan House of Commons (London, 1949), esp. chap. 8. Much urban history follows this pattern, reinforced by the localist arguments of county community studies like Alan Everitt's The Community of Kent and the Great Rebellion, 1640-1660 (Leices- ter, 1966). See, e.g., Wallace MacCaffrey, Exeter, 1540-1640 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958); and Alan Dyer, The City of Worcester in the Sixteenth Century (Leicester, 1973).

4 This view has been suggested in some important recent work on towns. David Harris Sacks's book, The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif., 1991), and especially his article, "The Corporate Town and the English State: Bristol's 'Little Businesses', 1625-1641," Past and Present, no. 110 (February 1986), pp. 69-105, discuss the connection between towns and the central government and their need for cooperation; Richard Cust's article, "Anti- Puritanism and Urban Politics: Charles I and Great Yarmouth," Historical Journal 35 (1992): 1-26, points out the overlapping interests and concerns of both townsmen and the crown. Similar themes have been traced in the period of the Reformation in Muriel McClendon, " 'Against God's Word': Government, Religion, and the Crisis of Authority in Early Reformation Norwich," Sixteenth Century Journal 25 (1994): 353-369. Robert Tittler has made numerous contributions to our understanding of early modem towns and the way they fit into English government and society. See esp. his Architecture and Power: The Town Hall and the English Urban Community, c. 1500-1640 (Oxford, 1991), "The Emergence of Urban Policy, 1536-1558," in The Mid-Tudor Polity, c. 1540-1560, ed. J. Loach and R. Tittler (London, 1980), pp. 74-93, and "Elizabethan Towns and the 'Points of Contact': Parliament," Parliamentary History 8 (1989): 275-88.

5 This argument is concerned with the relations between urban governors and the rest of the political elite rather than with rural craftsmen who might wish to participate in the economic life of a town. I do not dispute the fact that borough corporations were constantly vigilant to prevent nonfreemen from taking part in the local economy and that in a real sense these artificers were thought to be "foreigners" or outsiders.













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CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFLICT RESOLUTION

to using the royal courts to seeking out third parties for mediation- shows the sophisticated manner in which urban authorities related to the state at large. In the last decade, historians have increasingly shown the complexity of relations between localities and center.6 Rather than being automatically divergent, center and locality formed different aspects of the same whole. Particular circumstances and issues led to differing interests, and, indeed, by the reign of Charles I, the interests of some had diverged enough to cause serious conflict.7 Nevertheless, from the mon- arch on down to lowly local officials, the arbiters of early modern society shared an interest in working together to uphold the ideal of order. Civic leaders, like other magistrates, could not stamp out disorder, but they engaged themselves extensively to preserve stability.

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On 4 September 1619, the city of Chester celebrated unity. Bitter feuding over power and office had divided the corporation for months. Factions had arisen in the city, centering on the recorder, Edward Whitby, and the mayor, Sir Randle Mainwaring. The rift in the corporation widened through the summer of 1619, as tensions rose to the point where the mayor tried to expel Whitby from his office of recordership. The civic assembly finally took action to heal the corporate body. Unable to solve the matter themselves, the assembly agreed to refer the hearing of the cause to the earl of Derby, lord lieutenant of Cheshire and cham- berlain of the Palatine Court of Chester; Sir Peter Warburton, a judge of Common Pleas; and Sir Thomas Savage (later Viscount Savage), a deputy lieutenant and J.P. of Cheshire.8 These three men held high rank in Cheshire and served the crown in offices of state, but the three also had close and friendly connections to the city of Chester, all of them having been chosen as aldermen of the city.9 In July and August, the

6 See, e.g., Clive Holmes, "The County Community in Stuart Historiography," Jour- nal of British Studies 19 (Spring 1980): 54-73; and Ann Hughes, Politics, Society, and Civil War in Warwickshire, 1620-1660 (Cambridge, 1987).

7 Michael Braddick, "State Formation and Social Change in Early Modem England: A Problem Stated and Approaches Suggested," Social History 16 (1991): 5, 15, Parlia- mentary Taxation in Seventeenth-Century England (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1994), pp. 13-17.

8 Chester Assembly Books, Chester City Record Office (CCRO), AB/1, fols. 343v- 344, 345, 349v, 350v. See also Anthony Johnson, "Some Aspects of the Political, Consti- tutional, Social, and Economic History of the City of Chester" (D.Phil. diss., Oxford University, 1970), for further discussion of the city of Chester's ongoing struggle to maintain unity in the corporation. 9 The record of connection between these three men and the corporation is long. William, sixth earl of Derby, had been elected aldermen of Chester in 1610. On a number of occasions, the corporators asked him to resolve disputes among themselves or between


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referees made attempts to calm the furors and the divisions among the citizens, from which "all these contentions did arise." While settling the specific points under dispute formed the main task of these important men, they did not stop there. They went beyond the simple act of mediation to try to effect a symbolic restoration of harmony in the corporate body. According to a chronicler, on 4 September, Judge Warburton and Sir Thomas Savage "made Mr. Mayor and Mr. Recorder friends, and Sir Thomas Savage bestowed a fat buck on either of them upon condition that the one should sup the other at their own houses, with the Aldermen and other friends on both sides." This they did, the "right honorable William earl of Derby being with them, and many other worshipful knights and gent."

1 This ceremonial feast exhibited to the whole community that discord had ended and that friendship and unity had returned. The assistance of powerful friends, and a public show of love before the whole community, created a sense of peace in the corporation. Order returned to Chester.

For early modem Englishmen, "order" served as a watchword. As James I made clear in his Trew Lawe of Free Monarchies (1598), God had determined a precise pattern, hierarchical in nature, to regulate society.11 Those who exercised governance in England, both urban leaders and landed gentlemen, worked to reinforce this stable order in their local communities and thus the commonwealth at large. The increasing economic instability of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries gave rise to fears of social instability, which local elites worked hard to quell. While enforcing order on those of lower status by demonstrations of authority, governing elites also hoped to promote harmonious relations among the populace through their own good behavior. Their orderly con-

themselves and others, such as the dean and chapter of Chester cathedral. The earl owned property in Chester and retired there permanently when he turned over all his duties to his son James, Lord Strange, in 1637. Sir Peter Warburton was a Cheshire native who made his name as a lawyer and judge. He assisted the corporation in a variety of ways during his life, attending the corporate assembly with some regularity; he also owned or leased property in the city. Sir Thomas Savage hailed from a prominent local gentry family with long ties to Chester. In the 1620s he became an important courtier and friend of the duke of Buckingham, yet he never forgot his Cheshire roots and provided patronage for Chester corporation on numerous occasions in the 1620s and 1630s (Derby: CCRO, AB/1, fols. 309v, 318v; John Seacombe, Memoirs of the Ancient and Honourable House of Stanley [Manchester, 1767], p. 70; Chester treasurer's accounts, CCRO, TAR/2/40; CCRO, AB/2, fol. 8; Warburton: Dictionary of National Biography, q.v. "Sir Peter Warb- urton"; CCRO, AB/1, fols. 247v, 297v, 355; CCRO, TAR/2/23; Chester subsidy papers, CCRO, CAS/5, 6; Chester assembly files, CCRO, AF/10/96; Savage: Public Record Of- fice (PRO), State Papers (SP) 16/53/18; CCRO, AB/1, fols. 288, 303v, 345v; AB/2, fol. 12v, 13v). 10 Chester annals, CCRO, CR60 (Thomas Hughes Collection), at anno 1618-19.

James VI and I, The Trew Lawe of Free Monarchies (London, 1598).















course served as a model. Conflict, meanwhile, received strong censure as a poor example to others. Nowhere was this prescription for peace more important than in borough corporations. The law considered a corporation to be an individual, despite the fact that it consisted of many members. This made conflict contradictory and intolerable. For corporations, the metaphoric body politic served as much more than a figure of speech-it represented reality. Discord diseased the body. It also endan- gered the community by setting a negative example to the urban popula- tion, which, it was commonly assumed, might rise if not properly gov- erned.12 Corporation members therefore attempted to preserve order and unity, although not always permanently or completely, both among the borough inhabitants and among themselves.

Central government also both expected and encouraged borough corporations to act promptly in resolving internal strife. The Privy Coun- cil actively promoted the composition of differences within localities, to avoid intervention by the Board. They explicitly requested the corporation of Chichester in 1626 to "lay aside all dissensions and live in peace- able and quiet manner" in order to benefit the city and advance the king's service. Similarly, the lords of the Council commanded Chester's assembly to find agreement among themselves, presuming the corporators would rather have their problems "ordered in love than censured by the Board." 13 Failure on the part of local authorities might mean sending in commissioners or calling the mayor and aldermen to London to answer for their behavior. Traveling to London to appear before the Board, often for weeks on end, required large amounts of time and money; it was also a terrifying experience. In extreme cases, a disrupted corporation might be threatened with quo warranto proceedings, questioning the validity of the corporate charter.14 At worst, a corporation could lose all of its privileges and franchises, and civic leaders lose their control of local government.

This fear certainly gave corporators reason to take the Privy Coun-

12 Anthony Fletcher, Reform in the Provinces: The Government of Stuart England (New Haven, Conn., 1986), pp. 351-52; Fletcher and Stevenson, eds., Order and Disor- der, pp. 37-38.

3 Acts of the Privy Council (APC), June-December 1626, p. 264; APC, 1627-28, p. 164.

14 Quo warranto offered a serious threat, and a number of corporations did end up in King's Bench trying to prove the validity of their privileges. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any borough corporation actually lost its charter at the end of quo warranto proceedings. For instance, in the case of Great Yarmouth discussed below, the corporate charter was questioned by quo warranto in 1629, and the matter finally concluded in a nonprosecution (non prosequendo) in King's Bench in spring of 1639/40 (King's Bench Controlment Rolls, PRO, KB29/278, fol. 27).













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cil's advice and to accommodate internal disputes as quickly as possible. Although from the reign of Elizabeth the Privy Council added the resolution of municipal disputes to its duties, such matters made up only a small portion of business before the Board. Those disputes the Board did get involved in do not seem to follow a particular pattern over time, although it appears that questions of local franchise and religious disputes may have increasingly come before the Council in the 1620s and 1630s.15 This may suggest that corporations found it more difficult to find resolution at their own initiative as Charles's government became "more determined to pursue unpopular policies and singularly deaf to local complaints."16 Regardless of the reasons behind the apparent change, no corporation wanted to put itself in a position of having to answer to the Privy Council. Attention from the Council could only mean a serious problem in local order, and corporators were just as concerned to maintain order as were the lords in Council. Avoiding Privy Council regulation was not an attempt at exclusion from the broader governing structures of the state. Rather, civic leaders, seeing themselves as part of those structures, took the initiative to promote their own good governance, finding means both inside and outside borough walls to protect their interests.

The language of consensual decision making provided corporations with one important method of conveying a sense of order and harmony. Corporators expected to make unified and unanimous decisions, reaching agreement through discussion and compromise. Consensus was not simply an attitude of mind, it was also a method of procedure; townsmen did not invariably agree, but they carried out their business in such a way as to avoid conflict as much as possible.17 Unusually thorny or divisive questions might end in a voice vote, but records of these appear infrequently. Agreement proved the norm. Or at least it was the goal to which corporations aspired and the face that they presented to the public. Even the way they kept their official records assumed unanimity. Official court books and assembly minutes almost invariably emphasized agreement, even when corporation meetings demonstrably fell short of har-

15 Edith Henderson, Foundations of English Administrative Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), p. 73; APC, 1613-14, pp. 103-4, 49-50; APC, 1615-16, pp. 650-54; APC, 1616- 17, pp. 89-90, 121, 144, 303; APC, 1618-19, p. 199, 484; and throughout the volumes of APC. For further discussion of franchise issues, see Derek Hirst, Representative of the People? (Cambridge, 1975). See Part IV below; and Cust, "Anti-Puritanism and Urban Politics," for more on the Privy Council's treatment of religious difficulties in a borough corporation.

16 Wrightson, English Society, p. 154. 17 For more on consensus and consensual procedure, see Mark Kishlansky, Parlia-

mentary Selection (Cambridge, 1986).











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mony. In Exeter, for instance, the town clerk apparently sometimes filled out pages in the books as blanks for future meetings. These blanks listed the names of all the aldermen who should be at corporate assemblies, followed by the words "who wholly agree." Clearly, obstinate dissent was not supposed to occur in Exeter's corporation, at least not in the official records.18 In an entry in Chester's corporation Act Book for May 1619, the town clerk simply noted that there were "some matters in question" about the removal of a civic officer but that the assembly de- ferred a decision until the man himself could be present. An eyewitness to the meeting, however, gave a vivid-and less dignified-account of aldermen yelling at each other, peremptory speeches, violent humors, a demand that two council members be ejected from the meeting and their refusal to leave, and general disorder and ill temper.'9 Corporations strove to give the appearance of harmony, even in the face of civic cacophony. Their written records stood as a testimony of how they believed things should be and how the corporate body should act in the future, rather than as a precise account of reality. Corporations needed to confirm their well-being as governing bodies, not just to their citizens or the central government or the local gentry but possibly to themselves as well.20

Despite a strong desire to maintain the ideal of unity, townsmen consistently faced the reality of conflict. They attempted to minimize conflicts and resolve them as quickly as possible, using means both within the borough and without. Intramural harmonizing of discord was common, but it did not preclude the resort to other types of dispute resolution. Although localists, townsmen clearly recognized their need to remain connected to the wider society and the central government. Not focused on the immediate locality alone, town governors used all of the institutions and persons available to them to preserve order and to carry out the business of the borough. The English state consisted of many interdependent parts, from the crown down to the smallest localities. Cor- porations, as part of the larger body of governance, relied on this interde- pendence to reinforce their own authority and solve local problems.

18 Devon Record Office (DRO), Exeter City Archive, Council Act Book 5, e.g., fol. 168.

19 This incident arose as part of the dispute that was later resolved by the city's three patrons in September 1619. CCRO, AB/1, fol. 349v; Palatine of Chester records, PRO, CHES 38/48 (Robert Whitby to Edward Whitby, 1 June 1619). One wonders how many other disputes are disguised in borough records by the language of consensus.

20 In his Architecture and Power, Robert Tittler has shown how civic leaders used the built environment to display their authority and prosperity to the surrounding community and to reinforce their own importance to themselves. See esp. pp. 105-22 for a discussion of the symbolic power of civic trappings: buildings, maces and swords, chairs and benches, clothing, etc.











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In resolving their disputes, borough corporations had many options, as well as many models for behavior. The settlement of differences- everything from the personal or business discontents of individuals to matters that struck at the very heart of civic governance-occurred regularly. The law, of course, provided one potential remedy. Borough courts saw heavy use in the seventeenth century. Indeed, citizens risked disfran- chisement if they took certain types of local matters outside the borough courts.21 We know that litigants resorted to borough courts frequently, for instance, to settle failed credit arrangements.22 Disputes over moral behavior-defamation of character, quarreling-ended up before ecclesiastical courts or Quarter Sessions for resolution. The central courts at Westminster saw an all-time high in litigation in 1640.23 The courts- local, regional, and central-were familiar territory for many townsmen.

Some litigants surely desired victory over their opponents. It appears, however, that in many cases the end result of such disputes was not to claim victory but to quell conflict and maintain order. A historian of urban credit and debt in King's Lynn stresses the rarity of vexatious litigation; most complaints "were largely successful attempts to resolve

disputes and maintain the bonds of credit.""24 Similarly, a study of defamation cases in the ecclesiastical courts of York shows that, although many complaints came into court, few actually went through to a final decision. Many plaintiffs, after initiating a suit in court, withdrew their complaints and settled out of court through the mediation or arbitration of third parties. Avoiding the trouble and expense of law and a sense of friendship and love in the community motivated many to drop court proceedings.25 Townsmen in particular disliked the adversarial nature of the law, especially common law, in their commercial business. Commer- cial opinion stressed fair dealing and honesty; going to law-for in-

21 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, English Local Government from the Revolution to the Municipal Corporations Act, vol. 2, The Manor and the Borough (London, 1908), pt. 1, p. 338.

22 Craig Muldrew, "Credit and the Courts: Debt Litigation in a Seventeenth-Century Urban Community," Economic History Review 46 (1993): 26. Muldrew has shown that in King's Lynn in the second half of the seventeenth century, the Guildhall Court heard an average of over 1,000 suits per year.

23 Martin Ingram, Church Courts, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1570-1640 (Cam- bridge, 1987), p. 28; J. A. Sharpe, " 'Such Disagreement betwyx Neighbors': Litigation and Human Relations in Early Modem England," in Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. J. Bossy (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 168, 170; C. W. Brooks, "Interpersonal Conflict and Social Tension: Civil Litigation in England, 1640- 1830," in The First Modern Society, ed. A. Beier, D. Cannadine, and J. Rosenheim (Cam- bridge, 1989), p. 360.

24 Muldrew, "Credit and the Courts," p. 27. 25 Sharpe, " 'Such Disagreement betwyx Neighbors,' " pp. 177-78.















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stance, to collect debts-was frowned on.26 Even in the midst of a great deal of litigiousness, finding solutions that preserved peace and friendship seemed attractive.

It is not surprising, then, that borough corporations faced with internal divisions saw a range of options for resolution yet often chose those options that best protected their peace and allayed conflict. Legal action, both divisive and expensive, represented a breakdown of harmony, a failure to resolve matters in a more friendly fashion.27 Corporations, even more so than individuals, could not well afford the consequences of legal conflict. As did so many individuals, corporations regularly turned to third parties, often men not resident in the community, to resolve conflict and return civic government to order.

One way to avoid a suit at law but still to procure a more or less legal decision was to appeal to Assize judges for arbitration. In Lincoln, Assize judges Sir Peter Warburton and Sir Thomas Foster "heard and ended" a controversy over the office of town clerk. In the Western Cir- cuit Assize, the judges mediated a dispute between the mayor of Lyme Regis and the Overseers of the Poor, while the civic governors of Ipswich agreed in 1603 that, if further problems arose concerning the town clerk- ship, they were "content to refer the same to the order of Sir Edward Coke," a judge and a friend of the corporation. Similarly, the corporation of Chester appealed to the Assize judges to settle the city's conflict over the collection of tolls.28 Judges made attractive mediators because of the qualities they brought to the process: they had legal expertise, were considered to be objective observers, and had the backing of the crown behind them. The corporate practice of giving gifts and banquets to judges in some way reciprocated the services judges offered.29 In the air of mu-

26 Brooks, "Interpersonal Conflict," p. 387. 27 A handful of cases has been found where a disgruntled corporator, having been

removed from the corporation for misbehavior, obtained a writ of restitution out of King's Bench to get his position back. In a number of these cases, the corporator in question was restored, not because of his writ, but because he "submitted" to the corporation, basically apologizing and agreeing to behave well in the future (City Council Minute Book, 1556-1640, Coventry City Record Office, BA/H/C/17/1, fols. 222, 222v, 223, 226, 228, 234v; Chamber Order Books, Hereford and Worcester Record Office, Worcester St. Helen's Branch [HWRO], Worcester City Archive, A.14/1, bk. 2, fols. 61v, 63v, 64, 91, 99).

28 Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMC), Fourteenth Report (London, 1895), app. 8, p. 85; J. S. Cockbum, ed., Western Circuit Assize Orders, 1629-1648: A Calendar, Camden Society, 4th ser., vol. 17 (1976), p. 9; CCRO, AB/2, fol. 21. See also HWRO, Worcester City Archive, A.14/1, bk. 2, fol. 99.

29 Leicester borough accounts, 1605-6, 1601-2, 1606-7, Leicestershire Record Of- fice (LRO), BRIII/2/73/204, 74/39, 75/43; DRO, Exeter City Archive, Receivers' Ac- count Rolls, e.g., 1604-5, 1611-12, 1627-28; Hall Books, Norfolk Record Office (NRO), King's Lynn Town Hall, KL/C7/9, fol. 159; C. H. Cooper, Annals of Cambridge (Cam-















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tual goodwill that such hospitality engendered, town leaders hoped and

expected that Assize judges would assist them when the need arose. While Assize judges were useful, they were not always available.

Other authority figures also served this purpose. One important source of conflict resolution that corporations relied on has received little attention from historians. Some towns resorted to members of the landed elite to whom they had a specific attachment to help restore peace to a disor- dered community. The men to whom corporations turned in moments of need typically came from the ranks of the nobility or upper gentry, men with the social and political clout to make their decisions authoritative. Their status obliged them to uphold the social order, as did the offices of state-for instance, privy councilor or lord lieutenant-that many of them held. At the same time, ties of honor and gift giving, as well as local offices such as the borough high stewardship, bound them to these localities. This powerful combination of central authority and local connection encouraged townsmen to turn to patrons for assistance. Recog- nized as protectors of local interest, patrons could both reinforce corporate governance and link the locality to the crown and the nation.

Borough corporations sought out alliances that tied them into the other

governing structures of England. Borough patrons settled disputes for corporations all across England

in the early Stuart period, and in towns of all sizes. Boroughs as small as East Retford, Nottinghamshire, and as large as Chester called on the assistance of local patrons. The assembly of Boston agreed unanimously that "the difference about repairing and amending of the sluice and piles in the haven is absolutely referred to the determination and ordering of the right honorable the earl of Lincoln," high steward of the city at the time. The earl of Huntingdon mediated property disputes in Leicester, as did the earl of Shrewsbury in Derby. In Chester, the earl of Derby served as mediator in several disputes, including a disagreement between two aldermen over the building of new city waterworks.30 When individu-

bridge, 1843), 2:33; City Account Books, HWRO, Worcester City Archive, A.10, e.g., 1589-90, 1593-94, 1623-24, 1625-26. It does not seem that corporations followed a clear pattern in the types of problems they brought before judges as opposed to other mediators. Simple logistics may have played a role: if the Assize judges were in town, they heard the dispute.

30 John Bailey, ed., Transcription of the Minutes of the Corporation of Boston (Bos- ton, 1981), 2:430; order of the earl of Huntingdon, 14 April 1590, earl of Huntingdon to the mayor of Leicester, 30 November 1590, LRO, BRIV/9/13, 17; earl of Huntingdon to the mayor of Leicester, 25 June 1590, 14 April 1590, BRII/5/21, 29; recorder of Derby to the earl of Shrewsbury, September 1603, bailiffs and burgers of Derby to the earl of Shrewsbury, 15 Spetember 1603, Lambeth Palace Library, Lambeth Palace MS 3203 (Talbot Papers), fols. 108, 115; the earl of Shrewbury to Sir John Harpur, 20 Sep-

















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als (as in Leicester, Derby, and Chester) or the corporation (as in Boston) could not find a solution themselves, established local patronage links could be called on to reach one. Such quotidian disputes sprang up regularly in urban communities. Local magnates had the particular knowledge needed to settle such difficulties, while holding no material interest in the matter at hand.

The high stewardship provided a regular and useful venue for mediation of local disputes. High stewards held office in a borough, but their authority derived from their social standing or royal office. They ideally integrated local and central power. Townsmen brought all kinds of concerns before their high stewards, even resorting to that officer to com- plain against the depredations of the corporation itself. The earl of Rut- land, high steward of East Retford, received letters both from a group of townsmen and from the town's bailiffs when a bitter feud broke out in 1593 over the custody of the charter and other treasured documents of the borough. Each group blamed the other for the trouble, and each clearly assumed that Rutland would resolve the matter in its favor. Simi- larly, a merchant in King's Lynn, on the behalf of his fellow townsmen, appealed to the high steward, Lord Keeper Egerton, in an attempt to foil the actions of one of the town's aldermen. Alderman Thomas Baker, with the aid of his brother, supposedly was "maliciously and without any just cause" persecuting and plotting against some inhabitants, "to their continual vexation and great charges." The alderman and his fol- lowers apparently justified their actions by claiming "the great favor they have of your honor and other great personages to bring their devices and malicious practices to pass."31 The sparring parties in both towns expected to find resolution at the hands of their noble high stewards. They may have sought victory rather than compromise, but they nevertheless

tember 1603, MS 702 (Shrewsbury Papers), fol. 31; CCRO, AB/2, fols. 28, 35v-36; British Library, Harleian MS 2083, p. 597, MS 2104, p. 438.

31 HMC, Report of the Manuscripts of the Duke of Rutland at Belvoir Castle (London, 1905), 1:350-351; H. W. Saunders, ed., The Official Papers of Nathaniel Bacon of Stiff- key, 1580-1620, Camden Society, 3d ser., vol. 26 (1915), pp. 16-17. Unfortunately, in neither of these cases is the outcome of the dispute known. In East Retford, the earl of Rutland handed the matter over to two local deputy lieutenants for their attention and resolution. John Manners, the earl's uncle, was a J.P. as well as deputy lieutenant and also was serving as sheriff that year. John Thomagh the elder was the earl's "cousin" and steward of some of his estates; townsmen had asked Thoragh to assist in civic matters in the past. The earl was at this time a young man of twenty-two, and he was apparently in London when the townsmen asked him to intervene. Rutland may have taken less interest in the matter than the townsmen had hoped, or he may have thought the two gentlemen, who had regular dealings with the townsmen through their deputy lieutenancies, were better prepared to make a fair settlement (HMC, Rutland, 1:351, 350, 339, 303).









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agreed that a high steward was an appropriate arbiter who could be expected to provide an orderly resolution.

These examples indicate the variety of strategies that a corporation might use to maintain the health of the body politic. Different types of disputes called for different remedies, and those remedies were not exclu- sively homegrown. Urban communities had their own institutions for self-government, which they protected and cherished. Simultaneously, they existed as part of a larger commonwealth and its governing structures. Preserving local unity promoted national stability. Peacemaking in the town did not stop at the borough's borders but extended out to the personnel and institutions of the government at large.

II

In the resolution of conflict and the maintenance of order, we can see corporations reach beyond their own inhabitants and institutions. Per- sonal ties to the great men of the realm-patronage-offered townsmen an important means of upholding corporate integrity. A complex mixture of motives inclined civic authorities to reach out for help in solving their

problems. While wishing for "indifferent" arbitration, townsmen also expected that their chosen mediator would restore order and reinforce the authority of the corporation. The corporation of Barnstaple had several things in mind when calling on their recorder, the earl of Bath, to settle a dispute: concern for public order, desire to uphold the honor of the corporation, and the practical considerations of keeping urban government in proper working order. In 1599, Pentecost Dodderidge, scion of one of Barnstaple's most prominent families, and three confederates refused to pay their rates in the borough. Dodderidge and the others were not burgesses of the town but bought and sold there regularly. By all rights, these men should have entered into the freedom of the borough to carry on their trades, and the aldermen felt fully justified in rating them. When the four "recusants" refused to pay, the town receiver dis- trained their goods.32 In retaliation, Dodderidge procured a writ and had the receiver arrested. Events having reached this unpleasant impasse, the mayor and his brethren asked the earl of Bath to adjudicate the dispute.33

32 The offenders were labeled "recusants," not because they were Roman Catholic, but simply because they refused to take the freeman's oath of the town, thus recusing themselves from citizenship.

33 J. R. Chanter, Sketches of the Literary History of Barnstaple (Barstaple, 1866), p. 107; History of Parliament Trust, London, unpublished 1604-29 constituency report for Barnstaple (with thanks to Mr. John Ferris and the History of Parliament Trust for allowing me to use this report before publication). Dodderidge's refusal to become a freeman is odd since he came from one of the most prominent families in town and went



II







II









Bath had held the office of recorder since the late 1580s, usually assigning a deputy to carry out his duties. On this occasion, however, as in other matters of particular importance, the earl came to Barnstaple in person, sitting in the guildhall with the company of the corporation. The deputy recorder first recounted Dodderidge's alleged abuses. Dod- deridge then gave his statement, claiming that he and his fellows were rated too much, not that they should not pay at all. The earl of Bath reprimanded him for his rash behavior, stating that Dodderidge should have first appealed to him as recorder before launching into disobedience. Bath apparently saw it as his rightful duty to take action in matters of this sort. Dodderidge attempted to appease the earl, replying that "he would have done it but that a hundred of the inferior sort would have attended him and thereby given him a deal of trouble." This appeal to Bath's sense of propriety backfired, however, as the deputy recorder jumped on Dodderidge's words and alleged that he "went to raise a tumult and insurrection in the town." The earl shared this opinion, com- mitting Dodderidge to prison and binding him over to appear before the Privy Council for his disobedience.34

For the earl of Bath, this was the only correct outcome in the case: incitement of the populace and rejection of corporate authority could not be tolerated in a well-ordered society. The mayor and aldermen held legitimate authority from the crown in Barnstaple, and the earl-although he did not always see eye to eye with them-had to support their authority. Men like Dodderidge, who threatened to stir up the popular element, had to be stopped in order to maintain political and social structures. Because of the issues at stake, the earl of Bath took the matter personally. He chose to hear the matter himself rather than refer it to a deputy, and he took it amiss that Dodderidge did not appeal immediately to him in his official capacity as recorder. The earl clearly believed that the matter touched on his own dignity and status, as well as falling within his sphere of authority. Bath's decision ultimately found confirmation at the Board, as the Privy Council ordered Dodderidge not only to pay his assessed rates, but also to submit to being made a burgess for a ?10 entry fine, "as others do."35 With the fear of popular discontent quelled, the corporation forced Dodderidge to take up his rightful place of respon- sibility in the borough. Reliance on a noble patron helped the corporation to reinforce its authority without compromising it. The earl of Bath's

on in later life to serve as mayor and as M.P. for the borough. The reasons for his "recu- sancy" in 1599 remain enigmatic.

34 Chanter, Barnstaple, p. 107. 35 Ibid., p. 108; APC, 1599-1600, p. 63.









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honor and authority received confirmation as well, both in the locality and in London.

A shared interest in maintaining local peace and good government encouraged corporations and their elite patrons to work together in times of civic discord. A patron was expected to be a fair and relatively objective arbiter, given his high social status and position outside the regular concourse of the town. But he was also expected to have a particular commitment to the corporation which had selected him.36 The events in Barnstaple show the town's recorder protecting the authority of the corporation against the depredations of the citizens. A patron's favor was also expected to protect the well-being of the town as a whole. He became a member of the community, a particular type of citizen. Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, high steward of the town of Cambridge, acknowledged this dual role when he wrote to the corporation in 1610 to settle a conflict between a borough officer and the mayor and aldermen of the town. Henry Wulf, town bailiff, was setting "an evil example to others" by refusing to fulfill all of the requirements of his office. The corporation had written to Ellesmere complaining of Wulf's misbehavior, and the lord chancellor agreed to rectify the problem. Ellesmere told them that, "both in the love I hold to the town and in regard of the place I hold, I cannot but take the more particular notice as a thing more peculiarly belonging unto me, to see both the peace and good government of the town preserved and the disturbers thereof duly punished." But as a member of the corporation, he desired more "the reformation of offenses than the punishment of offenders" and hoped to make Wulf comply through admonition rather than condign punishment.37 Ellesmere explicitly identified himself with the corporation in his treatment of the incident but also brought to bear his authority as an important crown officer. Townsmen

36 A high steward's loyalty obviously differed from that of the regular corporators. Key court figures often offered patronage to more than one town at a time: the first earl of Salisbury served as high steward of multiple corporations, while Lord Ellesmere was high steward of both Oxford and Cambridge corporations. This seems not to have been much of a cause for concern among towns that chose them. Townsmen obviously expected that a patron would and could act in their best interests, regardless of his other responsibilities (A. B. Beaven, Bristol Lists, Municipal and Miscellaneous [Bristol, 1899], pp. 231-32; HMC, Fourteenth Report, pp. 160-61; HMC, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquess of Salisbury, vol. 18 [London, 1940], p. 253; A. N. Worth, Calendar of the Plymouth Municipal Records [Plymouth, 1893], p. 139; receipt for high steward's fees, DRO, MS 1579A/7/122; P. M. Tillott, ed., A History of York- shire: The City of York, Victoria County History [VCH] [London, 1961], p. 182; C. H. Cooper, Annals of Cambridge [Cambridge, 1845], 3:184; H. E. Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, 1585-1626 [Oxford, 1928], p. 205).

37 Cooper, Annals of Cambridge, 3:42-43.









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saw him as an officer of the town who also held authority beyond the borough, not as a royal officer forcing his will on the local community. His position as high steward of the corporation helped alleviate any potential threat to borough liberties. The corporation purposefully called on Ellesmere's dual interests to restore order to their body.

In some cases, this identification between town and patron even went beyond the sort of mediation provided by Ellesmere. Some corporations actually asked their patrons to draw up official orders for the use of civic government. Although this may seem like an invasion of corporate privilege, townsmen in the early seventeenth century apparently did not see it as such. A variety of instances of this phenomenon can be found in the early seventeenth century, in places like Chester, Reading, and Oxford.38 In Cambridge in 1629, the corporators called on their then high steward, Lord Coventry, to settle a serious dispute in the corporation over the proper form for mayoral elections and qualifications for serving as mayor. The corporation specifically asked him to devise orders "for the better government and quiet of the town." Lord Keeper Coventry, responsible to both the larger commonwealth and the local community, laid out rules for maintaining order in the town government by requiring a strict cursus honorum in mayoral elections. The mayor and representa- tives of both the aldermen and common councilmen signed Coventry's settlement. His orders became, in effect, bylaws of the corporation.39 Clearly, corporations in early modem England did not try perpetually to avoid the attentions of powerful peers or to govern independently of supposedly extramural forces. A division between "insiders" and "outsiders" cannot be drawn, for men like Coventry existed simultaneously as both.

III

An examination of one corporation's struggle to deal with internal division shows that this very ambiguity of definitions, the multiplicity of interests on the part of townsmen, could allow patrons to restore order. The corporation of Oxford manipulated this ambiguity successfully when faced with strife. In a reversal of usual meaning of "insiders" and "outsiders," the corporators of Oxford identified with a noble patron to the

38 CCRO, AB/1, fol. 355; J. M. Guilding, ed., Diary of the Corporation of Reading (Reading, 1895), 2:220, 221; Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, p. 297. A similar example can be found in HWRO, Worcester Corporation Records, A.14, box I, bk. 2, fol. 141.

39 Cooper, Annals of Cambridge, 3:218.



III






III




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exclusion of one of their own members. A disputed election of a town councilman in 1611 escalated into a vituperative attack by Alderman Thomas Harris against his fellow corporators and eventually against Lord Knollys, the city's high steward. Rather than defend their fellow's behavior, the town governors of Oxford disfranchised him and bound themselves more closely to their noble patron. Harris then appealed to Lord Chancellor Ellesmere for restoration to the aldermanic bench, producing the set of depositions recording the dispute. A story emerges of the con- testation and defense of the honor and privileges of the corporation and of the high steward.40

"By the general consent of this house and of all the commons of this city in the guildhall assembled," the citizens of Oxford chose Wil- liam Lord Knollys as their high steward on 11 January 1611. He suc- ceeded to the office on the resignation of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, who became chancellor of Oxford University. Strife between civic government and university over jurisdiction and precedence formed a basic structure of life in Oxford, making it virtually impossible for an officer of the university to serve as an officer of the corporation.41 To protect the city's interests, and to obtain a powerful advocate to counterbalance the university, the corporation chose a new high steward from the same social rank as Lord Ellesmere. In an elaborate show, the mayor, six aldermen, the town clerk, the chief bailiff, and the recorder all went to London to present the patent of office and a gift to Lord Knollys.42 While Lord Knollys accepted the place with "hearty thanks," he also showed his annoyance at the corporation for their failure to choose him earlier, "in

respect that his honorable father [Sir Francis Knollys] was in the same place, and he himself being of this Shire or County and of the Chiefest Rank of the same." Nevertheless, he agreed that he would "by all good means as well by himself as his friends protect and defend the same city." He then took an oath to maintain the liberties of the city of Ox- ford.43 The corporators knew they must treat their high steward particularly well if they wished to enjoy his favor. With troubles afoot regarding

40 The depositions are in the Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif., Ellesmere Col- lection (EL) 1946 ("The behavior and carriage of Thomas Harris late Alderman of the city of Oxford in his late Mayoralty and since for which he was displaced") and EL 1945 ("The answer of Thomas Harris unto the Articles objected against him").

41 VCH Oxford, vol. 4, The City of Oxford (London, 1979), pp. 74, 122. 42 Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, pp. 205, 206-7. Knollys was Lord Lieutenant of

Oxfordshire and served on the Privy Council for three monarchs-Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I (G. E. Cockayne, The Complete Peerage of England, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain, and the United Kingdom [London, 1910], q.v. "Banbury earldom"; Dic- tionary of National Biography, q.v. "Knollys, William").

43 Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, p. 207.















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the university and within the corporation itself, the townsmen needed the protection and goodwill of this powerful peer.

The city that Lord Knollys took into his stewardship was not a city at peace. Against a backdrop of ongoing conflict with the university, the corporation itself experienced turmoil stemming from the behavior of Thomas Harris. In 1609, during his mayoralty, Harris had offended the vice-chancellor of the university, which "extremely provoked both him and the university against the city." Mayor Harris's erratic behavior compounded not only the town-gown conflict but internal division as well. According to his fellow aldermen, he failed to defend the town's officers against the university or to write a letter asking for assistance from the then high steward, Lord Ellesmere.44 After his mayoralty, Harris continued his disruptive behavior, holding subsidy assessments in his own hands (and, by inference, embezzling them) and disparaging his fellow corporation members when they disagreed with him. He seems to have been something of a loose cannon. His actions caused intense feelings in the corporation, eventually leading to the disputed civic election of 1611.45 In that election, the question arose as to whether a bailiff could be chosen for the place of an assistant in the corporation. This seemingly minor point had major ramifications: doing the wrong thing would jeopardize the city's charter.46 The corporators could not come to a resolution. As an act of respect to Lord Knollys, their new high steward, they referred the matter to him for an official settlement.47

Knollys took great pains in his ruling. He carefully studied the city's charters and precedents, drawing up a long document explaining his resolution. Wishing "all peace, concord, and good agreements" to the people of Oxford, he stated that a bailiff could not be an assistant; it would be contrary to their chartered privileges.48 While the council of the corporation accepted the determination, Thomas Harris did not. Harris encouraged the unsuccessful candidate for assistant not to accept Lord Knollys's decision, thus creating further disruption in the city. Most corporators viewed his behavior as "an opposition if not rebellion against the whole body of the city," impeaching the peace and injuring civic authority. It also had the effect of discouraging the high steward from ever trying to

44 Huntington Library, EL 1946, fol. 68d. Harris claimed that he did this only out of respect for the lord chancellor, as the letter was going to be carried to London by a common carrier, a "sheepskin dresser"-a singularly unconvincing explanation (EL 1945, fol. 66d).

45 Huntington Library, EL 1946, fols. 68v, 69d. 46 Corporations that acted contrary to the precise specifications of their charters might

have those charters revoked for noncompliance. 47 Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, p. 208. 48Ibid., pp. 209-11.













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compose a dispute again, if "the party against whom it is or his adherents shall thus despitefully kick against it and despis[e] both him and it."49

Harris's insults moved beyond a simple disregard for authority, however, and launched into an attack on Lord Knollys's personal abilities and honor. Harris, in "very fleering and scornful manner," declared that Lord Knollys could not even read the city's charters, much less make an objective decision about them. He also refused to give any title of respect or honor to the nobleman but rather declared him an oath breaker who had ignored the customs and liberties of the city.50 Why Harris was so incredibly hostile remains obscure, but throughout his career in the corporation he had episodes of disruptive behavior.51 Regardless of the reason, in making these statements Harris brought shame on the whole corporation and jeopardized not only the settlement of the civic issues but the negotiations between the city and the university, which Knollys was then undertaking.

The affront, not surprisingly, incensed Lord Knollys, who wondered that, "in that city and amongst those citizens which should most respect him, and in the heart of that county wherein he dwelt and whereof he was lieutenant, he should be so highly disgraced and dishonored." He came to the city in July 1611, where the mayor and aldermen greeted him in their finest scarlet robes, presented him with gifts and a banquet, and showed him as much honor as possible. They wished to convey that the corporation as a whole revered him.52 Knollys later appeared before the whole assembly and charged Harris with his abuse. Harris, however, refused to humble himself or show any desire for pardon, which further irked the high steward. Lord Knollys declared that his honor could not stand sharing membership in the corporation with one as malicious and odious as Harris. He demanded that the council remove Harris from the corporation, or else he would remove himself from the high stewardship. The corporators now had a choice, either to support their fellow towns- man or to preserve their connection with Lord Knollys. They made their

49 Huntington Library, EL 1946, fol. 69d. 50 Ibid.; VCH Oxford, 4:147. 51 See Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, p. 69; M. G. Hobson and H. E. Salter, eds.,

Oxford Council Acts, 1626-1665 (Oxford, 1933), p. 4. Harris's behavior was erratic, and it is unclear whether he had any supporters. No evidence appears in the Council Acts to suggest that Harris had a following in his attitude toward Lord Knollys or his fellow corporators. That does not preclude the possibility, given the nature of the source, but all available evidence suggests that the great majority of the corporation condemned Harris's behavior. One recent work states that a "powerful section" of the city council already disliked Thomas Harris for his "overbearing manner" and his "attempt to maintain good relations with the university" (VCH Oxford, 4:147).

52 Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, pp. 212-13.













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decision quickly: the next day they officially removed Harris from his aldermanship and from the corporation, "in respect of his great abuses done in words towards our most honorable steward, the Lord Knollys, besides his very ill behavior, misusage, misdemeanor, and carriage of himself in the time of his late mayoralty towards this city and divers citizens thereof."53 It was far more important to maintain the goodwill and support of the high steward at this juncture than to defend a fellow corporator, especially one as troublesome as Thomas Harris. The corporators identified their interests with those of Lord Knollys and worked to preserve his favor as a way of preserving the liberties and peace of the city over time.

The matter did not stop there, however. Harris soon appealed to Lord Ellesmere, as lord chancellor, for readmission to the aldermanic bench.54 The intense desire of the majority of the Oxford city council to exclude this man from their midst and the real need of the city to retain good relations with its high steward are apparent in the city's final statement to Ellesmere. Reinstating Harris would not only return the dishonor of factionalism to the city and alienate Lord Knollys but would also keep Oxford from establishing patronage ties with noblemen in the future:

These things thus being, we appeal to the judgment of grave and honorable wisdom whether due respect to the honor of the king's Council and our own honorable Steward, as also a meet care to avoid that disgrace like to have fallen upon the City by being (as never yet it was) abandoned in displeasure by the Lord Steward thereof, if this man had not been ejected, were not sufficient motives and causes so to do; nay, whether we had not cause to think that if the city had been cast off for the abuse to the honorable Patron thereof not righted yet would have been for long time unre- ceived into Patronage by any other person of nobleness or honor.55

The corporation's arguments proved convincing: Thomas Harris remained excluded from the Oxford City council.

In this final statement, the men of Oxford clearly acknowledged their need for connection beyond the city walls. They willingly identified corporate interests with those of their high steward, to whom they owed honor and deference. Knollys had worked assiduously on the city's behalf to solve both the internal dispute and conflict with the university. He went on to compose a settlement with the university later that year,

53 Huntington Library, EL 1946, fol. 69v; Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, p. 213. There is no way of knowing whether the council reached a unanimous decision or not.

54 Huntington Library, EL 1945. 55 Huntington Library, EL 1946, fol. 69v.















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much to the delight and relief of the townsmen.56 Harris's dishonor to Lord Knollys put the future of the city in jeopardy, as it threatened to cut Oxford off from all potential patronage. After five years out of office, and with Lord Knollys's explicit consent and Harris's explicit promise to behave, this argumentative alderman finally returned to his place on the corporation in 1616.57 This was as it should be: corporations like Oxford preferred the idea of harmonizing everyone within the body. Only in extreme cases-such as Harris's attack on corporate integrity-did they wish to exclude someone. A borough with a reputation for fractious- ness and disrespect for authority found little favor with the ruling elite. Alienation of patronage meant that a town would not have a sympathetic mediator for dispute resolution or a protector of borough interests in the county or at court. Treating a patron appropriately in matters of internal interest to the borough had long-term ramifications for a corporation's ability to succeed in the patronage-oriented political world of early Stuart England.

IV Oxford's experience shows how the intervention of a patron in a

local dispute could not only strengthen and stabilize a corporation in the short term but also pay off in an ongoing interest of a national figure in the life of the town. This sort of interest proved especially important in situations where the matters that divided the corporation had a signifi- cance outside the walls of the town. For instance, disputes that involved religious differences regularly aroused Privy Council interest, and a patron's early intervention might prevent an appearance before the Board. The civic leaders of Lincoln asked the earl of Sheffield, lord president of the Council of the North, to decide a difference between the corporation and a local preacher who was factionalizing the townsmen; Lord Zouche, lord warden of the Cinque Ports, settled differences in both Rye

56 Salter, ed., Oxford Council Acts, pp. 221-22. 57 In April 1616, Harris, having apologized to Lord Knollys, asked the high steward

to request the corporation to reinstate him: "His Lordship in his letter declared his free forgetting and forgiving the said Mr. Harris any error or injury by him heretofore offered towards his Lordship, but yet left a free will and power unto this house to accept and restore him again so as some submission and promise of future conformity by the said Harris were made." The city council, taking into consideration Lord Knollys's magnani- mous example, agreed to forgive Harris his past sins and "lovingly received and restored" him into the corporation (ibid., p. 255). Proper order thus returned to Oxford, at least for the time being. Harris was ejected from the corporation again in November 1626 for having abused the mayor in words and for showing contempt toward his fellow city councilors (Hobson and Salter, eds., Oxford Council Acts, 1626-1665, p. 4).















and Dover that concerned civic preachers and groups in the two corporations that formed in support of them.58 In these cases, the noble mediator was able to resolve the matters before they came to the attention of the Council as a whole.

A patron could also provide much-needed assistance to a corporation whose internal troubles had already brought it to the attention of the Privy Council. The earl of Dorset, high steward of Great Yarmouth, protected that corporation from full-scale council regulation when the corporate body split over issues of governance and religion. Around 1629, two factions developed within the corporation, one tending toward puritanism and the other favoring the anti-Calvinist views of the bishop of Norwich Samuel Harsnett, recently translated to the see of York, and of William Laud, then bishop of London. This second group, although numerically smaller, had strong connections at court. The faction's leader, Alderman Benjamin Cooper, was able to prevail on Attorney General Heath, among others, to help him achieve a change in the borough constitution that would assist both him and his anti-puritan friends. He secretly moved to obtain a new charter, one calling for a single mayor, rather than the traditional two bailiffs; that sole mayor (not surprisingly) was to be Alderman Cooper himself. The new charter would also have halved the number of aldermen and common councilmen, nam- ing Cooper's supporters to those positions. The rest of the corporation, led by Alderman William Buttolphe, abhorred this change and strongly desired to retain the old constitution. They pursued their goal with the help of the newly chosen high steward, the earl of Dorset.59

Cooper's scheme to alter the charter came to a head in 1630. Alder- man Buttolphe, leader of the group wishing to preserve the old charter, managed to halt the plot by postponing the passage of the new charter

58 J. W. Hill, Tudor and Stuart Lincoln (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 111-12; HMC, Thir- teenth Report (London, 1892), app. 4, pp. 162, 170; Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1623-25, pp. 118, 147, 185, 358; Rev. John Reading to Lord Zouche, 4 March 1622, Sir James Hussey to the archbishop of Canterbury, British Library, Egerton MS 2584, fols. 305-7.

59 NRO, Great Yarmouth Assembly Books, Y/C19/6, fols. 122v-23, 126, 127; Henry Swinden, The History and Antiquities of the Ancient Burgh of Great Yarmouth (Norwich, 1772), pp. 501, 502n, 503-4, 505n; Cust, "Anti-Puritanism and Urban Politics," pp. 12- 13. Cust's article admirably dissects the religious issues involved in this episode. A new monograph on Great Yarmouth-Perry Gauci, Politics and Society in Great Yarmouth, 1660-1772 (Oxford, 1996)-indicates that after the Restoration, this corporation continued to establish links with important figures beyond city boundaries. "The corporation recognized that the maintenance of its legal and natural advantages relied heavily on the preservation of a dialogue between itself and outsiders, and thus it attempted to formalize the channels of influence which led to the authorities most regularly involved in Yar- mouth's affairs" (pp. 48-49).











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through Chancery. He petitioned the earl of Dorset, the lord keeper, and the king, who referred the matter to Dorset and four other members of the Privy Council.60 Dorset wrote to the corporation that autumn, in- forming them of Cooper's machinations in London: "I am now by your last certificate confirmed in my former opinion that you never desired any innovation or change of government. I thought it my part to know your desires, that so I might truly inform his Majesty (as I shall not fail to do) and that you may therefore continue the possession of your ancient rights and privileges." He asked Buttolphe and his group to "arm me in your just defense" by sending him information with which to argue against the alteration.61 Because the pro-alteration faction had friends at court, the "conservative" group vitally needed the solid support of Dor- set to defend the customary liberties of Great Yarmouth.62

While Dorset took a firm stand in defense of the traditional constitution of the town, his chief goal remained the restoration of peace in the borough and assuring the town's religious regularity. He did not condone puritan excesses but, rather, demanded the townsmen's conformity. When informed of religious irregularities in the town, he admonished the corporation: "I should want in my care for you if I should not let you know that his Majesty is not only informed but incensed against you for conniving at and tolerating a company of Brownists amongst you. I pray you, remember there was no seam in our Saviour's garment; root out that pestiferous sect forth your town; they are as dangerous to the soul as the plague to the body."63 He also refused to allow the two parties continually to try to eject members of the opposing faction from the corporation, calling for peace and harmony instead. "It is said that factions reigns [sic] amongst you, the which division much damnifies the peace and quiet under which all societies best subsist and prosper. I am not apt to credit rumor, yet persons of eminent quality have possessed

60 NRO, Y/C19/6, fol. 155. The king's referees consisted of the lord keeper, the lord treasurer, the earl of Dorset, Viscount Dorchester, and the bishop of London.

61 The earl of Dorset to the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth, August [1630], Great Yar- mouth Memorandum Book, NRO, Y/C18/6, fol. 256; Swinden, Great Yarmouth, pp. 502-3, 505n, 506n.

62 Richard Cust identifies Alderman Cooper's friends at Court as Attorney General Robert Heath and Viscount Dorchester (Cust, "Anti-Puritanism and Urban Politics," p. 13). The archbishop of York also favored the new scheme. Archbishop Samuel Harsnett had previously been bishop of Norwich; his stringent enforcement of conformity during his episcopacy there at times put him at odds with the corporators of Yarmouth (NRO, Y/C19/6, fol. 155; the bishop of Norwich to the bailiff and burgesses of Great Yarmouth, 15 July 1624, the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth to the bishop of Norwich, 31 January 1625, the bishop of Norwich to the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth, 23 January 1627, Y/C18/6, fols. 212, 215, 238; Swinden, Great Yarmouth. p. 504).

63 NRO, Y/C18/6, fol. 256; Swinden, Great Yarmouth, p. 505n.

















me, as I cannot but believe there is some ground of it. Let me prevail so far with you, as to entreat you all to incline your wills and endeavors to make up such differences as rents asunder that unity which ought to dwell amongst you."64 He advised them of the dangers of division: "How much concord advanceth both private families and politique bodies I shall not need to represent unto you, only I must with grief call to mind how miserably your Town is distracted within itself and what way that opens unto the daily attempts of such as truly wish not the prosperity of it. His Majesty (whose care embraceth the whole and every part of his kingdom) heartily wisheth a better correspondence amongst you."65 Dorset wanted composition, not division.

Despite his disappointment with the behavior of the battling corporators, Dorset did protect the town from the full brunt of Privy Council punishment when the matter came up before the Board. The corporation ran afoul of the Privy Council by ejecting alderman Cooper-"the main incendiary (as we upon more than probable grounds suppose) in all our molestations and combustions"-from their fellowship. Cooper in turn appealed to the Privy Council, which responded with a peremptory letter to restore him. Although the "misdemeanor" deserved a "severe pro- ceeding against" those who had engineered the dismissal, the Board rested "content to forebear the same," presumably because Dorset was handling the matter personally.66 Rather than solving the problem by cut- ting out unwanted parts of the body, as the rival factions had tried to do to each other, Dorset and the rest of the Board believed that order could only be achieved by bringing the two groups together again within the corporation.

The difference finally ended in peace in July 1631, when Alderman William Buttolphe, "out of his voluntary and free motion (that the com- mand of the Lords might be complied with, and the charters preserved from violation) desired this house, that he might be suspended, and se- questered from his place of Alderman, that so a way might be made for the readmission of Mr. Cooper. Which motion upon some consideration was well-liked and accepted of by this House." This was not a case of Buttolphe giving up in defeat. Rather, it provided a creative solution to a thorny problem. The corporation obeyed the king's commands, as required, but did not lose the service of their fellow, Buttolphe. For although he was suspended from his aldermanic place, Buttolphe retained

64 The earl of Dorset to the bailiffs of Great Yarmouth, 18 December 1629, NRO, Y/C18/6, fol. 254v.

65 Ibid., fol. 256. 66 The bailiffs of Great Yarmouth to the earl of Dorset, 6 October 1630, ibid., fol.

257v; Swinden, Great Yarmouth, pp. 509n-13n, 514n; APC, 1630-31, p. 384.













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his seat in church and his precedence in all things except the assembly. He continued to serve the corporation as their agent in London and in other business. The House officially restored Cooper, but with the statement that they had put him out validly in the first place.67 The factions in the corporation, as well as the Privy Council as a whole and the earl of Dorset individually, very much wanted the return of order and unity to Great Yarmouth, and they were willing to go to some lengths to achieve it. Almost certainly, the members' divergent views did not disap- pear with this resolution, but the fact that they agreed to present a unified public appearance speaks volumes about their ideals of order. The earl of Dorset, high steward of the town, deserves credit for helping to achieve this peace, working as he did both in the locality and at court to bring the two groups together into a unified whole rather than to remove one or the other from the corporation. Great Yarmouth maintained corporate integrity explicitly because the corporators looked beyond town walls for the resolution of this dispute. Their relationship with the earl of Dorset made the corporation not dependent, but stronger.

Problems like those that arose in Yarmouth played themselves out not only in the town but at the center as well, once again reinforcing the connections among various levels of royal government. The corporation honored the earl of Dorset with the high stewardship at a point when they needed a protector at court and a defender of local peace. The townsmen chose a peer already on the Privy Council who had shown favor to the town in the past and made him a member of their society. For his part, Dorset both upheld the rights of the corporation at the center and mediated peace in the locality, preserving corporate integrity there, as well. Great Yarmouth's difficulties reflected both local and national concerns, and their solution to reestablish order combined local and central actions carried out by a member of the corporation, the earl of Dorset, who was also a great officer of state.

V

By using a variety of mechanisms-some institutional and some personal-corporators strove to contain conflict among themselves. As with the resolution of commercial or moral disputes, the greatest good

67 NRO, Y/C19/6, fol. 199v; Swinden, Great Yarmouth, p. 515n. Buttolphe returned to the corporation in April 1633, when the next seat on the aldermanic bench opened. According to the official record of Buttolphe's restoration on 12 April 1633, not only Buttolphe but another alderman, Mr. Edward Owner, had volunteered to give up his aldermanic seat in order to preserve the charter and obey the Lords in 1631 (NRO, Y/C19/6, fol. 263v).



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was often not so much victory as finding ways to preserve peace in the community. Everyone from townsmen themselves to privy councilors and monarchs saw the benefits of composition over division. As parts of an increasingly integrated government, corporations reached out beyond their own borough walls to achieve order in the community. Patron- age provided a noninstitutional connection which corporations could ex- ploit, along with other methods, to preserve their integrity. During most of the Elizabethan and early Stuart period, this flexible connection helped foster effective government throughout the realm.

But composition cannot work when the parties no longer wish to agree. Dispute resolution offered no panacea, particularly when the nature of the issues under debate changed. In the later sixteenth century and the first decades of the seventeenth, most of the questions that rocked corporations concerned precedence, honor, office, or even money and property. While these could cause deep division, they could also be resolved when the will to maintain order was primary. When the causes of division became deeply held beliefs-particularly religion, and with the onset of civil war, loyalty to the king or parliament-agreement became less and less possible. As the story of Great Yarmouth suggests, the desire for both peace and unity was very strong, but corporators had to struggle mightily to achieve these ends. In this case, the political drive for unity suppressed the factions' unhappiness with each other. As En- gland moved into civil war and revolution, however, the ability and even the desire to compromise became diminished. Excising wholesale those who disagreed with the political winds of the day became the norm at all levels of government by midcentury. With the Restoration, parliamentary statute required that such surgical removal of dissent take place.68 It is not within the scope of this article to examine precisely how this change occurred. But just as national debates ultimately resulted in division rather than unity, so local disputes turned from a pattern of inclusion to one of exclusion when religion and political loyalty were at stake. Even the most powerful mediator could not mend that rift.

68 "An Act for the Well Governing and Regulating of Corporations" (the Corpora- tion Act), 1661. Paul Halliday's monograph, Dismembering the Body Politic: Partisan Politics in England's Towns, 1650-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, in press), will provide a systematic analysis of partisan conflict in towns and its consequences for politics and governance in England as a whole in the later Stuart period. Halliday shows that the principle of exclusion, rather than composition, became a basic feature of corporate life after 1660, even as townsmen continued to use the rhetoric of bodily wholeness.







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Conflict Resolution and Patronage in Provincial Towns, 1590-1640

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