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Transcript of Conceptual History of Democracy
Berghahn Books
Conceptual History and Politics: Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested?Author(s): Oliver HidalgoSource: Contributions to the History of Concepts, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2008), pp. 176-201Published by: Berghahn BooksStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23730897 .
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i RIL L Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 www.brill.nl/chco
Conceptual History and Politics:
Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested?
Oliver Hidalgo Institut fiir Politikwissenschaft der Universitat Regensburg
Abstract
This article surveys the history of the concept of democracy from Ancient times to
the present. According to the author, the conceptual history of democracy shows that
the overwhelming success of the concept is most of all due to its ability to subsume
very different historical ideas and realities under its semantic field. Moreover, the
historical evolution of the concept reveals that no unequivocal definition is possible
because of the significant paradoxes, aporias, and contradictions it contains. These
are popular sovereignty vs. representation, quality vs. quantity, liberty vs. equality,
individual vs. collective, and, finally, the synchronicity between similarities and dis
similarities. The ubiquitous usage of democracy in present-day political language
makes it impossible to speak of it from an external perspective. Thus, both demo
cratic theory and practice are suffused with empirical and normative elements.
Keywords
democracy, conceptual history, conceptual politics, normative theory
The concept of democracy has been associated at different points in history with some very opposing ideas: while the ancients used the term dripoKpaxta to identify the effective rule of the many or even of the whole people
(despite the fact only a minority were considered citizens and the popula tion was constricted to a small area), modern thinkers employ it in order
to refer to a society in which people are able to elect and control their
rulers as a means to guarantee freedom, equality, and the pursuit of self
interest for all individuals.1 There are also countless other forms of govern
" For a comprehensive analysis of ancient and modern democracies see Moses I. Finley
(1980), Fritz Gschnitzer (1995), and Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (1996).
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/187465608X363463
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 177
merit which adopt patterns, (sub-) types, and varieties of decision-making
processes that have also been labelled democratic, making it hard to keep orientation. This myriad usage of the concept leads to a spate of distinc
tions and qualifications. Most traditionally, one can speak of democracies
that are liberal or republican, direct or representative, consensual or majori
tarian, market or socially oriented. More recently, other variants acquired
prominence such as participatory, deliberative and grassroots democracies,
or even alternatives like demarchy, skewed democracy and non-partisan
democracy. Finally, considering how democracies have evolved worldwide, even the possibility of a specific Islamic transformation of democracy or of
a socialist and anarchist brand of democratization might expand the scope
of the concept in the future.
If a typology is plausible (a difficult task as it is, since nowadays the basic
traits of a direct democracy -initiatives, referenda and recalls — take place
within the representative system and the people sometimes not only han
dle legislative but certain executive and judicial powers as well), we cannot
avoid the suspicion that the "government of the people, by the people, and
for the people" (Abraham Lincoln) might just as well mean "everyone and
everything."2
Rather than succumbing to a mood of dismay, we must take into con
sideration W. B. Gallie's classical statement that democracy - like justice or
arts — is yet another one among those "essentially contested concepts"
which lack unique standards of definition.3 Furthermore (and fortunately) the contest seems to concern first and foremost the interpretation of the
concept, not the concept of democracy itself.4 Obviously then the question
that must be made is whether it is possible to find arguments and criteria
to assess what is the best interpretation of the concept of democracy or
whether all there is to be done is to accept a juxtaposition of competing
versions. This approach implies a second, deeper problem, namely, the
extent to which conceptual history might help in acquiring a normative
perception of democracy. At first glance, there can only be an answer in the
negative: conceptual history (here understood as the description and anal
ysis of concrete historical semantics, origins, derivations and alterations of
8 Giovanni Sartori (1992), 11. 3> See Walter B. Gallie (1956). 4) See some considerations concerning normative concepts presented by Stephen Lukes
(1974) and Rainer Forst (2003), 50-52.
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178 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
concepts) apparently belongs to the empirical paradigm in social sciences,5
therefore a normative notion of democracy (and not only a reflection of
the social and moral impact of democratic ideas and values) can only be
informed by political philosophy. However, simply considering what the
entire range of the history of political ideas is able to offer would be much
too simple. Instead, we must acknowledge the importance and thus pro
ceed to analyze the historical and conceptual contexts that provide the
framework for the development of a normative theory of democracy after
the linguistic turn.6 It is therefore possible to separate conceptual history
from an abstract history of ideas even if it remains closely bound to norma
tive theories. This presents the political philosophers with an additional
task. They must also make an effort to clarify the extent to which the con
ceptual history of democracy might function as a basis for any kind of
conceptual politics7 depending on whether they are able to extrapolate the
"best interpretation" of the concept of democracy. However, first I would
like to discuss, briefly, democracy as a historical concept, before showing that conceptual history also leads to the necessity of a normative concep
tion that reflects the aporias and contradictions of democracy.
1. The Concept of Democracy
As it is well-known, ancient Greece is the birthplace of democracy.8 The
word "5r|poKpaxia" (which means the "rule by the people") was invented
by the Athenians in order to define their political system after 462/461
B.C., particularly after Ephialtes put in place the proposals of Cleisthenes
in 508/507 B.C, disempowering the aristocratic Areopagand turning most
5) Through his writings on Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck, Kari Palonen (2002)
intends to turn the history of concepts into a subversive critique of normative political
theory. 6) Arno Waschkuhn (1998), part 3. 7)
"Conceptual politics" is my translation of Reinhard Mehring's concept of Begriffspolitik
by which he wants to characterize both the method of Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleck
in contrast to their own conceptions of sociologist or historian of concepts. See Reinhard
Mehring (2006), 31, as well as the analogy to Hermann Liibbe's concept of Ideenpolitik.
For the conceptual politics of Max Weber, see also Kari Palonen (2005). 8) Some authors argue that the historical origins of democracy can be found already in the
Sumerian City and the first republics of ancient India but these examples are at best democ
racies avant la lettre which makes them irrelevant for this article.
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 179
of the important political decisions to the assembly constituted exclusively
by male citizens.9 At the time, the first principles of democracy were free
dom and equality — all citizens being free by birth each one would accept
the other as an equal,10 and henceforth by ruling they accepted to be ruled
in return. After the second half of the fifth century, democracy also meant
that officials were to be controlled by fixed laws and by the people's vote
and - as stated in Pericles' funeral oration which survived thanks to Thucy
dides — that citizens would be ensured the right to live on their own behalf
without being educated and guarded by the state and its public norms."
The first historian to mention the concept of SquoKpcmw was obviously
Herodotus. Nevertheless, we must retrace its origins at least back to the
tyranny of the Peisistratides12 and the Athenian Sea Union13 when the
nobles' position was weakened while that of the citizens - the 8t|po<; - was
strengthened. Moreover, the etymological derivation of the word
8ri|roKpana also shows the replacement of law (nomos) as constitutional
concept (ehvopta, iaovopfa) by an emphasis on power, that is arche
((tovapyia, oXtyapyta) and kratia (hripoKpaxta), respectively.14 These shifts show evidence that the concept of democracy was above all
an attempt to identify political reality in ancient Athens. Today one can
hardly call democratic the political system in Attica, which included slav
ery and excluded all women and foreigners from citizenship. This con
versely makes it much easier to adopt the concept of 8r|poKpaxia in order
to describe present-day political conditions. However, the very singular
and complex circumstances that led to the development of the rule by the
people in Athens hardly compare with other political contexts and eras.
Rather than applying contemporary standards of democracy, one should
be able to contextualize the claims of the ancient Greeks. In this light, it is
no surprise that many thinkers in ancient Greece - among them Plato
(who associated democracy with chaos and anarchy), but also Socrates,
Xenophon and others — hoped for an aristocratic wind of change in the
city of Athens, leading them to lament the loss of moral order and authority
91 Kurt A. Raaflaub (1995), Jochen Martin (1995), andjochen Bleicken (1995). 10) See Aristotle (1280a), 5-7 and 24; (1291b), 32-38; and (1301a), 28-32. n) Werner Conze et al. (1972), 828. 12) Michael Stahl (1987) and Konrad Kinzl (1995). 13) Kurt A. Raaflaub (1995), 36ff. 14) Christian Meier (1983).
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180 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
and to call for the rule of the best (aptaxot), or of the ones distinguished
by their bravery (xt|tf|i) instead of the rule of the many, the mob (oyAoc;).15
Nevertheless, they were also capable of developing a readiness to accept an
arrangement compatible with democratic reality in Athens. Socrates
famously preferred to die rather than to break the democratic laws of the
city; Xenophon returned to Athens after the reconciliation between Ath
ens and Sparta; Plato made an interesting distinction between a "good"
and a "bad" form of democracy, which is supposed to have influenced
Aristotle's conception of ttoXtxeta as an amalgam between oligarchy and
democracy and therefore as a compromise between the quality of govern
ment and the people's participation.16 The mixed constitution subsequently
became the only conceivable form of Greek democracy outside Athens and
its Sea Union.17 Later the Romans put a new emphasis on law as a system,
including democracy only as a supplement. Their concept of res publico. -
connecting monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements18 — was a
model of constitution deemed to be the best insurance against instability,
from Polybius to Machiavelli.
After the fall of the republic and the rise of the Roman Empire the con
cept of democracy was submitted to new assessment as a result of political
circumstances. While Aelius Aristides called the Imperium romanum a
"common democracy of the world, under one man, the best ruler and
director,"19 Cassius Dio stressed that real democracy could only exist under
a monarchy, whereby the Platonic formula of justice ("Doing one's own")
was supposed to be no longer aristocratic but democratic.20 Ultimately,
15) Early supporters of democracy like Herodotus and Pericles, who linked justice and iso
nomia to the rule of the 8r||io<;, still did not envisage a conflict between citizens and nobles
but merely did emphasize the unity of the city against the menace of oligarchy and tyranny.
At first nobles like Pindar and Plato innovated the political and moral concept of aristocracy
in order to pit the rttle of the best against democracy or - as Thucidides and Aristotle did
later - to distinguish good from bad oligarchies. For the conceptual history of aristocracy
see Werner Conze and Christian Meier (1972). 161 In Aristotle a pure democracy is described as degenerated rule of the poor (1279b 5-10).
His concept of politeia understood as the good form of democracy or also as free constitu
tion was shared by Isocrates (IV, 125; ep. VI, 11) and Demosthenes (I, 5; VI, 21; XV, 20). 17)
Wolfgang Schuller (1995), 316-23 and Alexander Demandt (1995), viii and ix.
18) por jPg strong elements of popular participation in Rome, see John North (1994). 19) Aelius Aristides (1981), XXVI, 60. See also Richard Klein (1981), 131f.
20) Cassius Dio (1961), LVI, 43.4. and VI, 23.5. See also Alexander Demandt (1995),
213.
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 181
neither Aristides nor Dio wanted to renounce the legitimizing value the
concept of democracy still carried in the first centuries of the Christian era.
The situation only changed during the European Middle Ages, when the
predominance of religion over all aspects of life made the reference to
democracy evidently useless. It was not until the thirteenth century that a
few thinkers revived the concept - notably, St. Thomas of Aquinas, Engel bert of Admont, Marsilius of Padua and Nicole Oresme — who encoun
tered it through their reception of Aristotle21 and started using it to describe
the contemporary politics of the Italian cities.22 But even the rise of Prot
estantism and the diminishing authority of the Catholic Church (accom
panied by the rise of contract theory, which epitomized the new forms of
rationalism in politics) could not immediately change the association of
the concept of democracy with antiquity. The concept of representation,
especially, was for a long time considered to be incompatible with the idea
of the ruling people. Hence Thomas Hobbes argues in favour of represen
tation and against democracy — even though his argument that every man
is born free and equal can be said to be democratic. Meanwhile, Rousseau
insisted, vice-versa, on the sovereignty of the people against representation.
Obviously they shared the unchanged idea that democracy means nothing else than the reign of the people over themselves - for Hobbes a terrible
image and for Rousseau something too nice to be actualized.23 Further
more, since the Reformation and the Enlightenment the concept of democ
racy was sporadically used to identify some specific elements of the mixed constitution in England (Blackstone, De Tolme, John Adams), of the
republican constitutions of Switzerland and its cantons, of the Netherlands,
21) Hie philosophical work of Aristotle was unknown in the West from the fifth century all
the way to the late twelfth century. 221 See Claire R. Sherman (1995), 240-52; Karl Ubl (2000), 134ff., R.W. Dyson (2003),
203-05 and 246-50. 23) "A prendre le terme dans la rigueur de l'acception, il n'a jamais existe de veritable demo
cratic, et il n'en existera jamais [...] S'il y avait un peuple de dieux, il se gouvernerait demo
cratiquement. Un gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas a des hommes." Translation: "In
its most rigorous sense, there has never been a true democracy, such a thing will never exist
[...] If a people of god existed, it would govern itself democratically. Such a perfect govern ment is not appropriate for mankind." Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, (1959
1969), III, 4.
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182 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
and also of some German cities.24 Nevertheless, the (Aristotelian) scepti
cism concerning the realization of a "pure" democracy still predominated
until the end of the eighteenth century. Indeed, also very Aristotelian was
the fact that many thinkers restricted the concept's use to the description
of the state and government system, as, for example, in the works of Johan
nes Althusius, John Henry Alsted, Thomas Hobbes, William Temple, John
Locke, Samuel von Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, Charles de Montesquieu, the Encyclopaedic (De Jaucourt), Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Christoph Martin
Wieland and August von Schlozer.
This historical context explains why the concept of democracy would
not strike a chord during the French Revolution. During its first stage,
republic was still the most widely used concept.25 In this sense, the works
of the Abbe Sieyes are instrumental in proving that only the republic was
assumed to be able to include a modern market economy as well as a rep
resentative government,26 whereas democracy was still associated with the
direct rule of the people and the virtu of citizens. A few years later, how
ever, there was a significant increase in the number of positive statements
concerning democracy uttered by the revolutionaries,2' but eventually the
reign of the Jacobins only served to confirm scepticism towards democracy,
discrediting the concept for another few decades, especially in England and in Germany. This is how in Kant's Zurn Ewigen Frieden (1795) — a
complement of Rousseau's Contrat social in which an important distinc
tion between the forma regiminis (republicanism and despotism) and the
forma imperii (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) can be found —
democracy remains associated with the absence of checks and balances as
well as of representation and the rule of law.28
24> See for example Martin Luther's address on February 7th 1539 (WA IV: 4324), and
Rene Louis d'Argenson's Considerations (1764), 8ff., 61f., 70ff., and 103. 25) Therefore the concept of democratic did not play any role during the French debate
concerning the suffrage universe/in 1790. See Robert R. Palmer (1953), 214.
26) Jean Roels (1969).
27> See for instance Robespierre's address on February 5th 1794 when he made no substan
tial distinction between democracy and republic. Charles Vellay (1908), 324ff.
28) Before Sieyes and Kant, the Federalists argued in favour of the republic and against the
"ancient" idea of a democratic executive that might lead to despotism. In the United States,
the concept of democracy had a rather pejorative image at least until the Jacksonian
Democracy, after 1828 - despite the sympathies sporadically voiced by Thomas Jefferson.
See Gustav H. Blanke (1956), 43ff. Supposedly, the reason for this is that democracy
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 183
Two complementary things had to happen before the concept of democ
racy could start its triumphant advance. First of them was the historical
overcoming of the antagonism between democracy and representation
and, second, the extension of the concept beyond the classification of state
and government to the description of a particular form of society as well.
The Marquis d'Argenson was possibly the author who prepared and antic
ipated both innovations in the middle of the eighteenth century. In his
Considerations sur le gouvernement (1764) he distinguished between a fausse and a legitime democracy, the first one being anarchic and revolutionary, the second its "true" version, being represented by elected deputies.29 The
amalgam between the concept of democracy and political representation
became possible because d'Argenson neglected the state and constitutional
order and focussed on the social system. About one hundred years before
Tocqueville30 he already was concerned with the historical progres de la
democratic in France and also stressed the decisive role of the French mon
archy in repressing European feudalism and the privileges of the nobles
and in allowing the rise of civil society and social equality.31
D'Argenson's royalist view on democracy became politically efficient
soon after the French Revolution when Thomas Paine's answer to Edmund
Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) in The Rights of Man
(1791) began to dissolve the idea that democracy and representative
government must remain a contradictio in adjecto?2 In this same vein,
the distinction between the forma regiminis and the forma imperii, as it
was expressed by Kant, shifted towards the interpretation that rather
than the republic, democracy might be the forthcoming aim of history, whether in France (Constant, Guizot) or in Germany (Schlegel, Gorres).
became identified with the terreur of the Jacobins. See William Corbett's History of the
American Jacobins Commonly Denominated Democrates (1796). 29) Rene Louis d'Argenson (1764), 7f. A similar yet not so strict distinction can be found
in the Deutsche Encyclopiidie from 1783. 30) The Considerations started circulating in France after the 1730's. See R.R. Palmer 1953:
205. 311 Rene Louis d'Argenson (1764), 135ff. 32) Cf. Dolf Sternberger (1980). Therefore Fichte's and Schlegel's receptions of Kant's
Zum Ewigen Frieden — following Campe's Zweitem Versuch deutscher Sprachbereicherung
(1792) - insist on the compatibility between a representative democracy and a republic. See
Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1965a), 160; (1965b), 431ff. and Friedrich Schlegel (1966), 12-17.
Kant himself confirmed this view in his Metaphysik der Sitten (1797).
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184 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
As this development occurred, Aristotle's quantitative criterion — the rule
of one, a few or many — and most notably the opposition between monar
chy and democracy receded into the background. Later in the nineteenth
century (and particularly after the 1848 Revolution) the question was not
longer if democracy was within the historic horizon, but simply what kind
of democracy lied ahead in the future: free or despotic, liberal or socialist, monarchic or republican, elitist, grass-rooted or anarchic, or perhaps even
a "democratic" dictatorship. All these options became available due to the
fact that the concept of democracy had increasingly become a synonym for
modern society and culture,33 and that democratic theories (Jefferson, Toc
queville, von Stein, Lincoln, Mill, Proudhon,34 Marx, Mosca, Dewey)
changed into normative (or normative-empirical) concepts tailored to
organize the social reality of democracy or to overcome it, as for Nietzsche,
Sorel, and Pareto. Starting in the nineteenth century, one is also able to
observe how democratic systems develop distinctively in each country,
region, and continent. While the Anglo-American brand stood out for its
liberal aspects, France and other countries in Continental Europe remained
more strongly connected to the republican tradition. If presidential democ
racy is dominant today in North and South America (and in Eastern
Europe more recently), in Western Europe parliamentary governments
have been prevalent (despite some ill-fated hesitations and interruptions in
Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). The epoch-defining success of
democracy as a constitutional and social order, and, additionally, as a polit
ical practice gave rise to a host of empirical and formal theories during the
twentieth century (Weber, Schumpeter, Popper, Downs, Carl J. Friedrich,
Dahl, Lipset). A trait these theories have in common is the attempt to
describe, analyze, and forecast democratic processes and politics. The dom
inance of the formal-empirical paradigm in the social sciences succeeded in
promoting the opinion that concepts of democracy resting upon norms
and ideals lacking systematic reference to political reality were generally
33) In this respect, the fundamental break between the concept of democracy and its ancient
heritage occurred during the nineteenth century (Constant, Bluntschli). Since then the
identification of democracy with Protestant equality and Contract Theory (von Rotteck)
have been reflected in the use of the concept. 34) In Tocqueville and Proudhon it is also possible to find the Kantian insight that modern
democracy means most of all a peaceful handling of political and social conflicts beyond
the former Kriegergesellschaft.
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 185
undermined by empirical definitions.35 Nevertheless, there are still effec
tive normative concepts of democracy, emphasizing, for example, justice
(Rawls) or its bond to human rights (Habermas). Neither should other
lesser known conceptions of democracy be ignored, such as those that
criticize the lack of people's participation in contemporary liberal democ
racies (Barber, Bellah, Putnam) or that underscore its inevitable decline
due to the belief that democratic levelling is the conditio sine qua non of
totalitarianism (Lefort, Arendt). Furthermore, it is possible to find theories
that combine aspects of normative and empirical conceptions36 as well as
other rather empirical concepts that are used to formulate quasi-normative
concepts that inform the construction of a new social and political world
order, such as modernity, for example. It seems inevitable today that the
empirical reality and variety of democratic institutions and societies is
accompanied by renewed critical normative reflections on the concept
given that not only the best form of democracy is an object of dispute but
also its chances and risks in the context of globalization.
2. Paradoxes, Aporias, and Contradictions of Democracy
If we are to judge according to the large amount of different social and
political systems named "democracies" (among them the democratic peo
ple's republics of Korea, Laos and Algeria, the democratic republics of
Congo and East Timor, the people's republics of China and Bangladesh, the democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka, and the Islamic republics of
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan), there is no doubt no country in the world
would call itself "anti-democratic" today. Since the twentieth century, the
legitimizing value of democracy is such that any country will be quick to
call itself "democratic" in the sense that the ruler allegedly draws his legiti macy from the people, regardless of the existence of individual rights, free
elections, and the political power is not under people's control. Interest
ingly, the countries with the longest democratic traditions - the Swiss
Confederation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America -
do not draw attention to their democratic institutions and society by
means of their official name, whereas socialist countries in particular
35) Mostafa Rejai (1967), 31. 36) Giovanni Sartori (1992), Arno Waschkuhn (1998).
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186 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
seldom renounce or have renounced such a reference. While the use of the
concepts of republic and monarchy in order to define a state and a political
system demand the visibility of political institutions that have traditionally been associated with them, the employment of the term democracy appar
ently is not bound to such strictures. Whereas the first two concepts must
be supported by hard evidence, the concept of democracy remains amor
phous; whereas it is not so hard to identify a constitution as a republic or
monarchy, a fierce and protracted struggle has evolved around the question
of which countries are entitled to call themselves democracies. Prior to
1990, this issue was disputed between liberal and socialist regimes, nowa
days the same seems to be happening between the so-called Western
democracies (with their offshoots in Latin America, India, Japan, and
Eastern Europe) and political systems from other parts of the world, espe
cially in the Middle East and Asia.
In view of the above, this brief analysis might raise the suspicion that the
abuse of the concept by dictators, parties, and ideologists is a danger. How
ever, the conceptual history of democracy shows that different interpreta
tions are inherent to the concept itself. This goes beyond the general thesis
that all political concepts are liable to continuous change in terms of mean
ing since they reflect the mutating values and norms of a society. Not only
does democracy fit the general insight that (political) concepts are always collections of a plurality of meanings?7 that is, formed by historical reality
which makes it impossible to demarcate the boundaries between syn
chronic and diachronic time, but it also contains many and contradictory
meanings, dimensions and associations, all of which invite us to adapt its
semantics to different historical entities. Below one finds a list of five of the
most important paradoxes and aporias38 of democracy, which are not dis
cussed at length in this article:
(1) Democracy is obviously against the natural idea that the few above
should rule over the many below.39 In this respect, the sovereignty of the
people remains simply a metaphor for democracy as a special form of order,
37) Reinhart Koselleck (1978), 29. 38) A good overview concerning the huge list of relevant aporias and paradoxes pertaining
the concept of democracy can be found in Paul B. Clarke and Joe Foweraker: (2001), or
also in Robert Dahl et al. (2003). 39)
Jean-Antoine Laponce (1991).
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 187
although complete identity between rulers and subjects is impossible to
achieve. With representative government, elections, and the dismissal of
rulers, the concept of democracy is supposedly converted into political
practice but the contradiction between democracy and representation ulti
mately remains unsolved.40 Thus modern democratic theories try to distin
guish between the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of democracy.41
While every government system guarantees the necessary hierarchy and
verticality in order to avoid anarchy, only democracy provides horizontal
elements of control such as checks and balances, opposition, institutional
ized conflicts, and pluralism. The difference, however, between power
coming from above and legitimacy coming from below as underlined by thinkers such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Guglielmo Ferrero,42 and Max
Weber's is not specifically democratic.
(2) With respect to the democratic decision-making processes, there is
a general competition between the principles of quality and quantity.
Although some new models of radical democracy (Barber, Lummis) deny this antagonism and strive to widen the scope of democracy as well as the
intensity of participatory moments, the problem seems to be determining
how to achieve good or at least acceptable political choices. The vote of the
majority might be seen as an indicator of the quality of a decision (or of a
politician) but what will happen, however, if the majority is wrong about
decisive or fundamental questions?43 ffence one of the most important
tasks of democratic theory will always be locating the boundaries for dem
ocratic decision-making. Should it be bound by the constitution or by human rights or religion? Radical theorists like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
ff ans Kelsen stressed that any kind of border will necessarily violate democ
racy itself. This also led into a new paradox. While Rousseau claimed that
a divine legislator was necessary to educate the people in order to conciliate
quantity and quality (or the volonte generate and the volonte de tous) in
democratic decisions, Kelsen declared that voting for anti-democratic par
ties and demagogues in order to prevent the majority from destroying
democracies is actually an act of betrayal.44 Therefore, if democracy is to be
40) Danielo Zolo (1998) and Guiseppe Duso (2006). 411 Giovanni Sartori (1992), 137f. 42) See Alexis deToqueville (1954), 333 and Guglielmo Ferrero (1944), 481. 43) Bernd Guggenberger and Claus Offe (1984). 4'" Hans Kelsen (2006), 237. The paradox is also known as the Toleranzproblem of democ
racy. Manfred Hattich (1965).
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188 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
protected against its own dangers we must eventually accept some bound
aries and values located beyond democracy even if we agree that democ
racy and human rights might come from the same source (Habermas).45 As
long as a contradiction in practice is possible the appeal to anti-democratic
measures always remains a plausible option for democracy.46
(3) Democracy rests upon two fundamental principles that are often
following colliding trajectories: liberty and equality.47 When Goethe said:
"Legislators and revolutionaries who promise equality and liberty at the
same time are either psychopaths or mountebanks," he was indicating that
absolute equality could only be achieved by repression since a free society
will necessarily display differences and inequalities. On the other hand, the
classical controversy between Left and Right can persuasively be described
as a debate concerning the possible extent of equality, although neither
camp needs to challenge democracy itself given that they show respect for
the principle of freedom.48 Hence the struggle between democratic parties
all over the world is usually a quest for the right balance between liberty and equality. In this respect, the liberal ideal combining social hierarchy and political equality (Rawls) is one possible orientation among many. Moreover, in addition to the problem that some will become more equal
than others, there is the question of what kind of freedom is preferred: an
undefined negative one, giving us the opportunity to start our own pursuit
of happiness, or a defined positive one securing our participation in mak
ing the laws we have to obey. The former type is supported by liberals like
Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin, the latter by democrats such as Ben
jamin Barber and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. And there are other thinkers,
like Kant and Habermas, that attempted to combine both aspects. In sum,
reflection upon liberty and equality and the tension between them is one
of the perennial subjects of democratic theory.
45) This aporia persists in one of Habermas' earlier contributions (1973), 316, in which he
affirms that the "Verfassungswirklichkeit des biirgerlichen Rechtsstaates" was "seit je her in
Widerspruch zur Idee der Demokratie." An advanced discussion about the possible anton
ymy between democracy and the constitutional state can be found in Werner Kagi (1973). 46> For this see also Derrida's figure of "la democratic a venir." Jacques Derrida (2002), 112
157. 47) See the famous first chapter of Tocqueville's Democracy in America Vol. 2, book 2 Why
Democratic Nations Show a More Ardent and Enduring Love of Equality than of Liberty. A
meditation on the topic is offered in Ralf Dahrendorf (1963). 48) Norberto Bobbio (1994).
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 189
(4) Modern democracy also marks a new epoch in terms of the com
plex relationship between individuals and the collective. While in the
ancient world private concerns were strictly subordinated to the public
interest,"19 capable even of turning slavery into a moral imperative,50 the
modern age has set itself apart by the protection of individual rights and of
the pluralism of opinions, aims, and ambitions. Nevertheless, even mod
ern democracies require some degree of public spiritedness and social
homogeneity in order to conserve political unity and represent something
more than just a crowd of people. The question of how to bind democratic
individuals together is another problem for which several tentative solu
tions have been offered. Theory as well as history have witnessed several
such attempts under several (partially antagonistic) concepts such as the
state and the nation, race and ethnicity, religious and cultural traditions,
rationality, ethical categories like justice, tolerance or solidarity, the civil
society, communication, and, last but not least, economical success and
consumer needs. Furthermore, some degree of social homogeneity also
seems to be a necessary precondition for the functionality of democratic
techniques and for the peaceful coexistence of majorities and minorities.51
However, there is always a danger that in striving to forge political unity
and to solve essential social and political conflicts, the exact opposite might be achieved through the elimination of a sense of indefiniteness and divi sion that is inherent to democracy.52 Therefore, striking a balance between
private and public interests, individual and collective claims represents a
constant challenge for democratic theory.
49) Although some ancient authors also made important ethical innovations strengthening
the individual's position (sophists like Antiphon and Alcidamas, for example, emphasized
equality, Socrates and Aristotle considered the prospect of an apolitical way of life, and the
philosophical schools of Cynicism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism called for a kind of world
citizenship), one should not forget that the concept of the individual only becomes identifi
able with a singular human life after the first civil revolutions. Hence in Antiquity there is
neither a theoretical nor a practical separation between the individual and his community
comparable with modern individualism (Vittorio Hosle (1997), 36fF.). For the ancients it
was difficult to believe that the aims and purposes of one single man could be deemed
higher than the public need. 50) Alexander Demandt (1993), 51. 511 Herrmann Heller (1971). 52) Claude Lefort (1990).
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190 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
(5) The dislocation of the concept of democracy from a form of govern
ment to a form of society also leads to understanding of the heterogeneity
of democratic institutions as a result of moral, social, and cultural dissimi
larities. As indicated by Montesquieu and Tocqueville, the particular men
talities, habits, and intellectual manners of nations endow all social and
political systems with a character of their own. Thus there are two reasons
why democracy has become such a ubiquitous concept: it is able to explain
what democratic societies have in common as well as what distinguish
them from each other. This leaves democratic theory with the task of pro
viding cogent criteria to determine what is still, not yet, or no longer, a
democracy. But even in this respect there can be only provisional answers,
once again, as a result of the special dynamics of democracy. In particular,
the history of democracy can also be interpreted as a permanent movement
of inclusion that progressively incorporated once marginal individuals and
groups: slaves, the poor people, women, and so forth. Yet there have always
been those willing to criticize the alleged overreach of democratic equality.
This continues in the present as discussions on the extension of democracy
to other social groups (children, foreigners, and next generations)53 prog
ress. Thus when evaluating other societies one must keep in mind that
democracy is a process that might evolve differently or that might incorpo
rate key aspects that are not necessarily familiar to certain societies. Ulti
mately, however, we must eventually be able to say whether or not the
application of the concept is justified. The tensions between liberty and equality, individualism and collectiv
ism, participation and leadership will persist as problems each democratic
theory and system will have to deal with, even if they cannot ultimately be
solved.54 Given the diversity of societies and cultures, this also means that
solutions can hardly be universal. This approach also suggests that the
empirical variety of democratic political formations demands the acknowl
edgement that defining "what a democracy is" is a normative decision
reflecting different tentative solutions to the paradoxes of democracy. The
types of policies that are eventually pursued are inevitably a consequence
of this previous normative decision.
53) See for instance Bobbio (1988) and Dryzek (2000). 54)
J. Roland Pennock (1979).
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 191
3. Conceptual History and Conceptual Politics
The numerous contradictions, paradoxes, and aporias proper to democ
racy mean that the concept is rarely used in isolation, it is often qualified
by special adjectives that attribute a descriptive or normative meaning by
increasing differentiation and restricting conceptual stretching.55 Examples
of such adjectives used to qualify the concept of democracy are "authori
tarian," "neopatrimonial," "military-dominated," "parliamentary," "presi dential," "federal," "guarded," "electoral," "protected," "illiberal," "restrictive,"
"tutelary," "one-party," and "elitist"; or also "Western," "modern," "plebi
scitarian," "representative," "pluralistic," "socialistic," "liberal," and "delib
erative."56 In this respect, it is important to understand that the usage of
the noun reveals the intention to ensure that the referred state, society, or
system is in fact a democracy, since it displays at least one of its many prox
ies — elections, referenda, a constitution, parties, civil rights, a market
economy or also the pluralism of opinions and lifestyles. Meanwhile, the
adjective serves the purpose of emphasizing either the rejection or the
adoption of certain democratic practices. This is also why descriptive and
normative perspectives interfere in this conceptual construction. For
example, a "military-dominated," "authoritarian," or "parliamentary"
democracy just means that in fact different actors play powerful roles — the
military, the (elected) political leader or the parliament. Most importantly, the adoption of these adjectives normatively indicates whether the described
subject is more democratic or less so. For example, the adjectives "authori
tarian,", "neopatrimonial," "military-dominated," "guarded," "protected," "illiberal," "restrictive," "tutelary," "one-party," or "defect" are always detri
mental to the quality of democracy whereas the concept of a "parliamentary,"
"presidential," "federal," or "electoral" democracy rather confirms the fact we
are dealing with true democracies, albeit admitting different subtypes.57
Hence in all of these cases the concept of democracy itself remains a positive
norm whose devaluation demands an adjective. Consequently, it is hardly
551 David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997). 56) David Collier & Steven Levitsky (1997) and Hubertus Buchstein (2006), 48. See also
Giovanni Sartori (1970); David Collier and James E. Mahon (1993); David Collier and
Steven Levitsky (1997). 571 While the studies of Juan Linz (1978) and (1994) suggest that a presidential democracy can more easily deteriorate into an authoritarian regime than a parliamentary one, this does
not mean that the adjective "presidential" has an anti-democratic connotation.
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192 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
surprising that the semantic use the adjective democratic serves to legiti
mize states, societies, institutions, national and international organizations
or to support techniques, actions, value propositions, or even human traits.
But what about the other adjectives mentioned above? Are they also the
product of a conflict between a descriptive and a normative perspective?
Indeed they are. This becomes evident if the five aporias or contradictions
of the concept of democracy are considered: popular sovereignty vs. repre
sentation, quality vs. quantity, liberty vs. equality, individual vs. collective,
and, finally, the synchronicity between similarities and dissimilarities. In
order to demonstrate this argument, I shall point out that all those adjec
tives that cannot be immediately or unequivocally associated with the
decrease or increase in the quality of democracy can be rearranged as
antagonistic subtypes of democracy that stress only one side of a paradox
(or perhaps of several paradoxes). According to this criterion, the following
pairs of concepts dealing with the issues of government, decision-making,
ideology, economy, time, and space seem to be relevant:
direct (or radical) vs. representative democracy
elitist vs. deliberative58 (or participatory) democracy liberal vs. republican democracy
pluralistic (or market) vs. social democracy ancient vs. modern democracy
Western vs. non-Western democracy59
All of these conceptual constructions might include an empirical descrip
tion of existing democracies. However, they always include a normative
perspective as well. This occurs both at a theoretical level (in that a particu
lar dimension of democracy is valued positively or negatively in each case)
and at a practical level (through the observation of democratic institutions
and habits that reflect a normatively constituted political culture). There
fore direct or republican democracy emphasize the ancient heritage against
modern forms of representative or liberal democracy, whereas deliberative,
republican, social or also the known forms of non-Western democracy
58) For the concept of deliberative democracy, see Joshua Cohen (1989); Jon Elster (1998);
and Robert Talisse (2005). 591 Of course, this list is incomplete and could be enhanced with oppositions like consensus
vs. majoritarian democracy or also consociational vs. competitive democracy.
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 193
stress the collective against the more individualistic concepts of elitist, lib
eral, pluralistic and Western democracy. Liberal and elitist democracy
underline freedom against equality, the republican and deliberative sub
type vice versa; and while ancient and modern democracy are associated
with opposing notions of freedom, pluralistic and social democracy sug
gest a different concept of equality. Finally elitist, representative, and lib
eral democracy stand for the quality of democratic decision-making, whereas deliberative, direct, and republican democracy emphasize the
quantity of people participating. In this respect the evident cross relations between the different opposi
tions of conceptual constructions show at least two things: first, that one
adjective is hardly enough in order to produce an in-depth characterization
of a democratic system, and, second, that different democratic systems
have both similarities and dissimilarities (aporia no. 5) whereby the crucial
question is whether these dissimilarities include not only different norma
tive decisions concerning the aporias inherent to democracy but also
choices pertaining to aspects that diminish democracy. For example,
ancient democracy which included slavery and did not take individual
rights into account today would hardly be deemed as a sound democracy.
Likewise this can apply to the adjectives used to describe the decline of
radical forms of democracy into a tyranny of the majority, of social democ
racy into socialism, or the serious lack of democratic legitimacy in liberal, elitist or representative systems. Ffowever, the most difficult problem is of
course how to treat concepts of democracy in view of the existence of dif
ferent societies and cultures. From a Western point of view, the proximity
between existing Asian or Islamic democracies and authoritarian or totali
tarian regimes60 might seem quite obvious. Yet, we must not forget that the
fact that Western civilization has dominated our view of global democracy
means nothing else but the long-term result of normative decisions, values,
habits, and practices. So although the appreciation of non-Western democ
racies might be almost impossible for Westerners, we must keep in mind
that we are never simply describing but always evaluating in accordance
with our norms. These evaluations prove that the interaction between the
empirical and the normative perspective relative to the concept of democ
racy becomes even more accentuated in spatial comparisons.
For this difference, see Juan Linz (2000).
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194 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
But what does all of this mean for the conceptual history of democracy?
Hitherto we have been discussing how different conceptual constructions
are not only descriptions or attempts to grasp the normative decisions
made by democratic societies but are also normative decisions themselves
that serve to strengthen the functionality, efficacy, or simply the legitimacy
of a democratic system, or to stress either homogeneity or plurality, the
position of individuals or of the collective, the role of cultural identity and
so on. Thus the role conceptual history plays in this whole game is first and
foremost to reveal the conceptual politics of democracy. This brings us
back to the initial question of whether conceptual history might help us to
arrive at a normative perception of democracy. It is now possible to answer
that this is indeed the only possible perception since the contradictions
and aporias inherent to the concept of democracy require choosing one
kind of democracy over other.61 Conceptual history also shows that it is
not the concept of democracy itself that is essentially contested. Rather
contention is an essential feature of the democratic moment and is what
allows the use of the concept to subsume quite different historical realities
under its semantic field.
An additional question that arises is whether conceptual history simply unveils the issues and categories that inform normative perspectives of
democracy or whether it is also a form of conceptual politics. As Reinhard
Mehring argued, noting some surprising methodological analogies between
Reinhart Koselleck and Carl Schmitt, in the writing of a history of (politi
cal) ideas there seems to be a kind of blending of Begrijfssoziologie, Begriffs
geschichte, and Begrijfspolitik into each other.62 Although conceptual history should try to reveal the strategies of conceptual politics, the potential of
concepts to exert political power, and also the polemic purposes of seman
tic uses, it almost goes without saying that conceptual history may also
6,1 Here I have in mind Max Weber's statement that there is no "truly objective scientific
analysis of cultural life or [...] social phenomena" but only knowledge depending on "indi
vidual realities" or precisely on "normative ideas". See Max Weber (1991), 49 and 61f. So
an "objective" point of view turns out to be possibly by separating facts and norms (like
Weber assumed) it matters little if social phenomena which might be called or even treated
as facts are merely a result of our interpretation (Peirce), of our "realization-leading interest"
(Habermas) or of social communication (Niklas Luhmann) - in any case, we must decide
first what democracy "should" mean. And by all means this sort of definition is part of a
normative process which I call conceptual politics. 621 Reinhard Mehring (2006).
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 195
include a claim for the normative prevalence of particular conceptions —
perhaps already by deciding which concept might be worth analyzing. Most importantly however, it must not be forgotten that the analysis con
ducted according to the methods of conceptual history require the use of
concepts per se, almost all of which might be "political,"63 which means
that these concepts might become charged in a normative-political way
which means that they contain the potential for polemics.64 After all, con
cepts not only have a history but they also make history as "leading con
cepts of the historical movement" and by formulating "prerequisites of
possible futures."65 In other words, it may be possible to make a clear dis
tinction between the analytic and the normative application of concepts
yet it is impossible to act only as an observer of history and of changing semantic uses.66 Even the fundamental critique of normative concepts
includes an absolute normative approach. As discussed above, this dynam
ics is more than evident when it comes to democracy. In this sense, the
concept captures much more than one of the four fundamental criteria of
the Lexikon der Geschichtlicben Grundbegriffe,b7 which describes the seman
tics of modernity in toto - democratization. It also signifies that the con
ceptual history of democracy, which requires the consideration of the most
diverse spatial and temporal perspectives in order to become intelligible, cannot release itself from modern democracy's claim to be the exclusive
form and method capable of generating legitimacy. Therefore the concep tual history of democracy is also part of democratic history.
4. Conclusion
In his posthumously published book, Begriffsgeschichte. Studien zur Seman tik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (2006), Koselleck
emphasized that "the historian does research on concepts, in which social
63) HorstGiinther (1978), 102. 64) See Reinhart Koselleck (1967), 87fF.; (1972), XXf.; (1979). 65) Reinhart Koselleck (1972), XVII, (2000), 327ff. 66) See Reinhard Mehring (2006), 41. Hence the author's aim is also to extract a practical
proposition from Koselleck's studies focussing on a subversive critique of modernity whose
semantics and concepts are analyzed only with superficial objectivity (2006), 46. 671
According to Koselleck, the other three criteria are "temporalization" (Verzeitigung), "polit icization" and "ideologization" of all modern concepts. See Reinhart Koselleck (1972), 46.
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196 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201
and political processes are recorded persisting over the course of genera
tions and even centuries ."68 Hence conceptual historians research the his
torical transformations of perceptions and receptions of semantics in order
to understand the veritable meaning of concepts and to make sure their
usage remains critical and historically informed.
In the specific case of democracy, it is even more important to analyze
semantic change because the concept's inherent contradictions and aporias
require a special type of conceptual history. Paradoxically, the fact that
democracy is necessarily an "unfinished journey" (John Dunn) is what
might be the best guarantee that the concept maintains its hegemonic
status within political semantics. The fact that the concept of democracy
is still in use in scientific discourse as well as in everyday language is far
from being "an exception in the history of language."69 Rather, the under
determination of the concept seems to be the most important reason for its
success. The eternal question concerning the best political constitution
seems to have been translated into the question about the best kind of
democracy. Therefore the symbiosis between "social history" and "history o ( linguistic meaning"70 obviously suggests that the current debate con
cerning a possible "post-democracy" (Guehenno, Ranciere, Crouch, Jorke) will be futile.
However, conceptual history also proves that democracy is not simply a
label that could be used in order to legitimize any political or social system.
Although we cannot escape conceptual politics, because it is embedded
into the structure of concepts, democracy is much more than a strategy of
persuasion used to advance political agendas. What conceptual history
shows is the framework of the concept democracy in which different nor
mative decisions are available and also become necessary reference points
in the search for the best interpretation of democracy Nevertheless, it is
impossible to escape the problem that the contest over the best interpreta
tion of the concept must always establish the boundaries that cannot be
crossed. This search for the best interpretation of democracy is ultimately
a form of conceptual politics. It is less the lack of standards than the con
tradictions and aporias inherent to the concept that prevent us from for
mulating a valid single idea of democracy. Instead, we must always keep in
681 Reinhart Koselleck (2006), 365. 691 Hubertus Buchstein (2006), 48.
70> Karlheinz Stierle (1978), 184.
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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 197
mind that the many sides of democracy render each definition of "what
should democracy mean today"71 merely a preliminary, political decision.
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