Oliver Hidalgo Conceptual History and Politics is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested 1

8/18/2019 Oliver Hidalgo Conceptual History and Politics is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested 1

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© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/187465608X363463

Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 www.brill.nl/chco

contributionsto the history

of concepts

Conceptual History and Politics:Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested?

Oliver Hidalgo

Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Regensburg

Abstract

Tis article surveys the history of the concept of democracy from Ancient times tothe present. According to the author, the conceptual history of democracy shows thatthe overwhelming success of the concept is most of all due to its ability to subsumevery different historical ideas and realities under its semantic field. Moreover, the

historical evolution of the concept reveals that no unequivocal definition is possiblebecause of the significant paradoxes, aporias, and contradictions it contains. Teseare popular sovereignty vs. representation, quality vs. quantity, liberty vs. equality,individual vs. collective, and, finally, the synchronicity between similarities and dis-similarities. Te ubiquitous usage of democracy in present-day political languagemakes it impossible to speak of it from an external perspective. Tus, both demo-cratic theory and practice are suffused with empirical and normative elements.

Keywords

democracy, conceptual history, conceptual politics, normative theory

Te concept of democracy has been associated at different points in historywith some very opposing ideas: while the ancients used the term δημοκρατια to identify the effective rule of the many or even of the whole people

(despite the fact only a minority were considered citizens and the popula-tion was constricted to a small area), modern thinkers employ it in orderto refer to a society in which people are able to elect and control theirrulers as a means to guarantee freedom, equality, and the pursuit of self-interest for all individuals.1 Tere are also countless other forms of govern-

1) For a comprehensive analysis of ancient and modern democracies see Moses I. Finley(1980), Fritz Gschnitzer (1995), and Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (1996).

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O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 177

ment which adopt patterns, (sub-)types, and varieties of decision-making

processes that have also been labelled democratic, making it hard to keeporientation. Tis myriad usage of the concept leads to a spate of distinc-tions and qualifications. Most traditionally, one can speak of democraciesthat are liberal or republican, direct or representative, consensual or majori-tarian, market or socially oriented. More recently, other variants acquiredprominence such as participatory, deliberative and grassroots democracies,or even alternatives like demarchy, skewed democracy and non-partisan

democracy. Finally, considering how democracies have evolved worldwide,even the possibility of a specific Islamic transformation of democracy or ofa socialist and anarchist brand of democratization might expand the scopeof the concept in the future.

If a typology is plausible (a diffi cult task as it is, since nowadays the basictraits of a direct democracy -initiatives, referenda and recalls – take placewithin the representative system and the people sometimes not only han-dle legislative but certain executive and judicial powers as well), we cannot

avoid the suspicion that the “government of the people, by the people, andfor the people” (Abraham Lincoln) might just as well mean “everyone andeverything.”2

Rather than succumbing to a mood of dismay, we must take into con-sideration W. B. Gallie’s classical statement that democracy – like justice orarts – is yet another one among those “essentially contested concepts”which lack unique standards of definition.3 Furthermore (and fortunately)

the contest seems to concern first and foremost the interpretation of theconcept, not the concept of democracy itself.4 Obviously then the questionthat must be made is whether it is possible to find arguments and criteriato assess what is the best interpretation of the concept of democracy orwhether all there is to be done is to accept a juxtaposition of competingversions. Tis approach implies a second, deeper problem, namely, theextent to which conceptual history might help in acquiring a normative

perception of democracy. At first glance, there can only be an answer in thenegative: conceptual history (here understood as the description and anal-ysis of concrete historical semantics, origins, derivations and alterations of

2) Giovanni Sartori (1992), 11.3) See Walter B. Gallie (1956).4) See some considerations concerning normative concepts presented by Stephen Lukes(1974) and Rainer Forst (2003), 50-52.


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178 O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201

concepts) apparently belongs to the empirical paradigm in social sciences,5

therefore a normative notion of democracy (and not only a reflection ofthe social and moral impact of democratic ideas and values) can only beinformed by political philosophy. However, simply considering what theentire range of the history of political ideas is able to offer would be muchtoo simple. Instead, we must acknowledge the importance and thus pro-ceed to analyze the historical and conceptual contexts that provide theframework for the development of a normative theory of democracy after

the linguistic turn.6

It is therefore possible to separate conceptual historyfrom an abstract history of ideas even if it remains closely bound to norma-tive theories. Tis presents the political philosophers with an additionaltask. Tey must also make an effort to clarify the extent to which the con-ceptual history of democracy might function as a basis for any kind ofconceptual politics7 depending on whether they are able to extrapolate the“best interpretation” of the concept of democracy. However, first I wouldlike to discuss, briefly, democracy as a historical concept, before showing

that conceptual history also leads to the necessity of a normative concep-tion that reflects the aporias and contradictions of democracy.

1. Te Concept of Democracy

As it is well-known, ancient Greece is the birthplace of democracy.8 Teword “δημοκρατια” (which means the “rule by the people”) was inventedby the Athenians in order to define their political system after 462/461B.C., particularly after Ephialtes put in place the proposals of Cleisthenesin 508/507 B.C, disempowering the aristocratic Areopag and turning most

5) Trough his writings on Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck, Kari Palonen (2002)intends to turn the history of concepts into a subversive critique of normative politicaltheory.6) Arno Waschkuhn (1998), part 3.7) “Conceptual politics” is my translation of Reinhard Mehring’s concept of Begriffspolitik by which he wants to characterize both the method of Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleckin contrast to their own conceptions of sociologist or historian of concepts. See ReinhardMehring (2006), 31, as well as the analogy to Hermann Lübbe’s concept of Ideenpolitik.For the conceptual politics of Max Weber, see also Kari Palonen (2005).8) Some authors argue that the historical origins of democracy can be found already in theSumerian City and the first republics of ancient India but these examples are at best democ-racies avant la lettre which makes them irrelevant for this article.


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of the important political decisions to the assembly constituted exclusively

by male citizens.9 At the time, the first principles of democracy were free-dom and equality – all citizens being free by birth each one would acceptthe other as an equal,10 and henceforth by ruling they accepted to be ruledin return. After the second half of the fifth century, democracy also meantthat offi cials were to be controlled by fixed laws and by the people’s voteand – as stated in Pericles’ funeral oration which survived thanks to Tucy-dides – that citizens would be ensured the right to live on their own behalf

without being educated and guarded by the state and its public norms.11

Te first historian to mention the concept of δημοκρατια was obviouslyHerodotus. Nevertheless, we must retrace its origins at least back to thetyranny of the Peisistratides12 and the Athenian Sea Union13 when thenobles’ position was weakened while that of the citizens – the δημος – wasstrengthened. Moreover, the etymological derivation of the wordδημοκρατια also shows the replacement of law (nomos ) as constitutionalconcept (εύνομία, ίσονομία) by an emphasis on power, that is arche

(μοναρχία, όλιγαρχία) and kratia (δημοκρατια), respectively.14Tese shifts show evidence that the concept of democracy was above all

an attempt to identify political reality in ancient Athens. oday one canhardly call democratic the political system in Attica, which included slav-ery and excluded all women and foreigners from citizenship. Tis con-versely makes it much easier to adopt the concept of δημοκρατια in orderto describe present-day political conditions. However, the very singular

and complex circumstances that led to the development of the rule by thepeople in Athens hardly compare with other political contexts and eras.Rather than applying contemporary standards of democracy, one shouldbe able to contextualize the claims of the ancient Greeks. In this light, it isno surprise that many thinkers in ancient Greece – among them Plato(who associated democracy with chaos and anarchy), but also Socrates, Xenophon and others – hoped for an aristocratic wind of change in the

city of Athens, leading them to lament the loss of moral order and authority

9) Kurt A. Raaflaub (1995), Jochen Martin (1995), and Jochen Bleicken (1995).10) See Aristotle (1280a), 5-7 and 24; (1291b), 32-38; and (1301a), 28-32.11) Werner Conze et al. (1972), 828.12) Michael Stahl (1987) and Konrad Kinzl (1995).13) Kurt A. Raaflaub (1995), 36ff.14) Christian Meier (1983).


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and to call for the rule of the best (αριστοι), or of the ones distinguished

by their bravery (τιμήι) instead of the rule of the many, the mob (όχλος).15 Nevertheless, they were also capable of developing a readiness to accept anarrangement compatible with democratic reality in Athens. Socratesfamously preferred to die rather than to break the democratic laws of thecity; Xenophon returned to Athens after the reconciliation between Ath-ens and Sparta; Plato made an interesting distinction between a “good”and a “bad” form of democracy, which is supposed to have influenced

Aristotle’s conception ofπολιτεία

as an amalgam between oligarchy anddemocracy and therefore as a compromise between the quality of govern-ment and the people’s participation.16 Te mixed constitution subsequentlybecame the only conceivable form of Greek democracy outside Athens andits Sea Union.17 Later the Romans put a new emphasis on law as a system,including democracy only as a supplement. Teir concept of res publica –connecting monarchic, aristocratic and democratic elements18 – was amodel of constitution deemed to be the best insurance against instability,

from Polybius to Machiavelli. After the fall of the republic and the rise of the Roman Empire the con-

cept of democracy was submitted to new assessment as a result of politicalcircumstances. While Aelius Aristides called the Imperium romanum a“common democracy of the world, under one man, the best ruler anddirector,”19 Cassius Dio stressed that real democracy could only exist undera monarchy, whereby the Platonic formula of justice (“Doing one’s own”)

was supposed to be no longer aristocratic but democratic.20 Ultimately,15) Early supporters of democracy like Herodotus and Pericles, who linked justice and iso-nomia to the rule of the δημος, still did not envisage a conflict between citizens and noblesbut merely did emphasize the unity of the city against the menace of oligarchy and tyranny.

At first nobles like Pindar and Plato innovated the political and moral concept ofaristocracy in order to pit the rule of the best against democracy or – as Tucidides and Aristotle didlater – to distinguish good from bad oligarchies. For the conceptual history of aristocracysee Werner Conze and Christian Meier (1972). 16) In Aristotle a pure democracy is described as degenerated rule of the poor (1279b 5-10).His concept of politeia understood as the good form of democracy or also as free constitu-tion was shared by Isocrates (IV, 125; ep. VI, 11) and Demosthenes (I, 5; VI, 21; XV, 20).17) Wolfgang Schuller (1995), 316-23 and Alexander Demandt (1995), viii and ix.18) For the strong elements of popular participation in Rome, see John North (1994).19) Aelius Aristides (1981), XXVI, 60. See also Richard Klein (1981), 131f.20) Cassius Dio (1961), LVI, 43.4. and VI, 23.5. See also Alexander Demandt (1995),213.


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neither Aristides nor Dio wanted to renounce the legitimizing value the

concept of democracy still carried in the first centuries of the Christian era.Te situation only changed during the European Middle Ages, when thepredominance of religion over all aspects of life made the reference todemocracy evidently useless. It was not until the thirteenth century that afew thinkers revived the concept – notably, St. Tomas of Aquinas, Engel-bert of Admont, Marsilius of Padua and Nicole Oresme – who encoun-tered it through their reception of Aristotle21 and started using it to describe

the contemporary politics of the Italian cities.22

But even the rise of Prot-estantism and the diminishing authority of the Catholic Church (accom-panied by the rise of contract theory, which epitomized the new forms ofrationalism in politics) could not immediately change the association ofthe concept of democracy with antiquity. Te concept of representation,especially, was for a long time considered to be incompatible with the ideaof the ruling people. Hence Tomas Hobbes argues in favour of represen-tation and against democracy – even though his argument that every man

is born free and equal can be said to be democratic. Meanwhile, Rousseauinsisted, vice-versa, on the sovereignty of the people against representation.Obviously they shared the unchanged idea that democracy means nothingelse than the reign of the people over themselves – for Hobbes a terribleimage and for Rousseau something too nice to be actualized.23 Further-more, since the Reformation and the Enlightenment the concept of democ-racy was sporadically used to identify some specific elements of the mixed

constitution in England (Blackstone, De Lolme, John Adams), of therepublican constitutions of Switzerland and its cantons, of the Netherlands,

21) Te philosophical work of Aristotle was unknown in the West from the fifth century allthe way to the late twelfth century.22) See Claire R. Sherman (1995), 240-52; Karl Ubl (2000), 134ff., R.W. Dyson (2003),

203-05 and 246-50.23) “À prendre le terme dans la rigueur de l’acception, il n’a jamais existé de véritable démo-cratie, et il n’en existera jamais [. . .] S’il y avait un peuple de dieux, il se gouvernerait démo-cratiquement. Un gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas à des hommes.” ranslation: “Inits most rigorous sense, there has never been a true democracy, such a thing will never exist[. . .] If a people of god existed, it would govern itself democratically. Such a perfect govern-ment is not appropriate for mankind.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social , (1959-1969), III, 4.


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and also of some German cities.24 Nevertheless, the (Aristotelian) scepti-

cism concerning the realization of a “pure” democracy still predominateduntil the end of the eighteenth century. Indeed, also very Aristotelian wasthe fact that many thinkers restricted the concept’s use to the descriptionof the state and government system, as, for example, in the works of Johan-nes Althusius, John Henry Alsted, Tomas Hobbes, William emple, JohnLocke, Samuel von Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, Charles de Montesquieu,the Encyclopaedie (De Jaucourt), Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Christoph Martin

Wieland and August von Schlözer.Tis historical context explains why the concept of democracy wouldnot strike a chord during the French Revolution. During its first stage,republic was still the most widely used concept.25 In this sense, the worksof the Abbé Sieyès are instrumental in proving that only the republic wasassumed to be able to include a modern market economy as well as a rep-resentative government,26 whereas democracy was still associated with thedirect rule of the people and the virtù of citizens. A few years later, how-

ever, there was a significant increase in the number of positive statementsconcerning democracy uttered by the revolutionaries,27 but eventually thereign of the Jacobins only served to confirm scepticism towards democracy,discrediting the concept for another few decades, especially in Englandand in Germany. Tis is how in Kant’s Zum Ewigen Frieden (1795) – acomplement of Rousseau’s Contrat social in which an important distinc-tion between the forma regiminis (republicanism and despotism) and the

forma imperii (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) can be found –democracy remains associated with the absence of checks and balances aswell as of representation and the rule of law.28

24) See for example Martin Luther’s address on February 7th 1539 (WA IV: 4324), andRené Louis d’Argenson’s Considérations (1764), 8ff., 61f., 70ff., and 103.25) Terefore the concept of démocratie did not play any role during the French debateconcerning the suffrage universel in 1790. See Robert R. Palmer (1953), 214.26) Jean Roels (1969).27) See for instance Robespierre’s address on February 5th 1794 when he made no substan-tial distinction between democracy and republic. Charles Vellay (1908), 324ff.28) Before Sieyès and Kant, the Federalists argued in favour of the republic and against the“ancient” idea of a democratic executive that might lead to despotism. In the United States,the concept of democracy had a rather pejorative image at least until the JacksonianDemocracy, after 1828 – despite the sympathies sporadically voiced by Tomas Jefferson.See Gustav H. Blanke (1956), 43ff.. Supposedly, the reason for this is that democracy


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wo complementary things had to happen before the concept of democ-

racy could start its triumphant advance. First of them was the historicalovercoming of the antagonism between democracy and representationand, second, the extension of the concept beyond the classification of stateand government to the description of a particular form of society as well.Te Marquis d’Argenson was possibly the author who prepared and antic-ipated both innovations in the middle of the eighteenth century. In hisConsidérations sur le gouvernement (1764) he distinguished between a fausse

and a légitime democracy, the first one being anarchic and revolutionary,the second its “true” version, being represented by elected deputies.29 Teamalgam between the concept of democracy and political representationbecame possible because d’Argenson neglected the state and constitutionalorder and focussed on the social system. About one hundred years beforeocqueville30 he already was concerned with the historical progrès de ladémocratie in France and also stressed the decisive role of the French mon-archy in repressing European feudalism and the privileges of the nobles

and in allowing the rise of civil society and social equality.31D’Argenson’s royalist view on democracy became politically effi cient

soon after the French Revolution when Tomas Paine’s answer to EdmundBurke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790) in Te Rights of Man(1791) began to dissolve the idea that democracy and representativegovernment must remain a contradictio in adjecto.32 In this same vein,the distinction between the forma regiminis and the forma imperii , as it

was expressed by Kant, shifted towards the interpretation that ratherthan the republic, democracy might be the forthcoming aim of history,whether in France (Constant, Guizot) or in Germany (Schlegel, Görres).

became identified with the terreur of the Jacobins. See William Corbett’s History of the American Jacobins Commonly Denominated Democrates (1796).29) René Louis d’Argenson (1764), 7f. A similar yet not so strict distinction can be foundin the Deutsche Encyclopädie from 1783.30) Te Considérations started circulating in France after the 1730’s. See R.R. Palmer 1953:205.31) René Louis d’Argenson (1764), 135ff.32) Cf. Dolf Sternberger (1980). Terefore Fichte’s and Schlegel’s receptions of Kant’s

Zum Ewigen Frieden – following Campe’s Zweitem Versuch deutscher Sprachbereicherung(1792) – insist on the compatibility between a representative democracy and a republic. See

Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1965a), 160; (1965b), 431ff. and Friedrich Schlegel (1966), 12-17.Kant himself confirmed this view in his Metaphysik der Sitten (1797).


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As this development occurred, Aristotle’s quantitative criterion – the rule

of one, a few or many – and most notably the opposition between monar-chy and democracy receded into the background. Later in the nineteenthcentury (and particularly after the 1848 Revolution) the question was notlonger if democracy was within the historic horizon, but simply what kindof democracy lied ahead in the future: free or despotic, liberal or socialist,monarchic or republican, elitist, grass-rooted or anarchic, or perhaps evena “democratic” dictatorship. All these options became available due to the

fact that the concept of democracy had increasingly become a synonym formodern society and culture,33 and that democratic theories (Jefferson, oc-queville, von Stein, Lincoln, Mill, Proudhon,34 Marx, Mosca, Dewey)changed into normative (or normative-empirical) concepts tailored toorganize the social reality of democracy or to overcome it, as for Nietzsche,Sorel, and Pareto. Starting in the nineteenth century, one is also able toobserve how democratic systems develop distinctively in each country,region, and continent. While the Anglo-American brand stood out for its

liberal aspects, France and other countries in Continental Europe remainedmore strongly connected to the republican tradition. If presidential democ-racy is dominant today in North and South America (and in EasternEurope more recently), in Western Europe parliamentary governmentshave been prevalent (despite some ill-fated hesitations and interruptions inGermany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Te epoch-defining success ofdemocracy as a constitutional and social order, and, additionally, as a polit-

ical practice gave rise to a host of empirical and formal theories during thetwentieth century (Weber, Schumpeter, Popper, Downs, Carl J. Friedrich,Dahl, Lipset). A trait these theories have in common is the attempt todescribe, analyze, and forecast democratic processes and politics. Te dom-inance of the formal-empirical paradigm in the social sciences succeeded inpromoting the opinion that concepts of democracy resting upon normsand ideals lacking systematic reference to political reality were generally

33) In this respect, the fundamental break between the concept of democracy and its ancientheritage occurred during the nineteenth century (Constant, Bluntschli). Since then theidentification of democracy with Protestant equality and Contract Teory (von Rotteck)have been reflected in the use of the concept.34) In ocqueville and Proudhon it is also possible to find the Kantian insight that moderndemocracy means most of all a peaceful handling of political and social conflicts beyondthe former Kriegergesellschaft .


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undermined by empirical definitions.35 Nevertheless, there are still effec-

tive normative concepts of democracy, emphasizing, for example, justice(Rawls) or its bond to human rights (Habermas). Neither should otherlesser known conceptions of democracy be ignored, such as those thatcriticize the lack of people’s participation in contemporary liberal democ-racies (Barber, Bellah, Putnam) or that underscore its inevitable declinedue to the belief that democratic levelling is the conditio sine qua non oftotalitarianism (Lefort, Arendt). Furthermore, it is possible to find theories

that combine aspects of normative and empirical conceptions36

as well asother rather empirical concepts that are used to formulate quasi-normativeconcepts that inform the construction of a new social and political worldorder, such as modernity, for example. It seems inevitable today that theempirical reality and variety of democratic institutions and societies isaccompanied by renewed critical normative reflections on the conceptgiven that not only the best form of democracy is an object of dispute butalso its chances and risks in the context of globalization.

2. Paradoxes, Aporias, and Contradictions of Democracy

If we are to judge according to the large amount of different social andpolitical systems named “democracies” (among them the democratic peo-ple’s republics of Korea, Laos and Algeria, the democratic republics ofCongo and East imor, the people’s republics of China and Bangladesh,the democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka, and the Islamic republics ofPakistan, Iran and Afghanistan), there is no doubt no country in the worldwould call itself “anti-democratic” today. Since the twentieth century, thelegitimizing value of democracy is such that any country will be quick tocall itself “democratic” in the sense that the ruler allegedly draws his legiti-macy from the people, regardless of the existence of individual rights, freeelections, and the political power is not under people’s control. Interest-

ingly, the countries with the longest democratic traditions – the SwissConfederation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America –do not draw attention to their democratic institutions and society bymeans of their offi cial name, whereas socialist countries in particular

35) Mostafa Rejai (1967), 31.36) Giovanni Sartori (1992), Arno Waschkuhn (1998).


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seldom renounce or have renounced such a reference. While the use of the

concepts of republic and monarchy in order to define a state and a politicalsystem demand the visibility of political institutions that have traditionallybeen associated with them, the employment of the term democracy appar-ently is not bound to such strictures. Whereas the first two concepts mustbe supported by hard evidence, the concept of democracy remains amor-phous; whereas it is not so hard to identify a constitution as a republic ormonarchy, a fierce and protracted struggle has evolved around the question

of which countries are entitled to call themselves democracies. Prior to1990, this issue was disputed between liberal and socialist regimes, nowa-days the same seems to be happening between the so-called Westerndemocracies (with their offshoots in Latin America, India, Japan, andEastern Europe) and political systems from other parts of the world, espe-cially in the Middle East and Asia.

In view of the above, this brief analysis might raise the suspicion that theabuse of the concept by dictators, parties, and ideologists is a danger. How-

ever, the conceptual history of democracy shows that different interpreta-tions are inherent to the concept itself. Tis goes beyond the general thesisthat all political concepts are liable to continuous change in terms of mean-ing since they reflect the mutating values and norms of a society. Not onlydoes democracy fit the general insight that (political) concepts are alwayscollections of a plurality of meanings ,37 that is, formed by historical realitywhich makes it impossible to demarcate the boundaries between syn-

chronic and diachronic time, but it also contains many and contradictorymeanings, dimensions and associations, all of which invite us to adapt itssemantics to different historical entities. Below one finds a list of five of themost important paradoxes and aporias38 of democracy, which are not dis-cussed at length in this article:

(1) Democracy is obviously against the natural idea that the few above

should rule over the many below.

39

In this respect, the sovereignty of thepeople remains simply a metaphor for democracy as a special form of order,

37) Reinhart Koselleck (1978), 29.38) A good overview concerning the huge list of relevant aporias and paradoxes pertainingthe concept of democracy can be found in Paul B. Clarke and Joe Foweraker: (2001), oralso in Robert Dahl et al. (2003).39) Jean-Antoine Laponce (1991).


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although complete identity between rulers and subjects is impossible to

achieve. With representative government, elections, and the dismissal ofrulers, the concept of democracy is supposedly converted into politicalpractice but the contradiction between democracy and representation ulti-mately remains unsolved.40 Tus modern democratic theories try to distin-guish between the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of democracy.41 While every government system guarantees the necessary hierarchy andverticality in order to avoid anarchy, only democracy provides horizontal

elements of control such as checks and balances, opposition, institutional-ized conflicts, and pluralism. Te difference, however, between powercoming from above and legitimacy coming from below as underlined bythinkers such as Alexis de ocqueville, Guglielmo Ferrero,42 and Max Weber’s is not specifically democratic.

(2) With respect to the democratic decision-making processes, there isa general competition between the principles of quality and quantity. Although some new models of radical democracy (Barber, Lummis) deny

this antagonism and strive to widen the scope of democracy as well as theintensity of participatory moments, the problem seems to be determininghow to achieve good or at least acceptable political choices. Te vote of themajority might be seen as an indicator of the quality of a decision (or of apolitician) but what will happen, however, if the majority is wrong aboutdecisive or fundamental questions?43 Hence one of the most importanttasks of democratic theory will always be locating the boundaries for dem-

ocratic decision-making. Should it be bound by the constitution or byhuman rights or religion? Radical theorists like Jean-Jacques Rousseau andHans Kelsen stressed that any kind of border will necessarily violate democ-racy itself. Tis also led into a new paradox. While Rousseau claimed thata divine legislator was necessary to educate the people in order to conciliatequantity and quality (or the volonté générale and the volonté de tous ) indemocratic decisions, Kelsen declared that voting for anti-democratic par-

ties and demagogues in order to prevent the majority from destroyingdemocracies is actually an act of betrayal.44 Terefore, if democracy is to be

40) Danielo Zolo (1998) and Guiseppe Duso (2006).41) Giovanni Sartori (1992), 137f.42) See Alexis de oqueville (1954), 333 and Guglielmo Ferrero (1944), 481.43) Bernd Guggenberger and Claus Offe (1984).44) Hans Kelsen (2006), 237. Te paradox is also known as the oleranzproblem of democ-racy. Manfred Hättich (1965).


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protected against its own dangers we must eventually accept some bound-

aries and values located beyond democracy even if we agree that democ-racy and human rights might come from the same source (Habermas).45 Aslong as a contradiction in practice is possible the appeal to anti-democraticmeasures always remains a plausible option for democracy.46

(3) Democracy rests upon two fundamental principles that are oftenfollowing colliding trajectories: liberty and equality.47 When Goethe said:“Legislators and revolutionaries who promise equality and liberty at the

same time are either psychopaths or mountebanks,” he was indicating thatabsolute equality could only be achieved by repression since a free societywill necessarily display differences and inequalities. On the other hand, theclassical controversy between Left and Right can persuasively be describedas a debate concerning the possible extent of equality, although neithercamp needs to challenge democracy itself given that they show respect forthe principle of freedom.48 Hence the struggle between democratic partiesall over the world is usually a quest for the right balance between liberty

and equality. In this respect, the liberal ideal combining social hierarchyand political equality (Rawls) is one possible orientation among many.Moreover, in addition to the problem that some will become more equalthan others, there is the question of what kind of freedom is preferred: anundefined negative one, giving us the opportunity to start our own pursuitof happiness, or a defined positive one securing our participation in mak-ing the laws we have to obey. Te former type is supported by liberals like

Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin, the latter by democrats such as Ben- jamin Barber and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. And there are other thinkers,like Kant and Habermas, that attempted to combine both aspects. In sum,reflection upon liberty and equality and the tension between them is oneof the perennial subjects of democratic theory.

45) Tis aporia persists in one of Habermas’ earlier contributions (1973), 316, in which heaffi rms that the “Verfassungswirklichkeit des bürgerlichen Rechtsstaates” was “seit je her in

Widerspruch zur Idee der Demokratie.” An advanced discussion about the possible anton-ymy between democracy and the constitutional state can be found in Werner Kägi (1973).46) For this see also Derrida’s figure of “la démocratie à venir .” Jacques Derrida (2002), 112-157.47) See the famous first chapter of ocqueville’s Democracy in America Vol. 2, book 2 WhyDemocratic Nations Show a More Ardent and Enduring Love of Equality than of Liberty . Ameditation on the topic is offered in Ralf Dahrendorf (1963).48) Norberto Bobbio (1994).


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(4) Modern democracy also marks a new epoch in terms of the com-

plex relationship between individuals and the collective. While in theancient world private concerns were strictly subordinated to the publicinterest,49 capable even of turning slavery into a moral imperative,50 themodern age has set itself apart by the protection of individual rights and ofthe pluralism of opinions, aims, and ambitions. Nevertheless, even mod-ern democracies require some degree of public spiritedness and socialhomogeneity in order to conserve political unity and represent something

more than just a crowd of people. Te question of how to bind democraticindividuals together is another problem for which several tentative solu-tions have been offered. Teory as well as history have witnessed severalsuch attempts under several (partially antagonistic) concepts such as thestate and the nation, race and ethnicity, religious and cultural traditions,rationality, ethical categories like justice, tolerance or solidarity, the civilsociety, communication, and, last but not least, economical success andconsumer needs. Furthermore, some degree of social homogeneity also

seems to be a necessary precondition for the functionality of democratictechniques and for the peaceful coexistence of majorities and minorities.51 However, there is always a danger that in striving to forge political unityand to solve essential social and political conflicts, the exact opposite mightbe achieved through the elimination of a sense of indefiniteness and divi-sion that is inherent to democracy.52 Terefore, striking a balance betweenprivate and public interests, individual and collective claims represents a

constant challenge for democratic theory.

49) Although some ancient authors also made important ethical innovations strengtheningthe individual’s position (sophists like Antiphon and Alcidamas, for example, emphasizedequality, Socrates and Aristotle considered the prospect of an apolitical way of life, and thephilosophical schools of Cynicism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism called for a kind of worldcitizenship), one should not forget that the concept of the individual only becomes identifi-

able with a singular human life after the first civil revolutions. Hence in Antiquity there isneither a theoretical nor a practical separation between the individual and his communitycomparable with modern individualism (Vittorio Hösle (1997), 36ff.). For the ancients itwas diffi cult to believe that the aims and purposes of one single man could be deemedhigher than the public need.50) Alexander Demandt (1993), 51.51) Herrmann Heller (1971).52) Claude Lefort (1990).


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(5) Te dislocation of the concept of democracy from a form of govern-

ment to a form of society also leads to understanding of the heterogeneityof democratic institutions as a result of moral, social, and cultural dissimi-larities. As indicated by Montesquieu and ocqueville, the particular men-talities, habits, and intellectual manners of nations endow all social andpolitical systems with a character of their own. Tus there are two reasonswhy democracy has become such a ubiquitous concept: it is able to explainwhat democratic societies have in common as well as what distinguish

them from each other. Tis leaves democratic theory with the task of pro-viding cogent criteria to determine what is still, not yet, or no longer, ademocracy. But even in this respect there can be only provisional answers,once again, as a result of the special dynamics of democracy. In particular,the history of democracy can also be interpreted as a permanent movementof inclusion that progressively incorporated once marginal individuals andgroups: slaves, the poor people, women, and so forth. Yet there have alwaysbeen those willing to criticize the alleged overreach of democratic equality.

Tis continues in the present as discussions on the extension of democracyto other social groups (children, foreigners, and next generations)53 prog-ress. Tus when evaluating other societies one must keep in mind thatdemocracy is a process that might evolve differently or that might incorpo-rate key aspects that are not necessarily familiar to certain societies. Ulti-mately, however, we must eventually be able to say whether or not theapplication of the concept is justified.

Te tensions between liberty and equality, individualism and collectiv-ism, participation and leadership will persist as problems each democratictheory and system will have to deal with, even if they cannot ultimately besolved.54 Given the diversity of societies and cultures, this also means thatsolutions can hardly be universal. Tis approach also suggests that theempirical variety of democratic political formations demands the acknowl-edgement that defining “what a democracy is” is a normative decision

reflecting different tentative solutions to the paradoxes of democracy. Tetypes of policies that are eventually pursued are inevitably a consequenceof this previous normative decision.

53) See for instance Bobbio (1988) and Dryzek (2000).54) J. Roland Pennock (1979).


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3. Conceptual History and Conceptual Politics

Te numerous contradictions, paradoxes, and aporias proper to democ-racy mean that the concept is rarely used in isolation, it is often qualifiedby special adjectives that attribute a descriptive or normative meaning byincreasing differentiation and restricting conceptual stretching.55 Examplesof such adjectives used to qualify the concept of democracy are “authori-tarian,” “neopatrimonial,” “military-dominated,” “parliamentary,” “presi-dential,” “federal,” “guarded,” “electoral,” “protected,” “illiberal,” “restrictive,”

“tutelary,” “one-party,” and “elitist”; or also “Western,” “modern,” “plebi-scitarian,” “representative,” “pluralistic,” “socialistic,” “liberal,” and “delib-erative.”56 In this respect, it is important to understand that the usage ofthe noun reveals the intention to ensure that the referred state, society, orsystem is in fact a democracy, since it displays at least one of its many prox-ies – elections, referenda, a constitution, parties, civil rights, a marketeconomy or also the pluralism of opinions and lifestyles. Meanwhile, the

adjective serves the purpose of emphasizing either the rejection or theadoption of certain democratic practices. Tis is also why descriptive andnormative perspectives interfere in this conceptual construction. Forexample, a “military-dominated,” “authoritarian,” or “parliamentary”democracy just means that in fact different actors play powerful roles – themilitary, the (elected) political leader or the parliament. Most importantly,the adoption of these adjectives normatively indicates whether the describedsubject is more democratic or less so. For example, the adjectives “authori-tarian,”, “neopatrimonial,” “military-dominated,” “guarded,” “protected,”“illiberal,” “restrictive,” “tutelary,” “one-party,” or “defect” are always detri-mental to the quality of democracy whereas the concept of a “parliamentary,”“presidential,” “federal,” or “electoral” democracy rather confirms the fact weare dealing with true democracies, albeit admitting different subtypes.57 Hence in all of these cases the concept of democracy itself remains a positivenorm whose devaluation demands an adjective. Consequently, it is hardly

55) David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997).56) David Collier & Steven Levitsky (1997) and Hubertus Buchstein (2006), 48. See alsoGiovanni Sartori (1970); David Collier and James E. Mahon (1993); David Collier andSteven Levitsky (1997).57) While the studies of Juan Linz (1978) and (1994) suggest that a presidential democracycan more easily deteriorate into an authoritarian regime than a parliamentary one, this doesnot mean that the adjective “presidential” has an anti-democratic connotation.


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surprising that the semantic use the adjective democratic serves to legiti-

mize states, societies, institutions, national and international organizationsor to support techniques, actions, value propositions, or even human traits.

But what about the other adjectives mentioned above? Are they also theproduct of a conflict between a descriptive and a normative perspective?Indeed they are. Tis becomes evident if the five aporias or contradictionsof the concept of democracy are considered: popular sovereignty vs. repre-sentation, quality vs. quantity, liberty vs. equality, individual vs. collective,

and, finally, the synchronicity between similarities and dissimilarities. Inorder to demonstrate this argument, I shall point out that all those adjec-tives that cannot be immediately or unequivocally associated with thedecrease or increase in the quality of democracy can be rearranged asantagonistic subtypes of democracy that stress only one side of a paradox(or perhaps of several paradoxes). According to this criterion, the followingpairs of concepts dealing with the issues of government, decision-making,ideology, economy, time, and space seem to be relevant:

• direct (or radical) vs. representative democracy • elitist vs. deliberative58 (or participatory) democracy • liberal vs. republican democracy • pluralistic (or market) vs. social democracy • ancient vs. modern democracy • Western vs. non-Western democracy 59

All of these conceptual constructions might include an empirical descrip-tion of existing democracies. However, they always include a normativeperspective as well. Tis occurs both at a theoretical level (in that a particu-lar dimension of democracy is valued positively or negatively in each case)and at a practical level (through the observation of democratic institutionsand habits that reflect a normatively constituted political culture). Tere-

fore direct or republican democracy emphasize the ancient heritage againstmodern forms of representative or liberal democracy, whereas deliberative,republican, social or also the known forms of non-Western democracy

58) For the concept of deliberative democracy, see Joshua Cohen (1989); Jon Elster (1998);and Robert alisse (2005).59) Of course, this list is incomplete and could be enhanced with oppositions like consensusvs. majoritarian democracy or also consociational vs. competitive democracy.


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stress the collective against the more individualistic concepts of elitist, lib-

eral, pluralistic and Western democracy. Liberal and elitist democracyunderline freedom against equality, the republican and deliberative sub-type vice versa; and while ancient and modern democracy are associatedwith opposing notions of freedom, pluralistic and social democracy sug-gest a different concept of equality. Finally elitist, representative, and lib-eral democracy stand for the quality of democratic decision-making,whereas deliberative, direct, and republican democracy emphasize the

quantity of people participating.In this respect the evident cross relations between the different opposi-tions of conceptual constructions show at least two things: first, that oneadjective is hardly enough in order to produce an in-depth characterizationof a democratic system, and, second, that different democratic systemshave both similarities and dissimilarities (aporia no. 5) whereby the crucialquestion is whether these dissimilarities include not only different norma-tive decisions concerning the aporias inherent to democracy but also

choices pertaining to aspects that diminish democracy. For example,ancient democracy which included slavery and did not take individualrights into account today would hardly be deemed as a sound democracy.Likewise this can apply to the adjectives used to describe the decline ofradical forms of democracy into a tyranny of the majority, of social democ-racy into socialism, or the serious lack of democratic legitimacy in liberal,elitist or representative systems. However, the most diffi cult problem is of

course how to treat concepts of democracy in view of the existence of dif-ferent societies and cultures. From a Western point of view, the proximitybetween existing Asian or Islamic democracies and authoritarian or totali-tarian regimes60 might seem quite obvious. Yet, we must not forget that thefact that Western civilization has dominated our view of global democracymeans nothing else but the long-term result of normative decisions, values,habits, and practices. So although the appreciation of non-Western democ-

racies might be almost impossible for Westerners, we must keep in mindthat we are never simply describing but always evaluating in accordancewith our norms. Tese evaluations prove that the interaction between theempirical and the normative perspective relative to the concept of democ-racy becomes even more accentuated in spatial comparisons.

60) For this difference, see Juan Linz (2000).


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But what does all of this mean for the conceptual history of democracy?

Hitherto we have been discussing how different conceptual constructionsare not only descriptions or attempts to grasp the normative decisionsmade by democratic societies but are also normative decisions themselvesthat serve to strengthen the functionality, effi cacy, or simply the legitimacyof a democratic system, or to stress either homogeneity or plurality, theposition of individuals or of the collective, the role of cultural identity andso on. Tus the role conceptual history plays in this whole game is first and

foremost to reveal the conceptual politics of democracy. Tis brings usback to the initial question of whether conceptual history might help us toarrive at a normative perception of democracy. It is now possible to answerthat this is indeed the only possible perception since the contradictionsand aporias inherent to the concept of democracy require choosing onekind of democracy over other.61 Conceptual history also shows that it isnot the concept of democracy itself that is essentially contested. Rathercontention is an essential feature of the democratic moment and is what

allows the use of the concept to subsume quite different historical realitiesunder its semantic field.

An additional question that arises is whether conceptual history simplyunveils the issues and categories that inform normative perspectives ofdemocracy or whether it is also a form of conceptual politics. As ReinhardMehring argued, noting some surprising methodological analogies betweenReinhart Koselleck and Carl Schmitt, in the writing of a history of (politi-

cal) ideas there seems to be a kind of blending of Begriffssoziologie , Begriffs- geschichte , and Begriffspolitik into each other.62 Although conceptual historyshould try to reveal the strategies of conceptual politics, the potential ofconcepts to exert political power, and also the polemic purposes of seman-tic uses, it almost goes without saying that conceptual history may also

61) Here I have in mind Max Weber’s statement that there is no “truly objective scientificanalysis of cultural life or [. . .] social phenomena” but only knowledge depending on “indi-

vidual realities” or precisely on “normative ideas”. See Max Weber (1991), 49 and 61f. Soan “objective” point of view turns out to be possibly by separating facts and norms (like

Weber assumed) it matters little if social phenomena which might be called or even treatedas facts are merely a result of our interpretation (Peirce), of our “realization-leading interest”(Habermas) or of social communication (Niklas Luhmann) – in any case, we must decidefirst what democracy “should” mean. And by all means this sort of definition is part of anormative process which I call conceptual politics .62) Reinhard Mehring (2006).


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include a claim for the normative prevalence of particular conceptions –

perhaps already by deciding which concept might be worth analyzing.Most importantly however, it must not be forgotten that the analysis con-ducted according to the methods of conceptual history require the use ofconcepts per se, almost all of which might be “political,”63 which meansthat these concepts might become charged in a normative-political waywhich means that they contain the potential for polemics.64 After all, con-cepts not only have a history but they also make history as “leading con-

cepts of the historical movement” and by formulating “prerequisites ofpossible futures.”65 In other words, it may be possible to make a clear dis-tinction between the analytic and the normative application of conceptsyet it is impossible to act only as an observer of history and of changingsemantic uses.66 Even the fundamental critique of normative conceptsincludes an absolute normative approach. As discussed above, this dynam-ics is more than evident when it comes to democracy. In this sense, theconcept captures much more than one of the four fundamental criteria of

the Lexikon der Geschichtlichen Grundbegriffe ,67 which describes the seman-tics of modernity in toto – democratization. It also signifies that the con-ceptual history of democracy, which requires the consideration of the mostdiverse spatial and temporal perspectives in order to become intelligible,cannot release itself from modern democracy’s claim to be the exclusiveform and method capable of generating legitimacy. Terefore the concep-tual history of democracy is also part of democratic history.

4. Conclusion

In his posthumously published book, Begriffsgeschichte . Studien zur Seman-tik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache (2006), Koselleckemphasized that “the historian does research on concepts, in which social

63) Horst Günther (1978), 102.64) See Reinhart Koselleck (1967), 87ff.; (1972), XXf.; (1979).65) Reinhart Koselleck (1972), XVII, (2000), 327ff.66) See Reinhard Mehring (2006), 41. Hence the author’s aim is also to extract a practicalproposition from Koselleck’s studies focussing on a subversive critique of modernity whosesemantics and concepts are analyzed only with superficial objectivity (2006), 46.67) According to Koselleck, the other three criteria are “temporalization” (Verzeitigung), “polit-icization” and “ideologization” of all modern concepts. See Reinhart Koselleck (1972), 46.


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and political processes are recorded persisting over the course of genera-

tions and even centuries .”68 Hence conceptual historians research the his-torical transformations of perceptions and receptions of semantics in orderto understand the veritable meaning of concepts and to make sure theirusage remains critical and historically informed.

In the specific case of democracy, it is even more important to analyzesemantic change because the concept’s inherent contradictions and aporiasrequire a special type of conceptual history. Paradoxically, the fact that

democracy is necessarily an “unfinished journey” (John Dunn) is whatmight be the best guarantee that the concept maintains its hegemonicstatus within political semantics. Te fact that the concept of democracyis still in use in scientific discourse as well as in everyday language is farfrom being “an exception in the history of language.”69 Rather, the under-determination of the concept seems to be the most important reason for itssuccess. Te eternal question concerning the best political constitutionseems to have been translated into the question about the best kind of

democracy. Terefore the symbiosis between “social history” and “historyof linguistic meaning”70 obviously suggests that the current debate con-cerning a possible “post-democracy” (Guéhenno, Rancière, Crouch, Jörke)will be futile.

However, conceptual history also proves that democracy is not simply alabel that could be used in order to legitimize any political or social system. Although we cannot escape conceptual politics, because it is embedded

into the structure of concepts, democracy is much more than a strategy ofpersuasion used to advance political agendas. What conceptual historyshows is the framework of the concept democracy in which different nor-mative decisions are available and also become necessary reference pointsin the search for the best interpretation of democracy. Nevertheless, it isimpossible to escape the problem that the contest over the best interpreta-tion of the concept must always establish the boundaries that cannot be

crossed. Tis search for the best interpretation of democracy is ultimatelya form of conceptual politics. It is less the lack of standards than the con-tradictions and aporias inherent to the concept that prevent us from for-mulating a valid single idea of democracy. Instead, we must always keep in

68) Reinhart Koselleck (2006), 365.69) Hubertus Buchstein (2006), 48.70) Karlheinz Stierle (1978), 184.


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mind that the many sides of democracy render each definition of “what

should democracy mean today”71 merely a preliminary, political decision.

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Oliver Hidalgo Conceptual History and Politics is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested 1

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