Concept of National Identity

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The concept of national identityBhikhu Parekh aa Professor of Political Theory, University of Hull

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To cite this article: Bhikhu Parekh (1995): The concept of national identity, Journal of Ethnicand Migration St udies, 21:2, 255-268

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new community 21(2):255-268 April 1995

The concept of national identity

Bhikhu Parekh

Abstract Although national identity is a subject of much agonised debate in almost allcountries today, the debate is marred by several dubious assumptions. These includesuch beliefs as that national identity consists in being different from others and is dilutedby intercultural borrowing, that it is h istorically fixed that it is the sole or the majorsource of political legitimacy, that the state s primary task is to maintain it and thatnational identity defines the limits of permissible diversity. The author challenges theseand related assumptions. He argues that national iden tity is a not a substance but acluster of tendencies and values, that it is neither fixed nor alterable at will, and that itneeds to be periodically redefined in the light of historically inherited characteristics,present needs, and future aspirations.

There is hardly a country in the world today in which national identity is not asubject of agonised public debate. Their citizens frequently com plain that they'lack' or have 'lo st' their sense of national identity or that it has become 'diluted','eroded', 'corrupted' or 'confused', and wond er how they can acquire', 'retain','preserve' or 'strengthen' it. In this article I intend to analyse the nature anddynamics of national identity and to question some of the central assum ptionsinforming the debate on it.

Meaning of the termMuch of the debate on national identity is marred by a lack of clarity on itsmeaning. When we talk about national identity, as distinct from personal orreligious identity, we have in mind the identity of a territorially organisedcommunity or, what we may for conven ience call, a polity. Since the latter lacksa popularly accepted adjective, it is understandable that we should opt for theterm 'national'. The term nation, however, has a long history and carries a heavyideological baggage. It refers to a homogeneous and collectively self-consciousethno-cultural unit, a spiritual whole that shapes the substance and identity ofits members. Not every polity is or wishes to be organised in this w ay. To talkof national identity is to convey the wro ng impression that every po lity is orshould be constituted as a nation, and even that it cannot hav e an identity unlessit is so constituted.1 I suggest that we drop the term 'national iden tity', and

replace it with the term 'collective identity of a polity' or other such expressions.The latter expression not only conveys all that we intend to convey by the termnational identity, but also avoids the conscious and unconscious influence of theassumptions associated with the terms nation and national. If this seems toodrastic, we may continue to use the term national identity provided we con-stantly bear in mind that we m ean by it noth ing more than th e collective identity

Bhikhu Parekh is Professor of Political Theory at the U niversity of Hull.

0047-9586/95/020255-14 © Journals Oxford Ltd, published on behalf of ERCOMER

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256 B. Parekh

of a polity, and that we remain agnostic about whether a well-ordered polityneeds to be constituted as a nation.

As for the term identity it is used in much of the literature in several differentsenses, of which the following four are the most common.

First, some equate iden tity with difference, and argue th at to explore a polity's

identity is to explore what makes it distinct and distinguishable from others.2

Secondly, some equate identity with self-understanding, with what the polityunderstands itself to be, and argue that to explore or ascertain the identity of apolity is to explore its self-conception or self-understanding.3

Thirdly, some writers equate identity with deeply cherished values, goals andcommitments, and argue that to ascertain the identity of a polity is to ask whatit stands for, what is central goals or values are, what projects define it andevoke its undivided loyalty and commitment.4

Fourthly, for some writers identity refers to the inner constitution, the central

organising p rinciples, the constitutive characteristics, that m ake a polity the k indof polity it is. For them to inquire into the identity of a polity is to uncover itsorganising principles, its deepest tendencies, impulses, ideals, values, beliefs,dispositions, characteristic ways of thought, etc.5

I suggest that, of these four usages, the last is the most comprehensive andcoherent. The other three emphasise specific aspects of identity and mistakenlyequate these with the whole.

Identity and difference are logically interrelated concepts in the sense that toknow something is also to know what it is not. However the two are neitheridentical nor of equal ontological importance. One person differs from anotherbecause each is constituted in a specific way, that is, because each ha s a specificidentity. Identity is logically and ontologically prior to difference, and the lattercannot be its basis or criterion. If others were to become like us such that ourdifferences from them diminished, that would not in the least affect our identity.They have changed, but we have not, and the changes in their identity cannotchange o urs. We do not cease to be who w e are wh en others cease to be differentfrom us. And wh en w e are different from them , it is not the difference per se butthat fact that it springs from the kind of persons we are that is of ultimateimportance.

The equation of identity with difference, with what is unique and specific toan entity, leads to paradoxes and p roves self-defeating. M y differences fromothers diminish not only when I become like them but also when they becomelike me . As we saw it is od d, even incoherent to say that my identity has changedwhen theirs has. If this were true w e wo uld have to say that w e have changedwh en others have, although we may have remained the same Furthermore,when difference is made the basis of identity, others become our point ofreference, and we constantly strive to measure ourselves against them lest weshould become like them. This locates the centre of our identity outside our-

selves, and secures it at the expense of our autonomy. Besides to locate identityin difference is to fetishise the latter, to foster the spirit of exclusiveness, todiscourage mutual borrowing, and to be more worried about being differentfrom others than about being true to oneself. In short, difference cannot be thebasis of identity, and is important only insofar as it grows naturally out of thekind of person one is.

The second usage of identity, which equates it with self-understanding, isequally unsatisfactory. It wrongly implies that we are what we understand

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The concept of national identity 257

ourselves to be, that we are what we think we are. Our identity is shaped by anumber of factors such as our upbringing, childhood experiences, the uncon-sciously absorbed influences of our surroundings, the half-digested and oftenpoorly comprehended experiences of our adult life, and deep cultural memories,dreams, and myths. Our self-understanding is one of these factors, but it is notthe only one. Besides many aspects of our identity are often too deep andcomplex to be accessible to self-consciousness, and hence our self-understandingfalls considerably short of full self-knowledge and remains partial and limited.It would be odd, even incoherent, to say that they are not part of our identitysimply because they do not form part of our self-understanding. Again, self-understanding presupposes a self to be understood, that is, a self that is alreadyformed in a specific way and precedes and constitutes the subject matter ofreflection. This is why it is possible to discuss if our self-understanding iscorrect, incorrect, or only partially correct.

The third usage, which equates identity with goals, values and commitments,repeats some of the mistakes of the second. Goals, etc. are an integral pa rt of ouridentity, but so are such other things as our ways of thought, deepest psycholog-ical and moral dispositions, and cultural memories. Besides goals and values donot emerge and operate in a vacuum. They spring from and derive their appealand energy from their relations with other aspects of our identity. We do shapeour identity by consciously pursuing specific goals and making specific commit-ments, but equally the nature, content, definition and the likely effects of ourgoals and commitments are shaped by these other and never fully understood

aspects. To equate identity with goals and commitments is to imply that we arewhat we self-consciously make of ourselves, that identity is a project, and thusto invoke an untenably rationalist and volitionalist view of identity.

I suggest that although identity involves self-understanding, goals, values,differences from others, and so on, it is a much wider concept, whose specificityis best captured by the last usage. Basically and somewhat crudely, our identityrefers to wh o we are, how w e are constituted, what m akes us the kind of personswe are. It includes the central organising principles of our being, our deepesttendencies, dominant passions, characteristic ways of thought, deeply heldvalues, ideals, attachments, comm itments, our psychological an d mo ral disposi-tions, traits of temperament, the way we define and understand ourselves, etc.

In the light of our brief discussion, we can form a reasonably coherentconception of national identity. National identity refers to the way a polity isconstituted, to what makes it the kind of community it is. It includes the centralorganising principles of the polity, its structural tendencies, characteristic waysof thinking and living, the ideals that inspire its people, the values they professand to which its leaders tend to appeal, the kind of character they admire andcherish, their propensities to act in specific ways, their deepest fears, ambitions,anxieties, collective memories, traumatic historical experiences, dominant mythsand collective self-understand ings. To explore the n ational identity of a polity isto explore all these and to offer a faithful account of the kind of polity it is.

Cultural and political identityEvery territorially organised society has a shared way of life or a shared culture.A way of life represents a specific mode of regulating the personal andinterpersonal life and involves shared forms of thought and behaviour. It entails

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shared self-understanding, that is, a body of ideas, images and myths in termsof which its members understand and organise their lives and interpret andassign meanings to each other's actions and utterances. It also involves a sharedbody of rules, conventions, practices, and values which regulate how theyshould behave towards each other in different contexts as well as their mutualexpectations and obligations. Like a language to which it bears considerableresemblance and with which it is closely intertwined, a way of life can be richor poor but never meaningless, and lived with varying degrees of elegance andsubtlety depending on one's mastery of its resources.

Since a way of life involves a specific mode of behaviour and a specificunderstanding of life, it requires and encourages specific traits of temperament,psychological and mo ral dispositions, motivational structures, a specific range ofemotions and modes of expressing them, and so forth. In other words, everyway of life presupposes and cultivates what may loosely be called a commonsocial character among its members. The English way of life is based on andcherishes such qualities as self-containment, self-discipline, respect for privacy,an undemonstrative approach to human relations, and cautiousness in thepresence of strangers. The Indian way of life is differently structured andcherishes different qualities. As long as an Indian retains his characteristicqualities of temperament and character, he remains a relative outsider to theEnglish way of life and cannot fully and effortlessly participate in it. If he isskilful, he m ight find his way arou nd in it, bu t he can never feel at ease in it andwill always speak its conceptual language in an alien accent. A shared social

character and a shared way of life are intertwined. The latter reflects andsustains and is in turn underpinned and nurtured by the former. To participatein a way of life is to acquire the social character presupposed by it. In modernsociety autonomous individuals lead different ways of life, take pride in devel-oping different personal identities, and acquire different qualities of tempera-ment and character. Although their social character therefore contains greatinternal variations, they cannot share a common way of life and sustain constantand close interactions without acquiring a family of broad characteristics incommon.

A territorially organised society then is a body of individuals bound togetherby virtue of their participation in a shared way of life. What varies with theindividual and is not habitually shared by all or the bulk of its members is nota part of its collective identity. And even when a practice is cultivated by manyor most of its members, it does not form part of their collective identity if theircultivation of it is coincidental and not a response to social expectations andethos. For example, if som e mem bers of a society ha pp en to be eccentric, as theygenerally are in every society, their eccentricity in no way reflects on theirsociety and tells us nothing about it except perhaps that it is tolerant. But ifeccentricity is collectively encouraged in their society and is cultivated by themas a social practice, as is believed to be the case in England, then theireccentricity is a part of its collective identity.

Every modern society is internally differentiated and articulated into differentand relatively autonomous areas of life, such as the economic, the religious, thepolitical, the artistic, and the educational. Each of these areas has a distinctcharacter, entails a different mode of organisation, and calls for differentqualities of temperament and character. The armed forces, for example, developdifferent psychological and moral qualities and forms of interpersonal relations

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to religious and educational ins titutions. This means tha t although differentareas of life are embedded in and nurtured by a shared way of life, theyarticulate it differently and add to it new elements of their own. As Hume putit, 'A soldier and a priest are different characters in all nation s, and all ages.' TheBritish army shares much with the British university, for they are both part of

the British way of life. But they also display different forms of organisation anddiscipline, and draw on and develop different qualities of British character.Every modern way of life contains several overlapping ways of life, based onclass, occupation, gender, etc., each different but also sharing several featureswith others by virtue of being embedded in a common way of life. While it istrue that different classes and occupations tend to develop different ways of life,they cannot interact and work together unless their relations are defined andstructured by a constantly negotiated but nonetheless shared way of life. Inmodern society autonomous individuals choose their ways of life within thebroad limits set by their commonly shared way of life, and that adds to thelatter's diversity. As a result of all this, the commonly shared way of life andsocial character get considerably thinned down, and have often only a minimumcontent necessary to hold the society together.

The economic, military, educational and other areas of life have distinctcharacters that remain common to different societies. Although they are nodoubt influenced by the way of life of the wider society, they have autonomousstructures that cut across different ways of life. For example, although Britishuniversities differ from their French counterparts, they also resemble them inseveral significant respects. Qua universities they seek to purs ue comm on go als,which require them to organise themselves in similar ways. At one level allBritons share a common collective identity, irrespective of whether they aresoldiers, academics or workers. At another level all soldiers, academics andworkers share a common identity irrespective of whether they are British,French or American. A British academic has much in common with both aBritish soldier and an American academic. Even as the collective identity of acommunity contains internal diversity, collective identities of different com-munities overlap and share several common features. The identity of a com-munity is never homogeneous and exclusive.

Every territorially organised society needs to make arrangements for theconduct of its collective affairs. It wishes to live together and function as anindependent community in a world of other such communities. It thereforerequires a system of rules and procedures, what we may call a constitution,laying down who is entitled to speak in its name both to its members and tooutsiders and to take collectively binding decisions. The constitution articulatesand structures the political life of the community. The political life is a concen-trated expression and focus of the life of the community, and represents an areawhere the latter becomes conscious of itself as a single and unified collectivity.

Even as the shared way of life unites the members of a community at the culturallevel, the shared mode of conducting its collective affairs unites them at thepolitical level.

The political life of a community is embedded in and deeply shaped by itswider culture. However it also has its own distinct and autonomous character,and both articulates the cultural identity of the community in a distinct mannerand adds to it new elements of its own. A community's culture might be racist,but it might choose, as the United States did, to collectively commit itself to a

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non-racist polity and grant all its citizens full legal and political equality. Or, itsculture might be authoritarian and hierarchical, but it might decide, as many adeveloping country did, to break with it by enshrining the principles of liberalindividualism in the constitution of its polity. This is not to deny that there arelimits to the extent to which a polity can diverge from the wider culture of thecomm unity, but only to argue that the polity is autonom ous and can depart fromthe prevailing values and practices within certain limits.

The relation between the political life of the community and its wider culturetakes many forms. In traditional societies the former derives its legitimacy fromand pursues goals set by the traditional guardians of the community's culture.Its autonomy is considerably limited, and the community's political identity islargely though not wholly an organic expression of its cultural identity. Theopposite is the case in the transitional, developing or modernising societies.Their political institutions aim to transform and reconstitute the traditional

society on an entirely new foundation. They are based on different principles tothose of the community at large, and seek by all manner of institutional devicesto insulate themselves against the latter's pressures. The community's politicalidentity here is at considerable variance with its cultural identity, and thetension between the two is felt in all areas of life. In developed modern societies,the relationship between the political life and the wider culture, between thepolitical and the cultural identity of the community, is much more complex andfalls between these two extremes. The polity here is both autonomous andembedded in the wider community, and both shapes and is in turn shaped bythe latter.

A territorially organised society then is both a cultural and a political com-munity, and its identity is articulated at both cultural and political levels. It is acultural community because its members broadly share a common way of life,and a political community because they share a common mode of conductingtheir collective affairs. Its cultural identity lies in the character of its shared wayof life, its political identity in the way its political life is constituted. As we saw,although the two identities are related, they are also different and mutuallyirreducible. A community's cultural identity might be secure but not its politicalidentity, as was for long the case with Germany and India. The reverse can alsooccur; for example, with contemporary Iran and Algeria. Cultural and politicalidentities are threatened and p reserved in different ways. The former is diffused,has a weak enforcement mechanism and an ecclectic character, and is not easyto define and preserve. By contrast political identity has an objective point ofreference in the community's legal and political institutions, is a subject ofconstant public discussion and attention, is preserved in the recorded memoryof the community, and is therefore comparatively easy to elucidate and main-tain.

I have so far argued that the collective identity of a territorially organisedsociety is articulated at two overlapping levels, the cultural and the political. Inthe rest of this article, I shall concentrate on political identity, and only refer tocultural identity when necessary.

Complexity of political identityThe political identity of a community refers to the way its political life isconstituted, and includes the manner in which it conceptualises and dem arcates

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its political life, organises and manages its collective affairs, structures its legaland political institutions an d conducts its political discourse. It also includes thevalues to which the polity is collectively committed, and the qualities oftemperament and character it admires and on which it relies for the smoothconduct of its affairs. A community's political identity also refers to its deepestfears, ambitions, anxieties, tendencies, dominant myths, traumatic historicalexperiences and collective memories. Since a political community exists amongother such communities, to elucidate its identity is also to show how it differsfrom them.

Since different polities have different histories and are embedded in differentways of life, their political identities vary greatly. We may take two of them bywa y of illustration. Unlike Britain and France, Germ any becam e a state very latein its history. For a variety of reasons the amorphous 'Holy Roman Empire ofthe German Nation' did not transform itself into a modern state in the way that

Britain and France did. Some areas of the Empire had no Germans living in it,and some of those in which they lived were not part of it. Its constitutionalframework was so confused that a special science, the so-called Reichspublizistikwas needed to understand it. In the words of Samuel Pufendorf, it was corpusirregulare monstro simile (an irregular bod y ..like that of a m onster). There w asno feeling of belonging to a larger unit, and people's loyalties were largelyregional and topped up by a vague Reichspatriotismus.6 Not surprisingly Ger-many was popularly called not Deutschland but die deutschen Lande. Unable toemerge as a modern state, the political consciousness of the Germans was for

long dominated by two myths, that of the past empire which one day theyhoped to regain, and the corresponding myth of being 'cheated' and 'deniedtheir historical due by 'hostile others', especially France (see Kemper 1989).

Lacking a unified state of their own, the Germans located their unity in thenation, largely defined in linguistic and cultural terms (see Dyson 1980). Ger-many was a Kulturnation but not yet a Staatsnation, a distinction that is uniqueto it, and the Germans thought of themselves as Volkgenossen or ethnic comrades.Until the end of the Second World War, Germany distinguished betweenDeutschen (citizens of G erm an descent) Reichdeutschen (German citizens of non-German descent) and Volkdeutschen (individuals of German descent living inother countries). Germany belonged to the Germans, who formed the Germannation, and the task of the German state was to express the unity of the Germannation. The state was not a legal or political but a cultural and spiritualinstitution articulating and safeguarding the German national soul, an irre-ducibly unique and organic Volkgemeinschaft. It was viewed as a socially tran-scendental entity charged with the task of moulding its citizens and reshapingthe w ider society in the national im age. In such a climate civil society, individualrights and liberties, constitutionalism, a limited state and so on lacked securespaces of growth. The Germans both w elcomed and shied away from mo dernityand kept looking for a Sonderweg as is evident in the thinking even of such aliberal as Max Weber. They took a romantic and moralistic view of the role ofthe state and exempted it from the ordinary moral constraints. Ernst Troeltschput the point well:

German political thinking exhibits a strange conflict evident to everybody and that can beseen from outside. On the one hand it is filled with romanticism and sublime spirituality.But on the other hand it exhibits realism bord ering on cynicism and is absolutely indifferent

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to spirituality and morality. Above all it strangely tends to mix both together; to brutaliseromanticism and to romanticise cynicism (Troeltsch 1925, see also Brubaker 1990).

The Nazi period drew upon and intensified these trends and suppressed suchdissenting liberal strands of thought as had begun to develop during theW eimar years. Post-war G ermany wa s characterised by a profound anxiety overits political identity, and soug ht to break w ith it in favour of a liberal dem ocraticpolity of the Anglo-Saxon, especially the American, variety. This paved the wayfor a new form of political life with its characteristic modes of thought, politicaldiscourse, values and qualities of character.

The German political identity is a product of and reveals the continuinginfluence of these and other political experiences. It harbours the misguided butstill fairly deep feelings of historical injustice, an unhappy nostalgia for aromanticised past, intense cultural nationalism, powerful statism, an intriguing

mixture of profound self-doubt and deep moral certainty and of low politicalself-esteem and great cultural and economic pride, and so forth. The Germanpolitical identity also contains different and sometimes incompatible moral andpolitical tendencies. Thanks to its wish to break w ith its Nazi past, it follows themost generous asylum and even immigration policies, and has given refuge tom ore peop le than all the West European countries pu t together. Yet thanks to itshistorically and still highly influential ethnic conception of citizenship, it doesnot grant its Turkish migrants the rights of citizenship which it generouslyextends to Germans settled in the ex-Soviet Union and in eastern Europe. Itspolitical discourse reveals similar tensions. It cherishes individual rights, liber-ties and the freedom to choose one's way of life, but it also insists on theintegrity of the 'German national culture' and the global unity of the 'Germannation'. As a result of all this, its civil and criminal laws, educational policies,and so forth, display considerable incoherence.7

The American political identity represents a remarkable contrast to the Ger-man case.8 Unlike Germany, the United States has a distinct geographical andhistorical identity. Its territorial boundaries have never been in doubt, its birthas a polity is clearly dated historically, its Constitution has continued to providea clear statement of its constitutive political principles, and its very name dailyrem inds its citizens of the plural an d assocational character of their po lity. Sincethe United States was created by an act of choice and since most of its whiteinhabitants voluntarily became its citizens, the concept of choice remains anintegral part of its political self-consciousness and is evident in much of itspolitical theory. Unlike the traditional German political identity, the Americanpolitical identity is defined in political not ethnic terms. To be patriotic is to beloyal not to the American Volk bu t to the American way of life, which is onlypartially articulated in its Constitution. Although American patriotism can beintensely narrow and aggressive, its political character qualitatively distin-guishes it from the ethno-cultural patriotism of the Germans.

Unlike Germany, American citizenship is in principle open to all. But it isgranted on condition that the naturalised citizen gives up his earlier allegiancesand loyalties and whole-heartedly identifies himself with his new country.America is believed to represent a 'new world' which receives and 'melts'outsiders into a 'new race' of 'new men' prepared to shed their old prejudices,manners and habits. American citizenship is seen as a kind of rebirth, aconversion, involving replacement of one identity with another, and has a

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quasi-religious orientation with the Constitution as a sacred text or a politicalscripture and the Supreme Court as its high priest. It is informed by a distinctand unitary notion of what it is to be an 'American', and shadowed by apowerful conception of what constitutes an 'un-American' activity or belief.Since the German political identity is defined in ethnic terms, a German can bea communist without feeling that he has thereby ceased to be an 'authentic' ora 'true' German. And since his ethnic and national loyalty is largely taken forgranted, he does not need constantly to prove it to himself or to others. TheAmerican situation is quite different. Since its political identity is defined inconstitutional terms, it retains a strong ideological core and puts pressure on all'true' Americans to stay within a specific range of beliefs and practices and toprove their loyalty to their country. In recent decades the United States hasaccepted the idea of hyphenated identity, but continues to define it within theframework of a unitary view of American citizenship. A Polish-American is first

and foremost an American exactly like all others. The Polish half of his identityonly refers to his origins and has no political significance. His nationality isdepoliticised, ethnicised, and reduced to a dispensable cultural adjunct to hispolitical status as a citizen.

A detailed discussion of the American political identity would also need toexplore and explain its several other characteristic features. It would need toanalyse the distinctive character of its individualism, the ease with which thecountry seems to accept the pursuit of individual or group interest at theexpense of public interest, and the apparent incompatibility between the restric-

ted political choices of its citizens and their unlimited legal and moral choices oflife-styles. One would also need to trace the roots of its rights-centred andlegalistic political discourse, the deeply religious basis of its way of life in spiteof the rigid separation between the church and the state, its political self-righteousness, the nature and influence of the 'American dream' that is often anightmare for many of its citizens, and so forth.

Every long-established com mu nity then has a recognisable political identity. Itdefines, organises, and conducts its collective affairs in its own distinct way, isdominated by unique fears, dreams, hopes, and myths, and cultivates differentqualities of temperament and character. Some have deep propensities towardsextremism, and do not know how to restrain these. Others are either free ofthese, or possess countervailing tendencies that constantly hold them in check.Some polities that have a more or less continuous and honourable history anda relatively coherent way of life find their identity a source of pride. Those witha painful or discontinuous history or propensities towards extremism andracism view their political identity with mixed feelings. The differences in thepolitical identities of different countries become strikingly clear if we comparethe different ways in which they have conceptualised and conducted controver-sies surrounding such issues as abortion, gay rights, and the Muslim protests

against Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses.The political identity of a community then is a complex structure made up of

different elements and tendencies derived from its history, geography, religion,social structure, the wider way of life and self-understanding. It is nevercoherent and harmonious and often pulls in different directions. It is not staticeither. With changes in the wider way of life and in the community's circum-stances, needs and historical experiences, it develops new tendencies, fears andmyths, abandons old ones, changes their inner balance, and perceptibly or

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imperceptibly alters its identity. A community might suffer an economic ormoral decline,, or face unprecedented challenges. It then needs to identify itsstrengths and weaknesses, build on one and overcome the other, and soreinterpret its past as to draw new inspiration from it. Furthermore no societycan function without some conception of itself, and that too plays an impo rtantpart in shaping its identity. The British think of themselves as a fair-mindedpeople. In fact, like all other communities, they are both fair and unfair. Butsince they define themselves in terms of one set of tendencies, they set and judgethemselves by certain norms and endeavour to live up to them. In so doing theybecome fair and alter their character and way of life.

This is how all communities constantly recreate themselves. By emphasisingsome aspects of their character, setting themselves new goals and redefiningthemselves in certain ways, they acquire new capacities, develop new tenden-cies, and alter their identity. The process of self-creation does not occur in a

historical vacuum. A community inherits a specific way of life and character,which set limits to how and how much it can change itself. The change is lastingand deep if it is grafted on the community's suitably reinterpreted deepesttendencies and does not go against the grain. A community's political identitythen is neither unalterable and fixed, nor a voluntarist project to be executed asit pleases, but a matter of slow self-recreation within the limits set by its past.The more accurate its self-understanding, the more informed is the process ofself-recreation, and the more coherent is the identity it develops.

All attempts to define the political and cultural) identity of a community

involve a good deal of distortion and myth-making. This is so for a variety ofinterrelated reasons. Since political identity is a precipitate of countless forgottenor half-comprehended factors, it is too deep to be fully accessible to even themost critical self-reflection, and every account of it is necessarily partial. Besidesit is by its very nature a precarious balance of different and sometimes incompat-ible tendencies, each qualified and limited by others, and distorted when statedin abstraction from them. British toleration, for example, has distinct p sycholog-ical and moral roots, which both delimit its extent and breed distinct forms ofintolerance. The British are therefore both tolerant and intolerant, and to stressone to the exclusion of the other is to utter a half-truth. M ichael Oakeshott m akesa similar point when he argues that for the past three centuries, modernEuropean consciousness has been deeply divided between individualist andcollectivist tendencies, and that the unresolved and apparently irresoluble ten-sion between them explains much of its moral and political life see O akeshott1974). Since the political iden tity of a comm unity contains conflicting tendencies,which are reconciled differently on different occasions, a full statement of itrequires a patient and complex analysis and can never be provided in simpleand unqualified assertions.

Again, societies, like individuals, go about their daily business in a largelyunselfconscious manner, and rely on their inherited self-conceptions. Theybecome intensely self-conscious and raise disturbing questions about theiridentity only w hen they feel that their way of life is threatened . National identityhas become an imp ortant issue today in many countries partly because nationalboundaries are being weakened by global and macro-regional pressures fromabove and local and micro-regional pressures from below, and partly becausethe traditional system of moral values is undergoing profound changes. Sincethe question of national identity is generally raised in a climate of panic, there

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is a tendency to stress only those elements that are under threat. When suchmoderately religious societies as Iran and Algeria felt threatened by secularism,their religious leaders argued that religion was the very basis of their way of lifeand central to all they held dear. Those supporting secularism argued theopposite. When B ritain began to suffer an economic and political decline in the1960s and 1970s, the New Right blamed it on the loss of Victorian values. Itscritics argued that such a nostalgia was the root of the problem and that thecountry needed to make a clean break with its past. In the heat of the debate,there was little space for a complex and nuanced account of these countries'cultural and political identities. As a general rule, the very context in which thequestion of identity is raised makes it difficult to achieve a balanced response.

In political life an appeal to the community's political (or cultural) identityplays a powerful ideological role. The most effective way to recommend orcondemn a policy or a course of action is to argue respectively that it alone is

consistent with, or that it deeply offends, the community's identity. Every socialgroup therefore has a vital stake in promoting a view of the community'sidentity that serves its interests and marginalises its opponents. MargaretThatcher provided an excellent example of this. During her period of office sherepeatedly observed that since socialism was 'essentially' a 'continental'phenomenon and 'at odds with the character of the British people', she wasdetermined to 'destroy' it in order to preserve the British identity. Her view ofBritish identity delegitimised the Labour Party as well as all those advocatingnot only socialism but also some form of economic redistribution. The lattergroups rejoined with a wholly different view of British identity. What happenedin Britain occurs in every country. Political life is dominated by rival conceptionsof the collective identity, some more coherent than others but none whollysatisfactory.

It is possible for a com munity's identity to un derg o profound changes withou taffecting its sense of identity. Beliefs, values, and the w ay of life of its m embersmight change considerably, but their sense of who they are might remainconstant and they might not experience stress or anxiety. After the SecondWorld War, Sweden got rid of its social and political hierarchy, developed anegalitarian ethos, created a welfare state, and in general underwent profoundchanges, but the Swedes did not feel disorientated by these changes. There areseveral reasons why perception fails to keep pace with reality. Although thecumulative impact of changes can be considerable, they often occur slowly,giving those involved enough time to change with the changes. If changes wereto occur overnight, the situation would be different, but the constraints ofdemocratic political life and social stability ensure that this is not generally thecase. Besides the changes might occur in areas which those involved do notconsider central to their sense of identity. They might be mistaken and realisethis later, but the mistake cushions them against the immediate impact of the

changes. Furthermore in modern society change is an inseparable part of dailylife. The level of tolerance of change is therefore considerably greater than intraditional societies, and people are often able to take even the most radicalchanges in their stride.

Sometimes the opposite also occurs. A society's sense of identity might bebadly shaken even though the threat to its identity is insignificant. In severalBritish cities in the 1960s and 1970s, whites feared that the recent immigrantswere destroying their way of life, although in fact the latter were extremely

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few in number and anxious to adjust to the British way of life. Similarly manyin the West today feel deeply threatened by Muslim 'fundamentalism', althoughtheir fear is grossly exaggerated. Perception outpaces reality for a variety ofreasons. People are influenced by changes in their immediate environment, andthe fact that these are small when seen in a larger national context matters littleto them. Sometimes changes have a differential impact on different socialgroups. And if the impact is greater on the most vocal and volatile, anexaggerated impression of their overall significance gains currency. Again thescale and depth of changes are often too difficult for most people to compre-hend, who therefore remain vulnerable to the manipulations of the interestedmedia and politicians. Sometimes apparently trivial changes acquire undueimportance if they are believed to affect areas deemed to be central to thecommunity's identity. For example, immigrants might be few in number andwilling to adjust to the host society's way of life, but that makes no difference

to those who want their country to remain racially homogeneous or find itextremely painful to relate to those not sharing their way of life. And, again,Muslim 'fundamentalism' might not be a grave threat to the identity of westernsociety, but it is enough to worry those who deeply cherish secularism and freespeech and fear for their survival.

As we saw, people in modern society not only accept but welcome changes intheir material environment and even in their way of life, as is evident in theiruse of new technology and the freedom offered by the so-called permissivesociety. Yet they frequently complain about the loss, dilution or erosion of theirway of life. This apparent paradox is easily resolved. The values, ideals,character traits and forms of interpersonal relations are not all equally valued bytheir adh erents. Individuals value som e comp onents mo re than others, considersome but not others central to their way of life, and fear that the loss of whatthey consider more valuable or central to their identity would change their wayof life extensively and deeply. While other values, practices, habits or traits oftemperament might be changed, those they cherish should not be, for if theywere to be aban don ed, all that is valuable, wo rthwhile or distinctive in their wayof life would be lost.

To talk about the erosion or maintenance of a community's identity thenis to make a judgement about what within it is most valuable. Not every lossbut only the loss of what is greatly valued am oun ts to dilution. And similarlyto preserve or maintain a way of life is not to preserve it in its totality, butonly those elements that are considered most valuable. People h olding differentmoral norms are therefore bound to disagree about what constitutes an erosionor maintenance of their shared identity. For some British people the increasing'Americanisation' of their identity constituted its erosion; for Margaret Thatcher,it amounted to its enrichment. Or rather since she saw or at least presentedthe 'Americanisation' as really a return to the Victorian values, she viewed

the so-called erosion as really a restoration of the 'true' British identity thathad been 'eroded' by the post-war permissive society. Again some Britishpeople see the weakening of their class system or the monarchy as an erosionof their collective identity; for others these changes represent its much-needed reconstitution. Debates about the reconstitution or maintenanceof the collective identity of a community are often about the different visions ofits future, misleadingly conducted in the language of preserving the identityof the community.

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onclusions

In the light of our discussion several important conclusions follow, of whichthree deserve particular mention. First, national identity refers not—as thenationalist writers argue—to a mysterious national soul, substance or spirit but

to the way a polity is constituted, and includes such things as its deepesttendencies, dispositions, values, ideals, and ways of thought. Since nationalidentity develops over time and is not a product of a master design, it containsdisparate even contradictory elements and is not a coherent whole. Furthermoreit is articulated differently in different areas of life, each of which reflects,refracts, reacts upon and transforms it, and is therefore internally differentiatedand neither homogenous and monolithic. And since many elements of nationalidentity are elusive and too deep to be accessible to critical self-consciousness, itcontains large areas of opacity. This partly explains why a community isfrequently surprised by, and cannot easily make sense of, its reactions andbehaviour. Not even the most acute student of Germany could have predictedin the 1920s that a large section of the nation would acquiesce in massive actsof genocide.

Secondly, a community's identity is subject to constant change, partly inresponse to the changes in its environment and historical circumstances andpartly as a result of the changing self-conceptions, goals and ideals of itsmembers. Identity is closely bound up with the environment. When the villagepost office, corner shop and other traditional meeting places disappear, thoseinvolved, no longer now able to run into each other effortlessly and strike upconversations, are forced to retreat into solitary and self-contained lives. Withvast changes in society occurring daily, the identity of a community constantlyundergoes profound and inexorable transformation. As the community facesnew challenges and threats, it is required to reappraise and revise its traditionalgoals, values, institutions and self-understanding. These and other changesundermine the familiar world in which the community's identity is embeddedand provoke deep anxieties. If the changes are deep and extensive, the anxietiesgenerate a veritable psychological and moral panic, and render the communityvulnerable to the false promises of religious fundamentalists, naive traditional-ists and moral primitivists.

If a community fails to adjust to the changes and gets out of step with itsenvironment, it risks disintegration. If it changes too quickly or indiscriminately,it loses its moral balance, drifts without a sense of direction, and again risksdisintegration. This is the paradox of identity, to which there are no simpleanswers. Every community must wrestle with it as best it can, and find ways ofreconstituting its identity in a manner that is both deeply sensitive to its historyand traditions and fully alive to its present and future needs.

Thirdly, it is commonly argued that the identity of a community lies in its

distinctiveness, in being different from others. The hold of this belief is sopowerful and pervasive that all over the world, many communities deeply fearmodernisation and western values lest they should become 'like the west' andlose their identity. As w e saw , this belief is profound ly mistaken. Difference byitself has nothing to do with identity, and wa nting to remain different fromothers simply for the sake of being different is irrational. A community does, ofcourse, need to be true to itself, but the self to which it needs to be true is neithera coherent and homogeneous whole, nor an abiding and unchanging substance

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like the Christian soul, but a cluster of tendencies, impulses and values. It cantherefore be tru e to itself only by constantly relating its psychological and mo ralresources to, and reinterpreting and revising them in the light of its currentneeds and problems. Since other communities have undergone similar experi-ences, a community can learn much for them and benefit from judiciouslyadopting their institutions and values. To fear such borrowing in the name of'preserving' its identity is totally to misunderstand the nature and dynamics ofidentity. Identity is not something that we have, rather it is w hat we are; it is nota property but a mode of being. To talk of preserving, maintaining, safeguardingor losing one's identity is to use misleading metaphors. As we saw earlier, by itsvery nature a community's identity needs to be constantly reconstituted in thelight of its inherited resources, present needs and future aspirations.

Notes

1 For a further discussion, see Parekh 19952 This is characteristic of such earlier liberal and romantic writers as J.S. Mill (in some of his moods),

Herder and Schleiermacher and their modern day successors. It is the most common usage of theterm today. In his Considerations on the Government of Poland Rousseau argued that since Polandwas in danger of losing its national identity, its educational system should stress its nationalparticularities even if they were devoid of intrinsic value. For him all states in a similar situationhad a duty to do so.

3 See, for example, David Miller's article in this issue. See also Habermas 1994.4 This is one of the several usages to be found in Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on

Canadian Federalism and Nationalism, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993, especially

Chapter 8.5 This usage is common among many French and G erman writers. See James Knoulton and TruettCates, Jr. 1993. Habermas too gestures towards it. See Habermas 1994: 164ff.

6 See the articles by Michael Stolleis and Karl Otmar Freiherr von A retin in Günter Birtsah (1991:7-23; 25-36).

7 For a fuller discussion, see Parekh 1994.8 I am most grateful to Professor John Pocock for a stimu lating discussion on this subject

ReferencesBirtsah, G. (Ed.) (1991) Patriotismus, Aufklarung, 4(2)

Brubaker, R. (1990) 'Immigration, citizenship and the Nation-State' in France and Germany: AComparative Historical Analysis', International Journal of Sociology 5(4) December

Dyson, K. (1980) The State Tradition in Western Europe, Oxford University PressGutmann, A. (Ed.) (1994), M ulti-Culturalism, Princeton: Princeton University PressHabermas, (1994) 'Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State' in A. Gutmann

(Ed.), M ulti-Culturalism, Princeton: Princeton University PressKemper, P. (Ed.) (1989) Mach t des Mythos: Ohmacht der Verhunft, Frankfurt am MainKnoulton, J. and Gates Jr., T. (1993) Forever in the Shadow of Hitler New Jersey: Humanities PressOakeshott, M. (1974) On Human Conduct Oxford: Clarendon Press, Chapter 3Parekh, B. (1994) 'Discourses on National Identity' Political Studies, SeptemberParekh, B. (1995) 'Ethnocentricity of the N ationalist D iscourse' in Nations and Nationalism 1 1) March

Troeltsch, E. (1925) 'Deutscher Geist und Westeuropa' in G. Baron (Ed.), Gesamelte Kulturphilosophis-che Aufsätze, Tubingen

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