Tecson vs. COMELEC , GR 16134 , March 3, 2004 FACTS: Petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in taking cognizance of and deciding the citizenship issue affecting Fernando Poe Jr. They asserted that under Section 4(7) , Article VII of the 1987 Constituition, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue of the case.

ISSUE: As the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) , does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over the qualifications of presidential candidates?

RULING: No. An examination of the phraseology in Rule 12, 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court on April 1992 categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

Facts:Petitioners sought for respondent Poes disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.Issue:Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.HELD:1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding qualification of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held."Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution,refers to contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the elections.2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondents birth, provided that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondents citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

KILOSBAYAN vs. COMELEC, [G.R. No. 128054, October 16, 1997] Post under case digests, Political Law at Wednesday, February 22, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind Facts:A complaint was filed against private respondents, alleging that Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) were use for electioneering purposes. Kilosbayan alleges that DILG-NCR collaborated with Philippine Youth Health and Sports Development Foundation, Inc. (PYHSDFI), the former approving allotment to the latter 70M allegedly use to buy medical and sports equipment that was distributed few days before election and stopped at the day of election.

Comelec investigators submitted the dismissal of the complaint for lack of evidence to prove probable cause. Kilosbayan provided news clippings, regarding alleged use of funds resulting from the said transaction of DILG-NCR and PYHSDFI and arguments to support its claims. The new paper clippings was regarded as hearsay.Kilosbayan filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that they are not responsible for the production of evidence by using public funds, it is the COMELEC who should search the evidence by using public funds and with the help of other agencies of the government as the constitution gave them the responsibility to prosecute election offenses. The motion was denied, thus this petition to compel COMELEC to prosecute the private respondentsIssue: Whether or not the COMELEC can be compelled to produce evidence despite the complainants failure to prove probable cause.Ruling: NO, Insofar as the prosecution of election offenses is concerned, therefore, the COMELEC is the "public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the [Omnibus Election] Code before the competent court."

The determination of probable cause in any criminal prosecution, is made indispensable by the Bill of Rights which enshrines every citizen's right to due process, the presumption that he is presumed innocent.

Petitioner KILOSBAYAN must have necessarily tendered evidence, independent of and in support of the allegations in its letter-complaint, to prove probable cause. It certainly demands more than "bare suspicion" and can never be "left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic"

The task of the COMELEC as investigator and prosecutor, acting upon any election offense complaint, is not the physical searching and gathering of proof in support of a complaint for an alleged commission of an election offense. A complainant, who in effect accuses another person of having committed an act constituting an election offense, has the burden, as it is his responsibility, to follow through his accusation and prove his complainant.

Valles vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 137000, Aug. 9, 2000

Principle of jus sanguinis How Philippine citizenship is acquired Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino

HELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.Valles v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner questions the qualification of private respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to run for governor of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an Australian passport.Issue: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is, WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.Ruling: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including their children, are considered Philippine citizens. Respondent's father was therefore a Filipino, and consequently, her.Respondent did not lose her citizenship. Renunciation of citizenship must be express. Applying for ACR, ICR, and Australian passport are not enough to renounce citizenship. They are merely acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same."Dual citizenship" in the LGC, Sec 40, means "dual allegiance".

NATIONALITY THEORY NGO BURCA VS RP DIGEST FACTS: Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to Florencio Burca a Filipino citizen. She claims that she possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization as a Filipino citizen , she applied for cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration. This was opposed by the Solicitor General, but the trial court dismissed the opposition and declare that Zita Ngo Burca hass all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and that she being married to a Filipino citizen is hereby declared as a citizen of the Philippines. Such judgment of the trial court was appealed. ISSUE:Whether or not the petition of Zita Ngo Burca should be granted? RULING :NO The SC discussed here that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized. An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void. As to the merits of the case: Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding". the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal. We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act. Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail. Here, the case was submitted solely on the testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were presented. This does not meet with the legal requirement. Upon the view we take of his case, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition dismissed.

BENGSON VS. HRET ANDCRUZMarch 28, 2013 ~ vbdiaz BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZG.R. No. 142840May 7, 2001FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election. ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.HELD: petition dismissedYESFilipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:1. by naturalization,2. by repatriation, and3. by direct act of Congress.**Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:1. desertion of the armed forces;2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and5. political economic necessityRepatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.R.A. No. 2630 provides:Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001 Bengson v House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001

Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship Bengson III v.Cruz and HRET Facts:Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in SanClemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicablewas the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the United StatesMarine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, amongothers, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.Cruz was thereafter naturalized as a US citizen on June 5, 1990 in connection with his service inthe U.S. Marine Corps.On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship throughrepatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing marginof 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming thatrespondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives sincehe is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warrantoand declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the 2ndDistrict of Pangasinanin the May 1998 elections. Bengsons MR was likewise denied.Issue:Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.Held:Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-borncitizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of aparticular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of thePhilippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippinecitizenship."On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizensthrough naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as theRevised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), andby Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all thequalifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. Thedecision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from itspromulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has notbeen convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committedany act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announcedpolicies.Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in themanner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modesby which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Asa mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth

Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippinecitizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizenwho wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may behad under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armedforces; (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in theArmed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to analien; and (5) political and economic necessity.As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath inthe Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.As a rule, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that anaturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalizedFilipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost hisPhilippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. The ruleapplies to Cruzs case. Being a natural-born citizen, Cruz reacquired this status upon hisrepatriation.

Mercado v. Manzano (CaseDigest)Standard Mercado v. Manzano G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999Facts:Petitioners filed for respondents disqualification for election alleging that respondent is a dual citizen, and under the Local Government Code, dual citizens cannot run for public office.Respondent is a son of both Filipinos but was born in the U.S which follows the principle of jus soli, hence, considered an American citizen as well.COMELEC allowed Manzano to run because he was considered natural-born because of the vrtue that he is a son of both Filipino citizens but petitioners assail this.Issue: Is respondent Manzano a dual citizen and cannot run for public office?Ruling: The Court first defined dual citizenship and compared it to dual allegiance.Dual citizenship arises when a person whose parents are citizens of a state that follows jus saguinis and was born in a state that follows jus soli, hence, resulting to a concurrent application of different two laws or more.On the other hand, dual allegiance is a situation whre a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or more states.In this case, Respondent, though dual citizen, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy tantamount to his election of Phil. citizenship meaning he forswears allegiance to the other country and thereby terminating their status as dual.The Court stressed that participating in the election is an express renunciation of American citizenship.MERCADO VS.MANZANO, digestedPosted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011 307 SCRA 631, May 26, 1999 (Constitutional Law Dual Citizenship, Dual Allegiance)FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective office on the ground that he is a dual citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective local position.ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.Mercado vs. Manzano G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

Dual allegiance. vs. Dual citizenship Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: repudiation of other citizenshipFACTS:

Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got the highest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzanos proclamation was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.

In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jus soli). But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzanos certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified from running for any position.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the divisions ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration and was using an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC found that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office

HELD:DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

Dual Citizenship vs. Dual Allegiance

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

LGC prohibits Dual Allegiance not Dual Citizenship

The phrase dual citizenship in the LGC must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.PETITIONERS ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that Manzanos act of registering himself as a voter was an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it is provided that a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court. Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

LABO vs. COMELEC Case Digest LABO vs. COMELEC176 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.

Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec Digest Filed Under: Local Government Case Digests

Facts:

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, stating that she is 7-months resident in the said district. Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification, alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing seven months to since childhood. The provincial election supervisor refused to admit the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed her amended COC with Comelec's head office in Manila.

On April 24, 1995, theComelecSecond Division declared Imelda not qualified to run and struck off the amended aswell as original COCs. The Comelecin division found that when Imelda chose tostay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile. TheComelecen banc affirmed this ruling.

During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the election. But theComelecsuspendedher proclamation. Imelda thus appealed to the Supreme Court.

Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the election. Since the Comelec rendered the resolution on on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election, Comelec already lose jurisdiction over her case. She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not theComelecwhich has jurisdiction over the election ofmembers of the House of Representatives.

Issues:

1. Was Imelda a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.2. Does theComeleclose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case after the elections?3. Does the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Imelda's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections?

Held:

1. Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following reasons:

a. Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father brought his family back to Leyte.

b. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1.An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2.A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3.Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.

c. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

d. Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte ... to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." Furthermore, petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman.

2. With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the Comelec does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Moreover, it is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified timeis generally construed to be merely directory, "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.

3. HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Imelda, not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995)- See more at: http://legalvault.blogspot.com/2014/07/romualdez-marcos-vs-comelec-digest.html#sthash.0UtivHvS.dpufRomualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELECCITATION: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE:Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.