Comparison between the new European Risk- Based Inspection (RBI… · 2018-11-30 · Comparison...

Comparison between the new European Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) standard EN16991:2018

and the US standards API580/581: When and how to use which of the two?

44th MPA SeminarOctober 18, 2016

A. Jovanovic 11 Steinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies, Germany

STEINBEIS ADVANCED RISK TECHNOLOGIES

The paper will provide a comparative analysis of the standards as related to the scope, applicability in different industries, software implementation, possibilities of integration with other methods/standards (e.g. the ) and experiences from the practical use.

The cases of application in power and petrochemical industries will be used to highlight the particular advantages of each of the standards.

Abstract


What has changed 1996 to 2018? RBI 1998:

4 basic risk outcomes - flammable event, toxic releases, major environmental damage, and business interruption losses.

Risk: Probability x Consequence

Both a qualitative and quantitative process for understanding and reducing the risks associated with operating pressure equipment

RBI 2018:the same & more > safety, business, environment, reputation, … WIDE ACCEPTANCE & NEW UNDERSTANDING OF RISK!

RBI: More than 20+ years “around”


Petrochemical plants:… routine, standards, standardized software, reference providers, nobody asks about the principles, people interested in details, prices/money/RoI, time delays…

Power plants:… considered “useful, BUT…”, no real common agreement

Other industries (e.g. steel):… very different from case to case

RBI vs. (“general”) Risk Management:The concept of risk has changed! … e.g. ISO 31000, in RBI we stay with ISO Guide 51:2012

IMPORTANT: “Risk” in ISO 9001, ISO 45001, PED 2014/68…

RBI: A quarter of a century in industry

RBIFRisk-Based Inspection Framework

New EN16991:2018 standard


The RBIF Standard will be primarily, but not exclusively, applicable to oil & gas Petrochemical Chemical Power and other industry, however limited to non-nuclear

applications

RBIF EN16991:2018 Application


API 510Pressure Vessel

inspection

API 570Piping

inspection

API 653Tank

inspection

API 750ProcessHazards

Supporting documents& reports

for specificissues

API 581Risk-BasedInspection

API 579Fitness forPurpose

(not finished!)

Basic(resource)documents& reports

API 581RBI recommended

practice

API 581RBI recommended

practice(Lite Version - draft!)

Evaluation &Implementation

recommendations& documents

APIRBI-relateddocuments

API580

API580

EN16991:2018

European docs:EN16991:2018 vs. API …


The standard is developed in the frame of the CWA (CEN Workshop Agreement) 15740:2008 document, which specifies the essential elements for risk based assessment of industrial assets according to the RIMAP (Risk-based Inspection and Maintenance Procedures for European Industry) approach.

The main purpose of the RIMAP approach enhanced by the current RBIF project, is to ensure that defined and accepted levels of risk related to safety, health, environment and business/production/operation are achieved by using resource-efficient and risk-based (risk-informed) methods of inspection.

The Background: CWA 15740:2008


Contents of the RBIF EN16991:2018 Standard

RBIF Framework • RBIF Principles, • Requirements (Personnel, for performing PoF/CoF/Risk

analysis)

RBIF Procedure• Initial analysis and planning, • Data collection and validation, • Multilevel risk analysis, • Decision Making/Action Plan, • Execution and reporting, • Evergreen phase/Performing review

Annex (Examples)• Screening and detailed risk assessment, • Assessment of damage susceptibility(Ref. VGB 506),• Reliability Assessment (Ref. VGB 506)• Type of damage vs. Prioritized methods of inspection…• ...


RBIF Framework • RBIF Principles, • Requirements (Personnel, for performing PoF/CoF/Risk

analysis)

RBIF Procedure• Initial analysis and planning, • Data collection and validation, • Multilevel risk analysis, • Decision Making/Action Plan, • Execution and reporting, • Evergreen phase/Performing review

Annex (Examples)• Screening and detailed risk assessment, • Assessment of damage susceptibility(Ref. VGB 506),• Reliability Assessment (Ref. VGB 506)• Type of damage vs. Prioritized methods of inspection…• ...

Contents of the RBIF Standard


1. Definition of objectives (e.g. company health and safety objectives, optimize timing (prioritization) and extent of next inspection);

2. Definition of the systems, sub-systems (loops) and components to be considered, as well as the respective boundaries (e.g.: preheating system from inlet x to outlet y [P&ID No. xyz] including pressure vessels xyz, heat-exchangers xyz, and pumps xyz, etc.);

3. Definition of the scope of analysis, including operating conditions and exceptional situations to be covered (e.g. start-up/shutdown, disturbances, accidents etc.), as well as the operating period covered;

4. Definition of data sources available (e.g. design data, equipment history, component inspection data, PHA studies, etc.);

5. Definition of regulations to be consider;

6. Team specifications;

7. Tools (software) to be used;

8. Accuracy of the acceptance of the methodology and objectives with relevant institutions concerned (e.g. management and external, approved bodies and authorities).

EN16991:2018Procedure: Initial Analysis and Planning


EN16991:2018 Structured Damage Mechanisms

12


EN16991:2018 : Risk matrix


Data collection and validation

Data collected shall include:

plant level data,

design and available manufacturing and construction data,

operation,

maintenance and inspection,

safety systems (e.g. fire detection systems, etc.),

research to other relevant international available experience and

business related economic data (optional)

EN16991:2018 Procedure: Data collection and validation


Risk

Probability/Likelihood (of failure, PoF)

Consequences (of failure, CoF)

P.L1-1. Damage/failure statistics

P.L1-2. Damage related to design, material or assembly

P.L1-3. Damage caused by operating conditions

P.L1-4. Inspection status & findings

P.L2-1.1 Industry experience

P.L2-1.2. Component age since installed

P.L2-2.1. Design concerns

P.L2-2.2. Potential material problems

P.L2-2.3. Corrosion susceptibility due to material type

P.L2-2.4. Repairs / damage

P.L2-3.1. Quality of water/steam chemistry

P.L2-3.2. Potential for mechanical fatigue stress

P.L2-3.3. Potential for thermal fatigue stresses

P.L2-3.4. Local mechanical over-stressing

P.L2-3.5. Local hot spots

P.L2-3.6. Nominal operating temperature (relative to design operating temperature)

P.L2-3.7. Corrosion susceptibility due to operating conditions

P.L2-3.8. Temperature excursions

P.L2-3.9. Number of cold start-ups or shutdowns over design number acc. to standard [%]

P.L2-3.10. Number of warm start-ups or shutdowns over design number acc. to standard [%]

P.L2-3.11. Number of hot start-ups or shutdowns over design number acc. to standard [%]

P.L2-3.12. Typical s tart-up rate/loading rate

P.L2-3.13. Calculated exhaustionCreep

Fatigue

P.L2-4.1. External inspection status

P.L2-4.2. External inspection status

P.L2-4.3. Pressure testing status

P.L2-4.4. Qualitative inspection effectiveness category

P.L2-4.5. Replica damage class

C.L1-1. Health and safety consequences

C-L1-2. Environmental consequences

C.L1-3. Economic consequences

C.L2-1.3. Occupancy parameter/frequency and duration of exposure to hazard of a person/persons - F

C.L2-1.4. Inevitability parameter, taking into account the vulnerability Av

C.L2-1.2. Injury type/severity of harm - S

C.L2-1.1. Number of persons

C.L2-2.2. Estimated area affected by failure (outside plant)

C.L2-2.1. Environment

C.L2-3.1. Lost megawatt hours (lost production)

C.L2-3.2. Estimated cost in the area affected by failure

C.L2-3.3. Repair cost

GFF – Selection from table

GCC – Selection from table

PoF = GFF x Modification Factor

Factor-Based CoF

Level “0” Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

Detailed analysis based on (e.g.):

> strain measurements> hardness meas.> A-parameter> FE Analysis> crack assessment>...

GFF – Generic Failure Frequency

GCC – Generic Consequence Class

Factor-Based CoF

PoF = GFF x Modification Factor

P.L2-4.6. Damage/degradation present

Initial expert based

assumption of GFF

Screening Modification

Factors for GFF

Intermediate25 Modification Factors

for GFF

Detailed Analysis

Qualitative Semi-Quantitative Quantitative

EN16991:2018 Procedure: Multilevel Risk Analysis


If NO, perform Level 2 assessment…

Medium Risk

Low Risk

High Risk

Medium RiskLow

High

Low HighPo

FCoF

• Detailed NDT• Strain measurements• Hardness measurements• A-parameter• FE analysis• Crack assessment• ...

Level 3(detailed analysis, based on e.g.)

Decision making / Action Plan

Performance Review / Evergreen Phase

Execution and Reporting

Negligible

Low

Medium

High

V.High Action as for High Risk, consider replacement

RBIF Procedure: Is the risk acceptable?


Risk-Based Inspection Framework tackles a number of particular issues, among which the most important are the following ones:

1. The qualitative modification factor (probability of failure related)

2. Key performance indicators (KPIs)3. The ageing model4. Link to new developments from other standards – e.g.

API581:20165. Introduction of the IOW-concept (API584)

The new developments in the EN16991:2018


The qualitative probability factors that can influence the probability and consequences of potential failures. However, in order to consider these factors into the qualitative risk assessment, it is required to as-sign them a comparative level. These qualitative levels are different for screening and detailed assessment steps.

1. The qualitative probability factor (probability of failure related)

Screening Detailed


The example Level 1 Probability Factors (Assessment of damage Susceptibility in RBIF is adapted from he Annex 5 from VGB-Standard-S-506)

Annex A3: Examples


P.L1-1. Damage/failure statistics

QUESTION Provide a value for the “Damage/Failure Statistics” Factor, according to the scale below.

Hints Are you aware of this type of component failing in your operating company, or the industry? If yes, how often?

Explanation We look at both critical damage, unacceptable for further operation, and failure statistics, and how this knowledge influences the Generic Failure Frequency (GFF). Example: if a vessel has GFF of 5·10-4, the high level of damages and failures can increase the PoF to e.g. 8·10-4(NOTE: An example only!).

ANSWER (Value/Scale)

N/A Not applicable: Not relevant, not applied. Nicht relevant: Nicht betrachtet in der Analyse.

VL Very low: Shows no evidence of failure (Long operating experience)

Sehr niedrig: kein Hinweis auf möglichen Schaden - Schadensstatistiken (intern und extern) beruht auf lange Betriebserfahrung

L Low: Shows no evidence of failure (Short operating experience)

Niedrig: kein Hinweis auf möglichen Schaden - Schadensstatistiken (intern und extern) beruht auf kurzer Betriebserfahrung

M Medium: Isolated cases only (internal or external statistics)

Mittel: Schadensstatistiken (intern und extern) zeigen nur vereinzelte Schäden

H High: Failures have occurred in similar components (internally or externally)

Hoch: Schadensstatistiken (intern und extern) zeigen Schäden an vergleichbaren Komponenten

VH* Very high: Failures regularly occur on similar components / Statistics not available*

Sehr hoch: Schadensstatistiken (intern und extern) zeigen vermehrt Schäden an vergleichbaren Komponenten / Schadensstatistiken nicht verfügbar*

References: VGB-S-506, adapted

Comments/Warnings:

1. If there is any doubt regarding the interpretation of the text, the German wording prevails 2. Alternatively, the L/M/H scale can be used * - This value to be assumed/applied if value for this factor is unknown, or data are not available


P.L1-3. Damage caused by operating conditions

QUESTION Provide a value for the “Damage caused by operating conditions” factor, according to the scale below.

Hints Are you aware of the possibility of damage occurring due to the combination of the material and operating conditions/process fluids used? If yes, consider the frequency of occurrence, and the rate of the degradation.

Explanation: Takes into account damage arising from the operating conditions, or the combination of process fluid and material used, and also the frequency of this damage occurring. Example: X20CrMoV121 main steam piping operating in the creep range (~530°C) is susceptible to creep damage - this is normal and the component(s) are designed with this in mind, thus the answer can be Medium in this case. High and Very High answers can be given if the known damage state exceeds normal expectations, or if the operating conditions influencing the damage exceed normal boundaries.

ANSWER (Value/Scale)

N/A Not applicable: Not relevant, not applied. Nicht relevant: Nicht betrachtet in der Analyse.

VL Very low: Not susceptible under all foreseeable and known operating conditions / not expected due to the process fluid and material used (Long operating experience)

Sehr niedrig: Nicht anfällig unter allen vorhersehbaren und bisher bekannten Betriebsbedingungen / aufgrund der eingesetzten Werkstoffe und des Prozessmediums nicht zu erwarten (Lange Betriebserfahrung)

L Low: Not susceptible under all foreseeable and known operating conditions / not expected due to the process fluid and material used (Short operating experience)

Niedrig: Nicht anfällig unter allen vorhersehbaren und bisher bekannten Betriebsbedingungen / aufgrund der eingesetzten Werkstoffe und des Prozessmediums nicht zu erwarten (Kurze Betriebserfahrung)

M Medium: Susceptible due to the known operating conditions and type of construction / damage may occasionally occur due to the process fluids and materials used

Mittel: Anfällig aufgrund der bisher bekannten Betriebsbedingungen und bauartbedingt / aufgrund der eingesetzten Werkstoffe und Medien könnten vereinzelt Schäden auftreten

H High: Expected to occur due to the known operating conditions / damage expected due to the process fluids and the material used

Hoch: Es können Schäden aufgrund der bisher bekannten Betriebsbedingungen auftreten / aufgrund der eingesetzten Werkstoffe und Medien werden Schäden erwartet

VH* Very high: Increased rate of damage due to the known operating conditions / very probable due to the process fluids and materials used

Sehr hoch: Es können vermehrt Schäden aufgrund der bisher bekannten Betriebsbedingungen auftreten / aufgrund der eingesetzten Werkstoffe und des Mediums sind Schäden sehr wahrscheinlich

References: VGB-S-506, adapted

Comments/Warnings:

1. If there is any doubt regarding the interpretation of the text, the German wording prevails 2. Alternatively, the L/M/H scale can be used * - This value to be assumed/applied if value for this factor is unknown, or data are not available


Concept KPI pyramid adapted from API 754 -Management tool to measure and to react on a specific development within a plant. Lagging indicators –

events occurred in the past (e.g. LoPC)

Leading indicators –organizational attributes (e.g. # people trained)

2. The key performance indicators (KPIs)


2. The key performance indicators (KPIs)

Examples of KPI

template

Examples of KPI and objective of

selection


3. New features: IOW - alignment with API584:2014

Source: API 584:2014


Describes a mathematical formulation of degradation (e.g. ageing) of the asset.

CWA 63:2012: Ageing behaviour of Structural Components with regards to integrated Lifetime Assessment and subsequent Asset Management of constructed Facilities

4. New features: The aging model

The normal ageing prediction model involved certain uncertainties. Therefore, it is required to minimize the uncertainties in the prediction process in order to optimize the maintenance interventions. This model can define the range of service life for structures by incorporating the various uncertainties and system’s behavior into consideration.


Inspection reduces the risk by reducing the uncertainty!

The probability that loss of containment will occur is directly related to the amount of information that is available from the inspection and the ability to quantify that damage

PoF a function of time, and the effectiveness of the inspection in identifying and quantifying the type and extent of the damage

5. New features: alignment with API581:2016

Source: API 581:2008

Source: Steinbeis R-Tech: iRiS-Petro


Your priority/constraints: EN 16991 API 581/580

Power plants

Process plants

Other plants () ()

Qualitative ()

Quantitative

Expert involvement high medium/high

End-user procedures and national standards required

Answer: EN or API?

RBIFApplications

ExamplesSteinbeis Advanced Risk Technologies


Finland


Germany


South Africa


Analyses in database organized in logical, easily searchable tree structure

Station Unit

o Plant Area• Analysis 1• Analysis 2• ….

Possibility of selection of one or multiple analyses for display, depending on type of report

Overview of plants and RBI analyses


Number of High, Medium, Low, Negligible, Not Assessed for: Level 1 (by Component): Safety & Business Level 2 (by DM): Safety & Business

Risk Status


Risk Matrix

Level 1 (by Component): Safety & Business Level 2 (by DM): Safety & Business


Risk MatrixComponent/DM Counts


Component Tables


Search & Filter


No of DMs (H, M, L, N) Before/After by Area/System/Subsystem

Comparison time-n vs. time n+1Number of Damage Mechanisms


Comparison Part A / Part BProbability of Failure PoF (Sum and Average) Before/After by Area/System/Subsystem All assessed DMs or Only Inspected DMs (<2 yrs ago, 2-4, 4-6,…)


RBI Recommended Action PlanExample: Actions Based on Risk

Negligible

Low

Medium

HighExtensive inspection, Remnant Life Assessment. Assess on Level 3.

Extensive spot tests and inspection. Review existing scope and add inspections as necessary

Spot tests, continue with present scope

No action

V.High

Action as for High Risk, consider Repair/Replacement. Assess on Level 3.


Automatic high level recommendation based on criticality (Risk Category)

Inspection Prioritization

RBI Recommended Inspection/Action Plan


Risk over time: RBI reducing risks

Conclusions


Automatic high level recommendation based on criticality (Risk Category)

Inspection Prioritization

RBI Recommended Inspection/Action Plan


Identify the highest risk components in order to optimize inspections, increase safety and reduce costs.

Inspect the plant in the best possible way (know the best starting point -OPTIMUM). Cover the most important components within the available time and budget

Recommendation for optimal inspection plan: ↗ safety ↗ savings

Under Development…Financial Risk – Optimizing Inspections

Component Risks – Typical Plant, 80/20 rule


Typical RBI results

Consequences

Prob

abili

ty


Less usual RBI results: savings + inspection plan (know what is NOT to be inspected!)

(€300,000)

(€200,000)

(€100,000)

€0

€100,000

€200,000

€300,000

Difference WITHOUT inspection

Difference WITH inspection

Losses

Components with MAX gain in NPV when inspected

Components with practically NO gain in NPV when inspected

Component with LOSSES in NPV no

matter inspected or not

Gains


2010

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Beyond Predictive Maintenance(“digitally enabled”)


Beyond Predictive Maintenance:DIGITALLY ENABLED!

McKinsey (2018)


Practically it means that the components are dynamically clustered (e.g. “all superheater outlet headers”) according their characteristics and associated risks

Based on their characteristics, the new, yet to be analysed components (e.g. a new superheater), can be than pre-assigned to the corresponding clusters and a preliminary, “automatic” risk assessment made (e.g. “medium risk”)

Learn from “big data”

C2

C1

C3

C4

New component

?

?


Data Engine Program is used

Clustering Neural network

1134 valve data from projects 7 characteristics of valves

Application of Advanced Methods

1134 valves from 13 power plants: Characteristics

Design pressure

Design temperature

Nominal diameter

Cr%

Operating pressure

Operating temperature

Risk


Possible valve examples are positioned.

4 clusters (regarding Design Pressure, Design Temperature and Nominal Diameter characteristics)

2 examples

Clustering (Fuzzy C-Means)


for training process 168 data for testing process 8 data as input parameters 7 characteristics of valves as output parameter “risk” characteristic are used

Neural Network (Multilayer Perceptron)


Neural Network (Perceptron)

Learning Curve

Prediction of risk by NN


Use Case Cost Prediction – GB-301AOptimal replacement

Optimal Replacement Time


Optimize Costs, improve safety

Proposed Solution: Optimal Replacement of Components

Cost

Early replacement – waste of investment

Late replacement –increased cost of failures

Early Replacement Late Replacement


Typical RBI results

Optimum


Sample results:What can we learn from data?

A B C D E

1

2

3

4

5

Prob

abili

ty

Consequence

Detailed matrix Level 2

C2:80 LBB11 BR010MR 201Weld

C2:the rest of the Welds on80 LBB11

D1:Ue4 ASA

C3:B14 Bend (Bk2a 2004)B7 Bend (Bk2a 2004)

B9 Bend (Bk2a 2008)

LBA11, LBA12, LBA13:B28 BendMS67 Weld...

System 2

System 1

System 1 shows the greatest failure potential in accordance with the “expert opinion”


Standards: API: API 581:2008 >>> API 581:2016 EU: CWA 15740:2008/2011 >>> EN 16991:2018

AI: Case-based reasoning; FCM clustering; Neural networks… US: ASME PCC3:2007 >> ASME PCC3:2017!

AI: NOT only big data – but also, e.g., Expert Systems

Applications, applications, applications

Conclusions: The world of RBI in 2018

Conclusions – “Risk Intelligence” ExampleA BI-based Dashboard


Beyond Predictive Maintenance(“digitally enabled”)

2010

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2000

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1990

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1970

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Which plant has the highest average Business & Safety risk?

Which plant has the highest average Business and Safety Risk for the count of DM for Level 2 Risk rank by Safety?

For that plant, check the Components which are not assessed? Leading Damage Mechanisms?

Which component has the highest probability of failure? On-going work Machine learning and model development

Typical questions for a plant manager


2. Which plant has the highest average Business & Safety risk?


3. Which plant has the highest average Business and Safety Risk for the count of DM for Level 2 Risk rank by Safety?


4. Plant N: Components which are not assessed? Leading Damage Mechanisms?

Comparison between the new European Risk- Based Inspection (RBI… · 2018-11-30 · Comparison...

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