Commercial Aviation Safety

Team (CAST)

Runway Safety

Glenn W. Michael

Manager. CAST International

Operations

North Asia COSCAP Steering Meeting

Ulan Bator, Mongolia

June 21, 2011

In the U.S., our focus was set by the White

House Commission on Aviation Safety, and The

National Civil Aviation Review Commission

(NCARC) (1997)

1)Reduce Fatal Accident Rate

2) Strategic Plan to Improve Safety

3) Improve Safety Worldwide

Vision - Mission - Goals Vision • Key aviation stakeholders acting cooperatively to lead the world-

wide aviation community to the highest levels of global commercial aviation safety by focusing on the right things.

Mission • Enable a continuous improvement framework built on monitoring the

effectiveness of implemented actions and modifying actions to achieve the goal.

Goal • Reduce the US commercial aviation fatal accident rate 80% by

2007.

And

• Maintain a continuous reduction in fatality risk in US and International commercial aviation beyond 2007.

* Representing P&W and RR

** Observer

AIA

Airbus

ALPA

APA

ATA

IFALPA

NACA

Boeing

GE*

RAA

FSF

CAST brings key stakeholders to cooperatively

develop & implement a prioritized safety agenda

Commercial Aviation

Safety Team

(CAST)

DOD

FAA • Aircraft Certification

• Flight Standards

• System Safety

• Air Traffic Operations

• Research

NASA

ICAO**(ECAST)

JAA

TCC

NATCA**

NTSB**

IATA**

AAPA**

ATAC**

APFA**

ACI-NA**

Government Industry

• Safety

enhancement

development

• Master safety plan

• Enhancement

effectiveness

• Future areas of

study

• Data analyses

CAST

Joint Safety

Analysis Teams (JSAT)

Joint Safety

Implementation

Teams (JSIT)

Joint Implementation

Measurement Data

Analysis Team (JIMDAT)

Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST)

CAST

Moving into the Future

ASIAS

Aviation Safety Information Analysis and

Sharing System

Airport Driver Recurrent Training

• All FAR Part 139 Airports now require annual training of airport/air carrier employees who access the movement area (runways/taxiways)

• Actions: – Implement recurrent training for all drivers who

access the movement area

• Status of as March 2011 – All 567 FAR 139 airports now require annual

recurrent training for ALL movement area drivers

RUNWAY EXCURSIONS

Runway Excursions increasing

worldwide

Leading causal factor is

Unstabilized Approaches

UNSTABILIZED

APPROACHES

• Unstabilized approaches have resulted in runway overruns and veer-offs (Runway Excursions) and also have contributed to inadequate situational awareness in some CFIT accidents.

Unstable Approach Effects

• Unstabilized approaches may likely lead to:

• Runway excursions

• Landing short

• Missed approaches

• Controlled flight into terrain

• Hard landings

ICAO In Instrument Meteorological

Conditions (IMC), all flights shall be stabilized by no lower than 300 m (1000 ft) height above

threshold.

All flights of any nature shall be stabilized by no lower than 150

m (500 ft) height above threshold.

ICAO Doc 8168

FAA

• The FAA stabilized approach concept is

one in which the pilot establishes and

maintains a constant angle glide path,

towards a predetermined point on the

landing runway. It is based on the pilot’s

judgment of visual cues and depends on

establishing and maintaining a constant

final descent airspeed, a constant descent

rate, and a specific aircraft configuration.

• FAA AC 91-79.

Stabilized Approach Criteria

• Based on ICAO guidelines, the FSF created the criteria for a stabilized approach:

• The aircraft is on the correct flight path.

• Only small changes in heading and pitch are required.

• The aircraft speed is not more than Vref + 20 knots IAS and not less than Vref.

• The aircraft is in the correct landing configuration.

• Vertical speed is no greater than 1000 feet/minute (unless greater rate is required by approach procedure).

Criteria (cont)

• Power setting is appropriate for the aircraft

configuration and is not below the minimum power for

approach.

• All briefings and checklists have been conducted.

• ILS Category I is flown within one dot of the glideslope

and localizer; Category II and III ILS are flown within

the expanded localizer band; during circling approach

wings should be level on final not later than 300 feet

above airport elevation.

• Any deviations from above elements, required by a

unique approach procedure, require special briefing.

ATC CONTRIBUTIONS

• Improper speed control

• Delayed descent instructions

• No available precision approach

• Late runway or approach type change

• Vectoring to runways with significant tailwind component

• Vectoring into short final distances

• Vectoring resulting in crews to intercept glidepath from above

• Lack of or wrong information about distance to touchdown

• Lack of information about preceding aircraft

No Fault Go-Around Policy

• The failure to go-around following an

unstabilized approach contributed to

one-third of all landing excursion

accidents. Furthermore, the resulting

landing attempts had added to long

landings, fast approaches, and fast

and hard touchdowns

RUNWAY CONFUSION

• Action: Complete Runway Safety Review

of 20 airports chosen based wrong runway

departure data

– Runway Safety Action Team process used for

reviews

• Status: All short term initiatives identified

have been completed.

• Follow Up: The FAA administrator

directed analysis efforts at 22 additional

airports

Lexington Blue Grass (KLEX)

2006

• Aircraft was cleared for

departure on Runway 22 but

departed on Runway 26

– Comair flight 5191 crashed

approximately ½ mile from the end

of runway 26

• Similar non-fatal events

occurred prior to this event

Findings – Part 121 Operations

Airports with the highest number of overall reports have similar characteristics:

– CLE, HOU, ANC

– Multiple runway thresholds in close proximity to one another

• Airport layout requires use of same taxiway to reach the departure end

– Some require pilots to taxi across multiple runways

• ATC Clearance ‘cleared for takeoff’ provided prior to final runway

– Terminal building in close proximity to runway threshold

Cleveland-Hopkins Intl

(KCLE)

Aircraft cleared for takeoff on runway 24L

Houston Hobby Airport (KHOU)

Aircraft cleared for takeoff on runway 12R

•Aircraft took off on runway 17

• Runway 17 (2,200 feet

closed due to construction)

Ted Stevens Anchorage International

(PANC) • 1983 – Korean Airlines DC-10

was cleared to taxi to Runway 32. The DC-10 crew inadvertently taxied onto Runway 7L/25R and struck PA-31 on Runway 7L

• 2002 – China Airlines A-340 The crew was cleared for takeoff on Runway 32; but, departed from taxiway K

• 2002 – aircraft lined up on taxiway R for takeoff instead of Runway 32

• 2005 - EVA635, an all cargo MD11 was issued a takeoff clearance for Runway 32. EVA635 departed from taxiway Y

Air Carrier Pilot Training

• Action: Air carriers to provide pilots with

simulator or other training that

incorporates realistic scenarios from

pushback through taxi.

• Status: Of the 112 active air carriers, all

have reported that they are in compliance.

• Follow Up: Work continues to improve

training on ground movement procedures.

Air Carrier Cockpit Procedures

• Action: Air carriers to review cockpit

procedures to identify and develop a plan

to address elements that contribute to

wrong runway departures.

• Status: Of the 112 active air carriers, all

have reported that they are in compliance.

• Example: Many airlines now require

checklist item completion prior to, not

during taxi.

Best Defense Against Critical

Runway Conflicts

1997?000 severity A and Band high-hazard conflicts

RELs

Lights (undi fferentiated)

THLs

ASDE/Alerts

Other than survei l lance-based defense

Total of 167 events

Technology

• Runway Safety sponsors research on new

runway safety technology such as

– Low Cost Ground Surveillance Systems

– Runway Status Lights

• Future technology will focus on providing

information in the cockpit

– Moving map display – electronic flight bags

Jeppesen Airport Moving Map

33

History of RWSL Research

1988 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2003 2001 2002 2005 2004 1990

NASA

Pilot

Simulation

Boston

Runway Status

Light

Demonstration

D/FW Runway

Status Light

Development,

Evaluation

Original Lincoln

Laboratory Airport

Surface Safety

Study

Broad

vision of

surface

automation

“Surveillance

not good

enough”

Established

pilot

acceptance of

Runway Status

Light

Restart Runway

Status Light

Program

FAA, Lincoln Laboratory focus

on surface surveillance

improvements

Better

surveillance

available

FAA awards

contract for

enhanced surface

surveillance

systems (ASDE-X)

RWSL Concept

• Surveillance-driven (ASDE-X) airport lighting to warn pilots when a runway is unsafe for crossing or departure

• Runway Entrance Lights (RELs) are deployed at taxiway/runway intersections and illuminate when there is high-speed traffic on or approaching the runway

• Takeoff-hold lights (THLs) are deployed on the runway departure zone and illuminate when the runway is occupied in front of a departing aircraft

• The lights provide runway status but never convey clearance; i.e. no “green” state

Conceptual Diagram of the RWSL System

Runway Status Lights Installation at

Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport

West Side

DFW

in-pavement Light Fixture

Fusion

Server

RWSL Safety Logic

Transponder Multilateration

Field Lighting System

Terminal Surveillance

Radar (ASR-9)

Surface Skin Track Radar

Controller Evaluation

Display

RWSL Evaluation

System at DFW

State Machine

Light Activation

Logic

STPUNK

ARR LDG TAX DEP

LBT DBTLRO

AIR

STPUNK

ARR LDG TAX DEP

LBT DBTLRO

AIR

Runway Status Lights Operation

Pilot Feedback

0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

100.0

Comprehension Utility Acceptance

95 % 91 %

79 %

Effective training is essential for Runway Status Lights to be useful

18 Question

Survey

“…System worked as promised…”

“I thought that they worked great and is an incredible

idea. INSTALL THEM EVERYWHERE!”

Comments:

BUT Significant complaints about brightness, configuration

Only partial compliance with “Stop-on-Red”

Favorable

Unfavorable

Feedback from Air Traffic Controllers • Favorable response from

controllers

– No impact on capacity

• Suggested improvements

– Considered relatively minor

Runway Status Lights shown to be compatible with normal,

safe ATC tempo, style of operations

“…would have saved two Operational Errors charged

to me in the last 12 months…”

“…I found no need to change how I issued clearances

when status lights were active…”

• Suppress light activations due to aircraft taxiing on

runway

• Suppress light activations due to rain-induced

clutter

• Make lights dimmer at night

Next Steps: FAROS and RILs

• Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS) – Provides warning to aircraft on

approach to occupied runway

– Operational concept under review

– Operational evaluation planned for FY10

• Runway Intersection Lights (RILs) – Extend protection to arriving

aircraft

– Require different safety logic elements

– Engineering tests planned for FY11

FAROS

Summary

• Runway Status Lights augment a layered defense against surface accidents

• Upgrades to FAA surface surveillance (i.e. ASDE-X) enabled assessment of Runway Status Lights to proceed

• Operational Evaluations of Runway Status Lights ongoing

• Follow-on work planned for FAROS and RILs

LOW COST GUIDANCE

SYSTEM

(LCGS)

• SIMILAR TO ASDE-X

• LOWER COST MULTILATERATION

SYSTEM

LCGS

• Initial Evaluation; Spokane, WA

• 3 Additional sites will be selected for

testing

• Funding decision by end of 2010

A-SMGCS in Europe

International Perspective CAST Safety Enhancements

Western-built transport hull loss accidents, by airline domicile, 2001 through 2010

Accidents per

million departures

United States

and Canada

0.4

Latin America

and Caribbean

2.3

Europe

0.6

China

0.2 Middle East

2.0

Africa

7.6

Asia

1.6

Oceania

0.0

(Excluding

China)

C.I.S.

2.5

CAST

RASG-PA

ESSI

COSCAP UEMOA

COSCAP CIS

COSCAP NA, SA, SEA

World

1.0

COSCAP BAG COSCAP GS

COSCAP CEMEC

Resources

• http://www.faa.gov/runwaysafety

• http://flash.aopa.org/asf/runwaySafety/

• http://www.iataonline.com

• http://www.flightsafety.org

• http://www.cast-safety.org

• http://www.icao.int

http://www.cast-safety.org/