Comiilt and Comsec: Th:e Tactics of II - nsa.gov · docid: 3561977 p~·.i cl.a.'.:)sifi ecl/.ifor...
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DOCID: 3561977 C:if FICI AL U -39 9P dl \( ' .. .. ____ I-- ····-- ··················· ················ ········ ·········· ··· ····· ····· ·· (b)(3)-P. L. 86-36 Comiilt and Comsec: Th :e Tactics of 1914-1918-Part II Organ izationally, there was little' distinction between Comint and Comsec ; they were two sides of the same coin. But they developed at vastly different rates, with Comscc consistently lagging behind Comint. Indeed, indifference to the importance of protecting communications contributed grutly to the art of interception. An example of the serious losses suff cred by the. Russian army as a result of poor Comscc was mentioned in part one'. Leu well known is the fact that other countries, particularly Britain and the United·States, also paid heavily for their Comscc mistakes. Of the major powers, France: and Germany were the · most consistently of the importance of communications discipline. The Allies Rus.Jia. -'-Except for futilely looking for spies among their ranks and court-martialing some officers with German·sounding names, the Russians did nothing to cry · to plug the leaks in their communications until late 1915. when the first Comscc station was established. But it too late:. The Comint advantage which the Germans gained during the first month of the war continued until Russia, . torn by revolution, left the war in 1917. with di.sastrous results. In the fall of 1916, for example, the British suscaincd thousands of casualties in attempting to a village OD the river Somme. it .was finally capcurcd, the British found in an enemy dugout a complete transcript of an earlier operational order which a British major had read over the telephone to one of his battalions despite the subordinate's protests that the proecdure was dangerous. The British signal historian writes: " Hundreds of brave men perished, hundreds more were rnaimed for life as a result of this one act of incredible . . . . " He added that .Comsec was so poor in September 1916 that "it would not have been surprising if the German Intelligence Service had been able to reconstruct . .. practially the whole constitution of the British Army as it existed at the time, and to anticipate. the most intentioru of the Scaff." A combined intercept and security service was _in. full operation by the end of 1916 and was immediately successful in intercepting enemy communications and in catching shortcomings in British But even though countless compromises were: improvement in · Comscc was very slow. It wasn't until grounded· circuits were moved back farther from the front Jines and eventually replaced by twisted.pair circuits, and alternating- Britain .-Britain's Comscc 'ii.wakening came in current sets were replaced by direct-current equipment, when it was discovered that the enemy was intercepting that British wireline communications could be considered British forward wireline communications. Orders were technologically secure. Cryptographically,·the iruroduction immediately issued to improve the insulation of all wire of code and cipher also helped. circuits and to move ground connections back at least Unfortunately, much of this was negated, until late in yards from the front-line trenches. In addition , the war, by the careless use of the telephone. Such communicators were ordered not to mention the names or carelessness in forward areas was made a court-martial movements of units, the: location of guns, or .other tactical offense, but the enlisted men were·. the usually information. punished. Officers to immune; General Staff All of this had little effect. In fact, compromi ses were officers in particular resisted all -'tempts _ac · Comsec . worse in 1916 than in 191, _ . Despite orders, officers discipline:. According to one author, the General Staff continued discussing plans over the telephone, sometimes nullified the: value: of a _ secure telegraph system by using.· it Classified by DIRNSA (NSAM 123-2 ). Eiaempc Pron GOS, EO I Cat. 2. Dedu Da1e Casinot Be Determined. ·· · -- .. ·· p r\JCLASS IFIEDh'FOR OFFICIAL USQ ., .... ---- ...... ,, .... - -..... -.... , .... ,..,, , ..... , ..... - J · pproved for Release by f\JS.A. o 5-1 1-2009 FOIAC ase#5155' • : r •· ••
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Transcript of Comiilt and Comsec: Th:e Tactics of II - nsa.gov · docid: 3561977 p~·.i cl.a.'.:)sifi ecl/.ifor...
DOCID: 3561977 p~·.I CL .A.'.:)SIF IECl/.IFOR C:ifFICIAL U-39 9Pdl \(
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____ I--····--··················· ················ ·· ··· ··· ·········· ············· ·· (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
Comiilt and Comsec: Th:e Tactics of 1914-1918-Part II
Organizationally, there was little ' distinction between Comint and Comsec; they were two sides of the same coin. But they developed at vastly different rates, with Comscc consistently lagging behind Comint. Indeed, indifference to the importance of protecting communications contributed grutly to the art of communicatio~ interception.
An example of the serious losses suff cred by the. Russian army as a result of poor Comscc was mentioned in part one'. Leu well known is the fact that other countries, particularly Britain and the United·States, also paid heavily for their Comscc mistakes. Of the major powers, France: and Germany were the · most consistently awa~ of the importance of communications discipline.
The Allies Rus.Jia. -'-Except for futilely looking for spies among
their ranks and court-martialing some officers with German·sounding names, the Russians did nothing to cry ·to plug the leaks in their communications until late 1915. when the first Comscc station was established. But it w~s too late:. The Comint advantage which the Germans gained during the first month of the war continued until Russia , . torn by revolution, left the war in 1917.
with di.sastrous results. In the fall of 1916, for example, the British suscaincd thousands of casualties in attempting to ~ake a village OD the river Somme. W~~ it .was finally capcurcd, the British found in an enemy dugout a complete transcript of an earlier operational order which a British major had read over the telephone to one of his battalions despite the subordinate's protests that the proecdure was dangerous. The British signal historian writes: " Hundreds of brave men perished, hundreds more were rnaimed for life as a result of this one act of incredible foolishne~ . . . . " He added that .Comsec was so poor in September 1916 that "it would not have been surprising if the German Intelligence Service had been able to reconstruct . .. practially the whole constitution of the British Army as it existed at the time, and to anticipate. the most jcalously.guar~ intentioru of the Scaff."
A combined intercept and security service was _in. full operation by the end of 1916 and was immediately successful in intercepting enemy communications and in catching shortcomings in British Corns~: But even though countless compromises were: re~rted, improvement in · Comscc was very slow. It wasn't until grounded· circuits were moved back farther from the front Jines and eventually replaced by twisted.pair circuits, and alternating-
Britain.-Britain's Comscc 'ii.wakening came in 191~ current sets were replaced by direct-current equipment, when it was discovered that the enemy was intercepting that British wireline communications could be considered British forward wireline communications. Orders were technologically secure. Cryptographically, ·the iruroduction immediately issued to improve the insulation of all wire of code and cipher also helped. circuits and to move ground connections back at least 10~ Unfortunately, much of this was negated, until late in yards from the front-line trenches. In addition, the war, by the careless use of the telephone. Such communicators were ordered not to mention the names or carelessness in forward areas was made a court-martial movements of units, the: location of guns, or.other tactical offense, but the enlisted men were·. the '~nes usually information. punished. Officers scc~ed to ~ immune; General Staff
All of this had little effect. In fact, compromises were officers in particular resisted all -'tempts _ac · Comsec . worse in 1916 than in 191,_. Despite orders, officers discipline: . According to one author, the General Staff continued discussing plans over the telephone, sometimes nullified the: value: of a _secure telegraph system by using.· it
Classified by DIRNSA (NSAM 123- 2). Eiaempc Pron GOS, EO I 16~2. Cat. 2. Dedu Da1e Casinot Be Determined.
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for routine traffic while continuing to talk tactia over the telephone. At one stroke they thus eliminated, as the author put it, "all the unimportant and confusing talk which had for years hampered the enemy in his efforts to intercept the really important conversations ...
In fairness, it should be said that the British signal officer labored under all the difficulties inherent in dual. hatting. H is authority over Comsec in his division derived from the General Staff. He was at the same time operationally responsible to the line officers above him, and they usually considered him a signal officer only. That, together with generally feeble support from the Staff. weakened his Comsec role. •
Fran,e. -Like the British, the French discovered the need for Comsec in l 91 '.5 . Unlike the British. they enforced telephone discipline. In quiet Stt:tors. only a few specially trained officers were allowed to use the telephone, and all messages had to be conveyed in frequently changed codes. The restrictions were relaxed somewhat in the more ~ctivc sectors on the theory that whatever the enemy
. · learned would be outdated before it could be used.
The United States. - The technical aspects of Comsec 1 were fairly well known by the time America entered the war. and we took full advantage of that knowlrdge. But like t~e British, we never learned to deal adequately with
1 loose talk on the telephone. ·
J\mcrican practaCl! was to send discrepancy reports to the commanders of units which had violated Comsec procedures. The reports were usually ignored. The Chief of the Radio Intelligence Section reported that only once was an officer reprimanded for violating Comscc rules. In most cases the offenders were excused on the grounds that they didn't know of the regulations, or they were too busy to follow them, or they were justified in their actions:
Signal Corps telephone operators were instructed to rip out any connection over which secret information was passfog in the dear: While this undoubtedly reduced compromises, it did not eliminate them. To cite just one cxa~plc, .an .American regimental commander dose to the
. e~cmy lines used the phone to pass plain language instructions for an attack. Two minutes later the Germans unleashed the heaviest barrage that had ever hit that
. .particular unit. The Chief of the Signal Corps' Code :: ,· .. · ·Compilation Section later wrote: "How many lives were : . . . .. needlessly sacrificed by this indiscretion can never be
computed, but the capture of an enemy amplifier in the front area of this attack emphasized the folly of such negligence ...
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· The American tactical codes (the so-called "trench codes") were excellent, but again the human clement limited their effectiveness. As Frank Moorman, Chief of the Radio Intelligence Section, put it: ..... there certainly
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- c~~:~~!\P~,· .. -.... ~· ... -····t •. \: never existed on the western front a force more negligent in the use of their own code than was the American army." Moorman later suggested a way of dealing with t~ who used code carelessly:
My idea would be to hang a few of the offenders. This would not only get rid of some but woulq discourage the development of others. It would be a saving of lives to do it. It is a sacrifice of American lives to unnecessarily assist the enemy in the soh.nion of our code.
SECRET ............ ....... -- N!! 131
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"CHAMPLAIN" ·CODI!
-•u-.urnu .-..WZIYF'n -
Moorman summed up America's Com~ effort this. way: "We never got a real control because the ar'!}istice Came along just about that time, ju.tt W'1en WC WCre getting to work." ·
· .. ! .... .
The Central Powni• G"'"41ny.-ln Comsec, the . Germans· seemed · to do
~Jmost everything right. Radio wa$ ~cv~ .uie<i 'when more secure communications could be employed; plain language was held to a minimum; co~municatiol).S .eciuiPrrient and iyncms were as secure as the ttthnology ~ou.14·f>errtjit; and the need-to-know principle was scrictly o~~d.: .. · . · : ·
•J.itt1c infonnatioa is avail.ble on . c:omi« :. in ··die ~usuoHungarian army.
..Theomially at last, tht '°'4iiers .w~ imalled ~ground mats ... did llOt know what they weft for,and the ~~didn'.t bow how the signals~ rolleaed. Only auchoriied pu-. wen allowed in the listening mtimu, although in anerimci~ troOp. Coaad. rake refuge there. bur the inliereep( equipment lwl to be. bpc ~ o~ ~.ibt. :
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. Aware of the price the R.ussia.ns had paid for . the_ir 1~a.r'~tHI ~A*rattM; Pidi Mfoh'td' J!linaen~t;'1ls'l'te'as
· the spring of 1917, 'oPJio~ uiing ··field ·' radiO·· in the German army except for the interception ·of enemy communications. Hc was overruled, but Coinsec. was by then becoming second nature to German communicators. By posters, lectures arid orders · they. were constantly reminded that " The Enemy Is Listening." They took the warning seriously-rumor had ·it that violators wound up in front of a firing squad. ·
All the belligerents restricted communications near the front lines. In the Germans' 3-km-wide "danger zone" only officers and selected NCO's were allowed to use the telephone. Excrpt in emergencies all messa~es had to .be encoded ; this included those sent by courier, do~s and pigeons.
By 1918, German communications discipline was so good that the Americans obtained little intelligence from the enemy 's radio or -telephone traffic. One rta.son was that Comscc officers were by th.en attached t~ headquarters
. down at )cast as far as regiments.· But lapses still occurred. In March 1918, a German station comproniised a new code by sending the same message in both the old and new
ccxlcs. Within 48 hours the Allies were readin,R. the new. ·rt;de and lc'nriV ril'any ·:of d~:plai* for me major·' German 'offe~ivc that beAan ii 'ftel: 1tter::"l'lie sencling.of this one . mtssage mlist etttainly· have cost th~ lives of thousands of Germans," Moorman said, "and conceivably It changed the result of one or the grcatcSt efforts made by the German armies."
On another occasion, a German listening station interce~ a message about a planned cnrmy gas attack, and relayed it in the clear to headquarters. An Allied intercept unit caught that mnuge, and caused th~ rime and place of the attack: to be changed. According to a German report on the incident, " . . . the cattlcssness of our operators was-the direct ausc of the death of many of their comrades."
· }llmming
The AJlics were divided on the q·uestion of. jamming German radio communications. Fra~ce :~as ·for ir, Britain was against. The British ·vit:W ~i~1~: ~i~hough .th~· French -used the Eiffel Tower. radio suti~ to jam German communications early in the war.
· . . JANUAJlY. 20,.1918. . : . . ... .. . .
" SECRET
Not to bt 1.W.. illeO lht front.Jinr lttft<bn.
REGULATIONS FO.R LISTENING STt\TIONS
1. LISTENING SE.RVlCE .
I. ~ Chiri of dw li1tcain1 IWion u mponsibk lbM dw 1imnin11 •pp&tU!ll bt maimed ~ i~ ia paaillk (DJ two ftlftl dari11& ....... of""' octmty).
2. L~. when not ochrrwiw -..pi<d, ,,.., bt ulld io inlftttpe .Morw lipala. For !his purpmr all lillCllln - m br cnined in · • · • inlftnJ'li"I Monr si,plb. . . . . ·
} . Whcft ""~ ia taking a mcuag< and a!Mllhft an be hcud at dw-time. IK ia IO -U. wCh dw «her i~ IO _ lab it. oo that bod. wiU bt ttCIOtded. . .
~ - Whn neilhn ..,,,._ mcmnocion nor Mone lipl4 "" br batd. • i-.. of dw ~.,,.,.IV ia ID bC rrpaeedlp cbaftatd in otdtr co clmrfOint whether 1nJ1flina an·bt heard. Ground Inds •re co be~ '"9ed co lft 1"bedler dwy - iii,_. ordtt. . '
' · French -..cioo and IDClllfft arc 10 be p¥fll pmnncr owr Gaawi. · . · . 6 . ll>t ~"' to whcthtr an inmapc ia of irnpara- dGft llOI ill uiy -liewith lllt aper- or cllief !rf llalion. ~ii&
whidi aa be hmrd iuo be .-.W ud iadwled ia !hr NpWt ca IM fonm r.niilhed i., 111e _,.. · • .. - · ;· .' \. ~ · .. . , 7. Wordswhid>--~1ttCDbewriaea .... phamtbll1. · : · ~ · : .: ; 1
8. Aloy i"'fftllioas which dlt ~- 11181 rtaift '" co be aOClld ia dw -·Ji•. c .•. , - ....i ,._..a.tiaa: aW « J'c:"U'« . . \'Ilic;, ; ts0ced, h .. ried, C11C11mudi.,, la..,....,., dilwtc,ftC, • . I •
9. Uacltt i......,_ ~-.di madllli- • dlt opcr111or me1 form rcprcli., !hr-or,.,,_ oldie -at· TIMW &rc
to bt ...m.a c1ow • • Tbr ~ o1-i..q la ... be ...... The opcnmr - ftOI -- to - hia amdllliom. If lie attl .. , (vlhcr mdtnct. tither nmlirmiag or~ his Qlndmions. be ia 10 ldd dJaa to lbtcbilJ rqat.
ln•rapr·1taciom ofma doabled u Co!DMC urio• (Note -a.,a.lanoo No. '>- Tbe replarioas ..... ~~ ~ an· &om a Genau docwmeat- . · . · . · · ·
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At about the same time, German statioru on .the Western Front were reportedly ordered to jam communications between France and Russia. Whether they did so is noc known, but in any case the intelligenu being obtained from interception probably influencea the high command to discontinue or greatly reduce jamming on all fronts.
The British (and probably the French) experimented with jamming the enemy's wireline intercept operations. Jamming began along the entire British front in October 1916, stopping whenever inter.on of German communications was desired. The British soon found that jamming was costly and ineffective and it was discontinued.
Whether their use in this way was intention~! or not, elecuic generators behind the German lines often protected their telephone communications from interception. On the t~eory that the interference might al.lo protect their ~wn.
communications, the Americans communicated by phone only when the generators were running, suspending all conversation during the period that the machines were shut down · for maintenance each day. Toward the end of the war, Signal Corps engineers designed an electrical filter whicti helped the intercept operators . copy enemy ~ignals through the noise.
Deception . - The Russians, so backward in $0 many other ways, may h_ave)~ecn the first to employ radio deception. That was in
·the-spring of 1916, when they ~nt fake radio traffic in an . a~empc to fool the Germans. By 1918 all the armies were
practicing deception, or "camouflage," a.s it was then known. Fake calls and networks, bogus uaffic, radio silence and planted codes were alJ used with considerable success.
· An AsseJ.rment World War I affected our b~siness in two ways- it
cat~pultcd radio a;.a radio interception to new heights, and
.·~· ····" " . .,: .. _· CO ENTIAL - · . . · : . :· ...... .. .. .. . · .
it forced all countries into a greater appreciation of communications security. Though the Comint successes were less decisive ·than those of World War II, · they nevertheless influenced the outcome of the war.
It was the Roman phiiosopher Seneca who said that "the fortunes of war are always doubtful.· · By malcin~ the fortunes of World War I less doubtful, Comint helped make our future more certain.
CREDITS AND ADDITIONAL READING
Without the help.of the NSA Library facilities and s1aff rhis ave bttn written. S ial thanks are due
ormcr Spectrum ~~~~~~~~~ ... tt r t e ong1na 1 ea.
.... .,. ......
The besc gmeral works on communications, including Co.mint / . and Comsec, in World War I arc, fut the u_.s: ... Repon.of I~: .
Chi'/ Sip# Offim to th' Slmlllry of lf',.,.,.j919/ for .B~tl.iii • Thi Sipul Smitt ;,, ti# EllrOputJ_ w.,._ of 19.~~ ~ ·19/8 (Prw11&e), by Raymond E. Priestley; and for Germany,. 'P'•,. StcrttJ /,.The Bther (Part 1),- bj Wi~.F._~~FliCke. -A.1)' .. ,~ .. ..r .............. ! _. . .. , • •
· available in the Library's Cryjitotogic Collcttion·:or fro~ the Library of Congress. . . . . .. · . .
For an ex~Jlent account of the Zimmermann Telegr.am; the · greatest Comint coup of World W~r 1; ~ Henry ~fiorredt's aniclc, "The Telegram Thar Changed History,:' in </ryptorogi_' Spectrllm, Summtt 1970. . .: <:/ · ,. · '
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I l«ii' dtc Oim:tor's ·Sid. ·bu ·man tlaaa u aca--c 1n1en1t iD radio -Ill~. He enJinm die sabjca hJ.. ~·I -ud ~J .• a8dcjuC ~dios.. ReceiTcn from Ids coUec:doa:·o1. moie-da&a :50 sea· Ila~ _'*8 seea oa .local 1V ...0-i,-aad -IUS.;.ni(ie~~ ~-·
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