Climate Change, Weak States and the War on Terrorism in South

Climate Change, Weak States and the "War on Terrorism" in Southand Southeast Asia

Smith, Paul J., 1965-

Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs,Volume 29, Number 2, August 2007, pp. 264-285 (Article)

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian StudiesDOI: 10.1353/csa.2007.0034

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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 29, No. 2 (2007), pp. 264–85 DOI: 10.1355/cs29-2c© 2007 ISEAS ISSN 0219-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

PAUL J. SMITH is an Associate Professor with the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, USA.

Climate Change, Weak States and the “War on Terrorism” in South and Southeast Asia

PAUL J. SMITH

Climate change is emerging as one of the key security challenges of the 21st century, a challenge that will increasingly have effects in the realm of counter-terrorism. Since January 2002, the United States Government has grounded its counter-terrorism policies within an international/diplomatic framework of well-governed states that have the capacity and willingness to cooperate with the United States. Climate change threatens to undermine this objective. For example, several countries with which the United States hopes to forge long-term counter-terrorism alliances are geographically situated in areas that may be strongly affected by climate change. In Asia, three countries in particular — Indonesia, the Philippines, and Bangladesh — demonstrate the nexus between possible climate change effects and counter-terrorism. In these countries, increased poverty and reduced state capacity, a foreseeable outcome of predicted climate change events, contribute to the creation or sustenance of functional space which may allow terrorist groups to flourish.

Keywords: climate change, terrorism, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Philippines

On 29 April 1991, Cyclone Marian struck 110 miles off the southeast coast of Bangladesh. Over 139,000 people died, while millions were left homeless. The storm, described by a prominent Bangladeshi politician as “his country’s Hiroshima and Nagasaki”, caused more than US$2 billion in damage to housing and national infrastructure.1

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In addition, it destroyed crops cultivated over 74,000 acres of land, while another 300,000 acres of cropland were damaged. Bangladesh’s major port, Chittagong, could not function for several days as a result of sunken ships that blocked entrances and exits (McCarthy 1994, pp. 2–3).

Recognizing that it was overwhelmed by the scale of the disaster, the Government of Bangladesh reluctantly requested help from other countries, including the United States. The United States responded with a massive humanitarian operation known as Operation Sea Angel. Over 4,000 U.S. Marines and 3,000 U.S. sailors would ultimately take part in the relief effort (McCarthy 1994, p. 1).

For the country of Bangladesh, the arrival of Cyclone Marian — considered a “Super Cyclone” whose size approached that of Bangladesh itself — was not particularly surprising given the fact that natural disasters are common in that tropical country. The country suffers almost yearly from an onslaught of tropical cyclones, floods, tornadoes and tidal bores. Cyclones, and their accompanying storm surges, have been recorded as early as the sixteenth century. In addition, more than 175 severe cyclones were recorded between 1891 and 1988 (Rahman 1993, pp. 59–60).

However, the real significance of Cyclone Marian may not have been the fact that it was simply one more in a long succession of damaging storms to affect Bangladesh; rather, in light of predicted global climate trends, this particular storm — and its destructive impact — may serve as a harbinger of things to come. In February 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a report warning that future tropical cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes) will likely become more intense. In addition, they will also feature larger peak wind speeds and more heavy precipitation associated with continuing increases of tropical sea surface temperatures, or SSTs (IPCC 2007a). In other words, the experience of Bangladesh in 1991 may be repeated, perhaps more frequently and with greater severity, in the years and decades ahead.

For the United States, such an assessment clashes directly with key hopes and aspirations that U.S. officials have held for US-Bangladesh relations. As the seventh most populous country in the world — in addition to being a Muslim-majority state — Bangladesh has been viewed by Washington as “a voice of moderation among developing countries, in the Islamic world and in South Asia” (Rocca 2003). However, it is also a country with a nascent militant jihadi movement, one that Washington hopes that Dhaka can keep subdued (ICG 2006).

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In many ways, Bangladesh is emblematic of the dilemma facing the U.S. Government as it prosecutes its global war on terrorism (GWOT). Washington recognizes that many of the countries that the United States must aid, engage, assist, or establish alliances with — in the context of combating terrorism — tend to be poorer, developing states that have an array of pre-existing social, economic or demographic challenges. Many of these states also happen to be precariously positioned in the direct pathway of future and foreseeable climate change-related disruption and violence.

Bangladesh, as one U.S. official noted, is “one of a handful of moderate, democratic Islamic nations in the world today” which is an important ally for the US in its larger global campaign against terrorism (Chamberlin 2003). However, a Bangladesh that is grappling with the destructive effects of climate change — a phenomenon that the United States government does not consider officially to be among its top security challenges2 — may not have the capacity to live up to America’s hopes or expectations. This is the dilemma facing the United States, and indeed the world community as the global struggle against terrorism continues.

Terrorism, Safe Havens and Failing States

On 29 January 2002, President George W. Bush delivered his annual State of the Union address before the U.S. Congress and the American people. Coming just four months after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the speech naturally focused on U.S. efforts and achievements to counter global terrorism. The president stated that although hundreds of terrorists had been arrested, tens of thousands of trained terrorists were still at large. More importantly, these terrorists viewed the entire world as their battlefield, and thus the United States had to be prepared to pursue them wherever they were. President Bush (2002) also stated that “a terrorist underworld … operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities”.

President Bush’s description of the global nature of terrorism would presage a transformation in U.S. policy. Official U.S. Government documents began to focus on the problem of terrorist sanctuaries, “ungoverned spaces” and failed states. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), issued nine months after the State of the Union address, articulated the recognition that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones”. The NSS also warned that the United States would destroy terrorist organizations by convincing or compelling states to exercise their sovereign

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responsibilities by denying support, sponsorship, or sanctuary to terrorist organizations.

Failed states and ungoverned spaces were also addressed by other policy documents, including speeches by administration officials, during subsequent years. The National Military Strategy, for example, elevated the failed state concept to an entirely new level by referring to what were essentially failed regions. Specifically, the NMS (2004) described an “arc of instability” stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East up to Asia, where terrorists have been able to flourish in sanctuaries that protect them from surveillance and attack.

In 2005, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) issued a report in which it described weak states — which can be defined as states that lack legitimate and effective government institutions3 — as the vector for destabilizing forces such as criminal and terrorist networks, humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty “manifesting the dark side of globalization, and [posing] a very difficult kind of national security challenge”.4 In 2006, the second National Security Strategy of President Bush’s tenure highlighted the destabilizing effects of regional conflicts, which, if left unaddressed, would lead to the same outcomes: humanitarian disaster, ungoverned spaces and failed states that could become safe havens for terrorists.

The corollary to highlighting the threat posed by weak or failing states is to provide a way to confront the challenge. Indeed, U.S. officials have consistently discussed the importance of engaging with and bolstering key states as part of a larger strategy of creating a global bulwark against radical extremism and violence. In the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), for example, the U.S. Government emphasizes as its “second front” against terrorism the need to deny “terrorists the sponsorship, support, and sanctuary” that enables them to plan and execute their attacks. As part of this goal, the U.S. targets assistance to those states that have the willingness of combat terrorism, but may not have the means (NSCT 2003).

Denying safe havens to terrorists was a key theme in the recent testimony of Hamlin Tallent, a high-level official with the United States European Command [EUCOM], who discussed EUCOM’s long-term strategy in Africa: “Torn apart by war, disease and poverty, and marked by vast ungoverned spaces, Africa is an emerging haven for our enemies in the Global War on Terrorism” (Tallent 2005). Consequently, as Tallent asserted, promoting stability on the continent would be a key EUCOM goal.

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The theme of U.S. partnership with healthy and capable states was also evident in recent testimony by Eric Edelman, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, who discussed the importance of building the capacity of allied or partner nations for the purpose of fighting the global war on terror. Although the U.S. possesses unrivaled military power, Edelman (2006) reasoned, “This global war will not be won without the help of partner nations.” Thus, it is clear that a key component of the U.S. war on terrorism is an international system comprised of healthy and stable states that have the capacity to cooperate with the United States and to confront and subdue international terrorist organizations.

Climate Change and Weak States

As U.S. officials have deliberated upon and developed policies regarding weak states and ungoverned spaces, a number of environmental disasters — some believed to be possibly linked to climate change — have already demonstrated their ability to render weak states weaker and ungoverned spaces larger. In October 1998, the world was reminded of the destructive potential of an environmental disaster when Hurricane Mitch, a category five storm at its peak, slammed into Central America, devastating a number of countries, particularly Honduras and Nicaragua. The region was inundated by heavy rains as the storm weakened and stalled over the Gulf of Honduras (Rohter 1998).

The storm killed more than 9,000 people, and left an additional three million homeless (Leonard 2000). In addition, the storm caused about $8 billion in direct damage, including the destruction of social and economic infrastructure such as schools, villages, transportation routes and crops. Experts consider the storm to be the most destructive in the hemisphere’s recorded history (Leonard 2000). The storm not only had immediate destructive effects, but also undermined much of the development infrastructure of Honduras; in the words of one U.S. official, “what took decades to build was washed away in a few hours or days” (Schneider 1999).

Like many natural disasters throughout the world (and throughout history), Hurricane Mitch had a disproportionate effect on poorer individuals in the affected countries. Testifying before a U.S. Senate committee, one scholar observed that Hurricane Mitch taught “an important lesson concerning the linkages between poverty, wealth and environmental degradation in Latin America” (Dewalt 2000). This is consistent with the theme of a report issued by the World Bank and

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other institutions in 2003, which argued that climate change will likely compound existing poverty. The adverse impacts of climate change will be most striking in developing countries because of their high dependence on natural resources, their geographical and climatic conditions and their limited capacity to effectively adapt to a changing climate (World Bank 2003).

As noted above, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issued a summary report for policymakers in February 2007 that asserted, among other things, that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal” (IPCC 2007a). In addition, intense and more powerful cyclones (typhoons and hurricanes) are among the predicted effects of climate change in the future (IPCC 2007a). When cyclones strike poorer, developing states, they can have profound effects on national development and, ultimately, state capacity. When tropical cyclones brought devastating floods to Mozambique in 2000, for example, the resultant destruction led to a reduction in that country’s annual growth rate from 8 per cent to 2.1 per cent (Washington 2006, p. 1355). One U.S. official, in reference to Hurricane Mitch in Central America, stated “such [hurricane] events threaten sustainable development, by destroying years of development progress and investments and shifting development priorities from long-term goals to meeting relief and reconstruction needs” (Leonard 2000).

In addition to more intense storms, sea-level rise will become a growing reality as a result of climate change. The IPCC report states that both past and future anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions will continue to contribute to warming and sea-level rise for more than a millennium, “due to the timescales required for removal of this gas from the atmosphere” (IPCC 2007a). As seas warm, thermal expansion — the process in which water expands as it gains in temperature — is expected to contribute about 50 per cent of the projected rise in sea levels, while glacial melt will contribute the remainder (Ballou 2006, p. 210). Increased sea-level rise in addition to cyclonic activity will likely have devastating consequences for developing states, particularly as two-thirds of the world’s population live within 100 kilometers of the coast and since 30 of the world’s 50 largest cities are located along coastlines (Hugo 1996, p. 119).

More ominously, the IPCC report predicted that it is very likely that extreme weather events — heat waves, hot extremes, and heavy precipitation — will become increasingly more frequent (IPCC 2007a). Intense and heavy rains and floods pose a particular threat for many developing countries. Flooding creates not only huge humanitarian problems including widespread deaths but also causes enormous

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economic losses. In 1992, for example, floods in Pakistan, considered a frontline state in the global war on terrorism, killed more than 1,000 people and cost Pakistan more than $640 million (Bokhari 1992).

Extreme weather events will likely be superimposed on a litany of pre-existing challenges — unemployment, poverty, social conflict, governmental corruption — prevailing within affected states, particularly in the developing world. In parts of Africa, climate-related phenomena are exacerbating other problems such as overpopulation, poor land management, desertification and agricultural disruptions caused by economic shifts, internal conflicts and mass refugee influxes (Tallent 2005). Food shortages are already a major challenge across Africa. This is particularly the case in Chad, where drought and refugees from the conflict in the Darfur region have coalesced to generate a humanitarian catastrophe (Tallent 2005).

One of the concerns for U.S. policymakers is Nigeria, a key anchor state in Western Africa and major exporter of oil. John McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, recently warned the Senate Armed Services Committee of possible political instability in Nigeria. He stated that the government’s institutional foundations are “hollow from decades of neglect and corruption and will continue to make the country susceptible to recurring crises in the coming years” (McConnell 2007). In addition, Nigeria suffers from sectarian clashes, partially generated by religious differences between a largely Muslim north and a predominantly Christian south. Climate change, and its various effects, will only compound these challenges and likely contribute to internal violence.5

Climate change-related processes can also threaten water and food security in particular regions or states. According to a 2001 IPCC assessment, water availability — in regards to both temporal and spatial distribution — is expected to be “highly vulnerable to anticipated climate change” (IPCC 2001a). Food security will also be influenced by climate change (although the effects will vary by country or region): “Climatic variability and change will seriously endanger sustained agricultural production in Asia in coming decades” (IPCC 2001c). In Africa, climate change may threaten food security as a result of its “adverse effects on agriculture, especially in semi-arid and sub-humid regions and areas with more frequent and prolonged drought” (IPCC 2001b). Governments that are challenged by water or food insecurity may be less able to assist the United States in confronting international terrorist threats.

Climate change can also have an impact on disease and pandemics, which have a number of security consequences. A World Health

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Organisation (WHO) report recently noted that climate change has multiple influences on human health (WHO 2005). The report also stated that climate change may be causing over 150,000 deaths per year and that these risks may worsen dramatically in the future (WHO 2005). Climate change-related disease consequences will be most pronounced in poorer populations living at low latitudes “where the most important climate-sensitive health outcomes (malnutrition, diarrhoea and malaria) are already common, and where vulnerability to climate effects is greatest” (Haines et al. 2006, p. 2106–07).

Disease and pandemics may foster instability and state weakness through a number of mechanisms. A 2003 study by RAND found that infectious disease not only undermines human security, but can also influence state stability. Disease episodes, if left unchecked, can undermine public confidence in the state’s custodial function (Brower and Chalk 2003). Such episodes can also undermine a government’s legitimacy and ability to function. Disease can also pose a severe economic and social burden for a state — a particular challenge for poorer, developing countries — and can also “have a profound, negative impact on a state’s social order, functioning and psyche” (Brower and Chalk 2003). Many of these effects can cross international borders, affecting neighbouring states and generating regional instability.

Thus, as the examples above suggest, climate change may act as a significant destabilizing factor within the international system. Economic development, widely viewed by U.S. officials as a long-term solution against terrorism, can be stifled or undermined by environmental-related destruction (NSS 2006). Endemic poverty thus becomes reinforced, as was seen in the case of Hurricane Mitch in Central America (or as is regularly seen in Africa today). “Poverty bears indirectly on terrorism by sparking conflict and eroding state capacity, both of which create conditions that can facilitate terrorist activity” (Rice 2006, p. 78).

Climate change, rather than being a direct “root cause” of terrorism acts instead as an overarching destabilizing element that fosters the enabling environment for non-state actor terrorist groups. For terrorists to thrive and to be effective, they require as much functional space — defined broadly as “the freedom to carry out the various activities necessary to support the terrorist agenda” (Ramakrishna 2005, p. 146) — as a particular piece of territory or state will allow. Poverty and reduced state capacity, a foreseeable outcome of predicted climate change events, contribute to the creation or sustenance of this functional space, and can thus provide the critical political opening for terrorist groups — or their precursor political organizations — to gain a foothold

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within a state, acquire power or legitimacy and ultimately further their terrorist objectives.

Climate Change and the War on Terrorism: The Case of Three Pivotal Countries

In the spring of 1998, Indonesia suffered from the effects of the Asian financial crisis that had its origins in nearby Thailand. Unemployment was rising and the Indonesian currency — the Rupiah — had been devalued by 84 per cent. Over 80 million Indonesians were forced below the poverty line (compared to 22 million before the crisis) (Blustein 1998a). One World Bank official stated that Indonesia’s economic contraction was “virtually unparalleled for any country in the past 50 years” (Blustein 1998a).

Compounding the crisis was a devastating drought, caused by an El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) climate phenomenon that had persisted from the previous year. The drought caused food production to decline precipitously and thus food shortages became commonplace. As a result, food riots and mass demonstrations began to erupt, creating further social and political instability (Blustein 1998b). In February 1998, high food prices triggered violent riots in over 20 Indonesian towns and cities.6 The culmination of this and other factors led to President Soeharto’s resignation after more than 30 years in power.

The impact of Soeharto’s fall had a profound effect on the country. A once strong centrally-directed national government was transformed into a weak democracy that featured “intense political competition between the new president and a parliament that had a newfound and intense sense of empowerment” (Abuza 2003, p. 140–41). Moreover, central government control declined as provinces demanded redress from the decades-long legacy of overcentralization. More importantly from a terrorism perspective was the fact that hundreds of radical Muslim exiles returned to Indonesia and “demanded political space” (Abuza 2003, p. 141).

Two of the most important returnees were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, leaders of the then nascent Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) militant organization that advocated a commitment to salafi teachings, jihad, and the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia and beyond (ICG 2003). Indonesia’s sudden weakness provided the political opening that these two men needed to return from their exile in Malaysia; Sungkar and Ba’asyir were thus able to resume leadership of the JI organization in Indonesia (Ba’asyir would later assume sole leadership after Sungkar’s death). Within a few years, the organization

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would direct or inspire a series of bombing attacks across Indonesia. On 12 October 2002, they would execute their boldest operation to date: the attack on two nightclubs in Bali that killed more than 200 people, including 88 from Australia. Nearly a year later (on 5 August 2003), JI militants bombed the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta, while on 9 September 2004, the same group bombed the Australian Embassy in the Indonesian capital.

Normally terrorism and the environment are viewed as two unrelated phenomena, but the case of Indonesia suggests a much greater association than perhaps recognized previously. As the Southeast Asian country with the world’s largest Muslim population (more than 230 million), Indonesia is viewed by the United States as a pivotal state that will heavily influence the long-term goals of the U.S.-led global war on terrorism. Admiral William Fallon, until recently the head of U.S. Pacific Command, characterized the American relationship with Indonesia in the following terms: “The Government of Indonesia is a welcome partner in the War on Terror. Indonesia continues to play an influential role in moderating extremism, as evidenced by its willingness to contribute forces to peacekeeping operations in Lebanon” (Fallon 2007).

U.S. officials are particularly interested in helping Indonesia counter militant Islamist groups within its territory, of which Jemaah Islamiyah — described earlier — is one part.7 However, climate change potentially poses a long-term threat to U.S. goals in Southeast Asia because of its potential to weaken and destabilize the Indonesian state. Certain indicators suggest that, notwithstanding climate change, Indonesia is already a relatively weak state, for a variety of social, economic and political reasons.8

Although geography largely protects Indonesia from significant cyclone activity, the country, as mentioned earlier, remains vulnerable to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon, which has been described as “the most important ocean atmosphere cycle” in the world and includes two modes, El Niño and La Niña (Henson 2007, p. 32). ENSO is based in the tropical Pacific Ocean and extends from Ecuador to Indonesia (Henson 2007, p. 32). Although far from certain, some evidence suggests that climate change may increase the amplitude and frequency of future ENSO-related environmental events.9

ENSO may intensify droughts and potentially disrupt food production, similar to the scenario which occurred in 1998 in many parts of Southeast Asia. One study on droughts worldwide forecasts the incidence of droughts increasing steadily through the 21st century and, by the 2090s, “the percentage of the land area in drought increases

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to 30%, 40% and 50% for extreme, severe, and moderate drought, respectively” (Burke, Brown and Christidis 2006, p. 1122).

Droughts in Indonesia could also exacerbate forest fires, as witnessed during the 1997–98 period, and result in additional deforestation (Sunderlin 1999, p. 567). Indonesian forest fires during the 1997–98 ENSO period resulted in economic damages ranging from $2.3 billion to $3.2 billion (Tacconi 2003, p. 13). In addition the impact on human health was also serious. The Asian Development Bank conservatively estimates that at least 19,000 hospitalizations in the region can be attributed to the smoke (haze) crisis (Tacconi 2003, p. 24).

In addition, sea-level rise may threaten key cities in Indonesia, such as the low-lying coastal cities of Jakarta and Surabaya (Hulme and Sheard 1999). According to one study, sea-level rise will inundate 38 square kilometers of Jakarta’s total land area by 2030, resulting in economic losses in the $1 billion range.10 This and other climate-related changes could stimulate significant and disruptive internal migration, in some cases involving different and antagonistic ethnic or religious groups, which may lead to violence. Indonesia has long been plagued by violence associated with internal migration, stimulated either by government policies or other factors (Collins 2002, p. 588). In extreme scenarios — similar to what occurred in 1998 — climate change processes could promote instability and destabilize the government (or at least undermine confidence in government rule).

Indonesia’s vulnerability to El Niño and other climate change events are also shared by its nearby neighbour, the Philippines, a fellow Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member and key U.S. ally in Southeast Asia. Unlike Indonesia, the Philippines is not a Muslim-majority state (the Muslim population is about 4.5 million out of a total population of 91 million). However, for historical and geopolitical reasons, the Philippines is considered by the U.S. to be a critical anchor in countering terrorism in Southeast Asia: “Our partnership with the Republic of the Philippines (RP),” stated Admiral Fallon in 2007 to the House Armed Services Committee, “is central to success in meeting our War on Terror goals in Southeast Asia.”

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States, American officials deployed U.S. troops to the Philippines as part of the “second phase of America’s war on terrorism”, a deployment that was designed, in part, to prevent Al Qaeda from establishing a new base in the Southeast Asian country (De Castro 2003, p. 982). Nevertheless, U.S. officials are concerned by the persistence of terrorism in the

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Philippines, particularly on the southern island of Mindanao, but also in other parts of the country. Active and officially designated terrorist groups in the country include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Marxist (non-Islamist) New People’s Army (NPA). The Indonesian-centred JI terrorist organization is also reportedly present in the country, primarily via its alliance with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), an insurgency group that, for political reasons related to the government’s desire to maintain open dialogue, is not labelled a terrorist organization either by the Philippine Government or the U.S Government (ICG 2004).

As with many developing states, climate change threatens to undermine state capacity in the Philippines and thus may provide terrorists with the requisite “functional space” to pursue their agenda. The Philippines is vulnerable to a number of climate-related effects, including cyclones (typhoons). Geographical factors, such as the fact that the country is located in the northwestern Pacific, place the country directly in the destructive paths of tans-Pacific typhoons: “We are often the first to experience typhoons before they go to China, Taiwan and Japan,” stated a senior official with the Philippine weather bureau.11

As with Indonesia, El Niño (ENSO)-related events have adversely affected the Philippines. Droughts linked to El Niño have affected not only water availability and quality, but also other sectors including health, agriculture and the environment (Jose and Cruz 1999, p. 77). Water supplies may be threatened by extreme climate events; in the past, the Philippines has experienced imbalances in the supply and demand of water resources (Jose and Cruz 1999, p. 77). As a maritime state with significant human settlement in and around coastal zones, the Philippines is also vulnerable to sea-level rise. Towards the end of the 21st century, according to one study, sea-level rise could threaten 64 out of 81 provinces in the Philippines, which in turn could negatively affect over 43 million Filipinos living along or near the country’s coastlines.12

The combination of these environmental threats poses a challenge to the Philippine government’s state capacity, a country that is already considered a relatively weak state for a variety of social, political and economic reasons.13 Climate change threatens to either slow or stifle economic development, the magic formula that Manila believes offers a long-term solution to the problem of insurgency and terrorism (ICG 2004). On the southern island of Mindanao — which has the highest incidence of poverty in the Philippines — El Niño weather conditions in 1998 and 1999 caused an eight to ten per cent decline in agricultural

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exports, thus having a negative impact on economic development (Haw 2001, p. 7). In the future, climate change consequences for the Philippines generally may divert the central government’s attention away from economic and political troubles in the south, thus allowing them to fester and perhaps worsen.

From a terrorism perspective, the economic dislocation brought about by climate change may be useful to groups such as the NPA, which thrive on popular discontent with the government (and allegations of government corruption) as well as a Marxist narrative of social and economic injustice. Some Philippine security officials consider the NPA to be a greater long-term threat to the Philippine state than even the southern-based Islamist groups.14 The NPA was formed on 29 March 1969 and was created as the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, Marxist-Leninist (CPP-ML).15 The group seeks to “establish a ‘national democratic’ regime as a stepping stone to a communist Philippines”.16

Although Indonesia and the Philippines will likely be forced to endure many destructive consequences of climate change, their challenges will almost certainly pale in comparison to those of the South Asian country of Bangladesh. Like Indonesia and the Philippines, Bangladesh is also considered a key pivotal state for U.S. counter-terrorism goals. U.S. government officials have de-scribed Bangladesh, with the fourth largest Muslim population in the world — more than 124 million — as a “valued South Asian partner in the war on terrorism” (Rocca 2003). The U.S. Government is pur-suing constructive engagement with and assistance to Bangladesh because, as articulated by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher (2007), it believes that “prosperity and stability would make Bangladesh a model for democratizing Muslim-majority states, while a floundering or failed Bangladesh could be a potential haven for anti-U.S. extremists and have a destabilizing effect on the entire region.”

One of the critical concerns for the U.S. is the question of whether or not Bangladesh has the state capacity to manage a nascent militant Islamist movement, one of the manifestations of which is the group Jamaat ul- Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). In August 2005, Bangladesh experienced a wave of bomb blasts across the country which reflected “the increasing operational capabilities of Islamist extremists” (Le Miere 2005). The JMB, which seeks to install an Islamist government, was linked to the bombing campaign, as well as a series of previous bomb attacks during the preceding three years (Davis 2006). However, in 2006, the government, which had long

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denied the existence of militant Islamism within its borders, took aggressive and effective action against the JMB (Davis 2006).

Despite this success, however, questions remain regarding the Bangladesh Government’s long-term resilience and ability to counter violent extremism. The country is considered to be a weak or failing state due to a variety of economic and social factors.17 As with many developing countries, climate change is threatening Bangladesh’s state capacity in significant ways. Sea-level rise, which is predicted by the IPCC, will likely displace millions of Bangladeshi citizens. According to one estimate, a one-meter relative rise of sea level will result in a scenario in which 17.5 per cent of the country would be inundated, displacing about 13 million people.18 This is consistent with the 2007 IPCC study on climate change impacts, adaptation and vulnerability, which stated that “coastal areas, especially heavily-populated mega-delta regions in South, East and Southeast Asia, will be at greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and in some mega-deltas flooding from the rivers” (IPCC 2007b).

Moreover, an increase in the intensity of cyclones may contribute to social disorder or breakdown, due to the enormous human and economic costs that will be endured. For example, after initially killing 139,000 people in Bangladesh in 1991, Cyclone Marion left in its wake millions who were threatened by sickness, hunger and exposure.19 Environmental stress may undermine confidence in public institutions and officials, particularly if they are incompetent or corrupt (or perceived as the same). In 1970, when a cyclone hit East Pakistan — now Bangladesh — and killed between 300,000 and 500,000 individuals, the Pakistan Government’s (at the time Pakistan ruled what is now Bangladesh) tepid humanitarian response stimulated widespread indignation and is considered a key factor that stimulated the Bangladesh independence struggle a year later (Kristoff 1991).

Similarly, climate change-induced disasters or other stresses in Bangladesh may provide militant Islamist parties the political opening they need to gain legitimacy and entrench themselves. Already, Islamist parties in Bangladesh have gained political ground by appearing more disciplined and professional compared to the major parties (ICG 2006, p. 10). Their strong social agenda has made them an attractive alternative to more mainstream parties. As a result, the rise of radical Islamist militancy in recent years “has caught many off guard” (ICG 2006, p. 11). The most prominent of the Bangladeshi Islamist parties is Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat), which aims to make Bangladesh an Islamic state governed by Islamic law (ICG 2006, p. 15). Although only legally established in 1979, Jamaat has emerged as an

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influential party that holds eighteen seats in parliament and controls, through its alliance with the mainstream Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), two important ministries (ICG 2006, p. 15).

Overall, as can be seen in the case of Indonesia, the Philippines and Bangladesh, climate change is likely to hit poorer Muslim-majority states (or states with significant Muslim minority populations) particularly hard, not only in South and Southeast Asia, but also in other parts of the world such as Africa. This will contribute to non-climate related social problems such as unemployment and social breakdown. Social frustration and dissatisfaction with government performance — particularly in the wake of a climate-related catastrophe — may provide political openings for militant political parties or leaders. The net result will be weak states, instability and frustration, the enabling environment that will be most hospitable to anti-Western terrorism ideologies.

The United States, as the dominant economic and military power in the world, will be vulnerable to climate change effects in another way. As people around the world — particularly poorer people in developing countries — lose their homes and lives to the effects of climate change, they may view the United States as the culprit, or, perhaps the ultimate source of their misery. The United States is widely viewed as being opposed to significant global efforts to mitigate the causes of climate change (a perception that is not totally justified, but nevertheless widely accepted). A senior U.S. government scientist with the National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA) described the dilemma for the United States this way: “as indigenous people must abandon their land to rising seas or shifting climatic zones, they will be well aware of the principal source of the problem. Thus if we [the United States] continue on this course, failing to effectively address climate change, we will leave a heavy moral burden, and perhaps a legal burden, for our children” (Hansen 2007).

Conclusion

Although terrorism has not been widely linked to climate change, this essay suggests that such an association is emerging, and, moreover, in light of current and predicted trends, will become clearer in the years and decades ahead. Climate change does not directly cause terrorism, but it may indirectly assist by creating a hospitable enabling environment — weak states, reduced state capacity and ungoverned spaces — in which terrorist organizations can thrive.20 As was seen in Indonesia in 1998, terrorists and their related political organizations

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take advantage of instability or any type of state weakness. In the aftermath of the tsunami disaster in 2004, for instance, militant groups in Indonesia deployed agents to Aceh to help provide assistance to fellow Muslims, to spread religious messages and to recruit new members (Perlez 2005). To the extent that climate change contributes to natural disasters that promote state weakness, it could indirectly provide a political opening or increased “functional space” for local or global terrorist organizations.

From an ideational standpoint — the “battle of ideas” — climate change could emerge as a cause célèbre for anti-American militant preachers or anti-globalization protestors. If the United States continues to be perceived as the primary obstacle in solving the climate change issue — and indeed one of the key culprits in instigating the problem — it could help sustain an enabling environment that would be every terrorists’ dream. This is especially problematic since current science and knowledge accepts that climate change is already a fait accompli (notwithstanding any amelioration efforts) for the next few decades (Hurrell 2007). Any immediate mitigation efforts (i.e. reduction in carbon dioxide emissions, etc.) would reap benefits only in the long term.

Thus, the United States, at least in the short term, is left with few options except perhaps providing preventive and adaptive aid (reinforcing infrastructure, etc.) to developing countries and assisting in the aftermath of humanitarian disasters (as was witnessed immediately following the 1991 Bangladesh cyclone). The second activity is known to generate goodwill towards the United States and, not surprisingly, remains central to U.S. security co-operation efforts around the world (Fallon 2007).

Finally, the uncomfortable truth regarding climate change is that the most devastating effects are likely to be felt not in rich, developed countries, but rather in poorer ones, some of which may have sizeable Muslim populations. Climate change may threaten the ultimate objectives of the global war on terrorism by preventing integration of Muslim-majority countries into the global economic system. It is widely recognized that such integration may be one way to help reduce the enabling environment for terrorism. As a National Intelligence Council Project, which looked at global trends to 2020, noted: “The collective feelings of alienation and estrangement which radical Islam draws upon are unlikely to dissipate until the Muslim world again appears to be more fully integrated into the world economy.”21 However, climate change may stifle, delay or completely derail this integration, which is why the United States may want to

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reconsider its current posture on climate change as it constructs and implements its long-term strategy against global terrorism.

NOTES

The views presented in this essay are the author’s own and do not represent the positions or opinions of the U.S. Government or any of its entities.

1 Statement of Kamal Hossain, a Bangladeshi lawyer and author of the country’s first constitution. See Michael Fathers, “The death of a nation”, The Independent (London), 12 May 1991, p. 12.

2 In his report to Congress, John McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, did not mention climate change as posing a threat — directly or indirectly — to U.S. security. See Statement of John M. McConnell, Director, National Intelligence, Committee on Senate Armed Services, CQ Congressional Testimony, 27 February 2007.

3 Boaz Atzili, “When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors; Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict”, International Security (Winter 2006/2007), p. 139. To provide greater precision for the idea of “weak states”, this essay relies on the Failed States Index 2006 published annually by the Washington DC-based Fund for Peace. The Index categorizes states into four broad categories: red (alert); orange (warning); yellow (monitoring) and green (sustainable). It considers 12 criteria to determine whether a state is failing. These categories include (a) mounting demographic pressures; (b) massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating complex humanitarian emergencies; (c) legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia; (d) chronic and sustained human flight; e) uneven economic development along group lines; (f) sharp and/or severe economic decline; (g) criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state; (h) progressive deterioration of public services; (i) suspension or arbitrary application of rule of law and widespread violation of human rights; (j) security apparatus operates as “state within a state”; (k) rise of factionalized elites; and (l) intervention of other states or external political actors.

4 Fragile States Strategy (Washington DC: U.S. Agency for International Development, January 2005), p. v.

5 Emeka E. Obioha, Climate Change, Population Drift and Violent Conflict over Land Resources in North Eastern Nigeria (Paper delivered to the Human Security and Climate Change International Workshop, Holmen Fjord Hotel, Asker, near Oslo, 21–23 June 2005), pp. 9–11.

6 Geoff Spencer, “Police use clubs, sticks to stop Indonesian protest”, Associated Press, 25 March 1998.

7 Other salafi militant groups in Indonesia include Tandzim Qoedatul-Jihad Untuk Gugusan Kepulauan Melayu, Ring Banten, Mujahidin KOMPAK, Jama’ah Tauhid wal Jihad, and assorted smaller cells. See Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 3 May 2007), p. 14.

8 The United Nations Human Development Report (2006) classifies Indonesia as a “medium human development” state, based on a variety of indicators, including

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the fact that over 27 per cent of the country’s population lives below the national poverty line. See Human Development Report 2006 (United Nations Development Programme), accessed at http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf, p. 293. In addition, the annual failed states index categorizes Indonesia in the “warning” (orange) category within its failed states index — the second most serious category — which is based on 12 key political, social and economic indicators. See the Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2006, at http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php.

9 For a good analysis of this subject, see Sang-Wook Yeh and Ben P. Kirtman, “ENSO Amplitude Changes due to Climate Change Projections in Different Coupled Models”, Journal of Climate, 20 (15 January 2007), pp. 203–4; and also William J. Merryfield, “Changes to ENSO under CO2 Doubling in a Multimodel Ensemble”, Journal of Climate, 19 (15 August 2006), p. 4009–11.

10 “Flood risk rises with sea levels”, Jakarta Post, 25 January 2007.

11 Oliver Teves, “Red Cross fears more than 1,000 may have died in Philippine typhoon”, Associated Press, 3 December 2006.

12 Beverly T. Natividad, “RP provinces at risk from global warming”, Businessworld, 4 (April 2007); James K. Galvez, “Philippines Faces Great Risk from Global Warming”, Manila Times (Philippines), 30 April 2007.

13 The Philippines, like Indonesia, is categorized by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as a “medium human development” country, due to a variety of factors, including the fact that over 36 per cent of the country’s population lives below the national poverty line. See Human Development Report 2006 (United Nations Development Programme), available at http://hdr.undp.org/ hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf. In addition, the Failed States Index, relying on 12 key political, social and economic factors, categorizes the Philippines in the orange, or “warning” category (the second most serious category). See the Fund for Peace, Failed States Index 2006, at http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php.

14 Multiple interviews by author with Philippine military and security officials conducted at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, Hawaii.

15 “Group Profile: New People’s Army”, MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, accessed on 28 March 2007, at http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID:203.

16 “New People’s Army”, Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 2 May 2006 [Internet version].

17 The UNDP Human Development Report (2006) classifies Bangladesh as being within its “medium human development” category, similar to Indonesia and the Philippines. See Human Development Report 2006 (United Nations Development Programme) available at: http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf (see pp. 281–424). However, the Failed State Index produced by the Fund for Peace classifies Bangladesh in its red or “alert” zone (the most serious category), whereas, by comparison, Indonesia and Philippines are classified in the orange or “warning” (second most serious) category. See http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex2006.php.

18 “Bangladesh is used to coping but rising seas pose new dangers”, Climate.org [from Climate Alert, v. 8, n. 2, March-April 1995], accessed on 20 February 2007, at http://www.climate.org/pubs/climate_alert/articles/8.2/bangladesh.html.

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19 Earleen Fisher, “U.S. Transport Plane Arrives with Helicopters, Medical Crews”, Associated Press, 13 May 1991.

20 On this point, Admiral T. Joseph Lopez (USN-Ret.) has stated that “climate change will provide the conditions that will extend the war on terror”. See National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Washington DC: CNA Corporation, 2007), p. 17.

21 “New Challenges to Governance”, in Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project (NIC 2004-13), accessed 2 April 2007 from http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020_s3.html.

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Climate Change, Weak States and the War on Terrorism in South

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