CivPro Jara Notes

SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW MENDIOLA JARA NOTES 2013 (CIVIL PROCEDURE)

NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN PERIL. BROUGHT TO YOU BY YOU SURE OF THAT HA?

We take up Part II of the lectures on Remedial Law. You are through with Part I criminal procedure and

evidence. You were forced to read criminal procedure ahead of civil procedure because that is the curricula that

is required by the board of legal interpretation for law schools. You see, criminal procedure is taken up in 2nd

year much ahead of civil procedure. Criminal procedure really is taken up by 2nd year law students and then

civil procedure is taken up by 3rd year law students. The other reason why there was a lecture on criminal

procedure ahead of civil procedure is to emphasize that, although learned in criminal procedure that, generally,

the criminal action carries the civil aspect of the case, with regard to the civil aspect of the case, we usually do

not apply the rules for civil procedure.

X X X the defendant the accused , after he enters the plea of not guilty, is not required to file an answer to the

civil aspect of the case. It is enough that he pleads not guilty. That plea of not guilty is also a denial of this

probable civil remedy. This is also the reason why, in a civil aspect that is brought along by the criminal action,

we dont apply the rule on specific denial. This is required in civil cases. In a criminal case, the plea of [not]

guilty is not considered a specific denial if we apply the rules on civil cases because the plea of not guilty will

if there is a plea of not guilty, the court cannot compel the accused to explain why he is entering such plea. If he

chooses to plead not guilty, the court can do nothing about it. The court cannot ask the accused: what are your

reasons? what are your defenses? Unlike in a purely civil action where there is a civil complaint filed against the

defendant and the defendant simply tells the court in his answer, I deny liability. If we apply civil procedure,

that is a judicial admission of liability. In fact, that kind of denial in a civil case may lead to a judgment on the

pleadings. In civil, purely civil cases, not the civil aspect of a criminal case there is always a need for specific

denial which is not, again, required in the civil aspect of a criminal case. So do not have the impression that

although a criminal case carries with it, generally, the civil aspect of the case We dont apply civil procedure to

the civil aspect. That criminal case which carries with it the civil aspect will always be governed by criminal

procedure, not by civil procedure.

The only difference, probably, that can be cited with respect to procedural rules governing the civil aspect of a

criminal case will be the quantum of evidence. You learned in criminal procedure that the guilt of the accused

shall be demonstrated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. But in so far as the civil aspect of the case is

concerned, the quantum should only be preponderance of evidence. So that, in a criminal case, it is very likely

that the accused will be acquitted of the crime but he can be held civilly liable because the quantum of evidence

used, in so far as the civil aspect, is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but only preponderance of evidence.

But just like in criminal procedure, we always start with the topic on jurisdiction of courts. With respect to

jurisdiction over civil actions, we have several laws governing jurisdiction of courts in civil cases. Primarily, we



have the Constitution. And then we have the Judiciary Act of 1948 that is R.A. 296. And then we have this B.P.

129 the Judiciary Reorganization Act and its amendments. And then we have the law creating the family

court I think it was in 1997. And then the law creating the Sandiganbayan. Because we have so many

substantive laws governing jurisdiction of courts X X X identified the general law on jurisdiction in this country.

The general law on jurisdiction in our country is B.P. 129. All other laws are special laws governing jurisdiction.

So that if you find the conflict between B.P. 129 and the special law on jurisdiction, we just apply the rule on

statutory construction: the special law prevails over the general law. A good example is the provision in B.P. 129

on the jurisdiction of a regional trial court. X X X In testing the jurisdiction of a regional trial court, B.P. 129 says

that a Regional Trial Court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over the enumeration of cases, one of which

is cases which were cognizable by the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. So we have all these in the

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and then B.P. 129 provided that, thereafter, the jurisdiction of the

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall be exercised by the Regional Trial Court in the concept of exclusive

original jurisdiction. But X X X in the Family Court law, which is a special law, it is provided that a Family Court

has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving marriage, adoption, guardianship of minors, X X X

criminal cases and civil cases that involve a minor. There is then a conflict now between B.P. 129 and the law

creating the Family Court. But since the law creating the Family Court is a special law, its provisions will prevail

over that of B.P. 129. That is why these civil cases in adoption they are no longer cognizable by the Regional

Trial Court. They are cognizable by the Family Court.

We also meet in our classroom discussion the legal maxim that jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law. But

that is not necessarily true. What is governed by substantive law, in so far as jurisdiction is concerned, is

jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the nature of the case. This is the aspect of jurisdiction that is

governed by B.P. 129 and the other substantive laws on jurisdiction. There are other aspects of jurisdiction aside

from jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the nature of the action. One aspect of jurisdiction is jurisdiction

over the person of the litigants. That is not governed by B.P. 129. That is governed by the Rules of Court.

Another one is jurisdiction over the property involved. That is also not governed by B.P. 129. Its governed by

the Rules of Court. Jurisdiction over the issues of a case that is not governed by B.P. 129. That is governed by

the Rules of Court. So jurisdiction, as part of substantive law, is limited to the authority of a court to decide in so

far as the subject matter is concerned or the nature of the action. But when it comes to jurisdiction over the

person of the plaintiff, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, jurisdiction over the issues these are

aspects of jurisdiction that are governed by procedural law mostly, by the Rules of Court.

Youll also notice that in B.P. 129 that B.P. 129 does not mention anything about the Supreme Court. B.P. 129

begins with the Court of Appeals and goes down to the Regional Trial Court, the inferior courts, and in the last

part, there is a mention of the Sharia Court. So where does the Supreme Court derive its authority in exercising



jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or over the nature of the action? Of course, it is vested by the

Constitution itself. But if we read the Constitution on the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the Constitution

classifies the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court only into 2 kinds, that is: original jurisdiction X X X and appellate

jurisdiction. But the Constitution does not say that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive

its just plain original. The Constitution does not also tell us that the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

is exclusive appellate. It only says that Supreme Court exercises appellate jurisdiction over the following cases.

We now ask whether the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive or coordinate with other courts. And yet,

in most law books, there is always an item concerning exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and

also exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The basis of all these commentary is the old Judiciary

Act of 1948. The Judiciary Act of 1948 talks about the Supreme Court. It confers jurisdiction upon the Supreme

Court in a very thorough manner such that the Judiciary Act of 1948 provides for exclusive appellate

jurisdiction, exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In other words, we still enforce and recognize

the Judiciary Act of 1948. It has not been repealed by the Judiciary Reorganization Act. B.P. 129 did not repeal

the old Judiciary Act. The old Judiciary Act is still in force. But whats repealed by B.P. 129, in so far as the old

Judiciary Act is concerned, are provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which are inconsistent with B.P. 129. So do

not be of the impression that we no longer have the Judiciary Act of 1948. We still enforce and recognize the

Judiciary Act of 1948. The best argument to support this statement is found in Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. If you read Sec.

9, thats the section providing for the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. In Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, there is an

enumeration of cases that are allocated to the Court of Appeals exercising original jurisdiction and exclusive

appellate jurisdiction. It is in that last part of Sec. 9. That part which talks about appellate jurisdiction of the

Court of Appeals. We notice a clause in Sec. 9 saying that the Court of Appeals exercises appellate jurisdiction

over cases decided by the Regional Trial Court or quasi-judicial bodies in said laws that are assigned to the

Supreme Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Thats the best proof that the Judiciary Act of

1948 is still in force. It is expressly recognized as existing up to the present by the provisions of B.P. 129.

When it comes to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution as stated, the Constitution

provides for a limited number of cases over which the Supreme Court can exercise original jurisdiction and over

limited number of cases over which the Supreme Court can exercise appellate jurisdiction. And as we said

earlier, these are not exclusive. The exercise of original jurisdiction is not exclusive. The exercise of appellate

jurisdiction by the Supreme Court as provided by the Constitution is likewise not exclusive. Why do we say

this? We have to read the provisions of the Constitution together with the provisions of B.P. 129 in allocation of

jurisdiction with the other courts. The cases that are assigned to the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original

jurisdiction involve cases involving ambassadors, ministers and consuls. And then theres also the vesting upon

the Supreme Court of original jurisdiction over cases involving petitions for certiorari, petition for mandamus X

X X. If we read the provisions of the Constitution together with B.P. 129, we will find out that the same authority



is given by B.P. 129 to other courts like the Court of Appeals. Again, in Sec. 9, B.P. 129 provides that the Court of

Appeals also exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, quo

warranto, or habeas corpus. And then under the Chapter on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court , B.P. 129

also vests upon the Regional Trial Court a similar authority. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise original

jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and quo warranto. So if we take the

Constitution together with B.P. 129, there are, in effect, 3 courts in our judiciary which exercise original

jurisdiction over these petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus. They are

the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court. Which means to say, theoretically, that if a

petitioner feels that his rights have been violated lets say through a grave abuse of discretion committed by a

lower court, he can file a petition for certiorari or prohibition or mandamus against this judicial officer with the

Supreme Court, or with the Court of Appeals, or with the Regional Trial Court upon his choice. Theoretically,

that is the implication where the Constitution and B.P. 129 have given 3 different courts a similar jurisdiction

over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. So for purposes of jurisdiction, there is nothing wrong

if, for instance, there is a case pending before an inferior court (a Municipal Trial Court or a Municipal Circuit

Trial Court) and this inferior court gravely abuses its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and the

aggrieved litigant decides to file a petition for certiorari or prohibition or mandamus directly to the Supreme

Court. There is nothing wrong with that theoretically in so far as the issue of jurisdiction is concerned. Because

the Constitution has vested upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to entertain these petitions together

with the Court of Appeals and together with the Regional Trial Court. But the choice given by B.P. 129 and the

Constitution over the jurisdiction of these petitions is only theoretical. It has been greatly limited by certain

procedural rules. That is with respect to certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The limitation is known as

hierarchy of courts. Certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, procedurally, are governed by Rule 65. If you read

Rule 65, you will meet a section, I think its Sec. 4, which speaks about hierarchy of courts. This is a limitation

given to the right of a petitioner to file a petition directly with the Supreme Court. Thats a petition for certiorari,

prohibition, or mandamus, or even quo warranto. While theoretically we can file the case with the Supreme

Court, we should follow the procedural principle of hierarchy of courts. In Rule 65, it is expressly provided that

petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus would be filed directly with a Regional Trial Court or the

Court of Appeals. If we analyze carefully Sec. 4 of Rule 65, that is a severe limitation of the right of an aggrieved

party x x x as provided for in the Constitution. So although one of the basic principles why Congress enacted

B.P. 129 was to do away with the concept of concurrence in jurisdiction, B.P. 129 has not been able to do away

entirely with concurrent jurisdiction. B.P. 129 does not use the word concurrent in vesting jurisdiction upon the

courts. The law classifies the jurisdiction only into original jurisdiction, appellate jurisdiction, original and

exclusive, appellate and exclusive. Unlike in the past, under the old Judiciary Act of 1948, where the law

expressly contained provisions that conferred concurrent jurisdiction over certain cases upon different courts

which resulted, really, in confusion. Thats one of the purposes why we now have the Judiciary Reorganization



Act to do away with concurrence in jurisdiction. Generally, B.P. 129 has been able to do away with this concept

in concurrence of jurisdiction except with respect to certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, quo warranto, and

habeas corpus since the Constitution and B.P. 129 allocate original jurisdiction upon 3 courts X X X, then it is

safe to conclude that these 3 courts exercise original and concurrent jurisdiction over these petitions.

With respect to the Court of Appeals, B.P. 129 classifies the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals into original and

exclusive jurisdiction, original jurisdiction, and then exclusive appellate jurisdiction. With respect to the original

and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, there is only 1 case over which the Court of Appeal can

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction. And that is annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court. Because

the Constitution as well as B.P. 129 provide for certain cases only that could be adjudicated by the Supreme

Court and by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, we cannot classify the Supreme

Court and the Court of Appeals as courts of general jurisdiction although they are the 2 highest courts of the

land. The Supreme Court, although it is the Supreme Court, is not a court of general jurisdiction. It is still a court

of limited jurisdiction. Its authority is limited to those provided in the Constitution. Outside of those provided in

the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not exercise jurisdiction over other cases. The same is true with the

Court of Appeals. In Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, the authority of the Court of Appeals is very limited in so far as exclusive

original jurisdiction is concerned. There is, as we said, only 1 case over which the Court of Appeals can exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction. That is a petition to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court.

If the Court of Appeals is given the authority to annul the judgment of a Regional Trial Court, does not the

conferment of this authority carry with it the authority of the Court of Appeals to annul the judgment of an

inferior court, which is lower in rank than a Regional Trail Court? That is a logical argument. If the Court of

Appeals can annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, it should be reasonable that the Court of Appeals can

also annul the judgment of an inferior court. But that is not to construe jurisdiction over the subject matter or

over the nature of the action since the Court of Appeals since a court of limited jurisdiction. The Court of

Appeals can only annul the judgment of a Regional Trial Court. It cannot annul the judgment of an inferior

court. Does it mean to say that, while the decision of a Regional Trial Court can be annulled in a case filed before

the Court of Appeals, that the decisions of an inferior court is immune from annulment by the Court of Appeals?

That is right. The decision of a Regional Trial Court can be annulled by the Court of Appeals because that is

what B.P. 129 provides. But the decision of an inferior court is immune from annulment by the Court of

Appeals. But the decision of an inferior court can be annulled by the Regional Trial Court. Why is this so? Is it so

provided in B.P. 129 that a Regional Trial Court can annul the judgment of an inferior court? There is really

nothing provided in B.P. 129. If you read B.P. 129, I think the jurisdiction of the RTC starts with Sec. 19, there is

no provision on the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction which expressly confers upon a Regional Trial Court an

authority to annul a judgment of an inferior court. Nothing is provided in that matter in B.P. 129.



Since we are talking about annulment of judgment, we might just as well go to the procedural principles and X

X X to Rule 47 and thats the rule on annulment of judgment. You will notice it is Rule 47 of the Rules which

gives us the procedure to be followed when it comes to annulment of judgment The annulment of judgment

mentioned in Rule 47 is the annulment of judgment conferred by B.P. 129 to the Court of Appeals. In Rule 47, we

will notice that the 1st part the 1st few sections of that very short rule speaks about how a petition to annul a

judgment of a Regional Trial Court is filed with the Court of Appeals what the Court of Appeals can do after

the filing of the petition. But in the last 2 or 3 sections of Rule 47, the topic is suddenly changed from annulment

of judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court to annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court. So

there is a jump from annulment of judgments rendered by the Regional Trial Court to annulment of judgment

rendered by an inferior court. And in these last few sections of Rule 47, the Supreme Court says that a judgment

of an inferior court can be annulled although there is again no mention B.P. 129. And the court that has

jurisdiction original exclusive jurisdiction to annul a judgment rendered by an inferior court is a Regional

Trial Court. Can we not challenge the Supreme Court under Rule 47 to a Regional Trial Court of authority to

annul the judgment of an inferior court considering that B.P. 129 does not expressly give to a Regional Trial

Court authority to annul the judgment of an inferior court? We cannot because, under B.P. 129, there is an

allocation to the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction to entertain and decide all kinds of actions which are not

especially given to other courts. In other words, that provision of B.P. 129 is the justification why our books treat

the Regional Trial Court as a court of general jurisdiction. In fact, it is only the Regional Trial Court that is

considered as a court of general jurisdiction in our system and it is because of that provision in B.P. 129. If you

conceive about an action and then you start asking yourself which court has jurisdiction over this action. But

then you go through a process of elimination. If you entertain the idea of going to the Supreme Court, then you

just read the Constitution. And then you eliminate the Supreme Court if it has no authority under the

Constitution. Then you go to the Court of Appeals. Then you read B.P. 129. If, under B.P. 129, the Court of

Appeals does not have jurisdiction then it does not really have jurisdiction. Then you go to an inferior court. If

an inferior court also does not have jurisdiction, then you can be sure it is a Regional Trial Court that has

jurisdiction over the case. That is the principle is followed by Rule 47 when the Supreme Court, in the last few

sections of Rule 47, inserted a provision saying that with respect to the decisions of an inferior court, it is a

Regional Trial Court that has exclusive original jurisdiction. Because while there is an action known as

annulment of judgment rendered by an inferior court, since substantive laws have not allocated authority to

decide these cases to any other court, then it follows that it is a Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over

these cases.

In our study of Rule 47, the threshold case that you probably read or was assigned to read is that case of Islamic

Dawah v. Court of Appeals. In that case, the Supreme Court traced the history of annulment of judgment as an



action. The Supreme Court mentioned that in the past, before B.P. 129, the Supreme Court had from the start

recognized the propriety, the regularity of filing a petition for the annulment of judgment rendered by a court.

And before B.P. 129, the Supreme Court said that annulment of judgment of an inferior court can be entertained

by a Regional Trial Court. How about a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court? Can it be entertained by a

coordinate court? By another Regional Trial Court? The Supreme Court said yes because a Regional Trial Court

is a court of general jurisdiction. Thats the reason why in B.P. 129, the Court deemed it necessary to incorporate

this provision giving exclusive authority to the Court of Appeals to annul a judgment rendered by the Regional

Trial Court to do away with the anomalous situation then obtaining, before B.P. 129, where a Regional Trial

Court can annul a judgment rendered by another Regional Trial Court. Because there was no specific provision

in substantive law which allocated unto other courts this authority to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial

Court. So, because of B.P. 129, we now have a situation where the Court of Appeals can annul the judgment of a

Regional Trial Court expressly provided. And it is a Regional Trial Court that can annul the judgment of an

inferior court.

How about the Court of Appeals? Can the Supreme Court annul a judgment of the Court of Appeals, given that

the Supreme Court is the highest court of the land? The answer is no. Because there is nothing provided in the

Constitution which gives to the Supreme Court authority to annul a judgment of the Court of Appeals. So while

we have an action to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, an action to annul the judgment rendered by

an inferior court there is no recognized action, under the Constitution or under B.P. 129 or under the Judiciary

Act of 1948, authorizing the Supreme Court to annul the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. Although

there is 1 isolated decision by the Supreme Court which mentioned that the Court of Appeals itself can annul its

own decision. But that is not so provided in B.P. 129. If we rely solely on substantive laws like the Constitution

and B.P. 129, there is no such action as annulment of judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. It does not

mean to say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is immune from annulment. There could still be an

annulment if the Supreme Court will exercise what we call its equity jurisdiction. Rule 65, most likely, could be a

remedy in order to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals based on the same grounds that are given in

Rule 47. But there is no actual, recognized by substantive law, that is filed for the purpose of annulling the

judgment of the Court of Appeals. But B.P. 129 recognizes the propriety of a petition to annul the judgment

rendered by the Regional Trial Court. It also recognizes the propriety of filing an action to annul the judgment of

an inferior court.

If a judgment of a Regional Trial Court, if a judgment of an inferior court can be the subject of annulment by the

Court of Appeals or by the Regional Trial Court, as the case may be, can we not also seek the annulment of a

judgment rendered by a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency? After all, these quasi-judicial bodies,

they also exercise the functions of a court. That is, the adjudicate, they determine the rights and liabilities of the



litigants in the cases that are presented before them. This is also a settled issue. Annulment of judgment under

B.P. 129, as procedurally explained by Rule 47, does extend to annulment of judgment of quasi-judicial bodies.

There is no such thing as annulment of a judgment of a quasi-judicial body or an administrative body unless the

law creating the quasi-judicial body or a chapter of that administrative body allows the petition to be filed for

the annulment of these decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. In other words, we cannot file a petition under Rule 47

for the annulment of the decision of a Civil Service Commission or a Securities and Exchange Commission. You

will notice that in Rule 47, which follows, literally, the provisions of B.P. 129, it is provided that Rule 47 refers to

an action filed by a petitioner to annul the judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in a civil case. That is

clearly provided in Rule 47, which is what, literally, what B.P. 129 provides. B.P. 129 provides that the Court of

Appeals can annul a judgment of a Regional Trial Court. Now, the procedure, as given in Rule 47, is the Court of

Appeals can allow the judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil action. So if the action is not a civil action, it

is simply a criminal action or it is a decision rendered by a quasi-judicial body, then we cannot make us of Rule

47.

Since Rule 47 says that the annulment contemplated in B.P. 129 the authority given to the Court of Appeals to

annul the judgment refers to a judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil action. Does it mean to say that the

judgment of a Regional Trial Court acting as a criminal court cannot be the subject of annulment under Rule 47?

You know very well that a Regional Trial Court could act as a civil court and it could also act as a criminal court

because the Regional Trial Court exercises original jurisdiction over both civil actions and criminal actions. With

respect to the exercise by the Regional Trial Court of authority over civil actions, the decision of a Regional Trial

Court in these civil actions could be the subject of annulment of judgment by the Court of Appeals under Rule

47. But if the decision rendered by a Regional Trial Court is a decision in a criminal case, even if we can

challenge the validity because of the lack of jurisdiction or collusion or fraud, if the decision rendered by the X X

X [Regional Trial Court] is a decision in a criminal case, we cannot use Rule 47. Rule 47 is not a remedy to annul

a judgment rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a criminal court. So you do away with the

impression that Rule 47 is a remedy to annul a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court in all kinds of

actions. Sec. 1 of Rule 47 is very clear. The decision of the Regional Trial Court must be in a civil case so that it

can be the subject of annulment under B.P. 129, in relation to Rule 47. Does it mean to say then a decision of a

Regional Trial Court in a criminal case cannot be annulled? The answer is yes, under Rule 47. But a decision of a

Regional Trial Court in a criminal case can be annulled but not under Rule 47. It can still be annulled by filing a

petition for habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is the equivalent of annulment of judgment rendered by the RTC in a

civil case because B.P. 129 is very clear that, in relation to Rule 47, what can be annulled under Rule 47 is only a

decision of a Regional Trial Court in a civil case. If a party desires to challenge the validity of a decision

rendered by the Regional Trial Court in a criminal case, he should not resort to Rule 47. He should file a petition

for habeas corpus.



Is there a difference actually between Rule 47, that is a petition to annul the judgment rendered by a Regional

Trial Court in a civil case, to a petition for habeas corpus, which is a special proceeding but designed to set aside

the decision of a Regional Trial Court in a purely criminal case? There are substantial differences. Annulment of

judgment under Rule 47 is what we call as a direct attack on a final and executor judgment. The only purpose

why a party X X X resorts to Rule 47 is to have the decision declared null and void nullified and set aside. But

in a criminal case where the decision of the RTC may not be valid because of the same reasons given in Rule 47

lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud the remedy is habeas corpus which is not a direct attack on the judgment

rendered by a Regional Trial Court. Habeas corpus, in other words, is an indirect attack on the judgment of a

Regional Trial Court in this criminal case. Why is it an indirect attack unlike annulment, which is a direct attack

on a judgment? In habeas corpus, where it is filed in order to nullify a decision of a Regional Trial Court in a

criminal case, the principal relief which the petitioner in habeas corpus seeks is to declare that the petitioner has

been deprived of his liberty unlawfully unlawful deprivation of a right that is the principal relief which

habeas corpus seeks. It is not principally to set aside a judgment of a Regional Trial Court in that criminal case.

So that if you compare these remedies which seek to nullify or set aside the judgment of a Regional Trial Court

in a civil case and in a criminal case, the remedies of the petitioner in a criminal case are more advantageous

than simply compared to an annulment of judgment. Because annulment of judgment is a direct attack on the

judgment. While in a criminal case, the detainee or prisoner can challenge the validity of the judgment of

conviction although he is not attacking directly the validity of the judgment of conviction. He is attacking the

validity of the deprivation of his liberty.

You will also notice that Rule 47 is inserted in the 16 or 17 rules concerning appeals. In our Rules, the procedure

for appeal starts with Rule 40 and it ends up with Rule 56. So from Rule 40 up to Rule 56, the topic of these 16 or

17 different rules is always cases on appeal. Except now Rule 47, thats why the insertion is quite scandalous.

Annulment of judgment should have been included in the enumeration of special civil actions because it is

incorporated in the Rules on appeal but annulment of judgment has nothing to do with appeals. B.P. 129

considers annulment of judgment as an original action to be filed with the Court of Appeals or with a Regional

Trial Court. And in Rule 47, particularly applied to a petition for annulment commenced before the Court of

Appeals, you will notice that some of the features of a special civil action are carried by a petition to annul the

judgment filed with the Court of Appeals. For instance, if a petition to annul a judgment of a Regional Trial

Court in a civil case is filed before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals has the authority to outrightly

dismiss the petition. That is similar to Rule 65 where a court can outrightly dismiss a petition for certiorari if it is

not meritorious on its face. That is, of course, provided in Rule 47. The Court of Appeals can outrightly dismiss a

petition to annul a judgment. So if the petitioner has in mind stopping the execution or preventing the execution

of a final and executory judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court by making use of Rule 47, there is a big



chance he will not succeed because the Court of Appeals could outrightly dismiss a petition to annul a judgment

filed before the Court of Appeals.

Since the judgment sought to be annulled under Rule 47 is a final and executor judgment, will the filing of a

petition to annul the judgment be a good reason for the trial court to deny a motion for execution? Even if there

is a petition to annul a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, if that decision has become final and

executory and it is not the subject of annulment of judgment, Rule 47 is not a justification for the trial court not

to execute its final and executor judgment. So the prevailing party can still move for the execution of that

judgment, notwithstanding the commencement and pendency of a petition to annul the judgment of the

Regional Trial Court. The only remedy available to a petitioner in annulment of judgment before the Court of

Appeals to stop execution is to apply for a provisional remedy of preliminary injunction or temporary

restraining order. Thats why in most petitions to annul a judgment filed with Court of Appeals, the petitioner

variably applies for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction. Without these provisional remedies, even if

there is a petition with the Court of Appeals for the annulment of judgment of a Regional Trial Court in a civil

case, that petition to annul a judgment will not prevent the execution of that final and executor judgment.

Under Rule 47, in relation to B.P. 129, on annulment of judgments commenced before the Court of Appeals, is it

correct to say that only the litigants before the Regional Trial Court can make us of annulment of judgment?

That question has also been answered by the Supreme Court in the threshold case of Islamic Dawah v. Court of

Appeals. That case ruled that annulment of judgment, as contemplated in B.P. 129 and also as envisioned in

Rule 47, does not prohibit a stranger from filing a petition to annul a judgment rendered by a Regional Trial

Court although the petitioner may not have been a litigant in that particular case. He can do so as long as he can

show that he will be prejudiced by the execution of the decision sought to be annulled.

You will also notice that the requirements in Rule 47 before annulment of judgment can be properly commenced

are very strict. 1 of the requirements is that the petitioner must show that the remedies for motion for new trial,

that is, petition for relief and appeal, are no longer available through no fault of his own. In other words, if the

judgment has not yet become final and executor, a litigant cannot make use of annulment of judgment because

he can still appeal. He has other remedies. He can file a motion for new trial. If he has filed a motion for new

trial and that motion is denied and he neglects to appeal, so the judgment becomes final and executory, can he

now properly file a petition to annul the judgment? Still no because his failure to appeal was through his own

fault. He could just have appealed the judgment of the court. Let us say that the aggrieved party has failed to

appeal, has failed to file a motion for new trial and his failure to do so cannot be traced to his negligence or

inexcusable conduct, can he now file a petition to annul the judgment in the Court of Appeals? Still the answer is

no because there is still an available remedy to challenge a final and executor judgment. And that is a petition



for relief from judgment. The rules in 47 which apply the provision of B.P. 129 on annulment of judgment

rendered by a Regional Trial Court are very, very strict. All the other remedies must not have been availed of

through no fault of the petitioner. So even if we cannot fault the petitioner, as long as petition for relief from

judgment is still a remedy, still available, we cannot resort to annulment of judgment under 47. In that case of

Islamic Dawah, the Supreme Court said that if we allow a stranger to avail of annulment of judgment of a

Regional Trial Court in a civil case where he is not a party, then we should not also require the petitioner to

satisfy the requirements like availability, availment of new trial, motion for new trial, or appeal, or petition for

relief from judgment. The reason, according to the court, is that a stranger to a case cannot possibly cannot

possibly make use of a motion for new trial or appeal or a petition for relief from judgment because these

remedies, under the Rules, are available only to a litigant in a case. If the petitioner is not a litigant, he could not

conceivably satisfy this requirement.

If you compare the procedure in Rule 47 between annulment of judgment that is commenced before the Court of

Appeals and annulment of judgment commenced before a Regional Trial Court, you will immediately notice a

very significant difference. While the Court of Appeals has the authority to outrightly dismiss a petition to annul

judgment, a Regional Trial Court cannot. So if there is a petition to annul a judgment filed before the Regional

Trial Court and the subject judgment, of course, is one that has been rendered by an inferior court, the Regional

Trial Court has no authority to outrightly dismiss that petition to annul the judgment. In so far as the Regional

Trial is concerned in a petition to annul a judgment rendered by an inferior court, that petition to annul should

be treated just like any other case. So after of the filing of petition to annul, the Regional Trial Court will issue a

summons and then, having served upon the respondents, let the respondents file the answer, and then file the

case, and then render the decision. That is the significant difference between annulment of judgments

commenced before the Court of Appeals compared to annulment of judgment commenced before the Regional

Trial Court.

In Rule 47, if the judgment is annulled, then it is declared void by the court. So it can no longer be enforced or, if

that judgment has already been executed, the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court can order restitution

of properties if that is still possible. In analyzing Rule 47, the provisions of Rule 47 in relation to B.P. 129 on

annulment of judgment conferred upon the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court, I suggest that you

also read a rule in evidence. That is, impeachment of a judicial record which you must have taken up. That is in

Rule 132 of Evidence. Impeachment of judicial record. In that evidentiary rule, impeachment of judicial record

means to discredit a judicial record. A judgment of a court if, of course, a judicial record. So we can discredit or

set aside a judgment of the court under that principle of impeachment of judicial record. This is related to Rule

47 as well as to the provisions of B.P. 129 on annulment. In B.P. 129, there are no grounds for annulment

mentioned at all. The grounds for annulment are contained in Rule 47 and also in Rule 132 of Evidence. If Im



not mistaken, that would be Sec. 28 or 29 or 30 of Rule 132 in Evidence. The topic is impeachment of judicial

record. In that evidentiary rule of impeachment of judicial record, there are 3 grounds X X X: 1) lack of

jurisdiction, 2) fraud, and 3) collusion. If we compare that to Rule 47, there are only 3 grounds in Rule 47: 1)

absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or 2) absence of jurisdiction over the person of the litigants, and

then 3) extrinsic fraud. Rule 47 does not mention anything about collusion as a ground to annul the judgment.

Does it matter? It does not matter. Collusion is encompassed by the term extrinsic fraud as a ground for

annulment of judgment. So there is no conflict between impeachment of judicial record and the grounds

mentioned in Rule 47 for the annulment of judgment.

We go back to B.P. 129 and talk about the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court. With respect to a Regional Trial

Court, the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court is founded on certain factors. The 1st one is whether or not an

action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The other one is if the action is a real action it involves title to or

possession of real property. And then, if it does not involve real property or the action does not within the

concept of incapable of pecuniary estimation, then it is the amount involved whether it is properly for the

recovery for money or for the recovery of personal property.

The 1st factor is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. So if you come across of an action that is incapable

of pecuniary estimation, then that action is cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. Is it correct to say then that all

actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are cognizable by a Regional Trial Court always? That also is not a

correct assumption. If you read again B.P. 129, there are several actions incapable of pecuniary estimation which

are not exclusively cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. For instance, annulment of judgment which we

discussed a minute ago Annulment of judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation but B.P. 129 says that

annulment of judgment rendered by a Regional Trial Court is cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. How

about annulment of an arbitral award by a barangay court which could also be the subject of annulment of

judgment under the Local Government Code? That is not capable of pecuniary estimation. Is it cognizable

exclusively by the Regional Trial Court? The answer is no. Annulment of a judgment or an arbitral award by a

barangay court acting as an arbitral body, although incapable of pecuniary estimation, is cognizable only by an

inferior court. This is so provided by the Local Government Code. So the Local Government Code is a special

law in this matter. If it conflicts with B.P. 129, then it is the special law that will prevail. Certiorari, prohibition,

and mandamus. They are actions incapable of pecuniary estimation but they are not exclusively cognizable a

Regional Trial Court. So the provision in B.P. 129 which allocates to a Regional Trial Court exclusive original

jurisdiction over actions which are not capable of pecuniary estimation admits of several exceptions. And these

several exceptions are also found in B.P. 129. So not all actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are cognizable

only by a Regional Trial Court. There are such actions not capable of pecuniary estimation which are allocated

not to a Regional Trial Court but to other courts under the provisions of B.P. 129.



With respect to real actions, that is title to or possession of property this is now qualified by the amendment to

B.P. 129 which expanded the jurisdiction of inferior courts. These are the actions involving title to or possession

of real property: accion reinvindicatoria, accion publiciana they are cognizable by a Regional Trial Court

exercising exclusive original jurisdiction as long as the assessed value of the property is more than P20,000 or

P50,000, as the case may be. So you have to relate it to the expanded jurisdiction of the inferior courts. But with

respect to unlawful detainer and forcible entry they are also actions involving possession of real property

then they are always cognizable exclusively by an inferior court, regardless of the assessed value of the property.

Is it possible that an action is a real action and at the same time one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation?

The answer is also yes. We have such actions. They are real actions but they are also incapable of pecuniary

estimation. A good example is foreclosure of real estate mortgage since the property in mortgage to be

foreclosed is a mortgage constituted over real property, then that foreclosure of real mortgage is a real action

but, at the same time, it is not capable of pecuniary estimation because the issue to be resolved by the court by

the foreclosure court is always this issue: does the mortgagee (the plaintiff) have the right to foreclose? That

issue is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So what do we do in determining jurisdiction if an action is both a

real action and one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation? What factor will be determinative of the

jurisdiction of the court? Will it be the assessed value of the property or will it be the fact that the issue involved

is not capable of pecuniary estimation? Again, this is a settle issue. The Supreme Court said that if an action

carries the feature both of incapable of pecuniary estimation and a real action, like foreclosure of real mortgage,

the determinative factor is the feature of incapable of pecuniary estimation. So it is a Regional Trial Court that

will always have jurisdiction over foreclosure of real mortgage even if the assessed value of the property sought

to be foreclosed is only P1,000. As long as the action is foreclosure of mortgage, the action is exclusively

cognizable by a Regional Trial Court. So if you find in one action the 2 features which could be determinative of

jurisdiction incapable of pecuniary estimation and real action the determining factor will always be that

characteristic that it is not capable of pecuniary estimation. So it is a Regional Trial Court that will have

jurisdiction. The feature of foreclosure of mortgage as a real action will only be important in determining the

venue of the action but not the jurisdiction of the court. A similar action which applies the same principle is

expropriation of a piece of land. Expropriation of a piece of land is also a real action because it involves title to or

possession of real property. But expropriation of a piece of land will not take into account the assessed value of

the land sought to be expropriated for purposes of determining jurisdiction over the case. According to the

Court, expropriation, although it could be a real action, is also an action that is not capable of pecuniary

estimation. So expropriation of real property, even if the assessed value again is P1,000, will always be

cognizable by a Regional Trial Court.



When it comes to personal action under B.P. 129, the determining factor will be the amount sought to be

recovered if it is purely a claim for money. Or if it is recovery of personal property, it is the value of the personal

property according to the complaint. But when it comes to a pure collection suit that is, the creditor is

interested only in collecting money from the defendant there are exclusions given in the amendment to B.P.

129. Excluding charges, interests, attorneys fees, and damages. So the determining factor in a complaint for the

recovery of money, in so far as jurisdiction of court is concerned, will only be the principal sought to be

recovered. So that if the amount sought to be recovered by the plaintiff in his complaint against the defendant is

P1,000,000 a total of P1,000,000 the conclusion that the case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court will not

be correct. A complaint to recover the totality of P1,000,000 could be cognizable exclusively by an inferior court

if the P1,000,000 is the aggregate of the principal, the interest, the costs, the damages, the attorneys fees then

we have to find out the principal which the plaintiff seeks to recover. If the principal is only P200,000 but

P800,000 represent interest, damages, costs, and other excluded items, that will be cognizable by an inferior

court. That is now settled.

Supposing that the complaint is for the recovery of damages. You know very well that in a complaint to recover

damages, what is sought to be recovered is always money in terms of pesos and centavos. But under the

amendment to B.P. 129, we should exclude the item of damages. Supposing the complaint is purely for

damages, and the plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages, moral damages, temperate damages, exemplary

damages How will we now ascertain the jurisdiction of the court? We cannot use the rule of exclusion because

what the plaintiff seeks as are relief is the recovery of damages. Let us say that the plaintiff seeks to recover

P100,000 actual damages, P500,000 moral damages, and then another P500,000 exemplary damages. The

aggregate will be P1.1M but the complaint says that, principally, the plaintiff seeks to recover actual damages of

P100,000. With what court do we file that complaint? Again, this is settled. It should be with the Regional Trial

Court. When it comes to complaints purely for damages, the determining factor, in so far as jurisdiction of

courts is concerned, is the aggregate amount of damages the totality of the damages. So even if the complaint

has specified the amount of damages for each aspect actual, moral, exemplary, temperate damages the court

that will acquire jurisdiction is the court that has authority to rule on the aggregate totality of all the damages

claimed by the plaintiff.

With respect to recovery of personal property For instance, the recovery of a car. Do we take into account the

assessed value of the car in order to ascertain the jurisdiction of the court? The answer is no. B.P. 129 and the

amendment to B.P. 129 takes into account the assessed value for purposes of jurisdiction for real properties.

With respect to personal properties, the assessed value of that personal property has nothing to do with

jurisdiction of the court. So instead of using as a standard the assessed value, when it comes to personal

property, the determining factor will be the value of the personal property according to the complaint. In other



words, in our complaint for the recovery of a car, replevin for instance If the plaintiff wants the case to be tried

by the Regional Trial Court, all that he needs to do is state in his complaint is that the value of the car is P800,000

although it may not be true. Although it may be a false figure. When it comes to personal property, we always

rely on the variation given by the plaintiff in his complaint. So the jurisdiction of the court will depend solely on

the allegations in the complaint. Whether the allegation is true or false, the jurisdiction will be determined by the

figure given in that complaint, with respect to personal properties. Supposing the defendant challenges the

valuation given by the plaintiff in his complaint by telling the court that the car could not be worth P800,000

because it is a 30 year old car the true value of the car is only P100,000. And then the defendant is willing to

submit evidence to show the true value of the car. Will the court entertain the defendants move? No. The court

will not. The jurisdiction of the court will be based solely in the allegations in the complaint. In civil cases, after

the court has acquired jurisdiction over this particular complaint, relying on the allegations contained in the

complaint, it is very likely that, after trial, the evidence submitted by both sides will convince the court that the

true value of the car is really P100,000. Can the Regional Trial Court decide the case although it is now the

conclusion by the Regional Trial Court that the value of the car is only P100,000? The answer is yes. If a Regional

Trial Court acquires jurisdiction over a complaint to recover a car which, according to the complaint is valued at

P800,000, the Regional Trial Court continues to exercise jurisdiction over the case until it is finally decided,

regardless of the finding of the court that the value of the car is only P100,000. You know that principle very

well. That is called adherence to jurisdiction. Once the court acquires jurisdiction over the car, it cannot be

ousted of that jurisdiction. It will continue to exercise jurisdiction over the case until the case is finally

adjudicated. The only means by which we can oust the court the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over the

case is if Congress enacts a law saying that the jurisdiction of the court will not be based solely in the allegations

in that complaint. In other words, if Congress decides to abandon the principle of adherence to jurisdiction then

it is possible that the RTC will be deprived of jurisdiction. But as long as the principle of adherence to

jurisdiction is not abandoned by Congress, then if the court acquires jurisdiction over a particular case, the

exercise by the court of the jurisdiction of that case continues until that case is finally decided.

With respect to inferior courts Notwithstanding the expansion of the jurisdiction of the inferior courts

Meaning to say that in the expanded jurisdiction of inferior courts, practically all cases that can be decided by a

Regional Trial Court can now be decided by an inferior court, depending only on the amount involved upon

the value of the property. So real actions accion reinvindicatoria, accion publiciana they are all cognizable by

inferior courts now depending upon the assessed value of the property. Even estate proceedings can now be

entertained by an inferior court under its expanded jurisdiction. Does it mean to say that an inferior court which

exercises expanded jurisdiction can now be treated as a court of general jurisdiction? Its still a court of limited

jurisdiction. It can only take cases that are given to it by substantive law. The provision of B.P. 129 which makes

a Regional Trial Court as a court of general jurisdiction is not given to an inferior court. In B.P. 129, in the



enumeration of cases exclusively cognizable by a Regional Trial Court is an item which says the Regional Trial

Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all action that are not especially assigned to any other

court. That provision in B.P. 129 is not contained in the allocation of jurisdiction to inferior courts. So inferior

courts continue to exercise jurisdiction only over cases that are assigned to it under B.P. 129 and special laws, or

amendment to B.P. 129.

You will also notice that in B.P. 129, with respect to the vesting of authority to inferior courts, there is an

identification in Sec. 33 of what we call the totality test in determining jurisdiction. In Sec. 33, the totality test is

just a proviso with respect to ascertainment of jurisdiction of courts. The totality test given in B.P. 129 is more

encompassing than the totality test given in the Rules of Court. We also have a totality test in the Rules of Court.

That is in Rule 2. There is a totality test with reference to the section of joinder of causes of action. If you are

going to compare the totality test given in the Rules of Court, under the section on joinder of causes of action,

the totality test in the Rules of Court appears to be of a more limited scope. In B.P. 129, the totality test refers to

all claims of causes of action that are embodied in 1 complaint, whether they pertain to the same or different

parties or they arise out of the same or different transaction. X X X If you compare it to the totality test in Rule 2,

the totality test in Rule 2 speaks only about causes of action for money. The totality of money claims will be

determinative of the jurisdiction of the courts.

In B.P. 129, with respect to inferior courts, we also meet the term delegated jurisdiction to inferior courts. And

also the interlocutory jurisdiction to inferior courts or special jurisdiction to inferior courts. In delegated

jurisdiction, the inferior court acts as if it is a Regional Trial Court in deciding land registration and cadastral

cases which are contested or which will not be contested. If contested, the limitation is the value of the contested

property. If uncontested, the inferior court can act as a land registration court or cadastral court without any

limitation. But B.P. 129 is very clear in saying that if an inferior courts as a land registration or cadastral court,

the decision of the inferior court is appealable to the Court of Appeal, not to a Regional Trial Court. Which is the

rule that we follow in B.P. 129.

That is the delegated jurisdiction of an inferior court. In habeas corpus proceedings, there is also a mention of an

inferior court trying a habeas corpus proceeding. It does not mean to say that habeas corpus is cognizable also

by an inferior court. The authority of an inferior court to entertain a petition for habeas corpus refers to a

situation where a petition for habeas corpus is filed with the proper court usually a Regional Trial Court. But

there are no judges available to act on the petition. But that petition for habeas corpus is filed, still, with a

Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus. So the petition for habeas corpus is

filed with the Regional Trial Court but the clerk of court finds out that there are no RTC judges that are available

they are absent or are on leave that can entertain a petition for habeas corpus. This is the remedy provided in



B.P. 129. Attention to habeas corpus cases is urgent under our laws. In fact, habeas corpus proceedings are

always given preference by law. So if there are no RTC judges that are available, the next best thing to do X X X

is to transfer the petition filed already with a Regional Trial Court to an inferior court. That provision in B.P. 129

does not authorize the filing of a petition for habeas corpus directly with an inferior court. A petition for habeas

corpus filed directly with an inferior court can be challenged on jurisdictional grounds because B.P. 120 does not

vest unto an inferior court an authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. It is only under circumstances

where there are no other RTC judges available to entertain a petition for habeas corpus. X X X the judge can now

analyze and study the propriety of issuing the writ of habeas corpus.

We need a break in the meantime but before we have a break, I will give you this riddle and then you try to

answer it. Just like the riddle in grade school X X X. The question is: who am I? I am just an object. A face in a

crowd. Nothing outstanding about it about my form about my look. But, usually, Im between 4 inches to 8

inches long. And both genders, both men and women, young or old, adore me. And then I, on one end I have

a forest of X X X but my friends usually tell me that I am like a soldier X X X because I am on call 24 hours a day.

If there is no assignment given me, I just hang around I just lie down doing nothing. But when Im giving a

specific assignment, I see to it that Im always ready to complete the X X X. And when I am at work, I usually go

back and forth and that is warm and that is dark. And then when Im through with my job, my assignment, I

always see to it that I give out a sticky X X X white X X X and then I return to my X X X and then just hang

around and just lie doing nothing. Who is this person or object?

Before we leave jursidiction altogether, You have to know the meaning of primary jurisdiction and residual

jurisdiction

Residual Jursidiction is found in appealed cases particularly Rules 41 and 42. It is the jurisdiction enjoyed by the

trial court to act on certain matters even if the case is already on appeal. It is well explained in Rules 41 and 42.

So it is not correct to assume that if a case is decided by the trial court and the aggrieved party perfects an appeal

on time and the jurisdiction over the case is now assumed by the appellate court, like the Court of Appeals, it is

not correct to assume that the trial court is divested entirely of jurisdiction even if there is already a perfected

appeal. In Residual Jursidiction, the trial court continues to exercise jurisdiction over ceratin matters for a very

limited period of time. And after the expiration of that period, absolute jursidiction over the case will now be

assumed by the appellate court.

In Primary jurisdiction, this involves quasi judicail bodies, what happens in Primary Jurisdiction is that congress

enacts a law which vests jurisdiction under the quasi judicial body to try and decided cases which are

cognizable by regular courts under the provisions of BP 129. The reason why congress usually enacts these laws



is that congress feels that the quasi judicial body is better equipped in order to decide disputes between the

litigants. A good example of a Primary Jurisdiction conferred by substantive law is the jurisdiction given to a

quasi judicial body called HLURB, this board is given original jurisdiction, in some cases exclusive original

jurisdiction, to adjudicate cases of disputes between a subdivision buyer and a subdivision developer, so if a

subdivision buyer feels aggrieved for the non-performance by the developer of his commitments under the

contract, the buyer should not file the complaint with a regular court although under BP 129 the regular court

may have jurisdiction, usually for breach of contract the remedies given in the CC would Specific Performance,

Recission of Contract or damages for both cases or damages alone. In this rule on Primary Jurisdction, these

actions will not be assumed by the regular court although BP129 gives the regular court such authority

particularly the Regional Trial Court. The jurisdiction is given by substantive law to the quasi judicial body

HLURB because the HU presumably is better equipped to adjudicate contests between the subdivion buyer

and developer so that there is a breach by the subdivision developer of his commitments to the buyer, what the

buyer will do is to file a complaint with the HLURB.

There is one case however decided by the SC, where the subdivision developer filed a compalint for ejectment

against a subdivision buyer because it was the buyer who allegedly violated the terms of the contract and the

developer wanted to recover possession of the property purchased by the buyer. The subdivision buyer

challenged the authority of HLURB to entertain a complaint for ejectment which under BP 129 is exclusively

cognizable by an inferior court. The SC said the primary jurisdiction of the HLURB does not extend to

complaints for ejectment filed by one party against the other. So that in the case of primary jurisdiction vested

by substantive law to quasi-judicail bodies, the authority of the quasi-judicial body is interpreted strictly.

Ejectment could really be a dispute between a subdivision buyer and developer but then when the purpose is to

recover physical possession of the property or even in accion publiciana, the court said that it is the regular court

who has authority over the complaint.

Now we go the Rules of Court. In analyzing the provisions of the 1997 Rules of Court you should always bear in

mind the consitutional limits that are provided by the Constitution to the authoity of the SC on the rules on

pleadings, practice and procedure, like the ROC, the rules should be uniform in all courts of the same grade and

then the rules should provide for a speedy and inexpensive determination of the case and then the rules should

not increase, decrease or modify substantive rights. So if there is any rule on procedure which violates any one

of these limitations given under the Consitution, we may then properly challenge the applicability and validity

of these rules of procedure. There was one litigant who challenged the validity of a Rule in Criminal Procedure,

its Rule 115, and Rule 115 of Criminal Procedure really speaks not about procedure but more of the rights of the

accused. So the party said that Rule 115 should be excluded from the Rules of Court for it is not procedural but

substantive. It modifies, increases or decreases the rights of the person given by substantive law. The SC denied



the petition, saying that while the authority of the SC deals with the procedure, pleadings and practice and that

substantive rights should not even be covered, the court said that it is practically impossible for rules of

procedure to be devised without incorporating certain provisions that are concered with substantive law. The

standard should be if we take the ROC as a whole: are the Rules of Court primarily procedural in character? if

the answer is yes and there are certain provisions which speak about substantive rights or its coverage, that

should not be the justification for deleting the said provisions in the rules of court. The other justification given

by the SC is the Civil Code, the CC is substantive law but if we go over the CC, it contains provisions which are

not substantive in character, they are also procedural but that does not make CC a procedural law, its still a

stubstantive law. Some articles cited by the court which refer to procedural matters are articles concerning the

issuance by the court of a preliminary mandatory injunction or preliminary injunction in cases of unlawful

detainer and focible entry. But the SC said that we cannot simply say that the CC is no longer substantive simply

because there are certain articles that speak about procedural matters. So if you come across a provision of the

rules of court which violates substantive law in the sense that the rules of court reduces substantive rights or

modifies substantive rights there is a possiblity that this provision could be challenged or deleted from the rules.

For instance, in special procedings like the settlement of estate of a deceased person there is a provision in the

rules concerning the filing of claims. You are familiar with the rule that when a person dies and then there is a

settlement proceeding that is commenced with the court, the creditors for money arising from a contract which

is expressed or implied, should file their claims against the estate, they have no right to file a civil action for the

recovery of the money claim against the estate of the deceased or against the executor or administrator.

Otherwise, if the money claim is not submitted within the period fixed under the rules, the claim of these

creditors will be barred. and then there is another provision that says that if the deceased is a solidary debtor

together with another one who is still alive, it is the duty of the creditor to file a claim against the estate for the

recovery of the whole indebtedness. That is a violation of a principle under the Civil Code which says that when

there is solidary relationship between two debtors, the creditor is given by the CC the authority to file a

complaint against any one of the solidary debtors for the recovery of the whole indebtedness. So, if we apply the

Civil Code provisions, the creditor in the example could file a complaint for the recovery of the whole obligation

against the solidary debtor who is still alive, he does not have to file a money claim against the estate of the

deceased solidary debtor. In several cases which raised this issue, the SC said that the CC provision saying that a

creditor can file a complaint against any one of the solidary debtors will not be affected by the provision of the

Rules of Court concerning the filing of claims. This is an example of a provision in the Rules of Court which

substantially reduces the right given by law to a creditor to file a complaint against any one of the solidary

debtors for the recovery of the whole obligation.

These 1997 Rules of Court should be interpreted liberally according to the Rules. But the interpretation is not a

liberal interpretation in favor of the plaintiff or in favor of the defendant. A court being an impartial party to the



dispute. The meaning of a liberal interpretation is to promote justice, to carry out the duty of the SC under the

limitations given under the Constitution.

Under the Rules now, a civil action is always commenced by the filing of a complaint. That is the general rule.

There are certin civil actions usually special civil actions which are not commenced by a filing of a complaint.

Instead, we file for a petition. But it does not really matter whether we file a petition or a complaint when an

action is sought to be commenced. The filing of a complaint has given rise to the action that when a compalint is

filed, the court automatically acquires jursidiction over the person of the plaintiff. So in that action, the only

problem concerning the jurisdiction is the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant. But the

latest decisions, last year the court decided a case where it was held that even if a complaint is filed before a

competent court, if the one who filed the complaint is not authorized to do so, the court does not acquire

jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff. In fact, the court said that the court does not even acquire

jurisdiction to try or adjudicate the case. So the rule that we follow in our procedural principles which says that

the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff through the filing of a complaint will not

necessarily give jurisdiction by the court over the person of the plaintiff. The court can examine whether or not

the filing of the complaint is authorized by the plaintiff. If it is not authorized by the plaintiff, the court will not

acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiff. The court will not even acquire authority to decide the case. The court is

absolutely without any jurisdiction to try and decide the case if it is demonstrated that the filing of the complaint

is without authority given by the plaintiff.

In a complaint properly filed in court, that is one filed by the plaintiff himself or with the authority of the

plaintiff, of course the plaintiff under rule 10 has the right to amend that complaint provided that an answer has

not yet been filed by the defendant. The amendment made under Rule 10 is a matter of right. If the plaintiff

amends that complaint by impleading another defendant, then the court will have nothing to do except accept

the complaint since the amendement is a matter of right. And in so far as that new defendant is concerned, the

date of the filing of the complaint will relate back to the date when the original complaint was filed unless a new

cause of action is introduced in that complaint. In which case, we dont make use of that relating back doctrine.

The classification of actions under the rules is very simple as civil action, a special civil action, criminal action

and special proceedings. In the definition of a civil action, it is very clear that we do not necessarily follow the

definition of a cause of action under Rule 2. In Rule 2 a cause of action is defined as a violation by the defendant

of a right belonging to the plaintiff. So for a cause of action to accrue, the plaintiff must allege that he has a right

and that the defendant has violated such right. The indication given by this definition is that the right holder

must wait for a person to violate his right before he can have a cause of action to bring an action in court. That

concept of a cause of action should always be related to the definition of a civil action under section 1. The

definition of a civil action does not require a prior violation of a right so that the rightholder may have a

justification to go to court. The definition of a civil action is one by which a person sues another for the

enforcement or protection for a violation or a threat to violate such right. So there is no need for an actual



violation of a right before a case can be properly filed in court. Under the definition of a cause of action if there is

a threat to violate a right, there is already a cause of action.

Our rules of procedure become complicated when there are several rights that are violated by one and the same

wrongful act. If there is just one wrongful act and there are several rights that are violated, how many causes of

action will accrue? The standard given by decisions of the court is that in order to determine whether or not

several cause of action will arise if there is one wrongful act and there are several right that are violated is to

determine whether these rights belong to the same person or to different persons. That is the common standard

that we apply now. For instance, if a person drives negligenlty his car, and then he causes, as a result of the

negligent driving, damage or wrecks three cars, how many causes of action will accrue against the negligent

driver? Using the standard given by the court, we have to determine whether the three cars belong to one

person or the three cars belong three different persons. If the 3 cars belong to only one person, only one cause of

action will accrue. In other words, the person owning the three cars cannot file an action one complaint for

damages involving the first car and another complaint for damages involving the second car and another for the

third car. That not possible. That is spitting a cause of action because we are talking about violation of rights in

the concept of a cause of action. The owner of the three cars has only one right that has been violated by the

wrongful act of the negligent driver. But if these three cars belong to three different owners, the owner of the

first car has his own cause the owner of the second has another cause and the owner of the third has his own

cause of action. And because there are three causes of action that arise belonging to three different persons then

it follows that these three different persons can file separate complaints. They do not have to be joined as

plaintiffs in one compalint. They can file their own seprate complaints before the competent court. So that if the

3 cars belong to three different persons, the first owner can file his complaint before the RTC if he claims that the

damages suffered by him amount to 500,000. The second car owner can file his own claim before an inferior

court if the damages suffered by him abount ony to 200,000. So the filing of these complaints by the 3 different

owners will depend on the amount of damages which each will respectively claim in their complaints. The fact

that there are 3 different causes of action does not mean that the 3 different parties should go to the same court

in order to protect their interest and recover damages suffered by them. In our first example where the wrongful

act of driving has caused damages to 3 different cars but belonging to the same person, there is only one cause of

action. This owner of the 3 cars can only file one complaint for the recovery of damages of his 3 cars. Can he

properly and rightfully go to court right away because his right has been violated by the wrongful act. If we rely

solely on substantive law, the answer is yes. As long as a right has been violated by the wrongful act of another,

the right holder has the prerogative of going to court for protection and enforcement of his right. If we apply

procedural principles, the owner may be precluded from filing right away because other procedural rules has

introduced several precedents before a cause of action may accrue and if these conditions are not first satisfied,

the filing of the complaint will be premature. There could be dismissal by reason of prematurity. And what are

these conditions precedents established by rules of procedure and sometimes by substantive law? The first



condition precedent given by procedural and substantive rules is prior barangay conciliation. So even if a right

has been violated and the rightful owner goes to court but the dispute is covered by the circular on prior

barangay conciliation, then there could be reason for the court to dismiss the case or not to entertain the case and

just tell the parties to undergo barangay conciliation. The other condition precedent given by both procedure

and substative law is an arbtration clause that is usually given in contracts. The arbitration clause in contracts

invariably provide that there is a breach of contract, the innocent contracting party cannot simply go to court.

The dispute should first undergo arbitration proceedings. If the arbitration clause breached by immediately

filing a complaint in court, the court can refuse of try the case and the court can compel the parties to observe

the stipulations under the arbitration clause. The other condition precedent that is purely procedural is the

certification on non-forum shopping found in Rule 7. If a complaint or initiatory pleading is filed without a

certification on non-forum shopping, and remember that this defect is not curable by amendment, the court

acquires jurisdiction over the case under BP 129, but the court can order the dismissal of the case for non

observance of the certification as a condition precedent. There is another condition precedent that is given under

political law: Exhaustion of administrative remedies for the accrual of a cause of action. Under the civil code,

another condition precedent for members of the same family. It must be shown earnest efforts toward a

compromise must have been resorted to before going to court. So in the definition of a cause of action under the

rules of court is not qualified by certain condition precedents before going to court. He must see to it that these

conditions, if applicable, must be observed. The court, although competent and may have jurisdiction over the

case, will refuse to try the case and instead issue an order to the plaintiff to comply with the conditions. If there

is already a cause of action and these conditions are applicable, the general rule is for every cause of action the

rightholder can file one complaint. If there are 2 acuse, the right holder can file 2 complaints. If there are 3

causes, he can file 3 complaits. But what is proscribed by the rules of court is for the plaintiff to file more than a

single complaint arising from a single cause of action. In other words, the rules abhor splitting a cause of action.

Filing 2 or more complaints founded on the same cause of action is splitting a cause of action. The usual example

given in splitting a cause of action is lets say that the creditor is entitled to receive from the debtor 2 million

pesons. The obligation has matured, it has become due but not been paid. In the ordinary cause of things, the

creditor should file one complaint for the recover of 2 million pesos plus interest that has been earned by the

principal, cost and damages if there are any. If the creditor files one complaint for the recovery of 2 million pesos

as principal and this complaint will be filed before a RTC and then he files another complaint for the recovery of

interest in the amount of 200,000 pesos in the MTC. That is splitting a cause of action regardless of whether these

actions are filed before different courts. Since the rules prohibit a right holder from splitting a cause of action,

thus the rule also provides for sanctions. These are given by the rules itself. The filing of one could be used in

order to dismiss the other by reason of litis penencia, pendency of another action or if one of the causes has been

decided, the decision in one case can be used to dismiss the other by reason of res judicata. So there could be 2

grounds for dismissal of complaints which are a product of splitting of a cause of action. There is a third ground



provided by rule 7, and that is forum shopping. So if a right holder splits his cause of action, he can move for

dismissal either by reason of litis pendentia, res judicata or under Rule 7 on forum shopping. It is now settled

that if a party is guilty of splitting of causes of action, he is also guilty of forum shopping. There is no need to

elaborate on whether there is forum shopping as it can be shown that there is splitting of cause of action. Why

does the rule in the first place prohibit splitting? If you look at the consequences there is really not much

anything that can be suffered by the defendant. In our case the debtor is bound to file 2 million pesos plus

interest. So if the creditor files one complaint for the recovery of 2 million and the second complaint for the

recover of interest and damages amounting to 200,000. Even if we assume that the plaintiff will eventually win

in both cases, he wil

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