Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in SpaceWilbur L. Pritchard president Satellite Systems...

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Futurein Space

November 1984

NTIS order #PB85-205391

Recommended Citation:Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress,Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-STI-241, November 1984).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-601136

For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

Foreword

I am pleased to introduce the OTA assessment of Civilian Space Stations and theU.S. Future in Space. This study was requested by the Senate Committee on Commerce,Science, and Transportation and the House Committee on Science and Technology,and the request was endorsed by the Senate Committee on Appropriations and theHouse Committee on the Budget.

The study was designed to cover not only the essential technical issues surround-ing the selection and acquisition of infrastructure in space, but to enable Congress tolook beyond these matters to the larger context; the direction of our efforts. Giventhe vast capability and promise available to the country and the world because of thesophisticated space technology we now possess, equally sophisticated and thoughtfuldecisions must be made about where the U.S. space program is going, and for whatpurposes.

The Advisory Panel for this study played a role of unusual importance in helpingto generate a set of possible space goals and objectives that demonstrate the diverseopportunities open to us at this time, and OTA thanks them for their productive com-mitment of time and energy. Their participation does not necessarily constitute con-sensus or endorsement of the content of the report, for which OTA bears sole respon-sibility.

It often happens that information generated during the course of an OTA studycan be used as legislation moves through Congress. A number of statements presentedin Senate and House hearings by OTA and a technical memorandum drawn from theanalysis have already contributed to the course of the debate. This report, the culmina-tion of the OTA process, is now a resource for both Congress and the National Com-mission on Space, which Congress has created in order to give full and fundamentalreview to the basic questions of charting our course. It is OTA’S hope that the publica-tion of the study will also expand the circle of those who can effectively engage inthe debate and contribute to the decision process.

Director

. . .I l l

—

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in SpaceAdvisory Panel

Robert A. Charpie ChairmanPresident, Cabot Corp.

Harvey BrooksBenjamin Peirce Professor of Technology and

Public PolicyHarvard University

Peter O. CrispPresidentVenrock, Inc.

Freeman DysonProfessorInstitute for Advanced Studies

James B. FarleyChairman of the BoardBooz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.

Charles E. FraserChairmanSea Pines Co.

Andrew J. GoodpasterPresidentInstitute for Defense Analyses

Charles HitchProfessorThe Lawrence-Berkeley LaboratoryUniversity of California, Berkeley

Bernard M. W. KnoxDirectorCenter for Hellenic Studies

Moya LearChairman of the BoardLear Avia Corp.

George E. Mueller, Jr. *President and Chief Executive OfficerSystem Development Corp.

Carl SaganDirector of the Laboratories for Planetary

StudiesCornell University

Eugene SkolnikoffDirectorCenter for International StudiesMassachusetts Institute of Technology

James SpilkerPresidentStanford Telecommunications Inc.

Frank StantonPresident EmeritusCBS Inc.

James A. Van AllenHead, Physics and Astronomy DepartmentUniversity of Iowa

OTA appreciates the valuable assistance and thoughtful comments provided by ad-visory panel members at many points during the assessment. OTA, however, acceptssole responsibility for the views expressed in this report.

*Retired.

iv

OTA Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTAScience, Information, and Natural Resources Division

William F. Mills* and Nancy Naismith, ** Science, Transportation, and Innovation Program Manager

Thomas F. Rogers, Project Director

Philip P. Chandler, Deputy Project Director

R. James Arenz, Senior Analyst

Randolph H. Ware, Congressional/ Fellow

Paula Walden, Research Assistant

Marsha Fenn, Administrative Assistant

R. Bryan Harrison, Office Automation Systems Analyst

Betty Jo Tatum, Secretary

Contractors

Lewis White BeckCharles G. BellHubert BortzmeyerEva BrannWilliam CapronComputer Sciences Corp.

William Schneider, Principal IinvestigatorArthur DantoLeonard DavidEagle Engineering

Hubert Davis, Sr., Principal IinvestigatorMarc GigetJerry GreyJML, Inc.

John Logdson, Principal /investigator

Courtland LewisCharles MathewsPeter OgnibeneNicholas RescherAlex RolandSatellite Systems Engineering

Wilbur Pritchard, Principal IinvestigatorKenneth SayreScience & Technology Consultants

Russell Drew, Principal IinvestigatorJerome SimonoffEugene SkolnikoffTeledyne Brown EngineeringJames E. Wilson

*Through September 1983.* *After September 1983.

Contrib utors

James Arnold, University of California/California Space Institute

James M. Beggs, National Aeronautics andSpace Administration

William Bumgarner, Computer Sciences Corp.Ashton Carter, Massachusetts Institute of

TechnologyWilliam F. Cockburn, Embassy of CanadaAnthony Cox, Embassy of the United

KingdomDavid Criswell, University of California/

California Space InstituteTroy Crites, Aerospace Corp.Philip Culbertson, National Aeronautics and

Space AdministrationRichard Dal Belle, Office of Technology

AssessmentMaxime Faget, Space IndustriesJames Fletcher, University of Pittsburgh (Member

of Technology Assessment AdvisoryCouncil)

Robert F. Freitag, National Aeronautics andSpace Administration

Robert Frosch, General Motors Corp.Karl Harr, Aerospace Industries AssociationJohn Barrington, Communication Satellite

Corp.Allen Hill, Boeing Aerospace Corp.John Hedge, National Aeronautics and Space

Administrate ion

Saunders Kramer, U.S. Department of EnergyLouis Laidet, Embassy of FranceGordon Law, Office of Technology

AssessmentRobert Lottmann, National Aeronautics and

Space AdministrationJohn McElroy, National Oceanic and

Atmospheric AdministrationWilfred Mellors, European Space Agency,

Washington Office*William Perry, Hambrecht & Quist (Member

of Technology Assessment AdvisoryCouncil)

Irving Pikus, National Science FoundationUdo Pollvogt, MBB/ErnoLuther Powell, National Aeronautics and

Space AdministrationIan Pryke, European Space AgencyEberhardt Rechtin, Aerospace Corp.James Rose, McDonnell DouglasJoseph E. Rowe, Library of CongressHans Traumann, Embassy of the Federal

Republic of GermanyErnesto Valierani, AeritaliaCharles Vick, ConsultantDavid C. Wensley, McDonnell DouglasRay Williamson, Office of Technology

AssessmentGordon Woodcock, Boeing Aerospace Corp.

* Retired

vi

Participants in U.S.S.R. Workshop, Dec. 13, 1982

Craig CovaultAviation Week & Space Technology

Philip E. CulbertsonAssociate Deputy AdministratorNASA Headquarters

Merton DaviesThe Rand Corp.

Ed EzellNational Museum of American HistorySmithsonian Institution

John R. HilliardAir Force Systems Command HeadquartersAndrews Air Force Base

Nicholas JohnsonPrincipal TechnologistTeledyne Brown Engineering

Saunders KramerConsultant

Participants in Skylab Workshop, Jan. 25,

Leland BelewConsultant

David ComptonContractorHistory OfficeNASA/Johnson Space Center

John DisherConsultant

Herbert FriedmanChairmanCommission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics

and ResourcesNational Academy of Sciences

Owen GarriottAstronautNASA/Johnson Space Center

Roger HofferProfessorDepartment of Forestry and Natural ResourcesPurdue University

Courtland LewisBiotechnology, Inc.

James E. ObergConsultant

Kenneth S. PedersonDirectorInternational Affairs DivisionNASA Headquarters

Geoffrey PerryConsultant

Paul RambautNASA Headquarters

p. Diane RauschNASA Headquarters

Marcia SmithSpecialist in Aerospace and Energy SystemsScience Policy Research DivisionLibrary of Congress

1983

Kenneth KleinknechtManagerProcurement, Manufacturing and Tests for

Spacecraft SystemsMartin Marietta Corp.

Charles MathewsConsultant

Edmond ReevesChiefAstrophysics Payload BranchSpacelab Flight DivisionNASA Headquarters

William SchneiderVice PresidentControl Systems ActivityComputer Sciences Corp.

Robert SnyderChief, Separation Processes BranchNASA/Marshall Space Flight Center

Jesco H. Von PuttkamerTechnical EngineerOperations ManagementNASA Headquarters

Vli

Participants in Low-Cost Alternatives to a

Jacques ColletHead of Long-Term ProgramEuropean Space AgencyParis Office

Wilbur EskiteDeputy ChiefSystems Planning and DevelopmentNational Environmental Satellite, Data, and

Information ServiceNational Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration

Edmund J. HabibVice President for EngineeringSatellite Systems Engineering

Tadahico InadaWashington Representative for NASANational Space Development Agency of JapanScientific SectionEmbassy of Japan

Akihiko lwahashiRepresentativeScience and Technology AgencyGovernment of Japan

Norbert KiehneDFVLR (Deutsche Forschungs- und Versuchsanstalt

fur Luft- und Raumfahrt e. V.)

Participants in Low-Cost Alternativesto a Space Station Workshop, Apr. 27-28,

Hubert BortzmeyerConsultant

Joseph CarrollCalifornia Space InstituteUniversity of California, San Diego

Jacques ColletHead of Long-Term ProgramEuropean Space AgencyParis Office

David CriswellCalifornia Space InstituteUniversity of California, San Diego

Troy A. CritesThe Aerospace Corp.

Hubert P. DavisVice PresidentEagle Engineering, Inc.

Space Station,

Kazuo MatsumotoRepresentative

Apr. 4, 1983

National Space Development Agency of Japan

Wilfred MellorsHead (currently retired)European Space Agency

Robert NoblittSenior Systems AnalystTeledyne Brown Engineering

Alain PerardLong-Term Study ManagerCNES Paris

Udo PollvogtPresidentERNO-USA, Inc.

Hans TraumannAttacheScientific and Technological AffairsEmbassy, Federal Republic of Germany

H. J. WeigandConsultantMBB, Space Division

1983

Russell C. DrewPresidentScience and Technology Consultants

Jean-Pierre FouquetScientific Attache for Space AffairsEmbassy of France

George F. FraserChief Engineer, Advanced EngineeringShuttle Orbiter DivisionRockwell International

Allen HillMESA Program ManagerSpace Systems DivisionBoeing Aerospace Corp.

Tadahico InadaWashington Representative for NASANational Space Development Agency of JapanScientific SectionEmbassy of Japan

viii

William A. JohnstonVice-President for EngineeringFairchild Space Co.

Charles MathewsConsultant

Rudy MeinerEuropean Space AgencyParis Office

Wilfred MellorsHead (currently retired)European Space AgencyWashington Office

Robert MoryEuropean Space AgencyParis Office

Udo Pollvogt

PresidentERNO-USA, Inc.

Wilbur L. PritchardpresidentSatellite Systems Engineering

Anthony SharpeManager of Space Station ProgramTeledyne Brown Engineering

Thomas C. TaylorPresidentTaylor & Associates, Inc.

Hans TraumannAttacheScientific and Technological AffairsEmbassy, Federal Republic of Germany

Participants in Unit Cost Workshop, Oct. 18-19, 1983

James AlbusChief of Industrial Systems DivisionNational Bureau of Standards

William D. BumgarnerSenior Member of the Executive StaffComputer Sciences Corp.

Esker K. DavisPickering Research Corp.

Fred EschExecutive DirectorSpacecraft TechnologyCOMSAT Laboratory

James GrahamSenior Research AssociateJohn Deere & Co. Technical Center

Jack BarringtonSenior Vice PresidentResearch and DevelopmentCOMSAT Laboratory

Walter KapryanDirector and Senior Technical AdvisorLockheed Corp.

William PerkinsDirectorStrategic Business ManagementRockwell International

Donald K. Slay-tonPresidentSpace Services Inc.

William C. SchneiderVice PresidentControl Systems ActivityComputer Sciences Corp.

Albert A. SorensonTRW

William C. StoneResearch Structural EngineerNational Bureau of Standards

David WensleyChief Program EngineerSpace StationsMcDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co.

James E. WilsonConsultant

Donald H. NovakProject ManagerComputer Sciences Corp.

ix

Participants in Automation Workshop, Mar. 12, 1984

David AkinProfessor, Department of Aeronautics and

AstronauticsMassachusetts Institute of Technology

James AlbusChiefIndustrial Systems DivisionNational Bureau of Standards

Michael ArbibGraduate Research CenterUniversity of Massachusetts

Ruzena BajcsyProfessorDepartment of Computer and Information

SciencesMoore School of Electrical EngineeringUniversity of Pennsylvania

Michael BradyProfessorArtificial Intelligence LaboratoryMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Rodney BrooksProfessorDepartment of Computer SciencesStanford University

Margaret EastwoodVice President of EngineeringGCA Corp.

Charles FraserChairmanSea Pines Co.

William islerProgram ManagerSystems Science DivisionDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Steven JacobsonProfessorDepartment of Mechanical EngineeringUniversity of Utah

Henry LumActing ManagerOffice of Computer Science and ElectronicsNASA Headquarters

David NitzanDirectorRobotics DepartmentSRI International

Marc RaibertProfessorDepartment of Computer ScienceCarnegie-Mellon University

Carl RuoffJet Propulsion Laboratory

Roger SchapellManager, Advanced Automation TechnologyDenver AerospaceMartin Marietta Corp.

Thomas SheridanProfessorDepartment of Mechanical EngineeringMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Russell TaylorManager of Robot System TechnologyT. j. Watson Research CenterIBM

James A. Van AllenChairmanDepartment of PhysicsUniversity of Iowa

x

Contents

Chapter

1. Executive Summary

2. Issues and Findings

3. Space lnfrastructure

4. A Buyer’s Guide to

Page

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Space Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

5. Broadening the Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

6. Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Appendix Page

A.

B.

c.D.

E.

F.

G

Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Usesand Functional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ”Concepts in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . . . . . . . . 177

Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian SpaceInfrastructure (Civilian “Space Stations”) Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Title II-National Commission on Space (Public Law 98-361) . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Glossary of Acronyms, Abbreviations and Terms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227

Chapter 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

...

ContentsPage

Introduction: Relation of a “Space Station” (i.e., Space Infrastructure)to the U.S. Future in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Rationale for Space infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Infrastructure Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Technology Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Procurement Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Funding Rate Options.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Need for Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Some Possible Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Infrastructure Required by the Proposed Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .cost. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Shape of the Space Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .International. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., ., . . . . . . .Private Sector . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. . $, . . . . . . . . . . . . .New Role for NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.

1.

2.

3.

4.5.

Comparison of Some Options for Low-Earth-OrbitOperating Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Page

independently. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Space Infrastructure Platforms That Could Be Serviced by Shuttleor an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possibleat Various Annual Average Federal Funding Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12Possible Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggestedfor Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Chapter 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION: RELATION OF A “SPACE STATION”(I. E., SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE)

Atter the expenditure of some $200 billion(1984$) since the launch of its first spacecraft inearly 1958, the United States has obtained thescientific knowledge and developed the techno-Iogical capability and professional expertise tosucceed i n virtualIy any theoreticalIy possible ci-vilian space venture that it may choose to under-take, But America’s second quarter-century ofspace activities promises to differ markedIy fromthe first, almost wholly exploratory, era. If spaceis to be successfully developed in roughly thesame fashion as have other, more familiar natu-ralI resources and environments, the next stagewill be characterized by establishing and secu r-ing the capabilities to support routine, operationalactivities there. I n this report, OTA refers to the

TO THE U.S. FUTURE IN SPACE

range of in-space facilities and services that wouldsupport such activities as “infrastructure. ”

Important steps in the considered developmentof space have already been taken. By any stand-ard, the satellite communications industry is agreat success; its revenues have reached the mul-tibillion-dollar per year level and are growing atan annual rate of 15 percent. Massive Iaunch fa-cilities, expendable launch vehicles, and thespace Shuttle now provide routine access tomuch of near-Earth space; used in conjunctionwith a global communications network and sur-face data processing facilities, they provide a so-phisticated, though limited, range of services totheir users.

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

A large, inhabited “space station” in low-Earth-orbit is one approach to the establishment of a long-term infrastructurein space. The concept shown here (being visited by the space Shuttle) designed and built model used for

illustration throughout early 1984.

3

4 . Civilian space stations and the us. Future in Space

Another sign of strength is the maturity of theU.S. aerospace industry. This sector is now be-ginning to position itself to provide space assetsand services independently, and now anticipatesconducting some in-space investigations andcommercial-industrial activities, privately fi-nanced, either on its own or in combination withother business concerns. And other countriesnow have capabilities to do many things in space—capabilities that continue to grow rapidly.

For years, leaders of the U.S. civilian spacecommunity have advanced the view that the nextmajor logical step in space should be the acqui-sition of specific, permanent in-space infrastruc-ture: a civilian “space station. ”

In this context, Congress, in July of 1982, askedOTA to undertake an assessment of “CivilianSpace Stations”; this report is the product of thatrequest. The OTA assessment was requested orig-inally by the Senate Committee on Commerce,Science, and Transportation, later (in October1982) by the House Committee on Science andTechnology. The assessment was endorsed inAugust 1982 by the House Committee on theBudget and the Senate Committee on Appropria-tions. The various committee interests were statedas follows:

● Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,and Transportation: assess the need for a per-manent orbiting facility; examine the majortechnological alternatives and their relatedcosts and benefits; focus on the differentspace station designs and orbits, the rangeof feasible applications for the project, thebenefits and drawbacks of utilizing existingconcepts, the estimated costs for potentialmissions and design options, and prospec-tive private sector and international in-volvement.

Ž House Committee on Science and Technol-ogy: undertake an independent, rigorous,balanced study of the need for a space sta-

●

●

tion; address “the hard questions”; not onlylook at what a station can do that cannot bedone better some other way, but also eval-uate alternatives to a space station. “In short,the assessment should address and docu-ment the real forces driving us to build aspace station. ”House Committee on the Budget: estimatethe effect of a space station’s cost on theNASA budget and the overall Federal bud-get; and consider the roles of the Departmentof Defense, the international community,and the private sector in the development,production, and operation of an inhabitablespace station.Senate Committee on Appropriations: esti-mate the relative merits-of in-habitable andu nonhabitable space platforms; estimate therole automation/robotics can be expected toplay in the construction and eventual use ofspace platforms; and estimate the costs asso-ciated with the range of design options.

This assessment has attempted to be responsiveto the entire range of congressional interest, withthe exception of the interest of the House Com-mittee on the Budget in the role of the Depart-ment of Defense.

The report has examined the range of technol-ogy required of permanent space infrastructureas well as the broader policy questions arisingfrom NASA’s proposal of a particular constella-tion of infrastructure elements. Overall, the con-sidered development of space through the pacedacquisition of appropriate elements of space in-frastructure is a key to maintaining America’sleadership in space. However, because the Nationdoes not have clearly formulated long-range goalsand objectives for its civilian space activities, pro-ceeding to realize the present NASA “space sta-tion” concept is not likely to result in the facilitymost appropriate for advancing U.S. interests intothe second quarter-century of the Space Age.

RATIONALE FOR SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

Several countries are competent in the conduct providing growing economic competition for theof space investigations and the development and United States through development, acquisition,use of space technology. These countries are now and operation of their own elements of infrastruc-

Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 5

ture. The Soviet Union has made a commitmentto the permanent occupancy of space, has oper-ated orbital stations with human work crews forover a decade, and is showing interest in provid-ing competitive space services. Thus, if the UnitedStates is to continue as the leader in civilian spaceactivities, Congress must give serious thought tothe kind of space infrastructure to be developed,the long-term goals that that infrastructure is toserve, and the public-private and international ar-rangements that will take best advantage of it.

Future development of more sophisticatedspace science and applications capabilities—e.g.,staging of planetary exploration missions or as-sembly of large communications platforms—wouId be markedly facilitated by the existenceof appropriate elements of space infrastructure.It is assumed in this report that, whatever deci-sions are made regarding space infrastructure,publicly supported space science and space ap-plications will continue at roughly their presentlevel of appropriations (over $1 billion per year,as measured in constant dollars).

Although the United States already has ac-quired some initial elements of space infrastruc-ture, these are insufficient to undertake a num-ber of desirable activities in an efficient andeffective manner. The acquisition of some addi-tional permanent in-space infrastructure elementsWOU Id :

● allow sophisticated experiments in life andmaterials sciences to be conducted;

● permit fuel to be stored and supplies to bewarehoused in low-Earth-orbit;

● initiate more efficient staging of voyages tohigh orbits, the Moon, planets, and asteroids;

● allow the initial trial of new instruments, ac-tivities, and procedures; and

● allow the repair and maintenance of increas-ingly complex and specialized satellites andcommon carrier platforms.

The ability to undertake these activities, all ofwhich would support space science and applica-tions, constitutes a persuasive rationale for acquir-ing appropriate elements of permanent space in-frastructure. At present, the more appropriatewould be those which allowed the satisfactoryconduct of: 1) life and materials sciences experi-

ments, and 2) satellite servicing. However, by thesame token, sufficient resources to ensure thatthese science and applications activities actuallyare undertaken must be assured; otherwise, therationale for the infrastructure vanishes.

A persuasive case can also be made for seeingthat some of these permanent infrastructure ele-ments allow an on-board human work force. Thiscase rests on the fact that automated facilities,whether relatively autonomous or teleoperated,capable of supporting all of the activities listedabove will not be available before 2000, even ifa large automation R&D program is begun im-mediately. (This does not argue against such anR&D program. Indeed, there is good reason toexpect that sophisticated automation will be nec-essary for the future development of space as wellas for non-space-related Earth applications. Itmight well be appropriate, therefore, to initiatesuch a program now. Later, with the results of

6 ● Civilian space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

this program in hand, informed judgments couldbe made about the most sophisticated mix ofhuman and machine workers.)

As the Shuttle development program comes toa close, thousands of in-house engineers andtechnical support staff and, in principle, as muchas $2 billion (1984$) per year in contract fundsunder its present $7 billion (1984$) “budget en-velope” will be freed up to be applied to one ormore new programs. If NASA is to maintain itscurrent size—a size that NASA leaders judge tobe acceptable to the general public–the com-bination of people and funds that could soon be-

come available suggests, strongly, that any newprograms must include development and acqui-sition of a great deal of new technology, prefer-ably related to having people in space; large num-bers of technologists would be gainfullyemployed both in NASA and in the space indus-try under contract to NASA.

In addition, many believe that NASA might notlong survive in its present form without a single,large, “people-in-space” program upon whicha majority of its energies are focused. If a num-ber of smaller programs were initiated instead,each of them, it is thought, could be terminated


without widespread objections arising i n the po-litical process.

Finally, NASA may have thought it prudent topropose a ‘‘space station’ program rather thansome other large endeavor(s) (e. g., a return ofAmericans to the Moon, or sending people onan expedition to Mars, etc.), both because theformer had been carefully studied over the years,representing, i n NASA’s view, a natural comple-ment to the Shuttle, and because alternative largeprograms seemed too grandiose, have not recent-ly been discussed with the general public, and,therefore, were less likely to enlist the requiredsupport, both with in and without the adminis-t ration.

All of these considerations, taken together, areclear incentives for the space technology lead-ers, both Government and industry, to opt for acombination of a Shuttle-like “methods andmeans’ activity, rather than to accept the posi -

t ion of a much smaller Federal agency or to fightfor approval of one or more large, new space“end” programs.

But while the case to be made for acquiringsome long-term, inhabitable infrastructure in low-Earth-orbit is persuasive, OTA concludes that thereis no compelling, objective, external case eitherfor obtaining all of the particular array of elementsthat NASA now describes under the rubric of “TheSpace Station, ” or for obtaining this or any otherarray in the general manner that NASA is now ex-pected to pursue, or for paying the particular pub-lic cost that NASA now estimates is required. Asthe infrastructure would be of a broadly general-purpose nature, to be used to support over 100conceptual uses (few of which have been sharplydefined or have gained wide acceptance as impor-tant objectives of the space program), there is nonecessity for obtaining all of this particular arraysoon.

INFRASTRUCTURE OPTIONS

The fact that the Unitedveloped a wide varietymeans that it has genuine

States has already de-of space capabi Iitieschoices–both of what

infrastructure elements it places in orbit and ofhow these elements are to be acquired and used.It is around these choices that the difficuIt issueslie; by andi large, the technology is either in handor can be readily developed.

Technology Options

It must be emphasized that the particular con-stellation of space infrastructure elements thatNASA currently aspires to develop, construct,deploy, and operate is only one alternative ina wide range of options. Simply put, there is nosuch thing as “the space station. ” What is underdiscussion is a variety of sets of infrastructureelements, ranging from modest extensions ofcurrent capabilities to more sophisticated, ca-pable, and costly ensembles than NASA is nowsuggesting.

As one way of presenting the variety of tech-no logy options available, OTA has prepared tables 1 and 2.}

There is one fundamental infrastructure optionthat requires particular mention: should the ele-ments be wholly automated or shou Id they house‘] human crew? Conceptually, useful space infra-structure couId be designed either to include ahuman work crew or to depend on sophisticatedmachines unattended in space or operated viacommunication links with the surface. Despitethe fact that the relative efficiency and/or effec-tiveness of these two quite different approacheshave been extensively debated for years, no gen-eral consensus has emerged. However, if sophis-ticated new space activities are to be supportedby in-space infra1990s, there will

structure as soon as the earlyhave to be a human presence.

8 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in space

Table I.—Comparison of Some Options’ for Low-Earth-Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure

, - . Free-flying NASA InfrastructureExtended spacelab aspirationsDuration (developed Initial Mature,Orbiter: as permanent operational fullyPhase II infrastructure) capability developed

ExtendedDuration

Shuttle Orbiter:Orbiter Phase I

Date available(assuming start in 1985) Now

None

760

6Can acceptSpacelab

10 days

ModerateModestSome

ModestNoNo

ModestNo

NoNoNo

No

NoNo

No

ModestModest

No

No

Modest

1988 1990 1990

0.5 2-3

20 6100 100

(with Spacelabhabitat)

5 3New technology Modest crew

1992 1996-2000

20COSTb

(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) 0.2 8

CharacteristicsPower to users (kW)Pressurized volume (m3)

760

80200

200300

Nominal crew sizeMiscellaneous

5No new

technology

8Orbital

maneuveringvehicle plus

two free-flyingunpressurized

platforms

20Reusable

orbitaltransfer

vehicle plusseveral more

platforms

-.required; accommodationsmodest

laboratoryspace

Capabilities c

Time on Orbit 20 days 50 days Unlimited(90 day

resupply)

Unlimited(60-90 dayresupply)

ExtensiveModest

ModerateModerateModest

NoModestModest

ModestNoNo

Unlimited

(90 dayresupply)

Laboratories for:Life sciencesSpace science/applicationsMaterials scienceTechnology development

ObservatoriesData/communication nodeServicing of satellitesManufacturing facility (materials

processing)Large structure assemblyTransportation nodeFuel and supply depot

ModerateModestSome

ModestModest

NoModest

No

ConsiderableModest

ModerateSome

ModestNo

ModestModest

NoNoNo

ExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensive

ConsiderableConsiderableConsiderable

ExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensive

NoNoNo

ModerateModerate

No

ExtensiveExtensived

Considerable

Response to reasons advanced forspace infrastructureMaintain U.S. space leadership and

technology capabilityRespond to U.S.S.R. space activitiesEnable long-term human presence

in spaceAttention-getting heroic public

spectacleExtended international cooperationPromote U.S. commercialization of

spaceMaintain vigorous NASA

engineering capabilityEnhance national security, broadly

definedSpace travel for non-technicians

aLi~.ed ~ption~ are illustrative examples; the list is not exhaustive.bcosts include design, development, and ~r~uction; launch and ~perational costs are not included, some costs are estimated by the office Of Technology Assess.

ment; others were provided to OTA.cClearly judgmental.dlnclud~ng launch to the Moon, Mars, and some asta:otis.

Modest Modest

ModestModest

Modest

ModerateModest

No

No

Modest

Modest

ModestConsiderable

Modest

ModerateConsiderable

Modest

Modest

Modest

Considerable Extensive

ModestModest

ConsiderableExtensive

ExtensiveExtensive

Modest Modest Modest

ModestModest



No Extensive Extensive

No Unclear Unclear

Modest Considerable Considerable


Table 2.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

Unpressurized coorbiting platforms Pressurized platforms(serviced by means of extravehicular activity) (serviced internally while docked)

Space EuropeanIndustries’ Modified

SPAS MESA LEAS ECRAFT EURECA Platform Spacelab

Date available(now, or approximate, assuming

start in 1985)1986 Late 1980’s 1989Now

0.005

0.6NoneNone

3,000 lbPayload

10 days

NoModestModest

NoNoNoNoNo

NoNo

No

No

NoNo

No

YesUnclear

No

No

No

Now 1987

0.2

2NoneNone

2,000 lbPayload

6 months

ModestModestModestModestModest

NoNo

Modest

NoNo

No

No

NoNo

No

YesNo

No

No

No

Costb

(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) 0.3 0.60.01 0.2

CharacteristicsPower to users (kW)Pressurized volume (f?)Nominal crew size

0.1NoneNone

6NoneNone

202,500

1-3 onlywhen

docked25,000 lbPayload

63,000

3

20,000 lbPayload

200 lbPayload

20,000 lbPayload

Miscellaneous

CapabilitiescTime on orbitLaboratories for:

Life sciencesSpace science/applicationsMaterials scienceTechnology development


processing)Large structure assemblyTransportation node (assembly,

checkout, and launch)Fuel and supply depot

Unlimited 3-6 months Unlimited8 months


NoNo

Considerable

ModestNo


NoNo

Extensive

ModerateModerateModerateModest

ModerateNoNo

Considerable

NoModest

NoNoNoNoNoNo

NoNo

NoNo

NoNo

NoNo

No NoNo No

Response to reasons advanced forspace infrastructure

Maintain U.S. space leadershipand technology capability

Respond to U.S.S.R. space activitiesEnable long-term human presence






No Modest Modest No

NoNo

ModestNo

ModestNo

ModestNo

No NoNo No

NoConsiderable

NoConsiderable

UnclearNo

NoModest

No NoNo No

NoNo No No

No No No NoaListed ~latforms are illustrative examples; the list k not exhaustive.bcogtg include degi~n, development, and pr~uctlon; launch and operational costs are not included. SOme costs are estimated by the Office of Techno@y Assess-

ment; others were provided to OTA.cClearly judgmental.

10 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Procurement Options

Inasmuch as there is an affirmative answerto the question of whether to acquire some long-term, in-space infrastructure, the decision ofhow it is to be acquired must be faced. In manyrespects, this second decision is just as impor-tant as the first. The mode of acquiring new,long-term, in-space assets and services shouldbe influenced by a clear understanding of thecontext in which space activities are expectedto be carried on. And the decision as to how toacquire these assets and services will have a sig-nificant impact on future space activities.

There are four main factors that could heavilyinfluence procurement choices:

Several foreign countries are now capableof producing and operating substantial ele-ments of space infrastructure.Using its own resources, the U.S. private sec-tor is now capable of producing much of theinfrastructure currently envisioned and of-fering it for sale or lease to the Governmentor the private sector.NASA would prefer to acquire the infrastruc-ture under its own aegis and in the same gen-eral way that it has acquired other largespace systems (except for Spacelab).Other large and sophisticated civilian spaceprograms-can be easily imagined that wouldrequire professional skills and funds of thekind and magnitude now envisioned for a“space station. ”

Congress and the President have approvedNASA’s request to initiate a “space station” pro-gram, and NASA appears to be moving to acquiresuch infrastructure in much the same fashion thatit acquired the Shuttle:

●

●

●

A great deal of new technology would be de-veloped, acquired, and used, essentially allof which would be publicly funded.NASA would arrive at and issue detailed en-gineering specifications for, and exerciseclose management control over, the technol-ogy to be acquired.This infrastructure would be procured byNASA with Federal funds. The U.S. privatesector would not be prompted to use its own

●

resources to provide a substantial portion ofthe infrastructure.The international role would be limited.NASA would not seek the kind of close col-laboration that would result in shared author-ity, even if doing so might result in substan-tial capital cost reduction for the UnitedStates.

A significantly different acquisition approach–another option—would have the followingelements:

●

●

●

●

As much as is reasonably possible, alreadydeveloped, tested, and paid-for technologywould be used to achieve an adequate ini-tial operating capability, with developmentof new technology undertaken only wheredemonstrably required to lower overall costof ownership.NASA would prompt our private commer-cial-industrial-financial sectors to developand produce, with their own resources andon a genuinely competitive basis, as manyof the Government-required civilian “spacestat ion’ assets and services as they can;NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so;and they could be offered to NASA on a sale,lease or payment-for-service basis.NASA, in obtaining the elements not pro-vided by the private sector, would empha-size management methods specifically de-signed to take the best advantage of the nowquite sophisticated U.S. space industry.NASA would negotiate collaborative agree-ments with other cooperating countries thatwouId see all partners share in the benefitsof such an initial operating capability at a re-duced acquisition cost to the U.S. Govern-ment for its share.

This second approach would imply that NASAwould hand off much (perhaps most) of the moremundane “space station” work by paying the pri-vate sector to do it, thereby conserving its skillsand resources so that they could be focused onmore challenging space goals and objectives, in-cluding development of the very advanced tech-nology (e. g., bipropellant engines, a reusable or-bital transfer vehicle, etc.) required to addressthem—an activity which, for the most part, theprivate sector cannot justify.

Ch. l—Executive Summary ● 1 1

These two options are at opposite ends of aspectrum of approaches to the acquisition oflong-term space infrastructure. In determiningwhich approaches from this spectrum are mostlikely to influence the evolution of space activi-ties in a desirable direction, Congress may wishto consider the following questions:

● Should the Government be allocating its pro-fessional skills and experience to the devel-opment of (a) incremental or (b) fundamen-tal advances in technology?Which approach is most likely to stimulatethe “commercialization of space?”What level of international collaboration isreally desirable?What other large and important space endsshould be addressed in the next decade inaddition to the acquisition of in-space infra-structure methods and means?

Congress may also wish to keep in mind thatthe choice of approach to infrastructure acquisi-tion will also affect its eventual cost to the tax-payer. Beyond the observation that, in some gen-eral fashion, the cost will increase with thecapabiIity and sophistication of the infrastructure,accurate cost estimates are very difficult to make.2

However, the following are important costfactors:

1. the total capability acquired–which, as sug-gested by the examples listed in the tablesof infrastructure options, can encompass aconsiderable range;

2. the extent to which already developed,tested, and paid-for technology is used, v.a focus on new technology with its higherdevelopment cost and greater risk of costoverruns;

3. the substitution, where feasible, of auto-mated systems for the accomplishment oftasks previously undertaken only by humanbeings;

4. the manner by which the infrastructure is ac-quired–i.e., the extent to which NASA putsthe engineering challenge on the space in-dustry by issuing performance specifications,rather than continuing to issue detailed engi-

5.

6.

7.

8

9.

neeri ng specifications and managing the ac-quisition process in detail;the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to per-suade our private sector to develop infra-structure assets and services “on their own, ”and to provide them to the Government atpurchase, lease, or payment-for-serviceprices lower than those achievable by theGovernment;the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effecteventual private sector operation of the in-frastructure and its related activities;the extent to which large and rapid expan-sion of military space research, develop-ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activi-ties increases costs in the civilian spacesector also;3

the extent to which any “Christmas-tree ef-fect” takes place within NASA, whereby theinfrastructure acquisition management ispersuaded by the NASA Centers to allow thecost of desirable but nonessential RDT&Eactivities to be included in the acquisitionprogram; andthe effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arriveat large-scale collaboration and related cost-sharing arrangements with other countries.

These points address only the initial capital costof this infrastructure—to this cost must be addedits ongoing operation and maintenance costs; thecost of instruments and equipment needed forscientific experimentation in association with itsuse; and the interest cost of any money borrowedto fund the acquisition program. And it must beremembered, too, that the infrastructure willeventually become obsolete or wear out.

It is clear that there are many opportunities toreduce infrastructure net cost that could begrasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and deter-mined NASA management.4

These considerations suggest that, over the nextyear or two, at least as much attention should begiven to identifying the best ways by which thecountry should set about the permanent develop-ment of space as there is given to any technologi-

‘ClasSit’Ied m.lterldl M ,~~ not used I n prep.1 rl ng th IS report.4Cost red u ct 10 n me,~su rw are d ISC u ssed I n .1 pp. D of t h I \ report


cal advances and operational capabilities that areto be obtained.

Funding Rate Options

Another way of thinking about space infra-structure is to estimate how much of it couldbe obtained if different annual funding rateswere established. Thus, to provide an independ-ent basis of comparison with the civilian “spacestation” program now apparently favored byNASA, OTA has estimated what new space ca-pabilities could be provided, by when, for variousannual average Government funding rates. Nochanges to present NASA acquisition proceduresor NASA anticipated acquisition costs are as-sumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levelsof $0.1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$)were chosen to illustrate the number and kindof space infrastructure elements that could be ac-quired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years.

The results of these 12 funding scenarios aregiven in table 3, which shows the funding rate,number of years, total expenditure, and kinds ofinfrastructure elements acquired. s The elementsare divided into those that can operate indepen-dently (e.g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space sta-tion” central base) and those that depend on be-ing serviced or maintained from one of theindependent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneu-vering vehicle, a local in-space transportation sys-tem operated from a “space station” central ele-ment, or directly by the Shuttle).

Table 3 lists the following (among other) ele-ments of space infrastructure that could be ac-quired over various acquisition intervals:

1. At $0.1 billion per year: probably no “per-manently manned” facility could be ob-

sAdditional discussion of funding rate options can be found inch. 4 of this report.

Table 3.—Some Illustrative Space infrastructure Acquisitions Possibie at Various Annuai Average FederaiFunding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)

Space acquisition~

Dependent elements

Funding Number Total Unpres- Pressur- Space-based Beyond geostationaryrate of expenditures Independent infrastructure surized ized plat- transport($&r)

orbit spacecraftyears ($) element+ platforms form# vehicles elements

0.1e 5 0.5 EDO If (20 days, 5 crew) 2 — — —10 1 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 — — —15 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — —

0.3 5 1.5 EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3 1 — —10 3 Free-flying Spaceiab modules’ 1 1 OMV —

(permanent, 3 crew)15 4.5 2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2 1 OMV —

28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each)

5 5 Space transportation center (4 crew) – — OMV; ROTV —10 10 NASA initial operating capability 2 1 OMV; ROTV —

“space station”g (8 crew)15 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV;ROTV —

5 15 NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3 1 OMV; ROTV10 NASA mature “space statlon”g (16 crew) 3

—30 2 OMV;ROTV Lunar capable ROTV;

Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV) staffed Lunar facility15 45 NASA mature “space station”g 5 3 OMV; ROTV Lunar capable ROTV;

(18 crew, SDV) staffed Lunar facility;Mars voyage

aTaEle8 1 and 2 pre~nt charactorlatlcs and capabllltles of Infrastructure element8 In detail.b~tend~ Duratl~ Omltem (EOO) am limited In their etays on orbit; other Independent elements am IOnO-term.cplatfms of the LEABECRA~/EURECA type.dplatfoma of t~ m~lfl~ f~.flylm SWcela~pa~ lndugtrl~ ty~ With their own electrical power and pressurization SY8WIIS.eA~ * 1 b~~llonfyr, no Iong.tefm, staffed Infrastructure elements are -Ible.f ~~ i ~=teti ~mtlon o~lter, phaae I) and t~ Spacelab modules have Ilmkd electrical Wwer (abut 7 k~.bhe NASA “space etatlon” elements are expected to operate as transportation and aewiclng centera ae well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power for

exten81ve materlale processing.hA Slgniflcant pan of the cost of a human vieit to Mara couid b provided in thle ca~.


2

3

tained even by the year 2000. Further exten-sion of capabilities of the Shuttle system andunpressurized platform developments couldbe obtained. The acquisitions could be: a de-velopment of the Extended Duration Orbiter(EDO) Phase 1, for 20-day orbit stays, overa 5-year period; or EDO Phase II, for 50-dayorbit stays, over 10 years or longer, plus twoor three free-flying unpressurized platformssuch as EURECA, LEASECRAFT, and/or theSpace Industries’ platform (assuming that theGovernment would make an outright pur-chase of such platforms).At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, theacquisitions could be an EDO II plus several(perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10years, there could be acquired: 1) the firstpermanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived hab-itable modules in 28.5° LEO that could sup-port three people; 2) an orbital maneuver-ing vehicle (OMV) (enabling servicing ofnearby satellites); and 3) a few free-flyingplatforms. in 15 years, there could be ob-tained either: 1) two free-flying Spacelabs,one in polar orbit, one at 28.5° LEO; or 2)much more capable permanent infrastruc-ture at 28.5° than that which could be ac-quired in 10 years.For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, therecould be acquired: 1 ) a permanent LEO fa-cility operating as a transportation node; 2)an OMV; and 3) a reusable orbit transfer ve-hicle capable of transporting spacecraft toand from higher, including geostationary, or-bit. In 10 years the initial operating capabil-ity (IOC) infrastructure now favored byNASA could be acquired. In 15 years, nearly

4.

all of the infrastructure now seriously con-sidered by NASA could be acquired.At $3 billion per year (assuming that onlyfunds, not technology or other factors,would be the pacing program factor):NASA’s fully developed “space station”could become available in somewhat morethan 5 years. In 10 years, this infrastructureplus a geostationary platform, plus a Shuttle-derived cargo vehicle for lower cost fuel andcargo transfer to LEO, plus a lunar facilityready for occupancy and continuing oper-ation would become possible. In 15 years,NASA’s complete infrastructure aspirationsand a lunar settlement could be in hand and,perhaps also, plans for seeing a human crewtravel to the vicinity of Mars and back couldbe well advanced.

These projections are for infrastructure acqui-sition only; operational costs are not included.Also, there is a basic difference between the costsassociated with Shuttle-type vehicles and perma-nently orbiting facilities. The use of an EDO toconduct extended science or development activ-ities with a crew would involve launch costs eachtime it went into orbit; use of a permanent facil-ity would require resupply several times per year,but the cost for each flight could be shared withother payloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30-day EDO flights were conducted per year, about$1 billion (1984$) in annual transportation costswould be involved; in comparison, the cost of4 partial-load Shuttle launches per year to resup-ply a permanent facility would total $100 millionto $400 million (1 984$).

NEED FOR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

In view of the variety of possible ensembles of which identifiable, serious users have “hard” re-infrastructure, the different methods of acquiring quirements might well be acquired within the nextthem, and the range of funding rates at which decade. In the meantime, the most effective waythey could be acquired, how are the choices to to determine our direction in space would be abe made? In general, these choices should not be national discussion of, and eventual agreementmade without prior agreement on the future direc- on, a set of long-range goals which the Unitedtion of the civilian space activities of the United States expects its civilian space activities toStates; however, the infrastructure elements for address.

14 ● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in space

B Photo credit” Aeronautics and Space Administration

One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the space Shuttle for many advanced operations inlow-Earth-orbit. Shown here: (A) servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit—

here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna.

National

Ch. I—Executive Summary • 15

Today, unfortunately, there is general agree-ment neither on such a set of long-range goalsnor on a set of specific objectives which, as theyare addressed, would serve as milestones of prog-ress toward those goals. If future civilian space-related goals and objectives are to be effectivei n providing direction to U.S. space efforts, theyshould be such as to command widespread at-tention; have inherent humanitarian and scien-tific interest; foster development of new technol-ogy; have relevance to global issues; promptinternational cooperation; and involve major par-ticipation of our private sector.

Such a set of goals and objectives would allowa clear determination of the basic characteristicsof the infrastructure elements actually needed,and of the means and rate whereby these ele-ments should be acquired. In the absence of suchgoals and objectives, and with the great uncertain-ties in the estimate of any infrastructure cost tothe public, OTA concludes that it is impossible tojudge, objectively, whether or not most of the in-frastructure elements proposed to date—and, inparticular, many of the set currently proposed byNASA—are truly appropriate and worth their sub-stantial cost.

SOME POSSIBLE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

I n order to prompt the formulation and subse-quent discussion of future space goals and ob-jectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible long-range goals and a set of nearer-term objectivesdesigned to address those goals. Although OTAdoes not recommend either this particular set ofgoals or its supporting family of objectives, theyare intended to exemplify the kind of goals andobjectives around which consensus might wellbe formed so as to provide sensible guidance forthe Nation’s future space activities. The AdvisoryPanel of this assessment has taken an unusuallyactive role in helping to formulate these goals andobjectives. It is the panel’s judgment that thegoals and objectives proposed for discussion arereasonable and important.

The national goals proposed for discussion areas follows:

●

●

●

●

●

●

to increase the efficiency of space activitiesand reduce their net cost to the generalpublic;to involve the public directly in space activ-ities, both on Earth and in space;to derive scientific, economic, social, andpolitical benefits;to increase international cooperation andcollaboration in and regarding space;to study and explore the Earth, the solar sys-tem, and the greater physical universe; andto spread life, in a responsible fashion,throughout the solar system.

OTA has also formulated, as milestones to markprogress toward these goals, the following familyof 10 objectives. Table 4 relates these objectivesto the six goals. Some of the objectives are readilyachievable; others may not be, but still representlegitimate targets.6 They are not rank-ordered.

1. A space-related, global system/service

2

3.

4.

could be established to provide timely anduseful information regarding potentiallyhazardous natural circumstances found inthe Earth’s space and atmosphere, and atand below its surface.A transportation service could be estab-lished to and from the Earth’s Moon, anda modest human presence establishedthere, for scientific and other cultural andeconomic purposes.Space probes could be used to obtain theinformation and experience specifically re-quired to plan for further exploration of theplanet Mars and some asteroids.Medical studies of direct interest to the gen-eral public, including study of the humanaging process, could be conducted throughscientific experiments that compare phys-iological, emotional, and social experiencein the absence of gravity with experiencegained in the conduct of related surfacestud ies.

‘A full dl~cussion of the objectik es appear~ [n ch, 6 of this report.


Table 4.—Possible Goals and Objectives

Goals

Increase Derivespace activities’ Involve the scientific, Increase Study and Bring life

efficiency; general Derive political, inter- explore the to thereduce their public economic and social national physical physical

net cost directly benefits benefits cooperation universe universe

Objectives:N

P

P

P

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N

Y

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Establish a global information system/service re natural hazardsEstablish lower cost reusabletransportation service to the Moon andestablish human presence thereUse space probes to obtain informationre Mars and some asteroids prior toearly human explorationConduct medical research of directinterest to the general publicBring at least hundreds of the generalpublic per year into space for shortvisitsEstablish a global, direct, audio broad-casting, common-user system/sewiceMake essentially all data generated bycivilian satellites and spacecraftdirectly available to the general publicExploit radio/optical free spaceelectromagnetic propagation for long-distance energy distributionReduce the unit cost of space transpor-tation and space activitiesIncrease space-related private sectorsale&

Y Y NN N N Y

N

Y

P

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

P

Y

P

P

Y

Y

Y P Y N NN N

N

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

aThlg w~ld advance the proapects of successfully addressing aii other “9~is.”

Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carried out.

At least hundreds of members of the gen-eral public per year, from the United Statesand abroad, could be selected on an equi-table basis and brought into space for shortvisits there.A direct audio broadcasting, common-usersystem/service could be established thatwould be available to all of the countriesof the world on an economical and equi-table basis.In general, all of the nonclassified and non-private communications from, and non-proprietary data generated by, all Govern-ment-supported spacecraft and satellitescould be made widely available to the gen-eral public and our educational institutionsin near-real-time and at modest cost.Radio and optical free-space electromag-netic propagation techniques could be ex-ploited in an attempt to allow reliable andeconomic long-distance transmission oflarge amounts of electrical energy, bothinto space for use there, and from space,

lunar, and remote Earth locations for dis-tribution throughout the world.The unit cost of space transportation, forpeople and equipment, between theEarth’s surface and low-, geosynchronous-,and lunar-Earth orbit could be sharplyreduced.Space-related commercial-industrial sales

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.in our private sector could be stimulatedto increase at a rate comparable to that ofother high-technology sectors, and ourpublic expenditures on civilian space assetsand activities could reflect this revenuegrowth.

Congress and the President have now agreed onlegislation that will establish a National Commis-sion on Space. This commission will be well-posi-tioned to initiate and sponsor a national debateon the future direction of U.S. space activities. Thegoals and objectives suggested here may providea substantial starting point for further discussion.

Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 1 7

INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED BY THE PROPOSED GOALSAND OBJECTIVES

Technology

Some of these objectives, if they are to beachieved, will require certain elements of in-space infrastructure; others, depending on howthey would be carried out, may or may not re-quire such elements; still others will require none.The manner in which the United States obtainsany of this infrastructure should reflect, as muchas possible, our already great investment in spacetechnology and operations; whenever reasonablypossible, it should be obtained at the lowest cap-ital, and operations and maintenance, cost to thepublic purse.

If the Government’s large capital costs for de-velopment and production are to be minimizedand the private sector strengthened, then seriousconsideration might well be given to encourag-ing the private sector to provide infrastructure ele-ments that meet Government performance spe-cifications, rather than detailed engineering spe-cifications. These elements could be provided toothers as well as to the Government through sale,long-term leases, or on the basis of charges foractual service use.

The main elements of longer term space infra-structure called for in pursuing the family of 10objectives are:’

a.

b.

c.

an LEO capability to assemble and checkout the large and sophisticated satellites andspace structures needed to provide both thehazard-prevention and the direct audiobroadcast global system/service [objectives(1) and (6)];an LEO human residential and workingspace to be used for medical research [ob-jective (4)], and possibly for space visits [ob-jective (5)];a transport staging facility to support effi-cient travel to geostationary orbit, theMoon, and beyond, using reusable orbitaltransfer vehicles or other vehicles. [this

7N0 additional space infrastructure elements are needed toachieve objective (7).

would address objectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9),and possibly (8)]; and

d. a storage facility in LEO would allow use offull Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), andstaffed LEO laboratory facilities could pro-mote (1 O).

Of course, if such infrastructure elements wereavailable for the specific purposes that justify theiracquisition, they could be used for additional pur-poses also.

Note that, in essence, provision of the infra-structure needed to pursue two of the larger-scaleobjectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate mostof the needs of all of the other eight. In what fol-lows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure isincluded under these two objectives.

And note that no Government development offree-flying platform infrastructure elements iscalled for; these elements (e.g., MESA, SPAS,EURECA, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries plat-form, etc.) could and probably would be de-signed, developed, and installed by our private


Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in thisartist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost

space infrastructure elements.


sector, and/or other countries, and offered to thecivilian space community—both Governmentand private interests—under appropriate sale orlease arrangements, where they could be usedfor remote sensing, the conduct of scientific re-search, or the production of various materialsunder microgravity conditions.

Finally, note that very large amounts of verycostly electrical power in LEO (with an initial cap-ital cost of as much as $10,000 per watt) are notcalled for; some 20 kilowatts would appear to besufficient. Larger amounts appear to be neededonly for any eventual commercial-industriaI ma-terials processing, and could then be providedand financed by the private sector in anticipationthat such processing will prove to be profitable.

cost

Attaining all of the proposed objectives would,overall, cost a great deal of money. In the accom-panying table S, rough estimates are made for thecost of each of them, and the length of time overwhich each would be pursued to completion. Itis a fundamental assumption that maximum usewill be made of: 1 ) already developed and paid-for technology, 2) the most truly competitive pro-curement methods, and 3) the most modern andleast burdensome acquisition strategies and pro-cedures.

A first rough estimate of the total cost8 of at-taining all 10 of the proposed objectives is no less

BApp. F of this report discusses costs in detail.

Table 5.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion

Total costa DurationObjectives (billions, 1984 dollars) (years)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Establish a global information system/servicere natural hazardsEstablish lower cost reusable transportationservice to the Moon and establish humanpresence ther#Use space probes to obtain information reMars and some asteroids prior to early humanexplorationConduct medical research of direct interest tothe general publicBring at least hundreds of the generalpublic per year into space for short visitsg

Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,common-user system/serviceMake essentially all data generated bycivilian satellites and spacecraft directlyavailable to the general publicExploit radio/optical free-space electro-magnetic propagation for long-distanceenergy distributionReduce the unit cost of space transportationand space activitiesg’h

Increase space-related private sector salesh

2

20

2

6

0.5

2

0

0.5

5

0.5

10

15, 25

15

5, 25

5, 25

10

25

10

15

25

-$401acO~t~ are for @VelOprnent and acqulsltlorr. o~ratlona and maintenance costs are nOt included, excePt for some iaunch and

Oparationa costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.b15 ~eam t. eatabliah t~ settlement, and 3 visits/year at $0.1 billion each (pius tMSiC Shuttle launch costs) over the followin9

c~~~~~maverage, one pro~ eveV 3 yeara and S0.4 billion each.d~ billion over 5 Yearn t. establish a iife sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionhear thereafter to oPerate it. This

laboratory could also be used for materials science and other research.e5 years t. establish a LEO “ldgts-habitat,)’ and its continuin9 use thereafter.f $OU billion/year in addition to DOD expenditures.g~.3 billion~ear for a l~year t~hnolqy development efforf to reduce space transportation Unit COStS.%his would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives.i The actual cost couid ~ as high as $80 billion (1984 dollars), if costs exceed initial pr~ictions by WO/O


than $4o billion and perhaps considerably more(as much as $60 billion [1 984$]) over the next 25years. Table 5 itemizes the estimated costs for allthe objectives. Given that these estimates aremade at an early stage, there cannot be great con-fidence in their detailed accuracy, but such ac-curacy is unnecessary for the illustrative purposesbeing served here.

If work were to commence on all of them now,the bulk of the cost would occur over the next15 years.

Space transportation costs are not included inthese estimates, except for an additional $0.1 bil-lion (1984$) or so for each flight from low-Earth-orbit to lunar orbit. Rather, it is assumedthat some 10 Shuttle surface-LEO flights per yearat an average cost of about $0.1 billion (1 984$)each by early in the next decade would be bud-geted for all Government-sponsored civilian R&Dpurposes, including those considered here.

Financing

There are many matters that must be givencarefuI consideration before a national commit-ment to undertake such large, lengthy, and costlypublic activities could be made. Certainly amongthe most important are the sources and magni-tude of funds that can be reasonably expectedto be available.

If the funding previously spent on Shuttle de-velopment (approximately $2 billion per year) iscontinued but reallocated towards the initial ob-jectives, and if the NASA appropriation (approx-imately $7 billion per year) is augmented by areal growth of 1 percent per year, and if truly col-laborative cost-sharing international agreementscould be reached whereby other friendly coun-tries would contribute, say, an additional amount

equal to one-third of this subtotal, we could lookforward to approximately the following amountsbeing available for the initial 10 objectives:

Reprogramming of the Shuttledevelopment effort fund levelof $2 billion per year for 25years – $ 50 billion1 percent per year “realgrowth” over 25 years appliedto these objectives – $ 25 billionCost-sharing by other countries – $ 25 billion

Total – $100 billion

Amounts spent for related space research, devel-opment, test, and evaluation by the U.S. privatesector would be added to this total.

As these figures are considered, it should bekept in mind that space is a high-technology do-main. Increasing private sector interest in exploit-ing the economic potential of space invites com-parison of growth rates in other high-technologysectors. If private sector space-related sales con-tinue at a rate of 10 percent per year (a conserv-ative estimate for high-technology sectors), thetax revenues derived therefrom would, over thenext quarter-century, be quite substantial. Andto the extent that public funding of Governmentspace activities is understood as “offset” by thesetax revenues (as they sometimes are in the aero-nautics area) the net cost to the public for suchspace activities would be substantially reduced. g

Clearly, under such circumstances, funding lim-itations would not prevent the United States fromundertaking an ambitious publicly supported ci-vilian space program throughout the next quar-ter of a century.

9App. F of this report discusses these prospects at length.

SHAPE OF THE SPACE FUTURE

There are important changes under way in how rity considerations are already the subject ofspace activities are carried on. The number of im- widespread debate. If the United States is toportant players is increasing as space expertise maintain its leadership role in civilian space activ-and experience spreads, economic considera- ities, it must be prepared to make fundamentaltions are becoming more important, and secu- shifts i n policy and practice.

20 • Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Photo credit: Aeronautics and Space Administration

Communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit (such as Webster Vl, shown here)can provide continuous coverage of large of the Earth’s surface for relay of radio,

television, and telephone signals.

International ‘

International space activities will continue toexpand, both in numbers of countries involvedand in absolute magnitude of their capabilities.There is every reason to expect that the spacefar-ing nations of the world will find it in their inter-est to participate in the considered developmentof near-Earth space, and perhaps all countrieswould like to engage in civilian space activitiesto some extent. The OTA report on InternationalCooperation and Competition in Civilian SpaceActivities10 addresses a wide range of issues aris-ing in this area, and appendix C of this report dis-cusses the variety of ways in which the United

and Competition in Civilian SpaceActivities, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress,

in press.

States and other friendly countries might, in con-cert, develop, operate, and use long-term in-orbitinfrastructure.

Private Sector

To date, private sector interest in space hasbeen confined primarily to the successful satel-lite communications business and the support ofGovernment activities. However, there is tangi-ble evidence that a number of private concernswill soon begin to offer assets and services on afee-for-service or lease basis, both to the Govern-ment and to other private interests. The projectedneeds of space science and space applications,for example, constitute a ready market for pro-viders of various future infrastructure system/services.

Ch. I—Executive Summary ● 21

New Role for NASA

In view of the significant changes in the waythat space activities will be carried on in the fu-ture, NASA may well have to make certain funda-mental shifts of attitude and operation. I n thepast, it has been NASA’s responsibility to meetany given national space objective by itself; inthe future, it should be NASA’s responsibility tosee that the objective is met. That is, NASA shouldnow aspire to the much broader role of seeingthat others in our private sector and throughoutthe world do much more of what it does today.

In the simplest of terms: if NASA is to rise suc-cessfully to the challenges now emerging in thenational and international space arena, it shouldplace relatively less emphasis on accomplishingby itself those things that our private sector orother friendly nations can satisfactorily do, eitheralone or with NASA assistance. It can succeedin this only by continuing to cooperate with both,and by broadening this cooperation so as toprompt and assist both to extend their space-re-

lated capacities, confidence, and commitment.And it could emphasize such cooperation in theacquisition of in-space infrastructure—i. e., a“space station .“

Released from its present relatively near-termfocus, NASA could concentrate more of its ownprofessional activities on the most important andexciting of everything else in and concerningspace, the things that no one else can or will do:the very best of space-related science; the cuttingedge of space-related technology development;the boldest of space-related explorations and de-velopments.

Finally, NASA and other space-related officesi n the executive branch shouId see that their ac-tivities continue to be conducted, and the resultsthereof continue to be used, not only to increaseknowledge and to address important social andpolitical goals, but now also to enable our pri-vate space sector to increase its non-Governmentsales—the sales that generate the taxes that helpto pay for Government space activities.

38-798 0 - 84 - 3 : QL 3

Chapter 2

ISSUES AND FINDINGS

Contents

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NASA’s Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .National Commission on Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Civilian “Space Stations” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Case for infrastructure in Low-Earth-Orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Concerns About Low-Earth-Orbit Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Cost of Low-Earth-Orbit Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Our Future in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Long-Term Space Goals and ObjectivesLong-Term Space Strategies . . . . . . . . . .Cost Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .International Space Cooperation . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Space as an Arena of Peaceful Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NASA’s Changing Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Non-Government Policy Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Possible Legislative Initiatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Strategies for Acquiring Any New In-Space Civilian Infrastructure . . . . . . . . .Civilian Space Policies, Goals, Objectives, and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Creation of Space Policy Study Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter 2

ISSUES AND FINDINGS

GENERAL

N A S A ’ s C i r c u m s t a n c e s

A general and most important conclusion ofthis assessment, one that touches on all its otherfindings, is that any serious discussion of theNation’s future civilian space aspirations andactivities, both publicly funded and privatelysponsored, must be carried on with a full appre-ciation of the present and near-term circum-stances of the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA).

Since soon after NASA’s inception, its spaceprograms have had two major components: 1)a core of continuing space science and space ex-ploration activities, later joined by space appli-cations activities, and the development of thattechnology specifically required to conductthem; and 2) singular major technological for-ays, centering on people in space. It is worthnoting that while the core science and explora-tion activities were mandated in NASA’s foundingcharter, the National Aeronautics and Space Actof 1958, as amended, the succession of big pro-grams seems to continue as a matter of tradition–with the explicit approval of the President andCongress.

Such major undertakings as Mercury, Gemini,Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle take years, even adecade, to complete, involve a large fraction ofNASA’s engineering staff, and cost billions or tensof billions of dollars. Because the magnitude ofNASA’s commitment to these undertakings is socomplete, other, smaller programs—including thecore science and exploration activities—are al-ways at some risk of seeing part of their fundingdelayed or transferred to cover overruns in thebig programs. A small percentage overrun in amajor program component can represent thewhole of a smaller, but perhaps equally impor-tant science or application program.

For the most part, it is this spectacular kindof activity that takes most of NASA’s attentionand resources, is of most interest to the general

public, here and abroad, and serves the impor-tant national objective of projecting the civil-ian technological prowess of the United Stateson the world stage.

From the viewpoint of the technologists whomake up most of the continuing leadership of theU.S. publicly funded space effort, these majorNASA programs serve several important objectives:

●

●

●

●

●

●

they keep NASA in the public eye in a par-ticularly gratifying fashion;they attract the services and loyalty of out-standing space engineers both within NASAand the closely related sections of the U.S.private space industry;they allow the development of a great dealof new technology otherwise difficult tojustify on a piecemeal basis–technology thatallows further space advances subsequently;they are more difficult to interrupt or cancelthan smaller and/or less generally appreci-ated space activities;once approved, they require relatively littlefurther engagement by engineers in “politi-cal justification” activities for some time; andthey provide perhaps the most visible andapparently effective civilian response to thewidely publicized in-space activities of So-viet cosmonauts.

And to date, it is this kind of activity that hasobtained the most attention, and approval, of thepresident and Congress. But these large programsalso have another, rather troubling set of char-acteristics. Because they are primarily technologi-cal in nature, they are inherently difficult to ex-plain satisfactorily to those who are notprofessionals or not particularly interested. Theyare initiated by Government technologists andtheir supporters who are convinced of their value,rather than being initiated in response to largesegments of the general public’s specifically call-ing on NASA to provide them. ’ Perhaps most im-

‘The implication here is not that there is no public support forthe civilian space program in general or the big technological spec-

2 5



Dramatic manned space missions such as the Apollo 11 lunar landing have generated public support for NASA,

portant, the completion of any one of the large,high-technology, “manned” programs facesNASA’s management either with making a fun-damental move toward a more equal distribu-tion of agency funds among all its R&D pro-grams, or with creating and securing support foranother program of the same general charac-ter and size.

Thus, the first successful flight of a Shuttle or-biter in early 1981 found the NASA management

in particular, but that this support might be broadened ifwide public discussion were encouraged. One need only comparethe extent to which the public, to date, interests itself in space issueswith the extent to which it interests itself in education, health serv-ices delivery, housing, defense, transportation, etc.

confronting this problem again. Within a rela-tively few years thereafter, either another largenew program would have to begin, or a numberof relatively small existing programs would haveto be considerably enlarged (or new ones initi-ated)—or else as many as one-quarter of NASA’sprofessional staff and approximately $2 billion peryear would be lost.

Without an internal or external mandate toachieve a more nearly equal distribution of fundsamong all its R&D programs, NASA leaders optedto pursue another large, high-technology,“manned” program. The particular programchosen has been the subject of study and dis-cussion within the civilian space community fordecades: “the space station” program. After

Ch. 2—issues and Findings ● 2 7

detailed engineering study, the public acquisitionof in-space infrastructure under this programwould proceed for several years at an averagerate of some $2 billion per year. It would involvethe development of high technology, much ofwhich would address the problems attendant onseeing people reside and work in space in a per-manent fashion under safe and sanitary condi-tions. Its buildup could be phased to match thereduction in the Shuttle development programso that, overall, NASA’s present and anticipated“budget envelope” could be maintained, and theShuttle program’s professional skill mix could besatisfactorily reassigned.

Given, first, its institutional end of maintain-ing its current size and, second, its choice of aspace infrastructure program as means to attainthat end, NASA has been somewhat reluctantto consider new modes of acquiring the infra-structure envisioned. For example, NASA couldchoose to employ a great deal of already devel-

oped, space-qualified, and already paid-for tech-nology. It could prompt the U.S. private spaceindustry to come forward with proposals to pro-vide major infrastructure elements to NASA in aneconomical fashion, elements that the privatesector, using its own resources (including privatefunds), would design to the Government’s per-formance specifications (rather than to detaileddesign specifications under contract). lt couldseek international collaborative arrangementsunder which foreign partners would bear a sub-stantial fraction of the present $8 billion estimate,2

thereby significantly reducing the cost to U.S. tax-payers. However, with the two givens, these newapproaches could result in an insufficient pro-gram base to maintain the agency’s present sizeand, perhaps, even its present character as an in-dependent, civilian, national resource.

In view of NASA’s internal circumstances andthe many other external desiderata which its re-sources could alternatively address, the questionarises: is a “space station” program the best wayfor NASA to spend the foreseeably available $2billion per year3 to serve the needs of the Na-tion—and the world? The President and Congresshave just approved a “space station” programin principle, and allocated $150 million to com-mence engineering studies—studies now ex-pected to take 2 years. Decisions as to the char-acter, magnitude, and pace of this programwould be made after the completion of thesestudies, and any others that Congress mightrequest.

If: 1) NASA’S basic decision not to movetoward a more nearly equal distribution of fundsamong all its R&D programs remains unchanged,2) its overall aspirations for its “space station”program are not realized, and 3) no adequatesubstitutes appear and are approved within thenext 2 years, then the basic character of thepresent U.S. publicly funded civilian space pro-

zlt is imw~ant to appreciate that this $8 billion figure covers onlythe initial capital outlay, not the continuing operations and main-tenance costs or subsequent capital outlays to acquire additionalcapabilities.

JThe $2 billion per Year figure is predicated upon two Projec-tions: that NASA’s overall budget will remain level in constant(1984$) dollars at somewhat over $7 billion per year, and that theroughly $2 billion per year currently spent for Shuttle developmentwill be made available for space infrastructure acquisition.

28 Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

gram itself could be placed in question. IfNASA’s professionals were convinced that theycould not see a reasonable future for the exer-cise of the skills they so successfully displayed inthe Shuttle program, they would soon begin toexplore employment alternatives—and the moreaccomplished, more imaginative, and more inde-pendent employees, which any outstanding R&Dorganization simply must retain, would be theones most likely to do so. One of the clear alter-natives would be to work on what now appearsto be another rapidly growing high-technologyspace program area—that of the space elementsof the new military Strategic Defense Initiative(SDI), a program now headed by a former asso-ciate administrator of NASA who was responsi-ble for the Shuttle development program.

If large numbers of professionals left NASA, andif their leaving the civilian space R&D area wereaccompanied by similar departures from that partof the private space industry long associated withNASA, an already significant and increasing im-balance between our military and civilian pub-licly funded space programs would be magnified.A vigorous, independent NASA has served theNation well; any trend toward reducing it to mereadjunct status cannot be viewed, in the overallnational security context, without concern.

Thus, the NASA management may have “betthe company” on the successful outcome of acampaign to obtain approval for one more large,new, high-technology, publicly funded civilianspace program. Unfortunately, even if approvalis received, such a program could foreclose, per-haps for 5 to 10 years, the possibility of NASA’sundertaking other, more desirable options or itseffecting any fundamental changes either in itsmajor program mix or in the way it acquiresspace technology. Yet, in OTA’S judgment, seri-ous consideration must be given, now, to pre-serving these options and making these changes,if NASA is to maintain U.S. space leadership.For fundamental shifts in other national and in-ternational circumstances that will importantlyaffect the conduct of future space activities arealready under way.

Just as unfortunately, because the Shuttle de-velopment program is expected to be essentiallycomplete within 2 years, any moves to effect large

and desirable changes in the NASA program mixand/or acquisition processes and/or internationalcollaboration policies must also be made withinthat time. Making such moves effectively wouldcall for a high degree of institutional imaginationand political statesmanship by both branches,and NASA particularly.

Whatever else the executive branch and Con-gress decide to do at this decision point, theyshould resolve that they will not be required toface such circumstances again. The publiclyfunded civilian space program of the UnitedStates is too important, and the scientists andtechnologists heading the program too compe-tent and responsible, to continue to be treatedwith the form of “benign neglect” that has beenthe rule sincegrand Apollo

Transitionsfundamental,

the successful completion of theprogram.

Transitions

are under way. And they are soand moving so rapidly, that we

Ch. 2—Issues and Findings ● 2 9

should not be surprised to see them have sig-nificant, although presently unpredictable indetail, impacts on any “space station” program,even in the next few years. The key institutionalquestion is this: will U.S. leaders see to it thatNASA meets these transitions head-on andmoves out smartly to “lead the parade” by or-chestrating the growing and increasingly variedforeign and domestic space interests?

For nearly a quarter of a century, the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union were the only ma-jor players in the civilian space arena.4 Except forsatellite communications, all of the U.S. civilianspace activities were formally conceived, funded,and managed by the Federal Government, pri-marily NASA.

Similarly, during this interval, NASA, the Na-tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA), and the National Weather Service de-cided, with regard to the weather and climatearea, what space-related scientific, technology-development, and infrastructure-acquisition pro-grams should be conducted; developed theircharacteristics in some detail; mounted almostalways successful campaigns with the Presidentand Congress to receive direction, legal permis-sion, and Federal funds for their conduct; andthen conducted them using large numbers of in-house scientists and engineers and contractingwith their counterparts in universities and thespace industry.

NASA has frequently been willing to considerinternational cooperation in science with othercountries, and has reached cooperative agree-ments with many countries—agreements that sawother countries spend significant amounts ofmoney to support their space professionals andto provide them with equipment in order to ef-fect such cooperation. But there has yet to be anymajor cooperative agreement reached that wouldsee truly significant equipment jointly designedand produced by the United States and one ormore other countries that would result either in

4Since the adoption of the 1958 National Aeronautics and SpaceAct, the United States has maintained identifiably separate civilianand military space programs, though there has always been coop-eration between the two. The extent to which one can make a simi-lar distinction with respect to Soviet space activities remains a vexingquestion.

important technology sharing, in U.S. programrisk sharing, or in large savings to the publicpurses The Department of Defense (DOD) oftendoes so within NATO and elsewhere, as do ma-jor aerospace companies in order to reduce theirown financial, technological, and market risk ex-posure in large complex programs. NASA officialsare making overtures to other countries regard-ing their participation in any “space station” pro-gram, but it remains to be seen whether theseovertures will result in the kind of collaborationthat would realize major cost savings to theUnited States.

With a single recent exception,b there has beenno important instance in which our private sec-tor has set out to develop major items of space-related technology of acknowledged central im-portance to NASA programs on its own, using itsown resources—including financing—to do so.All such critical elements are still procured by theGovernment, with Government funds and someconsiderable Government oversight in the process.

However, over the past few years, internationalcivilian space circumstances, the circumstancesof our own space-related private sector, and theattitude of our Government toward the civilianspace area have begun to undergo fundamentalshifts-shifts that, in the next few years, cannotbut have great impact on what our publiclyfunded civilian space program does and how itdoes it.

As a result of the sustained and generous assist-ance of the United States, and by working in closeconcert with NASA and the U.S. space industryover the past few years, several other countrieshave conceived of, developed, produced, in-stalled, and used substantial space and space-related equipment. Such equipment, some of itdesigned primarily for scientific research, some

!$Spacelab is the exception that proves the rule. NOAA, on theother hand, is moving to obtain further contributions of space-related technology through the Economic Summit process, and ispursuing the development of international polar-orbiting meteoro-logical satellites; both of these initiatives could result in importantcost savings to the U.S. public program.

6The exception is the agreement, on an ‘upper stage, betweenNASA and the Orbital Science Corp. of Vienna, VA. McDonnellDouglas upgraded the Delta and developed the Payload AssistModule (PAM) using its own funds, and other private groups arenow developing expendable boosters of various kinds.


primarily for commercial applications, is of a so-phistication that often matches that of U.S. equip-ment, and of a sales magnitude that, in some in-stances, now clearly offers serious competitionto the generally acknowledged preeminence ofthe United States (cf. Spacelab; Ariane; the Cana-dian Remote Manipulator System; DBS space-craft; etc.).7 These countries now have sufficientconfidence in their own skills and experience toencourage them to ask for a much closer kindof cooperation with the United States. It will notbe long before they can and probably will insiston it, for they will have the ability and the motiva-tion to “go it alone” if they cannot see that theirbasic interests would be adequately served by thekind of cooperation extended to them by theUnited States.

Similarly, one of NASA’s outstanding successes(shared with DOD) has been that of shepherdingthe aircraft, electronics, chemical, and other high-technology areas of our private sector into thecivilian space business. This is now a very sophis-ticated and confident part of our overall nationalcommercial-industrial capability. But significantsegments of the private space sector are increas-ingly restless with the prospect of having to pro-duce high-technology space items under whatthey perceive to be the no-longer-necessary, andwasteful, “close control” of NASA managers.8

Also, the past few years have seen a growingnumber of entrepreneurs beginning to enter thecivilian space area. These “newcomers” are notlimited to those who would use the assets andservices that NASA expects to acquire; somewould provide such assets and services to boththe Government and others in the private sec-tor on what they believe to be inviting financialterms. Both the President and Congress are clear-ly determined to see that the private sector playsa much more prominent role in the civilian spacearea generally, that it is encouraged to make ma-jor investments therein, and that the country

7For a thorough discussion of this issue, see the OTA report /i-nternational Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activi-ties, in press,

6At least some in the private sector believe that they can do asgood work on space hardware generally as they do on commer-cial air transportation and communications satellites, and they arewilling to assume the financial responsibility of doing so and to riskgrave financial penalties if they fail.

finally begin to reap the large and direct eco-nomic benefits so long hoped for by civilian spaceleaders.

Finally, the great, persistent, and projected def-icits in our Federal budget now require Congressto take an even more careful look at deferrableexpenditures, especially “new starts. ” Indeed,the central issue of the President’s request forcongressional approval of the first phase of a“space station” program is that of its capital cost,even though NASA now estimates the size of theinitial portion of the program (in constant 1984dollars) to be less than one-half that of the Shut-tle program, and not much more than 10 percentof the Apollo program, and its acquisition sched-ule would seemingly not require NASA’s budgetto be increased over today’s amount.g

These new national and international circum-stances have begun to command the attentionof the executive branch, and important firststeps toward addressing them have been taken.However, although many of the leaders of theU.S. publicly funded space program are con-vinced of the importance of these circum-stances, few of them have the professional andbusiness experience required to ensure an ef-fective response. Furthermore, it appears thatmost of those beneath the top management lev-els as yet have little enthusiasm for making in-dicated changes. And, indeed, it is not clear thatleaders of the executive branch have thoughtout, clearly, just how far they are willing to seeinnovative arrangements arrived at that wouldcarry NASA and NOAA into much closer col-laboration with other countries and with ourown private sector.

National Commission on Space

In July 1984, Congress enacted, and the Presi-dent signed into Iaw, lo the National Aeronauticsand Space Act of 1985. Title II of this Act estab-

gHowever, consider the following: “In recent decades the aver-age overrun on major programs, in constant dollars and constantquantities, has been slightly over 50 percent. The average schedulemilestone has been missed by a third of the time initially projected.The average time to develop new systems has, until recently, beenincreasing at the rate of 3 months per year . . . each year. ” Nor-man R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-TechManagement,” Aerospace America, March 1984, p. 5.

lopublic Law 98-36I.

Ch. 2—Issues and Findings Ž 31

Iished a National Commission on Space. The de-liberations of the National Commission can beexpected to have a fundamental impact on theentire civilian space future, including the futurecourse of any civilian “space station” program.This conclusion is based on the assumption thatthe Commission will provide an appropriate mixof prestige, broad concern for the national inter-est, technical expertise, and diverse outlook.

There are great opportunities now perceptiblein the civilian space area, but the rapidly chang-ing circumstances that make their achievementpossible have raised difficult issues and createdinstitutional inconsistencies. If the new oppor-tunities are to be realized, these issues must befaced and the inconsistencies resolved. OTA hasearlier expressed the view that many of theseissues and inconsistencies cannot now be dealtwith adequately by the annual authorizationprocess and that, therefore, some more funda-mental mechanism, such as a Presidential Com-mission, should be created. The newly authorizedCommission is the first opportunity in a genera-tion for Congress—and the Nation—to set a trulyfresh course in space. It is critically important tothe Nation generally, and to a successful U.S.future in civilian space activities specifically, thatthe Commission be successful.

NASA now plans to spend the next 2 yearsmaking studies of a fairly specific low-Earth-orbit(LEO) infrastructure complex that it would ac-quire, operate, and use in a manner similar tothe Shuttle. This plan was set in motion someyears ago. Over the next year and a half, thedeliberations and eventual findings of the Na-tional Commission could offer NASA, andothers seriously interested in the space future,the opportunity to develop new program op-tions, and to compare these new options, newmethods, and new attitudes with the civilian“space station” program as currently defined.

Afresh, basic and uninhibited review of policyissues might well result in a fundamental changeof NASA views on the following matters:

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the appropriate character of the “space sta-tion” program;the character and mix of its various large,long-range programs;the ways in which it might orchestrate the ci-vilian space interests of all friendly countries;andthe ways in which it could act to promptgreatly increased private sector investment inspace.

CIVILIAN “SPACE STATIONS”

The Case for Infrastructure inLow-Earth-Orbit

on balance, a persuasive case can be madefor acquiring some long-term infrastructure innear-Earth space, some of which would allowa human work force to be retained there for ex-tended periods.11 This case rests primarily ontangible rather than intangible considerations.

The persuasive tangible reasons are that theUnited States would then be able to explore thepossibility of more efficient transport staging be-

I I [t is of course assumed that the character and location of theinfrastructure elements would be chosen to meet the specific, im-portant expressed needs of those expected to use the services thatthese elements would be expected to provide—i.e., not chosen bythe technologists who would design, produce, and install them.

tween LEO and geostationary orbit (GEO), theMoon, and beyond; to commence certain impor-tant life science12 and materials science experi-ments early in the next decade, the conduct ofwhich would otherwise border on the impossi-ble; to warehouse space assets and consumables,so as to improve the efficiency of very costlysurface-LEO transportation; to aspire to muchmore ambitious and dependable servicing of everlarger and more sophisticated, and thereforemore costly and complex, space assets, there-by containing their total life-cycle costs and in-creasing their effectiveness; and to undertake new

12Life ~ience r-arch could include studies of long-term responseto in-space conditions (in preparation for possible staffed expedi-tions to the Moon, Mars, or the asteroids) as well as studies rele-vant to the general human population on Earth.


and innovative space activities with confidentfreedom.

These reasons reflect not only the many yearsof conceptual studies of infrastructure arrays thatcould support space activities but, as well, a gen-eral consensus as to the value of space infrastruc-ture elements gained with actual experience inSkylab, the Shuttle Orbiter, the Soviet Salyut,Soyuz, and Progress, the Tracking and Data RelaySatellite System (TDRSS), Spacelab, the MannedManeuvering Unit (MMU), the West GermanSPAS platform, the Canadian Remote Manipu-lator System (RMS), etc.

Indeed, it seems likely that, in retrospect-sometwo decades hence—at Ieast a large portion, per-haps all, of the space infrastructure capabilitiesnow advanced by NASA as necessary will be seento have been so. But this eventuality gives noguidance as to how and when the various ele-ments should be acquired.

Another reason advanced is that, eventually,there may be important economic payoffs frommaterials processing in space that would requirethe use of space infrastructure. What is now re-quired is a great deal of imaginative and soundin-space basic and applied research in the ma-terials science area.

The intangible reasons for acquiring such infra-structure—reasons of maintaining space leader-ship generally, of creating further heroic rolemodels, of exhibiting our capacity for high-technology development, of enhancing nationalsecurity, of maintaining a strong NASA, etc.—are much less compelling. “Space buffs” and per-haps some in the private sector (those who havecalled for a long-term Government commitmentto provide R&D facilities in space before theywould consider investing there themselves) arguethat general-purpose space infrastructure (i.e., a“space station”) would address such great andintangible purposes. But there is no evidence thatlarge segments of the general public agree withthis assessment, and they have not been offeredthe opportunity to express their views on othermajor space ventures that might more forcefullyaddress such intangibles. A number of alterna-tive intangible goals have already been put forth;

undoubtedly, more will be articulated in thefuture.

The Concerns About Low-Earth-OrbitInfrastructure

But while the case to be made for acquiringsome long-term, habitable, LEO infrastructure ispersuasive, there is no compelling, objective, ex-ternal case either for obtaining all of the par-ticular array of elements that NASA now de-scribes under the rubric of “the space station,”or for obtaining this or any other array in thegeneral manner that NASA is now expected topursue, nor for paying the particular public costthat it now estimates is required to do so.13 (Theimportant internal case for proceeding with alarge, early “space station” program is discussedabove.) As the infrastructure would be of a verygeneral-purpose nature, to be used to supportmyriads of conceptual uses, few of which havebeen sharply defined or have gained wide accept-ance as important objectives of our publiclyfunded space program, there is no necessity forobtaining all of it soon. And, under these circum-stances its value to the space program is quitedifficult to estimate objectively.

Three groups are particularly concerned abouta nearly $10 billion (1984$) commitment to a“space station” program:

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those, particularly space scientists, who fearthat such a relatively large commitmentwould represent a hazard to their own spaceinterests;those space professionals who would preferNASA to take a more measured, evolving,learn-as-we-go approach; and

13Some contend that the substantial and growing U.S.S.R. spaceinfrastructure (including Salyut, Soyuz, Progress, and Cosmos 1443-class modules) constitutes a valid, and important, justification forthe United States to mount a comparable, if not more capable, pro-gram. This report does not address this contention. However, evenif keeping up with the Soviets or beating them at their own gamewere to become the motivation for a major civilian space infrastruc-ture acquisition program, it does not follow that such a programwould resemble that which NASA has described. Indeed, it mightbe quite different. See the OTA Technical Memorandum, Sa/yut:Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space, OTA-TM-STI-14, December 1983.

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Ch. 2—Issues and Findings ● 3 3

● those particularly concerned with the com-mencement of any new and costly Federalinitiative who are sensitive to its impact onthe Federal budget even if it falls withinNASA’s present, and hoped-for, “budgetenvelope” of some $7 billion per year.

Of course, if the projected capital cost werewell less than the near $10 billion (1 984$) nowestimated for the initial operating capability (IOC)(i.e., the initial phase of the infrastructure acqui-sition program that NASA has in mind; the fullcost of the program would approximate $20 bil-lion [1984$] by the year 2000), the concerns ofthese groups would be significantly lessened.

The Cost of Low-Earth-OrbitInfrastructure

The eventual cost of any in-space infrastructuredepends on the chosen size, capability, degreeof new technology involved, and method of ac-quisition. It is not now possible to make anotherestimate of the IOC cost that is significantly dif-ferent from that made by NASA for what it de-scribes as “the space station” in which one wouldhave greater confidence. There simply are toomany large potential “cost drivers, ” the signifi-cance of which cannot be judged under today’srapidly changing circumstances.

All of the experience with the acquisition,over a relatively long time, of large amounts ofspace technology, much of it to be newly devel-oped, suggests that the $8 billion (1984$) fig-ure will eventually be seen to have been a floor,not a ceiling, on cost. In spite of, or rather be-cause of, this experience, NASA is determinedthat it will not be repeated.14

There are several options available relating toacquisition practices, international collaboration,and the more imaginative use of the U.S. privatesector that, if effectively grasped, could reducethe cost impact on the Federal budget. Acquisi-tion of in-space infrastructure is inherently dif-ferent from the acquisition of a Shuttle or a com-mitment to develop and deploy those resourcesrequired to send a person on a safe round-tripto the Moon. To use NASA’s own earlier, cor-

lasee Augustine, op. Cit.

rect, and quite illuminating expression, space in-frastructure can be bought “by the yard.”15

One thing is clear: NASA, if it wished, or werepersuaded, could opt for obtaining now a“core” fraction of the total infrastructure ca-pability that it believes that the country will needover the long term—a core fraction that wouldallow many useful scientific studies to be madeand infrastructure support operations to be ex-plored and evaluated, at a net U.S. capital costof one-quarter to one-third of the $8 billion thatit now seeks. To this core fraction other ele-ments could be added incrementally as experi-ence is gained in its use and as requirements be-come sufficiently persuasive.

The technological and programmatic optionsexist for doing so. There is clearly a great varietyof U. S., other Government, and private in-spaceinfrastructure (some already in hand, some in de-velopment, some that is receiving detailed study)from which selections could be made to providevarious kinds and amounts of in-space assets andsupport services—assets and services that wouldbe expected to allow some new activities to beundertaken, and to increase the efficiency andeffectiveness of others.

Properly encouraged by NASA, private sectorfirms are almost certain to come forward in thenext few years with proposals that would providesome of the desired infrastructure elements and/or support services now thought to require Gov-ernment development and acquisition. Somesuch developments are already under way.16

Alternatives

Some large sophisticated civilian space ven-tures such as the Space Telescope are pushingat the frontiers of technology. This is not (or, atleast, need not be) the case for in-space infrastruc-ture. Indeed, there is little doubt that, with appro-

ls’’Space stations are the kind of development that you can buyby the yard.” James Beggs, NASA Administrator; Committee Re-port of Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Technol-ogy, and Space (Senator Gorton, Chairman) of the Senate Com-mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Mar. 8, 9, and15, 1983, p. 51.

IGTheSe developments are discussed in some detail in ch. 3 ofthis report.


priate congressional approval and funding, theNation could see the capabilities described byNASA in place and operating satisfactorily wellbefore the middle of the next decade. Because,in OTA’S view, technology development forspace infrastructure envisioned in the near-termshould present no significant problem, it has notbeen given central attention in this assessment.However, some general observations on technol-ogy matters may be useful here.

• Three basic kinds of in-space infrastructureelements are worthy of separate, but related,attention:1. one or more relatively large central com-

plexes, with work crews as required–complexes where the bulk of the relativelyinnovative work could be carried on;

2. normally unattended “free-flying” plat-forms, nearby or remote from such com-plexes, where various equipment couldcarry on activities precluded by the orbi-tal locations, micro-gravitational circum-stances, or effluents associated with a cen-tral complex; and

3 .transportation between the surface andsuch a complex, and between the com-plex and the platforms, and between thecomplex and much higher orbits or evenout to solar system distances.

● OTA is not persuaded that all of the particu-lar capabilities now being emphasized byNASA, when measured against alternatives,are the ones that have the greatest value tothe Nation’s publicly funded civilian spaceprogram. NASA’s present selection of the ini-tial set of infrastructure elements and theirlocation in space would provide many of thedesired support capabilities. But they wouldnot serve the interests of those attemptingto service remote-sensing platforms of impor-tance to weather and climate from low, near-polar orbits, or from geostationary orbits, northe interests of those in the private sectorwhose communications, and perhaps navi-gation/position-fixing, satellites are locatedin much higher, including geostationary, or-bits, nor the interests of those who wouldlike to see less costly transportation providedbetween the Earth and GEO, and the Moon,Mars, and asteroids.

● Providing safe, sanitary, and suitable in-

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frastructure elements ‘for long stays byhuman crews will be costly. But howevermuch some may be interested in exploitingunattended sophisticated machinery in LEO,the state of the art is not yet capable of pro-viding the wide range of functions and con-fidence that human workers can provide un-til well after the early 1990s. However, giventhe substantial emphasis that, to date, NASAhas placed on human work crews in space,it would be the prudent course, now, to raisethe level of support for the development ofin-space automation and remote operationfrom Earth. Emphasis on R&D for space-related automation and remote operationcould also be expected to have a salutary in-fluence on automation R&D for applicationshere on Earth, U.S. industrial competitive-ness, and its introduction into commercial-industrial activities.There are two quite different reasons that canbe advanced for the development of newtechnology to be employed in space infra-structure. One reason is to provide capabil-ities there that present technology cannot;the other is to reduce the life-cycle costs ofits ownership—i.e., to reduce O&M costsand extend its useful lifetime. Both arelaudable objectives. But they must bebalanced against the simple fact that “thereis no such thing as enough money,” and anydecision to provide anything more (or less)than the vitally needed capabilities, and todo so at an earlier than necessary date, andany decision to try to predict the far futureso as to provide for all possible uses of suchcapabilities, will simply result in at least theunwarranted, and perhaps wasteful, use offunds. OTA is not convinced that a goodenough balance has been struck betweenthe competing demands for funds for infra-structure and funds for other space activities.Diligent and imaginative exploitation of theShuttle fleet, along with use of free-flyingplatforms and local in-space transportationsystems for individuals (all already underway), could provide much useful informa-tion and experience that would be of greatvalue in making later decisions about thecharacteristics and operational employment

Ch. 2—issues and Findings • 35

of long-term in-space infrastructure. Overtime, this broadening experience will in-crease the confidence with which eventualinfrastructure selection decisions are made.

● Significant extensions of the time that an Or-biter could remain usefully on-orbit (to, say,double or triple today’s 7 to 10 days) wouldprovide many of the capabilities desired forwork crews in permanent infrastructure, andprovide them sooner and at relatively mod-est cost, thereby relaxing the cost and sched-ule requirements associated with the latter.

● Space lab’s operational characteristics alsocould be amplified at relatively modest cost,with the same helpful consequences.

● Private sector development of large in-spaceelectrical power supplies, occasionally at-tended platforms, and other infrastructureelements could be successfully completedbefore the end of the decade. If done withimagination and economy they could offerattractive alternatives to Government devel-opment and acquisition of these capabilities.

OUR FUTURE IN SPACE

Long-Term Space Goals andObjectives

The United States can now make major stridesin the civilian space area, but it is not adequatelyprepared to do so.

We need to “re-visit” the substance of the1958 Space Act, reaffirm those of its policy prin-ciples that are judged to be still valid, add othersas appropriate, and lay out a set of new goalsthat are responsive to contemporary and fore-seeable circumstances, interests and values. Aninitial family of end objectives also should beidentified that would address those goals overthe next years and decades.

U.S. civilian space activities should be designedto protect, ease, challenge, and improve the hu-man condition, In addressing its long-term goals,the Nation should strive to move its space inter-ests and activities closer to the mainstream ofpublic interests and concerns, maintain spaceleadership, enhance national security, and posi-tion its civilian space activities to respond to find-ing the unexpected in the cosmos.

For the purpose of prompting public discussion,OTA has developed an initial set of such goals,and a family of initial objectives to address thesegoals. Chapter 6 of the assessment treats thesein some detail. The objectives are suggested forconsideration as additions to, not substitutes for,the continuing “core” programs of space scienceand exploration, space applications, and the de-

velopment of the technology needed to conductall three. The family was generated to encouragemuch greater and more direct involvement of in-terested segments of the general public in civil-ian space activities, and to strive for economic,political, and cultural ends in addition to the sci-entific, exploration, and technology-developmentends of today. And the family contains some ele-ments that are simply “bold. ”

The national goals OTA proposes for discussionare:

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to increase the efficiency of space activitiesand reduce their net cost to the generalpublic;to involve the general public directly in spaceactivities, both on Earth and in space;to derive scientific, economic, social, andpolitical benefits;to increase international cooperation andcollaboration in and for space;to study and explore the Earth, the solar sys-tem, and the greater physical universe; andto spread life, in a responsible fashion,throughout the solar system.

Brief descriptions of the national objectives sug-gested to prompt public discussion follow; theyare

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not rank-ordered.

A space-related, global system/service couldbe established to provide timely and usefulinformation regarding all potentially haz-ardous natural circumstances found in the


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Earth’s space and atmosphere, as well as atand below its surface.A transportation service could be establishedto and from the Earth’s Moon, and a mod-est human presence established there, forscientific and other cultural and economicpurposes.Space probes could be used to obtain theinformation and experience specifically re-quired to plan for further exploration of theplanet Mars and some asteroids.Medical studies of direct interest to the gen-eral public, including study of the humanaging process, could be conducted throughscientific experiments that compare physio-logical, emotional, and social experience inthe absence of gravity with experiencegained in the conduct of related surfacestudies.At least hundreds of members of the generalpublic per year, from the United States andabroad, could be selected on an equitablebasis and brought into space for short visitsthere.A direct audio broadcasting, common-usersystem/service could be established thatwould be available to all of the countries ofthe world on an economical and equitablebasis.In general, all of the nonclassified and non-private communications from, and nonpro-prietary data generated by, all Government-supported spacecraft and satellites could bemade widely available to the general pub-lic and our educational institutions in near-real-time and at modest cost.Radio and optical free-space electromagneticpropagation techniques could be exploitedin an attempt to allow reliable and economiclong-distance transmission of large amountsof electrical energy, both into space for usethere, and from space, lunar and remoteEarth locations for distribution throughoutthe world.The unit cost of space transportation, forpeople and equipment, between the Earth’ssurface and low-, geosynchronous-, andlunar-Earth orbit could be sharply reduced.Space-related commercial-industrial sales in

our private sector could be stimulated to in-crease at a rate comparable to that of otherhigh-technology sectors, and our public ex-penditures on civilian space assets and activ-ities could reflect this revenue growth.

Under present circumstances, the infrastructurethat NASA would acquire in its “space station”program is best described as general-purpose,i.e., designed to support well over 100 in-spaceactivities. As a consequence, it must contain alarge number of sophisticated and costly ele-ments, and there is considerable difficulty in set-ting objective acquisition priorities among themand acquisition schedules for all of them.

Were a specific family of space end objectivesestablished, it would then be much less diffi-cult to establish which are the more importantin-space support assets and services that are re-quired, and the time by which they would needto become available.

A rough estimate of the cost of meeting thisfamily of objectives over the next quarter of a cen-tury amounts to some $40 billion to $60 billion.

To put this cost into perspective, it should benoted that:

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completion of the Shuttle development pro-gram would reduce NASA expenditures by$2 billion per year, or $50 billion over thisinterval;if the 1 percent per year “real-growth” prin-ciple is accepted and is extended indefinite-ly, another $25 billion would thereby beprovided;collaboration with other countries could pro-vide the equivalent of perhaps another $25billion; andthe private sector should be able to reducecosts and make direct space R&D invest-ments that, together, could amount to theequivalent of billions of dollars.

Clearly, under such circumstances, fundinglimitations would not prevent the United Statesfrom undertaking an ambitious publicly sup-ported civilian space program throughout thenext quarter of a century.

Ch. 2—issues and Findings “ 37

Long-Term Space Strategies

If Congress and the President together re-establish a formal set of basic civilian spacegoals, they—and the general public—could turntheir attention to identifying a family of specificobjectives to address them. Then, on a year-to-year basis, as these plans were completed to thesatisfaction of both branches, Congress coulddecide which one(s), if any, to pursue as tech-nological, financial, political, and other circum-stances suggest and allow.

In the case of each objective, detailed programplans could be laid out for attaining it. Such planscould:

identify required technological develop-ments and space infrastructure support ca-pabilities;identify operational and/or political con-cerns;reflect circumstances in the civilian spacearea generally, both here and abroad;estimate the schedules and costs to accom-plish each;judge who would be expected to be the ma-jor participants in their conduct;judge what the most likely end results of theirsuccessful completion would be;identify who would benefit from their suc-cessful completion, and what sources offunds should be looked to to meet both ini-tial capital costs and any ongoing O&M costs;andsuggest who would have the responsibilityfor any long-term ownership, operation,maintenance, and use of assets produced inthe program.

Every 5 years or so, a review of the progressof programs addressing the initial list of objec-tives could be conducted as at the outset, anda new family established. In this fashion, Congresswould always have before it well-thought-out ci-vilian space activity and investment options—op-tions to which a great deal of professional studyand general discussion had already been givenbefore any decisions to proceed were required.

In this general fashion the two vital questionsof “can we do it?” and “should we do it?” would

be separated, and the latter could be taken upby our political process in a more paced, thought-ful, and confident manner.

It is helpful to remember that broad, public,national debates on other important and com-plex issues–on housing policy, for instance, anddefense policy–take place regularly. While it istrue that, historically, there has been little or nonational debate on civilian space issues, that isbecause the Nation’s space capabilities are onlynow coming of age—in the sense that after 25years real options, worthy of discussion, finallyexist.

Cost Reduction

However else the publicly funded space activ-ities of the United States might be described,they certainly would have to be characterizedas being very, very costly. Today, the kind andnumber of space activities is no longer hinderedby ignorance of the physical characteristics ofthe Earth’s space domain, by concern about thereliable in-space lifetime of well engineered andtested equipment, or by fear that men and wom-en going into and remaining in space for as longas weeks at a time would be harmed. The unitcost of these activities is the greatest inhibitionto our development and use of space. If thesecosts were lowered by 10 to 100 times, manyindividuals and organizations would be at-tracted to doing things in and concerning spacethat today are not seriously considered or eventhought of.

Consequently, if space is ever to be widelyused, a fundamental thrust must be to reducethese unit costs sharply and across the board—and particularly the cost of space transportation.The Shuttle is an outstanding technological andoperational success, but achieving the objectiveof a much lower dollar per pound cost for pas-senger and cargo transportation between theEarth’s surface and LEO, GEO, and beyond stillremains to be accomplished.

Some elements of space infrastructure nowunder consideration by NASA for the first (IOC)and second (full-capability) phases of its “spacestation” program could improve the efficiency

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38 Ž Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

of Shuttle use and offer the promise of loweringthe unit cost of LEO/G EO/Lunar trips, and theseelements should be singled out for early and spe-cific attention. But cost reduction is such a fun-damental matter that it should receive major sup-port by NASA, and by the Department ofTransportation, and by our private sector gener-ally, and this support should call out for techno-logical, operational, and institutional innovation,and the objective, tough-minded, pursuit of anysuch innovations that show significant promise.

There are many opportunities open to NASAfor reducing unit costs in its own acquisition proc-esses, and these are spoken to in some detail inappendix D.

The Private Sector

Both the President and Congress have ex-pressed their determination to see the privatesector play a much more prominent role in ourcivilian space area, and NASA and NOAA mustpay this determination particular heed. But itis OTA’S view that, as yet, this serious matteris not receiving all the attention within the ex-ecutive branch that it warrants, except perhapsat the highest levels. ” This lack of attentionseems to result from the fact that most of thespace engineers and scientists in the Governmentsimply do not have the professional and businessexperience required to work closely and imagi-natively with the private sector. Perhaps evenmore important, their long-term experience with-in the Government “space club” has not pro-vided them with the perspective to appreciatehow important it is to the future of the publiclyfunded space program that the private sectorassume this more prominent role.

In general, most NASA and NOAA scientistsand engineers can appreciate that successful pri-vate sector investment in the civilian space area(as well as any other area, for that matter) willresult in increased employment opportunities, theproduction of needed and desired capital goodsand commercial services, the strengthening of oureconomy generally and our international trade

‘The July 20, 1984, issuance by the White House of a “NationalPolicy on the Commercial Use of Space” fact sheet is an encourag-ing development.

position particularly, etc., and do express the gen-eral sense that these are laudable national objec-tives. Yet almost all are still more interested inaddressing their own internal science and engi-neering agendas.

There is another aspect of the successful inter-jection of large-scale private sector activity intothe civilian space area that is perhaps most im-portant to the long-term prospects of the publiclyfunded portion of these activities: they could in-crease the tax base and increase tax revenues.

Today, U.S. private sector space sales amountto some $2 billion per year, are increasing at anaverage annual rate of some 15 percent per year,compounded, and are probably generating a totalof some $½ billion in taxes of all kinds. It appearsto be a reasonable conclusion that such an aver-age annual rate of increase could well be main-tained for at least the next decade or two.

Such a rate of commercial and industrial space-related sales- and tax-revenue increase could fig-ure most importantly in the future of the publiclyfunded civilian space program. Already, today,while the Federal outlays for this program costsome $7 billion per year, private sector spacesales return some $1/2 billion annually in the formof taxes. Were the 15 percent per year, com-pounded, rate to continue throughout the endof this century (and setting aside considerationof any negative impact that this growth couldhave on other segments of our economy), the re-sulting tax revenues could approach half of ourpublic cost for supporting a civilian space pro-gram of today’s magnitude. indeed, in 20 yearsthese growing tax revenues could equal the costof such a public program. And, by then, privatesector space-related R&D activities also could befunded at a level of billions of dollars per year.

The funds now being spent on NASA and NOAAprograms are “discretionary” not “entitlement”funds. At some time in the future, our nationalfinancial circumstances could prompt seriousquestions to be raised about the continuance ofsuch large, deferrable, expenditures. Of course,there are arguments that can be, have been, andwould be advanced for not reducing the presentlevel of such public expenditures, but these levelshave been sharply curtailed in the past. To the

Ch. 2—issues and Findings “ 39

extent that objective evidence of the direct im-portance of the R&D and other activities of NASAand NOAA to this kind of economic growth isin hand, it is an argument for the continuationof these activities.

OTA concludes that two important, perhapsthe most important, activities that NASA couldundertake today, and for the indefinite future,would be to reduce the unit cost to the privatesector of their conducting activities in space, andto be of assistance to them in their making pro-ductive investments in space.

Developing methods of truly useful and accept-able assistance could well be a thorny matter,inasmuch as in many commercial-industrial-financial areas there is a somewhat adversarialrelationship between the Government and theprivate sector. And for some time the Govern-ment will continue to be the largest purchaserof any private sector space goods and services.Consequently, just as in, say, the supercomputerand nuclear energy areas, the space area willhave to see the appropriate roles of the Govern-ment and the private sector sorted out to ensurethat the interests and responsibilities of each areclear, so as to best serve both—and the Nation.

Finally, it can be anticipated that the privatesector’s particular concern for cost reduction willeventually result in lowered costs in public spaceactivities also.

International Space Cooperation

For most of the space age, there has been con-siderable cooperation in space activities be-tween the United States (by NASA, NOAA andDOD) and several other friendly countries—ef-fective and useful cooperation. The changingcircumstances of the civilian space area call fora reappraisal of the kind and magnitude ofcooperation that now should be sought.

The OTA report International/ Cooperationand Competition in Civilian Space Activities,studies this area in some considerable detail;here we will confine our conclusions to two:

1. The European Space Agency (ESA), severalof its major member countries, Japan, andCanada have evidenced interest in working

closely with the United States on a “spacestation” program. Now may be the time toinquire as to whether our best interests, andthe interests of at least some of these coun-tries, would be best served by movingbeyond yesterday’s and today’s kind ofcooperation, and to attempt more direct col-laboration or even joint venturing with themon any such program.

As yet, NASA appears to be giving insuffi-cient thought to establishing the kind of mul-ti-national, interleaved, development andproduction program of the type often en-tered into by the Department of Defense inNATO and elsewhere, and by some of ourlarge private sector organizations and theiranalogs in other countries.

In the DOD case, considerations of mili-tary security, the additional complexity ofworking on programs involving other coun-tries, the hazards of undue technology trans-fer, and eventual commercial “spinoffs,”have oftentimes been resolved, to mutualadvantage, in favor of sharing costs and im-portant professional skills. There may be, in-deed, similar, legitimate concerns abouttechnology transfer arising in any future in-ternational civilian infrastructure develop-ment program. However, the technology de-veloped in such a civilian program would,in the main, be general-purpose, and thecost-sharing incentives would remain.

The general economic circumstances ofmany of these countries are basically sound;they desire to work with us on civilian spacematters in general, and any “space station”program in particular; they have exhibitedtechnological prowess in Spacelab, the Ca-nadian Remote Manipulator System, Ariane,and various communications satellites pro-vided to INTELSAT. They were willing totrust the good offices of the United Statesand NASA in going ahead with the $1 bil-lion European Spacelab program–a pro-gram that could be rendered valueless at anytime that the United States were to withdrawthe opportunity of their employing it withthe Shuttle.

Given all of these circumstances, it is notbeyond imagination that a major internation-al collaborative civilian “space station” pro-

- . — .


gram could be negotiated that, among itsother virtues, could lighten the total burdenon our public purse perhaps by as much as$2 billion to $3 billion. This is not the ap-proach to dealing with other countries onany “space station” program that is now be-ing taken by NASA. The present approachis one of asking other countries to add fundsto the United States’ estimated and antici-pated $8 billion commitment. The alterna-tive approach has not been debated in theUnited States outside of NASA.

The alternative approach is being exploredby NOAA: NOAA is soliciting importantcost-sharing, perhaps as much as one-half,on the part of other countries who share theU.S. interest in maintaining, and improving,weather-related space sensing systems. Thisalternative approach to working on a “spacestation” program with other countries isworthy of careful consideration by Congress.For no reasonable way of reducing the Fed-eral debt burden by billions of dollars shouldbe passed by unless Congress convincesitself that it is not in the Nation’s interest todo SO.

2. Except, perhaps, for the smallest and poorestcountries, all of the countries in the worldmust have at least some interest in space:the devices and people that orbit abovethem, the activities that go on there, andhow they all could affect their own interests.But only about one-tenth of the world’scountries play an active role in space today.

Here is an extraordinary opportunity forthe United States!

Our determination to exhibit “space lead-ership” need not and probably should notbe confined to dealing with the richest and/or most technologically advanced countries.We could broaden our approach to “inter-national cooperation” by taking as an expli-cit goal the incorporation of the space inter-ests and activities of any other country in theworld into our program, if that countrywould be at all inclined to participate inspace ventures along with us, Of course,such an initiative would require hard work,patience, imagination, and generosity on thepart of the United States. But these charac-

teristics are not usually in short supply in theUnited States generally, and certainly notamong the professionals in NASA and theDepartment of State. Indeed, it was the com-bination of just these national characteris-tics in the U.S. approach to working with afew countries in the past that enabled themto begin to work in space.

Recall that INTELSAT now has over 100member countries, joined in a common in-terest to see space used to improve commu-nications. The United States could nowbegin to use any in-space infrastructure pro-gram to start orchestrating the interests of allof the countries in the world that would bewilling to work with us in reasonable waysto see space developed and used for any andall peacefu I purposes “for the benefit of allman kind.”

Space as an Arena ofPeaceful Cooperation

Even now, when discourse between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union is modest in the ex-treme, and the practical possibilities of effectingcooperative space-related activities between thesuperpowers are severely limited,18 many cannotbut hope that the two countries will find waysto initiate important cooperative civilian spaceendeavors in the future.

To date, most visions of such cooperation formaround scientific activities. They are important,and they should continue to be given serious andthoughtful attention.

Together, the United States and the SovietUnion have some 600 million people and a grossnational product of some $5 trillion betweenthem, and both have global interests and power.Therefore, possible joint cooperative spaceactivities need not be confined to science; in-deed, a broad range of space-related activity

IBU,S..U.S,S.R. Coowration in space-related activities has not en-

tirely vanished. The SARSAT search-and-rescue program, a jointU.S.-Canadian-French undertaking, continues to interoperate suc-cessfully with the parallel Soviet COSPAS system. Both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union are members of INMARSAT, themaritime equivalent of INTELSAT, and both are cooperating, alongwith Europe and Japan, in the International Halley Watch program.

Ch. 2—Issues and Findings . 41

Photo Aeronaut/es and Space Administration

NASA has had agreements with more than 100 countries for cooperation in space activities. The pinnacle of internationalcooperation in space to date was the Test Project in 1975 (shown here), in which a U.S. Apollospacecraft docked with a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft for several days of joint manned operations. However, no international

cooperative agreement (including has yet involved significant sharing of technology or saving of costs.

areas might well be explored, imaginatively anddeterminedly.

OTA plans to report on some of the issues inthis area in the fall of 1984.

NASA’S Changing Role

Until a few years ago, and except for the satel-lite communications area, NASA has, since its in-ception, organized, staffed, and managed itself

to see that it, and its contractors, did essentiallyall that was done in the civilian space area.

Throughout most of this time, and probablywithout conscious reflection on NASA’s part, orthe part of anyone else, it has simply been as-sumed that once our country decided that some-thing was to be done in or for civilian space,NASA was to do it. That is, the responsibility forseeing that something got done in the civilianspace area was equated with NASA’s doing ititself.

42 . Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

But the changing circumstances of the past fewyears now clearly suggest a fundamental reap-praisal of NASA’s responsibilities and role in thedevelopment and further study, exploration, anduse of space.

Although this study of civilian “space stations”and the U.S. “future in space” has brought thesechanging circumstances into clear, at times pain-fully clear, focus, it has not attempted to searchout what NASA’s new role should be in detail.It is to be noted, however, that the Nation’s in-terests now are becoming much broader thanthose of NASA and, indeed, in some instances,may lead to conflicts with what NASA may per-ceive to be its own interests.

NASA could and, in OTA’S view, might wellnow give increased attention to making somefundamental shifts of attitude and operation.In the past, it has been NASA’S responsibilityto meet any given national space objective; inthe future, it could be NASA’s responsibility tosee that the objective is met. That is, NASA couldnow aspire to the much broader role of encour-aging others in the private sector and through-out the world to do much more of what it doestoday.

If NASA is to rise successfully to the challengesnow emerging in the national and internationalspace arena, it must place relatively less empha-sis on accomplishing by itself those things thatour private sector or other friendly nations cansatisfactorily do, either alone or with NASA assist-ance. it can succeed in this only by continuingto cooperate with both, and by broadening thiscooperation so as to prompt and assist both toextend their space-related capacities, confidence,and commitment. And it could emphasize suchcooperation in the acquisition of in-space infra-structure, i.e., a “space station. ”

Released from its relatively near-term focus,NASA could concentrate more of its own profes-sional activities on the most important and ex-citing of questions regarding space, the things thatno one else can or will do: the very best of space-related science; the cutting edge of space-relatedtechnology development; the boldest of space-related explorations and developments.

Finally, NASA could see that its activities con-tinue to be conducted, and the results continueto be used, not only to increase knowledge andto address important social and political goals,but also to enable our private space sector to in-crease its non-Government sales—the sales thatgenerate the taxes that help to pay for NASA’sactivities.

Non-Government Policy Studies

It is inherently difficult for the Governmentto make some kinds of policy studies and, in-deed, it is potentially hazardous to have all suchstudies made by the Government in areas of im-portant national concern.

Particularly in areas where Federal programstake a long time to develop and carry out (say,a decade: cf. Apollo, Shuttle, Landsat, “spacestation”) vested interests are naturally createdwithin the Government and closely related sec-tions of the private aerospace industry. Laterthese interests can present serious problemsof resource re-allocation on the program’s ap-proaching completion unless new avenues fortheir employment have been carefully exploredand publicly agreed on beforehand.

Our free, and increasingly educated, mobile,diverse, rich society is bound to generate ideas,desires, value judgments, and activities aboutwhich the Government simply has difficulty inkeeping well informed, particularly if the ideasare quite different from those with which theGovernment has been dealing for some time andare generated and pursued by persons and orga-nizations that are “new to the scene. ”

Civilian space activities continue to be of im-portance to the United States in many intangi-ble ways, and they are now beginning to beappreciated as offering tangible and growing pri-vate sector economic prospects as well. “Spacecommercialization” has become a popular topic.But in the absence of a “bottom line” and com-petitive economic forces, the Government hasa more difficult time than does our private sec-tor in sharply reducing unit costs. And Govern-ment offices only rarely, by themselves, originate

Ch. 2—issues and Findings ● 4 3

large innovative and challenging programs andcarry them out to satisfactory completion.

In the area of the physical sciences, for in-stance, U.S. leaders can look to several policystudy centers for independent guidance on issuesof broad national concern, In the space area,however, there are only a few dedicated individ-uals who can provide similar guidance.

In view of the increasing importance of civil-ian space activities to the American public gen-erally, it might well be desirable to establish oneor more independent space policy centers whose

professional staff would not be required to re-spond to the contemporary institutional con-cerns of the space community. Such centerswould control their research agendas andallocate resources as they believed best, ratherthan simply responding to directives. An exam-ple of this type would be a university-based in-stitute with several funding sources. The con-tinuing study efforts of such centers couldprovide the American public a better opportu-nity to consider, and to help initiate, space activ-ities that would address important cultural, eco-nomic, social, and political ends.

POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES

In the context of the circumstances and issuesdiscussed in this assessment and the conclusionsreached therein, Congress could now give con-sideration to taking a number of initiatives.

Some of these suggested initiatives are directlyrelated to “the civilian space stations” area;others are related to broader areas that are of gen-eral importance to “our future in space. ”

Strategies for Acquiring Any NewIn-Space Civilian Infrastructure

The response of Congress to the President’s for-mal request for the commencement of a “spacestation” program should take account of the gen-eral circumstances discussed in this study and theexistence of options beyond those proposed byNASA. Given these general circumstances andthe variety of options, Congress could adopt oneof four positions:

1. decide that it is premature and/or inadvisableto set out, soon, to obtain any large amountof new long-term in-space infrastructure, andrefuse to accede to an executive branch re-quest to do so a year or two hence; or

2. at least by implication simply agree, in prin-ciple, to provide the kind and number of in-space assets and services that NASA judgesto be necessary and, accepting its $8 billioncost and 7 to 8-year schedule estimate asworking numbers, be prepared to approve

3.

a year or two hence the acquisition of thegeneral kind of infrastructure elements thatNASA is now focusing on; orspecifically identify any major space servicesto be provided, ask NASA to present variousestimates of costs, schedules, and procure-ment strategies that would be involved inproviding them and, subsequently, selectfrom these estimates the elements and strat-egies to be approved; or


Free-flying platforms such as the one depicted in thisartist’s concept offer one option for relatively low-cost

space infrastructure elements.


4. for the acquisition of any in-space infrastruc-ture, simply approve an average annual ex-penditure rate for its acquisition and allowNASA to select the elements, acquisitionschedules, and procurement strategies in thelight of NASA’s judgment regarding their rel-ative cost and value.

Congress need not imagine that it is requiredto commit itself to accepting any of these posi-tions at this time, inasmuch as the President’sfiscal year 1985 request was restricted to the firstyear of a 2-year study activity that would cost arelatively modest amount (some 5 percent of theprojected total acquisition cost) for such a ma-jor implied space activity. But there is a suffi-ciently persuasive case for our obtaining someadditional space infrastructure so that thoughtfuland comprehensive study of what it should beand how it should be obtained is now warranted.Therefore (setting aside the very important mat-ter of our Federal budget’s present and projectedcircumstances and the implications thereof forany deferrable “new starts”) Congress could usethe next year and a half to become better in-formed about the options available to it and theimplications of selecting particular ones fromamong them. And it could task the executivebranch to make additional, broader, studies thanit now has in mind—studies that could assist Con-gress in arriving at its crucial judgments a yearor so hence.

The House Committee on Science and Tech-nology has taken an important step in the direc-tion of raising such broader issues in requestinga study by NASA that will look into “space sta-tion” program management and procurementmatters. 19 A report of this study, to be providedby NASA to the committee by December 15,1984, is expected to speak to both “ . . . [the]Space Station development management planand procurement strategies with a description ofthe alternatives available and the basis for the[NASA] choices taken.”

Similarly, Congress could request the executivebranch to inform it regarding:20

●

●

●

Igsee Committee report of Mar. 21, 1984.qt shou Id be noted that this assessment makes the assumption

that NASA’s overall funding level will remain relatively constantas it has in recent years.

The priorities it places on the various serv-ices and assets that it sees as generally de-sirable. That is, if Congress were to allocatemore or less than the $2 billion per year nowbeing discussed for the acquisition of IOCelements of space infrastructure, what arethe most important services to be made avail-able and elements to be selected?The ways that are available to keep the U.S.public cost to a minimum, and the bases forthe executive branch’s pursuit or rejectionof them. That is, there are two important op-portunities for reducing the public cost ofany space infrastructure, but it is not clearthat NASA—with its institutional interest inretaining present personnel force and appro-priation levels—has incentives to pursueeither with sufficient imagination and vigor.These opportunities are:1, Other countries could collaborate closely

with the United States so as to produceany agreed infrastructure in a fashion thatwould see their financial contributions re-duce the demands on our public purse towell below the $8 billion figure, ratherthan simply producing additional, perhapsessentially duplicative, infrastructure ele-ments at no savings to the United States.

2. Our private sector could be encouragedto use its own resources to develop, pro-duce, and install as much of any agreedinfrastructure as would meet the Govern-ment’s performance specifications at acost lower than the Government’s presentprocurement practices allow, rather thanhave Government funds used to purchaseall of it and Government personnel usedto manage the process in detail.

Other important space initiatives that NASAcould undertake. That is, if Congress wereto decide that the acquisition of any in-frastructure should proceed at an averageannual public expenditure rate appreciablyless than $2 billion per year, what other im-portant programs could be mounted with theremaining professional staff and the differ-ence in dollars?21

*1 Ibid.

Ch. 2—issues and Findings Ž 45

● Conceptual programs of cooperation withthe Soviet Union in civilian space activities.That is, while a case can be made for mount-ing large and continuing, technologicallychallenging, U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative civil-ian space programs, essentially nothing ofthis nature is now being seriously consideredbecause of the low state of political accom-modation. In anticipation that today’s ten-sions may abate someday, it is important thatconceptual programs now be identified anddescribed that would: 1 ) be of little inherentpolitical sensitivity, 2) offer little prospect ofsignificant technology transfer, 3) allow forimportant involvement of other space-expe-rienced countries as well, and 4) offer thepromise of important cost savings to anycountry that, otherwise, would pursue anyof them alone. The conduct of some suchprograms could well require some relatedelements of in-space infrastructure.

These broader studies would be carried onat the same time, and for a small fraction ofthe cost of, the “space-station” engineeringstudies that NASA is now beginning to con-duct, and the conclusions of their satisfac-tory completion would clearly be of impor-tance to Congress 1 ½ years hence.

Civilian Space Policies, Goals,Objectives, and Strategies

Except for a few changes in the basic space law,Congress has been satisfied to deal with evolv-ing circumstances through specific year-to-yearchanges in NASA’s authorization bills. But thesecircumstances are now so greatly changed, andour space assets and experience are now so great,that it has become clear that Congress could re-assess our civilian space laws’ goals, objectives,institutions, policies, and plans with great profit.

For instance, Congress and the general publicshould not find themselves in the position of hav-ing to decide on large, complex, and very costlyitems of space infrastructure such as a “space sta-tion” without having a much clearer understand-ing of what these items will all be used for overthe long term, and without being confident thattheir character, the uses to which they will be put,

how they are to be acquired, owned, operated,and paid for, have all been carefully consideredand conclusions reached that most would acceptas reflecting our broadest national interests—notprimarily the interests of the space community.

Congress is now moving to effect some impor-tant changes in space law and policy. Legislationhas already been enacted in 1984 by Congressand accepted by the President that makes an im-portant change in the Space Act.22 The act nowdeclares “ . . . that [NASA should] seek and en-courage, to the maximum extent possible, thefullest commercial use of space.”

Although a sufficient, and sufficiently broad,base of thought, analysis, and discussion of fun-damental considerations is not yet in hand toallow Congress to proceed to make other funda-mental changes in our national civilian space pos-ture with great confidence, the National Com-mission on Space authorized for in Title I I of thisyear’s legislation,23 and its subsequent activities,couId go far toward calling widespread attentionto our civilian space problems and opportunities.The Commission is expected to give the firstbroad consideration to our national space inter-ests in a generation—consideration that wouldencompass interests in addition to those of sci-ence and technology that receive by far most ofthe attention today. It is the kind of considera-tion that would guard against our continuing tobe caught up in either fascination with or the de-tails of exotic space technology, and would focusinstead on sensible and generally acceptablemethods whereby we can proceed with the de-velopment of space, meet human needs in so do-ing, and fashion new ways of paying for it as wego. And it could identify new policies, goals, ob-jectives, and strategies, and structural changesthat, put in place, would increase the likelihoodthat the great promises of the next quarter-cen-tury of the space age would, in fact, be realized.

All of those within and without the Govern-ment who are truly and seriously interested infurthering our prospects in space should be pre-pared to assist this Commission.

zzpublic Law 98-361.ZJlbid.

46 ● C i v i l i a n s s a c e S t a t i o n s s s n d t h e U . S . Future in S p a c e

The Creation of Space PolicyStudy Centers

The number of professionals engaged in spacepolicy analysis is extremely small. The President’sscience advisor spoke to this lack of independ-ent expertise in testifying before a House subcom-mittee in February 1984.

And in March the House Committee on Sci-ence and Technology24 spoke to “ . . . the chang-ing character of national and international spaceactivity [that] translates into issues and policy con-siderations of increasing breadth and complex-ity, ” and went on to say that “[d]uring the next

Wjee committee KpOrt Of Mar. 21 f 1984.

year the Committee intends to look in greaterdepth at the elements and character of the cur-rent institutional apparatus for setting space pol-icy [and] examining the process by which deci-sions and policies are reached on civil spaceissues. ”

In these circumstances, Congress could con-sider prompting the establishment of one or moremodestly sized, policy-related, study centers out-side of the Government. Provided with sufficient-ly broad charters, and funded in such a fashionas to assure both independence in, and long-termsupport of, truly challenging studies, professionalswould be attracted to conduct the kinds of broadinquiry and analysis that the civilian space areanow so badly needs.

Chapter 3

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Considerations For Any Space Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Orbits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Low-Earth-Orbit Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Technical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Space Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NASA’s Approach to Space Infrastructure . . . . . . .“Mission Analysis Studies” Summary . . . . . . . . .Infrastructure Functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reactions of National Research Council Boards . .

Alternative Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . .Uninhabitable Platforms . . . . . . . . .Habitable Infrastructure . . . . . . . . .Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) .Spacelab . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ShuttleShuttle

Figure No.

as PermanentExternal Tank

1.2.3.

4.

5.6.7,8.

9.10.11.

Orbital InclinationsDiagram of Shuttle

Infrastructure(ET) . . . . . . . .

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OF FIGURES

and Representative Uses .Mission Profile . . . . . . . . . .

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A Possible Configuration for NASA’s Initial Operational Capability . . . ‘ . .Space Station Involving a Solar Power Array, Habitat Module,Logistics Module, Two Laboratory Modules, and SatelliteServicing Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .An Artist’s Conception of a LEASECRAFT Enroute to Orbital AltitudeWith Payload Attached . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .A Free-Flying Permanent Industrial Space Facility. . . . . . . . .Major Spacelab Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Shuttle-Spacelab Flight Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .An Artist’s Conception of a Free-Flying Pressurized Modulean Attached Resource Module (second phase of ColumbusExternal Tank Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Possible Uses of External Tank ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Concept of Infrastructure Utilizing Four External Tanks . . . .

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Chapter 3

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

SUMMARY

Since 1957 various spacefaring nations havelaunched hundreds of spacecraft, many of whichremain today in Earth orbit or on itineraries withinthe solar system or beyond. Many of these space-craft, and some of those to be launched in thefuture including any “space station” elementsand associated launch and transportation sys-tems, are elements of space infrastructure, enabl-ing humans at the surface and in space to carryout activities outside of Earth’s atmosphere. Thischapter begins with a discussion of the spaceenvironment, orbits, and the technical aspects ofspace infrastructure. NASA’s specific aspirationsfor a “space station” and the functions that NASAexpects it to provide are listed in detail. The pro-jected uses of such a facility are summarized,taken from the response of a number of majoraerospace contractors to NASA’s Mission Anal-ysis Studies. The reaction of the National Re-search Council’s Space Science Board and the

Space Applications Board to NASA’s “space sta-tion” aspirations are then discussed. The re-mainder of chapter 3 lists and describes alterna-tives to NASA’s aspirations for space infrastructure,including a number of currently existing platformsand other infrastructure elements, and some thatare under development or in the planning stage. 1

A “USA Salyut” concept is presented as an op-tion that could provide in-space infrastructurethat is roughly comparable to the Soviet Union’scurrent Salyut 7.

‘Among the sources for the material presented in this chapterare background repcrts prepared for OTA by Dr. Jerry Grey,aerospace consultant (on space systems and transportation) andby Teledyne-Brown Engineering on alternatives to wholly new tech-nology in-space infrastructure. Additional material on existing orproposed space platforms and spacecraft was furnished by indi-vidual aerospace companies. Also available were results of an OTAworkshop on lower cost alternatives to a space station; workshopparticipants included aerospace industry and international repre-sentatives.

INTRODUCTION

The United States is currently pursuing a widevariety of civilian space activities. The argumentis being forcefully advanced that additional in-space infrastructure would permit scientific, tech-nology-development and commercial activitiesto be performed more easily or economicallythan at present, and might allow new types ofactivities in space. Plans for a civilian “space sta-tion, ” i.e., space infrastructure, were includedin the ambitious U.S. publicly supported spaceeffort which commenced immediately after thelaunch of the first Sputnik over a quarter centuryago. NASA undertook preliminary designs for

such “space stations” in the early sixties.2 In theearly seventies, astronauts were successfully sup-ported for long durations aboard Skylab, the firstU.S. space laboratory. Now, at the beginning ofthe second-quarter century of the space age, U.S.space infrastructure that would support long-du-ration human activities in space is again underconsideration.

‘The first realistic design initiative for a space station appears tohave been taken prior to the NASA efforts by the Lockheed Corp.Missiles and Space Division in the late 1950s (S. B. Kramer and R.A. Byers, “Assembly of a Multi-Manned Satellite, ” LMSD ReportNo. 48347, December 1958).

49

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANY SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

The space environment is quite different fromthat on and near the Earth’s surface. There area number of orbital, environmental, and techni-cal factors that must be considered to ensure safeand successful operations in space.

Orbits

Infrastructure elements could be located inone, or several, of a wide range of orbits. Mostcommunications satellites and some meteorologi-cal and Earth observation satellites utilize loca-tions in geostationary orbits, 35,800 km abovethe Equator, as fixed vantage points from whichto transmit and receive signals or to observe theEarth’s surface and its atmosphere. It has beenfrequently suggested that on-orbit servicing ofgeostationary satellites, their orbital transfer pro-pulsion systems, and inter-orbit transportationvehicles, could be done more efficiently from in-frastructure located in low-Earth-orbit (LEO) witha low inclination relative to the Equator. An or-bital inclination of 28.5° (see fig. 1) would be rea-sonable for this infrastructure, because launchesover the Atlantic Ocean from Cape Canaveralinto orbits of this inclination consume the leastenergy.

These two functions–servicing geostationarysatellites and launching into the lowest energyorbit from Cape Canaveral—are reasonably com-patible, because the additional energy neededper unit mass at great altitudes to transfer apayload into geostationary orbit from 28.5° isrelatively small.

However, full repetitive coverage of the Earthfor low-altitude meteorological and other Earth-viewing satellites requires near-polar orbits (suchas the near-900 inclination illustrated in fig. 1).Such satellites are therefore launched from theVandenberg Air Force Base in California, whichoffers a safe launch trajectory to the south, overthe Pacific Ocean. A Sun-synchronous near-polarorbit that follows the dawn-dusk line is possible;it avoids Earth shadowing of solar-powered orsolar-viewing instruments, but does not accom-modate Earth-viewing instruments that require il-lumination of the Earth’s surface by the Sun.

b

Figure 1Representative Uses

● Earth observation

Near-polar(land, ocean, atmosphere)

orbit

IMaterialsprocessingLife sciencesAstrophysics/solar

When repetitive but not full coverage of theEarth is essential, a lower inclination can be used;an orbit inclination of 57o is favored because itis the maximum practical inclination obtainablewith a Cape Canaveral launch. It may be desir-able to use infrastructure elements in several or-bital planes, or perhaps to develop and employa reusable orbital transfer vehicle (ROTV) fortransportation between orbits having various in-clinations, although this would be expensive.

Orbital altitudes are also related to several phys-ical characteristics of space. One of these is the“solar wind,” a radiation flux of high-energy par-ticles from the Sun, that can present a threat tohuman beings and equipment. However, the re-gion from 200 to 600 km in altitude (LEO) isshielded by the Earth’s magnetosphere and theradiation there is almost negligible compared withthe radiation in and beyond the Van Allen belts,which extend to 50,000 km in altitude. The mag-netic field is less effective in shielding against ra-

Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure . 51

Photo credit: Nat/ona/ Aeronautics and Space Administration

Diagram showing Earth’s magnetosphere and other near-Earth phenomena.

diation approaching the Earth near its magneticpoles, including that associated with solar flares.Thus, high-altitude orbits and near-polar orbitsare much less hospitable than low-Earth-orbits oflow inclination.

Orbit altitude also affects the amount of globalEarth coverage available to viewing instruments.If a sensor is required to provide daily global cov-erage, for example, the physical limitations onthe angular swath width impose a minimum sat-ellite altitude much higher than 500 km.

Aerodynamic drag becomes an important con-sideration for lower altitude orbits. Aerodynamicdrag decreases for higher orbits; at 400 km, thedrag is two orders of magnitude less than at 200km. The minimum economical, long-term alti-tude for large semipermanent infrastructure ele-ments that would be serviced using the Shuttleordinarily would be above 300 km, and it willlikely be below 600 km because of the rapid de-crease in Shuttle payload capacity with greateraltitude.

Since locations in LEO are above most of theatmosphere, astronomical observations of all sortsare favored there. As well, one revolution aroundthe Earth in a typical circular LEO takes 90 min-utes, allowing vast areas of Earth’s surface to beobserved in continuous succession and on a fre-quently repeated basis. However, higher orbitsprovide a broader field of view for remote sens-ing of Earth.

Another consideration is the energy that mustbe expended to take material to a sufficient alti-tude to obtain a relatively low drag, long-life or-bit. To reach LEO requires more than half of theenergy required either to reach geostationary or-bit or to escape the Earth’s gravitational fieldaltogether. This is the physical basis for some ofthe projected cost savings of a permanently orbit-ing infrastructure base: large launch costs wouldbe paid only once when infrastructure compo-nents are carried into orbit and left there, avoid-ing additional, repetitive, launch costs for heavyequipment that would be frequently used inspace. Of course, resupply launches would stillbe needed and would offset some of this cost sav-ing.3

Low-Earth-Orbit Environment

Four characteristics of the LEO physical envi-ronment are of particular interest: microgravity,high vacuum, periodic high-intensity sunlight,and the combination of solar exposure and shad-owing that makes thermal control possible. Forany infrastructure elements located beyond theVan Allen belts, a fifth environmental parameteris high-energy radiation,

3The number of resupply launches required would depend onthe types and levels of activities carried out, the presence or absenseof people, etc.


Above the minimum practical orbital altitudeof a permanent space facility, the presence ofmicrogravity and vacuum are essentially inde-pendent of orbital inclination and altitude. In par-ticular, the exploitation of microgravity or near“weightIessness, ” which occurs when gravita-tional and orbital acceleration counteract oneanother, shows promise for the processing of ma-terials under such unique conditions. Energy gen-eration depends on radiation from the Sun, andthermal control depends on radiating waste heatout into deep space. For most orbits, the Sun iseclipsed nearly half of the time by the Earth, butthis effect can be tolerated if energy storage sys-tems are used; batteries charged from solar pho-tovoltaic arrays can be used to supply electricpower during times that sunlight is blocked bythe Earth.

Of course, for many human beings, simply be-ing in orbit, and being able to view the Earth andheavens from this perspective, are the outstand-ing characteristics of space.

Technical Considerations

The design of infrastructure components andsystems will depend heavily on a number oftechnical considerations. While a considerableamount of workable “space station” technologyexists, as demonstrated by the success of Skylab,SPAS, MESA, and the Shuttle itself, the develop-ment of new technology may be desirable to ob-tain a long, and particularly useful and efficientlifetime for space infrastructure.

Data Management.– Space infrastructure ele-ments would use an extensive data handling net-work both on-board and on the ground. The net-work would serve orbiting elements including theShuttle, communication, navigation and remotesensing satellites, orbital transfer vehicles, crewmembers on spacewalks, tended free flyers, andsupport staff and scientific researchers on Earth.Cost, program control, and reliability prompt con-sideration of a wide variety of hardware and soft-ware technologies just now coming into being.For example, faster processors, laser disk storage,and flat display terminals will provide large in-creases in capacity at lower unit cost and weight.

Communications.—A number of communica-tion links would be desirable using frequenciesthroughout the electromagnetic spectrum and en-compassing a wide variety of distances, informa-tion content, and line-of-sight propagation direc-tions. Space communications must be designedto avoid interference with established ground-based systems and to take privacy, cost, capac-ity, and reliability into account. Another consid-eration is the location of communications anddata processing nodes. The various space infra-structure elements could require a large numberof antennas and lenses (the Shuttle has 23) that,altogether, would cover a wide field of view.Phased-array antennas, whose radiation patternscan be “pointed” electronically rather than me-chanically, could be widely used.

Systems for locating and tracking natural andmanmade debris, loose tools, and approachingspacecraft is also necessary. System concepts forthis purpose include radar with beacons or pas-sive reflectors, radio transponders, interferometry,the Global Positioning System, ground-based ra-dar, or Iidar (laser radar),

Although space communications can rely ini-tially on current technology, millimeter and op-tical wavelengths may be desirable for use inspace. The development of systems in these partsof the spectrum would offer significant techno-logical challenge.

Electromagnetic Interference (EMl).–This isa significant problem that can occur in space, par-ticularly when high-power microwave sourcesand sensitive detectors are involved. It is difficultto protect some electronic circuits from this “pick-up” problem. In some cases EM I could force theuse of a constellation of individual platforms sep-arated rather widely from each other rather thana single large structure.

Attitude Control and Stabilization .–Althoughspace infrastructure elements do not have to con-tend with gravity, wind, earthquakes, precipita-tion, and other problems encountered on Earth,they must deal with quite different problems suchas the absence of both a “firm footing” and the‘‘stiffening” influence of gravity. Of particularconcern is the control and stabilization of large,

Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure • 53

flexible, evolving, structural assemblies and mod-ules. Elaborate control systems for each module(sensors, actuators, computers, , . .) that are co-ordinated by a single “supervisory” controllermay have to be employed.

Power.–Solar photovoltaic power generatorswith nickel-cadmium battery storage are com-monly used in space. Systems employing themtoday cost at least several thousands of dollarsper watt and have useful lifetimes of 10 years orless in orbit. One alternative is a nuclear powerreactor, perhaps of the type now being exploredin the Space Power Advanced Reactor program,but development time and hazards to human be-ings (and perhaps cost) may well preclude theuse of nuclear reactors for inhabited infrastruc-ture in the near future.

Significant cost reduction in photovoltaic arrayshas been achieved using optical focusing devicesthat concentrate sunlight on the photocells, butconsiderable effort would be needed to developand demonstrate practical arrays of this type foruse in space. Coupled with this technique couldbe the use of more efficient solar cells, such asgallium-arsenide, in place of silicon cells. Effortsto increase the lifetime and reduce the mass ofbatteries could also lead to cost reduction. Onepromising replacement for present nickel-cad-mium devices is the nickel-hydrogen battery.Another, at an earlier stage of development, isthe regenerative fuel cell/electrolysis method, inwhich a fuel cell produces electricity and waterwhen in the Earth’s shadow and splits water intohydrogen and oxygen when in sunlight.

Thermal Energy Management.–For infrastruc-ture composed of connected modules, it may notbe practical to use individual thermal control sys-tems for each module. Although individual sys-tems would offer maximum flexibility, such anapproach would prevent heat thrown off fromone module from being used by another, andeach module’s radiator, which is by far the big-gest and most exposed component of the ther-mal system, would impose its own orientationand location constraints on the overall structure.Hence, a centralized, automated system may beneeded both to minimize total mass and to op-timize radiator orientation (i.e., edge to Sun).

38-798 0 - 84 - 5 : QL 3

However, such a system would require both alarge, massive single radiator and considerabletransfer of energy among the various modules viaa heat-transport medium. Therefore, the trade-offs between centralized and modular thermal re-jection systems need to be examined in detail.The centralized system might utilize a gimbaledradiator maintained in an edge-to-Sun orienta-tion, not only maximizing heat dissipation andthereby requiring perhaps a 60-percent smallerarea than a fixed radiator, but also minimizingsolar-wind degradation of its thermal coating.

A conventional separate-tube radiator, similarto that used in the Shuttle, would be extremelycomplex and massive because of the need forredundant piping, valving, and other plumbingcomponents. For a typical 100-kW heat rejectionsystem, a Shuttle-type radiator would requirealmost 6,000 meters (almost 4 miles) of tubingin over 1,500 individual pumped fluid tubes,more than 50 fluid manifolds, and more than 75isolation valves, fluid swivels or flexible linesegments. Hence, a heat pipe radiator may bea better choice. Heat pipes transfer heat by boil-ing a fluid such as ammonia at one end of asealed tube and condensing it at the other. Theliquid is then returned to the hot end by capillary(surface-tension) forces in a specially designedwick which forms part of the tube. The heat pipehas no moving parts, and each pipe is self-con-tained. Single pipes have demonstrated heat re-jection rates up to 2 kW; hence, as few as 50could handle 100 kW of power in space, Whilethe technology is relatively well known, consid-erable development is called for to evolve a prac-tical, reliable, long-life, heat pipe radiator at thispower level.

Another technological challenge would be aninter-module system that transfers thermal energyto a radiator. Shuttle-type pumped-loop systemsusing Freon 21 would consume large amountsof power (up to 5 kW for a 100-kW system), andwould also require the development of large,costly, space-rated pumps and their attendant re-pair and maintenance. A two-phase heat trans-port system using the same principle as the heatpipe would consume only about one-tenth asmuch power. Hence, it may be worth the costof its development.


The use of passive cryogenic coolers for electro-optical detectors will present a difficult techni-cal challenge. Active cryogenic systems are prob-ably not satisfactory for long-term operation. Pas-sive coolers require exposure to dark space andan environment that is free from effluents thatwould condense on the cooler’s cold patch.

Propulsion.— Infrastructure elements requirepropulsion systems for attitude control, orbitchange, station-keeping, and acceleration con-trol. Propulsion systems currently use storable liq-uid mono- and bi-propellant pressure-fed thrust-ers. Near-future plans include cryogenic oxygen/hydrogen propulsion systems. Longer term pros-pects are electromagnetic thrusters including ionrocket (ions can be accelerated to much higherexhaust velocities than those provided by chem-ical rockets) and mass drivers (“buckets” of heavymaterials can be accelerated, very rapidly by elec-trical motors rather than by conventional chem-ical combustion).

A principal challenge will be the creation of astorage and transfer system for handling liquidfuels in space. Specific needs are leak-proof fluidcouplings and leak-detection techniques, fluid-quantity gauges that operate with acceptable ac-curacy in microgravity where conventional liquid-Ievel sensors are not suitable, reusable, low-mass,nontoxic, long-life insulation for cryogenic stor-age and transport, and the liquefaction and refrig-eration systems needed for long-term cryogenicstorage. Improvements in cryogenic refuelingprocedures now used on the surface for Shuttleoperations would be necessary—preferably pro-cedures that would use automation—to obviatethe need for a large technical staff that would bevery expensive to accommodate in space.

Life Support Systems.–Some of the materialsnecessary for the support of humans in spacewould be supplied from Earth, others would berecovered in orbit from metabolic byproducts.With the exception of food, recovery technologydemonstrated since 1967 can provide for oxygen,carbon dioxide scrubbing, and water for bothdrinking and washing. Such a “partially closed”system accommodating an eight-person crew,each drinking about 3.5 kg of water and usingabout a liter of wash water per day, would have

to be resupplied every 90 days and would havea 30-day contingency supply. Compared with theShuttle system, which does not use recovery,almost 7,OOO kg per resupply launch could besaved. If reclaimed water were also used forshowers, and for washing utensils and clothes,thereby replacing “wet wipes,” disposable clothes,and disposable food service utensils, another5,000 kg could be saved for each launch. There-fore, the development cost of such a systemcould be offset by associated transportation sav-ings of over $100 million per year.

Food supply technology will also require somedevelopment, including improvements in packag-ing, preservation, bulk storage, reconstitution,and on-board preparation. Proper sanitation toreduce the incidence of debilitating illness in thecompletely closed environment of a “space sta-tion” will require waste disposal, contaminationcontainment, disease-prevention measures, andheakh-maintenance facilities unique to micro-gravity environments to be developed and used.Some of this technology has already been devel-oped for the long-duration Skylab project, but im-provements are needed. Particular attentionshould be given to the proper design of residen-tial, exercise, and recreational facilities if peopleare to remain in orbit for periods of much longerthan several weeks.

Space Transportation

Vehicles will be needed for transportation be-tween Earth and LEO, between various LEO or-bits, between LEO and higher, including geosta-tionary, orbits, and beyond to the Moon andperhaps to other planets and some asteroids. Inthe near future, supply for a “space station” fromEarth would rely primarily on the present Shut-tle and possibly its derivatives. Local checkoutand maintenance services requiring people work-ing directly in space could be conducted bytethered or free-flying spacesuited astronauts,sometimes augmented by the existing mannedmaneuvering units (MMUs). Servicing of moredistant spacecraft could be accomplished with aplanned orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), pos-sibly in combination with either the Shuttle or aplanned space-based ROTV, or by an ROTV (or


the Shuttle) carrying an astronaut equipped withan MMU.

Launching spacecraft into higher orbits or onEarth-escape trajectories requires the use of anupper stage rocket, which could be automatic,teleoperated, or used with a crew, plus kickstages or planetary landing stages, depending onthe project. ROTVS, either teleoperated or em-ploying crews, could be used to service satellitesin orbits of significantly different altitude andsomewhat different inclination.

Shuttle.-The Shuttle (fig. 2) meets most of thecurrent needs for transportation between the

Figure 2.—Diagram of

Earth’s surface and LEO at any Inclination. TheShuttle can deliver 30,000 kg to a 200-km (120-mile) orbit inclined at 28.5° to the Equator. Anyincrease in orbit altitude or change from this or-bit inclination reduces the payload capacity.However, most payloads are volume-limited bythe cargo bay’s 18-meter length and 4.6-meterdiameter rather than weight-limited. By the early1990s, the earliest date considered practical forobtaining a “space station,” NASA projects a totalof some 24 to 30 Shuttle flights per year, andsome 50 per year by the year 2000. The Shut-tle’s cargo bay could be used to carry infra-structure- elements

Shuttle Mission Profile

.

SOLID ROCKETBOOSTER RECOVERED

A

APPROACH ANDLANDING

56l Civilian Space Statlons and the U.S. Future in Space

its crew of up to seven persons could be usedto assist with any assembly and checkout. TheShuttle could also resupply expendable, ferrypersonnel, and serve for emergency rescue.

Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU).–TheMMU is a backpack equipped with a computer-operated propulsion system that permits an astro-naut to “free fly, ” thereby projecting his senses,his strength and dexterity, and his judgment be-yond the confines of the Shuttle or other habit-able infrastructure out to a few hundred meters.It is a general-purpose device that can be usedfor inspection, servicing and deployment or re-trieval of equipment, for construction and assem-bly operations, for crew rescue, for emergencyrepairs, etc. A Shuttle-based MMU was success-fully demonstrated on two flights in early 1984.

Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV).-Localtransportation in LEO would be provided by theOMV. It would be operated remotely from theShuttle, other space infrastructure, or possiblyfrom Earth. It would be designed to have a six-degree of freedom propulsion system that wouldallow satellite or platform servicing operations atdistances well beyond the MMU’S few-hundred-meter limit. One version of the OMV would beable to make altitude changes of 1,000 km ormore above its initial LEO and orbit plane changesof up to 8°, depending on payload weight.

Basic OMV equipment includes propulsionunits and propellent tanks; television cameras andlights for inspection and operator guidance; com-munications; control systems for remote opera-tions; electric power; thermal control; and variousmanipulators and docking attachments. CurrentNASA plans are to have such a new-technologyvehicle developed and operating in time to beuseful in the deployment and assembly of a“space station.”

Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV)-Up to No-vember 1982, all payloads launched into spacewere carried there by ELVS. There are now threebasic U.S. families of ELVS: the Delta, Atlas-Cen-taur, and Titan III. The European Space Agencyhas its Ariane family of boosters, Japan has itsN-2 (derived from the U.S. Delta) and is devel-oping others, the People’s Republic of China haslaunched a geostationary satellite using its FB-3

“Long March” rocket, and the Soviet Union isoffering to make its Proton launcher commercial-ly available. In addition, several private corpora-tions in the United States and Germany have an-nounced plans to develop ELVS. Many of thesevehicles and possibly others may be availablecommercially throughout the next decade. How-ever, it is not likely that they will be suitable forlaunching spacecraft that carry people, althoughthey could launch supply spacecraft as the Sovi-et Proton boosts the Progress into orbit.

Expendable launch vehicles that can launch tohigh orbits, or to Earth-escape trajectories, useeither their own upper stages or uniquely com-patible orbital transfer vehicles (OTVS). The pay-load itself carries the “kick stage” or other pro-pulsion needed to move from high, inclined,elliptical orbits to geostationary orbits.

Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV).-Areusable, high-performance, liquid propellant“space tug” could provide transportation be-tween LEO and geostationary and lunar orbits,or between Earth orbits of various inclination andaltitude. Reusability and space-basing give prom-ise of economic benefit for the use of an ROTVin launching and servicing communications andother satellites that utilize the geostationary or-bit. An ROTV could be piloted by a crew or re-motely operated.

Development of an “Advanced Space Engine”suitable to power an ROTV has yet to be started.Space-basing implies reusability, of course, aswell as flexibility of thrust and duration of rocketburn, and the ability to refuel and perform main-tenance in space. Thus, space-basing requiressome form of orbital logistics system, includingtanks, pumps, controls, and other equipment forrefueling, people or teleoperator devices to checkout the ROTV, refurbish it as needed, and resetits operating systems for each new trip, and per-haps crew quarters.

Space-basing also requires docking, servicing,and storage facilities in space to make ROTV op-eration possible. Moreover, as fuel for the ROTVmust always be brought from the surface to LEO,alternative ways of transporting it are under con-sideration. More efficient delivery systems thanthe Shuttle, such as a Shuttle-derived tanker vehi-


cle, are being looked at. Scavenging left-over fuelfrom the Shuttle external tank is being given con-sideration. Considerable development time andexpense would be involved in any of these efforts.

A prospect which offers an opportunity for con-siderable propellant savings is to dissipate theROTV’S excess kinetic energy, on return fromhigh altitudes to LEO, by allowing it to dip intothe upper reaches of the Earth’s atmosphere, amaneuver called “aerobraking.” The return flightwould consist of a brief de-orbit burn that wouldplace the ROTV into an elliptical transfer orbit

that intersects the top of the atmosphere. If theROTV could dissipate enough energy to decreaseits velocity by 2,400 meters per second, it wouldhave just enough energy left to raise it to a “spacestation’s” (typical) 300-km orbit. There, it coulddeliver its return payload (if any) and refuel forits next trip. This aerobraking concept promisesa saving of over half of the propellant needed(compared to an all-propulsive ROTV) for a re-turn trip with payload from geostationary Earthorbit.

NASA’S APPROACH TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

“Mission Analysis Studies” Summary

In 1982, as part of NASA’s planning to acquirelong-term inhabited infrastructure, i.e., a civilian“space station, ” the agency authorized “missionanalysis studies” in the United States, and reachedan agreement with foreign countries for parallelstudies, of the desires or needs for, and charac-teristics of, such infrastructure. The results ofthese studies appear in appendix A.

The “mission analysis studies” started with thesupposition that the United States would builda civilian “space station, ” and did not require thepotential user to address either justification of thebasic “space station” concept or its funding. Thestudies were simply to identify uses that eitherwould require or would materially benefit fromthe availability of a “space station” and to sug-gest some of its fundamental characteristics.

Of the several hundred potential activities inscience, commercialization, and technology de-velopment identified by the U.S. companies (pri-marily aerospace) conducting the studies, theselection was narrowed by NASA to a set of about100 time-phased missions for the first 10 yearsof “station” operation, 70 percent of which couldbe accomplished from a central base facility lo-cated in a 28,5° inclination in LEO. Free-flyingplatforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit,could accommodate most of the others.

The contractors viewed activities such as equip-ment servicing, research (especially in the lifesciences and materials processing), and assemblyand modification of large space systems as areasin which presence of a human crew would beparticularly beneficial. They recommended archi-tectural concepts involving several types of mod-ules for the initial central complex: a command/habitability module with accommodations for acrew of four; an electrical power system provid-ing about 25 kW to the users; logistics modulesfor periodic resupply; airlocks, docking ports, andpallets to enable mounting of equipment and lab-oratory modules. Subsequent development andgrowth of the facility over a 10-year period andincorporation of an ROTV and several free-flyingplatforms were anticipated.

Estimation of acquisition costs ranged from ap-proximately $4 billion to $5 billion (1984$) forthe initial facility, to about $12 billion for anevolved complex envisioned as being completed6 to 8 years after the system first became opera-tional. Other than the performance and socialbenefits of such a “space station,” they estimatedthat economic benefits from servicing satellitesin orbit, transfer of satellites to higher orbits byan ROTV, and human-tended long-term researchactivities would be considerable. The increasedability to launch planetary probes, establish alunar settlement, and undertake human explora-

Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure • 59

tion of Mars was considered of great significancein terms of long-range goals.

The foreign mission analysis studies paralleledthose of the U.S. contractors and defined a simi-lar set of space activities appropriate for infrastruc-ture use. All participating agencies from Europe,Canada, and Japan expressed great interest in tak-ing part both in providing elements of space in-frastructure and in actively participating as part-ners in its use. Many of them look upon it asfundamental to their future role in space andtherefore want long-term understandings andagreements with the United States on partici-pation.

NASA assembled the United States and foreignmission analysis reports and held a workshop inMay 1983 to synthesize the results. The workshopestablished a minimum time-phased “missionset” (for the initial decade of use) of 107 specificspace activities, plus four generic commercial-

industrial service activities (e. g., satellite servic-ing). Of the total set, 48 were categorized underscience and applications, 28 under commercial,and 31 under technology-development.

In parallel with the contractor studies, NASAhired two consulting firms to communicate witha variety of non-aerospace companies to iden-tify and encourage interest in the use of in-spacefacilities for commercial purposes. The consult-ants discussed prospects with approximately sOcompanies, and more than 30 expressed activeinterest in using a “space station” if it were avail-able. Most of the companies moving towardagreements with NASA to become active in spaceare well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with anannounced agreement is the 3M Co.), but sev-eral are from the small business sector or Europe.Interest is concentrated on the possible produc-tion of particular chemicals, metals, glass, com-munications, and crystals. Among the half dozencompanies now actively investigating the possi-

80X D.-NASA's Current Aspirations

$ 8 ., , . .


bility of sponsoring space experiments, most aremore interested in crew-tended operations ratherthan automated procedures. Further details of theconsulting firms’ studies are discussed in the finalsection of appendix A.

Infrastructure Functions

The NASA planning process has dependedheavily on the “Mission Analysis Studies” of U.S.and foreign aerospace contractors and foreignspace agencies. From the views assembled there-in, functions were identified for any space in-frastructure (“space station”) that could provideefficient and effective assets and services to sup-port the projected space activities.

NASA’s aspirations for a “space station” weremost recently presented to the Senate Commit-tee on Appropriations in March 1984. The in-frastructure envisioned in their plans would pro-vide the following:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

an on-orbit laboratory supporting researchon a wide range of life, materials, and otherscience topics, and the development of newtechnology (e.g., studies of biology, cosmicrays, processing methods for pharmaceuti-cals and semiconductors, testing of spacematerials, and advanced communicationstechnology);permanent observatories for astronomy andEarth remote sensing (e.g., a solar optical tel-escope to examine the surface of the Sun,a starlab to study the structure of galaxies,and Iidar equipment to probe the at-mosphere);a facility for microgravity materials process-ing and manufacture of products (e.g., phar-maceuticals, semiconductors, glasses, andmetals);servicing of satellites and platforms (e.g., themaintenance or replacement of compo-nents, replenishment of consumables, andexchange of equipment);a transportation hub to assemble, check out,

6.

7.

8.

and launch vehicles (e.g., those carryingcommunications satellites) to geostationaryor other high orbits, and as automated in-terplanetary probes (e.g., a Mars orbiter oran asteroid rendezvous vehicle;an assembly facility for large space structures(e.g., antennas for advanced satellite com-munications systems);a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and sup-plies for use as needed by satellites, plat-forms, vehicles, and people; anda staging base for more ambitious futureprojects-and travel (e.g., a lunar settlementor a human voyage to Mars).

Questions such as the following must be askedrelative to the corresponding functions listedabove:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

How much of an investment do these (andother) capabilities warrant?Is use of a “space station” the optimum wayto accomplish these missions?When will the need for a microgravity pro-duction facility be demonstrated, and howmuch of its cost should its users pay for?What kinds of satellites will be repaired,why, and who will bear the cost?When will the transportation hub be readyand why is it needed then?What is the purpose of the assembly facilityfor the large space structures–and of thelarge space structures themselves?What is the justification for a storage depotin space?When will a staging base be required for alunar settlement or a manned Mars expe-dition?

And, underlying all of these specific questionsis the hazard that too great a commitment to theacquisition of in-space infrastructure, and the re-sulting long-term operations and management ex-penditures, might preempt the adequate supportof other important civilian space activities.

Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 67

REACTIONS OF NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL BOARDS

Other science and engineering organizationshave participated in the study of space infrastruc-ture acquisition. NASA invited the National Re-search Council (NRC) to review its possible utili-zation for space science and applications. (TheNRC is a private organization of distinguishedscientists and engineers operating within the char-ter of the National Academy of Sciences to actas an advisor to the U.S. Government (and others)on science and technology issues. It worksthrough its committees, boards, and institutes,two of which, the Space Science Board (SSB) andthe Space Applications Board (SAB), studied theseissues in workshops during the summer of 1982.)

The Space Science Board concluded that al-most all of the space science research projectsforecast for the next 20 years (a forecast madewithout giving great attention to the possible useof sophisticated in-space infrastructure) could becarried out without the use of a “space station”as then characterized by NASA. These projectscould be carried out by using Shuttle/Spacelab,satellites, interplanetary probes launched with ex-pendable launch vehicles, or contemplated up-per stages compatible with the Shuttle. The SSBstated it was not opposed to a “space station, ”that a decision on it should be made for reasonsbeyond science uses, and that some science in-terests would make use of it if it were available.But the SSB expressed concern that any delaysin launching science payloads that might be im-posed as a consequence of waiting for comple-tion of any “space station” could harm scienceprograms unnecessarily, as the SSB believes hap-pened during the development of the Shuttle(when several programs used up funds for em-ployee salaries and other program costs duringsuch delays),

The Space Applications Board expressed guardedsupport for use of a “space station .“ It indicatedinterest in applications made possible, or mademore efficient, through use of appropriate infra-structure, such as servicing of free-flying plat-forms, launching of geostationary satellites, repair-ing LEO satellites, and serving as a materialsprocessing laboratory. Communications experi-

mentation, especially for large antennas, wasanother likely use in their estimation. The pres-ence of a human crew was deemed desirable,particularly for materials science experiments andfor modification and repair of instruments. TheSAB also concluded that a platform in near-polarorbit would be an important infrastructure com-ponent, to be used for Earth remote sensing ofresources, Earth environmental studies, andocean observations. The capability of the plat-form to merge and process a variety of data priorto transmission to the ground would be an advan-tage compared to independent, unprocessedtransmissions from individual satellites. The SABcautioned that sufficient resources must be madeavailable to develop instruments and payloads foruse on any “space station. ”

Another body examining the role of expandedspace infrastructure was the NASA Solar SystemExploration Committee (SSEC). The SSEC is agroup of the Nation’s outstanding planetary scien-tists directly advising NASA on planetary research.The SSEC, which spent 2 years defining a newU.S. planetary space strategy, looked at theusefulness of any new infrastructure for planetaryexploration. It concluded that, in the near term,the facility could be used beneficially as anassembly and launch base for deep space probeswith potentially important advantages for plane-tary spacecraft requiring large internal propulsionsystems. In the longer term, this could greatly fa-cilitate the return of samples from Mars by pro-viding a fully loaded booster such as a Centaurrocket. A “space station” could also serve as aholding facility for returned samples to alleviateconcerns of their possible contamination of theEarth.

In January 1984, NASA created a 15-memberadvisory panel of academic space scientists that,over a 2-year interval, is expected to give NASAadvice on suitable research projects for long-term,habitable, space infrastructure.

Of related interest to NASA programs, the NRC’sAeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB)conducted a workshop during 1983 on NASA’s


Space Research and Technology Program. Whilenot directly addressing “space station” issues,their report noted the high payoff uses of spacein the communications and meteorology fields,the present speculative nature of manufacturingin space, the high cost of space transportationand systems as an inhibiting factor in the com-mercial use of space, and that, in the face offoreign competition, the United States shouldcontinue to explore and stimulate potential usesof space.

The ASEB urged NASA to provide access tospace for experimental purposes as a natural ex-tension of national aerospace facilities on theEarth’s surface. Overall, the report recommendedthat NASA devote a significant portion of its ef-forts to develop technology that would reducethe cost of spacecraft subsystems, payloads, trans-portation, and operations.

ALTERNATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

Because of the large public costs associatedwith the NASA plans for acquiring in-space in-frastructure, and considering the view of theSpace Science Board (and others) regarding theNASA plans, it is important to explore alterna-tive approaches for providing the desired capa-bilities of such infrastructure. OTA has identifiedseveral alternatives that could provide various ca-pabilities, at various times, and at various initialcosts to the Government. These alternatives in-clude system components that currently exist orare currently under development. OTA has alsoconsidered a gradual approach to infrastructureacquisition with various average annual fundingrates; lower cost alternatives could be used asearly steps in an evolutionary development lead-ing to increasingly sophisticated and capable ar-rays of infrastructure. Each of these approacheshas different implications for initial Governmentcost, life-cycle costs, pace of commercial devel-opment, and the pace for carrying out humanactivities in space.

Uninhabitable Platforms

Regardless of the outcome of the debate overthe need for infrastructure that includes and/orsupports a long-term human presence in space,there is a significant community of users whowould benefit from having uninhabited space fa-cilities and services available to them. A numberof so-called free-flying automated platform alter-natives now exist, are in development, or havebeen conceived, that could take advantage of the

Shuttle or expendable vehicles for launch andservice.

The Shuttle can be used to launch to, and re-turn equipment or other materials from, LEO. Thisability allows for the use of space platforms of-fering electric power, heat rejection, communi-cations, attitude control, and other services to anumber of users. Some time after insertion intoorbit (typically several months to a year), the Shut-tle or an ROTV would rendezvous with such aplatform, and servicing intervals for platform-mounted instruments would be coordinated withthe rendezvous schedule, keeping costs in mind.Payloads could be exchanged, attitude control,fuel and other expendable replenished, batteriescharged, or the platforms could be returned toan LEO base or to Earth. Platforms could avoidcontamination and stability problems associatedwith inhabited infrastructure. The cost of thecommon platform facilities could be amortizedover a long lifetime and a large number of ac-tivities.

Fairchild LEASECRAFT.-The Fairchild LEASE-CRAFT (fig. 4) is designed to support equipmentthat can be exchanged on orbit. This design ap-proach anticipates that the costs (special equip-ment, crew training, etc.) and risks associatedwith performing maintenance and payload modi-fications and substitutions on orbit are outweighedby the saving in transportation cost and improve-ment in spacecraft utilization, which avoids fre-quent launch and return of the platform.


Figure 4.—An Artist’s Conception of a LEASECRAFT Enroute to Orbital Altitude With Payload Attached

LEASECRAFT was inspired by the MultimissionModular Spacecraft (MMS) system on which theLandsat D and Solar Maximum Mission spacecraftare based. It can provide up to 6 kW of powerand other services to user payloads, and is in-tended to serve LEO space projects that includedata acquisition/transmission and materials proc-essing.

Data acquisition activities generally require finepointing and high data rates but relatively mod-est power levels. Materials processing projects,on the other hand, require high power but lowdata rates and relatively coarse pointing. TheLEASECRAFT could be converted from one con-figuration to the other on orbit from the Shuttleor from other inhabited infrastructure.

The LEASECRAFT design includes a centrallymounted propulsion module that contains 2,700kg of hydrazine for transfer from the standardShuttle orbit of about 300 km to an operating

altitude of 480 km. Later it can be returned tothe Shuttle orbit for rendezvous. The total weightof the LEASECRAFT bus is expected to be 6,400kg (including the initial charge of propellant).

The power and other services provided by theLEASECRAFT are dependent on the number andtype of its modules. Details of how module andpayload changes will be handled will depend onlessons learned from the Solar Max repair. Pos-sibilities include the manipulation of tools by theRemote Manipulator System (RMS), spacewalk-ing outside the Shuttle cargo bay by payloadspecialists, and retrieval of the LEASECRAFT bythe RMS to a position in the cargo bay wherepayload specialists would perform the workneeded.

An automated electrophoresis payload beingdeveloped by McDonnell Douglas is frequentlymentioned in conjunction with the LEASECRAFT.It will consist of an electrophoretic processing fa-

. —


cility and a separate supply module having a com-bined weight of some 10,000 kg. The process-ing unit will use 3.5 kW of power and will requirean acceleration environment of less than 0.1 per-cent of gravity on Earth.

Another prospective payload for the LEASE-CRAFT system is NASA’s Advanced X-Ray Astron-omy Facility (AXAF). AXAF is a 9,000-kg telescopethat will operate in a 500-km orbit, require 1.2kW of power, and periodic change of imagingand spectrographic instruments.

The LEASECRAFT’s ability to accommodatespecific payloads is very similar to that of the highpower version of EURECA (see below), with oneimportant exception: the higher data handlingability of LEASECRAFT would allow it to accom-modate most science and applications instru-ments. It would not accommodate some instru-ment projects that are very large, or those thatrequire human involvement.

The initial LEASECRAFT reportedly will cost atleast $150 million (1984$) apiece to purchase.Users may also purchase partial services ofLEASECRAFT or lease an entire platform fromFairchild for $20 million to $40 million (1984$)per year. Transportation costs will include initiallaunch of the LEASECRAFT and its payload andother payloads that, subsequently, are taken toit for exchange.

Boeing MESA.–The Modular ExperimentalPlatform for Science and Applications (MESA) isa low-cost satellite system designed by Boeing forlaunch on the Ariane. The MESA design followsfrom Boeing small spacecraft designs and produc-tion of the last decade. This includes three space-craft known as S-3 for the Department of De-fense, two Applications Explorer Modules (AEMs)for NASA, and the Viking Spacecraft being pro-duced today for the Swedish Space Corp.

The MESA program utilizes existing hardwareand previous experience to achieve a low-costplatform for modest payloads that do not requirerecovery, and for special cases that do requirerecovery.

An interesting feature of the MESA system inits Viking configuration is that it duplicates the

Ariane structural interface on its top side, whichenables it to share a launch by fitting betweenthe Ariane and the primary payload. This use ofresidual launch capacity can reduce the cost oftransportation to orbit.

The total mass of the MESA/Viking platform issome 500 kg. The design of the platform providesfor attitude control and propulsion. Once the Vik-ing separates from the main satellite after launch,the propulsion unit can boost the Viking into itsoperational orbit. The spacecraft is spin stabilizedat 3 rpm, and Earth/Sun sensors and magnetictorquers are elements of the attitude control sys-tem. A combination of solar arrays and a batteryprovide 60 W of average power with a peak pow-er of 120 W.

Limited changes can be made in solar array sizeand power output. The overall diameter of theMESA with payload cannot exceed the 2.95-me-ter internal diameter of the Ariane’s payload com-partment. The central core of the platform is de-signed to accommodate both platform (420 kg)and payload weights (0o kg for the design refer-ence) and up to nearly 2,OOO kg of host satelliteweight during Ariane launch. The available vol-ume for the payload is 1.6 cubic meters (m J).Should the solid-propellant rocket motor not berequired, an additional internal volume of ap-proximately 0.6 m3 would be available for pay-load use.

MESA is limited in its applicability because ofits small size, limited resources, the use of spinstabilization, and the intention to have the pay-load integrated within the structure. This makesit best suited to small, scanning or nonviewing,dedicated activities. While suited for some spaceplasma physics or cosmic ray investigations, thespin stabilization is not appropriate for micrograv-ity activities. MESA will accommodate only asmall fraction of the science and applicationsprojects identified in NASA’s Mission AnalysisStudies.

MESA is reported to cost $10 million (1984$).Transportation charges on the Ariane are uncer-tain since it can share a launch with another pay-load. If it is carried in the Shuttle, it should qualifyfor the minimum charge of $12.5 million (1984$).

Ch. 3—Space Infrastructure ● 6 5

Photo ” Boeing Aerospace

The Boeing MESA spacecraft undergoing ground processing.


Shuttle Payload Support Structure (SPSS).–An example of a structure supporting payloadsthat remain attached within the Shuttle cargo bayis the SPSS that has been developed for NASA.Teledyne Brown expects to commercialize SPSSduring 1985. It will provide a mount, electricalpower, data handling, and environmental con-trol for payloads weighing up to 1,400 kg.

Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF).–Aplatform housing 57 experiments, many of themseeking to record how manmade materials holdup in the LEO environment, was released fromthe Shuttle in April 1984. The 10,000 kg-satellite,called the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF),will be retrieved by the Shuttle in 1985. The LDEF,basically a free-flying support structure for scien-tific experiments, cost $14 million (1 984$), notincluding launch and retrieval.

Pleiades Concept.–A concept to expand theuse of platforms for space science research hasbeen proposed by students in a 1983 systems en-gineering course at Stanford University. In thisconcept (called “pleiades”), a platform locatedin the Shuttle cargo bay would provide data proc-essing and other support for several co-orbitingfree flyers equipped for long-term astrophysicsresearch. Periodic servicing would be feasiblefrom the Shuttle. If developed, it might becomea permanent space infrastructure element.

Space Industries’ Platform.-A free-flying per-manent industrial space facility (lSF), designed pri-marily for materials processing, has been pro-posed by a new commercial space company,Space Industries, Inc. (fig. 5). An automated plat-form suited for production purposes, it could beplaced in LEO by the Shuttle and serviced sev-eral times a year by it and/or any eventual long-term space infrastructure. The ISF would includea pressurized volume where equipment could beserviced by a crew during resupply periods; thefacility, however, would provide no life supportfunctions when occupied other than a suitableatmosphere compatible with the Shuttle or ROTV,to which it is expected to be attached duringthese periods.

Assuming successful financing, the facility couldbe placed in operation in the late 1980s. No costfigures have been made public, but some indus-

try sources estimate that it would cost some hun-dreds of millions of dollars to develop and con-struct.

MBB SPAS.–The concept of a Shuttle-tendedplatform was tested, to a limited degree, with theSpace Pallet Satellite (SPAS) payloads during twoShuttle flights. SPAS was developed at the initia-tive of the German company Messerschmitt-Bol-kow-Blohm (MBB). Its structure is constructed outof graphite epoxy tubes to form a modular trussbridge that spans the Shuttle cargo bay in widthand fits that length dimension for which a mini-mum launch charge is made by NASA. The struc-ture provides mounting points for subsystem andexperiment hardware and includes a grapple fix-ture for handling by the Remote Manipulator Sys-tem, i.e., the Shuttle arm. The SPAS is designedto operate in either a Shuttle-attached mode oras a free-flying platform, and it was released dur-ing the seventh Shuttle flight to operate in the lat-ter mode for about 10 hours before retrieval. Inthat operation it provided the first opportunityto demonstrate the Shuttle’s ability both to de-ploy and retrieve a satellite. The SPAS payloadremained in the cargo bay during the 10th Shut-tle flight, where it successfully handled equip-ment for several commercial users.

Having only battery power and compressed gasthrusters, the initial SPAS is designed for short-Iifetime projects (7 to 15 days), but subsequentversions could undoubtedly extend the lifetimeby incorporating solar photovoltaic arrays andpropellant-type thrusters, and maybe even a kickmotor to achieve a wider range of orbits and/orto be able to return to a Shuttle-compatible or-bit for rendezvous. In its present form, SPAS willonly accommodate relatively small, low-powerinstruments used for short periods of time.

The basic SPAS platforms costs less than $1 mil-lion (1984$); subsystem equipment required byspecific payloads is not included. SPAS is de-signed to qualify for the minimum Shuttle launchcharge of $12.5 million (1984$) but, with a largepayload, it may exceed this qualification.

EURECA.–The European Space Agency (ESA)is developing a small unmanned platform carrierthat would be released from the Shuttle and re-trieved after free flights in space of 6 to 9 months.

.— — —


Figure 5.—A Free-Flying Permanent Industrial Space Facility

Initial Operating Configuration

‘ - - -

Four ISF Module Configuration

. .

---

Two ISF Module Configuration

ISF Docked to NASA’’ Space Station’

G

E p R b C UR CA d p C h Up h g d d h p p g m w EURECA d p h p p d w d b

m p b h o d d w h pp db k p m d m ph dE p p p m h g m

A g h d pm m EURECAw b q pp d w h b pop g h EUR CA g m b 0 m om h

m h d d 98 d d h m d b OOkm h op g EUR CA d p dw db g d b p 600 km w m h g d p d h pp d h K d g b d d w h h

Ch. 3—Space /infrastructure Ž 69

Shuttle. The ability to fly from the Shuttle to auseful orbit and back for rendezvous with theShuttle is typical of most space platform concepts.

The EURECA will have a payload capacity ofabout 1,100 kg with the combined carrier andpayload weighing approximately 3,500 kg. Thetotal length of the carrier/platform, plus itspayloads, in the Shuttle’s cargo bay will be 2.3meters, with an option for a shorter length of 1.6meters if desired.

Energy for EURECA will be provided by deploy-able and retractable solar arrays that will initiallydeliver 5.4 kW of power at 28 volts. Of this out-put, 1 kW will be available to the payload on acontinuous basis, while much of the balance willbe required to charge the batteries that supplypower when sunlight is not available.4 The powersupply for EURECA and its payload will be cooledusing a fluid loop connected to a radiator.

EURECA payload and housekeeping data willbe relayed to Europe via circuits employing theL-Sat communications satellite as a test. Thetelemetry system will normally use ground sta-tions in Europe, but it will also be compatible withthe Shuttle. The maximum data rate that can beprocessed on the ground by the proposed sys-tem is 2.5 kbps, although the on board system willbe capable of transmitting up to 1 Mbps.

Size, mass, capacity, and data handling abilityare the most stringent EURECA design constraints.If the data rate is restricted to 2.5 kbps, only filmcameras can be accommodated. But if the full1 Mbps data rate can be utilized, many scienceand applications instruments can be accommo-dated. However, large, high power, or high datarate payloads, such as telescopes, radars, Iidars,multispectral scanners, or a combination of theseor other instrument payloads cannot be accom-modated. Increasing the available power levelalone does not significantly improve the abilityto accommodate such payloads, since scienceand applications instruments that require highpower (e.g., remote sensing radars) also tend tohave high data rate requirements (tens to hun-dreds of Mbps).

4More power would be available for payload use if it proves pos-sible to operate the platform in a Sun-synchronous dawn-dusk or-bit where it does not enter the Earth’s shadow.

The cost of EURECA has not been clearly stated,although ESA has referred to a program cost of$170 million (1984$) that appears to include somepayload costs.

Plans are also being developed for EURECA 11,an advanced version having increased power andpayload capacity. The new design will allowspace-basing and equipment exchange on-orbit,using the Shuttle or a yet-to-be-developed Arianeautomatic docking system.

SOLARIS.-This French concept includes pre-liminary designs for an automated platform. Itwould be unmanned, located in LEO, and woulduse furnaces, a robot manipulator arm, solarpower, and other subsystems. Ariane 4 wouldlaunch a transfer and supply stage, and a ballisticreentry capsule will bring processed materialsback to Earth.

The first generation facility would have the fol-lowing major elements:

● The Orbital Service Module (OSM), whichis a user-shared platform with docking portsfor payloads and transport vehicles.

● An in-orbit Transport Modular Vehicle (TMV)for resupply, transport, and servicing ofspace payloads.

● A Data Relay Satellite CommunicationsSystem for control and high data rate trans-missions.

. The Ariane 4 launcher.

The intent is to fly the OSM in a circular “Sun-synchronous” orbit following a path over the twi-light line, thus avoiding the Earth’s shadow andthereby achieving a relatively high 10 kW of con-tinuous power output for its users. Activities suchas materials processing, microwave Earth obser-vation, and assembly and check-out of large ve-hicles in orbit are envisioned. The orbit altitudecould be adjusted from 600 to 1,000 km. Twodocking ports would be available for TMV berth-ing, with five ports for payloads. Data transmis-sion rates would not exceed 400 Mbps. The en-tire OSM weight would be 4,500 kg (excludingpropellant).

The function of the TMV is to provide transpor-tation service between the Ariane delivery orbitand the OSM, and to permit the return of a lim-

38-798 0 - 84 - 6 : QL 3


ited amount of equipment and products to Earth.The TMV will consist of an expendable modulewith propulsion, attitude and trajectory control,and the ability to rendezvous and dock.

The TMV can be used in either one-way orround-trip service. For one-way service the pay-load would be attached directly to the TMV mod-ule, and both would be placed inside the fairingof the Ariane 4 for launch. A 5,000-kg payloadcould be accommodated in this manner.

Round-trip service requires the use of a reen-try vehicle similar to the Apollo reentry module.The TMV module is attached to the reentry bodyfor launch in a manner similar to the arrangementfor a one-way payload, and the two are separatedduring reentry. About 2,500 kg and 15 m3 of pay-load could be accommodated within the reen-try vehicle; it could touch down on either landor water and is designed for reuse.

The first generation SOLARIS concept is func-tionally similar to the science and applicationsspace platform studied by NASA, except thatSOLARIS specifies a dawn-dusk Sun-synchronousorbit. This orbit restricts its usefulness for manyEarth-viewing projects that require lighting fromthe Sun. However, radars, Iidars, and some mi-crowave instruments can “see” in the dark andwould not be affected, while solar-viewing in-struments wouId gain the advantage of continu-ous visibility of the Sun. The ability of SOLARISto support large, multiple instrument facilitiesshould allow for accommodation of most of thesolar physics payloads. However, a continuousfull Sun orbit would be a problem for many celes-tial-viewing instruments that depend on Earthshadow to eliminate scattered light from the Sun.All automated life science activities and allmaterials processing, except for those requiringhuman presence, could be accommodated.

The orbit of SOLARIS is not suited to launch,retrieval, or servicing of low inclination satellites(including geostationary satellites), since a largeorbit plane change is required. And, since mostSun-synchronous satellites are not in dawn-duskorbits, a “latitude drift” would be required toservice them. Some studies consider satelliteassembly and service to be a major role for a

“space station”; SOLARIS would be able to ac-commodate only a small fraction of this market.

Costs of the evolutionary SOLARIS programhave not been defined, but they likely would beseveral billions of dollars (1984$) if the entire con-cept is developed.

Habitable Infrastructure

Although uninhabited platforms can be usedto support many experiments and commercialprocesses that do not require human presence,and some activities require a stability that wouldbe difficult to achieve if humans were present,other activities require or can be greatly aidedby human presence. These include life sciencestudies of humans in space, which are necessaryto prepare for long duration human travel inspace, and interactive experimentation in mate-rials processing (e.g., pharmaceuticals, semicon-ductors, crystals), which is required in order toexplore the commercial potential of materialsprocessing.

A number of infrastructure elements other thanthe proposed NASA “space station” are availablethat can support humans in space.

Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO).–A majorconstraint on the duration of the on-orbit timefor the Shuttle is the availability of electricalpower. The current Shuttle power system usesthree fuel cell powerplants fed by cryogenicallystored hydrogen and oxygen, and delivers 21 kWon a continuous basis, of which 14 kW is allo-cated to the Shuttle itself and 7 kW is availablefor payloads. The fuel cells are fed from tank sets(one hydrogen and one oxygen tank in each set)located under the floor lining in the Shuttle cargobay. Three tank sets are considered standardequipment. Two additional sets (for a total of five)can be installed with no volume penalty to pay-loads, but with a combined weight penalty (fullyfueled) of 1,500 kg. The full complement of fivetanks will provide a stay time of 8 days if the full7-kW payload allocation is drawn upon continu-ously. Where little payload power is drawn, asmight be the case for satellite repair or remote


sensing activities, the stay time could be as muchas 12 days.

One obvious approach to extending the staytime is to add more tank sets. One such conceptresults in a stay time of 15 to 22 days, againdepending on power consumption, by loadinga four-tank-set carrier into the cargo bay. Sucha carrier would shorten the usable length of thecargo bay by some 2 meters out of 18, and re-sult in a 3,700-kg decrease in payload capacity.Extension of this approach to even longer dura-tions has a practical limit because of the volumeand weight capacity lost, and the limited storagelifetime of cryogens.

A 20-day stay time with 7 kW of power con-sumed by the payload, or up to 26 days if lesspower is consumed, can be achieved by usinga solar array in conjunction with the five stand-ard cryogenic tank sets. In one concept, the solararray would deliver 18 kW in sunlight, and thefuel cells would deliver 3 kW makeup power fora total 21 kW. During orbital eclipse of the solararray, the fuel cells would supply the full 21 kw.The RMS could deploy the array underneath theShuttle, to avoid interference with the power sys-tem heat radiator and the field of view from thecargo bay. A previously proposed Power Exten-sion Package (PEP) was identical in concept butwas sized to provide 15 kw, instead of the nor-mal 7 kw to payloads. The payload weight pen-alty for these concepts, including tank sets, is esti-mated at 2,300 to 2,700 kg. The cost to modifyone Shuttle was estimated to be $100 million to$200 million (1984$). Spacelab would have beenthe principal beneficiary of the PEP, but theplanned flights of Spacelab were judged to be notfrequent enough to justify the expenditure.

To achieve stay times well beyond 20 days re-quires some radical changes in the power system,but the Shuttle could be designed for essentiallylimitless duration as far as power is concerned.Batteries would be used for power during Shut-tle eclipse, and operation of the existing fuel cellswould be limited to launch, reentry, or emergen-cies. The fuel cell reactants would be stored atambient temperature and high pressure, therebyeliminating the storage lifetime constraint asso-ciated with cryogens. A 48-kW solar array would

be required to provide power to recharge the bat-teries in sunlight; this power would be in additionto the basic 21 kW needed for Shuttle and pay-load power. The weight penalty for such a powersubsystem is estimated to be about 3,200 kg.

Modifications are required in other areas aswell. Flash evaporators that are currently usedto supplement radiator heat rejection requirelarge amounts of water in some attitudes, and tominimize reliance on them it would be neces-sary to increase the capacity of the radiators. Withregard to habitability, water tanks must be addedto compensate for water that is no longer gener-ated by fuel cells and a regenerative CO2 systemwould be required. Furthermore, for 15- to 30-day durations, the Shuttle habitable volume isonly adequate to marginal for a crew of four. Areconfiguration of the mid-deck, recommendedfor 30- to 60-day durations on orbit, includesmoving the airlock to the cargo bay. A Spacelabmodule would also be added to provide suchcrew amenities as a shower and an exercise andoff-duty area as well as increased work area.

Among the activities which an EDO would beexpected to support is satellite servicing. TheShuttle can reach a wide range of orbit inclina-tions and LEO altitudes, and the cargo bay, withits RMS and space for supplies and other supportequipment, seems well suited for this type of ac-tivity. The technical feasibility of repairing satel-lites from the Shuttle was demonstrated on theSolar Maximum Mission Satellite in April 1984.With the Shuttle launch charges alone projectedto be as much as $100 million for a dedicatedflight before the end of the decade, the prospectof sharing a launch for this purpose along withother payloads and/or activities is a significant fac-tor in the economic viability of such an operation.

In theory, with on-orbit infrastructure servingas an operations and distribution center, a Shut-tle destined for it could carry not only suppliesand equipment for the operation at hand butcould be loaded with payloads and supplies tobe left in space. Subsequent transfers to free-flyers, for instance, could then be accomplishedwith a lighter, more energy-efficient proximity-operations vehicle in contrast to the relativelymassive Shuttle. The premise is that the saving


to be realized by utilizing the launch capacity ofthe Shuttle more effectively would, over time,more than offset the cost of the on-orbit infra-structure specifically designed to handle equip-ment and supplies. It is not clear to what extentthe on-orbit infrastructure operations costs (bothon-orbit and ground-support) are included inanalyses of such operations. It is also not clearhow total costs (facilities and operations) wouldbe allocated among all users of a shared “spacestation” to establish the economic viability of anyparticular activity such as satellite repair andservicing.

Finally, an EDO could function as an observa-tory and a laboratory. There are adequate accom-modations in the aft flight deck to control andmonitor an observing payload such as one con-taining a large telescope. The Shuttle has no pro-vision for laboratory operations beyond the ac-commodations available in the mid-deck lockersand, on some early flights, the main galley area.However, a Spacelab module, discussed in thefollowing section, could be added to provide ashirt-sleeve working environment in the cargobay. One drawback is that Spacelab consumesnearly half of the available 7 kW of payload pow-er. Thus, electrical power for experiments wouldrequire careful management, and a more capa-ble power system would be desirable for an EDO.

An EDO is estimated to cost about $2 billion(1984$) for the basic Shuttle, $300 million (1984$)for an upgraded habitation module similar toSpacelab, and $200 million (1984$) for the PEP.The full Shuttle launch cost would be incurredfor each flight.

Spacelab.–The Shuttle carried Spacelab intoorbit for its maiden flight in November 1983.Spacelab is a set of hardware that converts thecargo bay into a general-purpose laboratory forconducting science, applications, and technol-ogy investigations. It was financed and builtjointly by ESA in close cooperation with NASA,providing a convenient means for working witha collection of experiments in a shirt-sleeve LEOlaboratory environment. It augments the Shuttleservices for powering, pointing, cooling, and con-

trolling experiment hardware and for data handl-ing and transmission to Earth.

Spaceiab is composed of two primary buildingblocks: modules and pallets. The module is a can-Iike pressure vessel approximately 4 meters indiameter that provides a shirt-sleeve workingenvironment for the crew and rack accommoda-tions for experiment hardware. The module con-sists of two end cones and one or two center sec-tions (each 2.7 meters long). It may be used ineither its long form (7.0 meters) or short form (4.3meters) and may be flown alone or in combina-tion with one or more pallets. The pallets are U-shaped structures 3 meters long that span the car-go bay and provide mounting for instruments thatare to be exposed to the space environment. pal-lets may be flown individually or tied togetherin trains. For pallet-only projects, the computersand other subsystem elements normally carriedin the module are housed in an “igloo” that canbe attached to the forward pallet, The Spacelabhardware set also includes an Instrument Point-ing Subsystem (IPS) capable of high-accuracypointing for clusters of small instruments or alarge telescope.

While both pallets and modules can be consid-ered for use as independent space infrastructure,in its present form Spacelab is totally dependenton the Shuttle for its resources. Specifically, theShuttle provides 7 to 12 kW of electrical power,8 to 12 kW of cooling, data handling and datacommunication at rates of up to 50 megabits persecond. Further, the Shuttle provides oxygen re-plenishment, and serves as both a crew residenceand a safe haven under emergency conditions.Spacelab depends on these resources to providea safe, stable laboratory environment.

Several stages in the evolution of the Space-Iab module beyond the current generation havebeen studied, moving from complete depend-ence on, and attachment to, outside support ele-ments, to relatively independent operation as afree-flyer that is resupplied every 6 months or soby the Shuttle or an OMV.

Spacelab With an EDO.–One version of theSpacelab that would be carried by an EDO uti-lizing a PEP, was studied by ESA in collaborationwith NASA, The electrical and heat rejection sys-


Figure 6.— Major Spacelab Elements

MODULE

terns would be modified to handle increasedpower, and the command and data managementsystem wouId be modernized. Since two Space-Iab modules are now owned by NASA, additionalcosts would involve only the modifications andlaunch costs.

Spacelab as an Attached Module.–Anotherversion would see the Spacelab used as a labora-tory component of a “space station.” The modulewould be lengthened to provide a greater shirt-sleeve volume for more experiments and people,but in this case other connected infrastructureelements would replace the Shuttle as a supportsystem. Either an existing NASA Spacelab modulecould be used for this purpose, or an additionalmodule could be provided at a cost of $300 mil-lion (1984$).

Spacelab as a Free-Flyer.–A third version isthat of Spacelab as an inhabited free-flyer. Thiswould require the development of a dedicatedservice module that would provide the types ofresources currently provided by the Shuttle.

For attitude control, there are a number of pos-sible candidate systems which could be adopted.In Europe, for example, there is the ESA ModularAttitude Control (MAC) system, which is designedfor general satellite application. This subsystemis in prototype form, and hardware tests are u riderway at present. Electrical power and cooling pro-visions would be required, as part of the dedi-cated services module, in the form of solar ar-rays, batteries, and a heat radiator with a coolingfluid loop. It is possible that the increased-capac-ity (12 kW) solar arrays under development byESA, together with the ESA radiator, would besuitable. Command and data handling could besatisfied by commercial computer technology.Oxygen supply for the free-flying Spacelab couldbe handled by using the nitrogen tanks that arealready available in Spacelab. However, for longdurations on orbit, additional provision for ox-ygen supply would be necessary, which mightpossibly take the form of a water electrolysis sys-tem (as yet undeveloped). For crew habitation,the developed Spacelab free-flying module would


Figure 7.–Shuttle-Spacelab Flight Profile

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need to be based on a two-segment-long moduleas a minimum (7.0 meters), or preferably a three-segment-long module (1 O meters), in order toprovide the necessary volume for sleeping, foodpreparation and consumption, waste disposal, ex-ercise and recreational equipment, and commod-ity stowage. Crew-supported experiment and lab-oratory activities could be accommodated in aSpacelab-derived two-segment module, con-nected to the habitation moduIe by an airlock;it would contain the necessary laboratory equip-ment and Spacelab-derived racks. The use of twomodules connected via an airlock would providethe basis for a necessary safe haven in the eventof a major failure in, or of, either module.

The use of two Spacelab-derived modules,combined with the associated dedicated service

module, could provide long-duration infrastruc-ture for human and automatic operations inspace. An intermediate step in this directionwould be the development of a two-segmentSpacelab-derived module, coupled with a dedi-cated service module. The cost of such a devel-opment (designed for Shuttle resupply every 90days) could be some $400 million (1984$). Thetwo-module development costs would be consid-erably greater than for a one-moduIe configura-tion, perhaps approaching $800 million (1984$).

To put the size of a Spacelab-derived free-flyerinto perspective, it is interesting to compare thefacilities described above to the Skylab facilitywhich was orbited 10 years ago. A three-segmentSpacelab module has roughly the same externaldimensions as the Apollo Command and Serv-


ice Module’s propulsion/resource system plusreentry vehicle, that part of the Apollo transpor-tation system that rendezvoused with Skylab. TheSkylab Orbital Workshop (OWS) provided pri-mary habitation and work space 6.7 meters in di-ameter by 8.2 meters long or about 280 m3 ofvolume. Thus, the volumes enclosed by the two-and three-segment-long modules contain 25 and40 percent, respectively, of the habitable volumeof the OWS, and together would total just 70 per-cent of the OWS volume. In addition to the OWS,some Skylab control and utility functions werehoused in the airlock module and the MultipleDocking Adapter. Because of the dimensions ofthe Shuttle cargo bay, a number of ShuttleLaunches would be required to build up a Space-Iab-based infrastructure on a scale equal toSkylab.

The free-flying Spacelab could accommodateany payload currently envisaged for the Space labmodule on the Shuttle. Some life science facilityconcepts now being studied use a dedicatedSpacelab module as their basic structure. All lifesciences studies could probably be performed;high-temperature furnaces for material process-ing may require higher power and cooling thatcould, if necessary, be provided by additionalpower modules. Commercial production facilitiesare not yet clearly defined, but if such produc-tion proves to be desirable, additional power andSpacelab modules could be added, if necessary,to accommodate it. A small fraction of the Earthor celestial-viewing instruments could utilize thescientific airlock or window of Spacelab, but thisis a cumbersome way to handle such instruments.The only advantage of the Spacelab window orscientific airlock over a permanent external mount-ing position is easier access to the instrument,while the disadvantages include limited space,restricted field of view, and the necessity to han-dle the instrument whenever it is installed. How-ever, viewing instruments could be installed andoperated on one or more co-orbiting platforms.

Spacelab could serve as an operations controlcenter for other space activities. Properly equipped,it could accommodate 100 percent of this func-tion, although, depending on the number ofactivities conducted, more than one Spacelabmodule might be needed. The characteristics of,

and the problems associated with, exchangingequipment in the Spacelab module indicate thatits best use might be as a dedicated life and/ormaterials science laboratory, or as an in-spacecontrol center.

The idea of developing and using. existingSpacelab hardware for long duration humanactivities in space remains attractive in view ofthe maturity of the system building blocks. Limita-tions of the free-flying Spacelab concept, how-ever, may be significant. As an example, it wouldbe difficult to develop an efficient closed-loop lifesupport system.

Spacelab as free-flyer, including a utilitiesmodule based on EURECA, has been estimatedto cost $1 billion (1984$). Transportation costswould include an initial full Shuttle launch andsubsequent supply and transport services via theShuttle. An automatic docking service could bedeveloped for resupply by expendable launchvehicles, but the cost of such a development isuncertain.

Columbus.–The Germans and Italians haveproposed to ESA that the Columbus project, usingSpacelab modules as components of a more ex-tensive infrastructure, should become the ESAcontribution to the U.S. “space station” program.

The plan, including three steps or phases, be-gins with a Spacelab module attached to a U.S.“space station, ” providing laboratory workspaceand deriving life support, power, attitude con-trol, and other services from the parent “station. ”A second step (fig. 8) is an independent free-flyingSpacelab with power, attitude control, and mod-est life support supplied by a service module fash-ioned after the EURECA platform. It would re-quire direct resupply by the Shuttle or an OMV,provide laboratory workspace, and allow tendingby a crew for up to 8 hours at a time. A third stepwould add another Spacelab one-segment mod-uIe, with propulsion, to be used as a crew trans-port and servicing vehicle which might also beable to accommodate a small crew for short peri-ods at the laboratory. By servicing the free-flyer,it would enable the Columbus module to oper-ate autonomously for a few months at a time. Thislast phase is projected in Columbus program liter-ature for possible implementation near the end


Figure 8.—An Artist’s Conception of a Free-Flying Pressurized Module Withan Attached Resource Module (second phase of Columbus concept)


of this century. Cost estimates for a Columbusproject are not yet available.

NASA Minimum Cost “Space Station. ”-Astudy regarding a “space station” that would min-imize costs by using Spacelab modules was per-formed at the NASA Marshall Space Center andwas reported in 1982. It would provide soundand useful infrastructure, but would be of rela-tively modest dimensions in comparison withNASA’s present aspirations. It would include ahabitat module, a separate safe haven for emer-gencies, and a support systems module. It wouldbe launched by the Shuttle and would have 1 kwof power and a scientific workspace. Later,another support system module and a dockingadaptor would be attached, providing for thelong-term support of three persons, an experi-ment module, pressurized and unpressurized ex-periment ports, gyroscopic attitude control, com-munications and data handling, and 6 kw ofnominal user power. According to the NASAstudy, the cost of this facility would be $2 billionto $2.5 billion (1984$), assuming the use of anexisting Spacelab module already in the in-ventory.

Shuttle as permanent Infrastructure. -In thediscussion of the EDO, it was shown how rela-tively modest changes to the existing Shuttle vehi-cle could result in 20- to 25-day on-orbit staytimes while more extensive modifications couldmake 30- to 60-day stay times attainable. A con-cept has been proposed by one Mission Analy-sis Study contractor group that would have ma-jor Shuttle and its external tank assemblies carriedinto orbit together to form permanent infrastruc-ture. The basic Shuttle would be stretched to add30 feet to the cargo bay and would be utilizedwithout the wings, tail, and thermal protectionsubsystem. The main engines and the OMS engineswould remain in place. The crew compartmentwould be stripped to make room for a controlmodule. A command module would be locatedin the cargo bay. Major external tank modifica-tions would include a power module with solararrays which would mount on the nose, and awraparound radiator for thermal control.

The Shuttle and its external tank also would usethe Shuttle solid rocket boosters for launching asis the case for the conventional Shuttle. Upon itsreaching orbit, the solar arrays would be de-ployed, the cargo bay doors would be opened,and the command module would be rotated intoan upright position, thereby freeing the cargo bayfor use in servicing and staging operations. Asubsequent Shuttle launch could deliver a habit-ability module, logistics module, and crew.

The use of a basic Shuttle in this fashion wouldallow the very rapid acquisition of infrastructureable to serve as a habitable “space station” fora relatively low development cost.

Shuttle External Tank (ET) .-Application of theET as an infrastructure element is intriguing be-cause of its large size, because it achieves a near-orbital velocity during normal Shuttle launchoperations, and because it “comes free of extracost” to orbit. As a result, several aerospace com-panies have studied the ET for possible use onorbit.

The ET has an interior pressurized volume ofsome 2,OOO m 3 in the form of two separatetanks—one for hydrogen, the other for oxygen.

In present Shuttle launch operations, the ETseparates from the Shuttle and reenters the atmos-phere after main engine cutoff. On average, atseparation from the Shuttle, the ET still containsabout 4,500 kg of liquid O2 and H2. The chal-lenge is to identify practical methods of salvag-ing the tank and scavenging these residual pro-pellants.

The ET in orbit, initially viewed as a construc-tion shed and distribution center, might serve asa mounting structure for telescopes, large anten-nas, large solar power collectors, and experimentpallets, or it could be used as a component ofinhabited infrastructure, in which case it wouldneed windows and entry hatches. The most ob-vious use for the ET is for on-orbit fuel storage.This requires the least on-orbit modification,but assumes that the techniques and equipmentneeded to scavenge leftover fuel from the Shut-tle and to store it for long periods in space are

.


The addition of a free-flyi~g’SPAS platform, at a ctwt of $(h~ b@i~n {1,~$) would increase the

science/applications uses by three. Other platforms suc!h a~ k4ESAj lXA3ECRAFf or EURECA could alsobe added. For example, the use of three EURECAS, wh[dhcould be purchased at a cost of $0.6 billion(1984$) or leased annually at a fraction of this cost, would increase science/applications uses by lo.(In addition, while the system as described here would rtot serve as an assembly/launch platform, 9out of 10 projected solar system probes could be designed ~ be launched with upper stages from theShuttle.) “,,., , ,

in summav, a “USA Salyut” that approximates the, S@i~ SaIyut 7 could be assembled using e=n-

tially existing or currently underdevelopment technol~g Iie;;,Spacelab modths and a service modulecomposed of EURECA or LEASECRAFT-type power ad at!t\t@&”ccmttol% With the added cost of sever-al free-flying platforms, it could support most of the ‘Wiend@~~d applications experiments and aboutone-third of the commercial and technology developwnt-adities’ now described by NASA as requir-ing long-term space infrastructure. Anwhg the sciene~ a@@@ it cdt)ld not support are what NASAdescribes as the Latge Deployable Reflector, Mars %~@h:@!tum, I!atth Wiences Research Platform,and Experimental Geosynchronous Communications l%t@i!ti. Operationally, the size, power, and portcapabilities of the infrastructure would mean the pace@ rg#@%h And ckwelopment work would neces-sarily be less than half as rapid as with the NASA”pro#m@~@ swce infr=tructure. [f sta~ed in 1985,it could be operational by about 1990 # a -t of rw~ly, $2 biilion (1984$).

. .Of course, any design aimed speclft~liy t@yard CjJr#@-~&@I e@ivalence with the Salyut 7 may

miss the mark by the time it becomes op@fitiondlfi wati~ %wiet space infrastr~cture could be quitedifferent by 1990. However, the general”-c~mparkon of Capability and cost is illuminating.

.4 .. . ,.,

‘Described in detail in the OTA Technical Mernorarrdum Sa/yut-Sot4tH StepS 7%ard Awrwnmt Human Presence in Space, December 1993.

developed. Use as an uninhabited warehouse orunpressurized, sheltered workshop in space onlyrequires that the tank be purged of residual fuel,since several access openings (larger than 1 me-ter diameter) already exist.

A concept to use ETs as components of habita-ble infrastructure has been developed by theHughes Aircraft Co. In this concept, four ETswould be taken separately into orbit and thenjoined to form the spokes of a large wheel-likestructure. Solar panels would be mounted on arim connected to the outer ends of the ET spokes,providing 150 kW of power. The wheel wouldrotate, and a “despun“ module at the hub of thewheel would provide zero gravity workspace.The basic feasibility of this “dual-spin” system hasbeen demonstrated on a much smaller scale inover 100 successful communications satellitesbuilt by Hughes. Modules attached to the outerends of the ETs, carried into space as aft cargo

carriers, would be available for habitation andpressurized workspace. Rotation of the wheelwould provide artificial gravity in the spinningpart of the facility and gyroscopic action for at-titude control.

This innovative concept has several obvious ad-vantages. There is no doubt that many humanactivities, such as eating, drinking, food prepara-tion, showering, and dealing with human waste,would be much easier to carry on in the artifi-cial gravity environment provided by this system.And possible health problems associated withlong-term living in microgravity, such as decalci-fication of bones and atrophy of muscle and con-nective tissue, could be avoided. In general, thepresence of spin and a choice of gravity regimes,ranging from microgravity to artificial gravitysimulating what we are used to on Earth, shouIdprove to be useful in solving a number of human,scientific, and engineering problems.


Figure 9.— External Tank Structure

INTE

L H2

L02 TANK


Figure IO.— Possible Uses of External Tank

PROPELLANT SCAVENGING ET AS A HANGAR

\ ’’

ET AS A STRONG BACK

.

ET WITH ACC HABITAT


Figure 11 .—Concept of Infrastructure Utilizing Four External Tanks

/

/" /

--

Chapter 4

A BUYER’S GUIDE TOSPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... .

Procurement Options .. ... ... ...... .. ... ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A Catalog of Space Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cost Drivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

People and Automation in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Alternative Funding Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusions . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . $ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES

Table No.

6.

7.

8.

Comparison of Some Options for Low-Earth-Orbit IndependentlyOperating Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Space Infrastructure Platforms That Could Be Serviced by Shuttle oran Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at VariousAnnual Average Federal Funding Rates... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

85

85

87

91

92

94

97

Page

88

89

97

Chapter 4

A BUYER’S GUIDE TO SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

SUMMARY

If the United States decides to acquire a sub-stantial amount of long-term space infrastructure,there are various ways to proceed that should becarefully considered, including the degree towhich new technology would be used, whetherNASA should set design or performance speci-fications, and the roles of the private sector andinternational partners. The costs and capabilitiesof a number of possible infrastructure options arecompared in a table format. The cost drivers asso-ciated with the listed options and OTA’s ap-proach to cost estimation are discussed. The nextsection examines a number of tradeoffs thatshould be considered regarding the use of auto-mation and people in a “space station. ” Buyers

may reasonably decide to acquire space infra-structure using an average annual funding raterather than a “lump sum” approach. Possible in-frastructure that could be obtained using aver-age annual funding rates of $0.1, $0.3, $1, and$3 billion (1 984$) are presented. The functionsthat NASA intends to provide in a “space station”are listed, and alternative infrastructures thatcould provide those functions are indicated. ’

1 In addition to the two OTA workshops mentioned specificallyin the following text, sources of information for ch. 4 include thesame references noted in ch. 3 for possible infrastructure elementsand their estimated acquisition costs.

PROCUREMENT OPTIONS

If there is an affirmative answer to the ques-tions of whether to acquire long-term in-spaceinfrastructure (and, if so, how much, of whatkind, and when), there yet remains the decisionof how it is to be acquired. In many respects, thissecond decision is just as important as the first.The mode of acquiring new, long-term, in-spaceassets and services should be influenced by aclear understanding of the contemporary contextin which space activities are carried on. And thedecision as to how to acquire these assets andservices will have a significant impact on thefuture of space activities.

The pioneering, generous, and effective effortsof the U.S. Government, and of NASA in particu-lar, have resulted in the spread of civilian spacecapabilities and expertise throughout much of theworld, to the point where they are now essen-tially beyond the power of the United States tocontrol even if it is of a mind to do so. Many ofthe nations of Europe, and Japan, Canada, India,BraziI, and the People’s Republic of China as well,are increasingly positioning themselves to pur-sue their own interests in space, independent of

what the United States might desire. Other coun-tries’ evident success with Spacelab, with Arianeand its launch complex, and in the field of satel-lite communications has given them great con-fidence in their abilities to work in full collabora-tion with the United States on major space programsand, before long, to undertake such programswithout the United States, should they then deemthat to be appropriate.

The U.S. private space industry is also fully ca-pable of developing all or most of the ensembleof low-Earth-orbit (LEO) infrastructure elementsneeded to provide a more-than-adequate initialoperating capability (IOC) of the type now be-ing studied by NASA. With the important excep-tion of satellite communications, our industry inthe past has undertaken work exclusively undercontract to the Government. However, the pastseveral years has seen the beginning of impor-tant space activities undertaken wholly on pri-vate initiative.

Some of these private sector activities and someof those undertaken by other countries will be

38-798 0 - 84 - 7 : QL 385


in direct competition with what many in NASAnow perceive to be their own important institu-tional interests.

With the completion of the Shuttle develop-ment program now in sight, the United Statesfaces a major decision as to whether–and, if so,how–to redeploy a large fraction of NASA’sresources. Under present circumstances, NASA,as in the past, would prefer to undertake anotherlarge technological program, similar to the Shut-tle, to serve as the major agency focus, ratherthan to spread its efforts over a number of activ-ities that could be more demanding and moreuseful. Of the various candidate activities, NASAhas chosen to concentrate on the acquisition ofa great deal of long-term, habitable LEO infra-structure.

Congress and the President have approvedNASA’s request to initiate a “space station” pro-gram, and NASA appears to be moving to acquiresuch infrastructure in much the same fashion thatit acquired the Shuttle:

●

●

●

●

A

A great deal of new technology would be de-veloped, acquired, and used, essentially allof which would be publicly funded.NASA would arrive at and issue detailedengineering specifications for, and exerciseclose management control over, the technol-ogy to be acquired.This infrastructure would be procured byNASA with Federal funds. The U.S. privatesector would not be prompted to use its ownresources to provide a substantial portion ofthe infrastructure.The international role would be limited.NASA would not seek the kind of close col-laboration that would result in shared author-ity, even if it might provide substantial capi-tal cost reduction for the United States.

significantly different acquisition approachwould - have the following elements:

● As far as is reasonably possible, already de-veloped, tested, and paid-for technologywould be used to achieve an adequate IOC,with development of new technology under-

●

●

●

taken only where demonstrably required tolower overall cost of ownership.NASA would prompt our private commer-cial-industrial-financial sectors to developand produce, with their own resources andon a genuinely competitive basis, as manyof the Government-required civilian “spacestation’ assets and services as they can;NASA would facilitate their efforts to do so;and they could be offered to NASA on a sale,lease, or payment-for-service-provided basis.NASA, in obtaining the elements not pro-vided by the private sector, would empha-size management methods specifically de-signed to take the best advantage of the nowquite sophisticated U.S. space industry (seeapp. D, “Synopsis of the OTA Workshop onCost Containment of Civilian Space infra-structure [Civilian “Space Station”] Elements).NASA would negotiate collaborative agree-ments with other cooperating countries thatwould see all partners share in the benefitsof such an IOC at a reduced acquisition costto the U.S. Government for its share.

This second approach would imply that NASAwould hand off much (perhaps most) of the moremundane “space station” work by paying the pri-vate sector to do it, thereby conserving its skillsand resources so that they could be focused onmore challenging space goals and objectives, in-cluding the development of the very advancedtechnology (e.g., bipropellant engines, a reusableorbital transfer vehicle, . . .) required, an activ-ity which, for the most part, the private sectorcannot justify.

These two options are at opposite ends of aspectrum of approaches to the acquisition oflong-term space infrastructure. in determiningwhich approaches from this spectrum are mostlikely to influence the evolution of space activi-ties in a desirable direction, Congress may wishto consider the following questions:

● Should the Government be allocating its pro-fessional skills and experience to the devel-opment of: 1 ) incremental or 2) fundamen-tal advances in technology?

Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space infrastructure ● 8 7

● Which approach is most likely to stimulate • What other large and important space endsthe “commercialization of space”? should be addressed in the next decade or

● What level of international collaboration is two in addition to the acquisition of in-spacereally desirable? infrastructure methods and means?

A CATALOG OF SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE

The fact that the United States has already de-veloped a wide variety of space capabilitiesmeans that it has genuine choices—both of whatinfrastructure elements it places in orbit and ofhow these elements are to be acquired and used.It is around these choices that the difficult issueslie; by and large, the technology is either in handor can be readily developed.

It must be emphasized that the particularconstellation of space infrastructure elementswhich NASA currently aspires to develop, con-struct, deploy, and operate is only one alterna-tive in a wide range of options. Simply put, thereis no such thing as “the space station. ” What isunder discussion is a variety of sets of infrastruc-ture elements, ranging from modest extensionsof current capabilities to vastly more sophisti-cated, capable, and costly ensembles than NASAis now suggesting.

As one way of presenting the variety of tech-nology options available, OTA has preparedtables 6 and 7.2

tables were prepared in response to the congressionalcommittees which requested this assessment, 3 discusses in-frastructure options in detail.

Photo credit: Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration

One option for modestly increased length of stay inspace is a Shuttle Orbiter modified for extended

flight—the Extended Duration Orbiter, or EDO. Sucha configuration might involve large solar panels for

extended electrical power, as shown here.


Table 6.—Comparison of Some Optionsa for "Low Earth” Orbit Independently Operating Infrastructure

Free-flying NASA infrastructureExtended Extended spacelab aspirationsDuration Duration (developed Initial Mature,

Shuttle Orbiter: Orbiter: as permanent operational fullyOrbiter Phase I Phase II infrastructure) capability developed

Date available(assuming start in 1985) Now 1988 1990 1990 1992 1996-2000

Costb(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars) None 0.2 0.5 2-3 8 20

CharacteristicsPower to users (kW)Pressurized volume (m3)

760

20 6100

(with spacelabhabitat)

5 3New technology Modest crew

required; accommodationsmodest

laboratoryspace

60200

200300

Nominal crew sizeMiscellaneous

6Can acceptSpacelab

5No new

technology

8Orbital

maneuveringvehicle plus

two free-flyingunpressurized

platforms

20Reusable

orbitaltransfer

vehicle plusseveral more

platformsCapabilities c

Time on Orbit 10 days 20 days 50 days Unlimited(60-90 dayresupply)

ExtensiveModest


NoModestModest

ModestNoNo

Unlimited(90 day

resupply)

Unlimited(90 day

resupply)Laboratories for:



processing)Large structure assemblyTransportation nodeFuel and supply depot

ModerateModestSome

ModestNoNo

ModestNo

ModerateModestSome

ModestModest

NoModest

No

ConsiderableModest

ModerateSome

ModestNo

ModestModest

ExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensive

ConsiderableConsiderableConsiderable

ExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensiveExtensive

NoNoNo

ExtensiveExtensive

Considerable

NoNoNo

NoNoNo

ModerateModerate

No

Response to reasons advanced forspace infrastructureMaintain U.S. space leadership and

technology capabilityRespond to U.S.S.R. space activitiesEnable long-term human presence






No Modest Modest Modest

ModestConsiderable

Modest


Modest

Modest

Modest

Considerable Extensive

ModestModest

ConsiderableExtensive

ExtensiveExtensive

NoNo

ModestModest

No Modest Modest Modest Modest

ModestModest

ModestModest

ModerateModest



No No No Extensive Extensive

No No No Unclear Unclear

Modest Modest Modest Considerable ConsiderableaLiated options are illustrative examples; the list la not exhaustive.bco~ts include de@~n, development, and pr~uct’on; launch and operational costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the Office of Technology Assess-

ment; others were provided to OTA.cClearly judgmental.dlncluding launch to the Moon, Mars, and aome esteroids.

Examples of habitable infrastructure are shown listed, followed by one version of Space lab de-in table 1. First, the present Shuttle Orbiter and veloped into a free-flying inhabited facility.its possible modifications for somewhat extended Finally, the present NASA-envisioned space sta-(but not permanent) stays on orbit (i.e., a so- tion” concept is given, including both the IOCcalled Extended Duration Orbiter—EDO) are version with an estimated completion in 1992,

Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space Infrastructure ● 8 9

Table 7.—Space Infrastructure Platformsa That Could Be Semiced by Shuttle or an Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle

Unpressurized coorbiting platforms Pressurized platforms(serviced by means of extravehicular activity) (serviced internally while docked)

Space EuropeanIndustries’ Modified

SPAS MESA LEASECRAFT EURECA Platform Spacelab

Date available(now, or approximate, assuming

start in 1985)

c o d ’(billions of fiscal year 1984 dollars)

CharacteristicsPower to users (kW)Pressurized volume (ft3)Nominal crew size

Miscellaneous

Capabilities c

Time on orbitLaboratories for:



processing)Large structure assemblyTransportation node (assembly,

checkout, and launch)Fuel and supply depot

Response to reasons advanced forspace infrastructure

Maintain U.S. space leadershipand technology capability

Respond to U.S.S.R. space activitiesEnable long-term human presence






Now

0.005

0.6NoneNone

3,000 lbPayload

10 days

NoModestModest

NoNoNoNoNo

NoNo

No

No

NoNo

No

YesUnclear

No

No

No

Now

0.01

0.1NoneNone

200 lbPayload

8 months

NoModest

NoNoNoNoNoNo

NoNo

No

No

NoNo

No

NoModest

No

No

No

1986

0.2

6NoneNone

20,000 lbPayload

Unlimited


NoNo

Considerable

NoNo

No

Modest

ModestNo

No

NoConsiderable

No

No

No

1987

0.2

2NoneNone

2,000 lbPayload

6 months


NoNo

Modest

NoNo

No

No

NoNo

No

YesNo

No

No

No

Late 1980’s

0.3

202,500

1-3 onlywhen

docked25,000 lbPayload

3-6 months

ModestNo


NoNo

Extensive

NoNo

No

Modest

ModestNo

No

NoConsiderable

No

No

No

1989

0.6

63,000

3

20,000 lbPayload

Unlimited

ModerateModerateModerateModest

ModerateNoNo

Considerable

NoNo

No

No

ModestNo

No

UnclearNo

No

No

NoaLi~t~ ~latformg are illustrative examples; the list Is not ‘Xhaustlve.btists include ~esian, ~evelopment, and ~r~uction; launch a~ o~ratl~nal costs are not included. Some costs are estimated by the office of Technology As~ss-

ment; others were ~rovlded to OTA.cClearly judgmental.

and a mature, fully developed facility (1996- ●

2000).

The parameters for each option that may beused for rough comparative purposes are:

. Approximate date of availability—assumingthat an acquisition (in contrast to a study)“go-ahead” were included in the fiscal year1987 budget.

Cost (in fiscal year 1984 dollars)–to producethe capabilities shown. The estimates arebased on sources such as industry reviews,company publications and meeting presen-tations, aerospace periodicals, and NASA in-formation releases. Inasmuch as some op-tions utilize existing hardware, the costs donot reflect similar proportions of develop-ment and production efforts for the variousoptions.


●

●

●

Characteristics–several design parametersand sizing factors that provide the bases forinfrastructure capabilities.Capabilities—the types of functional activi-ties that the listed infrastructure could sup-port, and the degree to which these activi-ties might be accomplished.Responsiveness of a given infrastructure-tothe various reasons put forward for havinga civi I ian n “space station, ” including anylong-term presence of human beings inspace .

If great and long-range space activities (for in-stance, the establishment of a lunar human settle-ment or the return of materials from the asteroidsor Mars) come under consideration, they wouIdappear to be achievable using a sophisticatedreusable orbit transfer vehicle (ROTV) coupledwith on-orbit assembly, check-out, launch, andrecovery. The one option listed in table I thatcould provide these capabilities is the NASA fullydeveloped infrastructure.

Examples of uninhabitable “free-flying’ spaceplatforms are shown in table 2. These platforms,or others, could be used in conjunction with, and

serviced by, any of the options listed in table 1.In this way, additional capabilities could be addedto the infrastructures given in table 1, SPAS andMESA are currently existing commercial platformsthat were financecj and developed by the privatesector. LEAS ECRAFT is also a private venture nowunder development.

Some cautions should be noted in the interpre-tation of this information. General descriptionsof the various options are given, an estimatesof their capabilities. These capabilities can be ex-pected to change in some cases. Most of the ca-pabilities have been described by qualitative ad-jectives. Quantitative estimates are rounded offto one figure. In the fifth section of the tables,“Response to the Reasons Advanced for SpaceInfrastructure, ” the comparisons clearly must bequalitative and judgmental in nature and are pre-sented simply to bring these factors to the atten-tion of the reader. For instance, as a particularitem the Spacelab option of table 2 is only oneof several that have been put forward; one byEuropean Space Agency (ESA) countries coulddefinitely augment international cooperation ifit were implemented.


COST DRIVERS

Beyond the observation that, in some generalfashion, the cost will increase with the capabil-ity and sophistication of the infrastructure ac-quired, it is difficult to estimate the eventual costof this capability to the Government. At least allof the following factors could have an importantinfluence on this cost:

1. the total capability acquired–which, as sug-gested by the examples listed in the tablesof infrastructure options, can encompass aconsiderable range;

2. the extent to which already developed,tested, and paid-for technology is used, v.a focus on new technology with its higherdevelopment cost and greater risk of costoverruns;

3. the substitution, where feasible, of auto-mated systems for the accomplishment oftasks previously undertaken only by humanbeings;

4. the manner by which the infrastructure is ac-quired, i.e., the extent to which NASA putsthe engineering challenge on the space in-dustry by issuing performance specifications,rather than continuing to issue detailed engi-neering specifications and managing the ac-quisition process in detail;

5. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to per-suade our private sector to develop infra-structure assets and services “on their own, ”and to provide them to the Government atpurchase, lease, or service-payment priceslower than those achievable by the Gov-ernment;

6. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to effecteventual private sector operation of the in-frastructure and its related activities;

7. the extent to which large and rapid expan-sion of military space research, develop-

ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) activi-ties increases costs in the civilian spacesector also;3

8. the extent to which any “Christmas-tree ef-fect” takes place within NASA, whereby theinfrastructure acquisition management ispersuaded by the NASA Centers to allow thecost of desirable but nonessential RDT&Eactivities to be included in the acquisition;and

9. the effectiveness of NASA’s efforts to arriveat large-scale collaboration and related cost-sharing arrangements with other countries.

These points address only the initial capital costof this infrastructure—to this cost must be addedits ongoing operation and maintenance costs; thecost of instruments, furnaces, etc., needed forscientific experimentation in association with itsuse; and the interest cost of any money borrowedto fund the acquisition program. And it must beremembered, too, that the infrastructure willeventually become obsolete or wear out.

It is clear that there are many opportunities toreduce infrastructure net cost that could begrasped by a vigorous, imaginative, and deter-mined NASA management.4

These considerations suggest that, over the nextyear or two, at least as much attention should begiven to identifying the best ways by which thecountry should set about the permanent devel-opment of space as there is given to any techno-logical advances and operational capabilities thatare to be obtained.

3Classified material was not used in preparing this report.4Cost reduction measures are discussed i n app, D of this report.

structure issues is that of the proper mix of so- 1.phisticated people and sophisticated machines(automation) to be employed in work activitiesin spaces

Sln arriving at judgments on various “man/machine” issues OTA,in close concert with senior congressional staff members, designedand convened a workshop which brought together many of theNation’s experts in “smart machine” development from the Gov-ernment, industry, and academic communities with OTA and con-gressional staff professionals. 2.

If specifically designed to do so, any civil-ian “space station” program could effec-tively serve as a high-visibility focus for pro-moting research and development in alldisciplines in the field of automation. im-portant advances in terrestrial applicationsof automation could be expected to followfrom a vigorous space automation program.However, there is a firm consensus among

Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space /infrastructure . 93

3.

4.

scientists and engineers in the various auto-mation disciplines that current automatedequipment could not accomplish many ofthe functions envisioned by NASA for anearly 1990s “space station. ” This situationresults, in part, because NASA has investedrelatively few resources to develop auto-mated capabilities specifically for general-purpose infrastructure-support (in contrastwith special-purpose scientific) space activ-ities. In addition, the academic and indus-trial advanced automation research commu-nity numbers only a few hundred.Therefore, if the kind of overall operational“space station” now envisioned by NASAis to be functioning by the early 1990s, itwill have to include people. Conversely, ifit is to be wholly or mostly automated, itcould not become operational until 5 to 10years thereafter, even with a major automa-tion R&D effort. However, if any of theaspirations of those now conducting re-search and development in the space materi-als processing area are realized, and one ormore processes are found suitable for long-term production, then elements of the infra-structure that would be devoted to such pro-duction, such as platforms co-orbiting nearany central complex, could be singled outfor early, specific, sophisticated-machineR&D focus.Conceptually, space infrastructure could bedesigned either to include a human workcrew or to depend on unattended sophis-ticated machines. Despite the fact that therelative efficiency and/or effectiveness ofthese two quite different approaches havebeen extensively debated for years, no con-sensus has emerged. This absence of con-sensus results from a number of factors: thestate-of-the-art for sophisticated machines;the amount of experience we have had todate in the actual conduct of space supportoperations is quite small; and, in such oper-ations, NASA has placed more emphasis onhuman beings than on machines;

5.

6.

For the foreseeable future, therefore,only a general continuum of conclusionscan be outlined:

machines generally will be unable to an-ticipate and deal with genuinely unknowncircumstances and surprises;people will need the assistance of ma-chines to gain speed, strength, and mem-ory; to improve their sensory capabilitiesand their mobility; and to provide themwith artificial senses via radar, Iidar, radi-ation detection, etc.;machines employed for ongoing R&D andcommercial-industrial operations will re-quire human oversight and assistance; andmachines, maintained by people or not,as circumstances suggest,” should do allhazardous and very-long-term repetitivework.

In the matter of relative cost of automatedand space facilities including people, theexpense of developing and providing safe,sanitary, and suitable living and working fa-cilities for human beings has to be weighedagainst the costs of providing analogousautomated capabilities. The former will cer-tainly be relatively expensive; the latter maywell cost more than some advocates im-agine, especially if as much capability is ex-pected of the machines as of a professionalhuman work crew. With respect to doinguseful work in space, human beings rep-resent in-hand technology. Cost alone doesnot provide sufficient ground for choosingbetween automated and manned facilities.However, there are three reasons advancedfor having men and women in space, onlyone of which is to do useful work. Theother reasons are: to serve as subjects forscientific study and to engage in any otherkind of human activity. With respect to thesecond and third reasons, the question ofhumans or machines does not even arise.Only the purpose of doing useful work hasbeen extensively studied and, as indicatedin the preceding points, no clear and gen-, “ ,


eral present advantage for having people or physiology, psychology, and social behav-sophisticated machines there has emerged. ior, must be acquired. If, similarly, the Na-If the Nation decides, as a matter of policy, tion decides, as a matter of policy, to enableto have some of its people remain away from people to pursue in space a variety of cul-Earth for long periods, then staffed space fa- tural activities other than work then, again,cilities, allowing for the study of human only their presence there will suffice.

ALTERNATIVE FUNDING RATES

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss a space infrastructureacquisition program that would involve an ini-tial decision on the purposes of, and the objec-tives to be achieved in, the civilian space area,followed by the design of that infrastructure withappropriate functional capabilities to support theattainment of these objectives. An estimate of thecost and schedule associated with the attainmentof these objectives, along with the acquisition ofsuch infrastructure, is also presented.

An alternative approach could simply establishannual expenditure levels for in-space infrastruc-ture acquisition. Thus, to provide an independ-ent basis of comparison with the civilian “spacestation” program now favored by NASA, OTA hasestimated what new space capabilities could beacquired, by when, if various annual averageGovernment funding rates were established to doso. No changes to present NASA acquisition pro-cedures or NASA anticipated acquisition costs areassumed. Arbitrary annual average funding levelsof $0,1, $0.3, $1, and $3 billion per year (1984$)were chosen to illustrate the number and kindof space infrastructure elements that could be ac-quired over periods of 5, 10, or 15 years.

The results of these 12 funding scenarios aregiven in table 8, which shows the funding rate,number of years, total expenditure, and kinds ofinfrastructure elements acquired. The elementsare divided into those that can operate independ-ently (e. g., the Shuttle Orbiter and a “space sta-tion” central base) and those that depend on be-ing serviced or maintained from one of theindependent elements (i.e., by an orbital maneu-vering vehicle (OMV), a local in-space transpor-tation system operated from a “space station”control element, or directly by the Shuttle).

Table 8 lists the following (among other) ele-ments of space infrastructure that could be ac-quired over various acquisition intervals:

●

●

●

For $0.1 billion per year: probably no “per-manently manned” facility could be ob-tained even by the year 2000. Further exten-sion of capabilities of the Shuttle system andunpressurized platform developments couldbe obtained. The acquisitions could be: a de-velopment of the EDO Phase 1, for 20-dayorbit stays, over a 5-year period; or EDOPhase 11, for 50-day orbit stays, over 10 yearsor longer, plus two or three free-flying un-pressurized platforms such as EURECA,LEASECRAFT, and/or the Space Industries’platform (assuming that the Governmentwould make an outright purchase of suchplatforms).At $0.3 billion per year: within 5 years, theacquisitions could be an EDO I I plus several(perhaps pressurized) platforms. Over 10years, there could be acquired: 1) the firstpermanently orbiting, Spacelab-derived hab-itable modules in 28.5° orbit that could sup-port three people, 2) an OMV (enabling serv-icing of nearby satellites), and 3) a few free-flying platforms. In 15 years, there could beobtained either: 1 ) two free-flying Spacelabs,one in polar orbit, one at 28.5°, or 2) muchmore capable permanent infrastructure at28.5° than that which could be acquired in10 years.For $1 billion per year: within 5 years, therecould be acquired: 1) a permanent LEOfacility operating as a transportation node(obtained as a new design by NASA), 2) anOMV, 3) an ROTV capable of transportingspacecraft to and from geostationary and

—


e-Earth that are the

chemical


Table 8.—Some Illustrative Space Infrastructure Acquisitions Possible at Various Annual Average FederalFunding Rates (all amounts in billions of 1984 dollars)

Space acquisitions a

Dependent elements

Number Unpres- Pressur- Space-based Beyond geostationaryFunding of Total Independent infrastructure surized ized plat- transport orbit spacecraft

rate years expenditures elements b platforms form# vehicles elements

O.1e5

1015

0.51

1.5

EDO If (20 days, 5 crew) 2EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3

— ———

——111

——

0.3 510

1.53

EDO II (50 days, 6 crew) 3Free-flying Spacelab modules’ 1

(permanent, 3 crew)2 free-flying Spacelab modules in both 2

28 degree and polar orbits (3 crew each

—OMV

——

15 4.5 1 OMV

510

510

Space transportation center (4 crew) —NASA initial operating capability 2

“space station”g (8 crew)NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3

OMV; ROTVOMV; ROTV

—1

——

15 15 OMV;ROTV

OMV; ROTVOMV:ROTV

112

—1530

NASA growth “space station”g (12 crew) 3NASA mature “space station”g (16 crew) 3

Shuttle-Derived Cargo Vehicle (SDV)NASA mature “space station”g 5

(18 crew, SDV)

510

—Lunar capable ROTV;staffed Lunar facilityLunar capable ROTV;staffed Lunar facility;Mars voyageh

15 45 3 OMV: ROTV

aTables 1 and 2 p~e~erlt characteristics and capabilities of infrastructure elements In detail.b=tended D“ratlon Orbitem (EDO) are IImited In their stays on orbit; other independent elements are lonO-term.cplatforms of the L E A S E C R A F T /E U R E C A tYPedplatfoma of t~ m~ifi~ free.flylng spa~elab~pa~e lndu~trles type with their Own electrical power and pressurization SyStemS.

eAt $fJ 1 billion&r, no long.te~, staffed infrastructure ebments are Wssible.f Em i (~tend~ Duration o~lter, phaae 1) and the spacelab modules have limited eleCtriCa~ pOWer (about 7 kw).gThe NASA “’space station” elements are expected to operate as transpodatlon and servicing centers as well as laboratories. They would have sufficient power forhextensive materials procesalng.

A slgnlflcant part of the cost of a human visit to Mars could be provided in this case.

other higher orbits, and 4) the capability tosupport the kind of vehicles that could bedeveloped later to travel to and from theMoon. In 10 years, the IOC infrastructurenow favored by NASA could be acquired.In 15 years, nearly all of the infrastructurenow seriously considered by NASA could beacquired.

At $3 billion per year (assuming that onlyfunds, not technology or other factors, wouldbe the pacing program factor): NASA’s fullydeveloped “space station” could becomeavailable in somewhat more than 5 years. In10 years, this infrastructure plus a geosta-tionary platform, plus a Shuttle-derived cargovehicle (SDV) for lower cost transfer of fueland cargo to LEO, plus a lunar facility readyfor occupancy and continuing operationwould become possible. In 15 years, NASA’scomplete infrastructure aspirations and alunar settlement could be in hand and, per-haps also, plans for seeing a human crew

travel to the vicinity of Mars and back couldbe well advanced.

These projections are for infrastructure acqui-sition only; operational costs are not included.In general, more extensive infrastructure wouldrequire larger operational costs. Also, there is abasic difference between the costs associatedwith using Shuttle-type vehicles and permanentlyorbiting facilities. The use of an EDO to conductextended science or development activities witha crew would involve launch costs each time itwent into orbit; use of a permanent facility wouldrequire resupply loads several times per year, butthe cost of each flight could be shared with otherpayloads. For example, if 12 dedicated 30-dayEDO flights were conducted per year about $1billion (1984$) in annual transportation costswould be involved; in comparison, cost of fourpartial-load Shuttle launches per year to resup-ply a permanent facility would total $100 millionto $400 million (1984$), depending on the weightof supplies carried in each flight.

Ch. 4—A Buyer’s Guide to Space /infrastructure . 97

CONCLUSIONS

The general conclusion of a great deal of studyby the civilian space community (Government,industry, and university) is that some additionallong-term in-space LEO infrastructure could beused to improve the efficiency and effectivenessof a number of present and anticipated spaceactivities. However, our space experience todate, and science, engineering, and space oper-ations considerations alone, are not now suffi-cient, by themselves, to determine the charac-ter and amount of the in-space infrastructureto be acquired soon. And in the absence of anyobjective external demand for its prompt acqui-sition, these considerations cannot determinethe rate at which it should be acquired.

There are a wide variety of infrastructure op-tions that could be chosen from to provide vari-ous kinds and amounts of in-space support assetsand services. Some infrastructure options cur-rently exist, others could be developed using cur-rent technology, and some would require new

technology. The cost to the Government of ac-

quiring this infrastructure could be reduced, sub-stantially, if our private sector were to offer to pro-vide lower unit cost portions thereof, and otherportions were provided by other countries in col-laborative programs within the United States.

it is clear that a number of important supportassets and services could be provided with in-frastructure other than that defined as “The NASASpace Station.” Therefore, in considering howmuch of what kind of in-space infrastructureshould be provided by when, reasonable waysfor Congress to proceed might be:

● to select those specific support assets andservices that they judge to be important, askNASA to price them, and specify a date bywhich they should become available; or

● to set an annual average funding rate for theacquisition of in-space infrastructure, andallow NASA to select the assets and servicesto be provided and the dates of their acqui-sition.

And Congress could decide to what extentNASA should emphasize the acquisition of anyinfrastructure by our private sector and by other

countries in order either to relieve the burdenon the Government’s budget generally, or to in-crease the amount, or hasten the time, by whichspace infrastructure would be acquired and/orother space activities were conducted.6

Using the first approach, Congress initiallymight select functions similar to those providedby the Soviet Salyut 7 (operational since 1982).Such a semi-permanent LEO laboratory could bedeveloped using Spacelab-like modules con-nected to a power and support module patternedafter current platform designs. It would supportseveral crewmembers and one-third of the science,commercial, and technology development activ-ities that NASA now suggests would be handledby their IOC. NASA’s estimate is some $2 billion(1984$) for such a development.

Or, in another example, the conduct of ROTVoperations might be selected as one of the mainsupport functions to be supplied by space infra-structure. This would allow servicing and otheractivities in virtually all orbits, including polar,geostationary, and even lunar. In addition, suchinfrastructure would support the continued ex-ploration of the solar system, which is one ofNASA’s most important “char ters.” The cost foran ROTV and its associated LEO infrastructure hasbeen estimated at $3 billion to $4 billion (1984$).

Of course, another example of the first ap-proach would have Congress simply select theIOC assets and services identified by NASA andthe aerospace industry that are estimated to cost$8 billion (1984$) (plus the cost of NASA staff);or even to spur the infrastructure acquisitionprocess beyond NASA’s present aspirations, andbegin to move people beyond LEO.

Congress could consider alternative ways ofproviding those assets and services in varyingdegrees. For instance:

● an on-orbit laboratory supporting researchon a wide range of life, materials, and otherscience topics, and new technology devel-

‘A conceptual possibility would be for NASA to provide a corefacility to which private industry could attach docking and fuel stor-age equipment for commercial ROTV operations.

——


●

●

●

●

●

opments (Shuttle, EDO, Spacelab, Colum-bus, NASA minimum cost “space station,”Space Industries platform);permanent observatories for astronomy, andEarth remote sensing (Shuttle, EDO, Space-Iab, Space Industries, SPAS, MESA, EURECA,Landsat, LEASECRAFT, Space Telescope,IRAS, 0S0 satellites, Solar Max, and otherexisting or planned observatories);a facility for microgravity materials process-ing including the manufacturing of suchproducts as pharmaceuticals, semiconduc-tors, glasses, and metals (Shuttle, EDO,Spacelab, LEASECRAFT, the Space Industriesplatform, SPAS, Columbus, EURECA, MESA);servicing of satellites and platforms, includ-ing the maintenance or replacement of com-ponents, replenishment of consumables, andexchange of equipment (Shuttle, EDO, ELVs,as well as OMVs and ROTVs operated fromthe Shuttle);a transportation node to assemble, checkout, and launch vehicles to geosynchronousand other high orbits, and on interplanetarytrips {Shuttle, EDO, Columbus, NASA mini-mum-cost “space station”);an assembly facility for large space structuressuch as antennas for advanced satellite com-munications systems (Shuttle, EDO, Colum-bus, NASA minimum-cost “space station”);

●

●

a storage depot for spare parts, fuel, and sup-plies for use as needed by satellites, plat-forms, vehicles, and people (ETs, Columbus,LEASECRAFT, the Space Industries platform,NASA minimum-cost “space station”); anda staging base for later, more ambitiousexploration and travel (Columbus, NASAminimum-cost “space station”).

If Congress were to select an average annualfunding rate, some examples of the approximatekind and amount of infrastructure that could beobtained over a period of some 10 years (in 1984dollars) are, for instance:

$0.1 billion per year: an EDO (20-day stayon-orbit) plus some free-flying platforms; or$0.3 billion per year: an EDO (50-day stayon-orbit), plus free-flying, pressurized infra-structure supporting several crewmembers,plus some free-flying platforms; or$1 billion per year: most of the NASA IOCplus an ROTV; or$3 billion per year: all of the NASA IOC, plusits extensions, plus an ROTV, plus a Shuttle-derived cargo vehicle, plusplatform, plus an operatingprogram.

a “geostationarylunar settlement


B Photo credit Natlonal Aeronautics and Space Administration

One alternative to the development of new technology is to use the Space Shuttle for many advanced operations inlow-Earth-orbit. Shown here are: (A) satellite servicing satellite in April 1984; (B) assembly of a large structure in orbit—

here simulated in water; and (C) a deployable antenna.

Chapter 5

BROADENING THE DEBATE

Contents

Space Infrastructure

Need for Goals and

Page

as Methods and Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Objectives .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

The Policy Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Today’s Too Narrow Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Recent Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

President Reagan’s Call for a “Space Station” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Steps Toward Broader Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Chapter 5

BROADENING THE DEBATE

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE AS METHODS AND MEANS

Even the most informed ardent supporters ofa U.S. civilian “space station” program agree thatany such facility would be a means to variousends, rather than an end in itself. The ends pro-posed may be grouped into four categories: in-dustrial (e.g., manufacturing materials); commer-cial (e.g., servicing satellites); scientific (e. g.,conducting experiments in the life sciences); andnational security (e. g., maintaining a permanentU.S. manned presence). These ends, despite theirdiversity, have in common a presumption thatspace activities will in future become more rou-tine and more clearly operational, less experi-mental, and less tentative. This presumption inturn derives from an important change in the waythat we are now beginning to view space.

Twenty-five years into the Space Age, we arein a position to view near-Earth space much aswe would a vast tract of undeveloped raw landon the Earth’s surface:

● We have identified at least some of the de-sirable locations (particular orbits).

. We have established an initial legal frame-work for their beneficial occupancy (the Out-er Space Treaty).

● We have reliable transportation for peopleand machinery to and from these remoteareas, from selected locations on the Earth’ssurface (via the Shuttle).

Ž We can maintain reliable communicationswith these remote areas (via NASA’s satel-lite communications system).

These capabilities are prompting us to undertakethe considered development of near-Earth space—with, therefore, the long-term implications for useand support of any assets and people placedthere.

indeed, the terms “space station” or “spacetransportation node” are most accurately under-stood as identifying elements of long-term, per-haps permanent, space infrastructure, concen-trated initially, for the most part, in low-Earthorbits. These elements would provide in-space

structure, electrical power, thermal control, ware-housing, stability (as to location, attitude, andtemperature), communications, fuel, associateddocking and air lock capabilities, local transpor-tation, LEO-GEO transportation, and, if staffed bymen and women, life support and residential andworking space, Because it is expected to be so-phisticated, and useful for periods of several dec-ades, this space infrastructure could provide anew and qualitatively different regime of spaceassets, allow the provision of new space services,and support the conduct of space activities in anew and presumably more efficient and effectivemanner.

Four major decisions have marked the U.S. ci-vilian space program: the establishment of NASAin the National Aeronautics and Space Act of1958, the initiation of the Apollo program in1961, the establishment of COMSAT in the Com-sat Act of 1962, and the initiation of the Shuttleprogram in 1972. But, despite the growing im-portance of the Nation’s publicly supported spaceactivities, the pattern of decision making over thepast 20 years has seldom proceeded in the lightof broad public discussion. Until very recently,the discussion of whether to undertake a “spacestation” program and, if so, what elements itshould contain, had also been confined princi-pally to engineers and scientists within NASA, andwithin NASA-supported university programs andaerospace contracting firms. Consideration of theviews and interests of these communities has, toa very great extent, determined the kind of “spacestation” program now suggested by NASA.

As NASA’s Shuttle development program comesto a close, thousands of its in-house engineersand technical support staff and, in principle, asmuch as $2 billion per year in contract funds,u rider its present “budget envelope, ” would befreed up to be applied to one or more new pro-grams. Given the agency’s natural desire not onlyto maintain its current size (a size NASA leadersjudge to have the support of the general public),

103


but to grow at 1 percent per year1–a desire sup-ported by the Reagan Administration–this com-bination of people and funds that could soon be-come available suggests, strongly, that any newprograms must include the development and ac-quisition of a great deal of new technology,preferably related to having people in space; largenumbers of technologists would be gainfullyemployed both in NASA and in the space indus-try under contract to NASA. NASA’s plans couldwell have been further influenced by the fun-damental political belief that the agency mightnot long survive in its present form without asingle, large, “people-in-space” program uponwhich a majority of its energies are focused. Ifa number of smaller programs were initiated in-stead, each of them, it is thought, could be ter-minated without widespread objections arisingin the political process. Finally, NASA may havethought it prudent to propose a “space station”program rather than some other large endeavor(s)(e.g., a return of Americans to the Moon, send-ing people on an expedition to Mars, etc.) bothbecause the former had been carefully studiedover the years, representing, in NASA’s view, anatural complement to the Shuttle, and becausealternative large programs seemed too grandiose,have not recently been discussed with the gen-eral public, and, therefore, were less likely toenlist the required support, both within and with-out the administration.

Once the decision had been made to begin de-fining a “space station” program to be proposedfor congressional approval, NASA began canvass-ing possible user communities to learn what char-acteristics they would like it to incorporate inorder to meet their needs. This process would

I NASA management has a strong commitment to its own institu-tional future. NASA Headquarters material, NASA HQ MF 83-2275(1 ), prepared for a presentation to its internal Policy ReviewCommittee in mid-1983, and subsequently presented to a Boardof the National Research Council, lists eight “Agency Goals. ” Thefirst goal is: “Provide for our people a creative environment andthe best of facilities, support services, and management supportso they can perform with excellence NASA research, development,mission, and operational responsibilities. ”

The second goal speaks to the space transportation system (theShuttle), and the third to the establishment of a permanent mannedpresence in space.

App. B shows that, in previous years, this commitment has alsobeen strong.

ensure that the actual infrastructure, when built,served as many constituencies as possible, andalso might moderate potential opposition fromgroups who might view any large project as athreat to the budgets of their relatively smalleractivities.

The groups canvassed included the variousNASA Centers, the National Research Council(the Space Science Board and the Space Applica-tions Board), the space industry, various poten-tial foreign providers and users of space technol-ogy (the European Space Agency, Canada, andJapan), and, in general, any groups that hadworked on previous “space station” studies. Theessential form of NASA’s questions to these vari-ous groups was: if there were a permanent andpermanently staffed “space station, ” what activ-ities might it reasonably support, how wouldthese activities influence its design, and of whatvalue would those support activities be? Eight aer-ospace groups, placed under contract to NASAin the fall of 1982, undertook parallel “missionanalysis studies”2 in order to determine a set ofactivities for the first 10 years of the “space sta-tion’s” operation, the fundamental characteris-tics suitable for accomplishing these activities,and the presumed value to be associated withobtaining and using them. These contractor groupssoon formed similar judgments regarding theamount of money that (NASA hoped) would bemade available, a desirable acquisition schedule,and NASA’s preferences on such matters as theemployment of people in space and the use ofnew v. already space-qualified technology. Also,using standard industry cost estimating practices,they suggested the likely acquisition costs of theinfrastructure elements to the Government,

The process by which users were canvassedwas essentially open-ended: no potential use thateither required or would materially benefit froma “permanently manned space station” was re-jected out of hand. Given NASA’s internal cir-cumstances, this open-ended character was cer-tainly unexceptionable: the more—and the morevaried—the identified uses, the more capable, so-phisticated, and large the supporting infrastruc-

2The resu Its of these studies are summarized in app. A.

Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate ● 105

ture would have to be. The greater the resultingcapability and sophistication, the more engineerswould be required to design, develop, and pro-duce it–and the greater its cost. Increased costs,in turn, wouId imply more Government contract-ing—and understandably generate greater inter-est in and support for the program by the spaceindustry.

In general, the greater the number of poten-tial users and potential suppliers, the greater theinfluence that could be brought to bear on Gov-ernment decision makers to approve any “spacestation” program. In any event, essentially all im-portant space industry groups were representedin the eight aerospace groups of companies, andthe number of potential uses recommended forinclusion totaled well over 100.

If there were any important potential uses leftout of account, either because the supportingtechnology would be too costly or could not beobtained in time, or because NASA judged theirdiscussion to be inappropriate for the time be-ing, they could still be provided for later, not inthe initial operational capability (IOC) “station,”but in the subsequent full capability “space sta-tion” program, which could continue to the endof this century.

it is important to appreciate that the form inwhich NASA put its original questions to the eightaerospace groups largely determined the approachtaken to potential acquisition of a civilian “spacestation.” And this approach, in turn, largely deter-mined the result—a “Christmas-tree” proposal inwhich there was something for all identifiable po-

NEED FOR GOALS

This entire panoply of relatively narrowlyfocused and nearer term ends provide, in OTA’sjudgment, insufficient justification for a major,new U.S. civilian space effort. Moreover, thereis general agreement neither on a set of long-range goals which the U.S. civilian space programnow is expected to achieve nor on a set of spe-cific objectives which, as they are addressed,would serve as milestones of progress towardthose goals. And without such a set of goals andobjectives the Nation cannot make a clear deter-

tential users, with little attempt either to weighthe seriousness of their intentions to use the fa-cility, or to gauge their willingness to see fundsthat they would employ otherwise used insteadto develop it. A different, and perhaps moreappropriate question, wouId have been: in viewof the maturing capabilities and increasing num-bers of the spacefaring nations of the world,3 whatelements of long-term, in-orbit infrastructurewould be appropriate to facilitate the considereddevelopment of near-Earth space? This questionwould not have required initial assumptions thatthe facilities would be permanent and perma-nently manned, that the size of the eventual pro-gram would have to be geared to maintainingNASA’s size and form, and that all possible usersshould be accommodated.

But even with the large number of uses thatwere identified, little doubt remains that thekind of “space station” which NASA preferscannot now be fully justified on scientific, eco-nomic, or military grounds,4 or combinationsthereof. Rather, a decision to approve it willrest, finally, on a political judgment that will re-flect many intangible factors as well.

31deally, one should add: “ and in wew of the goals and ob-jectives of our civilian space program. ” However, as arguedthroughout thts report, there is no publicly accepted agenda of suchgoals and objectives,

‘It must also be noted that, since the cancellation of the MannedOrbiting Laboratory Program in 1968, the U.S. military has beenconsistent in its public position that there is no military require-ment for a “manned space station. ” This position IS still publiclymalntal ned and remains i n force, even in the context of the Presi-dent’s call, in March 1983, for development of advanced ballisticmissile defense systems that could see large amounts of very sophis-ticated and costly military technology deployed in space.

AND OBJECTIVES

mination of the basic characteristics of the infra-structure elements actually needed, of theiracquisition schedule and cost, or of the meanswhereby they should be acquired.

If future U.S. space-related goals and objectivesare to be effective in providing direction to futureU.S. space efforts, they should be such as to com-mand widespread attention; have great inherenthumanitarian and scientific interest; foster the de-velopment of new technology; have relevance


to global issues; prompt international coopera-tion; and involve major participation of our pri-

vate sector so as to advance our economicprospects.

THE POLICY BACKGROUND

The overall end of U.S. space activities was firststated as a preamble to the National Aeronauticsand Space (NAS) Act of 1958, as amended (sec.102 (a)): “The congress hereby declares that itis the policy of the United States that activitiesin space should be devoted to peaceful purposesfor the benefit of all mankind.” Six policy prin-ciples, forming the core of the NAS Act, give sub-stance to that overall end. These six have pro-vided the framework in accordance with whichthe civilian space program has evolved to thepresent day. These principles may be stated asfollows:

●

●

●

●

●

●

that U.S. preeminence in space science, ex-ploration and applications be maintained;that economic, political, and social benefitsbe derived;that knowledge be increased;that civilian and military activities be sepa-rated (though they are to be coordinated andare not to duplicate one another unneces-sarily);that NASA, the civilian agency, be limitedlargely to research; andthat international cooperation be fostered.

Thus, the NAS Act articulated the policy prin-ciples for overall guidance of the U.S. civilianspace program, but the act alone has not pro-vided (and cannot be expected to provide) theparticular goals for civilian space activities. Lack-ing such guidance, the space program has insteadbeen directed by political and budgetary pres-sures not always relevant to a logically orderedexploration, development, and use of space. Atthe same time, none of the policymaking bodiessuccessively established in the executive branchnor any of the committees of Congress have beenable to ensure that a long-range plan of particu-lar policies and programs would be pursued. s

5For a fu II discussion of these policy principles and their implica-tions, see Civilian Space Policy and Applications, O T A - S T I - 1 7 7(Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,June 1982).

Over the years, a number of specific goals andobjectives have been proposed. Significantly,however, none of them has arisen as a result ofwidespread public discussion. With the maturityof U.S. space capabilities (and the capabilities ofseveral other countries and our own private sec-tor as well) on the one hand and the straitenedfinancial circumstances of the Government onthe other, this situation is in need of fundamen-tal change. That is, if the United States is to main-tain a strong commitment to a continuing civil-ian space program, then an informed nationalagreement on the goals and objectives of sucha program is most important.

At the beginning of the Nixon Administration,the Apollo program was rapidly coming to a suc-cessful close, but no clear definition of a post-Apollo space program had emerged. Early plan-ning efforts had failed to yield a consensus, andspace program budgets had decreased dramati-cally, presenting the new administration withgrowing unemployment in the aerospace indus-try as well as a major technological agency thatdid not have clear signals regarding its future. Inorder to address these problems, the Presiden-tial Space Task Group (STG) was establishedunder the chairmanship of the Vice President.The STG review was the first comprehensive in-teragency planning effort that was carried outwith respect to the civilian space program.

In its final report,6 the STG recommended com-mitment to a balanced publicly funded programthat included science, applications, and technol-ogy-development objectives, but no immediatecommitment to expeditions to the planets. Theysuggested no change in the institutional structurenor an operations role for NASA, but did empha-size the desirability of expanding internationalcooperation. The major technological develop-ment that the STG suggested was the reusable

— - . . —bThe Post-Apo/lo Space Program: Directions for the Future, Space

Task Group Report to the President, September 1969.

Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate ● 107

space Shuttle system that couId support an even-tual “space station. ” The clear priority was forShuttle development first, with a “space station”as a potential future development. Support forexploratory expeditions to the planets was re-tained as a long-range option for the Govern-ment’s civilian space program, with a “mannedMars mission before the end of this century asa first target. ”

In 1976, almost two decades after the adop-tion of the NAS Act, NASA issued its own “Out-look for Space” report. This document addressedthe cultural goal of better scientific understand-ing of the physical universe and the social/eco-nomic goal of further exploration and exploita-tion of the solar system, The report suggests fourgoals reflective of basic human physical needs:

1. improving food production and distribution;2. developing new energy sources;3. meeting new challenges to the environment;

and4. predicting and dealing with natural and man-

made disasters.

In October 1978, President Carter released aspace policy statement that summarized the im-portant aspects of an administration review ofspace policy and provided guidance regardingthe President’s view of national objectives in thepublicly supported civilian space program overthe next several years. This statement reaffirmedendorsement of a balanced space program andcommitted the administration to the continueddevelopment of the space Shuttle system and itsuse during the coming decade. However, thestatement made no new program commitmentsand specifically rejected any major new techno-logical development. No goals were set to pro-vide a focus for the program and the general phi-losophy was best characterized by the statementthat “activities will be pursued in space when itappears that national objectives can most effi-ciently be met through space activities. ” Over-all, the policy statement left many questions un-answered. It made several statements about whatthe United States would not do in space, but re-mained very general regarding the nature of whatit would do. In addition, it became clear that fiscalconstraints were likely to continue, and, as a con-

sequence, commitments to specific multiyearGovernment programs would be made only withgreat care. This announcement was received withsome dismay by the congressional leaders in-volved with the space program and by the aero-space community. This concern spawned a num-ber of hearings and proposed legislative approachesto a more vigorous space policy for the UnitedStates, and led to the request for the OTA assess-ment of Civilian Space Policy and Applications.

Then on July 4, 1982, President Reagan an-nounced the issuance of his National Space Pol-icy Statement “. . . to provide a general directionfor our future [space] efforts . . .,” asserting that// . . . our goals for space are ambitious, yetachievable. ” This statement “. . . establishes thebasic goals of United States policy which are to:

1.2.3.

4.

5.

6.

strengthen the security of the United States;maintain U.S. space leadership;obtain economic and scientific benefitsthrough the exploitation of space;expand U.S. private sector investment andinvolvement in civil space and space-relatedactivities;promote international cooperative activitiesin the national interest; andcooperate with other nations in maintainingthe freedom of space for activities which en:hance the security and welfare of man kind.”

On June 27, 1983, the Science Advisor to thePresident “. . . challenged] the aerospace com-munity to do some bold thinking about the future[concerning space],” and went on to observe that// . . . the real issue is how we can fashion a spaceprogram that addresses today’s national aspira-tions and needs . . . and . . . re-ignite[s] the spiritof adventure that captured America in the past. . . . “ He questioned “. . . why don’t we let theAmerican people share the grand vision of thefuture of space?”

But the articulated goals, particularly in the ab-sence of specific objectives designed to addressthem, fall well short of what the United States,today, might expect of its publicly supported ci-vilian space activities.

They do not speak at all of such fundamentalmatters as having human beings in space; of hav-

108 “ Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

ing the general public directly involved in space- pendence of the Western European countries andrelated matters; or of ameliorating the great in- Canada, Japan, Brazil, the People’s Republic ofhibition that the present cost of space assets and China, india, and others, as well as the large andactivities has on the development and use of constantly expanding U.S.S.R, space programspace. And there is little in these words to sug- that, in its nonmilitary aspects, commands the at-gest the imaginative, the exciting, the challenging tention and respect of our civilian space Ieaders.7

or the adventurous or, to use the Science Advi-sor’s word: the “bold. ” 7See Salyut—Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence

Finally, behind all of this there are the growin Space—A Technical Memorandum, OTA-TM-STI-14 (Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Decem-

i n g a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , c o m p e t e n c e , a n d i n d e - ber 1983).

TODAY’S TOO NARROW DEBATE

As the important matter of defining and artic-ulating such national goals and objectives is ad-dressed, it should not be taken as implied herethat such definition and articulation are not nowgoing on. What should be understood is that, forall practical purposes (including that of obtain-ing any civilian “space station”), this activity isbeing conducted by space-related scientists, engi-neers, and program managers—almost all withinthe Government, within university offices sup-ported by the Government, or within the Gov-ernment-supported aerospace industry, At best,then, the goals and objectives that would be ex-pected to result from this kind of considerationmight, understandably, represent viewpoints thatare narrow relative to the wide spectrum of ournational interests and opportunities in the civil-ian space area today. It is likely that an expres-sion of goals, and especially specific objectives,arrived at in this fashion will reflect, perhaps un-duly, the interests of their originators. And finally,the U.S. political system oftentimes places as

RECENT

Recently, there have been a number of callsto formulate a set of broadly based, contempo-rary national goals and objectives in the civilianspace area.

For instance, Simon Ramo observes in his newbook What’s Wrong With Our Technological So-ciety and How to Fix /t (pp. 175-1 76):

After twenty-five years it is still true of the en-tire commercial use of space in the united States

much weight on the process by which a nationaldecision is reached as on the substance of thisdecision; therefore, the better course for the Gov-ernment in the longer run is to encourage asmany of our citizens who are interested in spaceto participate in the pre-decision debate.

It was quite appropriate that, for most of thepast quarter of a century, our national space goalsand objectives primarily reflected those of the sci-ence and technology communities alone. Thesecommunities have done their work well. Conse-quently, our space activities now can, and should,be broadened to reflect both the maturity of ourspace knowledge and skills, and the general pub-lic’s broader interests and concerns.

The matter of describing a new and clarifiedset of long-term civilian space goals, and layingout specific civilian space activity objectives, ismade more urgent by the recent increase of mil-itary interest in space—an increase that may wellsoon accelerate.

PROPOSALS

that the government and the private sector havenot yet worked out their best permanent roles.Less forgivable is something else. With space soclearly an arena of powerful economic and [na-tional] security interest for the nation, we havebeen approaching plans and policies aboutspace for well over a decade on an intermittent,t-top-and-jump short-range political basis. NASAhas many hopes and plans, of course, but thenation does not have a plan for the next two dec-ades. A real plan would describe both goals and

Ch. 5—Broadening the Debate • 109

anticipated budgets. It would have recognition,acceptance, and stature with all the power cen-ters influencing advances and applications inspace, namely, the government’s ExecutiveBranch, Congress, industry, and the scientificand technological fraternity. A real plan wouldbe one to which all these forces were committedlong-term, in the same way that at the start ofthe 1960s we were committed to landing a manon the moon before the end of the decade. . . .[And while] the possibilities of space warfare[and] economic constraints [must be considered]none of these factors should prevent the UnitedStates from having sound long-range space goalsas a guide to the government’s budgeting proc-ess. . . . Less-than-adequate attention has beengiven to setting priorities and long-range goalsand allocating missions to each sector.

in a recent report prepared by the Subcommit-tee on Space Science and Applications and trans-mitted to the Committee on Science and Tech-nology of the U.S. House of Representatives,Representative Ronnie Flippo, then Chairman ofthe Subcommittee, stated that: “. . . there is alack of long-range goals for our space program.”8

The report noted that 7 years earlier it had alsoaddressed “Future Space Programs” and thenemphasized that NASA should “. . . focus on anover-arching concept [that] should represent oneor more mind-expanding endeavors which chal-lenge the imagination and capability of the coun-try [the] key element of [which] should be sub-

~Future Space Programs: 1981, Subcommittee on Space Scienceand Applications, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S.House of Representatives, May 1982, p. 1.

stantial return on past and current investmentsin space through clear . . . benefits to the societyon earth in the form of greatly expanded serv-ices and direct contributions to solution of earth-bound problems. ”9

The “NASA Advisory Council Study of the Mis-sion of NASA” (released on Oct. 12, 1983) sug-gests activities that, in some cases, could be con-sidered goals or objectives: explore the solarsystem, pursue scientific research in space, ex-ploit space for public and commercial purposes,and expand human presence in space. AndNASA awarded a near $1 million contract to aprivate organization (Ecosystems) to provide itwith suggestions on “. . . long-term researchgoals and the technology it should work on tomeet those goals. ”

The President’s Private-Sector Survey on CostControl, in commenting on the “. . . Federalexpenditure on R&D [of] about $48 billion a year. . . faults the major science agencies for failingto have clearly defined goals and plans for meet-ing them. ”10 And an editorial in the ChristianScience Monitor pointedly observes that “. . . itis most important that the U.S. develop a con-sensus on manned-space-flight goals. None nowexists . . . Until consensus exists no specific spacestation concept can be usefully approved.’” 11

91 bid., p. 3.l~sclence, No. 222, NO V. 25 , 1983, p. 903.I I The Chrjgjan Science Monitor, Dec. 12, 1983, p. 23.

PRESIDENT REAGAN’S CALL FOR A “SPACE STATION”

In 1984, the future of the Nation’s activities inspace was placed squarely on the congressionalagenda. In his State of the Union Address, Presi-dent Reagan spoke at considerable length aboutthe space area and what he judges should be theNation’s aspirations in regard to it. And he de-voted his radio address during the same week tospace. He directed NASA to commence the de-velopment of permanent, low-Earth-orbit infra-structure that would support human beings inspace, and to obtain it within the next decade.And he asked Congress to authorize and appro-

priate Federal funds to begin studies of this pro-posed infrastructure.

Of particular relevance here is the president’sassertion that: “[one of] our great goal[s] is to buildon America’s pioneer spirit and develop our nextfrontier . . . : space.”; “America has always beengreatest when we dared to be great. . . . We canfollow our dreams to distant stars.” And in devel-oping the infrastructure (i. e., a civilian “space sta-tion”) he called for international participation so


as to: “. . . expand freedom for all who share our In effect, the President’s speeches have nowgoals. ” prompted, and indeed his specific request for Fed-

In his radio talk, he spoke to the: “. . . challengeeral law and funds for a major new initiative in the

[of] reaching for exciting goals in space , . . ,“ whilepublicly funded civilian space program essentiallyrequires, the conduct of a national debate over the

explaining that, as well, “Our space goals will chart next year or two regarding our national interests,a path of progress toward creating a better life for

goals and objectives in the civilian space area.all people” [and he emphasized that]: “a , . . spacestation [should be seen as] a stepping stone for [ad-dressing] further goals.” Emphasis added.

STEPS TOWARD BROADER PARTICIPATION

Interestingly enough, the circumstances dis-cussed above have resulted in only one impor-tant change to the basic 1958 Act—the explicitemphasis on space commercialization that wasadded this summer. Indeed, it was only in thefall of 1983 that Congress began to hold hearingsthat might lay a basis for such changes. Scoresof billions of public dollars have been appropri-ated to pay for our public civilian space programsince we reached the Moon, and almost surelyscores of billions more will be appropriated dur-ing the next few decades, but, to date, withoutthe kind of thoughtful and fundamental reap-praisal of our contemporary national interests andactivities in space that many are coming to believethe issues now demand. Our publicly supportedciviIian space area has seemed to suffer from aform of benign neglect.

However, the debate is quickening. Congresshas taken an extraordinary step regarding the ar-ticulation of national goals and objectives in thecivilian space area. In passing the National Aero-nautics and Space Act of 1985, Congress, amongother things, found and declared that “. . . theidentification of long-range goals and policy op-tions for the United States civilian space programthrough a high-level, representational publicforum will assist the President and the Congressin formulating future policies for the . . . pro-gram . . . “; and they called for the establishment

of a “National Commission on Space” that willassist the United States “ . . . to define the long-range needs of the Nation that may be fulfilledthrough the peaceful uses of outer space “12

With the President’s signature to Public Law 98-361, there has been put into motion the first for-mal and fundamental reexamination of the Na-tion’s civilian space aspirations, objectives andinstitutions since the passage of the NAS Act in1958.

From the outset of this assessment, the needfor identifying a far-sighted set of generally accept-able civilian space goals and objectives that re-flect today’s circumstances has been apparent.Most notably, the assessment’s Advisory Panelhas strongly urged that an initial set of such goalsand objectives be identified and proposed forbroad study and discussion so as to lay a morerational basis for the consideration of any largeand costly space civilian “space station. ”

In response to that call, and with the intentionof providing a sound and useful starting point fora national debate on the scope and direction ofthe Nation’s space activities, the next chapter ofthis report provides an ensemble of interrelatedgoals and objectives for consideration by Con-gress and the American public.

IZpubllc Law 98-36I, Title Ii.

Chapter 6

TOWARD A GOAL-ORIENTEDCIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM

Contents

Possible Civilian Space Goals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Possible Civilian Space Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Indicated infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cost and Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Final Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES

Page

113

113

122

124

126

128

Table No. Page

9. Possible Goals and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11510. Cost and Schedule to satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion . . . . . . . 125

Chapter 6

TOWARD A GOAL-ORIENTEDCIVILIAN SPACE PROGRAM

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN SPACE GOALS

If the civilian space activities of the UnitedStates are to maintain widespread and enthusi-astic public support, they should aspire to pro-tect, ease, challenge, and/or improve the humancondition. Such aspirations can and should bearticulated in the form of long-range goals thatwould guide the conduct of the Nation’s spaceactivities in general and a decision regarding pos-sible acquisition of any “space station” in par-ticular.

In order to prompt the formulation and subse-quent discussion of future space goals and ob-jectives, OTA has prepared a list of possible long-range goals and a set of nearer term objectivesdesigned to address those goals. Although OTAdoes not recommend either this particular set ofgoals or its supporting family of objectives, theyare intended to exemplify the kind of goals andobjectives around which consensus might wellbe formed so as to provide sensible guidance forthe Nation’s future space activities. The AdvisoryPanel for this assessment has taken an unusuallyactive role in helping to formulate these goals andobjectives. It is the Panel’s judgment that thegoals and objectives proposed for discussion arereasonable and important.

The set of possible goals follows. (They shouldbe read with reference to the six basic principlesspoken to in the 1958 Space Act and discussedin the previous chapter. ) Some of these can bedefined in fairly specific terms, but others–no less

POSSIBLE CIVILIAN

In order to illustrate how the six basic civilianspace goals suggested in the previous sectioncould be addressed, this section identifies 10 spe-cific objectives that the United States (in coop-

significant—can be stated only in a more generaland open-ended way:

●

●

●

●

Ž

●

to increase the efficiency of space activitiesand reduce their net cost to the generalpublic;to involve the general public directly in spaceactivities, both on Earth and in space;to derive scientific, economic, social, andpolitical benefits;to increase international cooperation andcollaboration in and re space;to study and to explore the Earth, the solarsystem, and the greater physical universe;andto spread life, in a responsible fashion,throughout the solar system. ’

These goals (some new, some already well-accepted) have been chosen so as to move U.S.space interests and activities closer to the main-stream of public interest and concern, while atthe same time maintaining space leadership,enhancing national security, and developing newcapabilities to respond to finding the unexpectedin the cosmos.

I Undertaking this goal responsibly would entail preserving thepristine environments of other worlds for future study and apprecia-tion. For example, there are bodies such as Europa and Titan, whichhave not yet been explored, where life may already exist. And thereremains some residual controversy even about the possibility ofmicrobes on Mars.

SPACE OBJECTIVES

eration with other countries, in most cases) couldattain within the second quarter-century of thespace age. The particular objectives suggestedhere for further study and discussion are chosen

113


to have a great impact and, taken as a group, torespond to a broad spectrum of public, private,professional, and international interests.

Of course, discussion of any of these concep-tual objectives should actually be undertakenonly with surface-based alternative and comple-mentary activities clearly in mind. Some elementsof a few are already under way in a modest fash-ion, but not in the sharply focused fashion sug-gested here. Some may turn out not to be feasi-ble for technological, economic, or other reasons,Some could be attained in a very short time, butothers will take many years. Some respond to ob-jective needs, some respond to conceptual op-portunities. Broad consensus on some should berather easily reached, but others can be expectedto provoke serious argument and perhaps evendisagreement. They range in cost from near-zeroto tens of billions of dollars. Some are chosen par-ticularly because, in addition to the importanceof their being achieved, they also invite the ac-tive and important partnership of other countriesand the U.S. private sector.

These objectives are proposed under the as-sumption that the U.S. Government would still beexpected to carry on, as today, a “core” space-related basic research program at the level of atleast $1 billion annually (in constant dollars). Purescientific research should continue to encompasssuch diverse space-related areas as astronomy,cosmology, life sciences, materials sciences, ge-odesy, magnetism, relativity, plasma physics, me-teorology, atmospheric composition and dynam-ics, and programs of preparing for human Iunar,asteroid, and planetary exploration and settle-ment. The basic research program would be ex-pected to continue solar system exploration gen-erally, including the planets, their moons, theSun, comets and asteroids, and to improve themethods and means of transporting equipmentand people in space. And it would be expectedto develop, deploy, and use those “cutting edge”space technologies—large and sophisticated tele-scopes and interferometers that span the elec-tromagnetic spectrum, microgravity furnaces, so-phisticated and powerful Earth-oriented remotesensors, sophisticated space probes, etc.—that arerequired to make early and fundamental advancesin these fields in a highly productive fashion.

The results of these basic research activities, ofcourse, will be many and varied. In both theshorter and longer term they can have importantpublic policy implications and, in general, theycan eventually influence the cultural, economic,and national security interests of the country inmany, and oftentimes unexpected, ways. As theroles and capabilities expected of our in-spaceinfrastructure for the next two or three decadesare considered, basic research activities shouldreceive a high priority.2 Continuing success infundamental space research may be expected tofacilitate the accomplishment of the objectivesproposed here.

The titles of the 10 civilian space objectives fol-low. They are not rank-ordered:

1.

2.

3.4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

90

10.

Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimi-zation.Human Presence and Activities on theMoon.Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids.Medical Research of Direct Interest to theGeneral Public.People, Drawn From the General Public,in Space.Modernizing and Expanding InternationalShort-Wave Broadcasting.Providing Space Data Directly to the Gen-eral Public.Using Space and Space Technology for theTransmission of Electrical Energy.Reducing the Cost of Space Operations, Es-pecially Transportation.lncreasing Commercial-Industrial SpaceSales.

The eventual acceptance of any or all of theseobjectives (along with their related costs) as ac-tual national objectives would leave the priorityamong them, and the rate of public expenditurein addressing them, completely open. Each andall would be undertaken, if at all, only as thefunds become available to do so.

Table 9 relates these 10 specific objectives tothe broader goals.

A brief elaboration of each of the 10 follows.

‘See the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (Public Law98-361 ).

Ch. 6—Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 115

Table 9.—Possible Goals and Objectives

Goals

Increase Derivespace activities’ Involve the scientific, Increase Study and Bring life

efficiency; general Derive political, inter- explore the to thereduce their public economic and social national physical physical

net cost directly benefits benefits cooperation universe universe

Objectives:1.-

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Establish a global information system/service re natural hazardsEstablish lower cost reusabletransportation service to the Moon andestablish human presence thereUse space probes to obtain informationre Mars and some asteroids prior toearly human explorationConduct medical research of directinterest to the general publicBring at least hundreds of the generalpublic per year into space for shortvisitsEstablish a global, direct, audio broad-casting, common-user system/serviceMake essentially all data generated bycivilian satellites and spacecraftdirectly available to the general publicExploit radio/optical free spaceelectromagnetic propagation for long-distance energy distributionReduce the unit cost of space transpor-tation and space activitiesa

Increase space-related private sector

N

Y

N

P

P

P

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

N N N Y Y Y N

N

N

N

Y

P

Y

Y

Y

P

Y

N

N

N

Y

N

N

P

Y

P

P

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N N Y P Y N N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N

N

N

N

N

Nsale#

aThls ~~u~d advance the proSpeC& of successfully addressing all other ‘Qoals.”

Y: Yes; N: No; P: Perhaps; depends on how carded out.

1. Global Disaster Avoidance and Minimiza-tion.—ln cooperation with the other countries ofthe world, our Government and our scientific andenginering communities could be set to the taskof beginning to provide a global, space-related,Earth-monitoring system/service which wouldprovide fundamental information to the world’spolitical leaders, organizations, and institutionsto assist them in dealing, satisfactorily, withmacroscopic “life-and-death” problems in suchareas as weather, climate, air and water purity,food production, seismology, and resource con-servation. It would be designed to complementrelated surface-based system/services, taking spe-cific advantage of the in-situ measurement andmonitoring perspectives that only appropriatesensors located in space could offer. Attentioncould be concentrated on earthquakes, tsunamis,ozonosphere perturbations, severe storms, envi-ronmental pollution, the carbon dioxide “green-house” effect, volcanic effluvia, etc. Well beforethe year 2000 this operational global system/serv-ice could be in place, monitoring and studying

the Earth’s space and atmosphere, and surfaceand subsurface, for characteristics and changesrelevant to such problems, and supplying bothimmediate and longer term “warning” infor-mation promptly, directly, and in a form usefulto nontechnicians.

These are problems that have inherent multina-tional elements of potentially grave hazard. Andthis type of space-related system/service could bedeveloped, installed, and used in such a fashionas to obviate the serious concerns raised by somecountries over what they consider to be unduesurveillance of a military-political nature, or thekind of monitoring that could provide an undueeconomic advantage to some countries. Theoriginal elements of this system/service could becontinually improved on as new scientific knowl-edge is obtained, new space-related measure-ment techniques are perfected, and experienceis gained in the reliability, utility, and cost ofspace-related services in comparison with analo-gous services that could be provided at the sur-

—


face. It could, of course, draw heavily on any“global habitability” scientific studies. And itcould provide information that would be usefuIin furthering study of “nuclear winter. ”

2. Human Presence and Activities on the Moon.–Our Government and our scientific and engi-neering communities in government, universities,and the private sector, could be given the taskof establishing a modest, permanent, habitablefacility on our Earth’s Moon. Such a facility wouldallow physical, chemical, geological, and cosmo-logical studies to begin there in earnest–with theentire activity involving as many countries as pos-sible. The U.S. private sector in concert with theGovernment could also be challenged to providefacilities and services there that would open upthe Moon to travel, recreation, sports and othercultural, commercial, and industrial pursuits.Three important elements of this program couldbe: 1 ) the development of a relatively low-cost,human transportation system/service betweenlow-Earth-orbit and the Moon [see objective (9)];2) consideration of producing oxygen on theMoon from lunar materials as a source of rocketoxidant for return trips and for life support (i. e.,using solar energy to release oxygen from Moonrocks); and 3) a search for abundant supplies ofwater/ice in the cold-traps at the lunar poles.

A primary cost-driver for human settlement onthe Moon, and other celestial objects, will be thereliability and efficiency of the technology whichwould enable such settlements to provide livableatmospheres, grow their own food, and build ef-fective and durable habitats using local materials.

3. Obtaining Information Required for EventualHuman Exploration of Mars and Some Asteroids.—The Soviet Union has stated that it expects toexplore, and have some of its people establisha presence on, the planet Mars. The United Statescould also aspire to do so when the technologyis in hand to allow it to be done at relatively lowcost, when adequate Mars-related data and in-formation are also in hand, and when our experi-ence in settling on the Moon gives us the con-fidence that we can do so successfully and effi-ciently [see objective (2)]. Early programs to de-velop and use lower cost transportation, hous-ing, and people-related services in establishing

low-Earth-orbit and lunar residential and workplaces could all keep analogous Mars objectivesspecifically in mind. Over the next 10 to 20 years,crewless space probes, with characteristics spe-cifically reflective of our intention to have someof our men and women visit the surface of Marsearly in the next century, could be sent there.Specific plans could see a human exploration pro-gram commence on the satisfactory completionof our initial settlement on the Moon, providedthe cost of doing so is then seen to be acceptable.

Of course, the space probes could, as well,search for information of importance to a betterunderstanding of our own terrestrial circum-stances and processes. And consideration couldbe given to exploring a few of the asteroids aswel I.

4. Medical Research of Direct Interest to theGeneral Public.– For over 20 years, the space pro-grams of both the United States and the SovietUnion have been concerned with the ability ofmen and women to survive and function well inspace. Space provides a special environment,marked particularly by the near absence of grav-ity, within which several diseases and relatedhuman physiological processes might now beginto be profitably investigated. Important topicsrelevant not only to future space dwellers, butalso to the Earth population as well, could includeresearch on hypertension, osteoporosis (a disor-der involving loss of bone mass highly prevalentin older women), osteoarthritis (which affectsover 16 million Americans), weight control, en-ergy metabolism, digestive function, and bodyfluid balance.

To elaborate on one such opportunity: exper-imental evidence, gathered from both animalsand humans in space and in certain Earth-basedsimulations of some of the conditions of spaceflight, suggests that there may bean analogy be-tween some of the physiological changes that oc-cur in the absence of gravity and those changeswhich take place during the normal aging proc-ess. For example, as cosmonauts and astronautsadapt to longer duration living in essentiaJJyweightless conditions in space, they experienceatrophied muscles, brittle bones, and decreasedcardiovascular and respiratory capacity, i.e.,

38-798 0 - 84 - 9 : QL. 3


physiological conditions similar to those whichaccompany senescence. Further experimentalstudies in research programs carried on at theEarth’s surface and on the Shuttle-Spacelab mayconfirm that, inasmuch as the human aging proc-ess evolved under conditions of constant grav-ity here on Earth, removal of this force over longperiods of time in space results in changes in theaging process and its rate—changes that could bestudied in weightlessness with an explicit inten-tion of relating any findings to the general popula-tion. Given the importance of scientific studiesof aging to all of the world’s people as individuals,and the effects of an aging population on manyeconomic, social, and political institutions, if sur-face and Shuttle-Spacelab “space station” studiesare encouraging, the United States could in-augurate a major international research programin the fields of gerontology and geriatrics thatwould encompass related experimentation bothin space and on the Earth’s surface.

5. People, Drawn From the General public, inSpace.—The Government is now moving to ex-pand human use of the Shuttle to include a veryfew nontechnician “communicators” per year onEarth-space flights. Within the next decade, wecould have space “Lodge/Habitats” establishedin low-Earth-orbit, with the Shuttle being used tosee hundreds of persons per year, the great ma-jority of whom would be representative of variousprofessional and cultural sectors and the generalpublic (i.e., nonastronauts and nonspace techni-cian workers) drawn from the United States andrest of the entire world’s population, being trans-ported there to spend a short time in space. Theentire activity could be operated as a sound,albeit innovative, commercial enterprise carriedon in cooperation with the U.S. Government;there should be little or no net out-of-pocket costto the Government as a consequence of this co-operation. The enterprise could be conducted soas not to favor the rich—all of our citizens shouldhave some opportunity to visit there. And such“Lodge/Habitats,” and the activities that they,and the Shuttle, could allow to commence inspace, could be used to help the world celebratethe next “Millennium” in an extraordinary fashion.

Only when a large number of our citizens, rep-resentative of a broad cross-section of our society,

begin to experience the “space adventure” di-rectly, will the space domain and space activi-ties gradually begin to move into the mainstreamof our national interests and concerns.

~his objective and objective (7) have in com-mon the aim of making the space domain, andspace science and technology, much more acces-sible to the general public.]

6. Modernizing and Expanding InternationalShort-Wave Broadcasting.–Hundreds of millionsof people, world-wide, regularly listen to speechand music programs broadcast via shortwave bymore than 100 countries. Because of the inherentcharacteristics of the ionosphere which influencethe way by which the broadcast signals are pro-pagated, this service is limited at best and often-times is of poor quality, reliability, and coverage.Also, shortwave broadcasting has become a mat-ter of growing international political contentionbecause of its dominance by the major countriesand the growing interference to reception causedby increasing use of the sharply limited usefulradio-wave spectrum by very powerful surfacetransmitters. A cooperative U.S. Government-private sector initiative could lead an internationaleffort to establish a global system, employing so-phisticated and powerful direct broadcast satel-lites, that could replace most of today’s individ-ual country shortwave stations well within adecade. Developed as an international common-user system, use of its services could allow broad-casters throughout the world, regardless of theirsize, location, or political persuasion, to reachaudiences in other countries clearly and reliably,and at relatively modest cost. Such a servicecould go far toward meeting a standard of nation-to-nation broadcasting equitability simply notphysically possible under today’s surface-basedshortwave broadcasting circumstances. Briefly,it would be a more efficient, effective, and fairway of accomplishing the kind of shortwavebroadcasting now done from the Earth’s surface.And, as well, the prospect of wholly new kindsof international programming and internationalmarketing services could be opened.

7. Providing Space Data Directly to the GeneralPublic.—’’The wholesale introduction of com-puters into [the home and especially] into class-


rooms since 1980 amounts to a quiet revolutionthat will help meet the demands of scientific andtechnological change as well as economic com-putation in world markets.” 3 Nearly 80 percent

of our junior and senior high schools now havecomputers and it is expected that the number inour public schools will reach 600,000 by nextyear. A computer network now interconnects 200university sites, and the number of terminals isexpected to reach 150,000 soon.

A high school teacher in the United Kingdomhas attained international attention by having hisstudents ‘‘tune in” to signals from Soviet space-craft and deduce information about the crafts’characteristics and activities. The cultural, social,and economic implications of having a large andgrowing segment of our population using increas-ingly sophisticated computers in their homes,businesses, grade and high schools, universities,etc., promise to be enormous. Many of these in-dividuals and organizations could now be sup-plied, in near-real-time and at modest cost, withthe nonclassified and nonproprietary data gen-erated by payloads of public satellites and space-craft generally, by designing them to allow directreadout of the space signals transmitted fromthem and/or by providing the data promptly andgenerally from central collection points. For in-stance, a recent Shuttle/Spacelab flight resultedin the generation of 20 million video frames, 900frames of film, and 2 trillion bits of data. Hun-dreds of thousands of people have already takenthe opportunity simply to listen in, passively, tosurface-space voice communications—and mademodest payments to do so. Making data availableon the atmosphere, surface and subsurface char-acteristics of the bodies in our solar system, in-cluding the planet Earth, and spacecraft operat-ing data as well—all directly, while they werebeing generated–could allow and prompt amuch greater direct public involvement, bothhere and abroad, in the publicly supported U.S.civilian space program. As well, it could increase,by orders of magnitude, today’s study and ap-preciation of these space data, spacecraft tech-nology, and space activities generally, especiallyby our younger people. In time, the market couldwell prompt the creation of “service-added” or-

‘Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 6, 1984.

ganizations that could prepare various education-al packages with a wide variety of users in mind:students of various ages and interests and manyof the general public with home TV receivers,video recorders, and computers.

8. Using Space and Space Technology for theTransmission of Electrical Energy. -In effect, anyradio communication involves the transmissionof energy through the Earth’s atmosphere and/orspace—albeit at miniscule power levels. A fewyears ago, tens of thousands of watts of continu-ous microwave power were transmitted in freespace with very high efficiency and reliability, andmulti hundred million dollars per year Defenseprograms are now anticipated that would see atleast 10 megawatts transmitted through the at-mosphere and/or space via collimated and directedmicrowave and optical electromagnetic beams.Use of such methods and means might allowelectricity to be distributed usefully across space.Energy sources could be located in geostationaryorbit and/or on the lunar surface and the energytransmitted to the Earth’s surface. Or energycould be supplied from the Earth’s surface, asneeded, to geosynchronous orbit and to a mil-lion miles or more beyond, at any desired powerlevel. Given that the cost of electricity is verymuch higher in orbit (where it is provided by solarcell/battery combinations) than at the Earth’s sur-face, the latter might be able to be done com-petitively at an earlier date.

The ready availability of such electrical energyin space could allow a complete rethinking of thedesign and use of space assets and activities insuch space-related areas as communications, nav-igation, position-fixing, remote sensing, and eventransportation. This is because systems designerscould anticipate having tens of megawatts (ormore) of electrical power available in space,whereas they now have only kilowatts and stillonly tens of kilowatts by the middle of the nextdecade, and system operators would have to payonly for the amounts of power that the systemswould actually consume, just as at the surface.In addition, many areas of the world have enor-mous renewable energy potentials (especiallyhydro, but solar as well when the conversionprocess becomes economically attractive), butthey are located too far from other areas which


need such energy. A reliable, cost-competitiveand efficient solution to the very long-distance(several thousands of miles, and intercontinental)transmission problem could allow surface-gen-erated (N. B., in this case not in-space generated,as in the Solar Power Satellite concept) electri-city to be distributed via space. Most importantly,electricity generated by renewable sources couldbe treated as an exportable commodity, and in-ternational and intercontinental distribution andload-shedding could become a global possibil-ity—to great economic, social, and political ad-vantage.

And, of course, when such technology is reli-ably and economically in hand, it could be usedto supply electrical “fuel” to spacecraft on voy-ages to and from the Moon, and farther.

9. Reducing the Cost of Space Transportation.—Whatever other measures are used to charac-terize civilian space activities, that of the enor-mous cost of in-orbit assets and activities is cer-tain to be listed. The primary “cost-driver” is thatof space transportation for people and physicalassets. For the predictable future, it will cost wellover $1 ,000/lb (1984$) to place human and equip-ment payloads into 200-mile high-Earth orbit, inan era when, near the Earth’s surface, they canbe transported by aircraft over 10 times the dis-tance at one-thousandth of this cost. Such a greatcost differential continues to be one of the great-est inhibitions, perhaps the greatest inhibition, toour investment in, and use of, our Earth’s space.We could now begin to look well beyond theShuttle, and the specific technologies, fuels,payloads, and operations basic to its design anduse. We could mount large-scale, advanced tech-nology development programs that would ad-dress promising methods and means of provid-ing reliable space transportation at much lowerunit cost, giving full consideration to the futurecircumstance of the much greater space trafficvolumes that such lower costs could engender.An initial objective could be to reduce the costper pound for transport between the Earth’s sur-face and low-Earth-orbit by an order of mag-nitude.

10. Increasing Commercial-industrial SpaceSales.–The United States has spent well over$200 billion (1984$-adjusted) to learn how to en-ter space, to survive and function in it, and touse it. In doing so, the Nation has accrued anenormous reserve of space knowledge, assets,and experience, and created a sophisticatedhigh-technology space industry administered andmanaged by Government and non-Governmentprofessionals in essential harmony with manyother professionals in our university community.With one important exception, the entire civil-ian space effort has continued to be supportedfrom the public purse. The time has now beenreached when our private sector—commercial-industrial-financial—could begin to assume an in-creasing responsibility for the conduct of our ci-vilian space activities. The one exception, the pri-vate satellite communications business, has alreadyreached sales of some $2 billion per year andcontinues to grow at an average 15 percent peryear rate, compounded. Government organiza-tions, policies, activities, and leadership couldnow be structured not only to see that the growthin this one economically successful space fieldis maintained, but that other space fields (naviga-tion, position-fixing, tourism, remote sensing, andmaterials processing) are likewise explicitly en-couraged to grow and prosper. The President hasannounced a space strategy “to encourage Amer-ican industry to move quickly and decisively intcspace. Obstacles to private sector space activi-ties will be removed, and we’ll take appropriatesteps to spur private enterprise in space, ” Andthe Space Act has now been changed so as torequire NASA to “seek and encourage . . . thefullest commercial use of space.” New busi-nesses, increased employment, increased saleshere and abroad, the introduction of new anduseful public and private services, and larger Fed-eral, State, and local tax revenues all lie in pros-pect, once the present private sector learns howto moderate its dependence on the Govern-ment’s largess and its slow-paced, structured wayof doing business, and new private, competitive,entrepreneurial activities are formed and grow.One of the most important civilian space objec-


tives now could be that of seeing that procure-ment of more and more of our space assets, andthe conduct of more and more of our space activ-ities, become commercialized, so that: 1 ) the netburden of space activities on the public purse issharply reduced, and 2) the Government can applyits resources to the achievement of objectives thateither are not appropriate to the private sectoror lie beyond its capabilities.

As these economic benefits grow, they couldbe looked at as offsetting, at least to some extent,the cost of our publicly supported space program.Social benefits also must be kept in mind, sincea fundamental purpose of government is that ofmeeting important public needs that the privatesector inherently cannot.

Of course, a number of other objectives couldalso be entertained. These could include: in-creased emphasis on a solar system explorationprogram, augmenting the expected wide-ranging

core solar system exploration program mentionedearlier; a global person-to-person satellite com-munications system/service; an in-space “sophis-ticated-machine” experimental and demonstra-tion program; etc. It is clear that when trulyimaginative minds become impressed with thebroad dimensions of the space domain–not onlyits physical magnitude and character but the op-portunity for innovative uses–there is little appar-ent limit to the number and kinds of conceptsfor exploring and using it for earthly benefit.

Underlying a decision to pursue any or all ofthese objectives would be a concern for the basicwelfare of our own and indeed all of the world’speople; a challenge to international cooperationin large, exciting, and peaceful activities; a chal-lenge to the basic innovativeness and cost con-sciousness of our private sector; a commitmentto the permanent human investiture and consid-ered development of both our Earth’s space andour Moon; and a general sense of “spirit-lifting.”


After careful study, and the weighing of costs and reflective of enlightened U.S. leadership in thealternatives, it seems reasonable to observe that thoughtful, bold, imaginative, and purposeful de-any decision to pursue them could be taken as velopment and use of space.

INDICATED INFRASTRUCTURE

Some of these objectives, if they are to be fore . . . and use much common or hand-me-achieved, would require certain elements of in- down technology, as much as possible ratherspace infrastructure; others, depending on how than build custom hardware. . . .“4

they would be carried out, may or may not re-quire such elements; still others would requirenone. The manner in which the United States ob-tains any of this infrastructure should reflect, tothe maximum, our already great investment inspace technology and operations; whenever rea-sonably possible, it should be obtained at thelowest capital, and operations and maintenance,cost to the public purse. It would embrace the

If the Government’s large capital costs for de-velopment and production are to be minimizedand the private sector strengthened, then seriousconsideration should be given to encouraging theprivate sector to provide infrastructure elements,through sales, long-term leases, or on the basisof charges for actual service use, that meet Gov-ernment performance specifications.

views of NASA’s chief scientist: “[n assemblingthe necessary hardware, the watchword is ‘in-heritance’ . . . projects and spacecraft are to 4Dr. Frank McDonald, quoted in Christian Monitor,

make maximum use of what has been done be- Dec. 28, 1983, p. 14.


Obtaining space infrastructure in this fashionis not only a reasonable and effective use of U.S.space assets, but it could reduce the difficulty ofobtaining public funds for the scientists, engi-neers, managers, and equipment needed to pur-sue more, and more important, space ends.

The main elements of longer term space infra-structure called for in pursuing the 10 objectivesare:5

● an LEO capability to assemble and check outthe large and sophisticated satellites andspace structures needed to provide both thehazard-prevention and the direct audiobroadcast global system/service [objectives(1) and (6)];

JNo additional space infrastructure elements are needed toachieve objective (7).

●

●

●

an LEO human residential and workingspace to be used for medical research [ob-jective (4)];a transport staging facility to support efficienttravel to geostationary orbit, the Moon, andbeyond, using reusable orbital transfer ve-hicles or other vehicles. This would addressobjectives (1), (2), (3), (6), (9), and possibly(8); anda storage facility in LEO would allow use offull Shuttle loads, helping objective (9), andstaffed LEO laboratory facilities could pro-mote objective (1 O).

Of course, if such infrastructure elements wereavailable for the specific purposes that justify theiracquisition, they could be used for additional pur-poses also.

Note that, in essence, provision of the infra-structure needed to pursue two of the larger scale

—


objectives [(2) and (4)] could accommodate mostof the needs of all of the other eight. In what fol-lows, therefore, the cost of this infrastructure isincluded under these two objectives.

And note that no Government development offree-flying platform infrastructure elements iscalled for; they (e.g., MESA, SPAS, LEASECRAFT,EURECA, and the Space Industries platform)could and probably would be designed, devel-oped and installed by our private sector, and/orother countries, and offered to the civilian spacecommunity—both Government and private inter-ests—under appropriate sale or lease arrange-

COST AND

Attaining all of these 10 suggested conceptualobjectives would cost money—overall, a greatdeal of money. In table 10, rough estimates aremade for the cost of each of them, and the lengthof time over which each would be pursued. inall cases the cost estimates are rounded off to onefigure. And, again, the maximum use of: 1) al-ready developed and paid-for space technology,2) the most truly competitive procurement meth-ods, and 3) the most modern and least burden-some acquisition strategies and procedures, areall fundamental assumptions.

OTA’s first rough estimate of the total cost ofattaining all 10 of the objectives is some $40 bil-lion (1 984$) over the next 25 years. But, seem-ingly in the nature of things, long-term hightechnology development programs such as theseinvariably encounter unforeseen difficulties andexperience the pressure of unexpected externalevents. Indeed, the total cost should be under-stood to be no less than $40 billion (1 984$), andperhaps considerably more–as much as, say, $60billion (1984$ ).6 Given the early period at whichthese estimates are made, there cannot be great

b“ln recent decades the average overrun on major programs, inconstant dollars and constant quantities, has been slightly over 50percent. The average schedule milestone has been missed by a thirdof the time initially projected. The average time to develop newsystems has, until recently been increasing at the rate of threemonths per year . , each year. ” Norman R. Augustine, “TheAerospace Professional . . . and High-Tech Management, ” Aero-

space America, March 1984, p. 5.

ments, where they could be used for the conductof scientific research or the production of variousmaterials under microgravity conditions.

Finally, note that large amounts of very costlyelectrical power (with initial capital costs as highas $10,000 per watt) are not called for in LEO;some 20 kilowatts would appear to be sufficient.Larger amounts appear to be needed only for anyeventual commercial-industrial materials process-ing, and could then be provided and financedby the private sector in anticipation that suchprocessing will prove to be profitable.

SCHEDULE

confidence in their detailed accuracy. But suchaccuracy is not needed for the illustrative pur-poses for which they were developed.

if work were to commence on all of them now,the bulk of the cost would occur over the next15 years.

Space transportation costs are not included inthese estimates, except for an additional $0.1 bil-lion (1984$) or so for each LEO-lunar orbit flight.Rather, it is assumed that some 10 Shuttle surface-LEO flights per year, at an average cost of about$0.1 billion (1984$) each, would be budgeted forall Government-sponsored civilian research anddevelopment purposes, including those consid-ered here.

Clearly, these costs are great in total sum, espe-cially in the face of other important calls uponFederal tax revenues during an area of multi hun-dred billion dollar annual deficits in the Federalbudget.

While the total cost of our publicly funded ci-vilian space program will reflect the magnitudeand character of the objectives addressed in theprogram, and these will, in turn, reflect politicaldecisions, the unit costs to acquire and operatethe technology will reflect engineering and man-agement decisions.

Beyond the observation that, in some generalfashion, the cost will increase with the magnitude,

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Table 10.—Cost and Schedule to Satisfy Objectives Suggested for Discussion

Total costa DurationObjectives (billions, 1984 dollars) (years)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Establish a global information system/servicere natural hazardsEstablish lower cost reusable transportationservice to the Moon and establish humanpresence thereb

Use space probes to obtain information reMars and some asteroids prior to early humanexplorationConduct medical research of direct interest tothe general publicd

Bring at least hundreds of the generalpublic per year into space for short visitse

Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,common-user system/serviceMake essentially all data generated bycivilian satellites and spacecraft directlyavailable to the general publicExploit radio/optical free-space electro-magnetic propagation for Iong-distanceenergy distribution+

Reduce the unit cost of space transportationand space activitiesh

Increase space-related private sector salesh

2

20

2

6

0.5

2

0

0.5

5

0.5- $40i

10

15, 25

15

5, 25

5, 25

10

25

10

15

25

ab~t~ are for deve[~pment and acqu~sltlon, o~ratfons and maintenance costs are not Included, excePt for some launch and

operations costs noted for objectives 2, 3, and 4.b15 years t. establish the settlement, and 3 vlsits&ear at $0.1 billlon each (PIUS basic Shuttle launch costs) over the following

c&{~~r&erage, one pro~ evev 3 years and S0.4 billion each.d$2 billion over 5 years t. establish a life sciences laboratory in LEO, and $0.2 billionlyear thereafter to oPerate it. This

laborato~ could also be used for materials science and other research.e5 years t. establish a LEO “lodge-habitat, ” and its continuing use thereafter.f w ~ bllllon~ear In addition to DOD expenditures.9w:3 bllllon/year for a 15.year technology development effort to reduce space transportation Urlit COSk3.

%hls would also help efforts directed toward the other objectives.i The actual cost could ~ as high as ~ billion (1984 dollars), if costs exceed Mtial Predictions @ ~0/0

generality, and sophistication of the space capa-bility acquired, it is difficult–indeed, it is impos-sible, at this time—to estimate the eventual costto the Government of addressing these objectivesand obtaining the required infrastructure. A num-ber of the significant infrastructure “cost-drivers”are presented in chapter 4. Suffice it to say herethat there are a number of factors that could in-fluence the net cost to the taxpayer for acquir-ing space infrastructure, and many opportunitiesto minimize this net cost that could be graspedby vigorous and imaginative NASA management.Appendix D speaks to the matter of cost con-tainment.

To this point, only the initial capital cost of LEOinfrastructure has been considered. To this costmust be added its ongoing operation and main-tenance (O&M) costs (and the O&M costs of lunar

infrastructure also); the cost of instruments, fur-naces, etc., needed for scientific experimentationin association with its use; and the interest costof any money borrowed to fund the acquisitionprogram.7 We must remember, too, that infra-structure eventually becomes obsolete or wearsout, and, since its support services will come tobe depended on, this implies that some form ofamortization and replacement will be called for.

A consequence of the successful attainment ofany or all of these unit cost reduction objec-tives—and reduction in the unit cost of space

7Any such cost is not allocated (if indeed it were possible to allo-cate it) on a program-by-program basis. But, in the overall, the morethan $100 billion per year now required to be paid on the Federaldebt is a cost of Government that must be considered by Congress,at least implicitly, in all of its authorization and appropriationactions—in the space area as for all others.

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transportation generally—would be to attract and more of its research, development, test, andmore private interest to space activities. NASA, evaluation funds, to the development of trulyin turn, would then be able to apply more scien - “cutting edge” technology in support of itstific, engineering, and management attention, science, exploration, and other activities.

CONCLUSIONS

To create a truly modern civilian space pro-gram, the United States now might well move toadopt up-to-date, long-term goals in the civilianspace area, and to initiate work on a first familyof specific space objectives to address over thenext 20 to 25 years, If such goals and objectiveswere set, the Nation would have a clearer pic-ture of the kind of space infrastructure requiredto meet the objectives, as well as the cost andschedule under which this infrastructure couldbe obtained.

The United States would also be able to treatits publicly supported civilian space programmore explicitly as a direct investment of great po-tential economic importance, in addition to theother benefits that it provides. This might in turnensure that the program’s public costs would beprudently contained, that its economic benefitswould be substantially and objectively enlarged,and that it would serve the broadest public in-terest.

Finally, if an early, paced transfer of manage-ment attention, commitment, and resources takesplace away from further major development and/or production of Shuttle capability, and if thereis a vigorous and innovative pursuit of Govern-ment cost sharing with other countries and ourown private sector, then the 10 objectives out-lined here–or others analogous to them–couldbe aggressively pursued, and probably attainedrelatively soon, within the appropriations now ex-pected to be received by NASA. And the attain-ment of these objectives would entail the acqui-sition of much of the in-space infrastructure thatNASA now aspires to acquire. Also, if there is acontinuing increase in extra-NASA payments foruse of Shuttle services, and if the private space-related sector succeeds in continuing to grow atanything like its present rate, thereby generating

rapidly increasing tax revenues, these important“offsetting” incomes could be taken into consid-eration by Congress when passing on NASA ap-propriations.

Indeed, a reasonable extrapolation from pres-ent funding circumstances would suggest that, bythe end of this century, our publicly supportedspace program could be much larger than it istoday.

It must be emphasized that whether or not, asa matter of public policy, our tax-supported ci-vilian space program should be allowed to growto the magnitudes discussed here as possible isnot an issue addressed in this report. Rather, itis important to appreciate that, under certain con-ditions, expenditures for this program could beconsidered to be offset to a large extent by reve-nues, thus giving Congress more flexibility in set-ting expenditure levels than it has today. An im-portant element of public debate about our spacefuture, therefore, should be about the allocationof public, economically related investmentstherein—for we need no longer consider our pub-lic space expenditures as consumption expend-itures that underwrite the salaries of astronomers,the technologies required for exploring the solarsystem, and the intangibles of “space leader-ship. ”

The promising prospects now in view indicatewhat agenda items should be emphasized in pub-lic policy considerations of our long-term civil-ian space interests. For if, over the next quarter-century, we modernize our civilian space goalsand lay out a family of objectives for our civilianspace activities much broader than those usuallydiscussed; if we determine to focus our Govern-ment and private sector skills on building, togeth-er, a great commercial-i ndustrial-financial private

Ch. 6— Toward a Goal-Oriented Civilian Space Program ● 127.———— .——— -

sector space business in the face of growing in- we can move civiIian space activities into theternational competition; if we administer and mainstream of America ’s- indeed, the world's—manage our space activities with vigor, imagina- interests, reap great political, sociaI, and economiction, and statesmanship; and if we take the lead benefits, and very soon begin to have our menin orchestrating the space interests and activities and women strike out across the solar system.of all of the friendly countries of the world; then

Phofo credif /Vaflona/ Aeronauf/cs and Space Adm/n/straf/on

Space technology has opened up the entire to observation and scientific research. Satellite (I a joint projectof the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, produced dramatic revelations about the characteristics

of other stars in our galaxy.


FINAL OBSERVATIONS

Congress and the United States will soon havean unprecedented opportunity to rethink its basicviews and interests in the civilian space areathrough the creation, and subsequent endeavors,of a “National Commission on Space. ” PublicLaw 98-361 mandates that such an extraordinaryCommission be formed.

In preparation for doing so, a few observationsshould be made about a truly fundamental con-cern held by many regarding our publicly sup-ported civilian space program–a concern that,for the most part, goes unvoiced by professionalsassociated with this program, but which shouldbe dealt with in any fundamental reexaminationof it. In so doing, we should keep in mind thatthe essential magnitude and character of this pro-gram was set a generation ago in response to themajor national security concern raised by thelaunch of Sputnik by the U. S. S. R., and subse-quent international events and our perceptionsthereof. Thus, the basic nature was set in anotherera to serve the needs of that era and, fundamen-tally, has changed little, even though those needshave long since been met.

This concern may perhaps best be expressedin question form: How can the U.S. people andGovernment justify, today, continuing to makesuch truly great and continuing public expendi-tures on space related matters perceived by mostof our general public as (however at times inter-esting, and even exciting) lying well outside ofthe mainstream of their personal interests andconcerns, particularly now that our military spaceprogram serves to offset most perceived U.S.S.R.space-related military “threats,” and during anextended period of unusual national financialstringency?

As Congress begins to ponder this question, itmight start by reflecting on an observation maderecently by Freeman Dyson: “ . . . if I look at, say,Senate hearings and Congressional Committees,they tend to pay too much attention to scientists.They’re always talking very much in quantitativeterms and technical details when the problemsreally aren’t there. They very seldom ask, ‘Well,

what’s all this good for?’ “ (Emphasis in theoriginal .)8

In response to this question, many might bewilling, in principle, to give the Government the“benefit of the doubt” when its leaders point out(as they have nearly every year for the past dozen,at least), that eventually such R&D expenditureswill return economic benefits many times over.While there is a general consensus that, in macro-economic terms, economic “spinoff” to the pri-vate sector has been significant, outside of thesatellite communications area it has not been pos-sible to identify with objective confidence, todate, that such great economic returns have beenobtained (though there are grounds for hope thateventually satellite navigation and materials proc-essing in space may also provide significant eco-nomic benefits).9 And, of course, the same pros-pect for economic return could be advanced alsoabout many other economically related R&Dareas, high technology and not, in which Gov-ernment expenditures are either essentially zeroor only a very small fraction of today’s annual$7 billion public civilian space expenditures. Sothere is understandable reserve and questioningabout such a response. For most of us, $7 billionper year is a great deal of money.

Well beyond these kinds of considerations isthe ethical concern of whether or not scientists,engineers, and managers should be paid so verywell by the public to spend additional large sumsof public funds each year to do such things astake photographs of distant planets. Many takethe view that, with the immediate, continuing,and enormous problems faced by hundreds ofmillions of people throughout the world, withmillions of U.S. (tax-paying) families having to liveon a truly modest income or, indeed, having todeal with the lack of employment, with interest

eThe Washington Post, Apr. 9, 1984, P. B-1 1.9However difficult it may be to quantify the benefits of space R&D,

one can say with confidence that the use of weather satellites hassaved thousands of lives. In addition, the use of surveillance satel-lites has resulted in savings to the Government that are on the or-der of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars.


payments on our Federal debt now costing usover $100 billion per year, supporting space re-search and exploration of this great magnitudejust doesn’t seem to be a sensitive and equitableuse of public funds or even, to some, a particu-larly decent human avocation.

The more general pro forma response to thisconcern, at least in part, is that: “ . . . life is un-fair. ” Life is unfair. But most of us would proba-bly agree that we all do have some obligation,when reasonably possible, to attempt to redresssome of these sobering societal imbalances andthat, at the very least, those who are generouslysupported by the public to engage in civilianspace activities should share widely in the dis-charge of this obligation.

Another general pro forma response is thatmost grave and widespread human problemsseemingly cannot be addressed by space-relatedactivities, any more than they can be by a balletproduction or a walk in a park.

In this assessment the more direct and usefulresponse is that some of our civilian space pro-gram objectives can be purposely selected to seethat space is used, specifically, to make progresstoward important agreed-on societal ends. Thesuggested family of 10 conceptual objectives hasbeen crafted so as to see that some of them speakdirectly to a few of the most fundamental humanconcerns that space and space technology canindeed be used to “get at”: better protection fromnatural disasters, better communications amongthe world’s governments and peoples in our nu-clear weapons age, and greater understanding ofphysical conditions that affect all of us as we growolder. They are of such a basic nature as to beof potential value to “all mankind. ”

And, as well, a basic theme suggested here isthat the publicly supported civilian space pro-gram now could be organized and conducted toa considerable extent as a public investment pro-gram in basic science and high technology, and

that its leaders now could be charged, explicitly,with overseeing all of our public space activitieswith a fundamental view in mind: that these activ-ities lead, in both the shorter and longer run, tothe creation of wholly new commercial-industrial-financial ventures, and to truly large-scale, rapid,objectively measurable, national economic growth—with all that this implies for the delivery of new,useful, public and private goods and services, in-creased employment, increased deficit-offsettingtax revenues, and a more competitive interna-tional trading position.

And another basic theme is that the U.S. Gov-ernment could now endeavor to orchestrate theinterests and capabilities, however diverse and/orsmall, of all of the friendly peoples of the worldin cooperative civilian space activities.

If the United States does all of these things, anddoes them in a truly efficient and productive man-ner, then we would see space being used, wherespace can sensibly be used, both to protect andto ease the human condition.

With the creation of such major space-relatedprograms to address such basic human concerns,and appreciating that most of us the world over,much of the time, “do not live by bread alone,”we can in more reasonable conscience also con-tinue to undertake—and even perhaps enlargeupon—space-related activities that, as well, chal-lenge the human condition: we can strike outfrom the Earth for the Moon, 10 for the planets andasteroids, and indeed fix our eyes on ‘‘distants tar s .

But only if we pay our ethical dues to our fellowcountrymen and women and to “all mankind”-and only if we meet our financial obligations aswe go.

10An OTA Working paper giving the thoughts of six philosopherson “The Philosophical Implications of Establishing PermanentHuman Presence in Space” is available from the OTA Science,Transportation, and Innovation Program office.

POSTSCRIPT

This postscript gives the sense of a meeting of members of the AdvisoryPanel held in November 1983 at the Aspen Institute’s Wye Plantation. The docu-ment was prepared by E. B. Skolinoff, and carefully reviewed by the partici-pants. Certain exceptions expressed by participants are noted within the text.

The preparation of such a document by an OTA Advisory Panel iS an un-usual act ion; Advisory Pane Is are seIected to represent a wide cross cross-sectionof informed opinion, and serve only to give guidance and review to an OTAassessment. In this case, however, the people I i steal below chose to go beyondthe traditional role, and express their own views directly. Panel members havealso been given the opportunity to fulIy review and comment on the fulItextof the report itself.

REPORT OF THE SECOND ADVISORY PANEL MEETINGHeld at Aspen-Wye Plantation in November 1983

byProfessor E.B. Skolnikoff

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Participating Panel Members*

Robert A. Charpie, ChairmanHarvey BrooksPeter O. CrispFreeman DysonJames B. FarleyCharles E. FraserAndrew j. GoodpasterCharles HitchBernard M. W. KnoxGeorge E. Mueller, Jr.Carl SaganEugene SkolnikoffJames Spilker

The panel was asked to consider the proposalfor a manned civilian space station in the lightof the development of the Nation’s space activi-ties generally, and of possible future civilian activ-ities and goals in space. The panel approachedthis task first as a broad enquiry into future ob-jectives in space and how the proposed spacestation relates to those objectives. The results ofthat enquiry made it inappropriate for us to er-t-gage in a more detailed evaluation of the currentspace station proposal.

As background for our conclusions, we needto note that the panel believes U.S. civilian spaceactivities are and should be of high value to theNation domestically and internationally. Thecountry has a variety of motivations behind itsspace commitments—-political, psychological,scientific, technological, economic—all of whichhave validity and importance. In particular, inlooking to the future, the panel believes it essen-tial that the program should come to representagain the sense of exploration and adventure, theenergizer of both technological and institutionalinnovation, the source of outward-looking na-

*The participants are [n general agreement with this summ~rvot cone [us ions, although some members may not necessarl Iy cn -dorw all the details or the phrasing of certain statements.

tional pride that captured our imagination, andthat of others, in its first two decades. Those char-acteristics can be achieved in different ways, notnecessarily correlated to the magnitude of thespace budget. We also believe there should beways that the program can be used more effec-tively as an instrument for peace and cooperationin a world in which the environment of space isthreatening to become one more arena for mili-tary competition.

Our conclusions are as follows.

I. Current Space Station Proposal*

The panel has major reservations about the cur-rent NASA concept for a permanent mannedspace station and recommends against commit-ment to such a project at this time. We are quitecertain that a space station of some kind willeventually be needed. However, the objectivesunderlying the current concept seem diffuse andimprecise. Approval of the proposal now wouldtend to lock the Nation’s civilian space efforts intoa large, expensive program that would likely pre-empt alternative possibilities and programs.

The panel was most concerned about the ab-sence of studies that evidence a larger vision ofspace objectives and opportunities, against whichthis, or any future space station proposal, couldbe evaluated (see 11). A space station should notbean end in itself, but rather a step toward othergoals. Those other goals, which need to be care-fully developed and publicly debated, shouldprovide a necessary framework for evaluating therole and usefulness of any proposed design fora space station.

The panel recognizes that not all possible activ-ities and payoffs can be anticipated, and that

*George E, Mueller dlsa~rees w Ith thl~ conclusion, which heregards a$ not ~ onstru[ t iie with resi)ect to direct Ion tor NASA, andSu[)ptjn i~ [’ of unnecessary study. t+ e does a~ree w Ith the need tomake the i[)acc itatlon a step to a lon~-ra n~e goa 1, and would sup[mrt ,i\kl n~ NASA to de~lgn a t,Ic I lit} to ~upport such a program

133


unexpected opportunities emerge in the courseof developing a new capability. And the panelaccepts the validity of the desire to take advan-tage of the capabilities offered by the Shuttle. Butsome of the immediate functions envisioned forthe proposed space station (exploring near-Earthapplications, for example) can be evaluated with-out much, or any new infrastructure in space, infact, by imaginative uses of the Shuttle; and amore fully thought-out station keyed to longer-range objectives would be more likely to stimu-late innovation and imagination.

Moreover, the station as envisioned would ap-pear to have little payoff either for developmentof new technology (see III), or for the political-psychological benefits at home and abroad wehave already indicated should be given substan-tial weight (see also Xl).

The development of a habitable space stationto gain expertise of people in space is an impor-tant argument, but also one with little presentbasis for evaluation. We have seen no analysisof the differential costs of a manned v. an un-manned facility, nor an analysis of the oppor-tunity costs of that differential. It is important thatit be understood that the panel does not argueagainst man-in-space per se (the Shuttle may pro-vide a good portion of that experience), but ratherthat a better rationale than has been provided usis required for a goal worthy of attainment.

Il. Analysis Capability

The lack of studies analyzing long-term spacegoals and opportunities was striking to the panel.There were not even studies available that laidout possible alternatives to the current proposal.Without these, the panel felt it was not possibleto sensibly evaluate the scale, nature, cost or pur-pose of a manned civilian space station. An ini-tial “goals” paper prepared by OTA staff repre-sented a start toward the kind of studies that areneeded.

The panel believes this situation is deeper inits significance than simply whether adequatestudies had been conducted before the space sta-tion proposal was put forward. NASA has beenpositively discouraged by successive administra-tions from engaging in or sponsoring much for-

ward thinking, presumably to discourage theemergence of costly ideas or prevent the appear-ance of lobbying. One result is that apparentlylittle capability exists within NASA, and essentiallynone outside, able to carry out on a continuingbasis the kind of informed, analytical, criticalstudies that any major program area ought tohave. The need is acute.

We have considered various options for cre-ating such a locus for the professional study ofpublic policy questions relating to the civilianspace program and wouId make several observa-tions. Clearly, NASA should have a larger inter-nal capability for long-term analysis, but thatalone would not be adequate for obtaining ob-jective outside views or for establishing publiccredibility. The Administrator of NASA could, andwe believe should, serve as a sponsor of suchstudies, perhaps working through a broadly basedadvisory committee to enhance objectivity andcredibility. We recommend that early consider-ation be given to a long-term program of supportof studies in the private sector (analytical orga-nizations, commerce, industry and universities)that would build a community of knowledgeableanalysts of the Nation’s space activities, analo-gous to that which has been developed in otherareas such as energy and the environment.

Such a program of studies also implies a moreopen planning process and the concomitant con-tinuous rethinking of NASA objectives that gowith that openness. This process can provide anopportunity for more extensive engagement ofthe private sector (see Vi), an objective webelieve should be high on NASA’s agenda, andcan engage the interest of constituencies notalready deeply involved in the space area.

Ill. R&D

A major factor in evaluating a proposal for thenext step in the space program should be the con-tribution that objective will make to the devel-opment of new technology. The panel does notbelieve the civilian space station as proposed islikely to have as significant a technology-forcingeffect as should be required from a program thatwould be the centerpiece of the space agency’sactivities for close to a decade.

Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 135———

In fact, the situation is more serious, for ad-vanced technological development has beenseverely cut back in the space program since theearly days of the Shuttle program. Key technol-ogies that wouId be necessary for later missions,such as advanced space propuIsion systems ormachine intelligence and robotics, have not beenadequately (or at all) supported because of fund-ding limitations. Even technologies to fully exploitcurrent space applications have been relativelyneglected. The current proposaI for a civiIianspace station would generate little such technol-ogy development and, more than likely, wouldprevent funds being available for such programs.Yet, those technologies represent what should bemajor payoffs of space activities and the centralfeatures of future space activities

Accordingly, we recommend that NASA en-gage in the conscious development of seminal.11

technologies that are Iikely to form the bui!dingblocks for future space goals. This should be car-ried out in close cooperation with industry, ratherthan wholly in-house, with the Government stim-uIating private-sector ventures and financingwhere possible. The model of the highly success-ful relations between the National Advisory Com -mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) and industry foraeronautical technology could well be followedby NASA for space technology development.

IV . Immediate A l te rnat ives to a

Space Station

In recommencing deferral of the proposedNASA civilian space station commitment, we dobelieve other steps should be taken. Two of highpriority are given above: begin analyses of pos-sible long-term space goals, and design a programof technology development. In addition, someof the stated purposes of the proposed space sta-tion could be explored with the existing Shuttles.In particular, the possibilities and viability of man-ufacturing in space, repair of low-Earth-orbitspace satellites, and much scientific research canand should proceed with present capabilities and,if indicated, their modest improvements. Suchprograms can provide necessary information tojudge more definitively what the real needs areto carry out those functions on a continuing basis.It makes little sense to make major commitments

to an expensive large-scale facility if already ex-isting capabilities remain underexploited becauseof shortage of funds,

I n any programs undertaken in the near term,however, it is important that they not be allowedto develop a Iife of their own that prevents moredesirable aIternatives, or interteres with otherongoing programs of great importance, such asthose i n space science.

V. Long-Term Mis s ion Poss ib i l i t ies

The p,inei di~c us~ed w)m~~ ~x)s>i ble Iong-terma c- t i v i t i es t h (~ t < (~t i \ti (c( ! s o m e ot t h [’ ( r i t ~~ r i a Ji { Ib e l i e v e d t o 1)~’ im~mrt,lnt: lik.~1) to L t)mrm,]n({~vi(iwpr(~ad altent i( )n, i n ho r(’ r) t S( i (’ n t i ti( I n t e r c’~t,

technolc)g~ t’(lr( I ng r[> I LIL d n( (‘ to XI o I ){1 I i $~ L] t’~,\u b~td nt i,i I sixn Iti( .l n[{~ to h t] r II.~ n ~)! ( }t>l[’m 5, $11 lt-a hi I it y for i rlt~’ rn ,lt i u n d I C-[XJI N I r ,tt i f) n ( >~’<’ V I I i ,1 nd~)rikate-$c~( t~jr [J,irt i{ i~~<itit)n [~[t~ X), L1’~ I Ilcl\ ~’ tlcllrx[~rn i ned t h[’~~’ i n d(4{l i I, not f 1( ~ Lt [’ ,](ji [x-{ltt’ ,) n}~Jc] rtlcu Iclr c hoi~ v T h~~>/ ,] r{) \Ll ~}qt~~t I () 11 \ 01” 1 I) L’

kind~ ()( ~\MC [’ ;(~’i li L$ t> l~t~li(i (.) ~h(~u I(I l~t$ ,] n,i -ly7ed dnd stu(ji[(l il} (J(~tc]il.

(In<’ c-{]tegor) (Jt ~x~ssii)l~~ gtMl\ L\oLl I{i ini (Jl\ (Jprograms (let i~n(~d spvc iticci I 1)’ to cc)rlt ri but(’knowledge ~]bout ~jres(nt or futur<) pl,~nc’t,ir> ,{ndhuman issuc~s. For cx,~m}]l(~, ~)rogram< [{e>ign~[lto Iearfl mor[) dbout the global ‘‘~rw>r~hou:)~)’effect that cou Id resu It from dcc u m u I<it i rl~ C a r-kn dioxide in the atmosphere th rou~ll, ,Inl{)ngot h(’ r~, intensive examination ot t h e at m osp h [: wot VP n us, which has experienced its own m~~s$iveC02 ‘‘green house.” Another such goal WOUIC{ bethe study of the effects of Iarge-sc.]le fire, ~olcanicact ion and d u st storms t h rough ta rgeted stud i esof the Martian en~i ronment, which is rite ~vithsuch events.

More directly Earth-oriented, ,1 [)oi~ible orga-nizi ng focus of an i m portal nt se~ment of’ spaceactivities cou Id be the detaileci nlon it(~ri ng of thehabitability of our planet on the surface and inthe atmosphere. The substantial hazards anci pos-sible catastrophes lying ahead —COl and othergas accumulation, ozone depletion, soil deple-tion, deforestation, desertitication, agriculture dis-[>.]se \(LJ Iner,]bi I ity, among others—make a majorciedicatecl program of global monitoring poten-tially of crucial importance for the future.


A different kind of goal in space would be tocontribute directly to more generaI research ob-jectives in the life, material, or other sciences. Forexample, some of the effects of zero gravity onthe body appear to be similar to the effects ofaging. Are there important contributions that canbe made through space research programs onaging, an increasingly important social goal foran expanding global population? Many othersuch complementary research targets could un-doubtedly be developed and evaluated.

And, of course, there is a long list of possiblescientific goals in space that can be considered:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

unmanned rendezvous missions to an aster-oid or comet to provide early solar systemhistory;Mars exploration, with unmanned rovingvehicles;landing on the Saturn moon Titan, which hasa nitrogen atmosphere, complex organic mat-ter and strong evidence of a liquid ethane/methane ocean;solar spacecraft able to penetrate some dis-tance into the Sun while sending back infor-mation; andVenus probes.

Longer-term:6. landing on asteroids, planets or comets with

return of sample material;7. probes beyond solar system;8. manned lunar station;9. manned asteroid station; and

10. manned missions to Mars.

Note, incidentally, that the current space sta-tion proposal would not necessarily be the pre-ferred next step for most of these goals.

V1. Private-Sector Involvement

The panel is strongly of the belief that the pri-vate sector can be more effectively and exten-sively engaged in the Nation’s space activitiesthan it has been to date. For the most part, cur-rent involvement has been restricted to a selectgroup of NASA contractors or subcontractors.There is need for involvement of a much broaderindustrial constituency to elicit new ideas forspace applications and techniques. Not only isit desirable to engage the innovative and entre-preneurial character of American high-technol-

ogy industry, but also to attempt to bring downunit costs of space assets and activities over time,and to involve consumer-oriented industries inspace applications that may be marketable.

To engage the private sector effectively toachieve these objectives poses several require-ments. Consultation with industry should startwith a broad dialogue on a wide range of possi-ble space goals and mission opportunities, notwith the detailed design of an already-determinedspace station.

A second requirement is to develop a clarityof commitment to activities that signals long-terminterest. Such commitment is necessary to en-courage industry to invest its resources of man-power and money in the development of tech-nology potentially useful for those activities. Sucha clarity of commitment should be the outcomeof the joint studies and consultation referred toabove,

A third, with regard to space applications, isto use either public corporations (perhaps of theComsat type) or other institutional innovationsto take over commercial development and ex-ploitation of space technology. NASA is not wellsuited to the design and marketing of commer-cial/industrial systems or services—that is not itspurpose—and simply attempting to hand over anexisting developmental system, such as Landsat,to the private sector for operation is unlikely tobe viable.

It is also possible that the present structure ofNASA is not well suited to prompt a major in-crease in private-sector space activities becauseof the present large commitment to in-house lab-oratories (see IX) and present technology procure-ment practices. We cannot make a definitivejudgment on that, but recommend an objectiveevaluation by NASA and by Congress.

VIl. International Cooperation

International cooperation has been a goal ofthe U.S. space program from the beginning, butthe panel believes much more could be done.Cooperation is particularly attractive for futureactivities for several reasons: technical compe-tence is more widely distributed throughout theworld than in the past, resource limitations are

Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 137

more of a constraint on all countries, and manyspace activities are relevant to all people, not justAmericans.

It is possible that the costs of space activitiescould be reduced by genuine joint programs thatenlisted not only the funds, but also the talentsof other nations. Examples, such as Spacelab,already exist. But for more extensive cooperation,there must be a commitment for joint planningat a very early stage, and reasonable guaranteesof program continuation once a commitment hasbeen made. Past history of American project can-cellations in midstream do not contribute to con-fidence in the United States as a reliable partner.

Near-Earth space applications are of obviousinterest to other countries from a commercialperspective, but programs for monitoring thechanges in habitability of our planet would pro-vide other common motivations. And, planetaryprobes that would potentially provide informa-tion relevant to this planet’s concerns—for exam-ple, those goals mentioned earlier of improvingunderstanding of the CO2 greenhouse effect bystudies of Venus, or gaining knowledge of the ef-fects of fire, volcanoes and dust from study of theMartian environment—would also provide com-mon foci of interest with other countries.

In fact, the potential benefits for all from spaceactivities should provide a high incentive targetfor cooperation even if the other possible benefitsof resource and talent sharing are less clearly rele-vant. There are also, of course, difficulties inher-ent in international cooperation, difficulties thatstem primarily from problems of meshing ofdisparate bureaucracies and political systems.There is also the problem that the structure andincentives in NASA, and more broadly in thebudgetary and decision process in the U.S. Gov-ernment, do not lead naturally to seeking inter-national cooperation. This, too, is an issue webelieve deserves separate attention by NASA andby Congress.

It should be noted that there seems to be con-siderable interest within Western industrial coun-tries in cooperating on the proposed civilianspace station; European countries, Canada, andJapan are waiting for the United States to decidewhat it intends to do. Cooperation, to be reallymeaningful, must involve joint planning and

study of alternatives before selection is made. Werecommend a more open set of discussions thatask what we and other interested countriesshould be doing together.

Any military overtones to NASA projects (seeVlll) will likely have a negative effect on possi-bilities for international cooperation. Though itmay be possible in practice to separate the mili-tary from the civilian interests in specific missions,it is a problem that we cannot afford to ignore.

There are also potential political benefits to begained over time through intimate and extensivecooperation with others. Cooperation with East-ern bloc countries, and especially the SovietUnion, will not remove the sources of conflict,but may be used as an instrument to amelioratethose conflicts and offer alternatives.

Vlll. Effect of Military Programsand Interests’

The panel is very concerned about the effectson the civilian space program of a major new andenlarged focus on military uses of space. Thoughthere might be some budgetary competition, theprimary problem would be the competition forscarce technical manpower and industrial re-sources. The most qualified personnel wouldlikely be attracted to the rapidly expanding andtechnologically exciting defense sector, andNASA itself might see some of its best peopleleaving.

In addition, such a large-scale military commit-ment would likely serve to give a military imageto our space activities abroad, where the distinc-tion between civilian and military interests maynot be clear.

International cooperation in the civilian pro-gram may also be harder to achieve because ofincreased concern in the United States over ap-parent loss of technology assumed to be criticalfor national security. Controls over informationcould well be sufficiently onerous as to rule outsome forms of otherwise desirable cooperation.

*To avoid the appearance of possible conflict of interest, mem-bers of the panel with past and present involvement in military spaceactivities did not participate in the formulation of this section ofthe report.


IX. NASA Operations and Organization

The panel did not make any formal evaluationof NASA’s structure and performance, but a fewobservations based on the experience of panelmembers and the issues at stake are in order,some already mentioned.

As has been noted, NASA is not well positionedfor much more extensive cooperation with theprivate sector, or with other countries. The spe-cific reasons are different in each case, but theunderlying factors in NASA appear to be: thepride in past successes achieved by “going italone”; the perception of private-sector activitiesas competitive with, not complementary to, itsinterests; the lack of desire among most scien-tists and engineers to devote themselves to theadministrative orchestration of multicultural,multi-political projects; and the large fixed facil-ities of NASA that inhibit flexibility. All of thesediscourage assignment of major responsibilitiesoutside the organization.

This structure also serves to maintain high fixedoverhead costs in NASA, again discouraging ex-ploration with industry of ways of bringing unitcosts down. It is not clear what cost reductionswould be possible, but it would be difficult toevaluate the possibilities given the presentstructure.

To some extent, the existing structure may alsodiscourage the development of alternative goalconcepts, and generally inhibit imagination, sincechanges in programs may have negative effectson the present organization.

These observations may be exaggerated, orshould perhaps be balanced by other importantattributes. We urge attention to the issue,however.

X. International EconomicCompetition

International competition in provision of civil-ian space services has already emerged, primar-ily with European countries, and is likely to growin the future as Japan becomes more heavilyengaged. To some extent, that competition hasbeen encouraged by U.S. policies that have notprovided adequate guarantees for the future,

such as launch services, or have not been ade-quately consumer-oriented in systems design anddevelopment (for example Landsat). However,competition is inevitable, quite apart from U.S.policies, for advanced industrial nations withhigh-quality technological capabilities are likelyto enter any market with economic potential.

Men and women in orbit, utilizing sophisticatedand costly space assets, may be an important ca-pability for U.S. commercial exploitation of theeconomic potential for near-Earth orbits, but weconsider that case as not having been demon-strated as yet. In fact, commitment to such a ca-pability could delay exploitation, by preemptingfunding and personnel that might better explorepossibilities with industry through use of the pres-ent Shuttle capability or its modest extensions.It could, in fact, be a massive commitment to thewrong kind of station, even for economic purposes.

There is another aspect of the economic valueof space activities—the spinoff of new technol-ogy to the commercial sector. In this respect, aswe noted before, the proposed space stationwould likely hold relatively little interest as ameans of developing new technology—especiallyin comparison with other feasible goals.

Xl. Geopolitical Competition

The Soviet Union has been conducting a vig-orous manned space station program which, not-withstanding some serious mishaps, is apparentlyon track. Beyond the continuing exhibition ofspace prowess, presumably of important politi-cal value to them, the uses to which their capa-bilities are intended to be put are not clear–perhaps this is similar to the American situation—though Soviet Union scientists have often indi-cated that the long-range goals for their spaceprogram include manned bases on the Moon orMars. Regardless of later goals, they have cer-tainly been gaining useful information about peo-ple in a space environment (which they sharequite extensively with the United States).

There is a natural reaction in such circum-stances that leads to programs undertaken to“match” the achievements of the Russians, or tobe concerned about the information or experi-ence they have obtained that is not immediately

—

Postscript: Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting ● 139

available to us. But, for the United States toundertake a large-scale program not necessary,or ill-suited, to our needs is more likely to hand-icap us in the future in geopolitical competitionwith the Soviet Union. Especially is this so in thiscase in which the civilian space station goal isnot likely to command dramatic attention or tolead to important new technology.

Civilian space activities are, in fact, an impor-tant arena for international political competition.The panel’s plea is for the United States to aimfor a goal worthy of attainment from this perspec-tive, as well as from others. The international po-litical effects of visible, dramatic nonmilitary ac-complishments are important in presenting animage of a dynamic Nation able to preserve itsvitality in an open, democratic form of govern-ment. Many throughout the world find hope andencouragement in that demonstration; it is im-portant to us as well as to them.

We note again that competit ion in civi l ianspace accomplishments need not rule out the

possibility of some cooperation as well, even withour primary competitor. The more important thesubject, the greater would be the political signifi-cance of cooperation.

We close with reiteration of the panel’s con-viction of the importance of the civilian an spaceprogram to the country, and the significance ofthe next major steps in space that the Nationundertakes, Our ideas, our imagination, and ourcritical analytical abiIities need to be engaged i nlaying out the alternatives before us just as ourinstitutions, public and private, need to be appro-priately engaged in implementing the decisionsfinally made. In the long run, a sustained and ef-fective civi l ian space program wilt depend onbuilding a lasting political consensus,a consen-sus based on informed public debate and under-standing of the significant objectives that can beserved by civiIian space activities.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

RESULTS OF PRINCIPAL NASA STUDIES ON SPACESTATION USES AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Early in 1982, NASA established working groups toprepare for and coordinate a planning program to ac-quire a long-term in-space inhabited infrastructure,i.e,, a civilian “space station. ” A Space Station Steer-ing Committee at NASA headquarters led a two-pronged effort. A Technology Steering Committee hadthe task of assessing the current state of technologyand planning any needed development activities forthe program. At the same time, a Space Station TaskForce became the principal planning group to con-sider types of activities (user needs/desires) to be car-ried out with any new long-term infrastructure, sys-tem physical characteristics, concept development,and management organization.

To support the Task Force as well as help clarifyvarious issues involved, NASA authorized a series ofparallel investigations of the potential desires for, andcharacteristics of, such infrastructure. These studies(costing more than $6 million altogether) were madeby eight U.S. aerospace companies (with their asso-ciated subcontractors). In addition, the EuropeanSpace Agency, Canada, and Japan funded essentiallyparallel user studies of their own. Related investiga-tions of possible nonaerospace industry interest inspace use were made by two consulting firms.

Major Findings of the U.S. AerospaceIndustry “Mission Analysis Studies”

In anticipation that the United States could decideto build a publicly funded, habitable, permanent ci-vilian “space station”, NASA asked eight aerospaceindustry contractor groups to perform independent“mission analysis” studies to indicate what it couldbe used for (the desires and/or needs), what capabil-ities it should have to meet them (its attributes), whatits fundamental characteristics and components mightbe like (its architecture), and what costs and benefitsto the Nation might be expected of such a space pro-gram conducted over the remainder of the 20th cen-tury. Emphasis was to be on the user communities,national conceptual uses, and general architectures,not specific configurations.

in essence, they were asked to answer the questions“If the United States were to acquire an initial civil-

I The Department of Defense also participated with NASA in these studies,and paid 5 percent of their cost. For the most part, the studies related tonational security are classified, and no further reference will be made to themhere.

ian “space station “ complex in low-Earth-orbit (LEO)in the 1990’s, who could use it, how could they useit, what attributes, capabilities, and types of compo-nents should it therefore have, what would it cost,when could it become available, and what benefitscould its use provide?”

The contractor groups (in each case a prime con-tractor, usually with several subcontractors) commu-nicated with the individuals, organizations, and insti -tutions that might be expected to make use of suchin-space infrastructure to ascertain the important pres-ent and potential desires and/or needs for it, with em-phasis on those uses that would require or materiallybenefit from it. They then analyzed these various usesas a sequenced set of activities, so as to identify andcharacterize infrastructure attributes and capabilitiesthat would be necessary in order to meet them. Suffi-cient study of major components and architectural op-tions was made to provide reasonable indications ofhow adequate infrastructure could be provided.

They next provided programmatic and schedulingplans in order to predict when various portions of theprogram could become operational. Finally, costs ofestablishing the overall space infrastructure were esti-mated and the economic benefits projected that theyforesaw through its use. The companies drew conclu-sions and made recommendations regarding furtherdevelopments.

The eight prime contractors performing these studieswere Boeing Aerospace Co., General Dynamics Corp.(Convair Division), Grumman Aerospace Corp., Lock-heed Missiles and Space Co., Martin Marietta Corp.,McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co., Rockwell Inter-national, and TRW. About 20 other high-technologycompanies were involved as subcontractors. The finalreports were submitted on April 22, 1983. Their resultshave been published in a series of volumes entitled“Space Station Needs, Attributes, and ArchitecturalOptions.”

The major findings of these contractor studies areoutlined below.

Users and Uses(Mission Requirements)

The aerospace contractors actively sought out theinterests of potential users of LEO infrastructure in or-der to project what kind and extent of activities its sup-port assets and services should provide. Users were

141


categorized under the three broad areas of scienceand applications, commercialization, and technologydevelopment.

The fields of astrophysics and solar physics, lifesciences, environmental sciences and Earth observa-tion, materials processing, and communications sci-ences all offered examples of possible uses of an ini-tial complex. Over the longer term, it could be usedas a base for launching lunar, asteroid and interplane-tary research spacecraft. Advantages of having ahuman crew were seen in instrument and equipmentservicing (predominantly for Earth observation, plasmaphysics and astrophysics) and human involvement inresearch (predominantly in materials processing, lifesciences and solar physics). Research in most lifesciences, and some materials and astro/solar physicswas deemed impractical without direct human par-ticipation; one contractor concluded that 41 of 75science activities would benefit from a human pres-ence. The servicing of equipment would produce theside benefit of seeing instrument assets in space accu-mulated. Long-term operations would be especiallyimportant to some research.

The permanent infrastructure would include “free-flying” tended platforms to ensure isolation (whereneeded) from the possible dynamic disturbance orcontamination of various kinds that might be presentin an inhabited location.

Commercial possibilities were suggested for remoteEarth sensing in the fields of petroleum and mineralprospecting, and agricultural forecasts; for materialsprocessing; for on-orbit satellite launching of meteoro-logical, navigation, and communications satellites tohigher, even to geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), andfor satellite servicing (although CEO servicing wouldnot be possible using the initial infrastructure now en-visioned by NASA).

Almost all Earth resources observation from spacecurrently employs satellites without a crew and theiruse will continue; however, the contractors found ad-vantages in using people to select surface locationsto be studied, instruments, and observational param-eters. Having space infrastructure also would enableconcurrent multidisciplinary observations, and thecrew would add the flexibility to modify the instru-ments during long-term observation periods.

The economical processing of some materials underconditions of near-zero gravity is one of the more in-triguing possibilities for eventual commercial exploita-tion, with such materials as pharmaceuticals, alloys,semiconductors, and optical fibers as products. (Mar-ket demand for each of these products is seen by someof the more optimistic contractor groups as having the

potential to grow to the multibillion-dollar-per-yearlevel by the year 2000 if they could be made avail-able at acceptable prices).

McDonnell Douglas Corp. has already pioneeredin exploring the use of the electrophoresis process toproduce pharmaceutical materials aboard the Shut-tle. Electrophoresis is a separation process in whichelectrically charged particles suspended in a solutionmigrate through the fluid in the presence of an ap-plied electrical field. If the particles are of microscopicor larger size, a common process limitation is a sedi-mentation of the particles under gravitational condi-tions. The effective absence of gravitational attractionwhen conducted in orbit around the Earth permits theprocess of separation and purification of such ma-terials as proteins and pharmaceuticals to proceed atrates 500 to 1,000 times faster than on the surface ofthe Earth.

Several other companies are giving serious consid-eration to studying and manufacturing materials inspace. However, the contractor groups agreed that theconcept-to-market process generally takes many years,that a space research laboratory is required, that forat least some of the studies professionals in situ andcontinuous operations are very important desiderata,and that for most production processes, very largeamounts of electrical power (in present space terms)would be essential.

Satellite communications is already a 20-year-old,highly successful, world-wide commercial space enter-prise. It is seen as a business that should continue toexpand rapidly. The required technology should movein the direction of large, dynamically controlled, multi-antenna subsystems, on-board switching, and high r.f.power, for which a “space station” may well be seenby some as essential (or at least desirable) for efficientstructural assembly and deployment, testing andcheck-out, lower-cost transportation to geostationaryorbit—and eventually, perhaps, the servicing of GEOsatellites.

Satellite servicing is seen as enabling resupply andrepair of co-orbiting space vehicles, and those in otherorbits, such as polar or geostationary. In the latter case,a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle (ROTV) would beneeded to deploy or retrieve the spacecraft, as (ac-cording to several contractors) extensive servicingwould usually by done in, or in the vicinity of, a cen-tral “space station” complex.

LEO infrastructure is seen by the contractor groupsas enabling space technology development on allfronts–developments of interest to materials process-ing, communications, flight controls, fluidics, largespace structures, on-orbit assembly and test, robotics,

App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 143

etc. All of these would benefit because of the sophis-tication of the support equipment that could be pro-vided them, the longer time available for work in or-bit than is provided by the Shuttle, and the extensivecrew involvement needed, at least for the foreseeablefuture, for construction, calibration, and test.

Phased Activities (Mission Sets)

The contractor groups assembled sets of activitiesand operations responding to needs and desires ex-pressed by potential users in order to estimate theassets and services required to support them for vary-ing stay times in space. The preferred orbits were seento be a low-Earth-orbit whose plane would be at 28.50inclination to the Equator (typical of launches fromKennedy Space Center, FL), a 57° inclination (possi-ble from KSC with a more northerly insertion direc-tion) and a polar orbit (available with launch fromVandenberg AFB, CA). In some cases, staging togeostationary orbit or to escape velocity (for lunar,asteroid and/or planetary flights) would be necessary.

Most of the studies identified several hundred pos-sible uses and desires, a number well in excess of whatmight be accommodated during the 1990s. When ex-amined in the context of realistic technical progress,the likelihood that such uses/desires would actuallydevelop, and the benefits made available through suchuse, etc., the vast majority of those potential usescould be supported with infrastructure located in thelow inclination orbit of 28.5°. This is exemplified bya typical distribution of activities shown in table A-1as recommended by one of the contractor groups. The

activities in this baseline set are noted as being bestaccommodated either by attaching them to a central,inhabited infrastructure complex, or locating them onfree-flying platforms that would be tended only inter-mittently by crew members.

Inasmuch as some 70 percent or more of the po-tential needs/desires could be accomplished in the28.5° orbit, it was the unanimous recommendationof all the contractor groups that any initial inhabitedinfrastructure be located in this orbital plane. Free-flying platforms, either co-orbiting or in polar orbit,could accommodate most of the remaining missions.

One example of the number of inhabited infra-structure-attached payload elements at any time (so-called station occupancy) is shown in figure A-1, inwhich the initial operational capability was assumedto occur during 1990. The projected activities are seento reach a high number quite early in the develop-ment cycle.

Functional Capabilities

NASA has recently indicated that it expects pro-posed new space infrastructure to provide the set offunctions described in chapter 2. One contractor’svisualization of these functions is given in figure A-2,while table A-2 illustrates the corresponding attributesrequired for space infrastructure designed to accom-plish the functions. Translated into physical quantities,the requirements for power, pressurized volume, crewsize and Shuttle launches are typified by figure A-3.The initial power needs for the central space complexof the infrastructure are modest, about 25 kW, but as

Table A-1 .—One Contractor Group’s Mission Set

Attached to centralinfrastructure complex

in LEO Free-f I yersInclination plane Inclination plane (LEO)

28.5” Polar 28.5° 57” Polar GEO EscapeScience and applicatlons:Astrophysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Earth and planetary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Environmental observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Life sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7Materials processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Commercial:Earth and ocean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Materials processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Industrial services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Technology development: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Operations: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86Total mission set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

6 3 1 13 1 7 124 1 7 4 3

1 2 15

11

27 9 12 14 12 12

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the General Dynamics Corp


Figure A-l .—One Contractor’s Time-Phased Set ofActivities Involving Work Crews

30

20

10

01990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Year

Conclusion: 28.5-deg station captures approximately 92°/0 ofactivities involving crews.

SOURCE Based on Informatlon contained in the study led by GeneralDynamics Corp

the experiment load increases so does the power re-quirement. If materials processing in space takes placeon a commercial scale now visualized by some, thepower demands could then become quite large. It islikely that, eventually, much of the materials process-ing production would be carried out on platforms withtheir own solar array power supplies; they would co-orbit with the central complex.

In the view of most contractor groups, an initialoperational crew would consist of some three persons,with the crew size growing to as many as 8 to 10 inthe mid 1990s. Corresponding pressurized volume forthe crew and some operations might grow from about200 m3 to 600 m3.

Five or six Shuttle flights would be required to estab-lish the IOC infrastructure suggested in the studies.

Figure A-2. —A Representative Set of Functional Capabilities

SOURCE Based on in the study led by Grumman Aerospace


Table A.2.—One Contractor’s Estimate of RequiredInfrastructure Attributes

Accommodates activities with work crews:. Micro-gravity

— Life sciences— Materials processing— Technology development

● Outward looking— Astrophysics

● Earth pointing— Earth exploration— Environmental observation

Supports free-flyer activities:● LEO/H EO satellites/platforms

— Emplacement— Service— Retrieval

● GEO satellites/platforms— Emplacement— Service

● Planetary satellites— Boost

Provides resources:● Work crew time● Power● Data processing● Command and control● Thermal control● Stable platform● Pressurized volume● Exterior mounting

Provides functions:● Assembly and construction● Checkout● Service● Reconfiguration● Maintenance and repair● Transportation● Storage

SOURCE: Based on Information contained In the study led by the GeneralDynamics Corp

Contractors estimated that civilian projects would re-quire six or seven flights per year (fig. A-3). While threeor four supply visits per year by the Shuttle would beneeded for ongoing operations and maintenance(O&M), these could be partial-load deliveries com-bined with other loads.

Infrastructure Elements(Architecture)

It is at the implementation stage that the contractorgroups’ reports suggest quite different approaches toproviding those in-space infrastructure elementsneeded to meet the user needs/desires. One concep-tual array of components is illustrated in figure A-4.The central complex would be in communication withother elements including free flyers, free-flying plat-forms, a reusable orbital transfer vehicle, the ShuttleOrbiter, and ground stations via the Tracking and DataRelay Satellite communications system.

The components suggested by one of the contrac-tor groups for the first central complex are indicatedin figure A-5. A central command/habitability moduleprovides overall infrastructure command and control,data handling, communications, and accommoda-tions for a crew of four. (Several of the contractorgroups’ studies suggest three crew members at theoutset.) Directly attached is the energy module wheresolar cell arrays and batteries provide electrical powerand its conditioning and storage. (In this illustration,the energy module is pressurized; some studies sug-gest that it be mounted externally.) The third, logistics,module stores and makes available consumables andequipment delivered by the Shuttle. With only thesethree infrastructure elements, a crew could live in or-bit satisfactorily for extended periods but would beable to accomplish relatively little scientific or otheractivity beyond those experiments that could be ac-commodated in the available internal space.

Additional elements shown in figure A-5 are theairlocks to permit people to move in and out of thehabitability module and to conduct activities in space(so-called extravehicular activity (EVA)), an astronomyservice pallet to enable mounting of scientific obser-vatory equipment, and a payload service pallet to per-mit servicing of satellites and such auxiliary vehiclesas an orbital maneuvering vehicle. The final unit sug-gested for the IOC is a materials processing laboratory.

The continuous power suggested would approach25 kW (roughly corresponding with the initial levelshown in figure A-3). Inasmuch as the crew accom-modations might require about half of this amount,the power available to users would allow for materialsprocessing experiments but not for some kinds ofongoing production.

Other contractor groups would arrange the infra-structure elements differently, with a possible com-mand module separate from an habitability module,or an operations module combining energy genera-tion and conditioning with a command and controlcenter and EVA facilities. Some designs would incor-porate tunnels or passageways to connect differentmodules.

Ten or more subsystems have been suggested toenable the infrastructure elements to remain in orbitand function satisfactorily. These are itemized in theorganizational diagram shown in figure A-6.

In accordance with the NASA study directions tothe contractor groups to envision the use of new tech-nology where it would be beneficial, various newmaterials and theoretical designs for the subsystemshave been suggested. An example of one contractorgroup’s technology recommendations is given in tableA-3; while most items are considered to be currentlyavailable in a useful form, advanced technology wouldbe required to achieve the improved capability and/or


Figure A-3.— One Contractor’s Estimate of Resources and Services

90 95 00

Year

I200

n 1 1 1 I 1 i I I I“ 1990 1995 2000

Year

8

6

4

I J

o I I I 1 1 I I I I I95 00

Year

Shuttle flights

14

12

10

8

6

4

SOURCE Based on !nformatlon contained In the study led by the General Dynamics Corp

reduced weight and Iifecycle costs that it recom-mends. Some contractors identified standardizationas contributing to cost containment; where no ad-vance in technology appeared necessary, they sug-gested use of standard available equipment if prac-tical, with space qualification as necessary.

Evolution of the Initial Capability

All of the contractor groups provided plans for evo-lution from the initial operational capability (IOC) toexpanded infrastructure expected to become availableby the end of the century. One example of infrastruc-ture located in the 28.50 orbit is shown in figures A-7(IOC) and A-8 (Evolved). The crew would increasefrom three to nine, the power would triple, the num-ber of pressurized core modules would increase fromone to five, and the servicing facility would quadru-

ple in size. A similar evolutionary plan includingtended co-orbiting and polar platforms and an ROTVis shown in figure A-9. A possible co-orbiting indus-trial platform is illustrated in figure A-1 O, and an ini-tial tended polar platform could appear as shown infigure A-1 1. Core module commonality was suggestedby essentially all contractor groups in order to pro-mote production cost economy.

Role of a Human Crew

All contractor groups emphasize the importance ofhaving a human crew. All consider that “sophisticatedmachines” (robotics, artificial intelligence, etc. ) willnot be able to provide the desired capabilities thatcould be provided by a human crew through the early1990s. The benefits of having a human crew are sum-marized by one contractor group in table A-4.

App. A —Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements ● 147

Figure A-4. —infrastructure/’’Space Station”

Costs and Benefits

The cost estimates of design, development, test andevaluation, and production, of a “space station” com-plex have been made by each contractor group ac-cording to parametric models following a “WorkBreakdown Structure” developed by the joint Indus-try Government Space System Cost Analysis Group.Since detailed designs were not part of the study,predominantly weight-based parameter estimateswere used to arrive at a rough order-of-magnitude esti-mate for the costs of designing, building and deploy-ing a complex.

Inasmuch as individual contractor groups proposeddifferent combinations of modules and systems, con-siderable care is necessary in making comparisons ofcosts among them. It will suffice here to note that a“core” IOC space station in a 28.50 inclination orbit(i.e., command/habitation capability for a crew ofthree or four, power unit, and resupply logisticsmodules) was estimated to cost $3.3 billion to $4 bil-lion (1 984 dollars). With appropriate attached palletsand modules to provide further observation, experi -

ment, and servicing capability, the cost would be $4.5billion to $6 billion. With a crew of eight or nine, 6 0kW of power to users, two or three laboratory modulesand expanded servicing facilities, plus two tendedplatforms–one co-orbiting and one in polar orbit–the estimated acquisition cost would be $7.5 billionto $9 billion. This latter infrastructure array corre-sponds to the IOC suggested by the NASA Space Sta-tion Task Force (SSTF) in June 1983.

The above figures include those Shuttle launches re-quired to place the elements in orbit, but generallydo not include NASA support and program manage-ment expenses; OTA estimates that these latter costswould be another $1 billion to $2 billion if acquiredby NASA in its usual fashion.

An additional ROTV capability cost has been esti-mated at $2 billion to $3 billion, including both theLEO basing facility and the operating vehicle. If a newfuel tanker vehicle were to be developed, it could costapproximately $1 billion.

The programmatic approach assumed by a numberof contractor groups is that of the use of “protoflight”construction. One group compared the new method

38-798 - 84 - 11 : 3


Figure A-5.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex Architecture

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International.

Figure A-6.—A Suggested Central Complex Subsystem Organization

● Powergen

● Power ● Waterdist reclamation

● Waste mgmt

● Clothing

● EVA

● IVA

● Radiator ● Storage ● Engines ● Data bus

● Transport ● Handling ● Processors

● Interfaces

● Controls/displays

● Storage

● FLTsoftware

● Transmitter ● Attitude

● Antennareferencedetermination

● Detection/● Momentumranging storage

● Navgat ion

● Orbitmaintenance

● Structures ● Health maintenance

● Mechanisms ● Habitability &

● Materialscrew support

SOURCE Based on information contained in the study led by Rockwell International


Table A-3.—One Contractor’s Suggested List of Subsystem Enabling Technology

Subsystem characteristics—

EPS . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

●

DMS . . . . . . . . . . . •●

●

●

COMM & TRKNG •●

●

●

EC/LSS . . . . . . . . . ●GN&C . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

●

Solar arrayNiH, batteries180V dist.

Ada computer languageFibre opticsAdvanced main memory with b/ubatteryBubble auxiliary memoryS, Ku band subsystemsDish, omni-antennasTDRSSimultaneous operationclosed loopAttitude controlVelocity controlStabilizationSensors

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

a technology and techniques adequate required for technology

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Enabling technologyThin cell and higher efficiencyCell manufacturing processesBattery developmentHigh voltage component developmentMeeting existing Ada schedule a

Low loss couplers a

Develop higher densities

Space qualifications and higher densitiesModulations/cod ing/bandw idth a

Design/develop for applicationAcquisition/tracking/data rate a

Radio frequency interference protectionExisting hardware with modificationsExisting hardware with modificationsExisting hardware with modificationsExisting hardware with modificationsExisting hardware with modifications

Key Power Subsystem

Management Subsystem —Communication

TRKNG—TrackingEC/LSS—Environmental Control and Life Support SubsystemGN&C–Guidance, Navigation, and ControlTDRS—Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by the Grumann Aerospace Corp

Figure A-7.—One Contractor’s Suggested IOC Central Complex

SOURCE Based on Information contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp


Figure A-8. —The Same Contractor’s

Added facilities

● Solar array

Suggested Evolved Central Complex

— Assembly/storage

NADIR

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace

. Typical missions— Astronomy— Life science— R&D

— Satellite & industrialplatform service

— Payload assembly— Earth observation

Figure A“9.—One Contractor’s Suggested Evolution Plan; LEO, 28.5°

Key

TMS—Teleoperataor maneuvering system ISTO—lnitial solar terrestrial observatory

MMU—Manned maneuvering unit ASTO—Advanced solar terrestrial observatory

RMS– Remote manipulator system ASO—Advanced solar observatory

OTV—Orbital transfer vehicle LSS — Large space structure

SOURCE Based on contained in the study led by Marietta

App. A—Results of Principal NASA Studies on Space Station Uses and Functional Requirements • 151

Figure A-10. —One Contractor’s Suggested Free-Flying Industrial Platform

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace

Figure A-11 .–One Contractor’s Suggested Tended Polar Platform (IOC)

.

SOURCE Based on contained the study led by Grumman Aerospace Corp


Table A4.—One Contractor’s Summary of Benefits of infrastructure Work Crew Presence

Function Benefit Related issuesMaintenance and repair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

Real-time mission involvement. . . . . . . . ●

●

Lab operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

●

Construction, assembly, test checkout,modification of large systems . . . . . . ●

●

●

●

Reduced equipment cost ●

Enhanced availability and lifeReacting to unexpected or transient “eventsDiscovery, insight, andunderstandingDifficult or impossible to automatea •Research progress not paced byShuttle reflight schedule ●

Difficult or impossible to automatea ●

Simplify designs compared to ●

complex deployment ●

Stiffen structuresFinal test and correction in space

Realizing cost savings potentials

Designing activity andinstruments to take advantage

Lab equipment at “spacestation”Crew skills

Role of EVADesign to realize benefitsLow-thrust transfer to finaldestination

%VIthin the predictable future.

SOURCE: Based on information contained in the study lad by the Boeing Aerospace Co.

with that used in the Skylab project. In contrast to themultiple qualification test, backup, and flight articlesused then, they assume that the first production unitwill be a flight article. Furthermore, they judge thatthe large size of modules permitted by the space trans-portation system (STS) would promote economy ofscale. Finally, they judge that autonomous operationof the infrastructure would allow significant reductionin ground support compared to that of Skylab. Thesefactors lead them to conclude that a “space station”could be acquired for significantly less cost per poundthan was Skylab. Although it is unclear which precisespacecraft elements are included, their estimate was$77,000/kg ($35,000/lb) for Skylab (1984), while theyprojected $44,()()0/kg ($20,000/lb) for a “space sta-tion.” Their estimate of the cost of the Spacelab is$220,000/kg ($100,0O0/lb), although this is higher thanthat of European sources. (Of course, a “space sta-tion” could be many times larger and heavier thaneither Skylab or Spacelab.) They estimate that it re-quired 10 percent of the acquisition costs per year forSkylab O&M, and estimate that a life-cycle-cost de-signed “space station” would require about 3 percentper year to operate.

Estimates for operation and maintenance costs ofall the aerospace contractor groups fall within therange from $150 million to $600 million per year(1984); about $400 million per year represents a meanvalue of these costs for a “space station” accom-modating 8 to 10 crew members.

All contractor groups foresee that in-space infra-structure could provide operational performance,sociopolitical, and economic benefits. The first twoare essentially qualitative in nature: appropriate activ-ities would enable scientific and commercial commu-nities to expand and improve their activities in space.

Some of the technology advances would be expectedto “spin off” to other areas.

Further, they expect that the performance benefitswould accrue from an improved ability to perform in-space tasks, resulting in both an increase of quantityand improved quality of output. A number of theseare listed in table A-5. In the research and technol-ogy areas, the cost of development programs couldbe reduced by large factors–some project it to be asmuch as 50 percent. Free-flying platforms could en-able and promote many commercial projects. A basefor maintenance and repair of in-space equipment on

Table A.5.—One Contractor’s Summaryof Performance Benefits

All mission operatlons:● Decoupled from Shuttle launch schedule, payload

priorities, and ground delaysSpace based ROTV:

• 10,000 kg + useful payload into GEO● On-demand capability

On-orblt assembly:Ž Work crew can inspect, work around, and

complement robotics and automation● Shuttle size limits surmounted

On-orbit technology and R&D:● Work crew can calibrate, operate, and modify● True space environment● Interaction of multiple disciplines and capabilities in

a novel environment will produce synergisticadvances

● Shorter development programsSclentific observations:

● Short lived experiments extended● Work crew can monitor, intervene, replenish, and

updateSOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman

Aerospace Corp.


an as-needed basis, and scheduled activities such asresupply and/or removal of manufactured products,would be provided. The useful life of observationmodules would similarly be enhanced by replenish-ment of consumables, change of experimental equip-ment items and their unscheduled repair.

As scientific knowledge is gained there is greater po-tential to enhance the quality of life. Basic researchresults provide some of the background to applied re-search, where economic and social benefits prospectsbecome more visible. Improved space-based ocean,weather, and atmospheric research eventually couldassist in our ability to locate and manage Earth re-sources, and monitor and control the physical envi-ronment. New pharmaceuticals as well as semicon-ductors and metal products could become availablethrough space research and processing. Other socialbenefits envisioned by one of the contractors are in-dicated in table A-6.

“Space station’ ’-related economic benefits arehoped for in at least three ways: research, develop-ment, and production activities generally; satelliteservicing; and orbital transfer vehicle operations. Thecontractor groups judge that the greatest benefitsshould flow from the latter.

Research and development cost reduction throughuse of infrastructure support is the most difficult to esti-mate, but most of the contractor groups concludedit could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars peryear. One example is that of a lengthy science re-search project such as that involving the Shuttle In-frared Celestial Telescope Facility that anticipatessome 250 days of use in space. If done in a series of30-day extended-duration orbiter (EDO) trips, theassociated operating expense is estimated to be about$3.6 million/day, while if accomplished in a continu-ous interval in a laboratory there, the cost is expectedto decrease sharply, to $0.4 million/day. Materialsscience experiments done in space using a 30-dayEDO might cost $2.9 million per experiment, com-

Table A-6.—Some Social Benefits Suggestedby One Contractor

. High-technology—a national goal● Focus for engineering/science education● Lunar and beyond exploration• International cooperation● Unique, sophisticated development facility• New communication services● New commercial products and industries — medical,

semiconductor● New therapeutic, diagnostic techniques● Enhanced national securitySOURCE: Based on information contained in the study led by the Grumman

Aerosp~e Corp.

pared with an estimated $0.6 million per experimentif done in a long-term laboratory there. One estimateof the cost of pharmaceutical production, where alarge portion of the expense is in the materials, is thatof some $33 million/kg ($15 million/lb) if done in anEDO, compared to $18 million/kg ($8 million/lb) ifdone at a “space station.” These kinds of cost benefitscould be expected to continue throughout the com-plete “space station” life of some two decades and,if realized, could be a significant factor in encourag-ing the commercialization of space.

Were a Shuttle used to service an LEO satellite, theprice per flight would approach some $20 million,which is comparable to the value of the servicing formany such satellites. Using permanent space infras-tructure services offers the possibility, in principle, ofreducing this operational cost by perhaps one half.

Benefits expected of an ROTV are related primarilyto its being based in space and its reusability. One ofthe study contractor groups estimated that a fullyamortized ROTV service could be provided at a totalcost of about $60 million for a 4,500 kg (10,000-lb)payload delivered from LEO to GEO. In contrast, alarge expendable upper stage costs some $100 mil-lion or more, delivered with its payload to LEO. Thus,net economic benefit for the ROTV would be some$4o million to $5o million per flight, and 20 launchesper year could provide a total savings of $1 billion/year.

Figure A-1 2 illustrates the judgment of one contrac-tor group regarding the various kinds of benefits ex-pected of the use of a “space station.”

Regardless of when a positive economic payoffmight commence—always assuming that it does—a“space station” could be a powerful capability multi-plier. Of course, one of the most important benefitswould arise from the conduct of activities whichwould be impossible to conduct without it, and activ-ities that we cannot conceive of now.

Conclusions

The aerospace contractor groups that studied po-tential needs and desires for new infrastructure iden-tified hundreds of activities in the areas of spacescience and applications, commercialization, andtechnology development that could be carried out uti-lizing long lifetime infrastructure with accommodationfor a crew to live and work in space. The vast majorityare activities that are possible only with a crew sup-ported by the infrastructure, or ones that would beenhanced by their presence: they would maximizeR&D performance, especially in the life and materialssciences, and contribute to economic benefits. Nosingle activity, or even a few, would be sufficient tojustify its establishment, but the large total number


Figure A-12.– One Contractor’s Summary of Infrastructure (“Space Station”) Payoffs

Provides significant economic

Equivalent to two additional Orbitersbenefit as launch and utilities facility

7

6

5

B$ 4. +

3

2

1Extended time on orbit

STS sortie

Free-flyer spacecraft

Spastati

o 5 10 20

Time, years

Projected benefits exceed cost

$

Cumulativecost

Cumulative

benefits

years

SOURCE Based on Information contained the study led by Martin Marietta Corp

contributing in all functional areas, in the judgmentof the contractor groups, provide reasons to acquirean extensive permanently inhabited space infrastructure.

All study participants see significant benefits—in-cluding such intangibles as national prestige, leader-ship in space, and economic, performance, and socialbenefits connected with scientific research, commer-cialization, and new technology. Reflecting the broadrange of advantages projected, contractors differed asto which aspect would be most significant. Planetaryprobes, a Lunar settlement, and human explorationof Mars are considered of great significance in termsof longer range goals.

It was the unanimous recommendation that the firstinfrastructure units should be placed in a 28.50 inclina-tion low-Earth-orbit. All were envisioned as new tech-nology designs and were projected as allowing evolu-tionary growth with increased size and capabilityphased in over an initial assembly period of about 5years. The smallest unit with adequate volume tohouse a crew of three for extended stays and with min-

Provides long-term capability for

imum experimental and research facilities would con-sist of a command/habitat module connected to asolar-array energy module, plus two logistics modules(for resupply by Shuttle flight). They estimated suchan initial unit’s acquisition cost to be from $3.3 bil-lion to $4 billion (1984). A later complex accom-modating eight crew members, 60 kW of power tousers, two laboratory modules, several external pay-load attachment points and satellite service pallets,and two tended platforms (co-orbiting and polar) wereestimated to cost $7.5 billion to $9 billion. An ROTVcapability could cost as much as $3 billion more. Andfurther expansion of “space station” components andcapabilities were contemplated into the 21st century.

These contractor costs accumulate to $10 billion to$12 billion for the development of the contractor-suggested evolved complex over an approximately 9-year period to the mid-1990s; NASA support and pro-gram integration expense could be another $2 billionto $3 billion. The contractor “evolved” system isroughly comparable to the summer 1983 NASA IOC


but with the addition of full ROTV capability. (Furtheradditions that enter, generally, in NASA’s future plansto the year 2000 would add another $6 billion.)

The contractors point out that, although quite large,these expenditures may be compared with the approx-imately $60 billion (1 984) invested in the Apollo pro-gram and the estimated equivalent $56 billion spentfor the Salyut-Soyuz project (reported by Interavia forFebruary 1982), each over a somewhat comparableperiod of time. While the study contractor groups con-cluded that these estimated costs could be containedwithin a NASA budget projection that maintainedtoday’s level of appropriation over a 10-year period,they recognize that some cost-offsetting economic re-turn on this public investment is necessary.

While the prospects for cost containment and otherintangible benefits are considered to be promising,two operational factors are pointed out as the mainsources of large, quantifiable economic benefits. Oneis the use of an LEO-based ROTV system to transportequipments between LEO and higher orbits, includingGEO. The other relates to the fact that appropriate in-frastructure would result in maximizing the STS loadfactor for each flight. The contractors project a reduc-tion in costs for these activities of up to $10 billionover the system lifetime. Income could result from in-creased commercial space development fostered bythe lower cost of space activities and faster conductof research activities generally.

A final comparison may be made regarding otherlong-duration “space stations” of the past and present:Skylab and Salyut. As orbiting spacecraft accommo-dating crews, at first glance they appear to be fun-damentally similar. But, while all three could functionas space test and laboratory facilities, the contractorsnote that the proposed “space station” is the only oneproviding for satellite servicing. And neither Skylab norSalyut offered the assembly and transport harbor en-visioned for a new “space station. ”

Major Findings of “Mission AnalysisStudies” of Other Countries

Related studies were also requested of potentialforeign participants in any “space station” program.In terms similar to the eight U.S. aerospace contrac-tor group studies, the European Space Agency (ESA),the National Research Council of Canada, and a Jap-anese Space Station Task Team (representing numer-ous organizations in Japan interested in aerospaceactivities) prepared studies. In addition, individualcompanies or groups of companies from these regionspresented reports of elements or subsystems of specialinterest to them. Among these were Dornier of Ger-

many, Aerospatiale of France, Spar Aerospace of Can-ada, and a group of European companies consistingof AEG, British Aerospace, Fokker, and CIR.

European Space Agency

The member nations of the European Space Agency(ESA) authorized a study team which was directed byMBB/ERNO and included Aeritalia, Matra, BritishAerospace, Dornier System, SABCA, BTM, and KAMP-SAX. It examined European interest in providing ele-ments and the likely consequences of utilizing a“space station” having crew capabilities.

Especially emphasized was ESA’s desire to partici-pate actively in the program, both in the design andconstruction of components (e.g., logistics modules,free-flying platforms, laboratory modules, and equip-ment and servicing pallets) and in the later operations(e.g., access on a continuing basis for experiments,identification of payloads and operational require-ments, and provision of crew members).

The study assessed participation as offering poten-tial benefits to European nations in scientific, techno-logical, industrial, economic, operational, and politi-cal areas. European contributions were seen as basedupon their own set of potential user interests, on sys-tems with clean interfaces with other infrastructurecomponents, and on the utilization of developed Euro-pean technologies (specifically Spacelab). Perhaps ESAcould provide “dedicated modules” with preferentialconditions for European users to compensate for Euro-pean investment. Participation would be particularlycost effective to ESA if all of the infrastructure wereavailable to it without a major program on their partto obtain it, so that it would be complementary withrather than competitive with European unmannedsystems.

The study team identified about 130 activities that,conceptually, European countries desire to carry outin space. Similar to the projections of the U.S. con-tractor groups, they included materials processing, lifesciences and bioprocessing studies, space science andapplications, and technology development. An inno-vative use was that of entertainment, such as filmingof space movies and creation of new artistic forms inspace.

ESA recognized the possibility of free-flyers as a sup-plement to a “space station” for Earth observation andspace science, but noted the advantages (over an ex-pendable booster) of the Shuttle and additional in-orbit infrastructure; this combination would involveless costly hardware, provide return transportation asneeded, and obviate the necessity of bringing a com-plete spacecraft back to the surface for servicing.


The need or benefit from human involvement inabout 70 percent of the proposed activities wasstressed. Among these were life sciences experimentsand the servicing of satellites such as the EURECAvehicles that are under design in Europe. Power needsidentified for users were in the range of 20 to 30 kW.

Canada

The National Research Council of Canada expresseda high degree of interest. The Canadian report iden-tified about 37 potential uses and desires, largely inthe areas of remote sensing and technology develop-ment. Most could be carried out at an orbit inclina-tion of 28.5° with 5 kW of power. Many uses wouldbenefit from having a human crew, and a Canadianastronaut as a payload specialist was proposed.

Continued development of the SPAR Remote Ma-nipulator System is anticipated along with new workon associated construction and servicing subsystems.Also, Canada would develop a space vision systemto facilitate ranging and docking, and considerationis being given to advanced remote sensing subsystems.

In a separate report, Spar Aerospace Limited out-lined its capabilities in high-power solar arrays and in-dicated interest in building one of a modular type;various concepts were given but no cost estimates.

Japan

The Japanese Space Station Task Team reportedlong-term, across-the-board interest. While few spe-cifics regarding individual experiments were given,they anticipated uses for astronomy, life sciences,materials processing, technology development, Earthobservation, space energy research, and large com-munications satellite assembly. The majority of thesewould require or benefit from human presence, withlong time on orbit and human judgment and/or oper-ating capability as important factors. They anticipatethat space activities would involve two general phases—one up to the middle 1990s to develop methods tobe capitalized on thereafter.

The Japanese would be interested in developingalmost any or all elements of the space infrastructure,from attached modules to the ROTV. They suggeststarting with simple standard modules and enlargingthe capabilities for various additional needs.

Individual Foreign Company Interests

Extensive studies were made by several Europeancompanies or industrial groups to augment the reportsdiscussed in the previous sections of this chapter. Asubmission of Spar Aerospace Limited has already

been discussed in the section on Canada; others arepresented here.

DORNIER

Dornier of Germany investigated several concep-tual infrastructure elements for ESA which have an ob-vious relation to a potential later participation of Eur-ope in a U.S. program. The conceptual elementsanalyses included:

1.

2.

3.

‘requirements and technology aspects for spacepointing systems;designs and capabilities of heat pipe radiators;andlife sciences experiments and development of lifesupport systems.

AEROSPATIALE

Aerospatiale of France studied the following areas:1.

2.

3.

General infrastructure concepts, along with theirevaluation of the eight U.S. contractor group ar-chitectural designs. The contractor group studieswere noted as having numerous advantageousdesign features, but in each case several dif-ficulties are foreseen.Concepts for a Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehi-cle were studied with special consideration of itsfuel storage arrangements.Designs of a Teleoperator Maneuvering Systemwere-studied. It would incorporate solar arraysto provide electrical power.

AEG, BRITISH AEROSPACE, FOKKER, CIR

This group of European companies analyzed powersources employing solar energy arrays, comparingplanar and concentrator designs and various support-ing structure arrangements. A flexible-blanket, retract-able, fold-out array was favored for further study. Thisapproach also lends itself to stepwise growth to powerlevels as great as 250 kW.

MBB/ERNO, AERITALIA, BRITISH AEROSPACE,DORNIER SYSTEM, SABCA, BTM, KAMPSAX

MBB/ERNO, the leader of this group of companies,was also the principal contractor for the general ESA“space station” study. Thus, much duplication occursin this report of the summary appearing earlier in thischapter.

Considerable emphasis was put upon the possibil-ity of the Spacelab and EURECA spacecraft being usedas infrastructure elements.

Modifications of Spacelab could provide combinedhabitation/laboratory functions in conjunction with anEDO vehicle. A crew of three could be accommo-


dated, but this would result in a decrease in labora-tory space compared to the present Spacelab design.EURECA would first be used as a Shuttle-tended un-pressurized free-flying platform. Later development ofa resource/service module incorporating solar elec-trical power, environmental control, and life supportsystems would enable an increased capability in asso-ciation with the developed Spacelab and the EURECAplatform. Ultimately these elements could, with others,become components of a larger, more permanentspace infrastructure.

Also, a Spacelab with its own solar array could bea free-flying experiment module which could betended by a crew that would visit for a few hours ata time.

They also indicated a European consortium was pre-pared to develop and produce an ROTV and itshangar facility, a Teleoperator Maneuvering System(labeled by Matra as a Teleoperated Service Vehicle),and the satellite service and assembly infrastructuresegments.

No specific estimated costs were given. However,six items (a free-flying, tended, experiment module,a logistics module, a free-flying platform, an unpres-surized logistics resupply carrier, a teleoperator ma-neuvering system, and a thermal control technologydevelopment program) could be achieved over a 1syear period at funding levels aggregating about $1.6billion (1984). While direct comparison with estimatesmade by U.S. aerospace companies is difficult be-cause of numerous design and capability differences,this cost could be lower than, but of the same orderof magnitude as, the estimate for a corresponding setof modules by the American contractors.

The study observed that pressurized modules wouldsometimes be needed for experimental reasons evenif human habitation were not a consideration, and thiswould affect not only the design but also the opera-tion of such modules.

The study team recommended that developmentshould proceed in phases with the initial phase usingproven existing elements. Automated processes shouldbe preferred for routine work, but cost effectivenessmust always be considered, inasmuch as automationcan be costly.

This study, representing companies from manyEuropean countries, was oriented to identifying po-tentially produceable infrastructure elements, notoverall concepts. This emphasized Europe’s intentionto play an active role in development and operation,not simply provide hardware. The candidate elementswould satisfy their user needs and have clean inter-faces with the other elements of space infrastructure.This would not only put Europe in a position to oper-

ate their facilities, but also enable them to be offeredto the United States, thus allowing a sharing of re-sources and reducing the financial involvement of par-ticipating nations,

Summary

The universal attitude of all non-United States orga-nizations is one of enthusiasm to participate in a spaceinfrastructure program, not just to develop and buildelements of it, but to be active as partners in the oper-ation and use of its facilities, especially the elementsthat they would produce. Many of them look uponit as fundamental to their future role in space andtherefore want long-term understandings or agree-ments with the United States. The characteristic noteis one of desired international cooperation in whichthere is true participation throughout rather thansimply shared eventual utilization.

NASA Synthesis of the “MissionAnalysis Studies”

NASA assembled the United States and foreign mis-sion analysis reports relating to a civilian “space sta-tion” and held a workshop during May 1983, to syn-thesize the results. Of the hundreds of projects andexperiments proposed by potential users, the work-shop of the Requirements Working Group and theSSTF Concept Development Group established a min-imum time-phased “mission set” (for the decade from1991 to 2000) of 107 specific space activities, plus fourgeneric industrial service activities (e.g., satelliteservicing).

Of the 107, 48 were categorized under science andapplications, 28 under commercial, and 31 undertechnology development. The four additional com-mercial opportunity activities would be continuouslyavailable as needed for industrial servicing.

The NASA working groups judged the list of activi-ties to be realistic in terms of maturity of experimentaland program planning, scientific need, and progressof technology development. The programs identifiedfor the first 3 years were particularly well validatedin their view. At the end of the workshop, their rec-ommendations of the minimum capabilities requiredat IOC were as follows:

1. Space station central complex at 28.50:● 55 kW of average electrical power to users;● Two 60 m3 laboratory modules (for materials

processing in space and life sciences);● 5 person crew (4 for payload operations);● 300 MBPS data rate; and• 4 to 6 payload attachment mounts,


2. Polar platform (unpressurized):● 12.5 kW of average power;● 300 MBPS data rate; and• 4 payload attachment mounts.

Nonaerospace Industry Interestin Space Use

NASA contracted with the Booz-Allen & Hamiltonand Coopers and Lybrand consultant firms to com-municate with a variety of nonaerospace companiesto ascertain (and at the same time stimulate) interestin the use of space facilities for commercial purposes.Up to March 1984, they discussed prospects with up-wards of so companies of which more than 30 ex-pressed active interest. To most of these firms the con-cept of doing business in space is utterly foreign; agreat deal of exploring with them is necessary to sur-face possibilities of products or services that might becompatible with their commercial activities and offerpromising opportunity of eventual financial success.

Booz-Allen & Hamilton reported to a conference inmid-1 983 that most of the companies moving towardnegotiation of Joint Endeavor Agreements with NASAare well-known U.S. industrial firms (one with an an-nounced agreement is the 3M Corp.) but several arefrom the small business sector or Europe. Interest isconcentrated in such fields as chemicals, metals,glasses, communications, and crystals. Another typeof enterprise being actively pursued is a fee-for-servicelaboratory in space. Among the half-dozen companiesactively investigating space experiments, most are in-terested in crew-tended operations rather than remoteor automated procedures.

Since the administration’s authorization of a “spacestation” program, interest among several companieshas become more firm, according to those involvedin the study; the 3M Corp. has recently announceda Memorandum of Understanding with NASA to beginspace experiments on inorganic chemical materials

and on thin films. An executive with one companywith experience in aerospace has indicated that theGovernment’s funding toward eventual acquisition ofpermanently inhabited space infrastructure is a nec-essary (but not sufficient) condition to convince in-dustries that the United States is serious about spacecommercialization. He considers that, in addition, along-term commitment to supporting the commercial-ization effort is what will suffice to bring the privatesector into full participation.

Some industry observers point out that the often-mentioned example of how communications satellitesbecame a commercial success is not necessarily rele-vant to today’s efforts at space commercialization inother areas. First, there was already a clear market forthe improved communications services which a pri-vate organization was created to provide, somethingwhich is not clearly evident today is such areas asmaterials processing in space or remote sensing. Sec-ond, the enabling legislation to move it forward toreality was motivated by the need to create an inter-national system, while today’s commercializationissues concern primarily U.S. domestic businesses.

The barriers that Booz-Allen & Hamilton found towider interest in commercial space enterprises weretechnical, economic, and government-related. First,technical knowledge of the space environment bymany industries is very scanty, while in general thereare too few answers as yet to the behavior of manykinds of materials in space. Second, economic risksassociated with timing and cost of space experimentsare looked at by private enterprise from the standpointof the expected long payback period (1 O or moreyears). Third, the maze of government bureaucracyto be faced to obtain approval on such things as JointEndeavor Agreements is deterring some, especiallysmall companies, from entering into space business.Booz-Allen & Hamilton is recommending establish-ment of some form of permanent intermediary to assistnonaerospace companies in contacts with NASA andother Government agencies.

Appendix B

THE EVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN IN-SPACEINFRASTRUCTURE, I. E., “SPACE STATION,”

CONCEPTS IN THE UNITED STATES*

Introduction

Almost from the first time humans thought aboutleaving the surface of this planet, one theme has beenthe creation of some form of human outpost in space.In fiction, and during this century in increasingly spe-cific engineering detail, the “space station” concepthas been extensively discussed. In one of the two ma-jor space-faring nations, the Soviet Union, a fairlyrudimentary but still very capable “space station” pro-gram, centered on the Salyut spacecraft, has been on-going since 1971. In the other space power, theUnited States, the development of some kind of per-manent presence i n space to support space activitiesi n an efficient and effective manner, is now u riderway.

This appendix reviews those past occasions, withparticular attention to the rationales offered at varioustimes for space infrastructure development and to thediffering concepts which have been proposed. His-tory can cast a useful perspective on current policyalternatives, which, after all, reflect the continuationof a long-running debate over the justification for in-frastructure of various characteristics, size, and cost.By sketching the earlier points in the history of the U.S.space program at which a “space station” has comeunder serious consideration as a major project, onlyto be rejected in favor of some other alternative, it maybe possible to identify what is now different, and whatis not, that might now lead to a more favorable evalua-tion of various proposals.

Earliest Space Infrastructure(i e.,

.. “Space Station” Concepts) t

The first proposals for “space stations” conceptuallyakin to modern schemes appeared in the late nine-teenth century. Konstantin E. Tsiolkovsky’s Dreams ofEarth and Sky and the Effects of Universal Gravity(1895) and Kurd Lasswitz’s On Two Planets (1897) set

*This paper was prepared for OTA by John Logsdon, based In part on

orlglnal material by Alex Roland,I Much of this section IS based on papers by Frederick 1. Ordway, I I 1, ‘‘The

History, Evolutlon, and Benefits of the Space StatIon Concept, ” presentedto the XIII International Congress of the History of Sctence, August 1971;

and Leonard David, “Space StatIons of the Imaglnatlon, ” A/AA Studenf)our-na/ VOI 20, No, 4, winter 1982/1 983.

the tone by picturing “space stations” as steppingstones for trips by people to the planets, especiallyMars. Like these earliest contributions, succeedingproposals included fiction and nonfiction, humanismand science, practicality and fancy. They were sparkedby an unbridled enthusiasm for spaceflight and a firmbelief that exploration of the planets was human des-tiny. Most were informed enough to realize that di-rect ascent from Earth to interplanetary space was nottechnical y attractive. “Space stations” were way sta-tions, logistics depots on the way to the planets.

Tsiolkovsky in 1923 wrote of a station placed “ata distance of 2,000 to 3,000 versts (a Russian unit ofdistance equal to 0.6629 mile) from the Earth, as (anartificial) Moon. Little by little appear colonies withsupplements, materials, machines, and structuresbrought from Earth.” In his 1923 book, The RocketInto Interplanetary Space, space pioneer HermanOberth first described an orbiting manned satellite asa “space station, ” and proposed that it could be usedas an Earth observation site, world communicationslink, weather satellite, or orbital refueling station foroutward-bound space vehicles.

The early proposals resulted in more words thanhardware. The only group of “space station” advo-cates to make progress toward realizing their dreamswere the members of the German Rocket Society,among whom the “space station” concept becamecommon currency.2 But even they could only mud-dle along on rocket research with the limited privatefunds at their disposal until military support promptedby the approach of World War II brought on the fi-nancing necessary for research and development thatwould lead to spaceflight. Wernher von Braun andhis associates built the v-2 rocket for the Wehrmachtin order, they said later, to achieve their real goal—the development of spaceflight. Whatever their mo-tives, after the war they brought to the United Statesthe most advanced rocket technology in the world andschemes for “space station” and interplanetary flightthat had been sparked and nurtured by the romanticenthusiasm of the first half of the 20th century.

‘Barton C. Hacker, “And Rest As On a Natural Station: From Space Sta-tton to Orbital Operations In Space-Travel Thought, 1985-1951 ,“ unpublishedpaper, NASA History C)tlce ArchIves (hereafter NHOA), Washington, DC,p 9.

159


In the United States in the years immediately fol-lowing World War II, both scientists and military lead-ers recognized that the ability to launch payloads intoorbit would have important implications for their par-ticular fields of activity. In considering the various usesto which space might be put, several lines of devel-opment emerged. First, to the concept of “space sta-tions” with human crews as stepping stones to theplanets was added the less dramatic but more reali-zable concept of relatively small Earth satellites, notto send men to other celestial bodies but to performpractical, Earth-oriented tasks in orbit: communica-tion, scientific research, reconnaissance, etc. j

Second, further consideration led some to concludethat bases in orbit were “not necessary for most activ-ities envisioned there: rendezvous of the rockets andsatellites themselves is sufficient to most purposes. ”4

But this perspective and its appearance in the literaturedid nothing to deter a third line of development: theelaboration of earlier concepts of “space stations, ”perpetuated in this era most spectacularly by Wernhervon Braun’s concept of a toroidal “space station. ”Von Braun’s ideas received wide publicity in a Col-lier’s magazine special titled “Man Will ConquerSpace Soon.” Von Braun claimed that “scientists andengineers now know how to build a station in spacethat would circle the Earth, 1,075 miles up . . . .If wedo it, we can not only preserve the peace but we cantake a long step toward uniting mankind.”

Von Braun’s plan called for a triple-decked, 25-ft-wide, wheel-shaped station in polar orbit which wouldbe a “superb observation post” and from which “atrip to the Moon itself will be just a step.” The mainelement of space infrastructure would be accompa-nied by another: a free-flying observatory that wouldbe tended by a crew.

Von Braun noted that the station would not be alonein space; “there will nearly always be one or tworocket ships unloading supplies near to the station. ”“Space taxis” or “shuttle-craft,” as von Braun de-scribed them, would ferry both people and materialsfrom the rocket ships to the station itself.

Von Braun noted a number of uses for a “spacestat ion”:

● “a springboard for exploration of the solarsystem”;

‘R. Carglll Hall, “Early US. Satellite Proposals,” Tec/rno/ogy and Cu/fure,vol. 4, 1963, pp. 41 O-434; and Arthur Clarke, “Extraterrestrial Relays: CanRocket Stations Give Worldwide Coverage?” W/re/ess Wodd, October 1945,pp 305-308.

4Harry E. Ross, “Orbital Bases, ” )ourna/ of fhe British /rrferp/anetary Society,vol. 9, 1949, pp. 1 -19; Kenneth W. Gatland, “Rockets in Circular Orbit, ”)ourna/ of the British Interplanetary Society, vol. 9, 1949, pp. 52-59.

‘Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Last Frontier, ” Co//ier’s, Mar, 22, 1952,pp. 25-29, 72-74.

● “a watchdog of the peace”;● a meteorological observation post;● a navigation aid for ships and airplanes; and● “a terribly effective atomic bomb carrier. ”This detailed description was only one of the many

concepts developed in the years after World War II

but prior to the 1957 launch of Sputnik and the for-mal beginning of the Space Age.6 Even before theUnited States had an official civilian space program,most of the possible uses of a “space station” hadbeen identified by visionaries who dreamed of spacetravel,7

The Response to Sputnik, 1957-618

Sputnik changed the context for U.S. space activi-ties. In spite of President Eisenhower’s attempts toavoid it, a space race with the Russians was on. Allkinds of proposals that would have been laughed fromthe stage in earlier years were put forward in deadlyearnest. Many at home and abroad perceived theUnited States as having fallen behind the Soviet Unionat least in this sophisticated technology, and nothingbut a crash program would do.

Having people in space is the most complicated andthe most dramatic of space activities, and it quicklybecame the focus of the competition. News that theSoviets were considering a “space station” of the vonBraun variety fanned the enthusiasm in the UnitedStates for a like undertaking and underlined the mili-tary overtones of the space race.9 As one observer putit, “the rapid and timely completion of the MilitarySpace Station will do much to bring about spacesupremacy (italics added) for America and lay thescientific foundation for the aerospace power of thefuture. ” 10

But this was not to be. In spite of all that the mili-tary had done to pioneer research in spaceflight, Presi-dent Eisenhower opted for a civilian space agency, the

bThe detailed description in the von Braun article should not be confusedwith a detailed design. For two early detailed designs, see: 1 ) “Assembly ofa Multl-Manned Satellite, ” Lockheed Missile and Space Division, LMSD48347, Dec. 18, 1958 (available in the archives of the National Air and SpaceMuseum of the Smithsonian Institution); and 2) “A Modular Concept for aMulti-Manned Space Station, “ in the IAS Proceedings of the Manned SpaceStat/on Symposium, Apr. 20-22, 1960, pp. 37-72.

7See, for example, the IAS report, op. cit.8Thls history is recounted in John M. Logsdon, The Decision to Go to the

Moon Project Apollo and the Nat/onal Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,197o), ch, 2; and W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, Living andWorking in Space: The History o{ Skylab (Washington, DC: National Aero-nautics and Space Administration, 1983), SP-4208, ch. 1.

9“Soviet Scientist Sees Need for Manned Station in Space, ” AerO/spdCeEngineering, vol. 17, September 1958, p, 27.

iOLowell B. Smith, “The Military Test Space Stat Ion,” Aero/Spdce EfWKW-/ng, vol. 19, May 1960, p. 19.

App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States . 161

National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA), and entrusted it with a manned mission. Andthat mission would be a modest one, at least at thestart. Project Mercury would demonstrate that a per-son could fly in space; until then there would be notalk of “space stations” and manned flight to theMoon and planets.11

However, as the new space agency began opera-tions, NASA leadership set the development of a long-range plan for the agency’s first decade as a high-pri-ority task. A “space station” was a leading candidatefor a post-Mercury goal. The House Space Commit-tee in early 1959 concluded that stations were the log-ical follow-on to Mercury, and von Braun (then stillworking for the Army) presented a similar view i n hisbriefings to NASA, At this time, the German rocketteam had developed an elaborate scheme, called Proj-ect Horizon, for Army utilization of space, includingmiIitary outposts on the Iunar surface.

In the first half of 1959, NASA created a ResearchSteering Committee on Manned Space Flight, chairedby Harry Goett. At the first meeting of this committeemembers placed a “space station” ahead of a lunarexpedition in a list of logical post-Mercury steps. Insubsequent meetings, the debate centered on thequestion of whether a “space station’s” value forscientific research, especially in the biomedical area,outweighed the excitement of a lunar landing goal.

While some members of the committee argued that“the ultimate objective of space exploration ismanned travel to and from other planets, ” the repre-sentative of one center argued for an interim step,since “in true spaceflight man and the vehicle are go-ing to be subjected to the space environment for ex-tended periods of time and there will undoubtedly bespace rendezvous requirements. All of these aspectsneed extensive study . . . the best means would bewith a true orbiting space laboratory that is mannedand that can have a crew and equipment change. ” 12

Ultimately, the Goett committee recommended thata lunar landing be established as NASA’s long-rangegoal, on the grounds that it was a true “end-objective”requiring no justification in terms of some larger goalsto which it contributed.

These recommendations were not immediately ac-cepted. For example, at an August 1960 industry brief-ing on NASA’s future plans, George Low presenteda scheme in which a manned lunar landing and crea-tion of a “space station” were given equal treatment

I I Loyal s Swenson, jr., james M, G rlmwood, and Charles C. Alexander,

This I\’eM Ocean A H/sfory of’ Prqect Mercury, NASA SP-420T (Washing-ton, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon, 1966).

I ~Bruce Lofi I n, as quoted I n the MI n utes of the Research steering Commit-

tee on Manned Fllght, meeting of May 25-26, 1959 (NHOA)

as long-range goals of the NASA program; Low toldthe conference that “in this decade, therefore, ourpresent planning calls for the development and dem-onstration of an advanced manned spacecraft with suf-ficient flexibility to be capable of both circumlunarflight and useful Earth orbital missions. In the longrange, this spacecraft should lead toward a permanentmanned “space station. ”13 Low also announced thename of the advanced spacecraft program, then aimedboth at the Moon and at “space stations”; it was tobe called “Project Apollo.”

The Apollo Anomaly

Once again, however, external events intervenedto upset the orderly course of events envisioned bythose planning the country’s future in space. PresidentKennedy came into office in 1961 committed to reas-sert America’s vitality and resolve in the war of nerveswith the Soviet Union. When, in April 1961, the Rus-sians tested the United States once again by launch-ing the first man into space, Kennedy ended his earlyindecisiveness on the space program and in 1961committed the country to the race to the Moon. Thisdecision, the most momentous in the history of theAmerican space program, was made for reasons ofprestige and politics.14 It determined the future ofNASA and its programs more thoroughly than anyother decision before or since. That influence oper-ated on two levels.

First, and perhaps most importantly in the long run,the style and public perception of the Apollo commit-ment made it something of a model for all future spaceproposals. President Kennedy made the decisionquickly but not precipitously. He consulted his staffand NASA and chose the Moon landing as the mostdramatic and most feasible of the suggestions fordemonstrating U.S. ability to best the Soviet Union inhigh-technology competition. He presented the ideain a speech before an unusual joint session of Con-gress, in which the new President outlined his plansfor fulfilling his campaign promises of getting theUnited States moving again.

“Now is the time,” said Kennedy, “to take longerstrides—time for a great new American enterprise—time for this nation to take a clearly leading role inspace achievement, which in many ways may holdthe key to our future on Earth. ”15 In a moving and un-compromising challenge, the President called on Con-

1‘George Low, “Manned Space Fllght, ” an NASA, NASA -lrrdustry ProgramP/.]ns Conference, July 1960, p. 80, (NHOA).

‘“ Logsdon, op. cit., chs. 3-5, recounts the history of the declslon to beginthe Apollo program and analyzes the motives which led to that declslon

“lbld , p. 128


gress and the public to commit itself to a $25-billion16

undertaking in space for largely intangible goals ofprestige and competition. Congress and the publicagreed, launching NASA on its most famous and for-mative enterprise and creating an indelible image ofhow to launch a major project in space. Only slowly,if at all, would NASA administrators and other spaceadvocates come to realize that the Apollo commit-ment was a political anomaly defying duplication.

The Apollo decision also ensured that in accom-plishing the lunar landing objective the United Stateswould develop a large, but specialized, space capa-bility, and that manned spaceflight would come todominate all other kinds for at least a decade. Andit ensured, especially after it was complemented bythe lunar-orbital rendezvous decision, that the “spacestation” concept would recede into the backgroundfor the duration of the race to the Moon. The Moonmission would proceed on its journey directly fromEarth orbit–simply because that was the quickest wayto go (though not necessarily the best for long-termdevelopment) and the Saturn V launch vehicle (origi-nally designed for other purposes) would permit it.

In this hothouse atmosphere, Project Mercury andProject Gemini became demonstration programs forApollo. Many of the tasks that had to be accomplishedin order for Apollo to succeed were also on the agendafor “space station” research. Mercury, for example,demonstrated that a person could survive the weight-lessness and radiation of space. Gemini demonstratedthat rendezvous, docking, and extravehicular activ-ity were feasible. The last of these was always moreimportant to “space station” plans than to Apollo.Both projects demonstrated, at least to some, that ahuman being was a crucial component of the space-craft’s capability, performing such functions aspiloting, observing, and photographing; and pilotingespecially was contrasted with the comparativelyprimitive, ground-controlled capsules of the Russiansin which the cosmonaut was simply a passenger. ’

Notwithstanding these positive steps on the road toa total manned spaceflight capability, Apollo was toprove a programmatic deadend for NASA. Many inNASA understood all along that the lunar rendezvousapproach to accomplishing the objective was a tech-nical anomaly and they never gave up their notionof a more logical approach to human exploitation ofspace, i.e., a “space station. ” For this reason, whileApollo was at the center of public attention during the

lbThen_some $6CI bi I I ton today.I TSwenson, et al., Op. cit.; Baflon C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, on

the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini, NASA SP-4203 (Wash-I ngton, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1977).

1960s, studies of “space station” concepts proceededthroughout the decade.

“Space Station” Plans Duringthe 1960s

During the 1960s, “space station” studies were con-ducted both within NASA and by the various aero-space contractors (particularly those without a majorrole in Apollo). They resulted in examination of a widevariety of concepts, ranging from inflatable balloon-Iike structures, through the use of refurbished rocketstages, to very large stations requiring the use of SaturnV boosters to put them in orbit. Three NASA field cen-ters—the Manned Spacecraft Center in Texas, the Mar-shall Space Flight Center in Alabama, and the LangleyResearch Center in Virginia—managed these in-houseand contractor studies, and they were coordinated bythe Advanced Missions Office of the Office of MannedSpace Flight at NASA headquarters in Washington.18

While the manned flight centers at Houston andHuntsville were focusing almost their total energieson getting Apollo started in the early 1960s,’9 theLangley Research Center was giving substantial atten-tion to the theoretical and engineering aspects of“space station” design. These efforts dated from atleast mid-1959, and by 1962 enough work had beendone to form the basis for a “space station” symposi-um.20

Langley researchers noted that “a large mannedorbiting ‘space station’ may have many uses or ob-jectives.” Among these objectives they listed:

1. learning to live in space;● artificial-gravity experiments,. zero-gravity experiments, and• systems research and development,

2. applications research;● communications experiments,● earth observations,

3. launch platform experiments; and4. scientific research.

With respect to launch platform experiments, Langleysuggested that:

. . . the “space station” with its crew of trained astro-nauts and technicians should be a suitable facility for

Iestudles durln~ the 1960s at the Langley Research Center, the Manned

Spacecraft Center, and the Marshall Space Flight Center are summarized InLangley Research Center, Compilation of Papers Presented at the Space Sta-tion Technology Symposium, Feb. 11-13, 1969 (N HOA).

!sEven So, both Houston and Huntsville had “space station’ study effofls

under way; in par t icu lar , Houston was s tudy ing a la rge (24-person) “space station” to be launched by a Saturn V. The studies directedby Langley have been chosen for review because they were more fully de-veloped than those directed by the two other centers.

~t}The early Langley studies are summarized in Langley Research Center,

A Reporl on the Research and Technological Problems of Manned RotatingSpacecraft, NASA Technical Note D-1 504, August 1962 (NHOA).

App. B—The Evolution of Civilian /n-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States • 163

learning some of the fundamental operations neces-sary for launching space missions from orbit. The newtechnologies required for rendezvous, assembly or-bital countdown, replacement of defective parts, andorbital launch can be determined. 21

Among various “space station” studies carried outby Langley contractors during the first half of the1960s, perhaps the most detailed was that of aManned Orbital Research Laboratory (MORL) con-ducted by Douglas Aircraft from 1963 to 1966. Doug-las had had some prior interest in “space stations”;in 1960 it had built a full-scale mockup of a four-person astronomical space observatory as the centraltheme of an “ideal home exhibition” held in London.This station was to be constructed inside the fuel tankof a second-stage booster, a Douglas idea which ulti-mately found use in the Skylab program over a dec-ade later.22

In this study, a baseline technical concept for anMORL was established first, then the “utilization po-tential” of such a station was examined—i,e., designpreceded requirements. When the original design wascompared to various requirements, it was inadequate,and a larger station in a different orbit evolved as thefinal result of the study effort. The study found thatthe highest utilization potential came from “key engi-neering and scientific research studies augmented byspecific experiments directed toward potential Earth-centered applications. ” As the study proceeded, theMORL got steadily more sophisticated and bigger, asthere were no criteria established to limit the additionof new experimental requirements.

The MORL requirements study examined:● Earth-centered applications;● national defense;● support of future space flights; and,● the space sciences.

From this analysis, the study predicted the need for“hundreds of thousands of man-hours” in orbit tocarry out all useful applications; this implied a long-range requirement for “near-permanent operationsand support of probably several space stations. ” Thestudy also noted, foreshadowing a future issue, that“the limiting factor on the number of such stations,and the crew size of each station, appears to be thecost of logistic support. ” The final MORL concept, al-though basically a zero-gravity station, had an on-board centrifuge for reentry simulation, testing of phys-

.“ I hld)iGeorg(, v But Ier, ‘‘space sti3t10n5, 1959 To?” in B. J, Bluth and S R.

\Ic \eal L,Iprf~te on SpJCe, vol 1 (Granada Hills, CA National Behavior Sys-[t’m\, 1981 J, p 8

ical condition, and physical therapy if zero-gravityconditions were debilitating for the crew.23

By early 1963, NASA Associate Administrator andGeneral Manager Robert Sea mans called for study ofan Earth Orbiting Laboratory (EOL) from “an overallNASA point of view.” Such study was needed, saidSeamans, since an EOL had been studied and dis-cussed “by several government agencies and con-tractors” 24 and because NASA and DOD “are nowsupporting a number of additional advanced studies. ”Seamans’ reference to DOD was significant: NASAand DOD were locked in a controversy over controlof post-ApoIlo manned flight efforts. NASA’s manage-ment, anticipated Seamans, would “be faced with thedecision to initiate hardware development” in 1964.Seamans ordered an agency-wide, 4 to 6 week high-priority study which would examine EOL proposalsin terms of, among other factors:

1. Defense Department interest,2. international factors, and3. other government agency interest. 25

Throughout this study and other attempts to definea “space station” program in the 1963-66 period,there was a continuing tension between those design-ing the station itself (primarily associated with the Of-fice of Manned Space Flight (OMSF), its field centersand associate contractors) and those interested in theexperiments and other uses of such a faciIity (primar-ily the Office of Space Science and Applications andthe Office of Advanced Research and Technology(OART)). For example, one OART staffer complainedin 1963 that “the fact that OMSF is supplying fundsfor MORL , . . does not change the fact that in doingso they are in a supporting role to the experimentalpurpose of the MORL. That experimental purposeshould carry a heavy stick in the determination of howthe research program will be accomplished. ”26

Later in 1963, the Director of OART asked field cen-ter assistance in defining “more clearly the potentialusefulness of such a laboratory as a platform for scien-tific and technological research in space. ” He noted

~JDouglas MISS I Ie and Space Systems Diwslon, Douglas Aircraft CO., ‘‘ Re-

port on the Development of the Manned Orbkal Research Laboratory (MORL)System Utilization Potential, ” Repon SM-48822, January 1966.

ZdThough It IS not discussed in detal I In this report, durl ng this period the

Department of Defense was exploring the potential of manned flight for na-tional security missions. Some of this study effort was conducted jointly withNASA, but most was not; one focus of the effort was the military potentialof a “space station. ” In 1963, the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory(MOL) program was approved as an initial step in examining the ways Inwh Ich human crews cou [d be used to enhance national security operationsIn orbit The MOL wa5 canceled In 1969

J~Memoran~u m from NASA Associate Adml nlstrator, “Space Task Team

for ,Manned Earth Orbltlng Laboratory Study,” Mar. 28, 1963 (NHOA).“Memorandum from Chtet, Manned Systems Integration, to Director, Ot-

tlce of Ad\anced Research and Technology, “ SEB for the Manned OrbttalResearch Laboratory, May 16, 1963 (N HOA).

38-798 0 - 84 - 12 : QL 3


that “a view has prevailed to date, based primarily onintuitive judgment [emphasis added here], that this re-search function (exclusive of biotechnology and hu-man factors research) constitutes one of the more im-portant long-range justifications” for a “space station.”It was essential, he argued, to make “a correct deci-sion as to whether and why a MORL project shouldbe undertaken.”27

By 1964, the definition of uses for a “space station”had broadened enough to lead the Director of theOMSF Advanced Manned Mission Office to suggestthat it was “both timely and necessary to pursue. . . broadly beneficial uses of “space stations” withthe departments and agencies that will capitalize andexploit these broader uses” and that an interagency“applications working group” be established for thispurpose. Such interagency involvement, he noted,“can result in a higher level of knowledgeable sup-port to NASA for implementation of a national multi-purpose ‘space station’ program.”28

Beginnings of Post-Apollo Planning2g

Under pressure from the White House and Con-gress, NASA began looking beyond the Apollo proj-ect in 1964 and 1965. In 1964, an in-house examina-tion of NASA’s future options had recommended thatNASA defer “large new missions for further study andanalysis. “3° However, there was concern within NASAabout maintaining an adequate workload for bothNASA centers and NASA contractors, as the develop-ment phase of Apollo neared completion, and an evo-lutionary approach from Apollo to more advanced ac-tivities appeared more likely to meet this need, giventhe low probability of a major new start on post-Apolloprograms.

The nature of NASA’s long-range planning duringthis period turned on the style and personality of theAdministrator, James E. Webb. A lawyer and business-man who had served President Harry Truman as Di-rector of the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) and as Under

~’Memorandum from Director, Office of Advanced Research and Tech-

nology, “Request for Assistance in Defining the Scientific and TechnologicalResearch Potential of a Manned Orbital Laboratory, ” Oct. 31, 1963, NHOA,This IS not a reference to the Air Force’s MOL Program.

ZaMemorandum from Director, Advanced Manned Missions Program, ‘‘1 n-

creased Participation of Potential User Agencies in Development of BroadlyBeneficial Utiiizatlons of Manned Orbiting Space Station, ” July 15, 1964(N HOA),

~gSee Arnold Levine, Managing NASA In the Apo1/o Era, NASA Sp-4012

(Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1983),chapters 2 and 9 and James Webb’s foreword, for a full account of post-Apollo planning.

~OThe rep~ was called “Summary Report, Future Programs Task Group, ”

and was printed in U ,S, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and SpaceSciences, Hearings, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1966, 89th Congress,1st sess,, 1965, pt. 3, pp. 1027-1102.

Secretary of State, Webb combined an ebullient anddynamic personality with a keen political sense andlong familiarity with the ways of Washington. Hebelieved in long-range planning, but he eschewedlong-range plans, which he felt excessively tied thehands of the Administrator. He wanted to be preparedfor the future, but he did not want to commit himselfor NASA prematurely to another project as large asApollo.

Webb adopted two approaches to post-Apollo plan-ning. First he characterized and rationalized Apolloas the development of a capability in space, not anend in itself. Once the Moon landing was accom-plished, NASA would be able to convert the resourcesand experience of the Apollo program to other pur-poses through a program called Apollo Applications.Second, he used his fine political sense to ensure thatNASA adjusted its ambitions in space to suit the cli-mate of opinion in Washington and throughout theNation. As the war in Vietnam and the domestic unrestof the late 1960s compounded NASA’s problems ingetting congressional attention and appropriations,NASA gradually modified its internal plans and pro-posals. The agency took more clearly the line thatWebb stressed throughout his tenure: NASA musthave a balanced program in which manned space-flight played a role along with space science, applica-tions, and aeronautical research.

NASA spoke more often in the mid-to-late 1960s ofpractical, Earth-oriented space activities, which wouldexploit the gains already made and provide taxpayerswith tangible returns on their investment in space,And, increasingly, NASA came to look on the “spacestation” as the logical next step that would at onceexploit the Apollo team and its achievements and stillrespond to political pressure for a measured and prag-matic space program .31

The public debate in the late 1960s on the futureof the space program introduced many of the con-cepts about the “space station” that still surround thisproposal–some inherited from the Apollo experience,others developed to address the criticisms of that pro-gram. First, NASA sought, in conjunction with its plansfor a “space station,” to define an undertaking largeenough to focus the agency’s future activities, as Apol-10 had focused them in the 1960s. Occasionally, it wassuggested that a manned Mars mission would providethe ideal focus,32 but the “space station” could per-

~1 see, for example, Webb’s testimony i n U.S. Congress, Senate Commit-

tee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, National Space Goals for the Post-Apol/o Period, Hearings, 89th Cong,, 1st sess., Aug. 23-25, 1965.

JzWebb for example, stressed the importantance of focus in a letter to

President Johnson, Feb. 16, 1965, published in U.S. Congress, Senate Com-mittee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for FiscalYear )966, op. cit., p, 1028,

App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States Ž 165

form the same function, even while providing a logicalstep toward Mars. The “space station” had the addedadvantage of seeming more practical and Earth-oriented. Second, NASA stressed the flexibility of the“space station” concept and a station’s ability to per-form a variety of functions ranging from Earth-orientedapplications and scientific research to staging plat-forms for manned missions to the planets. George E.Mueller, NASA’s Associate Administrator for MannedFlight, emphasized the economic benefits of “spacestations” i n such areas as applications, weather, com-munications, research, and national security. 33

NASA advocacy of “space stations” also argued thatthe country should see that the Apollo team and hard-ware were held together and exploited, should main-tain manned spaceflight in addition to unmanned mis-sions, and should sustain the Nation’s preeminencein space in flight operations, science, and technologylest the Soviets win the long-term space race by de-fault. 34 Occasionally, NASA invoked national securityas a rationale for the “space station, ” but in the 1960s,at least, this brought the agency into apparent con-flict with the Air Force’s Manned Orbiting Laboratory,a conflict Webb tried to avoid, at least in public. 35

The theme that NASA employed most relentlesslywas that the “space station” was the logical next stepin the development of America’s capability in space.George Mueller was especially emphatic. Speaking ofpractical applications, he testified:

The major steps that are involved . . . are, first ofall, the development of an orbital “space station, ” andalong with that is a need for a logistics system to pro-vide support for an orbital “space station. ” That com-bination then leads to the development of what mightbe called an application center, and if you will, thatis probably going to turn out to be a relatively largeorbital station which will have in it the sensors thatare required .36

Continuing this hypothetical progression of Earth-oriented, practical “space stations, ” Mueller addedthat,

. . . having utilized this orbital station for a numberof years, there is another major step forward in goingto a research complex which might be the large or-biting research laboratory and coming from that re-search complex, then, would come the second gen-eration of application centers, and here they would

JJM~eller’s testimony IS in U.S Congress, Senate COminlttee on Aeronau-

tical and Space Sciences, National Space Goals for the Post-Apollo Per/od,Op Clt , p. 103MU s congress, senate Corn mlttee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,

Ndtlonil Spdcc God/s for the Post-Apollo Pe[@d, op. Cit., p, 338,)~webb told congress the h40L ‘‘represents an added nationa I space ca -

pa bill(y rather than a competitive one. ” Ibid , p, 341. See also the testimonyot Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Englneerlng, esp p. 336

l~Th IS and the foIIoWI ng two q uotatlons are from Ibid , pp. 49, 62, and 64

be more specialized and there would be more ofthem.

This envisaged a time well into the future whereman is really operating on a continuing basis inspace . . . . Mueller also proposed that:

we can go in the direction of exploiting ourIunar capability as it developed in the basic Apolloprogram and will be developed further if the ApolloApplications Program is carried out. Or we can go inthe direction of increased emphasis on Earth orbit ap-plications . . . . We can go from Apollo applicationsthrough the development of an orbital “space sta-tion, ” and then on to the near planet flyby systemsand follow a logical path which then goes to planetaryexploration.

For all the purposes a “space station” might serve,from the purely practical to the widely visionary, itwas always cast in this period as the logical next stepin developing space capability. NASA instituted anApollo Applications Program, but this was an interimmove towards what the agency really sought: a ma-jor political commitment to make the next step an-other large one.

In 1967 and 1968 this campaign suffered major re-versals which had permanent impact on the courseof events. The Apollo 204 fire in January 1967, whichkilled three astronauts during preflight testing at CapeKennedy, set the Apollo landing back a number ofmonths, and cast the first serious doubt on NASA’sability to meet its Apollo goal. The accident alsofocused congressional attention on NASA and con-sumed some of the agency’s political credit on theHill. Perhaps more damaging in the long run was theresignation of James Webb in the closing weeks of the1968 presidential election campaign. Leaving theagency without the major commitment to a post-Apol-10 program he had sought, Webb took with him anirreplaceable sense of political pragmatism that theagency would sorely miss.

As the first successful lunar landing mission ap-proached, in the fall of 1968 NASA requested $60 mil-lion to initiate a “space station” effort. This requestwas denied. NASA approached the beginning of 1969in some disarray:

• James Webb had resigned in the Fall of 1968, andthe Acting Administrator, Thomas Paine, was newto the agency.

● Richard Nixon had been elected President, andhis position on space policy was far from clear.

● NASA had settled on the “space station” as itspost-Apollo program objective, but to date hadhad no success in getting Presidential or congres-sional support for such an initiative.

NASA took bold action in the early months of 1969to attempt to change this situation.


Post-Apollo Planning UnderThomas Paine

A research engineer before joining NASA as Dep-uty Administrator in January 1968, Thomas O. Painebecame Acting Administrator following Webb’s resig-nation in October. Nominated NASA Administratorby President Nixon in March 1969, Paine was con-firmed by the Senate the same month, beginning theshortest term—less than 20 months—of any NASAhead.

Paine was a swashbuckler,37 an out-and-out spaceenthusiast, critical of the caution and circumspectionof his predecessor and determined to inaugurate thesecond decade of space with a major, national, Apol-lo-like commitment. As he wrote to the President’sscience advisor after being confirmed as NASA Ad-ministrator:

We have been frustrated too long by a negativismthat says hold back, be cautious, take no risks, do lessthan you are capable of doing. I submit that no per-ceptive student of the history of social progress doubtsthat we will establish a large laboratory in Earth or-bit, that we will provide a practical system for the fre-quent transfer of men and supplies to and from sucha laboratory, that we will continue to send men tothe Moon, and that eventually we will send men tothe planets. If this is true, now is the time to sayso . . . .We in NASA are fully conscious of practicallimitations . . . .In the light of these considerations,we can be sensible and moderate about our requestsfor resources—but we must know where we aregoing. 38

Initial Proposals

This philosophy led Paine, at the start of the Nixonadministration, to take steps unusually bold for an act-ing agency head. In February 1969, Paine appealeddirectly to the President in support of the mannedspace flight program. He argued that “positive andtimely action must be taken by your Administrationnow to prevent the Nation’s programs in mannedspace flight from slowing to a halt in 1972” and sug-gested that:

the nation should . . . focus our manned spaceflight” program for the next decade on the develop-ment and operation of a permanent “space sta-tion”-a National Research Center in Earth orbit—accessible at reasonable cost to experts in many dis-ciplines who can conduct investigations and opera

J7Homer Newe[ [, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years Of space scienceNASA SP-421 1 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Adminls-tratlon, 1980), p. 288.

‘Quoted {n Levine, op. cit., pp. 258-259.

tions in space which cannot be effectively carried outon Earth.

Paine told the President that he had “a unique op-portunity for leadership that will clearly identify youradministration with the establishment of the Nation’smajor goals in space flight for the next decade” andthat “the case that a ‘space station’ should be a ma-jor future U.S. goal is now strong enough to justify atleast a general statement on your part that this willbe one of our goals.”39

Paine asked for a March 31 presidential decision onfuture manned space flight issues. He did this eventhough he knew that, on February 13, the Presidenthad established an ad hoc blue-ribbon Space TaskGroup (STG) and had asked that group for “definitiverecommendations on the direction which the U.S.space program should take in the post-Apollo period,”with a September 1 reporting date.40 By asking thePresident to decide on the future of manned spaceflight in advance of the planning process which wasbeing established for precisely that purpose, Paine wastrying to use the success of the Apollo 8 circumlunarmission and the desire on the part of any new admin-istration to take some early and popular initiatives ascounters to a process which he was not sure wouldbe favorable to NASA.

In preparing for Space Task Group consideration ofthe Paine initiative, the positions of the various par-ticipants on a large “space station, ” and the factorsinfluencing their positions, became evident.

The BOB objective was to “head off any play byNASA to get a budget amendment now” since “thisis bad budget strategy, probably unworkable as far asCongress was concerned, and impossible to obtainwithout committing the President to support the long-range objectives. ”41

The President’s Science Adviser, Lee DuBridge,asked the Space Science and Technology Panel42 toassist him in evaluating the Paine initiative. The Panelmet with NASA officials, and advised Dr. DuBridgethat there was “no great urgency” related to the issuesPaine had raised and, “from a programmatic stand-point, the arguments in favor of early action appearvery weak. ”43

JgMemorandum from Thomas Paine to the President, ‘‘Problems and Op-

portunities in Manned Space Flight,” Feb. 26, 1969.@The STG was chaired by Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew and had as mem-

bers NASA, the president’s Science Adviser, and the Department of Defense,The Bureau of the Budget, Department of State, and Atomic Energy Com-mission had observer status.

41 Brlefi ng Memorandum prepared by the Bureau of the Budget, Econom -

ICS, Science, and Technology Division, “President’s Task Group onS p a c e Meeting No, 1,“ Mar. 6, 1969.

41A subgroup of the president’s Science Advisory Committee (F’’MC).4Jlbld

App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States ● 167

The “space station” did gain some support from theDepartment of State, which saw:

. . . a close relationship between our space programand foreign policy objectives. Thus, an ongoing, chal-lenging and successful space program is importantfrom the viewpoint of these objectives–particularlyone designed and funded to afford increasing oppor-tunities for international cooperation.

The State Department believed that there were “great-er international values i n a “space station” and reusa-ble logistics vehicle than in . . . lunar exploration, ”and that:

our choices should not be unduly influencedby our estimate of Soviet choices, nor do we needto prejudice deliberate consideration of our spacegoals in order to preempt Soviet activities. Our capa-bility is now well understood both by the Soviets andby most other countries. Foreign countries will focusless on the competition between ourselves and theSoviets than on the relevance of space activities totheir own interests and needs.44

The Department of Defense (DOD) position wasthat DOD “does not have or anticipate projects whichrequire a “space station” as defined by NASA. DODhas great interest in the development of a lower costtransportation system suitable for their uses as well asfor NASA’ S.”45

The report of the STG staff directors was a rejectionof that part of the Paine initiative which asked for early“space station” commitment:

The majority of the Committee members . . . didnot support the request for additional FY70 fundingto enable more rapid progress toward the launch ofa “space station” in the mid-1970s. This view doesnot represent an unfavorable judgment on the ques-tion of adopting the “space station” as a major newgoal of our space program, but rather results from adesire not to imply prejudgment of the eventual re-suIt of the STG review. The case for urgency was un-convincing, and it appears that no important optionswould be foreclosed by deferring action .46

This attempt by NASA to get early commitment toa “space station” has been reviewed in some detailbecause its resolution foreshadowed much of whathappened in the following 1 ½ years as NASA strug-gled to gain support for a “space station” develop-ment as its major post-Apollo program objective,Throughout the STG review and the White Houseconsideration of the STG report, NASA argued thatthe “space station, ” and not the space shuttle con-cept, which was evolving from its origin solely as the

“R F Packard, “Department of State observations, ” draft, Mar. 13, 1969,45MI Iton Rosen (NASA staffer for STG), ‘‘Memorandum for the Record, ”

Mar 13, 1969 (N HOA).46, Report O( the space Task Group Staff DI rector’s Committee on NASA’S

Request for Amendments to the NASA fiscal year 1970 Budget,” Mar. 14,1969, p 4

station’s logistic vehicle, should be the Agency’s top-priority program, In the summer of 1969, NASA lettwo Phase B study contracts for “space station” de-sign, and in its 1970 congressional testimony the sta-tion was presented as the centerpiece of the agency’sprograms,

Throughout 1970, NASA continued technical stud-ies and user-oriented activities to promote the stationconcept. However, by the middle of that year, it wasclear that in the eyes of the space subgovernment out-side of NASA, the shuttle program was a more attrac-tive investment than was the station, and by the endof the year, the station had been dropped back to con-ceptual study status. NASA had built up a great dealof momentum behind the “space station” conceptthrough the 1960s, but when it came time for thecountry to decide, through the policymaking process,whether the station was a “good buy, ” the responsewas negative. The reasons for this negative assessmentwere already clear for NASA to see by March 1969,but it took over a year for NASA’s leadership to rec-ognize the situation and to steer the Agency awayfrom the station and behind the shuttle.

Detailed Station Planning

After conducting preliminary Phase A studies, pri-marily in-house, during 1967 and 1968, NASA wasprepared in early 1969 to involve the aerospace in-dustry in defining the program through two Phase Bstudies. NASA’s hopes were that these program defi-nition studies would provide the technical basis fora start on “space station” development within a yearor two. These studies were initiated in September1969, and extended over most of the next 2 years. Butevents at the policy level made it increasingly unlikelythat the “space station” program would ever proceedbeyond the Phase B stage, at least in the 1970s.

The handwriting was already on the wall by the timethe “Paine initiative” was rejected in March 1969, butduring the rest of 1969 and 1970 it became muchclearer. Finally, NASA could no longer avoid reality,and by late 1970 the space Shuttle, not the station,was identified as the agency’s top priority. Just as theApollo Applications Program had been a “better buy”for the country in the mid-1960s, so the Shuttle wasperceived by policy makers in the early 1970s, But thefailure of the “space station” program to gain approvalwas not because of a lack of effort; the Phase B studyprocess was the focus for that effort.

DEFINING THE PREFERRED CONCEPTAND ITS RATIONALE

One problem, perhaps the key one, was that NASAfound it quite difficult to tell both prospective contrac-


tors and the political leadership what kind of station,for what purposes, it wanted to develop. This was soeven though NASA had been studying “space station”concepts throughout the 1960s. The basic require-ments which had emerged from the study effort were:

1.

2.

3.

qualification of people and systems for long-dur-ation Earth orbit flight;demonstration of man’s ability and functionalusefulness in performing engineering and scien-tific experiments; and,periodic rotation of the crews and resupply of the“space station. ”

The average crew size for this station was planned tobe six to nine persons, with a 2-year orbital lifetimedesign goal.47 An Apollo command and service mod-ule launched by a Saturn 1B booster was to be the lo-gistics vehicle for the station; the station itself was tobe launched on a Saturn V booster.

When Thomas Paine was exposed in January 1969to this staff thinking, he found it too modest. His cen-ter directors agreed. For example, Wernher von Brauntold Paine that:

NASA should now tell the contractors what we wantin the long run, what we foresee as the ultimate—thelong range–the dream–station program. NASAshould spell out the sciences, technology, applica-tions, missions and research desired. Then NASAshould define a 1975 station as a core facility in orbitfrom which the ultimate “space campus” or “spacebase” can grow in an efficient orderly evolutionthrough 1985.

MSC Director Robert Gilruth told Paine:We should now be looking at a step more compara-

ble in challenge to that of Apollo after Mercury. The“space station” size should be modular and basedon our Saturn V lift capability into 200-mile orbit.Three launches would give us one million pounds inorbit, including spent stages. That is the number weshould be planning for the core size.48

Out of this lack of consensus within NASA came arapid change from the January concept of a “spacestation.” In February, Aviation Week reported that “allprevious concepts have been retired from active com-petition in favor of a large station,” with the focus on“a 100-man Earth-orbiting station with a multiplicityof capabilities” and the “launch of the first moduleof the large “space station, ” with perhaps as manyas 12 men, by 1975. ” Top NASA officials were re-ported to have rejected earlier “space station” plansas “too conservative. ”49

4%Vllllam Normyle, “Alternatives Open on Post-Apollo, ” Awatiorr Weekand Space Techncdogy, Jan, 13, 1969, p. 16.

‘+BThomas palne’s notes from meeting on space stations, jan. 27, 1969

(N HOA).~yWI Illam Normyle, “NASA Alms at 100-Man Station, ” Aviation Week and

Spdce Technology, Feb. 24, 1969, p, 16.

NASA issued a Statement of Work for the Phase BSpace Station Program Definition on April 19. Prospec-tive contractors were ready; they had been followingthe rapidly expanding character of the program closelyand were “already forming teams in anticipation” ofthe Phase B competition. so

The Work Statement described the “space station”as “a centralized and general purpose laboratory inEarth orbit for the conduct and support of scientificand technological experiments, for beneficial applica-tions, and for the further development of space ex-ploration capability” and noted that the work re-quested would include “the Space Base but will focuson the mid-l970s Space Station as the initial but evolu-tionary step toward the Space Base. ” The objectivesof the “space station” program were stated as:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Conduct beneficial space applications programs,scientific investigation and technological engi-neering experiments.Demonstrate the practicality of establishing, oper-ating, and maintaining long-duration manned or-bital stations.Utilize Earth-orbital manned flights for test anddevelopment of equipment and operational tech-niques applicable to lunar and planetary ex-ploration.Extend technology and develop space systemsand subsystems required to increase useful life byat least several orders of magnitude.Develop new operational techniques and equip-ment which can demonstrate substantial reduc-tions in unit operating costs.Extend the present knowledge of the long-termbiomedical and behavioral characteristics of manin space.

The initial “space station” was to have a crew of12, and would normally operate in a zero gravitymode, but during the early weeks of its operation therewould be an assessment of the effects of artificial grav-ity; a counterweight would be tethered to the stationand the configuration spun to provide the gravitationaleffect, The station was to be 33 ft in diameter and wasnormally to operate in a 270-nautical mile, 55° orbit,but also be capable of operating in polar and slightlyretrograde orbits, 51

Shortly after the original proposals in response tothe statement of work were received by NASA, a newrequirement was added to the Phase B effort. Not onlywas the “space station” to be designed so that it couldbe the core around which a space base could be de-

50Wllllam Normyle, “Large StatIon May Emerge as ‘Unwritten’ U.S. Goal,”Aviat/on Week and Space Technology, Mar, 10, 1969, p. 104.

51 NASA , ,Statement of Work, Space station Program Definition (Phase B), ”

Apr. 14, 1969,

App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States . 169

veloped; the station module would also be the coreof a spacecraft designed for a manned trip to Mars.This requirement came out of the policy debates de-scribed in the section in this report, “NASA’s Post-Apollo Ambitions Dashed,” and was a reflection ofthe high hopes for all of NASA’s future manned pro-grams which were pervasive in the immediate after-math of the first lunar landing.

PHASE B STUDIES

Three aerospace firms, North American Rockwell,McDonnell Douglas, and Grumman Aircraft, sub-mitted proposals to NASA in response to the PhaseB Statement of Work, and on July 22, 1969, NASAawarded Phase B contracts of $2.9 million each toNorth American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas.The studies were to run for 11 months beginning inSeptember; MSC would manage the North AmericanRockwell effort, and MSFC, the McDonnell Douglasstudy.

A continuing problem during the course of thePhase B studies was the difficulty of integrating sta-tion design and the candidate experiments for the sta-tion. These studies were compiled into a thick docu-ment known universally as the “Blue Book. ” Oneparticipant in the study later noted that “the candi-date experiments compiled in the NASA Blue Bookare too costly to be considered as a whole, are some-what duplicated . . . , have not been verified as thetrue experiment goals . . , .“52

The Phase B studies were extended for 6 monthson June 30, 1970; by this time, the planning date forthe first station launch had slipped to 1977. The costof the program was now estimated at $8 billion to $15billion, including both development costs and 10 yearsof on-orbit operations; this estimate did not includethe cost of a space Shuttle program. It was reportedthat “an overriding desire on the part of the UnitedStates to internationalize the 12-man “space station”. . . has eliminated any possibility of Department ofDefense participation in the program.”53

In addition to the technical design activities, NASAwas undertaking a Phase B effort to define experimentmodules to be added to the core station and planninga year-long study to involve potential users, both do-mestic and international, in the program as it was de-veloping. A user’s symposium to kick off this effort wasscheduled for September 1970, and both study con-tractors were building full-scale mockups of the 33-ft

“Jack C. Heberllg, “The Management Approach to the NASA Space Sta-tion Deflnltlon Studies of the Manned Spacecraft Center, ” NASA TechnicalMemorandum X-58090, June 1972, p. 30,

$~space Business Dady, July 27, 1970.

station. However, beneath this growing momentumwas an uncertain base of political support.

On July 29, 1970, Charles Mathews, NASA’s Dep-uty Associate Administrator of Manned Space Flight,ordered MSC and MSFC to terminate the continuingPhase B activity and to redefine the effort in a funda-mental way. On the basis of congressional action,NASA leadership had become convinced that the Sat-urn V program, which had been in terminal condi-tion for almost 2 years, was finally dead, i.e., therewould be no booster capable of launching a 33-ft sta-tion. The only launch vehicle available for use in put-ting the “space station “ into orbit would now be thespace Shuttle, with its planned 15-ft by 60-ft payloadbay. What had started out as the supply vehicle forthe station was to be its key to survival.

It took some doing to skew the study effort towardcomponents with diameters able to fit into the Shut-tle payload bay; one study contractor commented that“people who were eager to fly in a 33-ft station foundthe prospect of long stays in the 14-ft station not veryattractive. ” But NASA did issue Phase B extensioncontracts for a modular “space station” study effortto extend through most of 1971, and North Ameri-can Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas went to workon the new concept.

By the time the studies were begun, however, thelikelihood that they would lead to an early commit-ment to station development was already vanishinglysmall. NASA had suffered a number of defeats in late1969 and through 1970 in its attempts to get an am-bitious post-Apollo program approved, and by thesummer of 1970 it was becoming quite clear to NASAleaders that only one big program had any chance ofpresidential and congressional approval, and that itwas not the “space station” program. From its startas the “advanced logistics system” for the station andspace base, the space Shuttle had garnered the inter-est of the Air Force and many within NASA, and inthe summer of 1970 the agency leadership grudginglydecided to make the Shuttle its top-priority program.Thomas Paine had announced his resignation in mid-1970, and the station thus lost a supporter at the top;this may have made the shift to the Shuttle easier.

Station studies continued through 1970, 1971, and1972, with the final in-house studies focused on asingle research applications module (RAM) to be car-ried into orbit by a Shuttle.54 This was all that remainedof what, only a few years earlier, had been plans fortruly large facilities in Earth orbit. As a final indicationof this reality, on November 29, 1972, the Space Sta-

~qThls u Itlmately became the basis for the Spacelab developed by the Euro-

pean Space Agency,


tion Task Force was abolished, then immediately rein-carnated as the Sortie Lab Task Force. NASA was ableto gain approval for Shuttle development in early1972, and that task occupied the agency’s energiesthroughout the decade. Until the Shuttle was ready,the dream of permanent human facilities in spacewould have to wait. However, preserving a large pay-load bay as an essential element of the Shuttle, NASAwas able to maintain the possibility of returning to thestation concept, thereby keeping its dream alive.

NASA’s Post-Apollo AmbitionsDashed55

While the “space station” Phase B effort was pro-ceeding apace at the technical planning level, at thepolicy level NASA from 1969 through the end of 1971was trying to get White House (particularly) and con-gressional support for an increasingly less ambitiouspost-Apollo program. The initial forum for this attemptwas the Space Task Group. After its early rejection ofNASA’s “space station “ initiative, the STG turned tothe task of preparing recommendations on futurespace policy and programs for President Nixon.

The image of the Apollo commitment as a modelfor future space goals colored STG discussions fromthe start. At an early STG meeting, NASA’s Adminis-trator, Thomas Paine, argued the need for a “new ban-ner to be hoisted” around which competent and mot-ivated engineers, scientists, and managers could rally,as they had around the Apollo goal. Vice PresidentAgnew, reacting to Paine’s point, raised for the firsttime in the STG context the question which would in-fluence much of the group’s debates: Where was theApollo of the 1970s? Could it be, asked Agnew, thatthe United States should undertake a manned missionto Mars?

When Agnew first read the staff proposals for STGconsideration, he reportedly was disappointed be-cause none contained the strong and dramatic themehe thought was required for the national space effort.On July 16, 1969, as he joined thousands at KennedySpace Center to watch the liftoff of the Apollo 11 mis-sion, Agnew “went public. ” In interviews at thelaunch site Agnew said that it was his “individual feel-ing that we should articulate a simple, ambitious, op-timistic goal of a manned flight to Mars by the endof this century. ” After liftoff, Agnew told the launchteam that he “bit the bullet . . . today as far as Marsis concerned. ”

Agnew’s statement at Cape Kennedy was not aspontaneous reaction to the excitement of the occa-

55Th is account is acJapted from John M. Logsdon, ‘‘The Policy Process and

Large-Scale Space Efforts,” Space Humanization Series, vol. 1, 1979, pp.65-80.

sion; it had been planned in advance. It reflectedAgnew’s willingness to lend support to an ambitiousand bold space program, if only NASA would proposeit. This willingness matched the predispositions ofNASA administrator, Paine, himself disappointed at thelack of excitement and purpose he was getting from theorganization’s planning machinery. Spurred on byAgnew’s private and public support, Paine decidedthat NASA should also “bite the bullet” and move ag-gressively to identify an early manned Mars missionas the central focus for its future plans. In order to dothis, he ordered NASA planners explicitly to incor-porate a manned Mars mission during the 1980s intoNASA’s overall plans. This was the source of the earlymodification to the Phase B study requirements de-scribed previously.

There were several reasons for switching to the Marsemphasis as a central theme in NASA planning. Per-haps most influential was the early STG rejection ofa “space station” commitment based on the “logicalnext step rationale. ” By justifying a “space station”as a necessary precursor to manned Mars missions i nthe 1980s, NASA hoped to provide a convincing ra-tionale for the station’s urgency. Not only “space sta-tions” but the newly proposed space Shuttle, the de-velopment of nuclear rocket engines, and theretention of the large Saturn V as a booster were re-quired if an early manned Mars landing were to beapproved as a national goal.

Between March and August 1969, as the Apollo pro-gram and other ongoing NASA missions achievedspectacular successes and public interest in space wasat a peak, as the Vice President continued to ask foran “Apollo for the seventies, ” as NASA’s mannedflight organization coalesced behind an aggressiveplan of new activities for the next decade, Painebecame more and more bullish about the need forbold new initiatives as a way of keeping the Nation’scivilian space program vigorous and his agency’smomentum large. As Apollo came to an end, NASAplans had gotten increasingly ambitious.

Now, by asking for “commitment in principle” tothe most ambitious plan his advisers had conceived,Paine presented a challenge to the other STG mem-bers and to others interested in the future of the spaceprogram. He told the Nation that NASA was ready tobegin a program that would send people to Mars atthe earliest feasible time, and he asked the Nation’sleadership whether they were willing to support sucha bold enterprise. The answer was not long in com-ing, and it was a resounding “No.”

The results of NASA’s attempt to mobilize supportbehind the Mars objective, were, from the agency’sperspective, little short of disastrous. What NASA dis-covered was just how limited the support for majornew space initiatives was. The final STG report, sub-


mitted to the President i n mid-September, did suggestthat “the United States accept the long range optionor goa l o f manned p lanetary exp lora t ion wi th amanned Mars mission before the end of this centuryas the first target. ” This goal, said the report, wouldact as “a shaping function for the post-Apollo p r o -gram. ” Beyond its general statements, the report rec-ommended no commitment to any particuIar programoption or even any specific project on a particulartimetable.

Even this “muted Martian manifesto” had no stand-ing with the White House. Although the STG finishedits work with its submission to the President, morethen 6 months passed before Nixon made any formalreaction to the Group’s recommendation, and that re-action was noncommittal. In the interim the processesof public policymaking operated on the space pro-gram to shape it to the short- and longer-term require-ments of what the White House perceived as thebudgetary and political interests of the Nation. WhenNASA tried to use the STG report as the basis for justi-fying its 1971 budget request, it found that the report’srecommendations carried little weight either in the Bu-reau of the Budget or, particularly, the White House.

While the President personally apparently remaineda space buff, his advisers were quite skeptical of thepolitical payoffs from major new activities in space;their reading of public opinion was that Americansociety had little interest in future space spectaculars.This skepticism, combined with stringent budgetaryconstraints, resulted in a budget for NASA in fiscal1971 that was far below NASA’s most pessimistic ex-pectations. NASA, still not reconciled to the notionthat space had little political support, “fought a retreat-ing action through the entire budget process, ” being“beaten back but fighting lustily at every turn of theroad, ” according to Administrator Paine.

It was in this context that, during the first half of1970, it became clear to NASA leadership that N A S Awould not get approval to develop simultaneouslyboth a “space station” and the space Shuttle. In aMarch 1970 statement, President Nixon provided onlya very guarded endorsement of future space activi-ties, and what priority was granted he gave to thespace Shuttle. During the 1970 debate over NASA’sbudget, Congress expressed a high degree of skepti-cism about ambitious new goals in space. The linkagesamong the Shuttle program, development of a “spacestat ion,” and a manned Mars expedition came underparticular attack, and threatening but unsuccessful at-tempts to delete funds for station and Shuttle studieswere made in both the House and the Senate.

As the preceding section described, at the techni-cal level NASA was still acting in mid-1970 as if “space

station” approval were possible. However, NASA’spolicy leadership grudgingly read the handwriting(which was in capital letters) on the wall, and in put-ting together the next agency budget request in Sep-tember 1970 decided to make the Shuttle the top-pri-ority NASA program for the 1970s and to give upattempts to gain approval to develop a “space station”until after the Shuttle program was well under way.It took another 1 ½ years of conflict-filled negotiationswith the White House and Congress before NASA wasable to gain their endorsements of the space Shuttlein 1972.

Using the budget process, the political leadershipof the country had applied its concept of national in-terest and national priorities to the space program;through that process, the technological aspirations ofNASA were put under firm though perhaps too short-term political control. What happened to NASA’s“space station” plans is best viewed, not in terms ofNASA “winning” or “losing,” but in terms of whathappens when an agency’s aspirations are significantlyat variance with what political leaders judge to be bothin the long-term interests of the Nation and politicallyfeasible. This experience might be quite relevant tocurrent attempts by NASA to gain support for the kindof “space station” program that it desires.

Skylab: An Interim “Space Station”56

The only remainder of the Apollo Applications Pro-gram, begun with high hopes in 1966, Skylab was aS-IVB third stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle, out-fitted as a workshop to be visited by three successivecrews after being launched into low Earth orbit. Themission could hardly have gotten off to a worse start.During launch of the Skylab workshop in May 1973,the meteor/thermal control shade tore loose from thespacecraft and seriously damaged a solar cell panelneeded to produce power on the vehicle. The firstcrew to visit Skylab managed to jury-rig a parasol toreplace the shade and to salvage the one solar panelthat was not lost in launch. This proved enough to savethe mission and to allow virtually the full run of ex-periments that had been planned for the three crewsthat visited the laboratory in 1973 and 1974, turningpotential disaster into another virtuoso display ofNASA resourcefulness and skill.

Skylab provided grist for everyone’s mill. “Space sta-tion” advocates praised the demonstration of man’slong-term survivability in space–84 days for the third

~~F~r a tull account of the Skylab project, see W. David Compton and

Charles D Benson, LI\ Ing and Work/rig In Space. the H/story of Space/abNASA SP-4208 (Washington, DC National Aeronautics and Space Admlnls-tratlon, 1983).


crew—and the rich variety of scientific and applica-tions tasks of which he had proved himself capable–ranging from Earth observation and photography tomanning the solar telescope, conducting physiologicalexperiments, and even carrying on space processing.Especially did they fasten on the role of human be-ings as the flexible, opportunistic component in the“space station” that had saved the mission with emer-gency repairs no machine could have made. Withoutpeople, claimed the advocates, Skylab would havefailed. 57

Without people, claimed the critics, Skylab wouldnot have been necessary. Many who questioned thewisdom of manned space flight, especially scientists,even while they conceded the impressiveness of theApollo achievement and appreciated how their ownprograms had ridden on its coattails, came to won-der if the whole undertaking involving people wasworth the candle. With money drying up and manyscientific missions promised for the final flights ofApollo being canceled with those flights, the relativeeconomy and efficiency of unmanned, automatedmissions looked more attractive in contrast. 58

Whatever the eventual evaluation of Skylab, it wasinterpreted by NASA’s manned space flight managersas legitimizing renewed study of the “space station”concept. Those studies, carried out during the 1974-80 period, have laid the base for current discussionsof whether it is finally time to move ahead with theacquisition of in-space infrastructure, of what charac-ter and magnitude, to be obtained by when, and tobe operated, used, and paid for by whom.

Recent In-Space Infrastructure(i.e. “Space Station”) Studies

In addition to the impetus to reexamine the “spacestation” concept which came from the success of theSkylab project, other influences in the same directionincluded the need to begin to identify potential “post-Shuttle” programs and new requirements for usingmen and women in space operations emerging froma number of study efforts being carried out by NASAin the 1974-75 time frame.

In order to build a plausible rationale for once againproposing a “space station” as an element of NASA’sprogram, it would be necessary to identify some high-priority activities which could not be accomplishedusing the space Shuttle, with its 7 to 20 day orbitalstaytime, its Spacelab facility for manned experimental

Szsee, for example, John H. Disher, “Next Steps in Space Transportation,Astronaut/es and Aeronautics, January 1978, p. 26,

JBNewell, op. cit., pp. 290-295.

activities, and its significant capability for lifting largeand/or heavy cargoes to low Earth orbit (LEO). Studieswhich established requirements for large structures inboth LEO and geosynchronous orbit–structureswhich could only be constructed in space—seemedto provide the needed rationale, and space construc-tion became a major theme in space infrastructurestudies during the 1975-80 period.

The first NASA foray into a new station study effortwas a 1975 study of a “Manned orbital Systems Con-cept” (MOSC) carried out by McDonnell Douglas As-tronautics under the technical direction of the Mar-shall Space Flight Center. This study “examined therequirements for . . . a cost-effective orbital facilityconcept capable of supporting extended mannedoperations in Earth orbit beyond those visualized forthe 7-to 30-day Shuttle/Spacelab system.” Study guide-lines included use of available hardware developedfor the Skylab, Spacelab, and Shuttle programs, “in-sofar as practical, ” and an initial operational capabil-ity (IOC) in late 1984.

The context for the MOSC study included a grow-ing concern about the Earth’s resource limitations,population growth, and environmental stresses, drivenby the widely publicized “limits to growth” debateof the early 1970s. The study noted that “the plan-ning and development of future space programs can-not be done in isolation from the many critical prob-lems facing the peoples of the world during thecoming decades” and that “there will continue to bemany conflicting and competing demands for re-sources in the years ahead.” This context skewed theemphasis in establishing activities to be conductedwith the support of in-space infrastructure to “the re-search and applications areas that are directly relatedto current world needs. ”

Though oriented more directly than past station con-cepts to high-priority global problems, the MOSCstudy still emphasized the “science and applicationsresearch facility” rationale; although such activities asassembly of large structures and operating space man-ufacturing facilities were examined during the study,the emphasis was on a facility which would “enablethe scientific community to pursue programs directlyrelated to the improvement of life on Earth.” The finalMOSC configuration called for a four-man modular-ized facility; the manned module would be based onthe Spacelab design, and Spacelab pallets would alsobe used to support unpressurized payloads. Total pro-gram costs for development and operation of the ini-tial MOSC facility were estimated to be $1.2 billion.59

SgMcDonnell Douglas Astronautics, Manned Orbita/ ~YskmJ ConcePtsStudy, Book l-Executive Summary, Sept. 30, 1975, pp. iii, 1-2, 30, 36.


Rather than attempt to gain approval to take theMOSC effort to a Phase B stage, in the Fall of 1975NASA decided to conduct further studies in which theemphasis was shifted from research in orbit to spaceconstruction. In explaining its study plans, NASAnoted:

Earlier “space station” studies emphasized the“Laboratory in Orbit” concept. Emphasis is now be-ing placed on a Space Station as an “OperationalBase” which not only involves a laboratory but alsosuch uses as: (a) an assembly, maintenance, and lo-gistics base for conducting manned operations involv-ing antennas, mirrors, solar collectors, transmitters;(b) for conducting launch and retrieval operations fororbit-to-orbit and Earth-departure vehicles which mayrequire assembly or propellant transfer in orbit; (c)for conducting retrieval, maintenance and redeploy-ment operations for automated satellites; (d) for man-aging clusters of spacecraft and space systems as acentral base for support for common services . . . .

Orbital location studies will emphasize the possi-ble exploitation of geosynchronous orbit, as well aslow inclination and polar low Earth orbit . . . . Cur-rent planning is directed toward a “space station”new start in fiscal year 1979.60

There were a number of reasons for NASA’s switchi n emphasis in “space station” justification. There wasno evidence that the scientific community was anymore supportive of a manned orbital laboratory con-cept in 1975 than it had been in 1970; prior attemptsto justify a “space station” by its use as a space-basedR&D facility had not been successful. More positively,the mid-70s saw a number of studies of the potentialsof space operations for addressing problems on Earth.

The most broadly conceived of these studies wasundertaken by a NASA study group which was askedin 1974 by NASA Administrator James Fletcher (whohad become Administrator in April 1971) to providean Outlook for Space—”to identify and examine thevarious possibilities for the civiI space program overthe next twenty-five years. ” The study group con-cluded that:

. . . the great challenges facing the physical needs ofhumanity are principally the results of the continu-ing struggle to improve the quality of life. Particularlycritical is the need to improve food production anddistribution, to develop new energy sources, to meetnew challenges to the environment, and to predictand deal with natural and manmade disasters. In eachof these areas, we found that significant contributionscan be made by a carefully developed space program.

The NASA report recognized that “future space pro-grams must provide a service to the public.” In re-sponding to the Outlook for Space report, James Flet-

‘>W S Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, N A S A4u(horIzatIon /or FY 1977, Hearings, p. 1046

cher set as a primary NASA goal, “accelerating thedevelopment of economic and efficient space serv-ices for society, ” such as “resources management,environmental understanding, and commercial re-turns from the unique contributions of space. ”61

The Outlook for Space report was not directly orstrongly supportive of the need for a “space station. ”It did conclude, however, that:

Most of these activities might well be supported bythe Shuttle system, together with associate space lab-oratories and free-flyers, There are more far-reachingobjectives, however, which will require human activ-ities in space transcending those supportable by cur-rent Shuttle flight plans, such as the construction ofsatellite power stations or the establishment of a per-manent lunar base. It is difficult at this time to assertthat either of these activities, or others like them—space manufacturing, space colonies—will be under-taken within the next 25 years. Nevertheless, as welooked at the future of space, particularly at thosemore creative programs directed toward major exploi-tation of the opportunities which space provides, weinevitably found man to be an integral part of the sys-tem. If the United States is to be in a position to takeadvantage of these potential benefits then it wouldseem necessary that we develop the capability tooperate for extended periods of time. The space fa-cility would be constantly available, although crewswould, of course, be periodically exchanged.

The creation of such a permanent space facilityseemed to us to be the most useful way to continuethe advancement of manned-flight technology. Withthe Shuttle system giving us comparatively low-costaccess to space on the one hand, and the economieswhich could be realized from the use of the perma-nent space facility on the other hand, the construc-tion of a permanent “space station” appears to bethe next logical step for the manned flight program—not as an objective in itself, but rather for its techno-logical support of a number of other objectives whichcan benefit from our growing knowledge of how hu-mans can work in space and to provide a foundationfor the future.62

Once again, NASA saw the justification for a “spacestation” primarily as “the next logical step” in ex-ploiting people’s ability to work in space.

In addition to the Outlook for Space study, in themid-1970s a number of even more visionary effortswere identifying challenging future space goals. Onenotion which received wide public attention, but hada relatively modest influence on NASA’s internal plan-ning activities, was the proposal by Princeton ProfessorGerard O’Neill that, primarily in response to theEarth’s resource limitations, work begin on develop-

~1 outlook {of sPaCe. A synopsIs (Wash I ngton, DC: National Aeronautics

and Space Adm I n Istratton, January 1976), pp. iv, v, 5-7~~lbld,, pp 55-56


ing very large human habitats in space—space col-onies. 63

A concept which was quite attractive to NASA’sengineers was developed by Peter Glaser of ArthurD. Little, Inc.; this was the proposal that large solararrays in geosynchronous orbit could provide a largesource of continuous energy on Earth. The solar powersatellite (SPS) idea was given a great deal of technicalattention by NASA during 1975 and 1976, until NASAwas forced by the Office of Management and Budgetto turn over lead responsibility for SPS to the EnergyResearch and Development Administration (soon tobecome part of the Department of Energy).

Developing an SPS would require extensive use ofon-orbit work crews in order to assemble and test verylarge structures in space. Similar construction require-ments were derived from less grand schemes involv-ing large antennas in space for communications useand scientific investigations.

By the end of 1975, NASA had developed an argu-ment that space construction might be a major re-quirement of its programs during the 1980s, andwanted to explore the role of in-space infrastructureutilizing work crews in carrying out these construc-tion efforts. In December 1975, the agency issued arequest for proposals for a “Space Station SystemsAnalysis Study” (SSSAS); the study effort was to befocused around the use of a “space station” to “servea wide range of operational base and space labora-tory activities, ” such as using the station “as a test fa-cility and construction base to support manufactur-ing, fabrication and assembly of various sizes of spacestructures, ”64

One finding of the system analysis studies was thatscientific efforts could “go along for the ride” on‘‘space stations” capable of supporting construction,materials processing, and power generation objec-tives. An aerospace publication reported that:

The space base concept is one whose time seemsto be coming rather quickly. Until recently, “spacestations” have been thought of mainly as . . . ‘thetraditional laboratory in the sky. ’ Some observers weresurprised when construction, materials processing andpower were given roughly equal status with sci-ence . . . . Now, the balance has shifted furtherto . . . space construction work as the ‘prime focus’of the studies.65

When NASA began this study effort in late 1975,its hope had been to use the Phase A study results as

6JGerard K. 0’ Nelll, ‘‘The Colonization of SpaCe, ’ phY51c5 Today, Sep-

tember 1974,b4NASA Press Release, “NASA Seeks Proposals for Space Station Studies, ”

Dec. 11, 1975.‘>’’ Operational Base Concepts Gain In Space Station Studies, ” Aerospace

Dally, Sept. 13, 1976, p. 54.

the basis for a Phase B “space station” “new start”in fiscal 1979—i.e., sometime after October 1978.However, NASA was unable to get the approval ofthe Office of Management and Budget to proceed ona schedule which would have made such a new startpossible. Recognizing that NASA was not going to beable to start on a major “space station” effort anytimesoon, by the spring of 1977 NASA officials were sug-gesting that “the (Shuttle) orbiter is a significant ‘spacestation’ in itself, ” and were looking toward ways toenhance Shuttle capability to perform many of themissions that the SSSAS studies had assigned to a“space station. ”66

Rather than being the year in which significant mo-mentum behind a “space station” program was de-veloped, 1978 turned out to be a year in which therewas essentially no “space station” activity per se. Thesystem analysis studies had identified, as importantsteps in extending the capabilities of the space Shut-tle, the development of an in-orbit power supply andof Shuttle-tended unmanned orbital platforms for var-ious science and applications payloads. Both JohnsonSpace Center (JSC) and Marshall Space Flight Center(MSFC) were studying orbital power supplies during1978; the Johnson Space Center concept was calleda power extension platform, while Marshall SpaceFlight Center was examining a 25-kW power platform.

Marshall also initiated studies of an unmannedScience and Applications Space Platform (SASP), andmost of the MSFC study activities during the 1978-80period were devoted to these two program concepts.(During 1980 and 1981, MSFC contracted withMcDonnell Douglas to study an evolutionary programthrough which an unmanned platform such as the onedefined in the SASP study could grow into a mannedplatform, i.e., a “space station, ” perhaps along thelines that McDonnell Douglas had earlier defined inthe 1975 Manned Orbital Systems Concept study.)

While Marshall’s emphasis was on an evolutionaryapproach to space platforms, by early 1979 the leader-ship of JSC had decided that the Center’s efforts shouldrefocus on a major “space station” effort. AviationWeek reported JSC was “concerned about this lackof continuing assessment for permanently mannedU.S. facilities” and was “mindful of the growing So-viet capability in this area. 67’ Another factor influenc-ing JSC thinking was “a need for a real goal to main-tain the dedication of present participants in the spaceprogram and the interest and enthusiasm of youngpeople in space technology in order to motivate theirpursuing engineering and science careers.”68

6bAvja(jon week and Space Technology, Mar. 16, 1979, P. 49.

b71bld.MNASA, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Space @erations Center: A

Concept Analysis, Nov. 29, 1979, pp. 1-1, 1-2.

App. B—The Evolution of Civilian In-Space Infrastructure, I. E., “Space Station, ” Concepts in the United States • 175

Based on these considerations, during 1979 JSC con-ducted an in-house study of a concept identified asa Space Operations Center (SOC). This study wasbased on two assumptions: “that the next 10 to 20years will include requirements for large, complexspace systems” and “that geosynchronous orbit isclearly a primary operational area in space in the com-ing decades. ” If these assumptions were valid, JSCargued, then “the space construction and servicingof these future systems wiI I be more effective with apermanent, manned operations center in space. ”

The primary objectives of the SOC were identifiedas:

●

●

●

construction, checkout, and transfer to operation-al orbit of large, complex space systems;on-orbit assembly, launch, recovery, and servic-ing of manned and unmanned spacecraft; and,further development of the capability for perma-nent manned operations in space wiith reduceddependence on Earth for control and resupply.

The SOC study noted that this list of objectives:. . . noticeably does not include onboard science andapplications objectives, although the free-flying sat-ellites which would be serviced would include mostlythose of this genre. The primary implication of thismission is that experiment and applications require-ments will not be design drivers; the SOC will be “op-timized” to support the operational functions of theseobjectives. However, experiments or applicationswhich can tolerate the operational parameters of theSOC can be operated onboard, or an entire dedicatedmodule could be attached to an available berthingport.

The study developed a concept of a self-contained,continuously occupied orbital facility built from sev-eral Shuttle-launched modules. The initial SOC crewwould be 4 to 8 people. In addition to a core facility,the full-capability SOC would require a constructionfacility and flight support facility. The costs of this fullycapable SOC were estimated at $2,7 billion, with thetotal facility in place 9 to 10 years after program ini-tiation. b9

The Johnson Space Center briefed interested par-ties on SOC at the end of November 1979, in anticipa-tion of initiating a contractor study of the concept dur-ing 1980. One account of this briefing suggested that“the ‘space station’ may be ready for a comeback.”7°

The following year would see a new administrationtake office and a new NASA Administrator appointed.The concept of in-space infrastructure would belooked at afresh.

●

W hj., pp 1.8, 1-13, 1- 1‘3, 1 ’247“Da\ Id Doollng, “Space StatIon May Be Ready for a Comeback, ” HurIf~-

~ i//c TIrrw$, Dec 9, 1979, p 4

Conclusions

It should be evident that there is no obvious cutoffpoint for an account of the development of the “spacestation” concept. Today’s planning and proposals area continuation of an evolution which has roots in theearliest years of this century and which has proceededi n sporadic bursts of intensity over the past quarter-century. It is possible, however, to reflect on past ex-perience in the context of the current situation. Suchreflection reveals two levels of concrete justificationwhich have been offered i n support of in-space infra-structure—i. e., “space station, ” acquisition.

One set of justifications ties the need for a perma-nent human presence in orbit to a particular imageof the future objectives of the civiIian space program.According to this line of reasoning, a “space station”can

1.

2.

3.

In

be seen as:a necessary way station in preparing for peopleexploring the solar system; oran extremely valuable “national laboratory in or-bit” for carrying out many of the research anddevelopment activities related to a balanced anddiverse civilian space program with both scien-tific and application objectives; ora centralized operations base from which theroutine exploitation of, particularly the commer-cial exploitation of, both LEO and geosynchro-nous orbits can most effectively proceed.all of these justifications, in-space infrastructure

is explicitly a means to achieving or faciIitating a par-ticular set of space policy objectives, and a decisionto develop it would be tied to the more fundamentaldecision that those objectives were of sufficientpriority to justify the investments required to achievethem, including the necessary infrastructure itself. His-torically, what has happened at past occasions fordecision on the course of the American space programis that other goals than those which would have re-quired a “space station” were given preference:

1.

2.

In 1961, President Kennedy sought a dramaticspace achievement in which the United Statescould best the Soviet Union. The choice of a lu-nar-landing objective and of the lunar-orbital ren-dezvous approach to achieving it as the responseto Kennedy’s need meant bypassing the devel-opment of Earth-orbital capabilities including“space stations. ”In 1969-71, President Nixon sought to reduce thepriority and budget allocation of the space pro-gram after Apollo while still developing somenew technology, maintaining a manned spaceflight element, and creating more balance amongvarious program objectives. Within the scope ofwhat he was wiIling to approve, there was insuf-


ficient activity to justify developing a major or-bital laboratory, and the space Shuttle was se-lected as an alternative (and in NASA’s mind, aninterim) step until the level of space activitywould become high enough to require such a fa-cility.

From the perspective of overall policy objectives,then, the fact that a “space station” has been rejectedas a part of the space program in the past can be in-terpreted primarily as a function of the particular stagei n the program’s evolution at the time that its acquisi-tion was proposed. Such rejections are best under-stood as national leaders saying “not yet” or “notunder the current conditions, ” rather than an outright“no.” The issue then becomes whether the overallcharacter and desired objectives of the Nation’s spaceprogram for the rest of this century are now of a scopeto justify acquiring in-space infrastructure as a meansto achieve them.

Related to this point is an observation which springsclearly from this historical record: that the concept“space station” can be used to describe very differenthardware configurations and technical capabilities,ranging from the von Braun toroidal concept of the1950s, through the 50 to 100 person space base pro-posed by NASA in 1969 and the “construction shack”concept of the mid-197os, to recent proposals for asmall and evolutionary station based on an unmannedplatform. Historically, then, the term “space station”is extremely elastic, and an informed evaluation of aparticular proposal must ask “what kind of ‘space sta-tion, ’ for what purposes, at what cost?” In this sense,the past history of the proposal is not particularly rele-vant to the current situation.

At another level of justification, the need for a per-manent human outpost in orbit has been consistentlyseen by those with a broad perspective on futurespace activities as a necessary step in developmentof a capability to explore and exploit outer space, ifthat exploration and exploitation is to be pursued ag-gressively. Thomas Paine made this argument toRichard Nixon in 1969:

We believe strongly that the justification for pro-ceeding now with this major project as a national goaldoes not, and should not be made to depend on thespecific contributions that can be foreseen today inparticular scientific fields like astronomy or high en-ergy physics, in particular economic applications,such as Earth resource surveys, or in specific defenseneeds. Rather, the justification for the “space station”is that it is clearly the next major evolutionary stepin man’s experimentation, conquest, and use ofspace.71

Current NASA Administrator James Beggs has mademuch the same point, saying that “a ‘space station’is the logical next step in the history of our mannedspace systems. It will build on the achievements ofthe Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle pro-grams. ”72

This argument decouples station justification fromany particular set of missions and suggests that a“space station “ is a valuable, logical, and/or neces-sary step in developing the capability to pursue anyfuture objectives in space. The underlying assumptionis that the United States will want to pursue an activespace program and that a “space station” is requiredto do so. This line of argument is frequently combinedwith assertions of the need for leadership or preemi-nence in space as a source of national pride and pres-tige and as a counter to the military and/or economicthreats coming from other spacefaring nations.

This theme has consistently been put forth over thepast two decades by advocates of a “space station.”In the past, it seems as if they were “ahead of thecurve’ ’—i.e.,., that in objective terms the U.S. spaceprogram had not yet developed to a point where theargument that a permanent manned outpost was in-deed the logical next step in an aggressive space enter-prise was plausible to those outside the space com-munity.

The same argument is being put forth today; thequestion is whether it is any more plausible in 1984,as the U.S. space programs enters its second quarter-century, than it has been previously. Given the capa-bility for easy access to orbit provided by the spaceShuttle, it may be that having the ability to stay in or-bit for extended periods for experiments or operationsis now in fact a “next logical step.” Or it may be thatthe program has not yet evolved, and is not evolvingtoward the kind of active future, in which the crea-tion of permanent human presence in orbit is justified.

This historical review suggests that space advocateswill continue to press their vision of the way to goabout opening the space frontier and that a “spacestation” will continue to be an integral part of that vi-sion. It is up to others in leadership positions to decidewhether the vision of space held by those who arethe heirs of Tsiolkovsky, Oberth, von Braun, and manyothers who have worked on the space program in thiscountry is one which the United States will nowembrace.

T\ Memorandum from Thomas Paine to the President, Feb. 24, 1969.

72 James M. Beggs, “Securing Our Leadership in Space,” Astronautics andAeronautics, September 1982,

Appendix C

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN ACIVILIAN “SPACE STATION” PROGRAM*

Introduction

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,as amended, includes the following passage: “The aer-onautical and space activities of the United States shallbe conducted so as to contribute to . . . the follow-ing [objective]: . . . Cooperation by the United Stateswith other nations and groups of nations in work donepursuant to this Act and in the peaceful applicationof the results thereof . . . .’1 As a result of this provi-sion, NASA has a long tradition of cooperation withother countries in space activities.

In accordance with this tradition, there have beenextensive discussions over the past 2 years betweenNASA and other friendly countries regarding a possi-ble international in-space infrastructure acquisitionprogram. Then, in January of 1984, President Reaganin his State of the Union Address called for a U.S.“space station” with international participation. Thesecircumstances indicate the importance of a full con-sideration of various international options for devel-opment, acquisition, operation, and use of future long-term, in-orbit infrastructure. The aim of this appen-dix is to contribute to this consideration.

Why International Involvement?

THE MOTIVES FOR COOPERATION

Countries engage in international cooperation in sci-entific and technical undertakings for a variety ofreasons. In order to assess the potential advantagesand disadvantages of international involvement byanother country in a U.S. “space station” program (oreven the advantages of fully internationalizing the pro-gram) it is first of all necessary to understand thereasons which lead nations to engage in internationaltechnical cooperation in general. These motivationscan then be discussed as they apply to the specificsituation of space infrastructure development, opera-tion, and/or use in order to provide a framework forexamining various degrees and forms of potential in-ternational involvement, from no involvement at allup to and including a space infrastructure enterprisewhich is fully multinational from the start.

● Paper prepared for OTA by Hubert Bortzmeyer, with revision by JohnLogsdon.

I National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, As Amended, Section102(b)(7).

There are both symbolic and utilitarian payoffswhich lead a country to engage in international in-volvement in its technical activities through formal co-operative agreements. Among the national objectivesserved by such involvement are:2

1. Symbolic Objectivesa.

b.

c.

d.

e.

political and policy influence–a country mayengage in international cooperation in orderto influence political attitudes and policy out-comes in cooperating countries, in particularso that those attitudes and outcomes are com-patible with its own national objectives.policy legitimization–a country may inviteothers to cooperate with it in order to enlisttheir support for a particular course of actionthat the country intends to pursue; broaden-ing the base of involvement in a particularundertaking may increase its legitimacy bothat home and abroad.policy commitment–a country may allowothers to participate in one of its undertak-ings as a means of gaining their commitmentto support some of its other policies.leadership–a country may invite others tojoin it in a common undertaking because itbelieves that such an intimate partnership willallow it to demonstrate clearly to others aleadership position.cooperation to encourage cooperation—acountry may initiate or enter into a specificcooperative undertaking in order to demon-strate its commitment to the general princi-ple of international cooperation as a desirablecourse of action.

2. Utilitarian Objectivesa.

b.

division of labor and sharing of costs–a coun-try may invite others to join in an undertak-ing it wishes to pursue in order to achieve anecessary or desirable sharing of the burdens,particularly the cost, of that undertaking.access to foreign resources—a country mayopen one of its undertakings to foreign partic-ipation in order to engage or have access to

‘This statement of objectwes IS adapted from Stephen M. Shaffer and LisaRobock Shaffer, The Politics of International Cooperation: A Comparison ofU.S. Experience in Space and in Security (Graduate School of InternationalRelations, University of Denver, 1980).

177


unique or superior resources, both physicaland human, available only in other countries.

c. economic influences-a country may inviteothers to participate in an undertaking in or-der to increase the likelihood that they willthen purchase the products or services of thatundertaking, rather than those of potentialcompetitors.

This breakdown of the objectives of cooperation ba-sically reflects the perspective of a country seeking toinvolve others in its activities; however, it also can beused to identify the reasons why others would agreeto cooperate with that country. In general, one wouldexpect those responding to a cooperative initiative togive highest priority to utilitarian benefits, but the sym-bolic payoffs from international cooperation can ac-crue, though not evenly, to all partners.

The United States has made international coopera-tion in science and technology—in space as in numer-ous other sectors-a major element of its foreign pol-icy; most observers agree that the overall benefits ofsuch cooperation in both symbolic and utilitarianterms have been substantial, and that the negative im-pacts have been comparatively insignificant.3 Unlessit begins a technical undertaking for motivations whichare overwhelmingly nationalistic in character (e.g.,Project Apollo or the Supersonic Transport) the UnitedStates has welcomed the participation of its closestallies. As international involvement in the “space sta-tion” program is assessed, this “bias” toward coop-eration will be maintained.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE:THE RECORD TO DATE

In the 25 years that the United States has had a Gov-ernment-funded civilian space program, internationalcooperation has been one of its major themes; as men-tioned above, it was an explicit objective of the NASAct. Armed with this legislative mandate, with Presi-dential and congressional support for a U.S. civilianspace program which emphasized openness and sci-entific objectives, and with already existing patternsof cooperation in space science, NASA has since itsinception conducted an active program of interna-tional partnership.

In space, perhaps more than in most areas of inter-national science, it has been the policies and initia-tives of the Government, rather than those of the sci-entif ic and technical community, which haveestablished the U.S. attitude toward cooperativeundertakings. 4 Although NASA’s international pro-grams have involved the Soviet Union, Canada, Ja-pan, and various developing countries, NASA’s pri-mary cooperative partner to date has been Europe—both individual European countries and the variousEuropean space organizations which have existedover the past two decades.

International cooperation in civilian space activityis thus a longstanding tradition, especially in the fieldof space science, but also to some extent in space ap-plications and space technology programs. As the gen-eral space policies of potential international partnersin a space infrastructure acquisition program are re-viewed, many examples of cooperative ventures canbe brought to light. These range in scope from mod-est participation in minor projects to intense involve-ment in major undertakings on the basis of full part-nership, An extreme example of the latter is the settingup of an intergovernmental consortium to carry outcomprehensive programs in a particular technicalfield—telecommunications.

On the other hand, there are few examples of sub-stantial involvement of foreign partners in programswhich could be characterized as the main thrust ofthe national space policy of a given country, whetherit be the United States, the U. S. S. R., or any otherspace-capable state. As a matter of fact, the only in-stance so far of such an arrangement is the involve-ment, since the early 1970s, of Europe and Canadain the development of the American Space Transpor-tation System (STS).

But even that example is not really valid, since thehardware developments assigned to Europe (Spacelab)and Canada (the Remote Manipulator System, RMS),although producing valuable complements, involvea rather minor share of the total costs involved, onthe order of 10 percent. Furthermore, what is reallycentral in the STS is the American-built Shuttle. Theother two items are accessory to it: the RMS couldeasily have been replaced with some U.S.-designedequivalent, and, if Spacelab did not exist, the STS

JThe Nat tonal Academy of Sciences has recently undertaken a review ofsclentlflc and technolog~al cooperation among the OECD countries which 4Another area where Government I nttlatlves were crucial I n establlshi ngreaches this conclusion. patterns of international cooperation was nuclear energy.

App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 179

would still be able to carry out 90 percent of its in-tended activities. s

An invitation for international participation in a U.S.“space station” program might well have the result,as did the U.S. offer to participate in STS development,that foreign participation would be somewhat margin-al in terms of both the scope and the nature of its sharein the workload. A different outcome, however, is alsopossible, resulting in what was described above as arather unusual circumstance: major foreign involve-ment in what will be the brunt of the U.S. effort inspace over the next decade or more. Since the earlyseventies, space technology has been disseminatingand/or maturing throughout the world, bringing cer-tain countries almost to par with the United States inaspects of space technology relevant to a such anundertaking, and thus broadening the technical basefor significant cooperation.

In order to understand which of these outcomes islikely and/or preferable, it is first necessary to detailthe objectives which would lead both the UnitedStates and other countries to collaborate on a spaceinfrastructure undertaking. As NASA’s current Direc-tor of International Affairs has observed: “Internationalspace cooperation is not a charitable enterprise; coun-tries cooperate because they judge it in their interestt o d o s o . ”6

U.S. OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS RELATEDTO INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S. SPACE

INFRASTRUCTURE ACQUISITION PROGRAM

In the first year of its existence, NASA formulateda set of policy guidelines for international coopera-tion in space. Those guidelines have survived periodicreexamination and remain in force today. They reflect“conservative values7” with respect to the conditionsunder which cooperation is desirable.

sThe U.S. policy, as became clear I n 1972, was to ensure that foreign con-tributors to the STS should not have responsibility for any element whichwas essential to the success of the system. The only civillan space programsto which Europe has contributed or is contributing essential parts are theInternational Ultraviolet Explorer (IUVE) and the Spxe Telescope (ST). ThereIS a strong push within NASA to Iim it the foreign role in any ‘‘space station’program to non-essential elements, but this push is being countered by anIncreasingly strong insistence, from the major ESA contributors at least, thatpotential partners be allowed to develop some of the key infrastructure ele-ments, Of course, there is a natural resistance within U.S. industry to seeingforeign organizations provide what it could produce: witness, for instance,the Industrial opposition to the Canadian development of the RMS. It shouldbe noted, however, that NATO partners are frequently gwen responsibilityfor developing essential components of defense systems, with consequentstrerigthenlng of the alliance.

6Kenneth S. Pedersen, “International Aspects of Commercial Space Activ-ities, ” speech to Princeton Conference on Space Manufacturing, May 1983.

7Arnold Frutkin, /nternationa/ Cooperation in Space (Prentice-Hall, 1965),

p. 32.

The essential features of NASA guidelines are:cooperation is to be on a project-by-project basis,not on a program or other open-ended ar-rangement;each project must be of mutual interest and haveclear scientific value;technical agreement is necessary before politicalcommitment;each side bears full financial responsibility for itsshare of the project;each side must have the technical and managerialcapabilities to carry out its share of the project;NASA does not provide substantial technical as-sistance to its partners, and little or no U.S. tech-nology is transferred; andscientific results are made publicly available.8

These guidelines have occasionally been bent, asin the case of the 1975 U.S.-U.S.S.R. Apollo-SoyuzProgram. In general, however, they have provided aneffective framework within which NASA has pursueda mixed set of objectives, including:

● Scientific/TechnicalIncreasing the number of qualified peopleworking on problems of space research andspace technology by broadening the base ofinvolvement in space activities;Shaping the development of the space pro-grams in other countries by offering attractiveopportunities to join with the United States i n“doing things our way”; andChanneling the funds and technical capabil-ities dedicated to space in other countriesaway from activities which are competitive ornot compatible with U.S. interests, but involv-ing them in a program dominated by and large-ly defined by the United States.

● Economic– NASA estimates that it has achieved over $2

billion in cost savings and effective contribu-tions from its cooperative programs over thepast 25 years; cost-sharing has been an influen-tial, though not top-priority, element of NASA’scooperative programs.

– Involving other countries in expanded spaceactivities may create new markets for U.S. aer-ospace products.

● Political— NASA’s international cooperative programs

have been designed to present a positive im-age of the United States to our cooperatingpartners; in particular, the contrast between

8Shatier and Shaffer, op. CIt,, p. 18

38-798 0 - 84 - 13 , QL 3


U.S. openness and Soviet secrecy with respectto space has been exploited by the UnitedStates.

— International cooperation in space has beenundertaken by the United States in order toadvance other U.S. foreign policy objectives.

While the priority given to these various objectiveshas varied over time and mission opportunity, at thecore has been a policy that permitted this country’sclosest allies to become involved in the U.S. spaceeffort. Indeed, some have criticized NASA for mak-ing possible such participation, at minimal cost, in aneffort paid for almost entirely by U.S. taxpayers; “ben-efit, know-how and opportunity were shared to an ex-tent which was totally unprecedented where an ad-vanced technology was involved . . . .“9 Since thestart of its civilian space program, the United Stateshas used international cooperation in space as ameans of creating a sense of togetherness and com-mon achievement among, particularly, the industrialdemocracies which are this country’s most significantpartners in maintaining world order.

The benefits to the United States of internationalspace cooperation do not come without costs, ofcourse. Among the potential negative impacts of in-volving others in the U.S. space program are:

1. increased technical risk and management com-plexity;

2. Significant O Ut-flOWS of sensitive or valuable U.S..

3.

4.

technology, employment opportunities, and/orhard currency, as the United States purchasesspace-related goods or services from othercountries;in particular, the development, through their in-volvement in U.S. space activities, of effectivecompetitors to U.S. firms in commercial space ef-forts; andpossible disputes among the United States andits cooperating partners-which, if not resolved,could lead to broader foreign policy conflicts.

To date, NASA has managed its affairs so as to haveminimized these potential negative impacts. For in-stance, many of the cooperative programs involvedNASA’s launching of foreign satellites, in which thetechnical risk to NASA was virtually non-existent andwhich often led to foreign purchase of additionallaunches.

gArnold Frutkin, “U.S. Policy: a Drama in N Acts,” Spectrum, September1983, p. 74.

FOREIGN OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTSRELATED TO INVOLVEMENT IN A U.S.

“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM

Success in cooperative undertakings requires thateach side perceives the cooperation as being bene-ficial to itself; such undertakings are even more likelyto be successful if there is at least some commonalityof objectives. All partners must believe that coopera-tion is a useful means for advancing some of their na-tional objectives without undue costs related to others.It is somewhat more difficult to generalize with respectto the motivations which might lead specific countriesor groupings of countries to decide to join the UnitedStates in development, operation, and/or use of spaceinfrastructure, but the following seems most germane:

● Scientific/TechnicalIn most areas of space technology, the UnitedStates is still a leader. Other countries mayhope that close partnership with the UnitedStates will give them increased access to thesetechnologies and help upgrade their own tech-nical capabilities.The “space station” contains elements ofspace infrastructure which, used in connectionwith the space transportation system, will“modernize” space operations; other coun-tries may decide they must be part of the mostadvanced way of operating in space,

● Economic— If the commercial potential of many areas of

space activity is as large as some forecast, useof in-space infrastructure will be an essentialor at least extremely useful means for achiev-ing that potential. Other countries wanting toparticipate in the commercial exploitation ofspace may view sharing the costs of a “spacestation” program as the best way to be majorpartners in such commercial exploitation.

— Cooperation with the United States may be theonly way that other countries can afford to de-velop capabilities in particular areas of spacetechnology. Division of labor and costs is anecessary approach for those without the re-sources to develop a total system of space in-frastructure on their own. While the UnitedStates could probably afford to develop it onits own, as could the ESA countries in collab-oration with Japan,10 probably no other coun-

IOAS noted later in this appemfix, there is a considerable difference bet-

ween the amount of taxpayers’ money the United States on the one handand Europe and Japan on the other are prepared to spend on space. Butthere is little doubt that Europe alone cou/d make a comparable investmentif the political will existed.

App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 181

try or region except the Soviet Union and itsallies could make a comparable investment inspace.

— Other countries may anticipate that such a pro-gram will provide marketing opportunities fortheir industries and want to participate in theprogram in order to maximize those opportu-nities.

. Political— Participation in the “space station,” like par-

ticipation in the space transportation system,may provide other countries a way of sharingin the political and prestige benefits of mannedspace flight activities without bearing the totalcost of manned systems.

— The United States is the military and economicleader of the non-Communist world; cooper-ation with the United States in such an effortmay provide a way for other countries to main-tain or increase their commitment to a politicaland military alliance with the United States.

THE POTENTIAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL“SPACE STATION” PROGRAM

Some have suggested that any major new undertak-ing in space be from the start “truly” international—i.e., designed, funded, and managed by an interna-tional consortium or an equivalent organization .11 Al-though the current momentum behind “space sta-tion” plans is leading away from this option, it is worthidentifying it here and assessing it later as a possibleway of approaching its development or operation.

Such an approach would, of course, be the ultimatein the way of internationalizing a program; in thismode of cooperation, the United States would merelybe a shareholder among many others within a con-sortium of participants. There are precedents in thisrespect; an instance which comes readily to mind isthat of the International Telecommunications Satel-lite Organization (INTELSAT).

In 1962, the U.S. Congress passed the Communi-cations Satellite Act, creating the Communications Sat-ellite Corporation (COMSAT) and charging it with de-veloping a global system for international satellitecommunications. The United States could not achievesuch an ambitious goal without the active participa-tion of other nations; therefore negotiations werestarted which led (after substantial conflict) in 1964to an “interim agreement” under which a global net-work was successfully established. In 1969, a Pleni-potentiary Conference was convened, with 67

1 I See, for example, RcJ&rt Salkeld, “Toward Men Permanently in Space, ’

Astronautics and Aeronautics, October 1979.

member countries in attendance: it resulted in aDefinitive Agreement which entered into force in 1973and made INTELSAT a working international organiza-tion, with a present membership of more than 100countries.

The U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries neverjoined INTELSAT, both because it was initiated by theUnited States and actually run by Americans duringthe first years of its existence and because they wouldhave had very little influence on the organizationunder the weighted system of voting which wasemployed.

The International Maritime Satellite Organization(lNMARSAT) has a number of features that are dis-tinctly different from those of INTELSAT. It providesglobal coverage, whereas INTELSAT does not. Anotherdifference is that among its member states, INMARSATcounts the Soviet Union (with a 14 percent owner-ship share, second only to the United States’ 23 per-cent) and several other socialist countries.INMARSAT’S statute obliges it to provide free accessto members and nonmembers.

INMARSAT was created pursuant to the initiative ofa United Nations agency, the Inter-governmentalMaritime Consultative Organization, which, from1973 to 1976, convened a series of international con-ferences to establish a global maritime satellite com-munications system. In 1979, the INMARSAT Conven-tion and Operating Agreement entered into force, andoperations started early in 1982. With the exceptionof the above-mentioned differences, INTELSAT andINMARSAT are similar in structure.

Could a similar international organization becreated, in order to develop, operate, and use in-spaceinfrastructure? In principle there is no obstacle to this,although the parallel with INTELSAT can be very mis-leading. In particular, it is not clear that the provisionof orbital infrastructure to accomplish a variety of ob-jectives could ever be the kind of profitable enterprisethat space-based communications has been. Commu-nications is a well-established business, yielding a re-turn on investment of about 14 percent withinINTELSAT. Also, the capability upon which INTELSATwas originally based (communications satellites andlaunch capabilities) had been developed by theUnited States at its own expense.

There are no such credible economic prospects forspace infrastructure, which would have many differentuses, some for pure government-funded research,others in the nature of a public service, and still othersfor commercial applications. Also, in a satellite com-munications system, there lies more cash-flow in theprocurement of the ground segment than in thebuilding of the satellites. This has made it possible for


American firms to be the exclusive manufacturers ofINTELSAT satellites for years without stirring too muchresentment within the international consortium,because other member countries have found ade-quate compensation in the manufacturing of groundstations for themselves and for sale abroad.

Also, Europe, with its Ariane series of boosters, isnow competing for INTELSAT launch contracts. In ad-dition, some form of international cooperation was ab-solutely essential, almost by definition, for an inter-national communications network to be feasible. Nosuch cooperative imperative is attached to space in-frastructure.

A more adequate precedent for an international“space station” enterprise might be that of an inter-national organization created to conduct a numberof jointly coordinated space programs for the benefitof its member states. Such a “limited partnership” maybe a realistic approach to space infrastructure devel-opment and/or operation. To a large extent, the Euro-pean Space Agency (ESA) does provide such a paral-lel. 12 Since its inception, ESA has performed verysuccessfully in spite of the difficulties associated withalmost all international organizations.13 In ESA’s case,the two major problem areas have been, and still are:1 ) the time and burdensome negotiations required tosettle differences about general policies to follow andwhat programs to support; 2) the framing of an “in-dustrial policy” designed to improve the worldwidecompetitiveness of European industry while ensuringa “fair return” to individual members states (the “re-turn” is the value of the contracts let by ESA to anymember state, and it is “fair” when proportionate tothat member’s financial contribution to the agency’sbudget).

The Convention governing ESA provides some cluesas to how these difficulties are dealt with in the longrun:

1. The formal structure of ESA is designed to accom-modate laborious negotiations and compromises.The legislative power, so to speak, rests with aCouncil where all states are represented; theCouncil meets regularly, usually for 2-day ses-sions.14 There is also an Executive responsible forday-to-day operations and long-range planning.

I ZESA is described i n more detail below.IJI ndeed, if one takes a long view of past European coopf?ration, saY, over

100 years, ESA’S record is strikingly good. Although its operations have beenon a much smaller scale than have those of NASA, ESA’S record of technicalsuccesses is perhaps as good as that of any other organization.

141n general, exh Member State has one vote in the Council. However,

a Member State does not have the right to vote on matters concerning anoptional program in which it does not take part. Except where the ESA Con-vention provides otherwise, decisions of the Council are taken by a simplemajority of Member States represented and voting.

2. ESA’s overall activity is subdivided into two cat-egories:

mandatory activities, which include chieflyscientific programs and basic organizationalexpenditures; mandatory contributions arebased on each state’s GNP;optional activities, which are specific programslike Ariane, Spacelab, Marecs, and so on; con-tributions to these programs are negotiatedbetween the participants at the inception ofthe program.

This system provides ESA with a considerable flexi-bility: although unanimous consent of all MemberStates is needed formally to permit ESA to undertakean optional program, a vote in favor of the programdoes not carry any obligation to participate. MemberStates may decide, after a program has beenauthorized, whether—and, if so, to what extent—theywiII participate. Thus, Member states can adjust theirfinancial effort to the degree of interest they see in aprogram and/or to the “return” their industry will ob-tain from it (one of the solutions to the irksome “fairreturn” problem). Also, member states can supportanother partner’s favorite project by a token partici-pation which can be traded against others, resultingi n “package deals” which settle seemingly unrecon-cilable differences.

A further degree of flexibility is provided by the factthat the agency is not obligated to manage all of itsprograms through its own staff. ESA can delegate toa national agency the responsibilities for a program’smanagement, if this appears to be preferable from apolitical, economic, or technical point of view (CNES,the French space agency, is thus entrusted with tech-nical management of the Ariane developmentprogram).

3. ESA early recognized that a multinational agencyis better off letting contracts to multinational in-dustrial firms rather than attempting to balancecontracts among national companies accordingto its “fair return” principle. This balancing actis often performed better and more quickly in-side multinational consortia of European aero-space and electronics firms, the creation of whichESA has encouraged.

As a last parallel which might be drawn from ESA,it should be noted that this agency’s role is generallylimited to development and demonstration of spacesystems. Utilization, in the sense of operational orcommercial exploitation, is usually entrusted to otherintergovernmental organization, like EUTELSAT for re-gional European communications or EUMETSAT formeteorological satellites. Commercial operation caneven be entrusted to private multinational corpora-tions like ARIANESPACE, which has been established


to produce, market, launch, and finance Arianelaunch vehicles. This arrangement could be paralleledin an international “space station” program: differentinternational entities, with possibly different member-ship and operating procedures, could take care of itsdevelopment and operation.

As far as development and operation are concerned,one might question whether the creation of interna-tional entities in charge of these activities would en-tail creation of new technical agencies duplicating theknow-how and resources of existing space agencies,most notably NASA. Clearly, this would not be an ad-visable course. However, the international body incharge of the program could confine itself to overallmanagement, and rely on existing agencies in the par-ticipating countries for technical management, super-vision, and day-to-day activity, a procedure similar tothat sometimes followed by ESA. Given that theUnited States would undoubtedly be the largest share-holder in such a joint venture, it should be possibleto have the leading role assigned to NASA and/or theU.S. private sector in this context. Other major agen-cies like ESA (Europe), NASDA (Japan), CNES (France),or DFVLR (West Germany) would as a matter ofcourse have to be entrusted with tasks commensuratewith their country’s or region’s financial commitment.

THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. DECISION TO“GO IT ALONE” WITH RESPECT TO THE

“SPACE STATION”15

Of course, there is the possibility that no other coun-try will reach agreement with the United States to co-operate in the acquisition and use of in-space infra-structure. In this unlikely situation, the United Stateswould “go it alone. ” Would such a step deal a fatalblow to all future prospects of international coopera-tion in space? There seems to be no reason to fearsuch a drastic outcome: what would probably hap-pen is merely an extension into the future of the pres-ent situation, characterized by a large amount of du-plication, with most countries striving to acquire moreor less the same capabilities so as to be able to com-pete, especially where commercial applications areconcerned.

The same countries, however, are now willing toparticipate in quite a large number of cooperative

.I SThe circumstances adduced at the beginning of this appendix provide

reason to believe that a U .S, -only program is the least I ikely alternative, How-ever, since no final Congressional decision on international participation inany U.S. “space station” program has been made—and since the Congressmay wish to reconsider this matter de rrovo-the U.S.-only option IS Includedhere

schemes, not only in the field of space science (re-putedly free of competition), but also in general publicservice types of applications (e.g., meteorology orsearch-and-rescue), and even in commercial applica-tions (e.g., communication via INTELSAT, INMARSAT,or INTERSPUTNIK). Cooperation, in other words,seems to be a widely recognized way of performingspace activities, provided a certain amount of auton-omous assets have been secured to safeguard nationalindependence and ability to compete, so that if thisU.S. offer to cooperate is not taken up on a programas central even as the “space station, ” this situationis unlikely to be reversed,

That such duplication does not make optimal useof the global resources of the international commu-nity is obvious, but by no means new. If one acceptsit, the next question, from a U.S. perspective, iswhether other spacefaring countries, not being in-volved in the U.S. program, would thus be motivatedto challenge U.S. supremacy in space and to competecommercially with it even more effectively and bet-ter than they do now. In other words, what are theimplications if other countries strive to acquire moreor less the same capabilities as the United States isseeking by developing space infrastructure, but ontheir own and not in partnership with the UnitedStates?

It should be noted first that acquisition of similar ca-pabilities does not necessarily require developmentof similar technology. The capability to launch satel-lites, for instance, can be provided by a very sophisti-cated reusable craft like the Shuttle, or by less inex-pensive expendable rockets. Similarly, it could turnout that most or all functions of space infrastructurethat utilize a human crew could eventually be per-formed by one or several automated systems. This cer-tainly seems to be true whenever a single specific ac-tivity is under examination: materials processing inspace, for instance, could perhaps be adequately per-formed in an operational production mode by an un-manned platform along the lines of the FrenchSOLARIS concept.

Therefore, when specific activities are consideredin isolation, there appear to be ways for other coun-tries to remain competitive in space applications with-out joining a U.S. “space station” program. However,when looked at from a global perspective, a compre-hensive space program is more than the sum of a fewspecific application projects. U.S. development oflong-term space infrastructure would mark the incep-tion of a new way of performing activities in space;the hoped-for result would be enhanced flexibility andeconomies of operation in many areas of space sci-ence and applications, whether already recognizedor presently unforeseen.

184. Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

Any country wishing to gain access to this new wayof doing business in space would have to acquire anextensive set of technologies and systems:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Orbital communication relays. (The United Statesis developing such relays in the form of the Track-ing and Data Relay Satellites; similarly, ESA’s L-SAT will have orbital capabilities and will be usedin this role for the control of EURECA).In-orbit servicing (and probably retrieval) systems.(The United States has flown a short-range systemof that kind, the manned maneuvering unit(MMU), which enables people to tend satellitesin the vicinity of the Shuttle, To go further alongthis line, NASA will have to develop the so-calledOrbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)).The capability of returning space hardware fromorbit to the surface of the Earth via unmannedvehicles. (This is a capability which the UnitedStates has bypassed through development of theShuttle) and/or;Ultimately, man-rated launch and reentry vehi-cles (unless automated systems or systems re-motely controlled from the ground suffice. to per-form all the space tasks for which the need forhuman beings is currently foreseen–a possibil-ity which is debatable at best).

Even if one takes into account that such capabilitiesneed not rest on facilities identical (in terms of size,sophistication, etc.) to those deployed by the UnitedStates, the cost of their creation is nevertheless likelyto be several times higher than the cost of creatingand maintaining independent “traditional” satellitebuilding and launching capabilities.

Consider, for instance, the total development andflight testing cost of Ariane 1: roughly $1 billion (1984).The corresponding cost for the Shuttle exceeds $10billion. The Shuttle’s payload capability is muchgreater than that of Ariane 1, especially in LEO. Butthe important point is that Ariane suffices to endowEuropean countries with the capability to launch allthe applications satellites they need, and even further,to market launch services abroad, competing com-mercially with NASA and the U.S. private sector inthat field. (One might state more accurately that thereal competition will come from the Ariane 2, 3 and4 versions, which together will cost about an addition-al $400 million beyond the initial development ex-penditures: the argument, however, still holds true.)

Suppose now that Europe decides to acquire amanned flight capability of its own. A typical way todo that (as explored in ESA’s “long-term preparatoryprogram”) would be to develop an even larger ver-sion of Ariane, with a LEO capability around one-halfthat of the Shuttle: under the name Ariane S, various

preliminary designs for such a vehicle have been pub-licized. These designs are compatible with a wingedreentry vehicle, looking somewhat like a down-scaledShuttle, which under the name HERMES has also beenthrough early design stages in France. Both craft couldoperate automatically but could also transport people.

No cost estimates have been officially quoted yet,but independent experts, by extrapolating from otherEuropean and U.S. program costs, predict $2 billionto $4 billion as the price for acquiring such a minimalcapability. This is much less than what it took to de-velop the Shuttle, but 2 to 3 times what it cost todevelop Ariane. Of course, in order to exploit sucha staffed flight capability properly, if it is not to remainonly a prestige enterprise, all space activities must beadapted to the “new way of doing business in space.”Today’s European satellites, for instance, do not lendthemselves to servicing in orbit; all sorts of new tech-niques would have to be adopted for that purpose,such as modules easy to plug out or in; built-in, readilyaccessible and readable check-out circuits; safety de-vices destined to protect the astronauts’ lives, and soon.

In turn, even if this proves to be economical in thelong run, it would call for increased investment at thestart. Added to the higher operating costs of mannedspace flight, the overall consequence of all these con-siderations amounts to this: in order to acquire thecapabilities which go with the new way of conduc-ting space activities, medium space powers like Eur-ope or Japan would probably have to multiply theirspace budgets by at least 2 to 3 times. However, theratio of civilian space expenditures to gross nationalproduct (GNP) in Europe and Japan is much smallerthan the corresponding ratio in the United States—i.e., roughly 4 times less. There is therefore room forexpansion, but such a major shifting of gears wouldrequire a reassessment of national priorities in all thecountries involved, and there is no sign that such areassessment is imminent.

A last question to address is whether another alter-native is open to these countries: again assuming thatthe United States goes ahead alone with the devel-opment of a “space station” and all the attendant newtechnologies, must countries wishing to enter into orstay in the space business of necessity develop similarcapabilities? In other words, could “doing businessin the old way” be competitive when faced with the“new way, ” just as expendable launch vehicles fromEurope, Japan, and the United States seem to be man-aging to stay in competition with a very new and dif-ferent craft, the Shuttle?

Two factors will have a deciding influence on thisquestion:

App. C—International /evolvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 185

1. Economics— The relative importance of captive markets;— charges applied to users: the very sophistica-

tion of new systems may, at least in the initialphase, lead to high operational costs; this argu-ment is further complicated by the fact thatuser’s charges do not necessarily reflect actualcosts. If the United States decided to go aheadfor reasons of its own, not all of which wereeconomic ones, it probably would not fullyamortize costs through user’s charges; othersuppliers of space services might do the same,to facilitate export sales, for instance;

— the fact that the key area of commercial com-petition in space utilizes the geostationary or-bit, whereas the “space station” and its relatednew capabilities will at the start focus on LEOactivities, and will extend their sphere ofoperations to geostationary orbit much later;meanwhile, business can go on as usual in thatorbit.

2. Political and Technical Trends— One of the major impacts of “space station”

technology will be in the field of constructionand assembly of large structures or platformsin orbit. Presently, however, there seems tobe a trend in favor of small or medium-sizedsatellites which fit the needs of one givencountry or group of countries eager to possessits own independent system. Small to medi-um-sized satellites would probably also appealto commercial operators (in the United Statesand elsewhere) who might find it of advantageto own a system built along their specificationsrather than to lease a segment of a largersystem.

— However, even small/medium satellites mightbenefit from new methods of operating inspace. The capability to check a satellite inlow orbit before transferring it to its final or-bit to start operation there, or the capabilityto repair it when it fails, may be a significantcommercial advantage which no prospectivecustomer is likely to overlook. However, theeconomic attractiveness of satellite servicingis still a very controversial matter; lb anyway,from a strictly financial point of view, a cus-tomer could be presented with the same ad-vantages by an adequate system of warranty.But the psychological appeal would clearly bein favor of the servicing capability.

lbThe reluctance of those concerned to meet the relatively low costs of

retrieving and refurbishing WESTSTAR 6 and PALAPA B-2 indicate that in-orbit retrieval ad repair are not yet economically attractive.

At the present stage, it would seem that neither eco-nomic factors nor political and technical trends yielda clear answer to the question of whether there is analternative way open to countries unable or unwill-ing to acquire in-space infrastructure. This is a majorreason to believe that the U.S. offer to cooperate withother countries will be accepted by other spacefar-ing nations, at least to the minimum extent necessaryto see what happens. Whether such minimal partici-pation is in the U.S. interest will be discussed later inthis paper. But the conclusion of the reasoning andanalysis just presented is inescapable—as the UnitedStates begins a space infrastructure program, others willwant to be part of it, provided the cost (in all sensesof the term) is not too great.

Possible Modes of InternationalInvolvement in a U.S. “SpaceStation” Program

There is a wide variety of possible forms that inter-national cooperation in a space infrastructure programmight take. This section describes two general cate-gories of involvement, each with several variations:

1. international cooperation during “space station”development, then separate deployment ofoperational systems; and

2. international cooperation throughout the deploy-ment, operation, and use of the “space station .“

JOINT DEVELOPMENT, SEPARATE DEPLOYMENT

If the United States and/or its potential internationalpartners believe that free and open competition in uti-lizing space is preferable (or unavoidable), and if thesecountries nevertheless want to save on developmentcosts and prevent all-out duplication of efforts, thenthis option will be attractive. joint development of atotal system or a piece of hardware, followed by sep-arate or independent deployment, operation, exploita-tion and/or sale is a commonplace arrangement in,among others, aerospace programs. Many military andcivilian aircraft have been or are being born that way,at least in Europe. The United States seems to favorseparate development fo l lowed by l icens ingagreements, but there are examples to the contrary(e.g., the joint development of the CFM 56 jet engineby General Electric and the French SNECMA).

Among the reasons that other countries might wantto commit only to joint development, reserving theright of separate deployment of constituent elements,are:

1. Going along to see what happens. This wouldtypically be the attitude of countries or agenciesfeeling rather skeptical about the benefits to be


2.

3.

derived from use of in-space infrastructure, butwhich deem it necessary to be at least symboli-cally present in the game, just in case it turns outthat their skepticism was ill-founded. Such part-ners may not be of the most active sort, but theyalso will not be troublesome, since the veryreason of their being present is “to follow theleader.” Presumably they would not be interestedenough in the joint undertaking to fund cost in-creases if the program should meet with difficul-ties, and would therefore attempt to settle for afixed amount rather than a fixed percentage typeof participation.Going along to acquire some of the know-howand of the technologies to be derived from theprogram. This would be the attitude of countriesor agencies with a positive attitude towards newsystems, but which are not in a hurry to deployand use them, so that they only want to acquireknowledge to be implemented in a much laterperspective. Along with other, more “political”motivations, this seems to be what prompted Eur-ope to join the post-Apollo program. There wasalso a more immediate industrial motivation; Eur-ope hoped to sell to NASA more units of the hard-ware developed by European firms, and NASAhas indeed purchased a second Spacelab flightunit in Europe. This type of motivation is apt tocreate problems, insofar as it raises the issue oftechnology transfer or dissemination.Going along in order to & able to deploy a sep-arate system at about the time that the primarypartner deploys its own. This is a sign of real in-terest to the program, insofar as it means that allparties truly believe in it. However, it might wellgenerate more problems than would the preced-ing ones. It is indeed unlikely that all parties con-cerned will aim, through their joint developmentefforts, towards development of strictly identicalinfrastructure elements. As a consequence, anumber of compromises would have to be ac-cepted by all (or some of) the participants to rec-onciIe differing specifications. Any given partici-pant will tend to specify the work assigned to itso that it serves directly (or with the smallestpossible amount of modification or adaptation)its own national interests. However, the endproduct of the same work, if the joint endeavoris to make any sense, must also be readily adapt-able to what other participants plan to construct.In a rather grossly exaggerated way, this is a situa-tion akin to ESA and NASA trying to agree on adefinition of Spacelab which would enable it tobe launched either by the Shuttle or by Ariane.

Such compromises are by no means impossible, butmust be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to makesure that the overall cost of the compromise designand of its adaptations to specific needs does not ex-ceed the added costs of separate developments. Fur-thermore, such a compromise design is inevitably dif-ficult to agree on, for all parties tend to believe thatit is to them that will fall the largest amount of modifi-cations to be made later to adapt the common devel-opment of their specific needs. These, however, areproblems inherent in all cooperative developmentprograms, and past experience, notably in the fieldof aeronautics and armaments, proves that they canbe settled whenever a strong sense of common pur-pose prevails.

While, for one or more of the reasons sketchedabove, joint development without a commitment tojoint operation or utilization may be attractive to a po-tential cooperating partner, it would appear that theUnited States might prefer a more comprehensivecooperative approach, as described below. However,there may be reasons for the United States to avoidcommitment to international involvement beyond thedevelopment stage. Among such possible motivationsare:

1.

2.

3

In

A feeling that national security applications inspace might evolve in such a way that the UnitedStates would prefer to deploy its own infrastruc-ture so that it could control access to it; this isnot necessarily a problem since provisions forsuch restriction could be part of an internationalagreement.A similar argument could be made if, particularly,materials processing activities appear quite prom-ising commercially and U.S. firms prefer a U. S.-only “industrial park” in space.The United States may prefer a safety valve free-ing it from the need to continue a joint effort ifthere is a likelihood that the cooperative experi-ence during the development phase is not satis-factory on technical, economic, and/or politicalgrounds.addition to all of the above, dissatisfaction with

joint development programs sometimes crops up, notfrom problems directly related to the developmentphase of the undertaking, but from an apparent or reallack of benefits deriving from the joint effort once ithas carried through. This leads one to examine whatbenefits can be expected, and what sort of frameworkis needed to ensure that they can be reaped.

1. Each party deploys and uses for its own purposesone or several units of the jointly developed hard-ware. (Construction would presumably be sharedamong industrial firms which built the proto-

App. C—International Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 187

2.

A

types.) This approach is feasible if integratedsystems have in fact been jointly developed; how-ever, as stated earlier, this may not necessarilybe the usual case, as agencies and administrationsinvolved wiII tend to prefer clear-cut interfacesrather than closely integrated systems.Assuming then that each participant has devel-oped a self-contained system (e.g., the UnitedStates develops a core element and country X ateleoperator maneuvering system (TMS) compati-ble both with the U.S. element and country X’sown spacecraft and launch vehicles), several op-tions are possible:— Participants in joint development efforts make

no provisions for the post-development phase,and leave it to evolving circumstances andeconomics to ensure a successful career for thedeveloped items. (For example, if the U.S. ele-ments are sound ones, country X will purchaseone or more, and vice versa, provided no legalobstacles or perceived national security con-cerns regarding these sales arise).

— Make it an obligation for all par-ties to purchase(and agree to sell) one or several units of thehardware developed by each.17

— And, of course, all possible intermediate ar-rangements between these two extremes. (Touse a simplified example: the United Statescould be obligated to use country X’s teleoper-ator maneuvering system, not by purchasingit but by offering as a compensation a givenamount of “utilization time” on elements ofits infrastructure; reciprocally, country X’s obli-gations would be to provide and maintain agiven number of these TMS vehicles.)

“closed-end” international partnership appearsto make the most sense if the infrastructure is a“ nec-essary, but not sufficient, part of the capabilities re-quired for effective and efficient operations in space.All partners will want to ensure that whatever is de-veloped will be compatible with their longer range,but separate, plans for space. However, this kind oflimited international involvement is less likely in mostsituations to be attractive either to the United Statesor to its potential partners than more substantial in-volvement in the operation and utilization phases aswell as the development phase. The following sectionexamines such an approach.

I @ch an expl~it obligation WOUld circumvent the possible unwillingness

of one party to purchase elements from another. From the European pointof view, U.S. unwillingness to purchase additional Spacelab modules hasbeen something of a problem.

JOINT DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION AND USE

The essential features of this option are:— operation and maintenance costs of the infra-

structure, as well as development costs, wouldbe shared;

— ownership of most or all of its elements wouldstay most probably with the United States; how-ever, all participants’ rights of access and use forcommon and/or national purposes, includingmutual commercial competition, would be guar-anteed by an adequate legal framework.

Implementation of this approach is essentially athree-step process, where each step has to be con-sidered separately before an overall conclusion ismade:

1. Joint DevelopmentMost considerations just set forth in the section

above are applicable here. In a way, however,there are fewer problems; the ultimate purposeof joint development being the deployment ofelements to be used jointly, there is less need forinvolved legal rules concerning mutual purchas-ing obligation, second source development, andso on. Nor does one have to be concerned aboutcompatibility of certain sub-elements with indi-vidual countries’ nationally developed launchvehicles and the like. (Unless of course some par-ticipants wish to be able to break the partnershipand go their own ways, but this would not be setas a primary objective of the arrangement.)

Needless to say, though, “rules of the game”are still indispensable, especially in three areas:

Settling the ownership of technology acquiredwhile carrying out the joint development, andtransfer of technology, where required, for ac-complishing the work;Assuming a dominant position of the UnitedStates in the undertaking, how much poten-tial leverage will be left to its partners in orderto give them a feeling of being able to protecttheir rights?Conversely, one has to retain for the UnitedStates the possibility to work out substitute ar-rangements, in the event that one or anotherof the partners defaults, so as to ensure theultimate integrity of the program,

2. Joint Operationjointly developed infrastructure can be used

jointly while being operated by a single coun-try—presumably the United States. joint opera-tion would, however, lend a more internationalflavor and help international participants to feelmore secure by giving them added leverage—


3.

with, of course, potential problems for the UnitedStates.

International involvement in operating the in-frastructure could range from very little (openinga few positions to foreign nationals on the groundcontrol team and possibly in the orbital crew, asa token gesture) to full-fledged internationaliza-tion of both ground team and crew. The latterwould imply including citizens of other countriesin various key positions in numbers proportionatewith the overall level of participation of theircountry in the program.

The latter case, even if likely to create prob-lems for the United States by the leverage andthe visibility it gives to its partners, might, how-ever, also pave the way towards solution of oneissue raised by this approach—the question of“equitable costs.” Assuming that the UnitedStates develops, say, 95 percent of a “space sta-tion” system, and that country X develops andbuilds 5 percent of it, it seems fair to reserve 5percent of the station’s effective working time forcountry X’s purposes. If, however, the UnitedStates is alone in bearing all the maintenance andoperating costs, X cannot enjoy its 5 percent“space station time” free of charge. Some equi-table reimbursement scheme has to be devisedfor maintenance and operating costs incurred bythe United States—a scheme that would resolveattendant problems of fair and accurate account-ing, opening U.S. accounts to X’s comptrollers,devising rules for taking into account all the fringebenefits built in the system (like the replenish-ment of propellant tanks with unused fuel fromthe Shuttle, and so on). However, if country Xactually carries out 5 percent of the maintenanceand operations in kind, it may be possible to endup wi th an a lmost no-exchange-of - fundssituation.Joint Utilization

The problem here is that there will be not onlyutilization in common for common purposes, butalso an individual participant’s use of the infra-structure for its own benefit, including commer-cially competitive types of usages.

International partners will want to be providedwith adequate safeguards to protect their legiti-mate rights. This, in turn, raises the question ofwhat are “legitimate rights.” An effort should bemade to define this concept as precisely as possi-ble. Listed below are what appear to be majorissues involved:— Is thereto be unrestricted use of a given frac-

tion of the “space station’s” effective work

time, for the user’s own benefit, for whateverpurposes, provided it complies with interna-tional law and a preset series of explicit rules?These rules must not be open to unilateral in-terpretation. Sensitive aspects, such as safetyand national security requirements, must beexhaustively and accurately dealt with in ad-vance, so as not to allow, later on, the impres-sion of arbitrarily imposed requirements.This right-to-use may not necessarily be freeof charge, but if a price has to be charged forit, it must be equitable (no preference with re-spect to the U.S. Government or private users,no hidden overheads, etc.). As stated above,the ideal situation would probably be onewhere very little or no exchange of funds oc-curs. The setting of utilization priorities isequally important in this connection; the pre-sent NASA-DOD arrangement for giving abso-lute priority to national security payloads inShuttle manifesting would not be likely to gen-erate much international enthusiasm if it wereparalleled.Cancellation clauses must be very explicit andprovide for adequate prior warning and com-pensation; unilateral recanting should not beallowed. Needless to say, the purpose of suchclauses would not be limited to protection ofU.S. partners; the latter would have to consentas a counterpart to a perdurable involvementsystem, in order to allow not only for the in-frastructure’s initial deployment, but also forthe continuous evolution and growth whichis going to be one of its main features.

There seems to be no reason why all the above-mentioned issues could not be settled in the terms ofa cooperative agreement among the United States andits partners. Legal terms, however, would probably notbe sufficient to enable all parties to the undertakingto feel safe and secure: safeguards embedded in thevery fabric of the joint effort, providing mutual le-verage and affording room for the inevitable compro-mises, may have to be accepted.

On the surface at least, such a situation might ap-pear unbalanced in the eyes of the U.S. public andGovernment: the United States will probably be car-rying most of the burden of the joint undertaking, andwould seem required to provide to others guaranteesand safeguards and to accept dependence on themin excess of what would be commensurate with itspartners’ share of the burden. To most of these part-ners, however, being involved substantially in a U.S.“space station” program would mean forfeiting theirability to develop not only a similar, but even a re-


duced, capacity of their own, at least in the near term.Therefore, they will be staking the whole of their ini-tial asset commitment in the joint venture, whereasthe United States would always be in a position, withsome added funds and efforts, to make up for the fail-ure of one of its partners to keep the deal—a recoursethat, under the circumstances, would be more costlyto the partners.

From the U.S. point of view, of course, acceptinginternational participants in its “space station” pro-gram makes sense only if this apparent–and, to someextent, real—imbalance does not jeopardize funda-mental national interests. The more guarantees andsafeguards the United States can afford to offer to itspotential partners, the more those countries are likelyto participate substantially and to pay accordingly.This working out of mutual stakes in a common under-taking is likely to be a delicate and complicatedprocess,

Potential International Partners

Now that potential modes of cooperation have beendiscussed, the potential partners for the United Statesin a “space station” effort will be described in somedetail.

Advances in space technology over the last decadethroughout the world provide many prospective can-didates for bilateral or multilateral cooperation on aspace station project. One should, however, keep inmind that taking a meaningful share in a program ofsuch scope, cost and technical sophistication, will beno trivial undertaking for most of these candidates.What is meant by “meaningful share” depends, ofcourse, very much upon the circumstances. In a bi-lateral arrangement between the United States andanother country, the latter’s supplying less than 1 per-cent of the infrastructure’s value in hardware or com-monplace electronic components can hardly betermed meaningful. On the other hand, in the caseof a broad multilateral organization comprising manycountries, large and small, with shares ranging froma fraction of 1 percent to several 10s of percent, a par-ticipation similar in level and kind to what has justbeen described might well be meaningful to the par-ticipating country.

Another factor to be taken into account when con-sidering joint ventures in advanced technological de-velopments is, obviously, the relative level of indus-trial development of the participating countries.Countries with more or less comparable industrialbackgrounds, similar technical outlook and mutuallycompatible management practices will find it easierto pool their resources.

This description of potential international partnerswill focus first and foremost on those industrializedcountries which at present are displaying a certainamount of interest, or at any rate curiosity, toward“space stations.” This list includes Europe–as a wholethrough the European Space Agency and as exempli-fied by countries like France, the Federal Republic ofGermany and Italy–and Japan and Canada.

Among the industrialized countries, the SovietUnion also deserves some mention, though hardly asa likely participant in a U.S.-sponsored program. Rath-er, as a major space power already engaged in its ownprogram of developing, emplacing, and using in-spaceinfrastructure, the Soviet Union is a potential compet-itor to the United States in offering opportunities forinternational involvement in such activity.

Among the developing countries, some have ac-quired enough space technology capability to designand build indigenous satellites and launch vehicles(China, India), and others have ambitious plans to doso in the future (Brazil). These and others deservesome attention, especially as possible participants ina broad multilateral effort.

EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY

Although joint European endeavors in space dateback to the early 1960s, the present European SpaceAgency (ESA) was founded in May 1975. ESA was thesuccessor to two earlier organizations, the EuropeanLauncher Development Organization (ELDO) and theEuropean Space Research Organization (ESRO). It isof interest to recall briefly the history of these organi-zations, insofar as it sheds some light on U. S.-European relationships in space endeavors as well ason how international space organizations perform.

In 1960-1961 a number of European countries (Bel-gium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, andthe United Kingdom) became aware of the politicaland scientific benefits to be drawn from space activi-ties (awareness of potential economic benefitsemerged some years later). They understood also thata pooling of their resources and efforts was necessaryto compete with the United States and the U.S.S.R.i n at least certain key areas—leaving out the develop-ment of staffed capabilities in which the superpowerswere competing strongly for what appeared to be es-sentially national prestige reasons. These countriesalso recognized the importance of a comprehensiveprogram including satellite as well as launch vehicledevelopment.

ESRO was created to deal with satellite develop-ment, and it did so successfully. From 1967 to 1975,ESRO launched (with U.S.-built rockets) nine satellites,


conducted a large number of experiments in space,engaged in successful cooperative projects withNASA, and managed to have its mandate enlarged toencompass applications satellites. The organizationbuilt up a competent and well-organized executiveand technical staff which ran three technical fieldcenters and a network of tracking stations.

ELDO, meanwhile, kept running into trouble, al-though it had only one project to deal with, the de-velopment of Europa, a medium-size rocket, roughlyequivalent to the U.S.-built Atlas-Agena. Poor man-agement structure was the main source of trouble;ELDO had almost no authority of its own, but actedas a sort of coordinating agency for separate nationalprojects (a British first stage, a French second stage,a German third stage, Italian payload fairings, etc.).Additional problems arose from the fact that systemand subsystem development had to proceed in par-allel. The first stage was virtually completely devel-oped at the start of the program and suffered only oneminor failure in nine flights. Each of the remainingstages experienced failures on its first operational flightas an element of the complete vehicle: as a result,there was a string of six failures in which, in turn, eachmajor element became successful.

The program was further marred by a formidableescalation of costs, and, when its eleventh test flightended in failure at the end of 1971, it was finally can-celed after $700 million had been spent.

At about the same time, the United States had stim-ulated ELDO, ESRO, and their member states to con-sider whether Europe should build a major segmentof NASA’s proposed space transportation system (STS),then referred to as the “post-Apollo program.” By1972, agreement seemed to be within reach; the taskallocated to Europe was development of a “spacetug,” an advanced rocket-stage to be used to transferpayloads from the Shuttle’s low orbit to higher ones,including the commercially essential geostationary or-bit, The tug appeared to be a good candidate for coop-eration, insofar as it was indeed an important segmentof the STS—almost a key one—and because in devel-oping it, Europe could draw from its unhappy but ex-tensive experience in rocketry. Furthermore, it wouldenable Europeans to keep working and making pro-gress in what they felt was an essential area–i.e.,launch vehicle development.

In mid-1 972, however, the United States decidedto withdraw the space tug proposal, “partly becausethe entire post-Apollo program was being scaled back,because of doubts about European technical capabil-ities, and also because the Air Force thought the mili-

tary potential of the tug was too great to permit de-pendence on outside sources.”18-19

Also, during the same period, France and the Fed-eral Republic of Germany (FRG) were negotiating withthe United States for the launching of their jointly builtSymphonic telecommunications satellite, which thecancellation of the Europa project left without alaunch vehicle. The United States agreed initially tolaunch Symphonic, but required that the satellite bedeclared experimental rather than operational. TheUnited States thus complied with its policy of assistingwith launchings provided they were for peaceful pur-poses and in compliance with “relevant internationalarrangements.” This was a reference to the INTELSATAgreement which required signatories to avoid “sig-nificant economic harm” to the organization causedby regional competition, To France especially, andperhaps to a lesser degree to the FRG, these condi-tions were construed as an attempt by the UnitedStates (and other INTELSAT partners who shared inthis position) to keep them out of the expanding sat-ellite telecommunications business.

These events acted as catalysts in the setting up (in1973) of the principles which were to govern the fu-ture ESA as well as in the drafting of its program. Basedon unsatisfactory European experience in obtainingU.S. launch assurances, the French found excellentgrounds for advocating development of an autono-mous European launch capability, and succeeded inobtaining from its partners a 40-percent participationin the previously French-only program to develop theAriane launcher. The FRG, though disappointed bythe withdrawal of the tug proposal, neverthelesssought out European participation in the U.S. spacetransportation system through development of a “sor-tie laboratory,” later named Spacelab.

The United Kingdom agreed to go along with a“package deal” which was worked out in July 1973,whereby France funded 60 percent of Ariane, the FRGabout the same percentage of Spacelab, and the U.K.56 percent of a European maritime communicationssatellite, later called MARECS. Each of the three coun-tries also agreed to take a minor share of the twoothers’ favorite projects. With this “package deal” ac-cepted, the creation of ESA could proceed, and theagency began operation in May 1975. The stated ob-jectives of the ESA include:

IKivilian Space Policy and Applications (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress,Office of Technology Assessment OTA-STI-1 77, 1982), p. 363.

19A more detailed discussion of European involvement in NASA’S pOst-

Apollo efforts is provided below.

App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program • 191

— developing and implementing a long-term spacepolicy;

— carrying out space activities;— coordinating the European space program and

the space programs of its member states; and— developing and implementing an industrial poli-

cy appropriate for its programs.The agency, in addition to carrying out major but

optional projects such as Ariane and Spacelab, car-ries out a space science program planned on a 5-yearbasis. This science program and ESA’s operating budg-et call for mandatory financial contributions from itsmember states. Table C-1 lists the current distributionof such contributions for the ESA science program. I nconstant-dollar terms, the ESA budget for mandatoryprograms has remained virtually constant since the or-ganization’s inception.

ESA runs a comprehensive set of space programs.1.

2.

Communications Satellites-a broad and vigorousprogram, with several satellites in orbit (OTS, anexperimental spacecraft, and MARECS, leased toINMARSAT to provide operational maritime com-munications); with more to be launched (ECS-1and -2, for the purpose of setting up a regionalsatcom system); and with a large communicationssatellite (L-SAT) under development. The first L-SAT payload includes four different experiments,one of which is to test direct-to-the-home TVbroadcasting.Remote Sensing–as a contribution to a globalprogram set up under the auspices of the WorldMeteorological Organization, ESA launched twoMETEOSAT geostationary weather satellites sim-ilar to the U.S. GMS. The second of these satel-lites was carried in orbit by ESA’s own launcher(Ariane), and ESA’s member states have agreedto keep the METEOSAT system in operationalcondition for at least 10 years (by replacing thesatellites when they fail in orbit). The Agency also

Table C-1 .—ESA Science Budget

Percent contribution to ESA’sMember States science programBelgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.49Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.51France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.40Federal Republic

of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . 25.57Ireland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.54Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.46Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.00Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.04Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.25Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.99United Kingdom. . . . . . . . . . 13.75

3.

4.

has under development an advanced coastal andoceanic monitoring satellite (ERS-1) equippedwith a radar and other microwave instruments.Other remote-sensing activities are also underway(data reception and dissemination, Spacelab-borne high-resolution camera).Space Sciences-ESA has pursued ESRO’s tradi-tion of ambitious scientific satellite projects. Fourof these are presently operating successfully whileseveral more are in the development phase. Mostnotable is GIOITO, a spacecraft to fly by Halley’sComet in 1986. Science also is an area wherecooperation with NASA has been and is exten-sive; ESA is contributing several major subsystemson the Space Telescope. The two agencies alsohad a joint program called the International SolarPower Mission (ISPM). This was a rather sophis-ticated plan to send two spacecraft (one U.S.-builtand the other European-built) over the two polesof the Sun. In 1981, because of budget cutbacks,NASA chose to withdraw its spacecraft from thisenterprise, creating frustrations and resentmentnot only within the scientific community but alsowithin political circles in Europe. The ISPM hasgone ahead but now includes only a Europeanspacecraft launched by NASA. The impact of thiswithdrawal is discussed later in this appendix.Launch Vehicles–this is an area where the dualnature of ESA’s policy is best shown. On onehand, the Agency actively pursues its Arianeautonomous launcher program, aimed in part atcompeting commercially with U.S. launch vehi-cles; on the other hand, it is locked in, throughthe Spacelab program, to the use of the U.S. Shut-tle. Concerning Ariane, in spite of two setbacks(failure of one development flight out of four andof the first operational flight attempted late in1982), there were (as of July 1984) 7 successfullaunches out of 9 attempts, and it is definitely atechnical success. The more powerful Ariane 2,3, and 4 versions have already been approvedand funded by ESA. Commercial success also isexpected during the next several years as a re-sult of several external factors: delays in the Shut-tle development schedule, high cost of U.S. ex-pendable vehicles such as Delta or Atlas-Centaur(resulting, in turn, from low production volume),and an insufficient number of Shuttle flights. Aprivate corporation (Arianespace) has been estab-lished to finance and market Ariane through ac-tive salesmanship and promotion.

Spacelab was successfully launched aboard theShuttle in November 1983. Slippages in thelaunch schedule, cost overruns, and technical in-terface problems—which each party tended to at-


tribute to the other—have at times caused a cer-tain amount of strain between NASA and ESA,but probably nothing more than is to be expectedin such an ambitious cooperative effort.zo T h equestion remains, however, of the scope whichwill be given to Spacelab’s utilization, and of whois willing to pay for the exploitation of its capa-bilities. How this question is resolved will havean influence on European attitudes toward par-ticipation in a U.S. “space station” program.

5. Future Plans–These are still in the process of be-ing drawn up, but it is worthwhile to point outthat ESA has allocated funds not only to evaluatethose options which are natural follow-ons of pre-sent programs (like an advanced heavy versionof Ariane beyond the planned version 4) but alsoto study explicitly the prospects of “transatlan-tic” cooperation. Within the next 2 years, ESAmust decide which of the major options identifiedby its long-term space transportation plan tofollow: cooperation with the United States in de-veloping space infrastructure, and/or pursuingEuropean-only development of modern capabil-ities for space operations. The timing of U.S. andESA decisions on future programs is now com-patible, but will not remain so indefinitely.

ESA also has an active program of basic researchin materials processing, one of the most promisingcandidates for widescale applications aboard a “spacestation.” This research program is carried out at pres-ent on a variety of vehicles, among which Spacelabis prominent. ESA’s Council has already approved andfunded the development of another in-space infra-structure element for this purpose; a space “platform,”it is named EURECA (European Retrievable Carrier).

EURECA is designed to carry experiments that re-quire longer times on orbit than are available on theShuttle. It will include materials processing facilities(furnaces and the like), and will be launched and re-trieved by the Shuttle. Its design will provide enoughmaneuvering and power supply capability to sustaina prolonged (i.e., 6 months) orbital life of its own.These features give to EURECA all the appearancesof a “free-flyer” which could be tended by other,future infrastructure elements and actually make itlook like a first step toward ESA participation in a“space station.”

All of the above points clearly toward an ESA will-ingness to consider seriously the possibility of a Euro-pean participation in a space infrastructure program.

ZOMany modifications had to be made to Spacelab as a result of changes

in the Shuttle interface. This situation was somewhat reminiscent of the opera-tions of ELDO, for it arose, and inevitably so, from the parallel developmentof a system and one of its major subsystems.

Past history, however, also points strongly toward aEuropean tendency to balance its commitments care-fully between the acquisition of autonomous capabil-ities (as exemplified by Ariane) and the involvementwith U.S. projects (e.g., Spacelab).

To sum up, it appears that, notwithstanding its pol-icy of retaining capabilities of its own, especially inthose areas where commercial competition may takeplace, ESA is a likely candidate for a substantial coop-erative effort with NASA because:

a. ESA and its individual member-states have a

b.

c.

d.

In

longstanding tradition of cooperation withNASA.Although much smaller, total European space ex-penditures are commensurate with NASA’s(about one fourth). Given that the consolidatedgross national product (GNP) of ESA’s member-states is somewhat larger than the GNP of theUnited States, there seems to be room for a sub-stantial increase in these expenditures. However,present trends do not seem to point in thatdirection.The ESA Executive (headquarters and technicalcenters) is driven by internal motivations whichare somewhat similar to NASA’s, and ESA is striv-ing to define and get authorization for an ambi-tious long-range program which would give size,focus and purpose to its activity.Most member-states of ESA are at least willingto take a look at a possible U.S. offer to cooper-ate on a “space station,” and generally believethat the very scope of such a program makes itnecessary to approach it jointly in order toachieve a meaningful level of participation.spite of what has just been said, some major

member-states of the European Space Agency do notwant at the present juncture to preclude bilateral co-operation with the United States (if they deem it wor-thwhile and no satisfactory joint European arrange-ment with the United States can be devised.) Thesecountries appear at present to be France, the FRG, andItaly, which together account for over so percent ofESA’s resources. In any case, even though these coun-tries would be likely to end up participating in a U.S.space infrastructure program through ESA if such aprogram is instituted, they will assess their interestsand decide upon their course irrespective of the jointEuropean assessment, and it is therefore worthwhileto take a closer look at each one.

FRANCE

France has always aimed at being the “third spacepower” after the United States and the Soviet Union,and has indeed managed to build up the largest and

App. C—international lnvolvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program ● 193

most comprehensive space program in Europe and thethird-largest in the world. Budgetary appropriationsare an indication of this; in 1983 (approximate figures)France’s space expenses will be $545 million (as com-pared with the FRG’s $325 million, or Japan’s $450million). French ambitions date back to the de Gaulleera, and it was as early as 1966 that France orbitedits first satellite with a French-built rocket, a few daysbefore its second satellite was launched by NASA.Since then, the French program has substantiallyshifted its emphasis away from national prestige to-wards economic competitiveness, especially for ex-port purposes.

Therefore, while maintaining a fair-sized space sci-ence program, CNES (the French space agency) hasbeen active mostly in launch vehicle development(Ariane, under ESA’s supervision), communication sat-ellites construction (participation in joint Europeanprograms; national TELECOM 1 satellites to be laun-ched in 1984; a bilateral program with the FRG tolaunch direct TV broadcasting satellites in 1985), landremote-sensing systems (the first satellite of which,named SPOT 1, is to be launched in 1986 and willincorporate two high-resolution instruments andstereoscopic imaging capability), and a variety of otherprograms.

French industry, meanwhile, does not content itselfwith implementing national programs and its share ofEuropean ones, but also strives very hard to competefor space-related export sales. Ariane launch serviceshave been sold to several organizations or countries–including private firms in the United States—and com-munications satellites to ARABSAT (a consortium ofArab countries).

CNES also runs a research program to evaluate ma-terials processing applications, and has laid out plansand preliminary designs for a specialized automated“manufacturing-in-space system” named SOLARIS.This concept features a platform (without crew facil-ities) equipped with furnaces, adequate power supply,and other ancillary subsystems including a robot man-ipulator arm; a transfer and raw material supply stageto be launched by Ariane 4; and a ballistic reentry cap-sule to bring processed items back to Earth. An effortto promote interest in this concept among other ESAmember-states has not met with success up to now,perhaps because it was felt to be premature.

In sum, France’s space policy places a strong em-phasis on “autonomy” (on a European level at least,if not in the strictly national sense). This is due in partto a frame of mind inherited from the de Gaulle era,but now even more so to economic considerations;commercial competition requires that a country beable to play its own hand independently. Furthermore,

France and the FRG are now discussing plans for amilitary reconnaissance satellite: this makes autonomyall the more important to French decision makers.

Hence the staunch support (and high financial con-tribution) given to the Ariane program, and the care-fully balanced bilateral cooperation with many differ-ent countries: the United States, the FRG, Sweden,and the U.S.S.R. particularly. In ESA’s policymakingbodies, France has been and will probably remain inthe future one of the staunchest advocates of the dualapproach of balancing cooperation with the UnitedStates with an equally strong commitment to autono-mous capabilities.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Just like France and other members of ESA, the FRGconducts the largest share of its space efforts throughthat agency’s joint programs. In particular, the FRGgovernment strongly supported the Spacelab programat its inception in the early 1970s, and since then hasprovided more than 50 percent of its funding. The FRGalso provides the largest single contribution to ESA’sremote-sensing programs (METEOSAT, ERS), and landcommunications programs (OTS, ETS). More recently,when trying to shape ESA’s future programs, the FRGhas acted as a promoter of the EURECA project de-scribed earlier, while France was promoting Ariane 4.

The FRG, however, is also engaged in a number ofbilateral cooperative undertakings. Along with France,the FRG is developing TV-SAT, a direct televisionbroadcasting satellite: experience thus gained willenable its electronics and aerospace firms to competefor export sales in what is expected to become oneof the fastest growing markets, that of DBS (directbroadcasting satellites). Another important area ofbilateral endeavor is space science, not only with theUnited States (several FRG scientific satellites havebeen launched by the United States), but also withFrance, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Strong emphasis on materials science and process-ing is a characteristic feature of the FRG’s space pro-gram. This includes suborbital flights on soundingrockets, which provide a few minutes of “near zerogravity”; small payload packages to be carried by theShuttle (referred to by NASA as “Getaway Specials”)and of course utilization of Spacelab. The FRG hasconducted major experiments on the first Spacelabmission in 1983 (which was a joint U.S.-Europeanflight). It has also purchased and will manage a whollyFRG Spacelab mission called D-1, to be flown in Oc-tober 1985.

The FRG materials processing program is not purelyscientific in orientation. It aims at involving the indus-trial sector early in exploring potential applications of


space-processed metals, composite metals, crystals,and chemicals. This close association of governmentsupport with industry’s initiative seems to work well,all the more so because the FRG’s major aerospaceand electronics firms play a much larger role in initi-ating and funding research and development effortsthan do their counterparts in other Europeancountries.

Generally speaking, this fits in well with what ap-pears to be the overall goal of the FRG’s space poli-cy: to encourage its national aerospace industry, topromote scientific and industrial/technological re-search, and to rely on ESA’S programs to stay in theapplications business. The keyword seems to be“competition through technological capability” ratherthan “competition through nationally proven sys-tems.” (This latter could well be the French motto.)

All this supports the views expressed in many quar-ters that among ESA’s member-states the FRG is themost “transatlantic-rein ded,” and that its attitudetowards cooperative ventures with the United Statesis likely to be more positive than that of the French.There is no doubt that in ESA’s councils, and evenmore freely so when drafting its national program, theFRG would consider very seriously a possible invita-tion from the United States to participate in “spacestation” development. Also, the FRG has been lessoutspoken than France in its reactions to the frustra-tions which have resulted from some of the past U. S.-Europe joint ventures. But the frustrations were thereall the same, and like most of its European partners,the FRG will weigh closely the pros and cons of thepossible modes of cooperation.

ITALY

With a 1983 budget for space activities in the rangeof$150 million, of which slightly more than one-halfmakes up its contribution to ESA programs, Italy isclearly demonstrating a willingness to implement aspace policy of its own. The framing of such a policyseems to be hindered by lack of central coordinationamong the several interested government agencies:Defense, Communications, and the National ResearchCouncil (CNR). The last, however, seems to be in theprocess of taking the lead.

In 1979, CNR managed to secure government ap-proval for an overall plan calling for a sharp increasein funding; this has been partly implemented. Mostof the increase is to fund national programs, especiallyin the field of communications satellites: a systemnamed ITALSAT is being considered, as well as a di-rect broadcasting TV system. Meanwhile, Italy hasstrongly supported ESA’s experimental L-SAT program

and has taken a leading position in advanced com-munications technology (20-30 gigahertz) through theSIRIO-2 meteorological data dissemination satellite,which was destroyed in 1982 when the first Arianeoperational flight failed to achieve orbit.

Besides its marked interest in communications-re-lated space activities, Italy has undertaken severalbilateral cooperative ventures with NASA, particularlyin areas not covered by European programs. In thepast, these have included an imaginative conceptcalled San Marco, involving several launchings ofsmall scientific satellites by U.S.-made SCOUT rocketsfrom an off-shore platform located on the equator offthe coast of Kenya. More recently, Italy started devel-oping IRIS, a small booster stage for Shuttle payloads.Remote sensing is another theme for U.S.-Italian coop-eration, if only because Italy runs the main EuropeanLandsat data receiving station located at Fucino nearRome.

The latest scheme considered for a joint U.S.-Italianventure is worth mentioning because of its obviousrelation to in-space activities. It is the so called“tethered satellite” concept, in which a scientific sat-ellite is to be attached by a long umbilical cord to theShuttle or another infrastructure element in orbit. Italynow has a Memorandum of Understanding withNASA regarding this matter, and joint studies areunder way to develop the concept, Perhaps becauseof this, Italy up to now has been one of the most eagerof ESA’s member-states to participate in informal dis-cussions on U.S.-European cooperation in a “spacestation” development program.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

Although the United Kingdom initially showed lit-tle inclination to share in NASA’s “space station”aspirations, this situation has changed over the pastyear, with U.K. interest coming to focus on platforms.Great Britain is, after France and the FRG, the thirdlargest contributor to ESA’s budget, but the lion’s shareof its attention over the past several years has beengiven to satellite communications, within ESA as wellas nationally. As it happens, a “space station” hasbeen thought, until recently, to be of relatively littlevalue to satellite communications (except in the verylong term). Britain’s developing interest in long-termin-orbit infrastructure, coupled with its intention ofmaintaining its vigorous space science program (pur-sued both through ESA and bilaterally with NASA) andits rapidly growing interest in remote sensing, may sig-nal a move toward a more comprehensive and diver-sified space program.

App. C—lnternational Involvement in a Civilian “Space Station” Program . 195

OTHER ESA MEMBER-STATES

This paper has dwelt at some length on those mem-bers of ESA which deem it preferable to participatedirectly, as well as through ESA, in talks with NASAon “space station” matters, This does by no meansimply a lack of interest on other member countries’parts. However, it does make it more difficult to assesstheir positions with respect to possible U.S. overturessince those positions are not debated publicly.21 Onefact remains, however: all ESA’s members have en-trusted to the Agency a long-term program planningmandate, and have provided funds therefore. And thismandate explicitly encompasses consideration of“transatlantic” cooperation on a space station.

CANADA

There is a General Agreement on Cooperation bet-ween Canada and ESA, which makes Canadian par-ticipation in an ESA contribution to a space infrastruc-ture program at least a possibility. Its longstandingtradition of bilateral cooperation with the UnitedStates, however, prompts Canada, through its NationalResearch Council, to evaluate its interest in a “spacestation” independently.

Canada’s expenditures in space in 1983 were about$100 million. Apart from a pioneering effort to operatedomestic satellite communications systems (the ANIKspacecraft family built by Hughes) and a number ofjoint scientific projects with the United States, Can-ada’s major bilateral program with NASA is the de-velopment of the remote manipulator arm for theShuttle. In return for a NASA commitment to purchaseadditional arms from Toronto-based Spar AerospaceLtd., Canada has funded the $100 million develop-ment of the first flight unit, which has been success-fully tested on Shuttle flights. Manipulator systemscould be important features of space infrastructure andthus are candidates for Canadian contribution.

JAPAN

With the exception of bilateral cooperation with theUnited States, Japan has, to date, carried the burdenof its space activities alone.22 Fairly constant in the lastfew years, Japan’s space expenditures per annumamount to approximately $45O million, a budget near-ly one half the size of the European Space Agency’s.

ZIThe ~sitlon of the smaller states In ESA is somewhat simi far to that of

those in the European Economic Community. At the Economic Summit, thebig four European nations attend in their own right; the remaining six arerepresented by the President of the Commission.

Zz)apan may nw be expanding its sphere of space cooperation. it has re-cently opened a liaison office in Paris, for example.

Space development in Japan is executed under theleadership of the Space Activities Commission (SAC),an advisory organ to the Prime Minister. The main ex-ecutive agency is the National Space DevelopmentAgency (NASDA), established in 1969 to undertakethe development of applications satellites and relatedlaunch vehicles, and to conduct launching and track-ing operations. Another agency, the Institute of Spaceand Astronautical Science (ISAS), is in charge of scien-tific space programs carried out on balloons, soundingrockets, and satellites. ISAS builds its own family oflaunch vehicles and runs its own launch center at Kag-oshima, independently of NASDA’s launch facilitieswhich are located at Tanegashima.

Japan is the only country where large-scale spacescience and space applications programs are carriedout by two completely separate entities, reporting todifferent departments of government; while ISAS is an“independent national institute” under the Ministryof Education, NASDA reports to the Prime Minister’sOffice through the Science and Technology Agency.But NASDA also carries out programs on behalf of,and draws funds from, other ministries: Transport(meteorology), Posts and Telecommunications,

From 1970 to 1981, Japan successfully launched 21satellites, developed two families of launch vehicles,undertook the development of several more satellitesand of a third type of launcher, and readied a numberof experiments to be carried by the Shuttle andSpacelab. For the time being, this effort has beendirected exclusively towards meeting domestic needs(communications, remote sensing) and the acquisitionof technology and expertise through a wide range ofscientific and experimental programs. Consequently,there has been, to date, little effort by Japan to com-pete with other space powers in offering commercialservices abroad. (An exception is the sale of groundstations for setting up communications networks orremote-sensing data reception; in these areas, Japa-nese industry has captured a good share of the worldmarket.)

Until very recently, Japan has cooperated closelywith NASA as well as with U.S. industry. In the fieldof space science, there have been a number of scien-tific exchanges, and this will continue as Japan plansto use flight opportunities on the Shuttle and Spacelab.Many of Japan’s applications satellites, whether ex-perimental or operational, have been developed with-in the framework of joint ventures among Japaneseand U.S. companies. As far as launch vehicles are con-cerned, the “Mu” series of small launchers has beenan indigenous development from the start, but thelarger “N” family to be used to launch applicationssatellites has relied on technology transfers from theUnited States.

38-798 0 - 84 - 14 : QL 3


The first stage of the “N1” version is in effect a Thor-Delta first stage built under license, and the third stageis a U.S. (Thiokol) production. The improved “N2”version goes even further in this direction, as it alsoincludes a U.S. (Aerojet) second stage. All told, Japa-nese industry builds barely more than half of the “N2”vehicle. It should be pointed out that the U. S.-Japa-nese Agreement on Space Activities (signed in 1969)imposes restrictions on the use of these U.S. technol-ogies and hardware by curbing transfer to third parties.The new launcher design, named Hi-A (roughlyequivalent to ESA’s Ariane 1 ) will alter this situationsignificantly, for the second stage (which will burn ad-vanced liquid hydrogen/oxygen propellants) and thethird stage, as well as the guidance system, will be ofindigenous design and manufacture. When the H1 -Abecomes operational, Japan will be only one stepremoved from an autonomous launch capability,namely the development of a new first stage (for whichpreliminary designs have already been proposed).

In addition to the obvious desire to increase Japa-nese industry’s share of the construction of spacehardware, this trend towards autonomy could bebased on two grounds. First, there may be dissatisfac-tion with U.S.-supplied hardware; indeed, in 1979 and1980 two costly launch failures were traced to prob-able malfunction of U.S.-supplied subsystems, and inthe aftermath of these events it was decided to accel-erate indigenous development.23 Second, an autono-mous launch capability clearly would enable Japanto offer full-scale commercial services in space ap-placations. 24

Another aspect of Japan’s space policy is that littlehas been done to diversify its sources for technologyprocurement and partnerships beyond the UnitedStates. Regular consultations are held, for instance,with ESA, but amount to little beyond some coordi-nation or satellite tracking stations. France was ap-proached in the early 1970s and at several points lateron for possible cooperation on liquid hydrogen-fueledrocket engines, but to no avail; the parties did notreach even a conceptual definition of a cooperativeventure.

zqhe japane5e reaction to the recent failure of transponders on their di-

rect broadcast satdlite suggests that the drive toward self-sufficiency will probably be further intensified.q has ~n ~nt~ out that Japan’s launch capabilities are severely limited

by agreements with the fishing industry, whereby the Tanegashima launchcenter can be used only four months per year. But this restriction clearlywould not be sufficient to deter Japan frcwr its traditional policy of enteringthe world market after a technology has been mastered and tried out on do-mestic markets.

In May 1984, Japan announced a plan for its par-ticipation in the U.S. “space station” program. Theplan calls for Japan’s development of an experimentalmodule to carry out life science and materials scienceexperiments, to be performed by one Japanese work-er. The module will be connected with the U.S. in-frastructure. It will include a manipulator arm, exper-imental devices for studies related to pharmaceuticals,crystals, compound materials, and a self-sufficiencyfood system. The development expenses to be paidby Japan are estimated to be 200-300 billion yen [$0.9-1.4 billion (1984)].

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Some developing countries can operate in space ontheir own, as is exemplified by India and the People’sRepublic of China. Both countries have launched sev-eral satellites using indigenous launchers. Both coun-tries are engaged in efforts to use existing systems toacquire expertise in important applications areas likemeteorology, remote sensing, communications, andeducational broadcasting. Details of programs andtechnology are not always very well known outsideof these countries; most Western observers who havevisited space facilities in India and China have beenimpressed by their potential, if not always by theirpresent condition. In both countries, an adequate sub-stratum of advanced industries is missing—especiallyin the areas of electronic components, high-grade ma-terials, and chemicals—and strains are caused by con-flicting priorities and by lack of foreign exchange.Shortages of trained technicians add further difficul-ties, but the foundation has been laid for further activ-ities in space.

Other developing countries are striving to reach thestage already attained by China and India. A few yearsago, it seemed that Brazil was on the verge of gettinga comprehensive program started, including its ownsatellites and launchers, developed in part indige-nously and in part with foreign help. (France and theFRG had actually almost concluded agreements withBrazil to that effect.) Political developments, growingeconomic difficulties, and diplomatic pressures fromsome countries that were, perhaps, wary of Brazil’saccess to missile technology have lowered these pros-pects considerably. Although Brazil has not managedto become a builder of space systems, it is an activeuser of existing systems (INTELSAT for communica-tions, LANDSAT for remote sensing), and still plansto operate a satellite communications system of itsown, which would be procured abroad.

Utilization of space technology, in contrast to its de-velopment, is almost worldwide. In particular, morethan 100 participating countries are members in


INTELSAT, and each of them operates at least oneground station. In addition, there are more than halfa dozen LANDSAT and/or SPOT remote-sensing datareception stations i n existence or u rider constructionthroughout the so-called Third World .25

Are there potential partners in a joint “space sta-tion” venture to be found among these countries, es-pecially among those which have some sort of aero-space industry of their own? There is no basic reasonwhy the answer should be no, but it must be pointedout that:

— to some of these countries, cooperation with theUnited States would pose a tricky, if not insur-mountable, political challenge, unless the modeof cooperation approached a “genuinely inter-national” one;

— financial participation of these countries couldprobably not exceed a very small percentage ofthe total cost; and

— such a program exceeds by far the ambitions thatthese countries set at present for their endeavorsin space, and going along with it in an interna-tional context would not satisfy the fundamentalcraving for autonomy and self-assertion whichoften, to some extent, underlies their spacepolicies.

Concerning the second point, it might be arguedthat a large number of small percentages can amountto a sizable sum. To give one example: 82 out of 102signatures of INTELSAT own each less than 1 percentof the shares, but their combined participationamounts to more than 20 percent. As to the thirdpoint, a genuinely international structure could beacceptable to countries who see space activities as ameans of self-assertion; for, even if the system werebuilt and operated by industrialized countries, itwould at least be jointly owned/managed by all. Theseconsiderations all point to the same conclusions: a sig-nificant level of participation by developing countriesis unlikely to occur, except possibly within somebroad international framework and unless aggressivelypursued by the United States.

THE SOVIET UNION

Under present and foreseeable political circum-stances, the Soviet Union would be unlikely to par-ticipate in in a space venture initiated and led by theUnited States. Even the prospects of its participatingin a genuinely international system seem very remote.One need only remember that the Soviet Union, andthe other Eastern-bloc countries, have never joined

25Each of these stations usually serves several Countria.

the INTELSAT organization. These countries decidedinstead to create their own international satellite com-munications system, named INTERSPUTNIK; since thetwo systems have to be linked somehow, there areINTELSAT ground stations in the U. S. S. R., Cuba, andRomania, but these countries are users of and not par-ties to INTELSAT. It is true that the Soviet Union isparty to several international satellite systems, notablyINMARSAT (which is, roughly speaking, to maritimecommunications, what INTELSAT is to ground com-munications) and SARSAT-CORPAS (an experimentalsatellite assisted search and rescue system). But thesewere created in a context where the United States didnot play a dominant role.

However, it is not possible to discuss internationalprospects for international involvement in a “spacestation” without mentioning the Soviet Union, for thatcountry does operate its own in-space infrastructure:Sal yut-Soyuz-Progress .26 Furthermore, the SovietUnion has provided opportunities to several othercountries to have one or more of their citizens visitthis infrastructure.

The Soviets have never concealed their ultimate in-tention to have some of their people in spaceoperating permanent facilities there, and Salyut isclearly a major step towards that goal. The pace ofits future evolution is, however, open to conjecture.The Salyut-Soyuz-Progress infrastructure, as developedto date, does not exhibit all the features to whichNASA aspires for U.S. in-space infrastructure.

For instance, the Salyut’s crew can perform workonly inside the station, or, when spacewalking, onlyvery close to it, by remaining tethered. The Sovietsapparently have no such thing as manned maneuver-ing units, teleoperated maneuvering systems, and thelike. As a result, the crew cannot tend other space-craft which might co-orbit or rendezvous with theircomplex, in order to maintain, service, or repair them.This reflects adversely on all material processing re-search: Salyut, because of perturbations caused by

NThe name SALYUT designates a series of manned Ohitd laboratories,

launched and operated one at a time since 1971. The system presently ac-tive, SALYU1 7, is likely to stay several years in orbit, as did its predecessorSALYUT 6, both because of design improvements and because a fair amountof in-orbit maintenance can now be carried out by visiting crews. The space-craft, weighing about 40,000 Ibs, is launched unmanned, and later on rendez-vous with SOYUZ capsules carrying a crew of 2 or 3. SALYUT 6 and 7 havealso been visited by larger (30,000 Ibs) unmanned craft. The usual patternof activity is to send abroad first a “semi-permanent” crew of two for a dura-tion now exceeding 6 months. While this crew stays on board, visiting crewsof three join them (usually for a week). These visits alternate with unmannedresupply trips by PROGRESS. To date, the station has been left unoccupiedfor some time after the semipermanent crew has accomplished its long-dur-ation stay, after which the cycle starts again. For a more complete discus-sion, see the OTA Technical Memorandum Sa/yut: Soviet Steps Toward Per-manent Human Presence in Space, December 1982.


crew members’ movements and the lack of a free-fly-ing platform in its vicinity, does not provide the verylow level of residual “gravity” necessary for the im-plementation of finely tuned experiments.

In spite of this, and other present limitations, the Sal-yut has been used extensively for military and civil-ian activities. In the latter case, where some resultsare known, cosmonauts have performed useful workin life sciences, Earth observation, astronomy, mate-rials processing, and technology development. Fur-thermore, SaIyut has enabled the Soviet Union to gainthe prestige associated with having some of its peo-ple in orbit.

Cooperation with the Soviet Union in space is acomplex matter.27 Planning is difficult when futureplans are, by definition, to be kept secret. Communi-cation with authoritative Soviet representatives tendsto be scant, slow, and often “beside the point.” Stand-ards, methods and even terminology are very differentfrom those in use outside the Soviet Union. Conse-quently, project managers and teams from these coun-tries who have been involved in bilateral programswith the U.S.S.R. have usually experienced great dif-ficulties in keeping cost and schedule under control.However, Soviet teams have proven their ability tobe flexible and imaginative when they feel the needfor it. For example, West German scientists whose in-struments are to be flown on the upcoming SovietVEGA mission to Halley’s Comet have found the co-operative arrangements quite satisfactory.

Whatever the difficulties inherent in internationalcooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space activities, thereare countries which have no other choice, and thereare countries which find advantage in balancing coop-eration with the United States with joint ventures withthe Soviet Union. It seems unlikely, however, thatthese latter countries would go so far as to bypass co-operation with the United States on a “space station”by exclusive recourse to analogous Soviet flight op-portunities.

Factors Influencing Assessmentof International Involvement inU.S. “Space Station” Program

PAST EXPERIENCE

Both the United States and its potential partners willhave a substantial historical record in mind when itcomes time to decide whether, and how, to proceedin a cooperative “space station” endeavor.

The debate over European participation in NASA’spost-Apollo program is by far the most important pastexperience, since it was the only time that the UnitedStates invited its major allies–Europe, Canada, Aus-tralia, and Japan—to participate in an effort which wasat the core of NASA’s plans for the future. While therehad been significant scientific cooperation prior to1969, particularly with Europe, there was a deliberatedecision as NASA’s post-Apollo efforts were beingplanned in 1969 and 1970 to make international in-volvement in those efforts, particularly of U.S. allies,a major theme.

Armed with what he thought was a mandate fromPresident Richard Nixon to seek such involvement,NASA Administrator Thomas Paine toured Europe andthe Far East inviting other countries to considersubstantial involvement in the emerging U.S. post-Apollo plans, which at the time included a “space sta-tion,” Shuttle, reusable orbital transfer vehicle (“spacetug”), and, ultimately, having people visit Mars. Euro-pean nations, through ELDO and ESRO, were particu-larly responsive to Paine’s initiative, and began tostudy in some detail various forms of participation; nei-ther Japan nor Australia made an active response tothe U.S. initiative.

A pr imary NASA object ive in in i t ia t ing thepost-Apollo dialogue was “to stimulate Europeans torethink their present limited space objectives, to helpthem avoid wasting resources on obsolescent devel-opments, and eventually to establish more consider-able prospects for future international collaborationon major space projects. ”28 In particular, NASA waseager to steer Europe away from developing an auton-omous launch capability. Plans for an expendableEuropean launcher were the “obsolescent develop-ments” to which Paine was referring.

At the time NASA was offering to involve othercountries in an ambitious post-Apollo enterprise; it didnot have White House or congressional approval forthe programs it was promoting overseas. Indeed, onetactic NASA may have been using to gain program ap-proval at home was to point out the problems involvedin withdrawing from incipient agreements with Eur-ope to cooperate in those programs. Potential U.S.partners were aware of the NASA approach; in Sep-tember 1970, for example, “American space officialswere asked for assurance that, if West European na-tions scrapped their space programs in favor of a jointeffort with the United States, the latter would not, inan economy move, back down. ”29

ZTU ,s, /u .s, s, R. Coowation in space will be examined by OTA in detail

in a technical memorandum to be published late In 1984.

ZBLetter from Thomas Paine, NASA Administrator, to the President, NOV.

7, 1969.ZqNew York Times, Sept. 24, 1970, P. 64.


By 1971, only the Shuttle and orbital transfer vehi-cle remained as part of NASA’s post-Apollo plans; the“space station” had been shelved for the indefinitefuture. NASA was suggesting to Europe that its partic-ipation involve developing some portion of the air-frame of the Shuttle orbiter and total responsibility fordeveloping the space tug. However, others within theExecutive Branch were skeptical that Europe had thetechnical capability to develop the tug on its own, andwere concerned that the United States might, in theprocess of assisting Europe in the tug development,transfer sensitive and/or economically valuable U.S.technology.

Throughout 1970 and 1971, negotiations on Euro-pean involvement in post-Apollo development effortswere Iinked to a European request for U.S. assurancethat it would launch European communication satel-lites. The United States had for some time resisted pro-viding such assurances on terms acceptable to Eur-ope because of its own economic interests, bothINTELSAT and in U.S. industry’s domination of themarket for communications satellites, but i n Septem-ber 1971 a compromise on the issue acceptable toboth sides was reached and this obstacle to the post-Apollo negotiations was removed.

President Nixon approved development of the Shut-tle on January 5, 1972. Shortly afterwards, a jointNASA/European “experts group” met and reportedthat “NASA . . . continued to encourage Europeanparticipation in development and use of the post-Apollo program. . . . NASA’s expectation [was] thatEuropean participation in development of the Shut-tle would be within the context of a broader programwhich included multilateral European responsibilityfor development of a major element such as reusablespace tugs . . , or Shuttle-borne orbital laborator-ies . . , .“3°

The suggestion that there was an alternative to Euro-pean development of the space tug had emerged with-in the United States during 1971; the so-called “sor-tie can” laboratory (also called a research andapplications module) was seen as clearly within Euro-pean capabilities, offering no risks of unwanted tech-nology transfer, having no military implications, andproviding clean technical and managerial interfaceswith development of the Shuttle orbiter itself. On theother hand, two factors militated against Europe’s de-veloping the tug: 1 ) recognition that the Shuttle andits associated orbital transfer vehicle would be usedby the United States for military, as well as civilian,purposes, and 2) NASA’s concern over housing the

JONASA press Release, Feb. 11, 1972.

tug, with its planned cryogenic fuel, in the Shuttlepayload bay.

In June 1972, the United States withdrew (withoutwarning) the option of Europe’s participation beingdevelopment of the tug, and told Europe that the onlychoice left for substantial participation was develop-ment of the sortie laboratory. Europe was also ex-cluded from direct involvement in developing any ele-ment of the Shuttle orbiter itself. This decision cameas a blow to Europe, which had already spent substan-tial sums both on tug development and, particularlyin the United Kingdom and Italy, on orbiter designwork in collaboration with U.S. industry. In terms ofstimulus to European technical and industrial capa-bility and eventual sales potential, Europe viewed thesortie laboratory as a distinctly less desirable option.

Nevertheless, Europe (and in particular the FRG)found the opportunity to become involved with theU.S. mainstream program for the 1970s attractiveenough that it continued negotiations in a situationwhere the United States was clearly playing a domi-nant role. After a further year of negotiations, in mid-1973 Europe agreed to proceed with development ofthe sortie laboratory (by now named Spacelab) as partof a “package deal” which also included developmentof a French launcher (which became the Ariane proj-ect) and of an experimental maritime communicationssatellite and which called for the creation of a singleEuropean Space Agency to carry out these projects.It was the difference in cost between the expensivetug development program and the less expensive (atthe time) Spacelab program which freed up the fun-ding needed to initiate joint European support ofAriane.

The Memorandum of Understanding which gov-erned NASA/European cooperation on Spacelab wassigned in September 1973.31 At the time of the U. S.-European agreement on Spacelab development, it wasanticipated that the facility would be used extensivelyin conjunction with the Shuttle and that the UnitedStates would buy several Spacelabs beyond the oneengineering model and one flight model which Eur-ope agreed to develop and build at its own cost andthen to deliver to NASA. This has not yet happened.

31 The Mou b~ween NASA and E’jA was a subo~l “ate document ~hlch

drew its authority from the Intergowxnmental Agreement between the UnitedStates on the one hand and each of the individual governments of the ESROMember States on the other. This Agreement was thus binding on the wholeof the U.S. Government not just on NASA. Although ratified by the parlia-ments of several ESRO countries, it was not submitted to the U.S. Senatefor ratification. As a consequence, its status was that of an “InternationalExecutive Agreement” and, as such, subordinate to U.S. domestic law. Thispoint, which the ESRO states did not appreciate at the time, became impor-tant in 1979 in connection with a U.S. Air Force plan (later cancelled) todevelop a system similar to Spacelab.


The costs of both Shuttle and Spacelab utilization haveescalated to the point where extensive utilization ofthe full Spacelab capabilities is questionable, and theUnited States has bought only the minimum single ad-ditional Spacelab to which it was committed.

The Europeans knew that, under the circumstances,they would have to accept the status of a junior part-ner. Now that they have demonstrated their compe-tence, they will look to agreements on a much moreequitable basis as Europe considers cooperation withthe United States in “space station” development. Forexample, the current head of CNES has questionedwhether Spacelab has “fulfilled German expectations”(the FRG was the major European advocate of the pro-gram) and has suggested that “there is some questionas to whether Spacelab . . . is really appreciated bythe U.S. . . . In any event, Europe does not really feelat home in Spacelab, whose operation is now out ofEuropean hands.”32

European acceptance of what some now perceiveto be unfavorable terms in the Spacelab agreementstemmed in large part from lack of confidence in Euro-pean capabilities and from a belief that only throughcooperation with the United States could those capa-bilities be improved. Now, having brought bothSpacelab and Ariane to success, Europe has muchmore confidence in its ability to chart its own futurein space and it is likely to be a more demanding par-ticipant in negotiations with the United States overcooperative ventures.

European confidence in the United States as a coop-erative partner was shaken in the spring of 1981 whenthe United States announced, without prior consulta-tion with its European partners, that it was cancelinga U.S. spacecraft which was part of a two-spacecraftInternational Solar Polar Mission (ISPM).33 This with-drawal caused vigorous protests from not only Euro-pean space officials but also representatives of foreignministries.34 There is general agreement that the ISPMaffair was not handled well by the United States.35 Al-though both the United States and Europe have man-aged to put ISPM in perspective, European officialsare not beyond using U.S. remorse over the incident

‘zHerbert Curien, “The Pride of France: a National Commitment, ” Spec-trum, September 1983, p. 75.

JJlndeed, European confidence had been shaken earlier when the United

States cancel led its share in the AEROSAT program, In this instance, the U.S.withdrawal was total, and the program was stopped.

3zFor a runn i ng account of the International Solar Polar Mission COfItrOVerSy,see articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mar, 2, Mar. 30, Aug.3, Sept. 28, and Dec. 28, 1981.

JSlt is ~rhaps ~rth noting that the situation was aggravated because NASA

was not permitted to consult or even warn ESA of the impending cancella-tion until the President’s budget had been delivered to the Congress.

as a bargaining chip in U.S.-European negotiations onfuture collaboration. For a time, though, it seemed asif “aberrations such as the unilateral pullout by theUnited States” from the ISPM could “set back pro-gress for years.”36 It is perhaps an indication of thebasically favorable climate for U.S.-European collab-oration in space activities that the ISPM incident andthe Spacelab experience are viewed as lessons of whatis to be avoided in future negotiations rather thanreasons for not cooperating in the future.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Military and national intelligence space activitiesprovide the United States and its allies with major na-tional security advantages, and all indications pointtowards reliance on them in the future. A major pro-gram like the “space station” is therefore bound tohave national security implications. If a decision ismade to develop a single set of infrastructure elementsto satisfy all interests, civilian and military, then theprospect of international involvement in such a pro-gram raises critical questions. This is all the more truesince new security implications may emerge as theprogram matures. If the future unveils unforeseen po-tentialities, international participation in the programmay inhibit, perhaps even prevent. the United Statesfrom taking full advantage of them.

To an extent, major international involvement willobviously restrict U.S. freedom of choice in the future:it would be more difficult, for instance, for the UnitedStates to preserve the option of integrating all its ef-forts in space (military as well as civilian) and havinga single Government agency responsible for them(though the U.S. Army and its Corps of Engineers mayexemplify a possible approach). Such a drastic stephas been debated and rejected in the past, but, in prin-ciple, it remains an option which international par-ticipation might foreclose. Conversely, any form ofU.S. military activity would raise major problems forESA as a partner, since the ESA charter precludes anyinvolvement in military projectso

37

A more likely future, however, is that any nationalsecurity uses would rely on elements operationallyseparate from the civilian one, but built with similaror identical technology and perhaps making joint useof basic utilities. Dependence of any military seg-ment(s) on parts and/or subsystems procured from for-eign sources could ensue, This is a situation which will

36Noel Hinners, “Space Science and Humanistic Concerns,” in Jerry Greyand Lawrence Levy, eds., Global Implications of Space Activities (AmericanInstitute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1982), p. 43.

‘Three of ESA’S members (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland) are neutralcountries.


never please the military (which, like France, prefers“autonomy”), but which can probably be met withadequate licensing arrangements (e.g., those underwhich the A V-8 Harrier aircraft was produced). Forinstance, if the U.S. military were to envision usingelements of any civilian space infrastructure undersuch circumstances, a foreign supplier could be re-quired to entrust a U.S. official agency with all draw-ings and documents needed to transfer the manufac-turing of the item under consideration to a U.S.supplier if such a course eventually proved to be nec-essary. An intergovernmental arrangement would spe-cify those situations where the U.S. agency is author-ized to implement the transfer to a national supplier,so as to protect the foreign firm’s commercial inter-ests in all other cases.

Such a device works best when the back-up sup-plier in the U.S. is pre-identified, so that a minimumamount of transfer of know-how, consistent with thepreservation of the foreign source’s interests, can becarried out in advance, thus shortening the inevita-ble lead time inherent in a manufacturing restart. Ofcourse, there is always the possibility that the U.S. mil-itary could procure systems directly from non-U. S.suppliers; this has happened for a few military systemsin the past.

Another security-related consequence of interna-tional participation could be that foreign participantswould be exposed to the operating characteristics ofthe technology used by U.S. national security agen-cies. This could involve those parts or subsystems pro-vided by foreign sources, and can be assessed onlyon a case-by-case basis. But the matter could extendbeyond foreign-supplied hardware, since foreign par-ticipants will of necessity have access to a certain levelof technological detail, especially those interfacingwith what they supply. This, however, is not neces-sarily critical: in a similar instance, the Shuttle, al-though it can be used to carry on U.S. national secu-rity activities, is itself not a classified item. However,many aspects of Shuttle operations, such as access tothe Orbiter itself, are carried out under strict security,and the military has developed separate control facil-ities for its use of the Shuttle.

Similarly, as the presumed leader in a space infra-structure program, the United States is bound to bei n a dominant position regarding transfer of sensitivetechnology and industrial information. As was the casewith Spacelab, all data and drawings pertaining to anyforeign contribution would have to be made availableto the United States in order to allow operation, main-tenance, and repairs to be carried out. The UnitedStates, on the other hand, would have to provide onlyessential interface data to its partners. Such considera-

tions, therefore, should not discourage the UnitedStates from seeking foreign participation, if it sodesires.

Perhaps more important to national security con-siderations are the restrictions which might be im-posed on certain national security uses of internation-ally developed infrastructure. While some, perhapsmany, potential international partners might not op-pose so-called “peaceful” military applications (e.g.,military R&D, or activities in support areas such ascommunications, navigation, surveillance), some ofthem are unlikely to agree to the installation of any“battle station” on an element derived from a devel-opment program to which they are party. There isclearly no way to bypass such an issue: it would ofnecessity have to be settled beforehand, as explicitlyas possible, in the agreement instituting the interna-tional program.

A last issue relating to national security considera-tions is that of the transfer of technology from theUnited States to foreign participants, or vice versa.There are generally two ways in which such technol-ogy

1.

2.

transfers occur: “In the course of an international developmentprogram, a certain amount of know-how is inevi-tably transferred among the parties to the project.This is more in the nature of general knowledge(management, organizational methodology andprocedures) than of specific technological skills.The character of technical interaction betweenNASA and ESA in conjunction with Spacelab,even though it includes some technical assistanceprovided by NASA, is evidence of this.If a foreign participant in charge of a given sub-system were to appear unable; at a late stage ofthe program, to produce a product conformingto required performance standards, it then wouldbecome necessary to assist the concerned partyin meeting the specifications, a process whichmight involve the transfer of valuable and sensi-tive know-how. This can only be assessed on acase-by-case basis, but a number of safeguardscan be built into the program at the start. Thesewould include careful selection of subsystems en-trusted to foreign participants and provision formidcourse assessment of performance. Ofcourse, the reverse possibility now exists as well:that the United States could gain access to valu-ab le technolog ica l know-how f rom othercountries.

POTENTIAL PRIVATE-SECTOR INVOLVEMENT

In principle, private business and internationalcooperation are perfectly compatible; successful


“multinationals” are proof of this. It is true that untilrecently there were no multinational firms involvedin space developments (unless INTELSAT is seen asa business). Actually, space activities in practically allcountries constitute an area where governmental set-ting of policy, financing, and implementation of pro-grams are the rule, although the private sector can beexpected to play an increasingly important role in fu-ture space activities.

There is a clear trend towards increased private-sec-tor involvement in those applications of space ex-pected to generate profit, and the matter of “spacecommercialization” is now being actively debated inthe United States. In Europe, precedents have beenset with firms like ARIANESPACE (for the sale of launchservices) and SPOT-IMAGE (for the commercial ex-ploitation of the French SPOT Earth-resources-sensingsatellite). In Japan, space programs rely on close gov-ernment-industry interaction.

Hence, if it appears that activities conducted usingspace infrastructure can be economically profitable,the fact that it was developed internationally shouldnot present an insurmountable obstacle to private-sec-tor involvement in its use. However, all other thingsbeing equal, it is likely that U.S. industry would pre-fer to deal with infrastructure owned and operated byU.S. interests, Government or private.

THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL APPLICATIONS

The greater the prospects of commercial use ofspace infrastructure, the better the prospects for re-turns from investments made to develop it. The eco-nomic prospects can only gain from its large and wide-encompassing utilization. Such utilization, includingforeign users, may exist even if the United States de-velops all or nearly all of the infrastructure. Manyforeign customers would be attracted to any oppor-tunities provided by its use. The extent of commer-cialization would then depend mainly on the condi-tions set by the owner(s) and operator(s): first andforemost, pricing policy, but also any commercial re-strictions (e.g., will the infrastructure be made avail-able to foreign firms competing directly with U.S. firmsin a given field of application?) and technical factors(e.g., such stringent safety requirements that disclosureof proprietary knowledge would have to be made bythe user). However, NASA’s experience with accom-modating commercial interests (including R&D efforts)on the Shuttle, through such mechanisms as Joint En-deavor Agreements and trips purchased in whole orin part by commercial interests under proprietary con-ditions, provides precedents which suggest that evenU.S.-only elements could accommodate non-U.S.commercial users successfully.

It appears likely that international involvement inspace infrastructure development, operation, andownership would enhance the prospects for an eco-nomically efficient and broadly based utilization pro-gram. Common interest in its future capabilities anduse will stimulate creativity and innovation among amuch wider international community of potential us-ers, including non-profit-seeking ones (governmentalagencies, research institutions and the like). Also, anycompetition from the Soviet Union will be lessenedif spacefaring countries feel secure in their participa-tion in a U.S./international complex.

THE TECHNICAL ADEQUACY OF POTENTIALFOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

What components of space infrastructure wouldeach of the potential partners reviewed earlier be mostlikely to contribute by virtue of the current tenden-cies of its own programs, of the existence of techno-logical domains where its industry is known to excel,or of other factors? Answers to this question are im-portant. For if any foreign partners enter such a coop-erative effort, the United States must ensure that theirtechnical contributions are feasible, compatible, andcomplementary. Or, from another perspective: towhat extent would the desired infrastructure have tobe modified in order to accommodate contributionsby a given set of participants?

It is impossible now to suggest more than a few gen-eralities, inasmuch as NASA has not yet specified whatthe overall performance specifications are going to be.

Too, the level of technical sophistication for a givensubsystem cannot yet be articulated. As just one ex-ample, consider electric power conditioning and dis-tribution. On all spacecraft developed until now, elec-tric power is distributed at low voltage, and allspacefaring countries possess the relevant technology.Many experts, however, judge that, for long-term in-space infrastructure, this technology should be sup-planted by an alternative, high-voltage technology. Inanticipation of just such a development, ESA andNASA have been discussing for some time the gener-ation of a set of standards to be employed in space-craft high-voltage power systems; but the matter is stilloutstanding,

Lastly, potential participants may wish to make theircontribution, not in the areas where their industry isbest endowed with existing capabilities, but rather inareas where they want it to acquire new capabilities.Nothing should prevent them from doing so if theyare ready to commit themselves to meet the costs ofsuch new and (to them) risky developments. This mat-ter could become “sticky,” however, if they were towish to make a “key” contribution in such an area,


Thus, no useful projection of task allocation can bemade now. Perhaps the division of work will have tobe negotiated on a case-by-case basis, before the pro-gram actually starts, but after its shape and definitionhave been outlined in more detail. Some countries arealready suggesting ways in which they might preferto contribute, and it would be wise for the UnitedStates to give careful consideration to including pro-spective partners in the infrastructure design phase insome sensible fashion.

Assessment: Pros and Consof International Involvement

A “U.S. ONLY” PROGRAM

At first glance, since almost certainly the UnitedStates is likely to bear the largest part of the financialburden of a “space station” development program,and since international cooperation is fraught withmany well-known difficulties, it would seem that therewould be much merit in the prospect of an independ-ent, strictly U. S., undertaking. In addition, many ofthe reasons which have led the United States to con-sider a “space station” program in the first place—national pride and a sense of accomplishment, nation-al prestige, national security, or supporting U.S. firmsin commercial space activities—might best be servedby a program carried out under exclusive U.S. control.

Similarly, it could be argued that potential interna-tional partners might find it to their advantage to beleft to their own devices in planning and implement-ing their respective space programs, rather than hav-ing to weigh the pros and cons of associating them-selves with what will in essence be an Americanprogram, unlikely to be perfectly suited to their goalsand/or technical and financial resources and likely tolimit their ability to pursue independent actions.

The arguments in favor of a strictly national U.S. pro-gram can be summarized as follows:

1, There is no substantial reason why the UnitedStates would not be able to go it alone: the coun-try has all the technical and industrial resourcesnecessary.

2. Generating and maintaining international inter-

38

est in a “space station” program and enlistingparticipants is in itself a difficult process, leadingto many concessions on the part of the UnitedStates and other participating countries, the re-turn from which could be rather disappointing.Participation of Europe in major U.S. spaceundertakings, such as the Space TransportationSystem or the Space Telescope, seems always tostay in the 10 to 15 percent range, which is con-sistent with European space budgets. Even if one

798 0 - 84 - ] 5 , QL 3

3.

4.

other major partner, say Japan, joins the “spacestation” program at a similar level, this still leavesthe U.S. to bear 60 to 70 percent of the expense.International cooperative programs, especiallywhere advanced technology is concerned, havethe reputation of being beleaguered by complexdiplomatic and managerial interfaces, as well asby difficult compromises needed to tailor theoverall undertaking to each participant’s particu-lar requirements.Past experience points to the fact that the U.S.civilian space pro-gram is difficult enough to coor-dinate with the U.S. national security program ona purely national basis. This could be even moredifficult in the case of an international “space sta-tion” program.

These considerations must however be carefullyweighed against a number of arguments in favor ofinternational involvement:

As stated repeatedly, international cooperationis a long-standing tradition in civilian space pro-grams, and pursuing it has had a very positive po-litical impact. Traditional partners of the UnitedStates in the industrialized world consistently listcooperation with this country among the objec-tives of their space policy statements; for exam-ple, the head of the French space program, whoalso chairs the ESA Council and the European Sci-ence Foundation, has recently noted that “coop-eration with the United States is of fundamentalimportance. ”38 The United States has given astrong impression already that it anticipates sig-nificant international utilization of a “space sta-tion” and that, in order to assure such utilization,it wilI be receptive to foreign participation i n thedevelopment phase of the program. A decisionto forego such participation would certainly havemajor (though probably not yet very major) po-litical costs.

2. As discussed earlier, if the United States choosesto go ahead alone with its space infrastructure ac-quisition program, several countries or groups ofcountries among the industrialized Western-typedemocracies are likely to follow suit, even if ona smaller scale and after some time. Such duplica-tion of efforts might well result in a net loss tothe Western world. The very cost of these invest-ments is bound to generate an extremely harshlevel of competition for their commercial utiliza-tion, to the point where it may not be economi-cally sound any more and the benefits of space

~acurlen, op. Cit., P. 76


commercialization could be lost or significantlydelayed.

3. Even if the prospects that Europe and Japan mayassociate in a joint “space station” program with-out the United States seem remote, there is nodoubt that this possibility becomes more likelyif the United States chooses to go it alone. Asargued earlier, there are virtually no cir-cumstances in which Europe or Japan wouldrefuse a U.S. offer of involvement in the “spacestation, ” and thus it is up to the United States todecide whether to make that offer.

As argued earlier and briefly again above, a likelyimpact of U.S. decision to proceed alone would bethe eventual development by other space-orientedcountries of capabilities which will be, at least in part,similar to those offered by a U.S. “space station.” Thiscould result in increased downstream economic com-petition between the United States and other indus-trial countries in commercial exploitation of space. Byinvolving potential competitors in the U.S. ‘program,this situation might be avoided or minimized. Thereis a certain parallel with the situation regarding Euro-pean involvement in U.S. post-Apollo activities. Bywithdrawing the offer of European development of aspace tug (with an estimated cost to Europe of $500million—$1 billion) and substituting the Spacelab (thenestimated to cost $100 million-$200 million), theUnited States made possible a European financialcommitment to develop its own launcher, which isnow competing with the Shuttle for launch contracts.The United States needs to evaluate carefully whetherit wants to create a similar situation as its “space sta-tion” program begins.

As mentioned earlier in this paper, from the U.S.perspective international involvement is an option, nota requirement. However, not only are there strongreasons for the United States to pursue this option,but, at least from NASA’s perspective, internationaliz-ing the “space station” program to some meaningfuldegree eventually may bean important means of ga-thering political support in this country for the sizeand kind of program that it wishes to have. If the na-tionalistic objectives which might be served by NASA’spresent “space station” program aspirations are notsufficient to gain White House and congressional sup-port of a “go it alone” approach, then an approachmixing nationalistic and cooperative elements seemsessential to mobilize political support for it.

AN INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM

This approach to space infrastructure development,operation, and use would be preferred by the UnitedStates and/or other space-capable countries only if it

was the best available means of maximizing all of thenational objectives which have led to beginning theprogram in the first place. As mentioned earlier, theINTELSAT and INMARSAT analogy is rather mislead-ing here. The objectives of those systems are inher-ently international in character and could not be suc-cessfully pursued without broad internationalparticipation, while space infrastructure can be devel-oped and operated as a purely national enterprise.

Even the parallel to ESA is somewhat artificial: Euro-pean countries created ESA because such a joint en-deavor was the only way that they could marshal theresources required to carry out a comprehensivespace program, albeit on a regional rather than a na-tional basis. The United States, should it chose to doso, has the resources required for unilateral “spacestation” development.

A decision to create an international acquisition ar-rangement is highly unlikely, given the specific char-acter of the support mobilized behind the “space sta-tion” concept in the United States, Europe and Japanto date. One fundamental motivation which couldlead to such a decision–that it was the only way tomobil ize the needed financial or technical re-sources—is missing, and there seems to be no othercompelling reason, from a U.S. perspective, to pur-sue this option. Only if it were seen by the UnitedStates and, to a lesser degree, other spacefaring statesas a particularly attractive way of symbolizing theircommitment to broadly based international cooper-ation would a “fully international” option be pre-ferred; no such vision has been persuasively ad-vanced.

Making international operational arrangementsonce the infrastructure is acquired appears a some-what more realistic prospect, though still unlikely tobe preferred by its developers. The United States (andits partners) could recoup at least some costs of theacquisition by selling shares in it, and this form ofbroadened international involvement may be an at-tractive way of giving newly industrializing and de-veloping countries a useful sense of involvement onthe space frontier. Broader international involvementcould also be accomplished by internationalizing (tosome extent) the operating crew—or by leasing facili-ties to the rest of the world.

A U.S. PROGRAM WITH INTERNATIONALINVOLVEMENT

Since the United States has given strong indicationthat it will open its space infrastructure program toforeign participation, it is useful to estimate what formof involvement is most likely to be successful, wheresuccess is defined as a mixture of costs and benefits


which is acceptable to all involved. Reaching an agree-ment is likely to involve difficult bargaining and sig-nificant compromise at the political, managerial, andtechnical levels. This process is already beginning, andboth the United States and its potential partners (par-ticularly Europe) are approaching the issue in a ratherdifferent manner than was the case during the 1969-73negotiations over post-Apollo participation.

Those objectives which are likely to be of most in-terest to the United States perhaps would be bestserved by a cooperative approach which would com-mit the United States and its partners to share impor-tant parts of the overall acquisition program, to remaininvolved beyond its acquisition (i. e., during its oper-ational phase as well), and to seek broadly based infra-structure utilization once established: that is, overalljoint acquisition, operation, and use. Certainly theUnited States would prefer to be the world leader inspace development and use over the next few dec-ades. A U.S.-led, freely arrived at, major in-space in-frastructure collaboration program–one involvingmany, perhaps all, countries, especially the majorspacefaring ones—would go a long way towardachieving this goal.

But it seems as if the objectives, primarily utilitarian,which would motivate other countries to join in sucha U.S. program would be best served if they could doso with minimal loss of their future freedom of ac-tion—i.e., participation in the acquisition, includingdevelopment, phase only, with no a priori commit-ment to system utilization or to sharing in overallsystem management.

Potential U.S. partners are, of course, fully awarethat a U.S. offer to share in the acquisition of in-spaceinfrastructure is fundamentally political in character,and that decisions on issues such as cost-sharing anddivision of labor are as much political as technical oreconomic. However, as the earlier review of the spaceprograms of potential partners has suggested, Europe(both ESA and individual countries) Canada and Ja-pan will bring some very real assets to the negotiat-ing process. The outcome of that process is certainlynot going to reflect U.S. interests alone. Indeed, Eur-ope, Canada and Japan may consider their participa-tion in the operation of the infrastructure and theirguaranteed access to it as preconditions to their con-tributing to its development.

Appendix D

SYNOPSIS OF THE OTA WORKSHOP ONCOST CONTAINMENT OF CIVILIAN

SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE (CIVILIAN“SPACE STATION”) ELEMENTS1

PREFACE

This appendix summarizes information presented atan OTA workshop on cost containment and cost mini-mization in NASA’s projected civilian “space station”program. This program is expected to result in theGovernment’s acquisition of elements of an overallin-space infrastructure support system. The 2-dayworkshop was held on October 18 and 19, 1983, andwas attended by more than a dozen senior profes-sional representatives from (non-NASA) high-technol-ogy Government organizations, Government-relatedaerospace industry organizations, and non-space in-dustry organizations. Most of those attending wereeither former senior NASA professionals or hadworked often on large NASA contracts. The views ofinvitees unable to attend are also contained in this ap-pendix. A Glossary of Terms appears at the end of thedocument.

The workshop discussions were limited to a NASAprogram that would develop infrastructure elementswithout significant participation by foreign govern-ments or the private sector in either funding or over-all management. Such involvement would bring withit additional considerations that would have to be ad-dressed early in the planning stages of the project inorder to avoid serious, cost-increasing programchanges.

Moreover, the workshop discussions assumed thatNASA staffing for the project would remain at the min-imum levels required to obtain the infrastructure atthe earliest date and in the most cost-effective manner.

Workshop participants did not attempt to quantify,in either absolute or percentage terms, the estimatesof possible cost reductions expected to result fromusing the management and technical approaches sug-gested here.

The first section summarizes the results of the 2 daysof discussion; it is divided into the two areas on whichthe discussion centered: management considerations

1 Workshop conducted for OTA by Computer Sciences Corp.

206

and technical considerations. A synthesis of the discus-sions in these two areas is presented in the next twosections. The last section is a set of tentativeconclusions for the consideration of NASA andCongress.

Summary

Recent history indicates that only about one-thirdof the cost of acquiring a space system is directlyrelated to hardware. Management, engineering, inte-gration, test, software, documentation, and other ac-quisition support activities use up the remaining two-thirds. Although many ways that promise to cut costsin a civilian space infrastructure (“space station”) pro-gram were discussed at the workshop, program phi-losophy and management were emphasized.

Some of the cost issues have already been recog-nized by NASA and may indeed be incorporated intoNASA’s current cost-control activities. These issues arenonetheless included here in order to bolster the argu-ment that NASA will have to change the way it ac-quires high-technology space assets if acquisition unitcosts are to be sharply reduced.

The major cost issues are summarized below:

COST-CONTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS

New technology: In general, the cost of in-spaceinfrastructure elements is directly related to theamount of new-technology research, develop-ment, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) invested inthe program. To minimize cost, NASA shouldadopt an approach that would minimize theamount of new technology necessary to meetperformance objectives. Because NASA Centershave their own continuing agendas and tend toincorporate their own RDT&E interests into large,popular, long-term development programs, theextent of involvement of the Centers in the man-agement of large space programs affects the costof those programs.Sufficient management authority: NASA’s cur-rent plan to designate a separate Associate Ad-

App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements . 207

●

ministrator for the program is both necessary andappropriate. The structure, responsibilities, andauthorities of the management organization re-porting to this Associate Administrator are alsovital for controlling costs.Careful definition: An extensive definition phase(e.g., the present NASA Phase A/B) could helpminimize costs by determining precisely what ca-pabilities are required to meet specific objectives;technology development should be limited tothose requirements.

These issues, discussed in terms of management andtechnical considerations, are summarized below.

●

MANAGEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Centralized management: A centralized, high-level NASA organization to manage developmentand procurement could lower cost by reducinglayers of management, minimizing the numberof organizational and design interfaces, and co-ordinating parallel development efforts. It couldalso simplify coordination of technical and man-agement efforts.System engineering and integration: Strong sys-tem engineering and system integration efforts(see Glossary) both by contractors and by NASAcould reduce the number of technical interfaces,allow most design conflicts to be resolved in-house, and help ensure that the overall systemis engineered for optimal performance.Bounded program: Defining a bound, or endpoint, to the initial acquisition, including devel-opment, activities could contain costs by elimi-nating the possibility of prolonged RDT&E so asto reach an early initial operational capability(lOC).Separation of NASA’s general RDT&E costs frominfrastructure acquisition costs: The initial de-velopment should be based as much as possibleon available technology. And only those RDT&Ecosts that directly contribute to developmentshould be charged to this program.Development of new cost models: Current costmodels will not provide accurate estimates of thefunding needs of the future civilian “space sta-tion” program. These models were developed forefforts that had requirements fundamentally dif-ferent from the needs of the proposed “space sta-tion. ”

TECHNICAL AND PROCUREMENTCONSIDERATIONS

Current technology: Based on the requirementsdefined to date for an operational civilian “space

●

●

station, ” extensive technological developmentdoes not appear to be necessary to obtain its nec-essary elements. Elements based on current tech-nology would be less expensive to produce, withsome exceptions would appear to have reason-able long-term operation and maintenance costs,would permit later improvements, would not re-quire as extensive a management effort, andwould cost the taxpayer less,Performance objectives requirements: Thestrong Phase A/B effort that NASA currently per-forms is required. However, if NASA developsdetailed design specifications and procures hard-ware on the basis of their use, contractors’ ini-tiatives to meet or better schedules and costswould be inhibited. Performance objectives (withspecified minimums) based wherever possible oncurrent technology would allow contractors tomeet the program requirements in the most cost-effective and timely manner.Contract incentives: By specifying performanceobjectives that could be met with minimal ad-vances in technology, NASA would encouragecontractors to propose the most efficient cost andschedule approaches. Incentive contracts thatboth reward and penalize would help to ensurethat these objectives are met.Design issues: Adopting standards, defining andmaintaining simple” interfaces, replicating ‘basicelements, and specifying common hardwarewould simplify design and development, reducechange-migration across the interfaces, and re-duce the impact of nonrecurring costs.

Management Considerations

Both the management philosophy and practiceunder which any space program is conducted are usu-ally dominant factors in determining the cost of thevarious program elements. Sound management prac-tices must include cost avoidance, cost minimization,and cost containment. The following managementpractices should keep space system acquisition costslow:

centralize the development program manage-ment organization and have it report directly tothe NASA Associate Administrator;use proven industry contractors for acquiring themajor program elements;set specific endpoints for the initial developmentphase; anddevelop and implement management practicesthat emphasize, and wherever possible reward,cost reduction and cost containment.


CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT

A centralized organization to manage the acquisi-tion program could reduce costs by concentrating thecontrol and integration of all technical, cost, andscheduling activities. Clear lines of responsibility; cen-tralized direction; strong control over budgets, funds,and technical decisions; and control over such fac-tors as interface and communality would be enhancedunder such an approach. Splitting program manage-ment among different NASA centers, as has sometimesbeen the practice in the past, could make it difficultto develop a fully integrated “space station.” How-ever, the centers should be used, as necessary, to pro-vide specific expertise or technical support.

The management organization, which would be re-sponsible for contracting for the various program ele-ments, should be given a large measure of authority.The organization could be located at a Center in or-der to have access to technical and administrative sup-port. Such an organization must have an experiencedtechnical arm; to achieve that, expert personnel fromNASA Centers could be assigned to the program man-agement office.

This centralized approach would enable a programmanager to more easily assess risks and make cost-reducing decisions, primarily because he or she wouldbe freed from conflicting pressures from other partsof the organization. (This reasoning supports the argu-ment that individual NASA Centers should not be giv-en management control over elements of the pro-gram,) Under this approach the central programmanagement team would have the best chance toevaluate costs, scheduling, and performance objec-tively, and to produce balanced emphases anddecisions.

When a Center does manage the development oftechnology or hardware for the program, it should beon a subcontract basis from the program managementoffice. It should have a specific development time andcost. Inasmuch as current technology would be usedwherever feasible, long-term RDT&E programs at theNASA Centers would not burden the acquisition pro-gram with their associated costs and management de-mands. While new-technology RDT&E is an importantcontinuing function of the NASA Centers, it shouldbe funded separately unless it uniquely meets the per-formance or cost objectives of the space infrastruc-ture program.

SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION

In any complex system, each component or sub-system should be designed with the objective ofenhancing the performance of the entire system. Thus,compromises must be made among the various sub-

systems so that the complete system—not just eachcomponent of it—performs as well as the technologi-cal state-of-the-art and the funds available for its ac-quisition will allow. This activity is known as systemengineering. System integration is the term used to de-scribe activities aimed at ensuring that the individualsubsystems work together to create a well-functioningwhole. Both of these concepts involve much morethan just technical performance. In the case of NASA-procured systems, acquisition costs and operating andmaintenance costs also should be important consid-erations. Usefulness to system users, such as simplicityof access, is another, and long life and easy evolutionto the next step may be others. More detailed factorsmight include ease of flight preparation, in-orbit main-tenance, and updating, for example.

Many past system engineering and integration ef-forts at NASA have emphasized the technical or mis-sion performance. Certain changes that have occurredduring the past 25 years of space effort should nowallow NASA to broaden its view of system engineer-ing and integration.

Until very recently, the civilian space program hasbeen (it had to be) characterized as a very high-tech-nology program that has had to bootstrap itself: thatis, the technology often had to be developed duringthe same time interval that it would have to be incor-porated into the spaceflight hardware. Thus, NASA’sresponsibility was not only to manage the aerospacecontractors that build the mission hardware but alsoto establish both internal and external RDT&E capabil-ities to carry out the necessary parallel technology de-velopment. In discharging these dual roles, NASA, ofnecessity, has been intimately involved in design anddevelopment of the systems it was procuring. Indeed,doing so was the only practical way by which NASAcould effectively communicate its requirements to itscontractors. As a consequence of these circumstances,NASA has tended to concentrate on the hardware de-sign and performance aspects of system engineeringand integration— sometimes at the expense of costcontainment.

Two factors present today should allow NASA tobroaden its emphasis from hardware design consid-erations of system engineering and integration toother, equally important matters: 1 ) the relatively ad-vanced state of the technology—especialIy that avail-able for this program—and 2) the evolving sophisti-cation of U.S. industrial capability. After 25 years ofspace technology development and operational ex-perience in its use, essentially all of the technologyis in hand to build a sophisticated, long-life, reason-ably priced civilian “space station” for operation inLEO. Also, the aerospace industry has changed sig-nificantly. Part of NASA’s original charter was to fos-

App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements . 209

ter and enhance the space technology know-how ofU.S. industry. To a considerable extent, NASA hasachieved this objective: many senior personnel in in-dustry have devoted their entire careers to space-re-lated activities, and many have come to the industryfrom NASA–in various fashions NASA gave many ofthese and other individuals their professional “start.”

Because of these factors, several cost-reduction pos-sibilities now exist. Inasmuch as space systems shouldbe built using current technology unless new technol-ogy would lower life-cycle costs, in many cases NASAshould be able to specify the use of already existinghardware. Using this technology, together with cur-rent industry sophistication, should enable NASA totransfer more of the system engineering and integra-tion associated with hardware design to industry, free-ing NASA system engineers to concentrate on costminimization and avoidance, operability, and otherimportant matters. Of course, NASA must continueto ensure that all of the space infrastructure elementswork together efficiently; that the major interfaces aredefined, controlled, and integrated; and that the enduse objectives are met. A NASA centralized projectmanagement organization would be responsible forthese efforts. In particular, the organization could en-sure that appropriate tradeoffs are made that result inreduced development and O&M costs.

BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM

NASA’s present emphasis on the “evolutionarycharacter” of the “space station” program, while em-bodying many good programmatic features, gives riseto a very real concern —that is, the pace at which ini-tial elements of the integrated system become avail-able for early operational use. Program delays oftenare associated with over-sophistication built in dur-ing the definition phase or with unrealistically stringentspecifications. In addition, many engineers and scien-tists have a tendency to keep improving the designat all levels—improvements which also can result indelays in advancing to operational status.

This concern could be allayed by the very practicalapproach of establishing a program consisting of abounded acquisition phase, including development,for the procurement, launch, in-orbit assembly, andacceptance of the infrastructure elements defined asproviding initial IOC. The centralized program man-agement office would carry out this phase. All otherrelated or supporting activities would have separatebudgets and would be subcontracted to other NASAoffices after negotiation of performance specifications,costs, and schedules. Even the bounded programshould have identified elements that could be elimi-nated or moved off-line in event of cost, schedule, or

performance problems in order to meet the IOC date.This approach provides considerable flexibility shouldunforeseen program difficulties occur—as they almostalways do.

The program’s initial operational phase would beinitiated on the IOC date, but the operational plan-ning would be begun earlier by a parallel program or-ganization. A well-thought-out transition plan to movefrom the acquisition to the operational phase shouldbe developed as a part of Phase A/B and acted uponthroughout the acquisition phase so that effective andcomprehensive operating procedures exist at the out-set of operations. Thus, the program organizationneeded to conduct the operational phase should beestablished by NASA during Phase B. This organiza-tion would work with the acquisition program officeand with other operations organizations within NASA.In particular, it would become familiar with the oper-ations of the Shuttle, Spacelab and other space infra-structure elements in order to gain experience in theiruse.

The two program organizations–acquisition andoperations—should work together to obtain low life-cycle costs. Cost estimates should be keyed first to thetwo program phases and then to schedules, in orderto foster sound decisionmaking regarding the pro-gram’s ongoing budget. During the operations phase,the overall concept of a civilian “space station” shouldbe reviewed periodically, in close concert with the pri-vate sector, to determine whether the Governmentshould continue, expand, or reduce operations basedon considerations of life-cycle costs and nationalbenefits.

COST AWARENESS AND CONTROL

Establishing and maintaining cost awareness amongaerospace engineering personnel in both Governmentand industry should be a major part of any programactivity and should begin at the definition phase. Atthat phase, it is important that the definition be com-plete within the scope of the bounded program. Thisactivity should include an estimate of costs of all ele-ments of the work to be done. System designersshould participate in this process and be responsiblefor any budget alterations assigned to them. Contrac-tor costs and schedules must be realistic and contrac-tors should be made aware of the need to estimatethem accurately.

Cost awareness can be promoted through motiva-tional programs. One useful approach involves con-tract incentive fees for cost, schedule, and perform-ance. However, when this arrangement is used, thecontractor must not be overly constrained in hisproblem-solving efforts. The incentive contract is a


motivational technique that could be used effectivelyat all levels of the organization. It could be augmentedat the lower levels by direct awards for cost-saving sug-gestions, underbudget performance, rapid problem-solving, and similar efforts that reduce the costs of aparticular facet of the program.

Key to any effective cost control activity are accuratecost estimates. Estimates that are too low break downthe cost control process. Estimates that are too highcreate a “vacuum” that will surely be filled. Moreover,cost models based on previous programs will not givesatisfactory results for this program because thosemodels use weight, volume, safety, and complexityfactors that are significantly different. A quantitativeanalysis is needed to correct existing cost models. Inthe meantime, bottom-to-top estimates may prove in-structive, particularly when applied to already existingtechnology or subsystems.

Life-cycle costing may dictate design decisions thatare more costly initially but that provide savings overthe long term. Program operating environments mustalso be considered for their effects on costs: design-ing for a fail-operational, as compared to a fail-safe,working environment is costly. The concept of accept-able risk, particularly human risk, as it affects costsshould be analyzed anew, because the in-orbit “spacestation” operating environment is inherently muchmore tolerant of operating difficulties than has beenthe case in previous space programs. The ability torepair equipment and rescue personnel also shouldbe taken into account.

Finally, to be effective, cost estimates, whether de-rived from cost models or otherwise, must assume areasonably small development effort for solving unex-pected problems. Additional funds should be set asideto handle such problems, but access to this moneyshould be very carefully controlled.

Technical and ProcurementConsiderations

The kind of technology to be used, and the divisionof tasks between private contractors and NASA Cen-ters during the acquisition process must be consideredin order to achieve the lowest unit cost. The follow-ing factors should also be kept clearly in mind:

● The United States, the European Space Agencycountries, Canada and other countries have al-ready invested enormous amounts of money andeffort to develop, test, and use sophisticatedspace technology.

. The aerospace industry has “come of age, ” andnow can be expected to exercise ingenuity incontaining costs and meeting performance and

time schedules without the detailed NASA man-agement oversight required in the past.Conflicts of interest often exist between RDT&E-oriented NASA Centers and the system acquisi-tion management office responsible for overall ca-pability optimization, cost containment, andmeeting of schedules.

USE OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGY

Together with various ground and space transpor-tation infrastructure, appropriate in-space infrastruc-ture should provide NASA and other users with cost-effective capabilities to pursue many important space-related objectives. It is quite appropriate that NASAconsider the program in this larger context while mak-ing plans for its development. And, the character andmagnitude of the NASA Centers’ involvement in thisplanning activity must bean important part of this con-sideration.

The various NASA Centers are developing prelimi-nary concepts for individual infrastructure elementsand associated subsystems. These design concepts aretechnologically sophisticated and are being developedon an individual subsystem basis. It appears that thesesubsystems are to be packaged in modules that areas independent as possible from each other, and thatthe infrastructure central complex will bean aggregateof these modules.

Proceeding with the acquisition of such individualsubsystems in this fashion could be evidence of in-adequate system engineering capability, or inadequatemanagement strength, or both. Both are needed toenforce those top-down tradeoffs and compromisesnecessary to ensure that the overall system—and notjust the individual subsystems or modules—functionsas well as possible, Experience has shown that earlyhesitation regarding system engineering can often re-sult in increasing difficulty later in the enforcementof such compromises; measures taken to integrate sub-systems that, by then, do not inherently fit togethercan be a very costly experience.

It appears that NASA may now be planning toemploy a substantial amount of new and sophisticatedtechnology in the program, and to have a parallel pro-gram for the development of this technology. it is veryimportant that NASA first analyze, based on perform-ance requirements and cost reduction/avoidance ob-jectives alone, whether developing this new technol-ogy is necessary. In particular, it should seek soundprofessional advice from outside NASA in order to bal-ance any internal tendency to favor new technologydevelopment. It must be repeated that, for the mostpart, a functional “space station” could be built usingcurrent technology. It could be cost effective in ad-

App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements ● 211

dressing important, long-term, civilian space programgoals and objectives. And it should be designed so thatit could be modified during its operating life as new,more cost-effective, technologies are developed “off-line.”

INCENTIVE CONTRACTING VIAPERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS

To date, most NASA spaceflight activities have in-volved planning for and procuring hardware that hasbeen at the leading edge of the technology. Accord-ingly, because it has had to issue detailed engineer-ing specifications to contractors, NASA has beenheavily involved in the technical aspects of such pro-curements. It is NASA’s present intention to issue engi-neering specifications for procurement after thedetailed definition is determined in a combined PhaseA/B study. This process would tend to over-constrainpotential private-sector contractors: the detailed de-sign, budget, schedule, and expected performancewould be predetermined. However, design changesare usually necessary to resolve unanticipated prob-lems that occur as the design is developed. The needfor such changes in turn may adversely affect thebudget, schedule, and performance. Design changeshave been the chief reason that spaceflight hardwarehas been so costly.

However, if the overall infrastructure was engi-neered first as a whole, then NASA could procure iton the basis of performance specifications rather thandetailed engineering specifications. A detailed PhaseA/B preparation would still be required, but its pur-pose should be to determine the performance objec-tives and minimum requirements of the overall in-frastructure, and then of the specific elements,ensuring that all specifications are necessary andachievable. Such an approach provides contractorswith incentives for achieving the performance objec-tives within cost and on schedule.

Specifying the desired performance, and providingcontract incentives for achieving performance and forbettering costs and schedules, could minimize unitcosts, Further, with negative incentives—i.e., penaltiesfor failure to meet the costs and schedules–agreed-to unit costs could also be minimized. NASA shouldcarefully define an acceptable incentive fee structurethat relates to a predetermined level of risk accept-ance for the program. Contractors would be respon-sible for any trade-offs to meet the performance speci-fied. NASA’s system engineering and integration rolewould be to define the areas where the elements meetand to ensure that the elements do in fact work to-gether. This procedure is used by COMSAT to pro-cure hardware for satellite communication systems

from the aerospace industry, and has been highly suc-cessful and cost effective.

DESIGN ISSUES

For-profit companies understand the importance ofgood design practices in minimizing the cost of man-ufactured products. These practices include usingstandard components or subsystems when appropri-ate, minimizing and simplifying interfaces, andreplicating basic elements as often as possible. It is ex-pected that space hardware contractors will use suchdesign practices if NASA encourages them to do so.

As noted earlier, however, NASA seemingly nowplans to procure the infrastructure elements by meansof detailed engineering specifications. Such a plancould prevent contractors, when the seemingly inevi-table design changes crop up, from calling on the mostcost-effective design options to remedy the problem.

Moreover, detailed design specifications are rarelydeveloped with overall cost effectiveness in mind.Reflecting their past experience, NASA Centers oftenemphasize technical excellence and complete elimi-nation of risks, even when the safety of people is nota concern, almost regardless of the costs.

But if performance specifications were written to re-quire minimal use of new technology, design prac-tices would not be an issue. Contractors could dowhat they do best—design cost-effective equipmentthat meets the Government’s specified performanceneeds.

Acceptable risks should be assessed during NASA’sPhase A/B definition to determine where performancespecifications and, ultimately, design specificationscould be relaxed to contain and minimize costs.

Conclusions

The primary conclusions of the OTA workshopfollow.

CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OFINFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Effective and efficient management of the proposedprogram could be achieved by establishing an orga-nization with a single point of authority and controlat a high level within NASA. To ensure complete in-tegration of all management interfaces, this organiza-tion should control all prime contractors directly andinvolve only those Centers necessary for the techni-cal execution of the program. This central NASA man-agement organization should be responsible for estab-lishing performance specifications and for defining andmanaging interfaces between major elements. Theprime contractors for these major elements should be


fully responsible for the system engineering and in-tegration of their respective elements.

MINIMIZATION OF THE USE OFNEW TECHNOLOGY

It is almost axiomatic that cost and risk will be min-imized if the IOC infrastructure is built using proven,state-of-the-art technology to the extent feasible. Spacetechnology has now developed to the point that futureRDT&E and associated facilities should be fundedseparately from this program; they should not be de-pendent on justification by any one large space pro-gram for their inauguration or continuation. RDT&Eperformed at NASA Centers should be funded solelyon the basis of need to support long-range spacescience, applications, or technology development.NASA should seek outside advice as to what new tech-nology is needed in order to offset any possible in-house bias in favor of costly, and perhaps unneces-sary, development.

PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS ANDINCENTIVE CONTRACTS

Significant cost savings could be realized if NASAwere to procure major elements of the “space station”based on performance specifications, rather than ondetailed design specifications, Contracting should in-clude incentives and penalties based on performanceobjectives so that the contractors would be promptedto apply initiative and ingenuity in minimizing costswhile meeting schedules and performance.

CONTRACTOR SYSTEM ENGINEERINGAND INTEGRATION

If infrastructure elements were procured on the basisof incentive contracts defined by performance speci-”fications, design details would be the responsibility ofthe contractors, not NASA. By implication, contrac-tors for major infrastructure elements would also per-form the system engineering and integration for theirelements. The centralized NASA program office wouldbe responsible for defining, controlling, and in-tegrating the interfaces.

FINITE, BOUNDED ACQUISITION PROGRAM

Costs could be contained if the program wereplanned as a finite, bounded acquisition program spe-cifically designed to achieve an early IOC. The acquisi-tion phase would include the procurement, launches,on-orbit construction, and acceptance testing of theflight systems. The later, separately managed, opera-tions phase would then be initiated and reviewed peri-odically. The effect would be to bound all acquisition

costs, including development costs, and to provide afixed framework for operations planning,

RISK MANAGEMENT

With the program based, insofar as possible, uponproven current technology, operational risk could beexamined rationally as a cost factor. Alternative ap-proaches to quantifying risk acceptance should be ex-plored; complete risk avoidance at any cost is notalways required and is very costly.

Glossary of Terms

Available technology-space technology, includinghardware, software, techniques, and capabilitiesthat need no further development for inclusion aspart of the infrastructure (“space station”).

Bounded program–Predetermined end point of anyresearch, development, test and evaluation(RDT&E) program, in terms of time and costs basedon realistically achievable objectives.

Cost models–Formal methodologies for estimatingthe cost of planned future spacecraft subsys-tems/systems based on extrapolations of the costof previously developed similar subsystems/sys-tems, with appropriate weighting factors for dif-ferences in weight, volume, safety, complexity, pastand/or anticipated cost increases, etc.

Components–The lowest level of decomposition ofthe parts that comprise a subsystem.

Configuration control–Formally established projectcontrol procedures for proposing and approvingchanges to a developing system by assessing theeffects of possible changes on the other compo-nents/subsystems within the system, on the systemperformance, and on the interfaces with othersystems.

Current technology-(See available technology.)Design specifications- Detailed engineering specifica-

tions for the procurement and manufacture of ele-ments of the infrastructure,

Definition phase–The initial phase of any proposedNASA high-technology development and/or acqui-sition program. (NASA proposes to spend more ef-fort than usual on the definition phase of a spaceinfrastructure—civilian “space station’ ’—program,corresponding to its more conventional Phases Aand B so as to permit better estimates of infrastruc-ture use, technology, and costs to be made, therebyenabling NASA to go directly into Phase C contrac-ting following procurement funding approval.)

Elements–The highest level of decomposition of themodules, free flyers, platforms, and transportationvehicles that comprise any infrastructure.

App. D—Synopsis of the OTA Workshop on Cost Containment of Civilian Space Infrastructure Elements ● 213

Engineering specifications–( See design speci-fications.)

Incentive contracts-Contracts that reward the con-tractor for meeting or bettering performance,schedule and/or cost estimates while complyingwith all minimum specifications. Penalties are im-posed for not meeting schedules, costs, or speci-fications.

Infrastructure-The totality of surface and in-spacecomponents, subsystems, modules, elements, and,perhaps, in-space human crew that are to be usedto support various space activities efficiently andeffectively. (See “Space Station.”)

Interfaces-The point or points at which adjacent sub-systems, systems, modules, or elements of any in-frastructure come together in a structural, mechan-ical, electrical, or functional sense.

Life cycle cost–Total cost from start of conceptthrough development, production, deployment,and operation throughout the useful life of the in-frastructure. Includes all maintenance, operational,and peripheral costs.

New technology—Technology that either is nonexis-tent and must be developed or does not exist infully usable form, and which must at least bechanged and perhaps be developed further beforeit becomes “avail able.” This implies that additionalcosts must be incurred to bring the technology toa useful stage.

Open-ended program–A program without a definedend point in time and/or cost and which, in manycases, tends to be self-perpetuating.

Performance requirements-Quantitatively statedfunctional requirements; they must precede engi-neering or design specifications.

Phases A, B, C, D–Fundamental elements of NASA’susual approach to the development and acquisi-tion of large, high-technology systems:

Phase A–Study of conceptual design options andalternatives for accomplishing the desired ob-jectives.Phase B—Trade-offs to select one or more gener-ally acceptable approaches as most cost effective.Usually provides first-order cost estimates based onpast experience with analogous systems.Phase C–Detailed design, which begins to provideinformation for a more accurate bottom-to-top costestimate.Phase D–Actual system development. Usuallydone on a cost basis, with an incentive fee; rarelyprocured at a fixed price. There is continuous man-agement by NASA and, at times, negotiation re-garding performance, costs and/or schedules.

(In phases A and B, suggestions regarding appro-priate technologies are usually heavily influencedby NASA.)

RDT&E– Research, development, test, and evaluation(or engineering.)

Space Station–Infrastructure elements located in theEarth’s space, perhaps containing a human crew,used to support space activities efficiently and ef-fectively. (See “Infrastructure.”)

System engineering-System design methodology thatadjusts components and subsystems in order toachieve the best possible performance from the sys-tem as a whole in addressing specified objectives;system initial and life cycle cost is usually an im-portant consideration; acquisition time can also bean important consideration.

System integration-The engineering necessary to en-sure that all of the individual subsystems interfaceproperly so that the complete system performs asit should.

Test bed (RDT&E)–A facility for simulating the envi-ronment and/or external interfaces so that systemsand subsystems can be tested realistically.

Appendix E

TITLE II—NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SPACE(PUBLIC LAW 98-361)

Purpose

Sec. 201. It is the purpose of this title to establisha National Commission on Space that will assist theUnited States–

(1) to define the long-range needs of the Nation thatmay be fulfilled through the peaceful uses of outerspace;

(2) to maintain the Nation’s preeminence in spacescience, technology, and applications;

(3) to promote the peaceful exploration and utili-zation of the space environment; and

(4) to articulate goals and develop options for thefuture direction of the Nation’s civilian space program.

Findings

Sec. 202. The Congress finds and declares that–(1) the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-

tion, the lead civilian space agency, as established inthe National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, asamended, has conducted a space program that hasbeen an unparalleled success, providing significanteconomic, social, scientific, and national securitybenefits, and helping to maintain international stabilityand good will;

(2) the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,as amended (42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), has providedthe policy framework for achieving this success, andcontinues to be a sound statutory basis for nationalefforts in space;

(3) the United States is entering a new era of inter-national competition and cooperation in space, andtherefore this Nation must strengthen the commitmentof its public and private technical, financial, and in-stitutional resources, so that the United States will notlose its leadership position during this decade;

(4) while there continues to be a crucial Govern-ment role in space science, advanced research anddevelopment, provision of public goods and servicesand coordination of national and international efforts,advances in applications of space technology haveraised many issues regarding public and private sec-tor roles and relationships in technology development,applications, and marketing;

(s) the private sector will continue to evolve as amajor participant in the utilization of the space envi-ronment;

(6) the Nation is committed to a permanentlymanned space station in low Earth orbit, and futurenational efforts in space will benefit from the presenceof such a station;

(7) the separation of the civilian and military spaceprograms is essential to ensure the continued healthand vitality of both; and

(8) the identification of long range goals and policyoptions for the United States civilian space programthrough a high level, representational public forumwill assist the President and Congress in formulatingfuture policies for the United States civilian spaceprogram.

National Commission on Space

Sec. 203. (a)(l) The President shall within ninetydays of the enactmert of this Act establish a NationalCommission on Space (hereinafter in this title referredto as the “Commission”), which shall be composedof 15 members appointed by the President. The mem-bers appointed under this subsection shall be selectedfrom among individuals from Federal, State, and localgovernments, industry, business, labor, academia, andthe general population who, by reason of their back-ground, education, training, or experience, possessexpertise in scientific and technological pursuits, aswell as the use and implications of the use of suchpursuits. Of the fifteen members appointed, not morethan three members may be employees of the Feder-al Government. The President shall designate one ofthe members of the Comission appointed under thissubsection to serve as Chairman, and one of the mem-bers to serve as Vice Chairman. The Vice Chairmanshall perform the functions of the Chairman in theChairman’s absence.

(2) Members appointed by the President under par-agraph (1) of this subsection may be paid at a rate notto exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate ofbasic pay in effect under section 5332 of title 5, UnitedStates Code, for grade GS-18 of the General Schedulefor each day, including traveltime, during which suchmembers are engaged in the actual performance ofthe duties of the Commission. While away from theirhomes or regular places of business, such membersmay be allowed travel expenses, including per diemin lieu of subsistence, in the same manner as persons

214

App. E—Tit/e I/-National Commission on Space Public Law 96-361 • 215

employed intermittently in the Government serviceare allowed under section 5703 of title 5, United StatesCode. Individuals who are not officers or employeesof the United States and who are members of theCommission shall not be considered officers oremployees of the United States by reason of receiv-ing payments under this paragraph.

(b)(l) The President shall appoint one individualfrom each of the following Federal departments andagencies to serve as ex officio, advisory, non-votingmembers of the Commission (if such department oragency does not already have a member appointedto the Commission pursuant to subsection (a)(l):

(A) National Aeronautics and Space Administration,(B) Department of State.(C) Department of Defense.(D) Department of Transportation.(E) Department of Commerce.(F) Department of Agriculture.(G) Department of the interior.(H) National Science Foundation.(1) Office of Science and Technology Policy.(2) The President of the Senate shall appoint two ad-

visory members of the Commission from among theMembers of the Senate and the Speaker of the Houseof Representatives shall appoint two advisory mem-bers of the Commission from among the Members ofthe House of Representatives. Such members shall notparticipate, except in an advisory capacity, in the for-mulation of the findings and recommendations of theCommission.

(3) Members of the Commission appointed underthis subsection shall not be entitled to receive com-pensation for service relating to the performance ofthe duties of the Commission, but shall be entitled toreimbursement for travel expenses incurred while inthe actual performance of the duties of the Com-mission.

(c) The Commission shall appoint and fix the com-pensation of such personnel as it deems advisable. TheChairman of the Commission shall be responsiblef o r –

(1) the assignment of duties and responsibilitiesamong such personnel and their continuing supervi-sion; and

(2) the use and expenditures of funds available tothe Commission. In carrying out the provisions of thissubsection, the Chairman shall act in accordance withthe general policies of the Commission.

(d) To the extent permitted by law, the Commissionmay secure directly from any executive department,agency, or independent instrumentality of the FederalGovernment any information it deems necessary tocarry out its functions under this Act. Each such de-

partment, agency, and instrumentality shall cooper-ate with the Commission and, to the extent permittedby law and upon request of the Chairman of the Com-mission, furnish such information to the Commission.

(e) The Commission may hold hearings, receivepublic comment and testimony, initiate surveys, andundertake other appropriate activities to gather the in-formation necessary to carry out its activities undersection 204 of this title.

(f) The Commission shall cease to exist sixty daysafter it has submitted the plan required by section204(c) of this title.

Functions of the Commission

Sec. 204. (a) The Commission shall study existingand proposed space activities and formulate an agen-da for the United States civilian space program. TheCommission shall identify long range goals, oppor-tunities, and policy options for United States civilianspace activity for the next twenty years. In carryingout this responsibility, the Commission shall take intoconsideration—

(1) the commitment by the Nation to a permanentlymanned space station in low Earth orbit;

(2) present and future scientific, economic, social,environmental, and foreign policy needs of the UnitedStates, and methods by which space science, technol-ogy, and applications initiatives might address thoseneeds;

(3) the adequacy of the Nation’s public and privatecapability in fulfilling the needs identified in paragraph(2);

(4) how a cooperative interchange between Federalagencies on research and technology developmentprograms can benefit the civilian space program;

(5) opportunities for, and constraints on, the use ofouter space toward the achievement of Federal pro-gram objectives or national needs;

(6) current and emerging issues and concerns thatmay arise through the utilization of space research,technology development, and applications;

(7) the Commission shall analyze the findings of thereviews specified in paragraphs (1) through (6) of thissubsection, and develop options and recommenda-tions for a long range national civilian space policyplan.

(b) Options and recommendations submitted in a c-cordance with subsection (a)(7) of this section shallinclude, to the extent appropriate, an estimate of costsand time schedules, institutional requirements, andstatutory modifications necessary for implementationof such options and recommendations.


(c) Within twelve months after the date of the estab- House of Representatives, a long range plan for UnitedIishment of the Commission, the Commission shall States civilian space activity incorporating the resultssubmit to the President and to the Committee on Com- of the studies conducted under this section, togethermerce, Science and Transportation of the Senate and with recommendations for such legislation as thethe Committee on Science and Technology of the Commission determines to be appropriate.

Appendix F

FINANCING CONSIDERATIONS ANDFEDERAL BUDGET IMPACTS

With respect to the conceptual objectives proposedfor discussion in chapter 6 of this report, it is impor-tant to ask not only the question of “what would theirattainment cost?,” but the next most important ques-tions as well: “who would pay these costs?” and“under what circumstances?” This appendix ad-dresses these questions, and then turns to an exami-nation of how novel answers thereto could affect theFederal space budget.

Financing Considerations

International Considerations

Note that what is being discussed here are notNASA 1 goals and objectives, but national goals andobjectives and, at least for the most part, goals andobjectives for the benefit of all mankind. Therefore,for instance, when other countries can reasonably beexpected to have an active interest in cooperating withthe United States as parties in multinational activities,this also should be taken into explicit considerationwhen considering their cost to us.

John Logsdon has recently observed that: “Thereis now the possibility of a global division of labor andcost in space science [and exploration] . . .“.2 Offi-cials of the European Space Agency (ESA), for instance,are reported to be of the view that ESA: “ . . . antici-pates contributing . . . perhaps up to 30 percent of theestimated cost [of any] space station . . .“.3 And OTAhas been told, informally, by a well-informed foreignofficial that, if Japan and Canada also were to be in-cluded in a full partnership arrangement, “in the limit”this fraction could be appreciably larger. And recentlyfractions of 35 to 40 percent overall have been publi-cized. 4 (This 35 to 40 percent, i.e., some $3 billion[1984$] apparently is now seen by NASA as in addi-tion to the $8 billion [1 984$] now estimated by NASAas the cost of the IOC infrastructure to the UnitedStates.)

Simply for purposes of illustration, an assumptionof one-third foreign government cost-sharing is takenhere as a reasonable expectation regarding at least ob-

I Other Government agencies, primarily the National Oceanic and Atmos-

pheric Admtnlstration (NOAA), have Important space interests and respon-s} bllitles as well.

‘Science, Jan. 6, 1984, p. 11 et. seq.; see esp. p. 13.3Science, Dec. 9, 1983, pp. 1099-1100.4Nature, Mar. 15, 1984, p. 216.

jectives (1), (2), (3), and (4). A further assumption ismade: that the U.S. Government will view its civilianspace leadership role as one of orchestrating the in-terests, abilities, and activities of any and all of thosecountries of the world who wish to participate in spaceresearch, exploration and development, and that itwill play this role in the vigorous, sensitive and inno-vative fashion that competitive space circumstancesand the high political and financial stakes require.

Indeed, if the United States does not lead the worldin this fashion, there is growing indication that, per-haps sooner than we imagine (especially with the suc-cessful Spacelab experience behind them), severalEuropean countries themselves would be prepared to“go it alone.” And the U. S. S. R., as well, may be be-ginning to exhibit an “outreach” toward cooperationwith countries outside of the Communist bloc.

The Solar System Exploration Committee of NASA’ssenior Advisory Committee has taken specific and pos-itive recognition of this opportunity in its recent re-port: Planetary Exploration through Year 2000.5 Underthe general heading of “International Cooperation, ”the Committee observes that: “In the 1960s and1970s, planetary science was clearly dominated by theUnited States, with major contributions by the U.S.S.R.The trend in recent years has been an increase, rela-tive to the United States and the U. S. S. R,, in the ca-pability and interest of other nations to participate inplanetary science and exploration missions. This in-creasing interest has occurred against a backdrop ofbudgetary constraints in all nations, together with in-creasing sophistication and cost of planetary missions.Combined, these factors suggest that more planetaryscience can be accomplished in a given period if in-terested nations coordinate their planning and, occa-sionally, undertake joint missions.”

But no allowance is made in the NASA budget pro-jections–projections that average some $400 million/year (1 983$) throughout the rest of this centuryG–forthe important financial contributions that other coun-tries could be expected to make to space science andexploration programs.

One very long-term, very successful example of mul-tinational cooperation in the space field was devel-oped under the enlightened leadership, and with theimportant assistance of, the United States: the lnter-

S1 983, see esp. pp. 25-26.%ee NASA’s report, p. 27.

217

218 . CiviIian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space

national Telecommunications Satellite Organization(I NTELSAT). Some 20 years ago, the only countries in-volved in civilian satellite communications were theUnited States, the United Kingdom, and France.Today, INTELSAT counts 109 countries as members;the countries conduct a useful, profitable, and rapidlygrowing space-related business–long-haul trunk com-munications—which grossed some $400 million in1983, and in which the required U.S. investment shareis now down to less than 25 percent. (The businessis now so profitable that, last year, potential com-petitors came forward.) And INTELSAT has beenjoined by INMARSAT in the maritime communicationsarea; INMARSAT counts even the U.S.S.R. among itsmembers. ’

Finally, the President has taken steps to see that thematter of international cooperation—indeed, perhapsinternational collaboration—in the civilian space areawill receive direct and important attention by the ex-ecutive branch. In his radio address during the weekof his 1984 State of the Union message, the Presidentobserved that: “international cooperation . . . haslong been a guiding principle of the United Statesspace program [and that] just as our friends were askedto join us in the Shuttle program, our friends and allieswill be invited to join with us in the space station proj-ect.” In response to this Presidential directive, NASA’sAdministrator has recently visited several other coun-tries to explore the matter of their working on any“space station” program with the United States.

Private-Sector Considerations

Also, when our private sector can reasonably be ex-pected to assume the cost (in anticipation of commer-cial-industrial sales and profits), or at least an impor-tant fraction thereof, this should be taken intoconsideration. This should be the case for at least ob-jectives (2), (5), (6), (7), and (10) (see ch. 6).

For much of 1983, and still continuing, NASA hashad a task force studying what it might do to speedand enlarge the “commercialization” of space. Andthe Department of Transportation (DOT) has recentlybeen charged by the President with assisting an ex-pendable launch services industry.

Now the President has given a powerful generalthrust to the matter of much greater economic partic-ipation by our private sector in space-related activi-ties, In his 1984 State of the Union address he ex-pressed himself of the judgment that: “ . . . spaceholds enormous promise for commerce today,” and

7For a thorough discussion of the satellite communications area, see theOTA report International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Ac-tivities (now in press).

was quite specific in justifying his decision to startwork on the development of space infrastructure interms of its eventually allowing for “ . . . living andworking in space for . . . economic . . . gains. ” In hislater radio address he stated that he expects: “ . . . aspace station will open up new opportunities for ex-panding human commerce . . . .“

The legislative branch too, perhaps smarting be-cause of the seemingly endless Landsat commerciali-zation difficulties, and responding to the continuinghesitancy within NASA concerning their space appli-cations responsibilities, has moved to strengthen thelaw quite specifically regarding “space commercializa-t ion. ” NASA’S fiscal year 1985 authorization bill,which became Public Law 98-361 with the President’ssignature on July 16, 1984, makes a basic change inthe “National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.”It amends section 102 of the act by including a newparagraph (c) as follows: “The Congress declares thatthe general welfare of the United States requires that[NASA] seek and encourage, to the maximum extentpossible, the fullest commercial use of space.” Thisis strong, unambiguous and “revolutionary” languagefor our publicly funded civilian space program’s“char ter.”

It would seem reasonable, therefore, to imagine thatthe kind of private sector participation suggested herein addressing certain of the 10 conceptual objectiveswill, in fact, be realized.

International Plus Private-SectorCost Sharing Considerations

Thus, when the financial support of both othercountries and our own private sector are taken intoconsideration, the net U.S. public cost of meetingthese 10 conceptual objectives is estimated to be some$25 billion to $40 billion (1984$), i.e., some 70 per-cent of their estimated $40 billion to $60 billion totalcost. 8 (See table F-l). The average net public cost forthe first 5 years considered here would be some $2.0billion/year (1984$); during the last 5 of the 25 yearsthe average net public cost could decrease to aboutone-half this rate. (See table F-2.)

These expenditure rates suggest that, with the com-pletion of the initial modest Moon settlement, the pro-jected NASA budget could allow a major program ofhuman exploration of Mars (and of one or more as-teroids) to begin in earnest.

‘Norman R. Augustine, “The Aerospace Professional . . . and High-TechManagement,” Aerospace America, March 1984,

App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts ● 219

Table F-l .—USA Net Public Cost (billions of 1984 dollars)

Total Other Private USA netcost countries sector public cost

1. Establish a global information system/serviceregarding natural hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Establish lower cost reusable transportation servicewith the Moon, and establish human presence there . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Use space probes to obtain information regarding Marsand some asteroids prior to early human exploration . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Conduct medical research of direct interestto the general public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. Bring at least hundreds of the general publicinto space for short visits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. Establish a global, direct, audio broadcasting,common-user system/service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7. Make essentially all data generated by civilian satellitesand spacecraft directly available to the general public . . . . . . . . . . .

8. Exploit radio/optical free-space electromagnetic propagationfor long distance energy distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9. Reduce the unit cost of space transportationand space activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10. Increase space-related private salesa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

0.7 0 12

20 7 1 13

2

6

0.3 0 2

2 0 4

0.10.5 0 0.4

0.22

0

0 2

00 0

0.50.5 0 0

00

00.5

50

= 26C

50.5

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . = 40b =10 = 4aThi~ would advance the pr~~pect~ of successfully a& JresSing all goals and all other objectives.bThe actual total cost including a ~percent incre=e could be $60 billion; the same inCreaSe could affect all other cost ‘Stimates’cwith a 50.percent cost increase, this cost could be $40 billion

NOTE: Some rows do not sum due to rounding.

Table F-2.—First Rough Estimate of the Total Cost/Year and the Net Public Cost/Year(in billions, 1984 dollars) for the First 5 Years, of Attaining the 10 Conceptual Objectives

Total cost (and the Total Net public cost Net publicyears) to attain each cost/year, (and the years) to attain cost/year,

“objective first 5 years each objective first 5 years

1. 2 (lo) 0.20 1 (lo) 0.102. 20 (15) 1.33 13 (15) 0.873. 2 (15) 0.13 2 (15) 0.134. 6 ( 5) 0.40 4 ( 5) 0.28

0.5 ( 5) 0.10 0.1 ( 5) 0.026 2 (lo) 0.20 0.2 (lo) 0.027. 0 (25) 0.00 0.0 (25) 0.008. 0.5 (lo) 0.05 0.5 (lo) 0.059. 5 (15) 0.33 5 (15) 0.33

10. 0.5 (25) 0.02 0 (25) 0.00=40 = 3 =26 ==2

Economic-Growth Considerations civilian space area to date, and considering only ex-penditures from now on.

To date, except for the satellite communicationsarea, the United States’ publicly supported civilianspace program has been essentially one of basic re-search, exploration, and development of technologyrequired to support both. Economic returns have beenexpected to result from general “spin off” to the pri-vate sector from these otherwise-directed R&D activ-ities. The general sense is that to some important ex-tent that has apparently happened, even though the

PROJECTED GROWTH IN PRIVATE SECTORSALES AND RELATED TAX REVENUES

Beyond the cost-offsetting financial participation ofother cooperating countries and our own private sec-tor, it is important to obtain some useful sense of thepresent, and future, marginal net cost to the U.S. gen-eral public of its civilian space activities—i e., settingaside further consideration of the over $200 billion(1984 adjusted) “sunk cost” of our investments in the

38-798 0 - 84 - 16 : QL 3


evidence on the macroeconomic level is admittedlydifficult to come by.

Let us start, therefore, probably conservatively butobjectively and reasonably quantitatively, by notingthat the present (1 983 year-end) U.S. commercial-in-dustrial space-related annual sales of capital equip-ment (essentially all in the satellite communicationsbusiness, for satellites, their launching, and their asso-ciated ground equipments) are some $1.6 billion/years If satellite insurance sales, operations and main-tenance (O&M) charges related to surface equipments,end-to-end circuit lease charges and lease charges forin-space microwave transponders (there are nowsome 400 in orbit which are owned by U.S. compa-nies) are added, total U.S. private-sector space-relatedsales are now probably $2 billion to $3 billion peryear.

This sales figure, at least in the satellite communi-cations long-haul circuit leasing area where recordshave been kept since the outset of private sector oper-ations (see INTELSAT’s annual reports) is a conse-quence of an average annual growth rate of some 15percent/year, compounded, for nearly the past 20years. 10

If it is assumed that the total of all Federal, State,and local tax rates on these sales averages 20 to 30percent, 11 then, roughly, $0. 5 billion/year in Govern-

ment tax revenues are now being derived from thesesales. Thus, while the gross civilian space-related Gov-ernment expenditures are some $7 billion/year today,in fact the net Government expenditures could beconsidered to be significantly Iess—i.e,, effectivelysome $6.5 billion/year (or some 7 percent) less.

Now, assume for the purpose of illustration that thetotal sales generated in the satellite communicationsarea, enlarged in time by space-related navigation,position fixing, remote sensing, materials processing,tourism, private launch and transportation services,space platform leasing, etc., continues to grow at thecurrent rate, i.e., some 15 percent/year, com-pounded–a doubling about every 5 years. The pro-jection for this rate of growth has been made by NASAand others and may prove to be conservative. The

gThis figure was provided to OTA by Janet Martinusen ot the AerospaceIndustries Association of America, Inc.)

IOln what follows, note that no attention is given either to the influence

of inflation or to any decrease in nonspace-related sales as a consequenceof the growth of space-related sales; i.e., this discussion must be considered—particularly by economists–as illustrative and qualitative, not methodologi-cally exhaustive and quantitative.

llfconomjc RepOr-f of the President, transmitted to the Congress, February1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984); Study of1982 Effective Tax Rates of Selected Large U.S. Corporations, prepared bythe staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, November 1983).

most recent projection, by Jerry Grey12 is that: “Sat-ellite communications demand is still growing rapidlyat between 20 and 30 percent per year and is pro-jected to continue at this rate to the end of the cen-tury, despite potential inroads by optical fibre cables.projections for turn-of-the-century annual volume(spacecraft, launch and integration services, and com-munications services themselves) range from $30 bil-lion to$100 billion.” A 15 percent/year, compounded,sales growth throughout 1984-2000 on a 1983 baseof $2 billion would produce sales of some $20 billionin 2000; on a $3 billion base, some $3o billion.

Of course, the rate of 15 percent/year, com-pounded, may prove to be optimistic. If, instead, a10 percent figure is used, the year 2000 sales projec-tion would exceed $10 billion on a present $2 billionbase, and $15 billion on a present $3 billion base.

Further, assume either that Government civilianspace-related expenditures remain at about $7.o bil-lion (1983) per year or that they grow, in real terms,at 1 percent per year, compounded, as is NASA’s de-sire and this administration’s expressed intention.

(No attention is given here as yet to the reimburse-ments made to the Government for the provision ofspace-related Government services—now almostwholly the reimbursement for the provision of Shut-tle flights.)

Under such circumstances and with such assump-tions, over time, the effective net Government costof supporting the civilian space program (in billionsof 1983 dollars) could be considered as decreasing ra-pidly. (See tables F-3 and F-4.)

Under either assumption regarding future NASA ap-propriations, and a projected 15 percent/year tax rev-enue increase, the “break-even” point would bereached in some 20 years; i.e., in one generation theeffective net public investment required to underwriteour entire Government civilian space program—eithera program of today’s magnitude or, by then, some 20percent larger–would be reduced to zero. Even withthe lower 10 percent/year tax revenue growth projec-tion, the effective net public cost would then be agreat deal less than today’s. And, over the next 20years, a total of tens of billions of dollars (1 984) in taxrevenues would have been generated.

This is such an important observation and prospectthat it bears further elaboration. For the prospect thatsuch extraordinary private-sector space-related salesand tax revenue projections might well be attainedsuggests that the Government could commit itself topromoting, vigorously and innovatively, the growth

!Z’’lnvesting In Space . . . ,“ Aerospace America, April 1984, p. 90.

App. F—Financing Considerations and Federal Budget Impacts • 221

Table F-3.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space. Related Sales,and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Federal Civilian Space Program

(billions of 1983 dollars per year– assuming a 15°/0 sales growth rate)

Government space expenditure net costTax revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983) increasing

Years growth @ 150A/year year (1983) at 1‘\OlyearO (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.55 (1988) 1,0 6.0 6.4

10 (1993) 2.0 5.0 5.715 (1998) 4.1 4.020 (2003) 8.2 (1.2) 0.325 (2008) 16.0 (9.5) (7.5)

Table F-4.—Growth in Tax Revenues From Private Sector Space-Related Sales,and Their Influence on the Net Cost of the Government Civilian Space Program

(billions of 1983 dollars per year–assuming a 10% sales growth rate)

Government space expenditure net cost

Tax revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983) increasingYears growth @ 10%/year year (1983) at 1‘/Olyear

O (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.55 (1988) 0.8 6.2 6.5

10 (1993) 1.3 5.7 6.415(1 998) 2.1 4.9 6.020 (2003) 3.4 3.6 5.125 (2008) 5.4 1.6 3.6

of commercial and industrial space-related sales. Thatis, the Federal Government, working in close concertwith the private sector, would work to see, over time,a great increase in such high-technology sales, therebygenerating proportionally much greater tax revenueswhich could be looked upon as “offsets” to the pub-lic R&D expenditures on space. Also, if successful,such an initiative would result in an effective transferof much of the responsibility for the health and growthof space-related economic activities from the publicto the private sector.

The President has just taken particular note of thispossibility: the July 20, 1984, White House “FactSheet” entitled “National Policy on the CommercialUse of Space” states that “In partnership with indus-try and academia, Government will expand basic re-search and development which may have implicationsfor investors aiming to develop commercial spaceproducts and services.”

Of course, private-sector gross revenues also can beexpected to support space-related commercial-indus-trial R&D. Again, assuming that sales grow at the aver-age annual rate of 10 to 15 percent, compounded, andassuming as well that about 5 percent of these salesis spent by the private sector on space-related R&D(probably a conservative assumption; C. Paul Christ-

ensen recently observed that: “ . . . a successful high-technology company normally must spend 5 to 10percent of its gross sales on R&D’’13) then, 20 yearsfrom now, a private-sector R&D investment rate ofsome $1 billion to $2 billion (1 984) per year wouldhave been reached.

The total Government investment (again, assumingthat NASA appropriations increase at 1 percent “realgrowth” per year, compounded) plus the commercial-industrial investment in space-related R&D would beexpected to increase substantially overtime. (See tableF-5, which assumes a 15 percent projected growth ratefor the private sector.) By the end of the next quarterof a century, the country’s overall space-related R&Dactivities could reach a level that would be nearlytwice the size of today’s Government program andthat, by then, would be increasing at some 5 per-cent/year, compounded.

These are extraordinary projections, and they couldwell turn out to be conservative ones.

To put such numbers into a space R&D and explora-tion perspective, note that a U.S. public expenditureof an average of some $1 billion/year over, say, 15

I Jsclence, Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117


Table F-5.—Growth in Yeariy U.S. Space investment,Federal (increasing at 1°/0 annually) Pius Private

(increasing at 150/0 annually)

Investment (billions of 1983 dollars per Year)Years Government Private TotalO (1983) 7.0 0.1 7.15 (1988) 7.4 0.3 7.7

10 (1993) 7.7 0.5 8.215 (1998) 8.1 1.0 9.120 (2003) 8.5 2.0 11.025 i2008) 9.0 4.1 13.0

to 20 years could allow us, along with other cooper-ating countries, to place a modest settlement on theMoon. In similar fashion, an additional some $2 bil-lion/year, over 20 to 30 years, could allow a firsthuman landing on the planet Mars. And each of thesesums would include paying for that kind and amountof LEO infrastructure specifically required to assurethe efficient operational conduct of these ventures,

HISTORICAL BASES FOR A PROJECTION OFSALES GROWTH IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR

While, of course, no brief can be held with com-plete confidence, either for the absolute rates of in-crease of space-related sales, or for such a long-termcontinuation thereof as is outlined here—and othercountries have also already clearly perceived the greatlonger-term economic prospects in the space area14–it must be remembered that the U.S. investment inthe publicly supported civilian space area has pro-vided an enormous base of assets, understanding andexperience for so doing; that the active interest of ourprivate commercial-industrial sector in investing inspace assets and activities, already non-trivial, isquickening; and that we have other high-technologygrowth “stories” as useful references: air transporta-tion, computers, radio, television, medical technol-ogy, communications, etc.

For instance, President Karl G, Harr of the Aero-space Industries Association observed, in his reportof December 1983, that “ . . . there has been a con-siderable acceleration in the building of commercialcommunications satellites . , . that’s just the beginningof an indicated boom; worldwide projections showenormous increases in demand for satellite commu-nications services between now and the end of thecentury.” And Secretary of Transportation ElizabethDole is recently quoted as saying, with reference to

14See the OTA rew~ on /nternatjona/ Cooperation and Competition inCivilian Space Activities, 1984.

that Department’s new responsibilities for the com-mercialization of expendable launch vehicles: “ . . .this involves ‘a whole new industry’ with growth pros-pects estimated at up to $10 billion over the next dec-ade. ”15

A recently published OTA report, InternationalCompetition in Electronics, notes that: “Sales of themore than 6,000 electronics manufacturers in theUnited States exceeded $125 billion in 1982 and aregrowing rapidly . . . the growth rate over the past dec-ade reached nearly 15 percent [per year, com-pounded].” 16-17

As one general example: Forbes magazine hasrecently 18 surveyed the sales growth of 25 leadingcompanies in the electronics area, comparing theaverage of such sales for the most recent 5 years withthe average of the preceding 5 years. The annualsales growth of the top one-half of the companies aver-aged 23 percent, compounded.

The early days of commercial radio provide anotherexample of how the growth rate of a newly introducedservice supported by new technology can attain phe-nomenal values. “[In] the spring of 1922 . . . the saleof radio sets, parts, and accessories amounted to morethan $60 million annually. By the end of 1929, saleshad climbed to a remarkable $843 million.”19 This isan annual growth rate of greater than 40 percent/year,compounded. More recently, lasers and their applica-tions have become at least as big a high-technologybusiness as has satellite communications, “In the past2 decades . . . the market for laser-related systems thatsolve practical problems has grown to over $3 billionper year , . . “2°

As an individual company example, over the past7 years the International Business Machines Corp.(IBM) has seen its sales grow at an average annual rateof 14 percent, compounded, and its top financial of-ficer was quoted late last year as venturing the predic-tion that “ . . . sales growth in the next several yearswill surpass the 14 percent rate . . . “;21 in fact, salesgrew 17 percent in 1983.22 Seven years ago IBM’s sales

J~Aerospace Daily, Jan. 19, 1984, pp. 97-98.lcNovember 1983, p. 108.17N4B. Neither this figure, nor any that follow which reference sales growth

in either absolute numbers or annual rates, have been adjusted to reflectthe unusually high inflation rates that held during the late 1970s and early1980s. Consequently, they are inherently “optimistic” if taken as an auguryof future sales growth. But, at the same time, this was an epoch during whichbusiness expansion was abnormally repressed by the same inflationa~ pres-sures—pressures that, one hopes, will not soon be repeated.

Iajan. 2, 1984, p. 176.IsSteven L. ~1 Sesto, “Technology and Social Change, ” in Technological

Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 24, pp. 183-196; see esp. p. 183.Zoscience, Apr. 13, 1984, P. 117.I} Wa// Street Journal, Dec. 9, 1983, P. 5.llwall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1984, p. 2.


were some $15 billion; today they are some $40 bil-lion, and 3 years from now could approximate $55billion. It is clear that the absolute size of sales is notnecessarily an impediment to further sales growthwhen desired new assets and services are being in-troduced and adopted—not even at the $30 billion to$50 billion/year level.

Other, more recent, high-technology commercial-industrial examples abound. Over approximately thepast decade (ending in 1982) the average annual com-pound growth rate in sales (taken from Moody’s orindividual company reports) for the CommunicationsSatellite Cooperation was 15 percent; for INTELSATand Texas Instruments: 16 percent; for Hewlett-Pack-ard: 23 percent; and for MCI: 68 percent.

Thus, it does seem reasonable to expect that, withenergetic and innovative consideration explicitly givento cooperative Government-private sector promotionof United States commercial-industrial space invest-ments and initiatives—initiatives directed both toopening up new uses related to space and to reduc-ing the unit cost of producing space assets and con-ducting space operations–the next quarter of a cen-tury could see truly important, perhaps outstanding,growth in our civilian space-related sales, with all thatthis should imply for employment, tax revenues, in-ternational trade, etc. As the earlier referenced OTAreport succinctly states: “ . . . the United States needsto search for new engines of growth to drive the econ-omy into the 21st century . . . “23 and “ . . . specialstress should be laid on . . . R&D and technology plusmeasures aimed at stimulating investment in new andinnovative firms . . . “24 And, as a recent WashingtonPost article emphasized: “America’s strength in ex-porting is not in standardized, commodity products,but in high-technology specialized products that drawon the huge pool of American know-how and exper-tise;] specialized, higher technology products . . . areAmerica’s bread and butter.”25-26

LEGAL AND EXPERIENTIAL BASES FORFEDERAL/PRIVATE-SECTOR COOPERATION IN

ECONOMICALLY DIRECTED R&D

It is important to note that there is some precedentin Federal law for exploring Government-private sec-tor initiatives in stimulating sales in a high-technology

13/nternatjona/ com~titfon in Electronics, p. 466.Z41bld., p. 502.~sjan, 8, 1984, P, G l/G826 Notably, in the private commercial-industrial world, the sPace area is

not yet even considered to be important in terms of “high technology”-see U.S. News and World Report, Jan. 16, 1984, p. 38 where, in de fintng“High Technology: What Is It?,” space assets and activities go unmentioned.

domain such as space. The “Stevenson-Wydler Tech-nology Innovation Act of 1980”27 states: “(a) Policy.It is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Gov-ernment to ensure the full use of the result of the Na-tion’s Federal investment in research and develop-ment. To this end, the Federal Government shall strive. . . to transfer federally . . . originated technol-ogy . . . to the private sector. ” Also, for instance, theDepartment of Defense (DOD), using the 1982 author-ity incorporated into formal law by inclusion of appro-priate language in Title 10 of the United States Code,Section 22394, employs very long-term contracting forutility services in its “Venture Capital Energy Procure-ment Program by the Military Services. ”28 DOD usesthis program to excite the private sector to developand use new technology to provide DOD with energyservices at lower cost than otherwise; this approachis now being replicated by certain States and munici-palities.

And the features of the “Small Business InnovationDevelopment Act of 1982,”29 which was enacted to(among other things) “ . . . utilize Federal researchand development as a base for technological innova-tion [so as] to contribute to the growth and strengthof the Nation’s economy, ” also could be utilized byNASA, NOAA, DOT and other space-related execu-tive branch offices. This act requires that as much as1 1/4 percent of the “annual extramural” R&D appro-priations of most major Federal agencies be spent withsmaller and, presumably, more aggressive, more en-trepreneurial, business organizations.

Perhaps, say, a small fraction of 1 percent of the totalannual NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT appropria-tions could be spent directly and specifically to promptactivities that offer reasonable promise of furtheringthe growth of space-related sales in our private sec-tor. In close concert with our private space-relatedbusiness sector, the Government, in order to realizea more effective linkage of its R&D to the private mar-ketplace, could use these funds to help “focus” thescientific, exploration, and technological results of theother 99.5 percent on the task of increasing businesssales.

Such a requirement would be somewhat analogousto that holding for the nine national laboratories thatoperate under the aegis of the Department of Energy.Under the terms of the Stevenson-Wydler Act (sec.11 (b)) these laboratories are obligated to spend notless than 1/2 percent of their funds on activities that

ITpub[lc Law 96-480, Sec. 11. Utilization of Federal Technology, Oct. 21,

1980.Zasee an article by this title in the 10th Energy Technology Conference Re-

port, p. 230 et seq.‘qPublic Law 97-219.


would see the technology that they develop, usingFederal funds, “transferred” to our private sector. Thepotential power of such an approach is a matter ofpublic record. One of these laboratories, Sandia,spends more than 1 percent of its budget in this fash-ion, and has had a long list of successful transfers. 30

In one area alone, that of clean-room technology usedby hospitals and electronics companies, Sandia esti-mates that sales have now reached $200-million/yearby 70 companies. Much as in the case of satellite com-munications and NASA (but scaled down by just anorder of magnitude), the total tax revenues providedby such sales, probably some $50 million, is some 8percent of Sandia’s $7oO million annual budget.

In an article entitled “The Making of a Conserva-tive Science Policy,” Wil Lepkowski observes that:

from 1982 onward [the present] Administra-. . .tion . . . drew back from its original insistence that thegovernment had no business developing new tech-nologies for the private sector. ” He suggests that: “Infact, there is nothing wrong with the government’s de-veloping ideas, concepts, and hardware for the pri-vate sector to exploit for the good of the public.” Andhe concludes: “What the administration will noticein 1984, and try to stimulate, is evidence from researchagencies that their programs are contributing to theeconomy, innovation, and productivity. We can ex-pect to see growing evidence of the major contribu-tion of the conservative revolution: closer and closerintegration of economics with science and technolo-gy. After many decades, policymakers are doing a bet-ter job of bringing the two together. That, by itself,is an achievement.”31 The President’s 1984 State ofthe Union address and his subsequent radio addressboth bear out Lepkowski’s expectation in the civilianspace area,

The Congressional Research Service recently ob-served that: “ . . . many analysts believe that Federalpolicy to harmonize governmental and private sec-tor support of private science and technology proba-bly could be improved significantly without [an ex-cessive] degree of government-private sectorcollusion . . . “32 And it prepared a report for the useof the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-portation of the United States Senate that notes that:33

“With increasing [prospects] of space commercializa-tion . . . the Government may have to provide fund-

jOTechno/ogy Transfer at Sandia National Laboratories: First Annual Re-port, SAND83-0345, March 1983.

31 Technology Review, January 1984, p. 39 et SW.j?jee the CRS Review, January 1984, p. 14.

3Wongressional Research Service, “Policy and Legal Issues Involved in the

Commercialization of Space” published as a Committee Print (No. 98-102),Sept. 23, 1983, pp. 17-18.

ing if the private-sector [at the outset] is unwilling orunable to fund the R&D [and it] may be necessary toincrease support for initial R&D funded by the Gov-ernment if commercial activity is deemed important.”The report raises serious questions as to “. . . the ef-fectiveness of [the] mechanisms [now used by NASA]for promoting [space] commercialization,” But theheretofore-mentioned example of Sandia and, for in-stance, the pressure for AT&T’s Bell Labs, with its $2billion/year budget, to become consumer- and market-oriented, 34 suggests that the executive branch, andespecially NASA and Commerce/NOAA/DOT, if prop-erly prompted by the President and Congress and ledby imaginative, experienced, and tough-minded lead-ers, could make the required transition. For instance,NASA’s recent request for proposals for a Shuttle mar-keting support contract is an important step in thatdirection.35 So is Executive Order #12465 (February24, 1984), designating the Department of Transpor-tation as the lead agency “for encouraging and facili-tating commercial ELV activities by the United Statesprivate sector.”

THE SPACE-RELATED PRIVATE SECTOR GROWS UP

Slowly, the private sector is learning more aboutspace, more about the prospects of doing businessthere, and more about how to deal with the Govern-ment in so doing.

For instance, NASA and the 3M Co., St. Paul, MN,signed a memorandum of understanding earlier thisyear that will enable the company to fly aboard theShuttle several experiments related to the growth oforganic crystals and the development of thin films.NASA has signed one major joint endeavor agreementwith McDonnell Douglas and Johnson & Johnson forthe production of pharmaceuticals in space, and cur-rently is in discussions with approximately 20 com-panies contemplating future space endeavors.

Other firms have been involved in discussing a widerange of experimental activities such as electroplatingenhancement, improvement in catalytic materials, for-mation of glass alloys, research in long-term bloodstorage, development of remote-sensing techniques,development of smaller space vehicles and compo-nents of a “space station,” etc. The firms include: Fair-child, Micro-Gravity Research Associates, John Deere,Space Industries Inc., DuPont, Honeywell, A.D. Lit-tle, Orbital Sciences Corp., American Science andTechnology Corp., Ball Aerospace, C2Spaceline,Sparx, Spaceco Ltd., and Astrotech.

Jtsee /formation Technology Research and Development, OTA, in Press.MNASA tndust~ Briefing for STS Marketing, May 1, 1%4.


Of greatest importance in considering the matter ofthe Government’s working to promote growing pri-vate-sector sales i n the civilian space-related area are,of course, the views and policies of the leaders of boththe legislative branch and the executive branch, par-ticularly the President himself. President Reagan hasmade his views and desires clearly known. In his radioaddress of January 28, 1984, he stated: “We expectspace-related investments to grow quickly in futureyears . . . .NASA, along with other departments andagencies, will . . . promote private investment. . . we’re going to bring into play . . . the vitality ofour free enterprise system. ”

So, whatever views the administration has in regardto close cooperation between the Government andthe U.S. private sector in general, and however muchattention such cooperation receives in other areas, itis now clearly, indeed forcefully, on record as sup-porting it between civilian space-related offices suchas NASA and the commercial-i ndustrial-financial in-stitutions that can be expected to profit from such co-operation. To repeat: “ . . . NASA . . . will promoteprivate investment , . . ,“

And, of course, to the extent that the private sectorprovides space assets and operational services thattechnology, the marketplace, and its growing free-enterprise capabilities allow, and conducts RDT&E ac-t iv i t ies a t the mul t ib i l l ion-do l lar /year leve l , NASAwould be able to concentrate on the more basic re-search, the more demanding space exploration, andthe more exotic “cutting edge” technology requiredto support both.36 First hints of the potential of sucha private sector move are beginning to appear: Rock-well International is studying the commercial con-struction, launch, and maintenance of a private-sectorin-orbit “electric utility, ” costing more than a billiondollars, that would be prepared to offer electrical pow-er as a service to a host of space operations; J’ SpaceIndustries is readying itself to develop, produce, anddeploy a sophisticated space platform by 1988; theAstrotech Corp. is holding discussions about their pur-chasing a Shuttle Orbiter at a price of some $2 billion(1984); etc.

Impacts on the Federal (NASA)Space Budget

What can be concluded from simply studying andprojecting the Federal civilian space program budgetitself?

jbsee the article by George Mueller in Aerospace America, January 1984,

p. 84 et seq.ITsee the International Section of Renewable Energy News, December

1983.

As an initial reference point, the NASA fiscal year1984 budget authorized by Congress is adopted. It isusually presented in the general form of table F-6. (Thedata source is the Congressional Record. In all thatfollows, rounding can influence the last figure in sums.All other Government civilian space expenditures aresmall relative to NASA’s, and their inclusion wouldunnecessarily complicate this discussion.) Inasmuchas only the space R&D elements of this budget are ofconcern here, this table presents just these.

Table F-6 shows that $2 billion will be spent on Shut-tle production (Space Transportation Capabilities De-velopment) in fiscal year 1984. The Shuttle produc-tion and development program is nearly complete;when it ends, there will be about $2 billion that isunspoken for in the NASA budget, if current fundinglevels continue.

Two other financial matters must be taken into con-sideration: the reimbursement to the Government forShuttle transportation services when the Shuttle is usedby the private sector and other countries; and the 1percent/year real growth in funds that would be madeavailable to NASA if the present administration’s ex-pressed budget views in this regard for future fiscalyears are accepted by Congress and continue indefi-nitely.

That the payments for use of Shuttle launch serv-ices are already reimbursing the Government for 4percent of the publicly funded civilian space program,and that these payments are now expected to growto truly important dimensions soon (perhaps 14 per-cent by 1989), should be appreciated by all with a seri-ous interest in the cost of this program. The NASA Ad-

Table F-6.—NASA Overall Authorization forFiscal Year 1984 (billions of dollars)

A. R&D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.88B. Construction and facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.13C. Program management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.24

D. Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . =$7.30The R&D element (A, above) consists of external

contract funds for:1. Space transportation capabilities

development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.012. Space transportation operations . . . . . . . . 1.553. Physics and astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.564. Planetary exploration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.225. Life sciences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.066. Space applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.317. Technology utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.018. Aeronautical research and technology . . . 0.329. Space research and technology. . . . . . . . . 0.14

10. Tracking and data acquisition . . . . . . . . . . 0.70

=$5.90


ministrator has reported at a press briefing36 that thereimbursements—primarily for Shuttle flight serv-ices—approached $300 million in fiscal year 1984, andthat he expects that they will approximate some $7OO

million in fiscal year 1985. Further, he stated that: “1still anticipate reaching the break-even point in 1988or 1989. ”

Thus (even without considering the cost-offsettingimportance of tax revenues generated by private-sec-tor space business) the net cost to the public of ourpublicly funded civilian space program even now issignificantly less than the gross cost because of thisShuttle cost reimbursement: it is $6.6 billion net outof $6.9 billion gross. Next year the expected reim-bursement income would more than offset a 4 per-cent inflation rate. (Considering the tax revenues asan additional effective “offset” would reduce the $6.6billion to $6.1 billion. That is, the net cost could beconsidered to be some 11 percent less than the grosscost, and falling.)

And, finally, NASA now has some reason to expectthat funds for its program would increase by 1 per-cent/year plus any inflationary increase. If inflationcompensation plus 1 percent real growth becomesemplaced in NASA’s annual appropriations, it wouldhave important influence on the pace at which space-related objectives, such as those suggested here, couldbe pursued. A 1 percent “real growth” on a base of$7 billion/year would provide a total addition of some$10 billion by the end of this century, and a total ap-proaching $25 billion in the next 25 years—i.e., anaverage of some $1 billion per year (1984$) over thislatter interval.

Under the assumptions made here, three conclu-sions may be reached concerning cost and financingconsiderations:

1. In the absence of any private-sector or other-country financial participation-i .e., under cir-cumstances whereby the full cost of addressingthe ten conceptual objectives would be defrayedby U.S. public funds, and assuming that the fundscontinuing to become available year-to-yearwould be in the same amount as those now avail-able under NASA’s “budget envelope,” then,starting 2-3 years hence, the essential completionof Shuttle-related development could providesome $2 billion (1984) /year—i,e., some $50 bil-lion (1984$) over the next quarter of a century,

2. If, to this RDT&E “wedge” is added the antici-pated 1 percent/year “real growth” in appropria-tions, in addition to an indexing of appropriationsto neutralize the influence of inflation, the next

3.

4.

25 years could see a total of some $25 billion(1984$) added to the $50 billion made availablethrough the Shuttle RDT&E completion—i.e., atotal of some $75 billion (1984$). Thus, just thesetwo measures alone would suffice to see (fromthe financial viewpoint alone) that the ten con-ceptual objectives could be satisfactorily ad-dressed within the next quarter of a century.If the two preceding assumptions are retained,and if, in addition, the full cost were to be sharedby other countries and our private sector, in thefashions and to the degrees outlined earlier, thismeasure (again, speaking just of financial, not po-litical or technological circumstances) would al-low the ten conceptual objectives to be attainedin, say, 20 years since this would allow some $15billion (1984$) of public funds to be used to accel-erate the schedule. Alternatively, the 1 percentper year “real growth” and/or the “base” figureof $2 billion could be reduced.Whether or not such public and other funds areindeed made available could be influenced, pos-itively and importantly, by two other circum-stances:● If the incorne from other countries and the pri-

vate sector for the use of the Shuttle increasesas is now hoped/expected, then, in a half-dozenyears or so, this would amount to NASA appro-priations being, in effect, “offset” by as muchas some $2 billion (1984$) per year;

. If our private space-related sector could be stim-ulated to maintain its present rate of salesgrowth, it could begin to make significant addi-tional space R&D investments itself—invest-ments that could grow to billions of dollars/yearin the next two decades or so; and

. If the tax revenues “thrown off” by our privatesector’s commercial-industrial sales continue toincrease in the future as they have in the past,i.e., if a 10 to 15 percent per year, compounded,growth rate were to continue over the next quar-ter of a century, they could, at least to some ex-tent, be looked upon also as an important “off-set” to the gross public cost of our publiclysupported space program, inasmuch as theywould amount to scores of billions of dollars(1984$).

Clearly, under such generaI circumstances as these,funding limitations would not prevent the UnitedStates from undertaking an ambitious publicly sup-ported civilian space program throughout the nextquarter century.

aaThe Washinflon Post, Feb. 6, 1984, page A-9.

Appendix G

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONSAND TERMS

Glossary of Acronyms andAbbreviations

ACC – Aft Cargo CarrierAEM – Applications Explorer ModuleASO – Advanced Solar ObservatoryASTO – Advanced Solar Terrestrial Ob-

servatoryASEB – Aeronautics and Space Engineering

Board (of the NRC)AXAF – Advanced X-Ray Astrophysics Fa-

cilityB — BillionBOB – Bureau of the BudgetCDG – Concept Development GroupCNES – Centre National D’Etudes Spatiales

(France)CNR – National Research Council (Italy)COM – Center of MassC O M M — CommunicationsCOMSAT – Communications Satellite Cor-

porationDBS – Direct Broadcast SatelliteDDT&E – Design, Development, Test, and

EvaluationDMS – Data Management SubsystemDOC – Department of CommerceDOD – Department of DefenseDOT – Department of TransportationECLSS – Environmental Control and Life Sup-

port SubsystemEDO – Extended Duration OrbiterELV – Expendable Launch VehicleEOL – Earth-Orbiting LaboratoryEOS – Electrophoresis Operations in SpaceEPS – Electrical Power SubsystemESA – European Space AgencyET — External TankEUMETSAT – European Meteorological Satell i te

Organ izat ionE U R E C A – European Retrievable CarrierEUTELSAT – European Telecommunications Sat-

ell ite OrganizationEVA – Extravehicular Activity (“walking in

Space”)FF — Free Flyer

g – Gravity

GEO – Geostationary Earth Orbit (some-times, less precisely, geosyn-chronous)

GN&C – Guidance, Navigation, and ControlGPS – Global Positioning [Space] System

(see NAVSTAR)HEO – High Earth OrbitIMS – Information Management SubsystemINMARSAT – International! Maritime Satellite Cor-

INTELSAT

IOCISAS

ISFISTOIVAJEAJSCKbps

KSCkgkWLDEFLDRLEO

LIDARLSSM

MACMASMBBMbps

M D AMESA

MMSM M UMOLMORL

MOSC

poration— International Telecommunication

Satellite Corporation— Initial Operational Capability— Institute of Space and Astronautical

Science (Japan)— Industrial Space Facility— Initial Solar Terrestrial Observatory— Intravehicular Activity– Joint Endeavor Agreement– Johnson Space Center— Kilobits per second (of data

handling)— Kennedy Space Center— kilogram (2.2 pounds)– kilowatt— Long Duration Exposure Facility— Large Deployable Reflector— Low-Earth-Orbit (usually 200-600

km)— Light Detection and Ranging– Large Space System— Million— meter (3.3 feet)— Modular Attitude Control— Mission Analysis Study— Messerschmitt-Boelkow-BIohm— Megabits per second (of data

handling)— Multiple Docking Adaptor— Modular Experimental Platform for

Science and Applications— Multimission Modular Spacecraft— Manned Maneuvering Unit— Manned Orbiting Laboratory— Manned Orbital Research Lab-

oratory— Manned Orbital Systems Concept

227


MPSMSCMSFCNACNAENASNASA

NASDA

NAVSTAR

NOAA

NRC

O&MOART

OAST

OMBOMSOMSF

OMV

OSMOTAOTVOWSPEPP/LPOVR&DRCSRD&P

RDT&E

r.f.RMSROTVRWGSAB

SDVSOC

— Materials Processing in Space— Manned Spacecraft Center— Marshall Space Flight Center— NASA Advisory Council— National Academy of Engineering— National Academy of Sciences— National Aeronautics and Space

Administration— National Space Development

Agency (Japan)— DOD Satellite Navigation System

(see GPS)— National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (within DOC)— National Research Council (of the

NAS-NAE)— Operations and Maintenance— Office of Advanced Research and

Technology (within NASA)— Office of Aeronautics and Space

Technology (within NASA)— Office of Management and Budget— Orbital Maneuvering System— Office of Manned Space Flight

(within NASA)— Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (for-

merly designated TMS)— Orbital Service Module— Office of Technology Assessment— orbital Transfer Vehicle— Orbital Workshop— Power Extension Package— Payload— proximity Operation Vehicle— Research and Development— Reaction Control System— Research, Development, and Pro-

duction— Research, Development, Test, and

Evaluation (or Engineering)— Radio Frequency— Remote Manipulator System— Reusable Orbital Transfer Vehicle— Requirements Working Group— Space Applications Board (of the

NRC)— Shuttle Developed Vehicle– Space Operations Center

S O L A R I S – European Space Platform ConceptSPAS – Space Pallet SatelliteSPS – Solar Power SatelliteSPSS – Shuttle Payload Support StructureSS – Space StationSSB – Space Science Board (of the NRC)

SSECSSSAS

SSTF

STG

STSTDRSTDRSS

TMS

TMVTRKNGTRSTSVTUSKVAFBWBS

— Solar System Exploration Committee— Space Station Systems Analysis

Study— Space Station Task Force (within

NASA)— Space Task Group (of the National

Security Council)– Space Transportation System– Tracking and Data Relay Satellite– Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

System— Teleoperator Maneuvering System

(former designation for OMV)— Transport Modular Vehicle— Tracking— Teleoperator Retrieval System— Teleoperator Service System— Tethered Upper Stage Knob— Vandenberg Air Force Base— Work Breakdown Structure

Glossary of Terms

Base–the central or core set of interrelated, and per-haps interconnected, 28.5° LEO infrastructure(“space station”) modules including facilities forpower, docking, control, and human habitation.

Cargo bay–the Space Shuttle’s central fuselage sec-tion (openable to space) in which cargo, equip-ment, and experiment modules are carried.

Core–(see base.)Cosmos 1443-a Soviet resupply vehicle for Salyut or-

biting spacecraft.Element–any module, platform, free flyer, or vehi-

cle which is an integral part of the in-space infra-structure, and dependent on one or more other ele-ment(s) for its long-term operation.

Free flyer–an unattached or free-flying uninhabitablesatellite (usually dedicated to one purpose or activ-ity) which is serviced by or otherwise dependenton other infrastructure elements.

Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellitewhose circular orbit lies in the plane of the Earth’sequator and which thus remains fixed relative tothe Earth; by extension, a satellite whose positionremains approximately fixed relative to the Earth;its altitude is necessarily approximately 35,000 kmabove the Earth’s surface.

Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite whoseperiod of revolution is equal to the period of rota-tion of the Earth about its axis.

Infrastructure-a generic term referring to all the ele-ments constituting an interdependent space sup-

Glossary of Acronyms, Abbreviations and Terms Ž 229

port system, consisting of surface and in-spaceelements.

Leasecraft-proposed commercial, long-term, unpres-surized platform that could be used for Earth obser-vation, materials processing in space, etc.

Low-Earth-Orbit (LEO)–an orbit around the Earth ataltitudes usually ranging from 200 to 600 km andlocated at any of various inclinations to the Equator.

Megabit-a data communications rate of 1 million bits(or units) per second.

Module—an element of the infrastructure base or corewhich provides a unique function for infrastructureoperations.

Orbiter–the Shuttle vehicle of the NASA Space Trans-portation System.

Orbit transfer–change of orbit, usually to one of sig-nificantly different altititude or inclination.

order of Magnitude–factor of 10.Pallet–an open structure attached to an element of

infrastructure that provides mounting for equip-ment, vehicles, or experiments.

Platform–an orbiting multi-use structure capable ofsupplying limited utilities to changeable payloadsand dependent on other infrastructure elements;usually uninhabitable except, perhaps for some, forservicing.

Polar orbit–an orbit whose plane intersects theEarth’s axis of rotation.

Salyut–a Soviet inhabited “space station” in LEO, thefirst model of which was launched in 1971.

Satellite–a body that revolves around another bodyof preponderant mass and that has a motion pri-marily and permanently determined by the gravita-tional forces of attraction between them; generallyapplied here to an object revolving about the Earth.

Shuttle-the reusable passenger- and cargo-carryingsurface-LEO vehicle of the NASA Space Transpor-tation System; sometimes referred to as the SpaceShuttle Orbiter.

Skylab–an independent orbiting laboratory com-posed principally of hardware remaining from theApollo program; inhabited by crews of astronautsduring 1973-1974.

Spacelab–a laboratory module, designed and pro-duced by ESA, carried into and out of orbit in theShuttle cargo bay and supported by the Shuttlepower and life support systems.

Space probe–a spacecraft designed to travel out ofthe gravitational field of the Earth to explore otherparts of the solar system.

Space station–a totality of habitable and uninhabit-able Earth-orbiting interdependent infrastructureelements constituting a long term in-space supportsystem.

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS)–acommunications system used to relay data directlybetween orbiting vehicles and a single U.S. groundstation at White Sands, NM.

Index

broadening the debate, 103-110need for goals and objectives, 105policy background, 106President Reagan’s call for a “space station, ” 109r e c e n t p r o p o s a l s , 1 0 8

space infrastructure as methods and means, 103steps toward broader participation, 110

buyer’s guide to space infrastructure, 85alternative funding rates, 94catalog of space infrastructure, 87cost drivers, 91people and automation in space, 92procurement

Congress:House:

CommitteeCommittee

109Senate:

CommitteeCommittee

tion, 4

options, 85

on the Budget, 4on Science and Technology, 4, 44, 46,

on Appropriations, 4, 60on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-

European Space Agency (ESA), 39, 56, 66, 155, 189evolution of civilian in-space infrastructure, 159-176

Apollo anomaly, 161beginnings of post-Apollo planning, 164earliest space infrastructure, 159NASA’s post-Apollo ambitions dashed, 170post-Apollo planning under Thomas Paine, 166recent in-space infrastructure, 172response to Sputnik, 1957-61Skylab: an interim “Space Station, ” 171“Space Station” plans: during the 1960s, 162

financing considerations and Federal budget impacts,217-226

infrastructure options, 7funding rate options, 12procurement options, 10technology options, 7

comparison of options, 8space infrastructure platforms, 9

infrastructure required, 17cost, 18financing, 19technology, 17

INTELSAT, 39, 40internationaI involvement i n a civiIian ‘‘space station’

program, 177-205assessment: pros and cons, 203-205factors influencing assessment of international involve-

ment, 198-203possible modes of international involvement, 185-189potential international partners, 189Why international involvement?, 177-185

issues and findings, 25-46

civilian “space station s,” 31-35alternatives, 33concerns about LEO infrastructure, 32cost of LEO infrastructure, 33infrastructure in LEO, 31

general, 25-31NASA’s circumstances, 25-28transitions, 28

possible legislative initiatives, 43-46civilian space policies, goals, objectives, and

strategies, 45creation of space policy study centers, 46strategies for acquiring any new in-space civilian in-

frastructure, 43U.S. future in space, 35-43

arena of peaceful cooperation, 40cost reduction, 37international space cooperation, 39long-term space goals and objectives, 35long-term space strategies, 37NASA’s changing role, 41non-Government policy studiesprivate sector, 38

legislation:Comsat Act of 1962, 103National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 25, 35,

103, 106, 110National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1985, 30, 45

National Academy of Sciences, 61National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),

4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 21, 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 38,39, 42, 43, 49, 58-60, 103-104

Solar System Exploration Committee, 61National Commission on Space, 16, 30, 31, 214National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA), 29, 30, 38, 39, 40National Research Council, 49, 61NATO, 29, 39National Weather Service, 29need for goals and objectives, 13Nixon administration, 106

OTA workshop on cost containment of civilian spaceinfrastructure, synopsis of, 206-213

People’s Republic of China, 56, 85possible goals and objectives, 15Presidential Space Task Group, 106

Ramo, Simon, 108rational for space infrastructure, 4-7Reagan, President Ronald, 107, 109relation of a “space station” to the U.S. future in space,

3Report of the Second Advisory Panel Meeting, held at

Aspen-Wye Plantation, November 1983, 133-139analysis capability, 134

233


current space station proposal, 133effect of military programs and interests, 137geopolitical competition, 138immediate alternatives to a space station, 135international cooperation, 136international economic competition, 138long-term mission possibilities, 135NASA operations and organization, 138private-sector involvement, 136R&D, 134

results of principal NASA studies on space station usesand functional requirements, 141-158

major findings of the U.S. aerospace industry “Mis-sion Analysis Studies, ” 141

AEG, British Aerospace, Fokker, CIR, 156Aerospatiale, 156Canada, 156costs and benefits, 147Dornier, 156European Space Agency, 155evolution of the initial capability, 146functional capabilities, 143individual foreign company interests, 156infrastructure elements, 145Japan, 156phased activities (mission sets), 143role of a human crew, 146users and uses, 141

NASA synthesis of the “Mission Analysis Studies, ” 157nonaerospace industry interest in Space use, 158

shape of the space future, 19international, 20new role for NASA, 21private sector, 20

space infrastructure, 49-82alternative infrastructure, 62-82

habitable infrastructure, 70Columbus, 75Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO), 70Spacelab, 72-75

uninhabitable platforms, 62Boeing MESA, 64EURECA, 66Fairchild LEASECRAFT, 62Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), 66MBB SPAS, 66Pleiades Concept, 66Shuttle Payload Support Structure (SPSS), 66SOLARIS, 69Space Industries Platform, 66

shuttle as permanent infrastructure, 77considerations for any space infrastructure, 50-58

LEO environment, 51orbits, 50space transportation, 54

expendable launch vehicle (ELV), 56manned maneuvering unit (MMU), 56orbital maneuvering vehicle (OMV), 56reusable orbital transfer vehicle (ROTV), 56shuttle, 55

technical considerations, 52attitude control and stabilization, 52data management, 52electromagnetic interference (EM I), 52life support systems, 54power, 53propulsion, 54thermal energy management, 53

NASA’s approach to space infrastructure, 58-60infrastructure functions, 60mission analysis studies, 58

National Research Council, 61

Title n-National Commission on Space (P. L. 98-361),214-216

toward a goal-oriented civilian space program, 113cost and schedule, 124indicated infrastructure, 122possible goals, 113possible objectives, 113

global disaster avoidance, 115human presence and activities on the Moon, 117increasing commercial-industrial space sales, 120medical research of direct interest to the general

public, 117modernizing and expanding international short-wave

broadcasting, 118obtaining information required for eventual human

exploration of Mars and some asteroids, 117people drawn from the general public, in space,

118providing space data directly to the general public,

118reducing the cost of space transportation, 120using space and space technology for the transmis-

sion of electrical energy, 119

U.S. Department of Defense, 4, 29, 30, 39U.S. Department of Transportation, 38U. S. S. R., 5, 45

U.s . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1984 0 - 38-798 : QL 3

Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in SpaceWilbur L. Pritchard president Satellite Systems...

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Transcript of Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in SpaceWilbur L. Pritchard president Satellite Systems...