Civilian protection in the battle for Mosul: critical priorities

Cover photo:Mosul, Iraq, 19 October 2016: Smokerises from Bashiqa town following acoalition airstrike during theoperation to retake Iraq's Mosulfrom Daesh (ISIS).

© Ferhat Jahan Panah/AnadoluAgency/Getty Images

© Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights andMinority Rights Group InternationalOctober 2016

This report has been produced as part of the Ceasefire project, a multi-year pro-gramme supported by the European Union to implement a system of civilian-ledmonitoring of human rights abuses in Iraq, focusing in particular on the rights of vul-nerable civilians including vulnerable women, internally-displaced persons (IDPs),stateless persons, and ethnic or religious minorities, and to assess the feasibility ofextending civilian-led monitoring to other country situations.

This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union.The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the publishers and can underno circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.

Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights

The Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights is a new initiative to develop ‘civilian-ledmonitoring’ of violations of international humanitarian law or human rights, topursue legal and political accountability for those responsible for such violations,and to develop the practice of civilian rights. The Ceasefire Centre for CivilianRights is registered as a charity and a company limited by guarantee under Englishlaw; charity no: 1160083, company no: 9069133.

Minority Rights Group International

MRG is an NGO working to secure the rights of ethnic, religious and linguisticminorities and indigenous peoples worldwide, and to promote cooperation andunderstanding between communities. MRG works with over 150 partner orga-nizations in nearly 50 countries. It has consultative status with the United NationsEconomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and observer status with the African Com-mission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). MRG is registered as a charityand a company limited by guarantee under English law; charity no: 282305,company no: 1544957.

Written by Mark Lattimer, Miriam Puttick and Mays Al-Juboori.

Report designed by Staša Sukic.

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IntroductionIraq’s second city, Mosul, had a pre-war population of some2.5 million. Situated on the banks of the Tigris in the gover-norate of Ninewa, Mosul occupies a strategic position withIraqi Kurdistan and the culturally-diverse Nineveh plain tothe north and east, and the Syrian border and the oil fieldsof Deir Ezzor to the west.

Ever since Mosul was captured by the forces of the IslamicState of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in June 2014, the Govern-ment of Iraq and its international partners have declaredtheir determination to retake the city. In the intervening pe-riod, civilians in Mosul have suffered gross violations at thehands of ISIS, including but not limited to murder, extra-ju-dicial executions, cruel treatment, rape, sexual slavery, pil-lage and forcible population displacement.

With the start of the assault on Mosul by forces of the Iraqigovernment and the international coalition, the risk to civil-ians has reached a critical level. The UN has warned of thepotential displacement of over one million people fromMosul, to add to Iraq’s existing IDP population of 3.3 million,and humanitarian agencies have begun planning for amajor crisis. However, planning for the humanitarian fall-out from the battle of Mosul only addresses one part of thechallenge for civilian protection. Recent operations to ‘lib-erate’ or retake smaller population centres in central andwestern Iraq, or in Syria, have been marked by indiscrimi-nate bombardments, the use of banned weapons, the use ofcivilians as hostages or ‘human shields’, reprisal attacksagainst civilians or those hors de combat, as well as masspopulation flight and the extensive physical destruction ofresidential areas, infrastructure and other civilian objects.

This briefing draws on such recent precedents to identifythe critical risks to civilians in Mosul and surrounding areas

of Ninewa and the corresponding priorities for civilian pro-tection. It calls for an effective system of responsibility andaccountability across parties to the conflict to ensure adher-ence with international humanitarian law (IHL) and inter-national human rights standards.

All parties to the conflict, including the government of Iraq,members of the international coalition, ISIS and other non-state actors, are bound by the provisions of the Geneva Con-ventions of 1949, including their common Article 3concerning conflicts not of an international character, otherrelevant IHL instruments, and customary international hu-manitarian law. While this briefing draws attention to pro-visions which are at particular risk of being violated, nothingin the discussion should be taken to question the need for allparties to the conflict to abide by the full range of their obli-gations under IHL and, where applicable, human rights law.

The conduct of hostilitiesReliable figures for the current population of Mosul, or forthe number of ISIS-affiliated fighters in the city, are not ob-tainable. However, ISIS strength has been variously esti-mated at between 5,000 and 15,000 and the entire populationof Mosul and the surrounding area at between one and twomillion. The probable ratio of fighters to civilians is thusunder one in 100. In such a situation it is necessary to stressthe fundamental importance of the principle of distinction,that is, the need to distinguish at all times between armedforces and those directly participating in hostilities, who maybe subject to attack, and the civilian population.

Precautions in attack and the prohibitionon indiscriminate attacks

In advance of any military attack, IHL requires precautionarymeasure to be taken to spare the civilian population and civil-

Civilian protection inthe battle for Mosul:critical priorities

4 Civilian protection in the battle for Mosul: critical priorities

ian objects. These include verifying the military na-ture of any objective, and taking all feasible precau-tions in the choice of means or methods of attack(such as the choice of weapon or the timing of anattack) to avoid, or in any event minimise, civiliandeath or injury or damage to civilian objects.

A significant number of targets in the anti-ISIS aircampaign to date have not been pre-planned orfixed military objectives but rather targets of op-portunity; in such circumstances pilots or basecommanders making operational decisions needto have sufficient information available and therequisite training in IHL rules to ensure necessaryprecautions are taken. When it becomes apparentthat the objective is not military, or that an attackmay be expected to cause excessive civilian deathor destruction, the attack should be cancelled orsuspended.

In the case of fixed military objectives at least,where circumstances permit, advance warningshould be given of attacks affecting the civilianpopulation. The provision of a warning, however,does not relieve the attacker of responsibility totake further precautions.

Parties to conflict must distinguish at all times be-tween combatants and non-combatants (includingcivilians and those hors de combat). Attacks oncivilians and civilian objects are prohibited at alltimes. Indiscriminate attacks are also prohibited.These include attacks which fail to distinguish be-tween military and civilian objects, or ones inwhich expected incidental civilian deaths or in-jury, or damage to civilian objects, are excessive inrelation to the concrete and direct military advan-tage anticipated. Intentionally directing attacksagainst civilians or civilian objects, or launchingan indiscriminate attack, is a war crime.

As has been extensively documented elsewhere,ISIS has on numerous occasions deliberately tar-geted civilians and has perpetrated mass killingsof both civilians and captured soldiers.1 In a pre-vious report by the Ceasefire Centre for CivilianRights and Minority Rights Group International itwas also estimated that anti-ISIS bombing cam-paigns had killed thousands of civilians in Iraq;the majority of them, over 2,800 by September2015, were killed in often indiscriminate bombingby the Iraqi Security Forces.2

Use of prohibited weapons

Throughout the history of regulating armed con-flict, from the prohibition on the use of poison tomore recent initiatives to ban anti-personnelmines and cluster munitions, certain weaponshave been prohibited on the grounds that they areby their nature indiscriminate, and therefore in-consistent with the principle of distinction, orcause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

In the battle against ISIS in Iraq both sides haveused prohibited or censured weapons. Barrelbombs3 have been dropped by the Iraqi SecurityForces on densely-populated areas in central andwestern Iraq, including in Fallujah, in numerousinstances. Their use in Mosul has also been re-ported.4 Mustard gas, a chemical agent, has beendeployed by ISIS, including in Sinjar and inMakhmour. In early 2016 the Organisation for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed theuse of sulfur mustard in an attack on the Kurdis-tan Region of Iraq.5

‘Human shields’, aerialbombardment and humanitarianaccess

Much of the civilian killing and destruction ofcivilian objects in the conflict against ISIS to datehas resulted from patterns of interlocking, and fre-quently unlawful, behaviour on both sides withcivilians caught in the middle.

Like many other armed opposition groups aroundthe world, ISIS often bases itself in densely-popu-lated urban areas. It has ignored the IHL duty insuch situations to take passive precautions to en-sure that any military objective is sited away fromcivilians or civilian objects in case of attack. More-over, ISIS has frequently used the presence ormovements of the civilian population to shieldmilitary objectives. This constitutes a war crime.

Again, however, the deployment of ‘humanshields’ does not remove the responsibility of ad-verse parties to take precautions to avoid, or atleast minimise, civilian casualties and to refrainfrom attacking a military objective where the lossto civilian life would be disproportionate.7 TheIraqi ministry of defence has sought to justify highrates of reported civilian deaths from ISF opera-

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tions by saying that ISIS fighters deliberately posi-tioned themselves in civilian areas or civilian fa-cilities such as hospitals in an attempt to shieldthemselves from attack.8

The battles to retake cities from ISIS, including Ra-madi and Sinjar in Iraq and Kobane in Syria, haveoften caused widespread physical destruction. TheISIS practice of booby-trapping or bombing build-ings on retreat has contributed to the destruction,but much of it has been due to intensive aerialbombardment by the US and members of the in-ternational coalition and, in Iraq, by aerial bom-bardment and shelling by the ISF. UN officialsdescribed the destruction in Ramadi as worse thananywhere else in Iraq; some 5,700 buildings weredamaged, with 2,000 completely destroyed, includ-ing the hospital and the train station.9 Some esti-mates put the level of damage in central Ramadiat 80 per cent. Such widespread destruction, to-gether with other factors such as the prevalenceof explosive remnants of war, make the swift re-turn of IDPs impossible. (Less intensive bombingin the subsequent operation to retake Fallujah wasreportedly due in part to the realisation that suchlevels of destruction were publicly unacceptable.)

‘Carpet’ or ‘area’ bombing, as widely practised inEurope and the Far East during the Second WorldWar, is now generally considered unlawful underIHL, at least in the sense of bombing operationswhich treat as a single military objective a numberof clearly separated and distinct military objec-tives in a city containing a similar concentrationof civilians or civilian objects. Further investiga-tion would be necessary to conclude whether thiswas an accurate characterization of any of thebombing in Iraq, or whether the widespreadurban devastation rather reflects patterns of indis-criminate bombardment, or even the collectiveimpact of a very large number of individual at-tacks on discrete military objectives.

The impact on the civilian population shouldnonetheless be clear. This is particularly the casewhere civilians have not been able to flee andhave suffered from lack of food and medical sup-plies during siege situations. Once again, tacticsemployed by both sides in the conflict during thesieges of Ramadi and Fallujah impeded humani-tarian access for prolonged periods despite re-peated calls by the UN and humanitarian agenciesfor all parties to the conflict to allow passage of hu-


A disturbing feature of armed conflictin recent years is the rise in attackson hospitals or other medical facili-ties or personnel, including by partiesto the current conflict in Iraq. In Oc-tober 2015 US airstrikes on a hospitalin Kunduz, Afghanistan, killed 42 peo-ple, including 24 patients and 14staff. The subsequent US investiga-tion concluded that the incident wascaused by unintentional human errorand equipment failure and no crimi-nal charges were brought.

Fallujah general hospital and othermedical facilities in the city were hit

Hospitals andother places ofspecial protection

repeatedly, without warning, inshelling by Iraqi Security Forces in2014-15.6 Some reports connectedthese attacks with the fact thatwounded ISIS fighters were under-going treatment at the hospital. Ithas also been reported that ISIShave used medical facilities as basesor even command centres.

All medical units (including militaryhospitals) benefit from special pro-tection under IHL, and cannot bemade the target of attack. The factthat enemy fighters may be under-going treatment does not removethis protection. Even if a hospital isbeing used as a location from whichto launch hostile acts, the hospitalcould only become the target of anattack once prior warning had been

given to enable the acts to cease orfor the patients to be evacuated.

ISIS has a long history of destroyingand defacing cultural monuments,churches and other places of wor-ship, which also enjoy special pro-tection under IHL. Finally, IHL alsogrants special protection to worksand installations containing dan-gerous forces, including dams,whose destruction may causelarge-scale suffering in the civilianpopulation. The poor state of main-tenance and general safety of theMosul dam has been the subject ofmuch speculation in Iraq in recentyears. ISIS launched attacks againstKurdish Peshmerga positions nearthe Mosul dam as recently asSeptember 2016.

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manitarian relief for civilians in need.10 During thesiege of Fallujah in the first half of 2016, ISIS pre-vented civilians from leaving, reportedly shootingat those attempting to flee, while Iraqi SecurityForces and Shi’a militias encircled the city, pre-venting supplies from entering.

Investigation of civilian casualties

IHL imposes specific duties to investigate civiliandeaths. These include an obligation on all partiesto identify the dead and the missing, in further-ance of the right of families to know the fate oftheir relatives. There is a further duty on belliger-ents to undertake an investigation where a breachof IHL may have occurred, including a suspectedfailure to take all feasible precautions to avoid lossof civilian life.

Human rights law imposes additional obligationson states towards all those under their jurisdiction.In relation to the right to life, this includes an obli-gation to undertake an investigation in any casewhere an individual has been killed by stateagents. In addition to binding the Iraqi governmentwith regard to any military action taken on its ter-ritory, this obligation also falls on members of theinternational coalition where an attack has led tothe death of civilians under their effective control.

Under the UN’s Basic Principles and Guidelines onthe Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victimsof Gross Violations of International Human RightsLaw and Serious Violations of International Hu-manitarian Law, investigations under both IHLand human rights law should be effective, prompt,thorough and impartial.11

The recording and investigation of civilian deathsin Iraq is greatly hampered by a lack of trans-parency from almost all parties to the conflict.Civilian deaths caused by ISF bombing are rou-tinely denied or blamed on ISIS. Even if the US doesnot accept extra-territorial obligations underhuman rights law, its practice regarding the inves-tigation of possible IHL violations in Iraq appearsto have deteriorated from the practice of US forcesand the International Security Assistance Force inAfghanistan. ISAF established a civilian casualtytracking cell in Afghanistan in late 2008 in order to‘acknowledge civilian casualties immediately andtransparently investigate allegations rapidly’.12

Accountability across anti-ISIS forces

A complicating factor in the Mosul offensive is thefact that it is not an operation carried out by onecentralized military force, but rather a coordinatedeffort by an alliance formed of extremely diverseand loosely-organized armed actors. The exactmake-up of this alliance, and the role that eachactor will play within the operation, are still un-clear. However, it is likely that some or all of the fol-lowing actors will be involved: the Iraqi SecurityForces, the federal police, the Kurdish Peshmergaforces, the US-led international coalition, the Shi’amilitias organized under the umbrella of the Popu-lar Mobilization, the National Mobilization andother Sunni armed factions, and possibly evensome minority militias (Christians, Turkmen,and/or Yezidis). The potential involvement of Turk-ish forces currently stationed in Iraq is also unclear.

These actors all have competing agendas andsome are deeply distrustful of one another. For ex-ample, some Sunni actors have made clear theirview that the Shi’a militias should not play anyrole in the operation, while the Shi’a militias arereluctant to concede a central role to the KurdishPeshmerga in the offensive. These tensions are allthe more potent give the strategic importance ofMosul, as the last major city in Iraq held by ISISand capital of the Ninewah governorate, parts ofwhich are claimed by both Arabs and Kurds.

Crucially, the plethora of armed actors participatingin the military campaign to retake Mosul raisesquestions about the chain of command and ac-countability for violations that may be perpetratedduring the course of hostilities. Recent experiencein Iraq poses a worrying precedent. The retaking ofthe cities of Amerli, Tikrit, Ramadi and Fallujahfrom ISIS control over the course of 2014-2016 wasaccompanied by widespread reports of violationsagainst the civilian population, including abduc-tions, beatings, torture and forced confessions, sum-mary executions, mutilation of corpses, and burningand looting of civilian homes.13 However, there hasso far between little to no indication that perpetra-tors of such violations will be held to account.

The actions of the Shi’a militias grouped under thePopular Mobilization Front have been particularlycontroversial. Although a 2016 decree by the


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Prime Minister incorporated the PMF as a specialunit of the Iraqi Security Forces, supposedly bring-ing it firmly under the control of the central gov-ernment, some militia members continue to assertthat they respond to no one but themselves.14 Dur-ing the retaking of Fallujah in May-June 2016, Shi’amilitias were reported to have engaged inwidespread human rights violations against SunniArab civilians. An estimated 1500 Sunni men wereseparated from their families by PMF units andsubject to treatment that ranged from harassmentand beating to torture and killing.15 After the endof the Fallujah operation, Prime Minister Abadi ac-knowledged that there had been violations but in-sisted they were individual transgressions, andpromised accountability. However, only four orfive people were detained, and the entire Fallujahinvestigation has been shrouded with uncertainty,with little information shared publicly about theconduct or outcome of the procedures.16

Questions also arise as to accountability for viola-tions perpetrated by other actors in the coalition. Asnoted above, members of the US-led internationalcoalition have failed to acknowledge mounting civil-ian casualties promptly, or to investigate them trans-parently. The Kurdish Peshmerga have also beenaccused of violations against civilians in areasunder their control, such as destruction of homes inArab villages and forced displacement of their resi-dents.17 However, accountability is complicated bythe fact that the Peshmerga operate de facto inde-pendently from the Iraqi Security Forces, and com-mand and control is split between the two majorKurdish political parties: the Kurdish DemocraticParty and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.18 Accord-ing to the UNHCR, there have not been any prosecu-tions of Peshmerga members accused of violations.19

Adherence to international humanitarian law andthe maintenance of accountability requires firstand foremost that the central government estab-lish effective control over the armed groups fight-ing under its banner. Armed groups operatingindependently of central government control mustat a minimum establish accountability mecha-nisms within their structure to respond to allega-tions of violations. All credible allegations ofviolations must be investigated promptly andtransparently and suspected perpetrators ofcrimes prosecuted according to standards of dueprocess.

Protection forinternally displacedpersonsMilitary operations to retake the city from ISIS arelikely to provoke large waves of displacement, ascivilians attempt to flee. Several estimates exist asto the numbers of IDPs likely to be created by theMosul offensive, and they vary according to theexpected duration of the hostilities. The KRG hasreportedly envisioned three possible scenarios. Inthe best-case scenario, the Mosul operation will re-sult in a quick defeat for ISIS, displacing 100,000at most while the remaining residents never leavetheir homes. In the middle scenario, over 400,000IDPs would be displaced in successive waves ashostilities intensify. In the worst-case scenario, thehostilities could go on for months, creating onemillion IDPs.20 However, the UN warns of a higherfigure, stating that as many as 1.2 to 1.5 millionpeople could be displaced.21

Many IDPs will initially flee towards villages in theNinewa plains in search of relative safety, whileothers will head south towards Tikrit, retaken fromISIS control since March 2015.22 Some may evenflee to the Syria-Iraq border to the north, passingthrough Syrian territory in order to re-enter Iraqfurther south.23 A number can also be expected tohead towards ISIS-controlled districts, such as TelAfar. However, the greatest proportion of IDPs willlikely seek to end up in one of the three Kurdishgovernorates of Erbil, Suleymania, and Dohuk.

International humanitarian agencies, the Kurdis-tan Regional Government, and the Government ofIraq have already started some planning to copewith the imminent exodus of IDPs from Mosul.There are fears, however, that existing plans areinadequate, fail to address the multiple protectionchallenges, and that local capacities will quicklybe overwhelmed. Experience from previouswaves of displacement caused by the ISIS advanceand by government-led campaigns to take backmajor cities from ISIS control indicates the type ofcivilian protection challenges that are likely toemerge during the Mosul offensive. In order to ef-fectively protect IDPs originating from Mosul, therelevant actors need to: create safe corridors andensure the security of civilians fleeing Mosul; im-


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plement consistent, transparent and non-discrim-inatory documentation, screening and entry pro-cedures at checkpoints and border crossings; andprovide for the humanitarian needs of IDPs upontheir arrival in camps and other temporary shelterarrangements. Each of these issues is discussed inturn below.

Safe corridors and security in flight

During hostilities in Mosul, the right of civilians toleave the city and seek safety elsewhere must beguaranteed. Parties to the conflict should take allpossible measures to safeguard the physical secu-rity of civilians attempting to leave the city, facili-tate their journey through safe corridors, andprotect them from security threats while in flight.Residents living in the city at the time of the offen-sive should not be assumed to be ISIS collabora-tors by attacking forces, nor should they bepunished by ISIS for attempting to leave.

During the retaking of Fallujah, ISIS snipers shotcivilians leaving the city, and burned boats to pre-vent civilians from crossing the Euphrates River.24

There are also reports that ISIS recently detainedapproximately 2,000 civilians who were trying toescape Hawija.25 In early 2016, the UN Special Rap-porteur on the rights of internally displaced per-sons reported that civilians leaving Mosul facedharsh punishment from ISIS if caught, and thatISIS had placed landmines in routes leading out ofthe city, causing many civilian deaths.26 Other ac-tors, too, have been responsible for restricting themovement of civilians out of conflict areas. Afterthe retaking of Amerli from ISIS in November2014, PMU and ISF units prevented Turkmen andSunni Arab residents of surrounding villages frommoving to safe areas.27 In November 2015, thePeshmerga prevented Sunni Arab IDPs fleeing TelAfar from accessing safe areas due to accusationsof their support for ISIS.28

The Government of Iraq, the Kurdish RegionalGovernment and their partners must also priori-tize the creation of safe corridors. However, theymust take care to ensure that such routes are ac-tually safe before encouraging civilians to usethem. During the operation to retake Fallujah fromISIS control in March 2016, the Iraqi governmentinformed civilians about three safe exit routes outof the city. However, civilians attempting to use

them continued to be blocked by ISIS, and facednumerous security threats en route, including theproximity of armed groups, ongoing clashes, andthe presence of landmines. On 10 June, 26 peoplewere injured and one killed when a landmine ex-ploded on the route towards Al-Salam junction.29

The parties to the conflict should ensure that roadsare decontaminated from landmines and otherrisks to civilians before being publicly announcedas safe routes, and they should commit to sustainedprotection of such routes. In particular, this shouldinvolve attention to the risks faced by vulnerablegroups. Many of those fleeing will be female-headed households who have lost or been sepa-rated from the male breadwinner. Womentravelling without a male companion are oftenprone to exploitation and abuse, including traffick-ing. Due to the arduous nature of the journey, someIDPs may also seek the service of smugglers to assistthem in escaping, opening up further challenges.30

Another factor which has repeatedly threatenedthe security of civilians fleeing ISIS-controlledcities is the presence of checkpoints along theirroute, manned by a variety of armed actors, in-cluding non-government actors. Civilians stoppedby armed groups at checkpoints have been subjectto violations, and the presence of these check-points in itself acts as a deterrent to civilians con-templating escape.31 For example, during themilitary operation to retake Fallujah, Sunni Arabfamilies fleeing the city were on multiple occa-sions stopped by Shi’a militias operating under theumbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Fam-ilies were separated, and the men were automati-cally treated as ISIS collaborators and subject to arange of humiliating treatments. For example,Human Rights Watch received reports of menbeing detained without food or water; insultedand harassed; beaten with sticks and cables; tiedto trucks with rope and dragged, sometimes to thepoint of death; and summarily executed.32

Although there is a legitimate and understandablefear that ISIS fighters may infiltrate the civilianpopulation leaving ISIS-controlled areas, securityscreenings must be conducted transparently, byauthorized actors in accordance with the law, andwith judicial oversight. In cases where familiesmust be separated, family members should be in-formed about the location of their detained rela-


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tives and the reason for their detention. Detainingauthorities have the responsibility to provide food,water, sanitation facilities and meet other basicneeds of detainees, or to allow humanitarian ac-tors access to detention locations. In cases wherethere is no indication that detainees have ties witharmed groups, they should be immediately re-leased.

Documentation, screening and entry

The large numbers of IDPs expected to flee fromMosul is likely to create a build-up at entry pointsto Kurdish-controlled parts of Ninewa and into theKurdistan Region itself, especially Kalak check-point on the border with the Erbil governorate, 40kilometres east of Mosul, as well as to other partsof Iraq. This will present a major humanitarianchallenge, if IDPs are forced to camp outside atborder crossings for days on end without ade-quate supplies of food, water, or medicine.

Since the ISIS advance of 2014, the experience ofIDPs attempting to cross governorate borderswithin Iraq has been extremely uneven, creatinghumanitarian crises and resulting in effective re-strictions on their freedom of movement as guar-anteed by international law. Not only does eachgovernorate implement its own entry procedures,but procedures have been implemented inconsis-tently within the same governorate and even at in-dividual checkpoints. For example, since 2014IDPs from Anbar province have been repeatedlyprevented by the Iraqi Security Forces from cross-ing Bzebis bridge, the only entry route into Bagh-dad. Officials at the Baghdad checkpoint alsorequired IDPs to have two sponsors from the gov-ernorate before allowing them entry, a difficultcondition for many to satisfy, causing delays ofdays or even weeks. IDPs also reported that entryprocedures were sporadically and inconsistentlyimplemented, leading to accusations of discrimi-nation against Sunni Arabs.33

There have also been multiple reports of the Kur-dish authorities implementing inconsistent andeven discriminatory entry procedures on IDPsseeking refuge in the region, beginning in 2014 andcontinuing to the present. Various sources have re-ported that the Kurdish border officials sometimesrequire IDPs to have sponsors in the region, oreven pre-existing residency permits, before allow-

ing them entry, and sometimes do not. The proce-dure seems to vary according to the official on dutyat the time, and more often according to the ethnicand religious profile of the IDPs. Generally, Kurdsare easily permitted entry to the region without theneed for a sponsor or any residency permit. Chris-tians and Yezidis also experienced relative ease ofentry, even without a sponsor. In contrast, theUNHCR states that all Arab and Turkmen IDPs havebeen denied entry into the region since late 2014except those who were able to present pre-existingresidency permits.34 The UN Special Rapporteur onthe rights of internally displaced persons furtherreports that Sunni Arab families living in the Kur-distan Region face restrictions on their freedom ofmovement, while Christians and Yazidis do not.35

The procedure for extending and renewing resi-dence permits is also unclear and inconsistentlyapplied.36

In order to prevent unnecessary delays at check-points and to support IDPs’ freedom of movementas far as possible, the Kurdish authorities must en-sure that entry requirements are transparent, uni-form, and non-discriminatory. They shouldpublicly announce the conditions and documentsrequired for entry and cease the practice of differ-entiating between IDPs on the basis of ethnicity orreligion. If security screenings are required, thesemust also be conducted transparently and in ac-cordance with the law.

Special measures will be needed to respond to theproblem that many IDPs are likely to be travellingwithout documentation, having lost or beenrobbed of their identification during displace-ment. IDPs should be informed of the documentsrequired for entry, and the procedure for renew-ing and reissuing lost documents. Previously, IDPswithout documents have been required to go tocentral government offices in Baghdad, but thisexpectation is impractical and opens IDPs to fur-ther risks.37 Government agencies should continuethe process of setting up mobile or temporary reg-istration offices in the North, expanding them toensure that all IDP populations can be served.

Even if measures are taken to expedite entry pro-cedures as much as possible, IDPs are still likely toface the possibility of being stranded at check-points for extended periods of time. Build-ups ofIDPs at checkpoints have already led to reported


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deaths of pregnant women, children and the el-derly, while many more suffered from dehydra-tion.38 Humanitarian actors should take pro-activemeasures to mitigate this problem, by pre-position-ing relief workers and stocks of essential items atborder checkpoints, such as food, drinking water,and medical supplies. The Kurdish authoritiesshould also prioritize entry and accelerate screen-ing for vulnerable populations, including pregnantwomen, young children, unaccompanied children,the elderly, and persons suffering from medicalconditions.

Protection issues in IDP camps

Civilians fleeing Mosul will have serious and ur-gent protection needs immediately upon their ar-rival to safer territory. Many will have left Mosulwith little more than the clothes on their backs, ormay have been robbed of their possessions uponleaving. In many cases, they will have undergonean arduous journey to reach safety, travelling fordays without access to food or water and con-stantly in fear. Some will have witnessed the deathof loved ones and other conflict-related horrors,and will be in need of psychosocial support.

The KRG authorities have begun planning for theIDP exodus by constructing camps in Kurdish-con-trolled parts of northern Ninewah. However,whether their capacity will be sufficient is seriouslyin question. Current planning appears to depend onthe simultaneous return of large numbers of exist-ing IDPs to liberated areas of the Ninewa plain.Given the very poor recent experience with IDP re-turns in Iraq, this scenario seems optimistic at best.

The KRG itself is already hosting an estimated 1.8million Iraqi IDPs and Syrian refugees, displacedsince 2014 and 2011 respectively. Although theKurdish authorities have been commended fortheir willingness to take in large numbers of IDPsand refugees, serious gaps in protection exist. Forexample, many IDPs still lack access to basic facil-ities and services, such as drinking water, electric-ity, food, clean latrines and shower facilities,education and healthcare. In the midst of an eco-nomic crisis worsened by low oil prices, retreatinginvestors, and a decrease in budget contributionsfrom Baghdad, the Kurdish authorities are strug-gling to provide for the needs of IDPs. Interna-tional humanitarian actors working in the region

also consistently report that the level of fundingsecured from the international community is farbelow the amount necessary to respond to the es-sential needs of IDPs. For example, in January2016 the UN Humanitarian Country Teamlaunched an appeal for $861 million to support 7.3million Iraqis in need of humanitarian assistance,but as of July 2016 only 40 per cent of that amounthad been raised.39

However, in contrast to the 2014 influx of IDPs intothe KRG, which happened quickly and unexpect-edly, with the Mosul offensive the Iraqi and Kur-dish authorities have had the advantage offoresight, as well as the advantage of learningfrom the 2014 crisis. The international communityneeds to act now to support the Iraqi and Kurdishauthorities in planning for the humanitarian re-sponse to IDPs displaced from Mosul. The KRG hasidentified $284 million as the budget required forthe first six months.40

With funding in place, both domestic and interna-tional authorities would be able to focus on meet-ing the humanitarian needs of newly-created IDPs,prioritizing the most vulnerable groups. Thisshould involve pre-positioning of essential items(such as emergency kits, food rations, medical sup-plies, water and sanitation products, and basichousehold supplies) at strategic points along flightroutes, checkpoints and holding areas and arrivalpoints. It will also involve identifying suitable landfor construction of camp facilities to accommodatethe new arrivals, including ‘winterization’ or ‘sum-merization’ of the camps as the case may be. It willbe difficult to predict how long IDPs will have tostay before being able to return to Mosul, andmany may choose not to return at all. Conse-quently, humanitarian actors should plan for theshort- to long-term needs of IDPs, including:

● Food Supply: Iraq has a government-fundedfood ration program (the Public DistributionSystem, or PDS), which has long functioned asan effective system for distributing basic fooditems to families.41 However, the current crisisand disruption to domestic food productioncaused by conflict present challenges to thedistribution of food for IDPs. Humanitarianactors should work with government authori-ties to identify gaps in provision and respondaccordingly by distributing essential food


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items to families in need. The governmentshould also simplify the procedure to replacelost PDS cards, which is currently bureaucraticand inefficient.42

● Healthcare: IDPs currently living in the KRGreport access to healthcare as one of theirmost pressing needs.43 Many IDP camps are lo-cated in isolated areas of the region, and IDPswho cannot afford the costs of travelling intourban centres to visit hospitals and clinics areeffectively unable to access healthcare.44

Crowded and unsanitary living conditions incamps present health risks to IDPs, with respi-ratory infections, acute diarrhoea and skindiseases identified as leading causes ofdeath.45 IDPs displaced from Mosul will beeven more vulnerable since they have beenliving with limited access to medicine andhealthcare since ISIS first took control of thecity in June 2014.46 National authorities andhumanitarian actors should therefore deploymobile medical clinics to IDP camps to ensurethat all IDPs have access to much-neededhealthcare.

● Education: currently, only 50 per cent of chil-dren in camps and 30 per cent of those outsideof camps are accessing education.47 The dis-placement crisis in Iraq has caused more thantwo years of disruption to IDP children’s edu-cation, with little sign of an end in sight. Evenwhere schools are available to children in theKRG, a variety of factors prevent them fromaccessing education, including the distance ofschools from the camps; poor quality of teach-ing and resources in schools; high student-teacher ratios; and language barriers faced byArabic-speaking children forced to adapt tothe Kurdish curriculum.48 National authoritiesand humanitarian actors should establishmore temporary schools in IDP areas and en-sure that teaching capacity and resources arein place ahead of the impending IDP influx,and employ Arabic-speaking teachers to easethe transition of IDP children into the newschool environment.

● Protection of vulnerable groups: the humani-tarian response to the IDP crisis should in-clude attention to the particular needs ofvulnerable groups, such as female-headed

households and victims of sexual and gender-based violence. Camp facilities should be de-signed with proper lighting and private andsecure latrine and shower facilities, to preventthe high prevalence of sexual harassment cur-rently reported in camps. Women’s needsshould also be taken into account as far ashealth and sanitation are concerned, such asensuring IDP women’s access to reproductivehealthcare and menstrual hygiene products.Finally, it is likely that a significant number ofIDPs from Mosul will have been victims or wit-nesses of sexual and gender-based violence,and other traumatic experiences. The provi-sion of psychosocial support should thereforebe considered an urgent humanitarian need.

Protection of civiliansand those placed horsde combat followinghostilitiesTreatment of detainees

Under IHL, wounded or captured fighters, or thosewho lay down their arms, are hors de combat andare required to be treated humanely at all times.Although captured fighters in a non-internationalarmed conflict are not entitled to prisoner-of-warstatus, they are afforded significant protections byCommon Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,along with civilians, persons taking no active partin hostilities and others hors de combat. CommonArticle 3 expressly prohibits murder, mutilation,cruel treatment and torture, the taking of hostages,outrages on personal dignity (in particular humil-iating and degrading treatment) and unfair trials.While the absence of prisoner-of-war status in anon-international armed conflict means that oppo-sition fighters can be criminally liable under Iraq’sdomestic law, even for acts that are lawful underIHL,49 any trial must be in a regularly-constitutedcourt, affording due process guarantees.

ISF units have committed serious violations of therights of detainees, including murder, mutilationand beheadings of suspected ISIS members. AnABC News investigation in March 2015 uncoveredphotographs and videos posted on social mediathat appeared to show Iraqi special forces carrying


12

out such atrocities and was told by a senior US of-ficial that the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs ofStaff had repeatedly warned Iraqi leaders aboutsuch conduct. US assistance for certain units wassubsequently withdrawn.50 Following the retakingof Fallujah, there have been accounts of severe

abuses in government-run prisons in Iraq.51 Asnoted above, IDPs who fled Fallujah were sub-jected to gross violations at the hands of Shi’a mili-tias surrounding the city. 1,500 men and boys wereseparated from their families for interrogation,hundreds of whom were subjected to torture, ex-


The Convention on the Rights of theChild57 and its Optional Protocol onthe Involvement of Children inArmed Conflict prohibit the recruit-ment and use of children in hostili-ties.58 Parties are also required totake all feasible measures to preventsuch recruitment and use by armedgroups distinct from the armedforces of the state, including theadoption of measures necessary toprohibit and criminalize such prac-tices.59 The conscription or use inhostilities of children under the ageof 15 years is a war crime.

In the campaign against ISIS, chil-dren have often been associatedwith PMUs and pro-governmentmilitias, with leaders commendingyouth and children for liberating ter-ritories from ISIS. Schools in Bagh-dad, Diyala, Basra and othersouthern governorates have report-edly been used as religious and mil-itary training camps for children,following Grand Ayatollah al-Sis-tani’s call on students on 5 June 2015to undertake military training in theirsummer breaks. Additionally, theMinistry of Youth and Sports has ex-plicitly encouraged the use of youthclubs for military training ofchildren.60 There have also been re-ports of children fighting alongsideYezidi and Turkmen militia in Ninewaand Kirkuk, as well as within Sunnitribal-based militias supporting theISF against ISIS in Ramadi.61

Child soldiers The systematic recruitment and useof children by ISIS is widely reported.The fall of Mosul in 2014 led to an in-crease in recruits in ISIS-controlledterritories.62 The 2015 report of theUN Secretary-General on childrenand armed conflict records that be-tween August 2014 and June 2015,hundreds of boys, including Turk-men and Yezidis, were forcibly sepa-rated from their families and takento training centres where they weretaught the Quran, combat tacticsand the use of weapons. These chil-dren have been received in at leastfive training centres in Tel Afar,Mosul, south of Mosul and also inAleppo and Raqqa in Syria. Amongstother accounts, in February 2015,families with two or more sons inMosul were required to have oneson join ISIS. The same month, ISISimposed compulsory recruitment inthe Rutba district, Anbar. After thefall of Tikrit in April 2015, ISIS furtherforcibly recruited 100 young menand boys between the ages of 13and 20.63 It has been estimated thatat least 1,500 children have been en-listed to fight for ISIS and some chil-dren as young as 8 have beenreportedly trained in ISIS camps.64 Astudy revealed that unlike other con-flicts where children are used in war-fare for a specific purpose, thefatalities of child ISIS fighters occurin the same types of attacks and lo-cations as their elders.65 The rate ofchild involvement in ISIS operationsis also increasing, with three times asmany suicide attacks involving chil-

dren and youth in January 2016 com-pared to January 2015.66

If Mosul is freed from ISIS, authori-ties will potentially be left with a largenumber of indoctrinated children.Iraq has a specific obligation underinternational law to demobilise andrehabilitate former child soldiers andto ensure their reintegration into so-ciety.67 In practice, this is likely to bechallenging. Past experiences of childsoldiers in Liberia, Mozambique orUganda indicate that family and reli-gion are the two key tools to youthdemobilisation and reintegration,68

but for children in Iraq, religion hasbeen distorted and there have beenmany instances where the families ofchild soldiers were implicated in theirrecruitment.69

Reports indicate that children in Iraqhave been arrested without war-rants and held in secret detentioncentres for extended periods of timeand are subjected to ill-treatment.Iraq has a lack of youth institutionsand prison alternatives and childrenare frequently detained with adults.As of September 2015, 474 childrenwere being held in detention facili-ties in Iraq and had been convictedon security charges under the Anti-Terrorism Act (2005). Notably, theterrorism law prescribes the deathpenalty, irrespective of age at thetime of conviction or the time of al-leged commission of the crime.70

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ecution or enforced disappearance. As many as900 men are still missing and 49 civilians weresummarily executed or tortured to death.52 Therehave also been reports of sentencing or executionsof suspected ISIS fighters in lieu of justice. InFebruary 2016, an Iraqi trial of suspected ISISmembers sentenced 40 people to death in a meretwo-hour court proceeding, on the basis of confes-sions allegedly induced after torture.53

If Mosul is retaken, the capture or surrender oflarge numbers of ISIS fighters is possible and thequestion of their imprisonment will arise. Al-though Common Article 3 lacks detailed rules gov-erning detention in a non-international armedconflict, its guarantees of humane treatment aresupplemented by the more detailed rules in Iraqidomestic law and the international human rightsinstruments to which Iraq is party, including theInternational Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights and the UN Convention against Torture.Given the practices cited above, there is mountingconcern about Iraq’s ability to conduct humanetreatment of detainees, particularly if the numberof prisoners exceeds domestic capacity.

Surrendered or captured ISIS members may in-clude foreign fighters. Approximate figures indi-cate that the number of foreign ISIS fighters inIraq and Syria increased from 12,000 in June 2014to 30,000 by December 2015.54 Returning foreignfighters may also face prosecution in their na-tional state for violations committed in Iraq orSyria. Indeed, UN Security Council Resolution 2170(2014) explicitly requires states to bring ‘foreignterrorist fighters’ to justice. Approximately 20-30percent of the European and US nationals whoform the ISIS group of foreign fighters have re-portedly returned,55 but the capture or detentionof others by Iraqi forces in the Mosul offensivemay place pressure on their national governmentsto intervene on their behalf, including in exercis-ing diplomatic protection.56

Women and former captives

Women and girls in ISIS-controlled territories rou-tinely suffer physical abuse including sexual vio-lence; restricted access to healthcare andeducation; and restrictions on freedoms of move-ment, expression and religion.

In a post-ISIS Mosul, the health and psycho-socialneeds of female inhabitants must be considered.As ISIS prohibits women and girls from being seenor touched by male doctors, the lack of femalemedical personnel remaining in the city hasseverely depreciated the availability and qualityof healthcare, including maternal health services.

Particularly vulnerable are women and girls thathave experienced sexual violence or have beenheld captive by ISIS. Following significant num-bers of escapes, estimates of the remaining num-ber of Yezidi and other women and girls in ISIScaptivity vary widely, but up to 2,000 may remaincaptive in Iraq and Syria. The safety of women andgirls held as hostages, prisoners and sex slaves isof deep concern during the Mosul offensive. At-tacking forces should consult with activists and ex-perts to locate the women prior to attacks andforces involved should be thoroughly briefed inadvance so that the protection of women captivesand other hostages remains paramount.

If freed from ISIS, former female captives will re-quire long-term mental health and psycho-socialcare. The provision of such services to escapees inthe past has been patchy and social stigma sur-rounding both mental health and sexual violencehas served as a further barrier to care and reinte-gration. Both the Iraqi government and the KRGshould amend their laws to permit abortions forrape victims, as the procedure is not presently anoption for women seeking to terminate their preg-nancies safely and legally.71


Christian man displaced from the city of Mosul in 2006. ManyIDPs from Mosul have suffered repeated displacement.Bartallah, Mosul, 2006. © Mark Lattimer/MRG

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In addition to women and girls, Yezidi men andboys and other minority captives are a specially-vulnerable group requiring specific response andprotection measures. Former captives may re-quire urgent medical care, as well as long-termpsychosocial support. The reunification of formercaptives with their families should be a priority.Consideration must also be given to the situationof forced recruits, including those belonging toYezidi and other minorities, and the availability ofamnesties.

Finally, investigations need to be instigated to lo-cate missing minority captives and women andgirls, including those believed to have been traf-ficked or killed.

ISIS families

The families and relatives of ISIS members will be-come extremely vulnerable following defeat. Re-ports indicate that as ISIS loses territory, therelatives of suspected ISIS members are being ex-pelled from their home by Iraqi authorities. Forexample, families of over 200 militants have re-portedly been forced to leave both Dhuluiya andHit, despite the fact that ISIS was defeated in Dhu-luiya nearly two years ago.72

Tribal leaders assert that these measures are forthe protection of ISIS families but the actions sug-gest that collective punishment is being applied,even though family members may have taken nopart in hostilities and committed no crimes undernational law. According to a UN official, the expul-sions are becoming widespread, are endangeringcivilian lives and are fuelling sectarian tensions.73

Those forcibly displaced are refused refuge inneighbouring districts and may have no option butto return to ISIS-controlled territory, hence placingthem at risk of further violence.74

Statements from officials or politicians have as-serted that no marriages have occurred in Mosulbetween ISIS members and residents of the city.Ninewa Governor Nofal al-Akoub suggested thatthis was the case, while Ninewa MP Intisar al-Jabouri has publicly claimed that ‘sexual jihad’ hasnot occurred and there has been ‘no marriage be-tween any woman in Mosul and an ISIS militantduring those two years’.75 However, authoritiesmust be open to the possibility that such mar-

riages may have occurred during the ISIS occupa-tion, in order to provide the appropriate protec-tions for the wives of ISIS members and theirchildren. This may include foreign ‘jihadi brides’,who possibly were victims of their militant hus-bands,76 and whose protection will necessitate co-operation between Iraqi authorities and theirnational governments.

Mosul is also likely to be home to children con-ceived during the occupation of the city by un-known fathers, or brought to Iraq by foreignfighters, or born within marriages formed duringthe occupation, or conceived from rape. It is criti-cal that these children, like all others in Iraq, areafforded the protections of Common Article 3 andthe Convention on the Rights of the Child. Childrenwho do not possess civil documentation or are un-able to obtain it are at risk of statelessness and reg-istration procedures may need to be amended tofacilitate their protection.

ConclusionRecent precedents from military operations to re-take Iraqi cities from ISIS control, including Tikrit,Ramadi, Fallujah and Sinjar, demonstrate a pat-tern of repeated failures to implement sufficientmeasures for civilian protection, both in the con-duct of hostilities and in planning for the human-itarian consequences. These include:

● consistent failures by parties on both sides ofthe conflict to take constant care to spare thecivilian population and to take all feasibleprecautions in the choice of means or meth-ods of attack to avoid, or in any event min-imise, civilian death or injury or damage tocivilian objects;

● the deliberate targeting of civilians or thelaunching of indiscriminate attacks, which failto distinguish between military objectives andcivilians or civilian objects, by parties on bothsides in the conflict;

● the use of prohibited weapons, including mus-tard gas (ISIS) and barrel bombs (ISF);

● attacks by both sides on places of special protec-tion, including hospitals and medical facilities;

● the recruitment of child soldiers by the PMUsand by ISIS, including in ISIS’ case their use assuicide bombers;

● a series of escalating and often unlawful tac-


15

tics by both sides which result in very high lev-els of civilian suffering, including the use of‘human shields’, the employment of siege tac-tics on civilian-populated cities, the intensivebombardment of urban areas and the failureto ensure humanitarian access as well as safecorridors for population flight;

● the imposition on IDPs by Iraqi and KRG au-thorities of discriminatory documentation,screening and entry procedures at check-points and governorate border crossings;

● the inhumane treatment by parties on bothsides of the conflict of detained civilians andfighters hors de combat in violation of Com-mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, in-cluding murder, mutilation, cruel treatment,torture and unfair trials;

● the failure by all parties to the conflict, includ-ing members of the international coalition, toacknowledge civilian casualties promptly andto investigate them transparently;

● the refusal by members of the internationalcoalition to take sufficient collective responsi-bility for the violations committed by the IraqiSecurity Forces to which they provide militarysupport.

Given this weight of recent practice, it is fearedthat thousands of civilian lives in Mosul and sur-rounding areas are now at critical risk.

It is recommended that:

1. All parties to the conflict adhere at all timesto their obligations under international hu-manitarian law, including ensuring respectfor the fundamental principle of distinction,and their obligations under internationalhuman rights law.

2. The Iraqi Security Forces and allied militiasshould actively suppress revenge attacks andcollective punishments inflicted by theirforces on communities perceived to have sup-ported ISIS and ensure the perpetrators of anysuch attacks are held accountable.

3. Specific measures should be taken byforces attacking Mosul to secure the protec-tion of specially-vulnerable groups, includ-ing child soldiers, ISIS captives and forcedrecruits, and the children and families ofISIS members;

4. Members of the international coalition, in-cluding the US, UK and France, should:– take greater collective responsibility for

ending gross violations committed by theIraqi forces to which they provide opera-tional military support;

– establish a civilian casualty tracking cellin Combined Joint Task Force – OperationInherent Resolve to ensure civilian casu-alties are acknowledged promptly and in-vestigated rapidly and transparently;

– provide adequate funding to interna-tional humanitarian agencies and Iraqiprovincial authorities struggling to copewith a further escalation in Iraq’s dis-placement crisis.


16 Civilian protection in the battle for Mosul: critical priorities

1. See, for example, Minority Rights GroupInternational, IIHR et al., No Way Home: Iraq’sminorities on the verge of disappearance, July 2016;and MRG, IIHR et al., Between the Millstones: thestate of Iraq’s minorities since the fall of Mosul,February 2015.

2. Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and MinorityRights Group International, Civilian deaths in theanti-ISIS bombing campaigns, 2014-2015,November 2015.

3. See UN Security Council Resolution 2139 on thesituation in Syria which ‘Demands that all partiesimmediately cease all attacks against civilians, aswell as the indiscriminate employment ofweapons in populated areas, including shellingand aerial bombardment, such as the use ofbarrel bombs, and methods of warfare which areof a nature to cause superfluous injury orunnecessary suffering.’ UN S/RES/2139 (2014), 22 February 2014.

4. Al Arabiyah, ‘Like Assad, Maliki uses explosivebarrels to quell rebellion’, 2 July 2014;http://english.alarabiya.net/en/webtv/reports/2014/07/02/-Explosive-barrels-hit-Iraq-conflict-areas--12.html

5. Organisation for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons, Statement, 22 March 2016.www.opcw.org/news/article/director-general-expresses-concern-over-alleged-recent-chemical-attacks-in-iraq/

6. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Iraqgovernment attacking Fallujah Hospital’, 27 May2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/05/27/iraq-government-attacking-fallujah-hospital

7. See Ministry of Defence, UK Manual of the Law ofArmed Conflict, 68: ‘Any violation by the enemy of[the prohibition on human shields] would notrelieve the attacker of his responsibility to takeprecautions to protect the civilians affected, butthe enemy’s unlawful activity may be taken intoaccount in considering whether the incidentalloss or damage was proportionate to the militaryadvantage anticipated.’

8. See Office of the UN High Commissioner forHuman Rights, Report on the Protection of Civiliansin Iraq, September 2014, www.ohchr.org/Documents/ Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_POC_Report _FINAL_6July_10September2014.pdf

9. Reuters, ‘UN team calls destruction in Iraq’sRamadi “staggering”‘, 2 March 2016,http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-ramadi-idUSKCN0W61S1

10. This is an obligation under customary IHL. SeeInternational Committee of the Red Cross,Customary International Humanitarian LawDatabase, Rules 53 and 55.

11. UN General Assembly, Basic Principles andGuidelines on the Right to a Remedy andReparation for Victims of Gross Violations ofInternational Human Rights Law and SeriousViolations of International Humanitarian Law, UNDoc. A/RES/60/147, 16 December 2005, para 3(b).

12. Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and MinorityRights Group International, Civilian deaths in theanti-ISIS bombing campaigns, 2014-2015,November 2015, p14.

13. Joe Stork, ‘Arm’s length is still too close for U.S.troops and abusive Iraqi militias,’ Military Times,9 July 2016.

14. Christoph Wilcke, “Why Accountability for Iraq’sMilitias Matters,” Human Rights Watch, 27 May2016.

15. Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Fallujah Abuses TestControl of Militias, 9 June 2016.

16. Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Fallujah Abuses InquiryMired in Secrecy, 7 July 2016.

17. Amnesty International, ‘Iraq: Security challengesdo not give carte blanche to commit humanrights violations,’ 5 May 2016.

18. Danish Immigration Service, The Kurdistan Regionof Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection,Security and Humanitarian Situation, January 2016, p. 41.

19. Ibid, p. 39.20. Graham-Harrison, E., ‘Could the liberation of

Mosul lead to a million fleeing to IraqiKurdistan?’ The Guardian, 27 August 2016.

21. United Nations Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs, Mosul Flash Appeal, July2016, p. 1.

22. Ibid, p. 2.23. International Rescue Committee and Norwegian

Refugee Council, In Search of Safety, July 2016, p. 10.24. Ibid, p. 7.25. Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Thematic

Report: Displacement in KR-I, Iraq, 24 August 2016.26. United Nations, Report of the Special Rapporteur

on the human rights of internally displaced personson his mission to Iraq, A/HRC/32/35/Add.1, 5 April 2016, p. 12.

27. MRG, IIHR et al., No Way Home, op cit., p. 19.28. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on IDPs,

op cit., p. 12.

Endnotes

17

29. International Rescue Committee and NorwegianRefugee Council, In Search of Safety, July 2016, p. 9.

30. Ibid, p. 10.31, Ibid, p. 8.32. Human Rights Watch, Iraq: Fallujah Abuses Test

Control of Militias, 9 June 2016.33. Lahib Higel, Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Security and

protection, Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rightsand Minority Rights Group International, March2016, p.13.

34. Danish Immigration Service, The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI): Access, Possibility of Protection,Security and Humanitarian Situation, January 2016,p. 26.

35. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on IDPs, op cit., p. 17.

36. Danish Immigration Service, op cit., p. 17.37. Ibid, p. 180.38. Lahib Higel, op cit., p.19.39. UN OCHA, op cit., p. 16.40. Parvaz, D., ‘Massive crisis’ as 1.5m expected to

flee Iraq’s Mosul,’ Al-Jazeera, 29 September 2016.41. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on IDPs,

op cit., p. 11.42. Danish Immigration Service, op cit., p. 58.43. Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Thematic

Report: Displacement in KR-I, Iraq, 24 August 2016,p. 6.

44. Danish Immigration Service, op cit., p. 60.45. ACAPS, op cit., p. 5.46. Ibid., p. 3.47. Chatham House, Internal Displacement in the

Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Impact, Response andOptions, July 2016, p. 4.

48. Ibid, p. 4.49. Kraehenmann, S., Foreign Fighters under

International Law, Geneva, Geneva Academy ofInternational Humanitarian Law and HumanRights, October 2014, p 20.

50. ABC News, ‘Top US military official repeatedlywarned Iraq about troops’ conduct’, 12 March2015; http://abcnews.go.com/International/head-us-military-repeatedly-warned-iraq-troops-conduct/story?id=29599056

51. Savage., C., Schmidt, M., Shmitt, E., ‘Lack of Planfor ISIS Detainees Raises Human RightsConcerns’, New York Times, 11 May 2016.

52. Dearden, L., ‘Up to 900 refugees from Fallujahfeared dead after being kidnapped by anti-Isismilitia in Iraq’, Independent, 5 July 2016.

53. Ibid. and Amnesty International, ‘Iraq: ShockingSurge in 2016 Death Sentences Tops 90 as‘Terror’ Trial Closes’, 18 February 2016,https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2016/02/iraq-shocking-surge-in-2016-death-sentences-tops-90-as-terror-trial-closes/

54. Ricks, T., ‘The lesson of Colombia’sdemobilization of FARC can help us work againstISIS’, Foreign Policy, 28 Jan 2016.

55. Id.56. Kraehenmann, S., op cit., page 53.57. Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.58. Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children

in Armed Conflict 2000. Iraq’s declaration onratification stipulates that the minimum age ofvoluntary recruitment in Iraq is 18 years.

59. Ibid., Art 4(2).60. Report of the Secretary-General on Children and

Armed Conflict, UN Security Council, 9 November2015, S/2015/852, p 9-10.

61. Id.62. Ibid., page 8. 63. Ibid., page 9. 64. Alfred, C., ‘A Shocking Number of Kids Are

Fighting And Dying For ISIS’, Huffington Post,19 February 2016 and Bloom, M., Horgan, J.,Winter, C., ‘Depictions of Children and Youth inthe Islamic State’s Martyrdom Propaganda,2015-2016’, CTC Sentinel, Volume 9, Issue 2,February 2016.

65. Ibid., p32. 66. Ibid., p31.67. Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children

in Armed Conflict 2000, Art 6(3) and 7(1).68. McLaughlin, E., ‘How ISIS Recruits Children, Then

Kills Them’, CNN, 22 February 2016.69. Alfred, C., op cit.70. Report of the Secretary-General on Children and

Armed Conflict, UN Security Council, 9 November2015, S/2015/852, p 10.

71. Human Rights Watch, 5 April 2016,https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/05/iraq-women-suffer-under-isis

72. Hassan, G., Hameed, S., ‘Iraq is expellingsuspected ISIS families from local communities’,Business Insider UK, 9 September 2016.

73. Id.74. Id.75. Mustafa, H., ‘ISIS’ Children in Mosul Facing more

Trouble after Liberation’, Asharq Al-Awsat,13 August 2016.

76. Dearden, L., ‘Isis ‘jihadi brides’ trying toradicalise girls and encourage UK terror attacksonline as they remain trapped in Syria’,Independent, 13 August 2016.



Recent precedents from military operations to retake Iraqi citiesfrom ISIS control, including Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah and Sinjar,demonstrate a pattern of repeated failures to implement sufficientmeasures for civilian protection, both in the conduct of hostilitiesand in planning for the humanitarian consequences. Given thisweight of recent practice, it is feared that thousands of civilian livesin Mosul and surrounding areas are now at critical risk.

Since 2014, ISIS has deliberately targeted civilians on numerous occa-sions, but parties on both sides of the conflict, including the Iraqi Se-curity Forces and allied Popular Mobilisation Units, are responsible for:

● launching indiscriminate attacks, which fail to distinguish be-tween military objectives and civilians or civilian objects;

● the use of prohibited weapons, and attacks on places of spe-cial protection, including hospitals and medical facilities;

● the recruitment of child soldiers; and● the inhumane treatment of detained civilians and fighters

hors de combat in violation of Common Article 3 of the GenevaConventions, including murder, mutilation, cruel treatment,torture and unfair trials.

Such conduct, together with the imposition of siege tactics on ISIS-held cities and the intensive bombardment of urban areas by Iraqiand international coalition forces, has combined with the ISIS tacticof using ‘human shields’ to result in thousands of civilian casualties

and high levels of civilian suffering. The failure to ensure humani-tarian access as well as safe corridors for population flight has alsobeen compounded by the imposition on IDPs by Iraqi and Kurdishauthorities of discriminatory documentation, screening and entryprocedures at check-points and governorate border crossings.

In the context of military operations to retake Mosul, this reportrecommends:

● Members of the international coalition, including the US, UKand France, should take greater collective responsibility forending gross violations committed by the Iraqi forces towhich they provide operational military support; and shouldestablish a civilian casualty tracking cell in Combined JointTask Force – Operation Inherent Resolve to ensure civilian ca-sualties are acknowledged promptly and investigated rapidlyand transparently;

● The Iraqi Security Forces and allied militias should activelysuppress revenge attacks and collective punishments inflictedby their forces on communities perceived to have supportedISIS and ensure the perpetrators of any such attacks are heldaccountable;

● All parties to the conflict should adhere at all times to theirobligations under international humanitarian law, includingensuring respect for the fundamental principle of distinction,and their obligations under international human rights law.

In brief

Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group International54 Commercial Street, London E1 6LT, United [email protected] | www.minorityrights.org/ceasefire

This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the publishersand can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.

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