Civil Defense Study (1961)

7/28/2019 Civil Defense Study (1961)

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BOTH. '1

RED -T -AND- 1 -"TAD1- -


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EDrnRS NOTEArthur W wkow is the a u k f Tbe Limits of Dejmst,* a critical s d yof tbe various policies of deterrence held in t h e Department of Dcfense. Theb w k also p r o p e s a form of disarmament which, in Waskow's words, "would

advance iberty in the world" white providing a genuine security. Waskow, afret-lancewriter and former congesshal: legislative assistant, is a gduatestudent in American history a t the U n i e t y of Wiiodn , now completinghis dkertarion on race riots. He is one af the authors in theAmerican FriendsService Committee's sndy series, "Beyond Deterrence"Peace Literature ServiceAmerican Friends Service Committee'Doubleday, Much 1962

"BEYOND DETERRENCE'-A Study Series(to be published throughout 1962 )

DOES DETERRENCE DETER? y D.F,F b g--I -50UNILATERAL INITIATIVES AND DISARMAMENTby Mulford Sibley - . SONUCUAR WAR VS. M AN by William Davidon- .5OFREECHOICEOR ENGlNEERED CONSENT by DaNas Smythe .I 0NO DESTRABLE ALTERNATTVE by W. H. erry - . I 0DISARMAMENT A N D TKE COIdMUWU THREATby Fred Warncr Neal .5OUNINTENDED WAR by Arthur W&w .50

OTHER PAMPHLETS AND BOOKSTEE CASE AGAINST LIMITED NUCLEAR WARFARE bySenator Hubert Humphrey - - -10THE MORAL UN-NEUTRALITY OF SCIENCE by Sir CharlesP, now . I 0THEMORALS OF EXTERMINATION by Lewis Mumford-- . l oTHE C W A I G N TO MAKE CHEMICAL WARFARE RE-SPECTABLE by Walter Schneir ,10ON THE BRINK by Jerome Davis $2.91MADMEN AT WORK (The Polaris-Story) by W.H.Cary, Jr. - .20DISARM TO PARLEY By W.H. Ferry - .20LABOR AND T H E COLD WAR by Stewart Meacham - - 31LABOR'S STAKE IN PEACE by E d a- .20THEWEST IN CRISIS by James P.Warburg,--- .7SDEAR MR. RESIDENT by Harrop and Ruth Freeman $3.00FOREIGN POLICY A N D CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCEby George P.Kem an and others .45


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I n No* on arnk 12, President M y r o d u r guid.to American policy the slogan "Neither Red nor dud.'* Yet tk civil defenseprogrvn he strongly supportsis the one d v a b l e program thnt could rcntltin America's being both dead and Red.Most critic& of tbe propwed civil defense program have not looked atit in ternur of deimate goals. The criticisms have f o c d on minor questions

of technique and have frequently been contradictory. Critics have arguedthat the p r o p s tw small, that it should include k t helter8 as well osf&ut s b h , hat ie depends too much on home shelters and too little oncornmunit). shelters, that it depends rim much on community h e l m andtoo ittIe on home shelters, that it haves foe much power to the states, thatit hns granted too much power to the D e f m Department, that it bas s t i r r e dup mch hysteria tbat some Axnericans are preparing to kill other Ameriunain the name of civil defense and that it h a not stirred up enough excitementt o banish th e apathy and indaerence to civil defense.But none of these criticism has gone to the real root of the trouble. Thereal trouble with civil defenge is that it will not work by the standards thePresident set up. To use his slogan as a benchmark by which to judge thecivil defense program, its terms might be d & d this way: "dead" to meant ha t all Americans would be dead wit& one year from the date t h a t athermonuclear war began, ond "Red" tomean thnt American free enterprise,free speech and free elections had been wipedwt by an d-powerful c e n dgovernment.

Tf a civil defense program were to make R h c s s and deadness IesP k l yfates for America, the program would be worthy of support; if civil defensewere t o make either of these fates kss U d y at the price of making the othermore likely, the program would require the most serious, soul-searching re-clumination, and if civil defense could be shown to make both Rednessddeadness more IikeIy fates for America, then civil defense ought certainly tobe rejected out of handTo app& civil defense intelligentIy therefore m p h n amination ofthe effects a civil defense program would bave upon the likelihood of thermo-nuclear war; upon the kind, size, and survivability of a thetmonucIear warif it did come, and upon American free enterprise and political liberty.

Civil Defense as D~llnge~o PeaceSince 1958 there hs been a stntggIe inside the Pentagon between two op-p o d views ofwhat American mihary strategy should be. Growing logicallyout of the two d t a r y strategies are two opposed views concerning civddeft -ne that civil dcfcnse is a necessary part of the American militaryposture, and the other that civil defensc might endanger the stability ofAmerica's deterrent to Swict attack. Let u.9 examine these two strategies andtheir imnIicatiom.The &st of these strategies is held mostly (tbough not erclusirely) byoficers of tbe Air Force. It is based on the belief tbat a controUcd, "lirnitEd"thmmonuchar war is possible. Its advocates are often called "counter-fore"strategists, because they believe that any nation would use its H-bombsagainst its enemy's military forces rather than agilinse enemy pplations.


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They Mieve that Russian miss& and bombers would k sed mostly to at-tack hmicm misaile and hm&r bases, mthw tb;m large American ci tk ,and that Amuica's a d c trength would lx used intk s a m e way a g dthe Rrrssiana Counter-force strategists believe that ehermonuclcarwar w dbe very much *old-fashioned, nineteenth-century war, in which everynation deliberately left its enemy's governmat and the bullc of his popu2atwnb,n order to have a government with which to negotiate terms of p e a ~ eand a &g d t p iom which to extract indemnities or &tory. Thecouuter-force view of war is thus &at of two military forces duelling wbilethe rest of both zutiom watch and wait.Counter-force strategy n e e d y assumes t ha t military forces and therest of the populationare really s e p a r a d from each other, so that an attackon forcei will not badly damage the population. The cnomous poww of theH-bomb makes essential not only a physical and geographical separation be-tween forces and populations, but protection of the civilian populationt byr n w of civil defense. That is why counter-force strategists insist uponcivil defense aa a part of the American militaypstumBut what kind of civil defense does rhip mean?Hem sup- of counter-force strategy disagree, depending upon their idea of how a thermonuclearwar is likely to begin. One view is that such a war would begin with a directattack by the Soviet Union upon American bomber and missiIe haw. Withwhatever the United States had left, it would retaliate upon Soviet bas- andso the war would go on, thrust and parry, u n d one side or the other badshown its superiorityand could demand the enemy's submission. In the mean-rime, mast of the American population would baw been waiting out the warin areas not directly exposed to b h t and fLu.There would have been acci-dents and &sfwes, and some cities are sa close to imprtant bases that thesecities would have been destroyedBut wunter-force strategists calculate thatprhaps no mare than 30,000,000 Americans would have died from directattack in this stage. For everyone else, the chief danger ww l d be fallout, andtherefore rhis =hml of counter-force strategists argues for the creation ofample f a b u t shelters for t h e whole American population.

T h e second school of counter-force stracegists argues that thermonuclearwar might well bcgin in anothcr way. They suggest t ha t the Communistsmighr attack important American inter-# without attacking the UnitedStates itself. For example, the Soviet Union might take over West Berlin oxmighr invade Western Europe, or China might invade Southeast Asia or theChinese and Russian3 together might sponsor a Communist revolution inSouth America. In any of these cases, the United States mighr want to beable to rhreaan the Communists with punishment on their home ground.Thus the United States might be the h t o use the H-bomb in this kind ofwar, &st to knack our Soviet military bases that might otherwise mtaliate,and then to strike perhaps one or two ppulation centers a a minor punish-ment for a minor provocation or against o whole series of c i t k to punisha& a major provocation as invasion of Western Europe.Probably before taking an action like this the United States would issuean ultimatum to the Communists to withdraw their pmwative act or s d c rthe consequences. But before issukg such an u l ~ t u mr firing its h a -


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n u c k w w p q theUnitsd Scam w d ant to be able to protect it s ownpopulation fmm xeprisal. It w o d d thereforebe mxs s q for the governmentro order evacuationofAmerican c i b n order to prevent tbe Russians fmmh d g o d a t e or any a l a c k by an attack on wr large popuIationcenters. It would be necessvp to prorect tbe people king evacuated agPinstdirect H-bomb attack and therefore against 6re and blast as w d s fallout,The h g e numbers of people invdved would make it necessary co build hugeundergmund cities insulated from firt and bkpt and capable of accommodat-ing large numbers of Amdcans. For t h e e rtzsons, this second school ofruategisa urges that immediate attention be paid to building b h t shelmamd to m&g mngtmcnts fm *'stmt~gicvac~ation,"mcadng evacuationmore than one day in advance of the expected Soviet am&.Thus, in rhe hope of freeing American &wry forces to fight a tbermo-nuclear war more eeectivdy, counter-force stratcgista call for o propm ofcivil defense.Many of the u i dcs of counter-force strategy are ogcera in the Amy andNavy. They argue that if m y hermonuclear war comes, it cannot possiblybe the "limited" and wntroUcd kind of war that counter-force strategistsexpect. They h h t that no nation can survive a thermonuclear war, and thatMOEmerican milimry pwer must be so constructed as to deter anysuch war from beginning. They beIieve that a stable detcrrcnt---~nehat pre-vents any nation from striking first-wdd dew the defense of Americaninterests by h i d - w a r for- on I d nd sea.

Stabledeterrent strategists argue t b r e no themonuefar war can possiblybe contro1M. Thy argue that once a t h m m & r war began, the bail ofH-bombs directed agaiast dtq targem wmld destroy communications,prevent assessment of one%own or the enemy's damage and almost certain1ybrmk down the command p tbat pmxme the nation-state itself. Oncethe p s i b i t y of mntrolwas ht,hermonuclear bombs on bth sides wouldbe f&g without regard to distinctions between people and military targets.Moreover, stabledeterrent strategists point out tbat the assumed ggraphical separation of people and forces is impossible to maintain. As missilebases become more and more numerous, dispexsed, mobile, secret and "hard-ened" against direct blast (d n hopes of making t b m invulnerable to a&st strike and able to mount a retaliatory strike), the Soviets will be raisingt b e size pnd power of their weapons in an attempt to destroy these more andmore invutnerabie bases. As rbe attacking weapons would grow more andmore powerful, thqr would threaten more and more damage to populationsa t some distance frorn Ground Zero. Thus the Atomic Energy Commissionhas calculated that a 100-megaton H-bomb would came a grmt firestormover an area larger tban the state of Vermont.The last criticism of counter-for- strategy is the most serious. By aimingthe attack a t each side's atomic forct~,t w d a great premium uponstriking first. Whichever nation absorbed the fist attackwould have its abilityto retaliate greatly impaired. Both nations will see and understand this, andin any period of in- political crisis each wdI be extremely fearful that tbcother might decide to s t r h &st, If either nation concludes that the other isabout to st&, the prrssurer to st r ike first instead will bt enormous.

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Thw stabbdmrcent straregists fe;u that a counter-fme strategy wwldbe M y o bring about a preemptive war, and that once the war beg= itwould mount nevitably into a war against popddons as well as forces. Sincet h y fed any daermonuclear war would destroy America, they have tried towork out ways to deter such a war inst#d of winning it. They feel itblutelg nectwzry that both rhe United States and the Soviet Union have everyreason to avoid even the bare p W t y of striking first with thermonucleara r m against the ocher and that the United Stares and the Soviet Union eachknow that &the 0 t h feels this wav. Advocates of a stable deterrent believethe sy s teh will be stabk if both i r e a t powcrs have an extxmely w d p mtected ability to mount a rttrriiatory thermonuclear str ike against the other(hg., okrir tdmwhw) and if both powers a t the same t h e have no pt+tection for their populations, industries and governments. The theory is thatin tbis state of affairs neither n a t i o n would be willing to use its striking force&st, out of fear of overwhelming retaliation that would destroy its wholesociety. But,on the orher hand, ePeh nation would b willing to rtrike secondsince an attack upon it would so n w l y destroy the country that mthingworse codd be expected in return for mounting an attack upon the aggressor.Thus both naeiom would be p n n r s e d that the other would never inten-tionally st r ike first.fngicauy, accepting this Strategy woutd mcan that the United Stat&- andthe Soviet Union ought not to have any civil defense at all. Both mtiwswould be publicly announcing their knowledge that thermonuclear warwould mean total destruction for their own mcuty, Both nations, by basingtheir strategies on this knowledge, would bt offering ttKi entire populations- -as hostages to prevent thmmonuclear war.There is a second element in atable-demrcne thinking rbae would workagainst having civil defeme. Acceptance of the thermonuchr rtalernatewould makc it necessary for the United Statw to strengthen iu limited-warforces in order to defend its interests mund the ghh, since the thrcat ofthermonuctar punishment could not be used, The necessary mobiIization ofmoney and men in su6cient amounts to make a limited-war force able toresist the greater numbers of the SovietEmpire w d ake it extremely dif-ficult to build n civil defense system at the same time. For thia xezpon,strategists who emphasize the need for a limited-war capability are dubiousabout the comparative usefulness of civil defense.The two serategies would have imporcant implications in foreign plicy,outside the field of purely miIitary affairs.Supporters of counter-force strat-egy say that civil defensc w d d "stiffen he national will." By this they meanthat if the United S t a w had a civil defense system in optration, the Americanpeople and government would be more Uely to go to the brink of total warrather than negotiate in political crises like that over Berlin. Even if civildefense would not actually prevent national destruction, the M e f of largesegments of the population and government that it would protect l ive mightforce some future administration into a more kUigerent stance.Thus counter-fore strategy and civil defense go hand in hand with abrinksf-war foreign policy, while the stable detwrcnt would h d o a for-eign p l i c y more interested in negotiatiw and modention. I t would be p-


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sible from a stable-deterrent Ation tomove in the direction of anm c w t dor d i m a t , but it wouf be i m p i b l e in ehe counter-force atmosphereof a constant arms build-upd mpding preemptive war to discuss am^control or &atmarmat dausly.Deciding for or against civil d e f e m is crucial to choosing ktw- wara d ace, since there is involved the choice betwem counter-fwce strategyand the stabIe deterrent. Counter-force strategy leads toward thermonuclearwar without in fact easing the impact of that war u n America. The stabledetunnr , which reqvirr. that no c i d defense bed,era nr last r shortrespite in the arms race and t h e chance of a period of negotiation. For t kitasons, onemajor defect of civil defense is that it leads to war.

Ciuil Defense ri r u Danger to LifeSupporrers of civil defense rwt their case u p n be belief that a civil d t f u ~program could save a number of American lives in case of thermonuclearwar.

In examitring that belief, it t m u y o ask first whether civil d e f wwould make a difXerencewhetherit w o d in fac t save any lives at dl-and secondly whether civil defense might actually increase the number ofdeaths from a rhetmonuclearwar. Inmaking thia analysia tht key factors artwhat the war and its aftermath would be like and what the civil defenseshelmr system would be like. The interrelation ofb wo factors woulddetermine how many would survive a t t a e ~ u c l w ar.Even a thermonu&ar war that be@ with an attack upon d t a r g bass

is practically sure to degenerate inro a disordered, desperak attack againstthe whole nation. CommunicationswouId surely be one of the &st casuaItieaof a thermonuclear attack. It w d xuemefy W a l t even to assess thedamage to American fore- caused by the first strike against us. Missilemenin one county would probably have no way of discoveringwhether them i d ebasw in the next camty are still capable of &ing. To get any c h r pictureof what damage W E have done the enemy w d e enomrouslymoreW c d tAssuming that an.A m c r i c ~ overnmentwere still functioning after the h tattack, it would have to try to give orderswithout knowing its own survivingdefenses, the power Ieft to its own striking arm or the enemy targets stillrequiring theruetion.In fact, such B government may have great di&cufty in delivering itsorders a t dL Electric wammbionh,adio towers and telephone instah-tiomwould all have been knocked out. J d g evices would be used by theenemy ta prevent orders to fire from reaching their destination. Thtta mallgroup of atomically armed forceswould be left to make ehtir own decisioarabout how to attack the enemy. Meanwhile, some American cities wouldhave been destroyed, either because they were roo c h o h i l e bases or be-

cam of inaccuracy in aiming md Gng . Some field commanders would de-cide to take revenge by aiming their missiles a t enemy cities. Others mightbelieve from thek 3 ituation that theUnited States had been defeated andtbat there was no option but mrrender. S d I others, without orders and mu-rounded byh, ight succumb to nsane fear and h a d nd end updringH-bombs at -thing in sight. The same p m s would be tacoking place onthe eacmy sidc, with tbC d t hat a t t a c h would bE d e I i h t c l y motrntcd


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.mi- -u m of tbt atta%&--tl m piEcOe protected ba=, would have beenmound with 50-mcgawa and 100-mptw bomb& Tk vmnont4idb t o r m predicted by& A& Energy . . mresultfromatchw ~ ~ ~ w l d m e a r r a h ~ i n ~ m o s s 6 r e w h o t t h a t i t w ~oxygen from iu entire pctimetcr in hurricane-velocity winds and wwldbum even maferiPLP that am nw n~mrp l l pmbustible, thus desp'oying prpe-t i c d y d ifewithin its mcb,Citits that were mih away from auch in~r~h-riona as Nike-Zm bass which th e encmy would try to destroy would ktlumselvc~wipcd out aa a byproduct. Highways and ra ihada would bc&atroyed or made weless, mad i c a l supplies would bc destroyed and medicalpeaonncl would be killed or disabsd. From multi-megaton bombs that weretither accidentally or intentiwnliy exploded in the air,m i l k of h n k m aup to several hundred miIes away would haveh linded. Thus many ofthoec who would be necmary to help the critically i n j d or to H#p order,mtablish communications and k t escue operations d d hemdmbe h e l p k and requiring attention.All thh would have occurred within minutes of tk &st thermonuclearattack. Assumiag a fallout shelter system had betn constructed, millions ofAmericans would had for their nearest shelter. Mauy would never make ith a u s e of fire, immdate high &don, choked strsets, automob& ~cci-dtnm and so on. But millions would get to the dm , m d t this point thesecond factor-the nature of the shelrer program-would cwne into egect.Much has becn written about the d y r immorality of p m t qnugbbors from entering one's own fallout shelter. The dilemma is stpfklyclwr. Either unauthoriPRd entrants will have to bc t u r d away, or theirpresence will bring about their own deaths and t h e of the Icgitimate OCCU-pants. A shelter that has been prepared for a two-week stay for fiverwith the bare survival necessities of food, water, air a d anitation am-ply not suppore 8ix peopk for& stay necessary to avoid& allout dmger.But what has not bsen u n d e r d is that p~~ciselyhis same di-lemma applies tocanmunity shelters.A sheIterp r c p d for 300 pwsonscan-not accept more. It will be cxtremdy &cult to keep extra people uut of aW t e r tha t bas been built in a public place with public funds, but if ertm

m ~ 1 ee allowed to enter thev will brine d d ith them.is not easg to eh- betwhen the mhitia Nevertheless, in case of warth e choice will hnvt to be made on the spur of the moment by anyone whocould establish himself as shelter Ieader. Whatever his choice, he wil l havecamnous d s c u l t y in pernunding all oecupta of tkMtu bat he is right,cgpeeially if ht chooses exclusion and m e f those excluded haw family titswith &ow admitted. The result will be that from the &st moment of thestay in the shelter the qwtim of eadership is likely to be hotly and probablyviolently d e b a t h d where this ia SO, the prohbility of survivalh&two we& in a lndcrhr or divided shelter is low.Xle~piretbeEe p m b h n making thdr way to and gming inside a fdmtshelter, if the civil defense program had been sizable millions of Ametiunswwld probably find themseIves inside, bedding down for a two-week stayuntiI the f a b u t bad ettltd m earth At this point the problem of shelter


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life would causemore deaths and e d t i e s . AU the evidence from catastrophesituations k &at everybody s d w oa his f d y . Since aImrrsta11 Americanfdm separated during the b y , a daylight attack wwfdmean b t of husbands, wives and c&n would have to decidewhether to stay in their shelters, daperate without knowledge of their fam-ilies, or to attempt to leave in the hope of seeking thun out. But In attemptto lcave might danger not o d y having but evergone the in the shelterbecause of the fdlout outside, unless speciaI and expensive arrangementswered or *-tight exips. Thus the Mrc r leadership might have t o make asecond major decision a b u t permitting departure. A third major ethicalproblem would confront the leadership if occupantsk a m e violently insane,or wok others by screaming in ttaeir nightmam, or grew deliriously sickShould such "anti-social" unfortunates be r e p e ~ f d l ydrugged, or killed out-right, if drugs were m c c ox absent? h r very such decision would in-d v e mom1 choices so =cult and so basic that oppositionwwM be aroused.

Wherever an oppai$m developed, leadership problems would multiply.Simply cleaning up the shelter from the results of mas diarrhea and nausea(always tbe first response to disaster) ~ n dhen rationing space, fwd, water,medical m p p b and access to toilet would require a b r i h t leader, severalW e d lieutenants and complete eoopefatiw. Previous knowledge of then m a r y arrangements, the ability to commandrespect and a feel for &&gwith overwhctning crisis would be absolutely awcntia1 in every shelter leadermd in most of his lieutenants. Any shelter tbat found itself without such aleader would be unlikely to survive, and a shelter in which there were twosuch men might bave di6culties if the two k a m e Iepders of opposing fac-ths. Cantending with such extreme di&cdties, mPny shelters would un-doubtedly succumb to apathy ar to itratioad vioIence, In many c aw a sociPIcohpse would interrupt access to air, food, water and sanitation. It couldonly be expected tbat many who had gone into the shelters would nevercome out.When they did come out, some might h d he bomb stiU falling. It isinteresting that pmponents of civil defense mume a single thermonuclearattack fohwed by twoweeks of quiet for the radioactive dustw settle, afterwhkh it would lx safe to come out of the shelter. It is more likely thatenemy missileswould be aimed and timed before the war to goofl d-aut*matically a t s t a g g e d intemals. A government might well do this in orderto be able to threaten furthw attacks (aimed at shelter-ieaving ppdationson D-plw-14) f a surrender were not forthcoming. Any such possibilitywould make grim farce out of alf civil defense p i b i l i t i e .Nevertheless, Iet us Pssume that for one reason or another tht bomb havestoppedwhen the food rum out and people h v e tbeir shelten. What wouldthey come out to? The social fabric of America wouId be ripped to shreds.Even if food bad been stored Idorehand, a trip to the storage center wouldbe necmaary co get it. Highways would be bIocEcad, *line would baveburned or exploded and railroad tracks would have been torn up by blast; soit wmld l i m y K neceas;up to walk to get food. Water m a i n s and dam3would have broben and p d ca tio n p h t s been abandoned, so that pmcticaIlyno artificial water systemswould be working. Most of the available clothing


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would have burned or beti contPminafed by f h t . f it had d y eenmuminad, washing w d m t usable, but without water, washingwould be impossible. If people came out of their shelters into d d wcatbpr,some kind of heat and housing would lx essential, but most of the housingwould bave been destroyed or contaminated,and fuels wwId h v e hen de-stroyed or made inaccessible. Disease would be rampant, &ce sewage ]in-would have broken, water would have been polluted and controls over ramandbeta would bave brokeu down. Biological warfare would probably haveadded to thesenatural origins ofb.What o f the gwemmenral structure necessary to restore the crucial serv-ices? Many d c i a h would have died, and their replacements ww l d be totallyinexperienced. Martial hw woufd nominaily be in effect, but there wouldactually be few military 6r e organizatims intact enough to enforce it.PCor would help be availab from elsewhere. All of North America andEurope wodd be in dire straits, and most of the NorthernHemispherewouldbe strugghg with a massive dose of falhut. Since American retaliation woddhave similarly crushed the Soviet Union, neither nation would even be ableto ask for emergency relief from the other in the traditional pattern of thevanauished suine for the victor's heln.other work, this catastrophe &odd differ from ~rac t icdy l l in thepast in that there would be no social cushion for the injured, the stming, theb e d , o fall back on. A h a y s before, human being in troubled ~pfor help from other human beings wbo had not been hurt. But after a full-scde thermonuclear war, there would not be enough undamaged ~ i e t i e seftto bring the necessary quick aid. The world's least touched populations wmldb hm in the South- Hemisphere;but thme poples, except for Awtr&and New Zealand, are also the world's poorest, l e s t able to &ord the ships,the fwd, the medic4 supplies and personnel, and tbe administrative capacitynecessary t o save American lives and society. As for Australia and 'MewZealand, they are simply too small in population and roo far away to do thejob in the necessary time. The result would be that most of t h e who didcome out of the shelters would die in the next month for lack of the simplebiological necessitiw and of the social system that could bring these necessi-t ies to thtm.. . .

The fa& and destructionwould extend even beyond the s d y~temothe very physical and biologicd environment in which North American manhas lived. Dr. John N.Wolfe, chief of the Environmental Scicnces Branchof the Atomic Energy Commission,has pointed this out: "Thermal and bhteflects, and concomitant radiation, would create vast areas that would beuseless to the survival of man. Add a h ire, k t evastation and dhse ,and the picture in many areas becomes grim indeed. Fallout sheltem in suchareas seem only ameans of delaying death." Another biologist, Dr. N. entleyGlass of the J o h Hoplrins University, bas estimated that after a 7,000-megaton attack upon the United States the radioactive soil would be unn&to produce edible food for five years. Although there are ways of decontpmi-nating such soil, this in itself woufd require work on tbe tnd in WWY SObighty xadioactive that the workers would themselvts be killed. In fact, onescientist from the defense-oriented RAND Corporation told the H o u d d


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civil defense hearing that once dl life i dimhated from an area, a pint ofno return is reached at which the h d mmm toob d e or evenrecomuuction.Thus if one views the A d a n eople ond the M o d American continentas a social and ecological spfm, n which dl the elements are ia.&tdand a heavy blow at all of them makes the recovery of any of them d i k d p ,onemusr cetimatc that a thcrmonuclmr war wwld leave no Americans aliveto mourn on ia &st PMiversary.So far this analysis haa sugpted that civil defense in in no way an assetto sumival But is thue any way in which civil defenseW act as a Ehwtto life? Thexe arc r e v 4 psibil i t im that &odd bc explored before tbpm-doxicol propsirion can be a w s dThe mast obvious of t h a e k associated with the version of counter-farcestrategy that iocIudw "'strategic evacuation" to huge underground b h tM e e r a It would seem h r xiomatic tha t if the Soviet Unionhad attackeda major Western interest and had then been confronted with m AmericPnevacuation of c i v h bvhuplg portendingsn dtimarum, the Soviets w dattack the United States at once, The rtreanu of refugee c i v h wouldhuwelve-3 constitute the c b r otification of danger and invitation toattack Tbe attempt a t civil defense would its& have signaled the R-to begin a &tion-dmroying war. At the snme time, the helplama ofthe civilians during the evacuation i d d akt them more liable to diein the b t omenta of attack Thus civil defense would have defeated itsown purpose.The second way in which civil defense mighta c ~ U yncrease the dang#rto livesa explained by a quotadon from the report of thcHoriseld Subcommittee on Milit;up Opera*, Ttae Capnmittee pointed at,"As we b d d more &ilw and 'hid i~ to reduce vu lnd ty , tbtenemy must earmatk bigger n u k aylo& far e d ;uget and cosl~emphtea larger total *tack This increnses thepomttl f d h t and otber bazamh farEhe civilian popuIah" From this forxuStiw the HoMefd Subcommitteesomehow drew the c o n c l u b that civil, defense should be increased, Othmmay be pardoned for concluding that any such increase would merely mggtstto the enemy that he f w t k increme I& amck level. Thus an attempt atcivil d e f a would bring in an enemy preparation for a larger at-tack. As we have just sem proved by the Rwdana, modern technology &=it easy tu raise the power of thcrmmuchweapons from the 10 or 20-mgo-ton level to 50 or 100 megatom. It is much more &cult and expensive tothe I d f p-tim given to civilhns. Tbus civil defense wouldalwap bebehind in this spiral, and every incmse in civil defense would merelytrigger an even larger in the attack capability. Xn tbh kind of mot,people will always be k r s ,d he number of deaths will be inmad.Civil defense cannot be defended a measure for pmtecting Americanl iva ThermonuckPr war will be m devastating tha t a t best civil defensewill.only prolong a few& ives for a few wceka or m o n k By the timc theh t v e m r y of the war would roll around, those few million Americanawould be just aa dead as if they h d no civil defense a t all. A t wmt, s om easpxts of c i d &fcnse rniglu actually increase the toll of edy d e a h in the


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immtdinte hours and &ye r r f ~tack . In any case,Americana cannot dependon civil dcffnse to prwmt &maelves or their m t r y rom dying.Civil Dsfmse as a Danger to a Free Emmmy

Aa t h e di&ultia and inndequacics of civil dcfense pre pointed out morecIPrlp, pmpmts of civil defense react by urging larger andmore expeosiveprogram. I t is &doze relevant ro examine what a larger and larger civildefcnsc would do to our economy,How would it affect the w d t h and well-being of private individuals? What wmId it do to our wet-all economicgrowth? What impact would civil defense h e pon free enterprise asagainst centralized government control of the sonomy?Estimates of the a t f civil defense naturally vary according to whatkind of program is being advocated. The imiitence of Administration and&~~ress iorialproponcnr~of civil defense that p m m t activities are mereIya b s t step toward r much k g e i civil defense &oft suggests that the mumto be spent wil l wmt;mtly incrmse. The HoWld Subcommittee estimadtha t fallout-only heltcrs would c a t about $100per space and that a f a b i tp m g m providing orae space ford merican would therefore cost about$20 billion. Tbe Defense Department, h e r , eports that e s h t a of thcc a t of conutructionof fdou t shelm nm from $100 tcr $300gum-'hat stocking of the shelterwith minimal food and water aupp 'es would runappmximady mother $41 $61 per apace. Neither of thcst W t wincludes the cmt of supportive meaaurw rmch zp food stomge centers, con-struction of &breaks, or pm t t a c k education of the population for civildefense.Nor does the $zo-billionestima* in#e the c a t of constructing momthm one shelter apace for each American, dthough the ummmus dailymobility of America would suggest that or thm p e e s in Merentparts of a mmpoIitan prep would bp necessary to meet attacks a t Mmnttimes of thc day and night. If, as the HoMd Sulxommittce suggests, tbeUnited Statta should begin to build blast &eltern as well as fallout sheitem,the costs would be mwmously i n d . There seam no d& that aprogram of vast underground&cItus suitable for stmtegic evacuationwouldcost in the mnge of a t lerst several hundred billian ddlnrs.There as been t& that family fallout sheltersmight cost aa little as $150.But even a cursory emmination of the kind of shelter that might be builtfor five people a t that price shows that it could not be equipped either withoxygen or with a ventilating system capable of admitting air but weening

out fallout; with fal lout-pmf w&, with protection against bre from aburning house immediately above, and with f d , water, sanitation andmedicine for two weelm, In shore, p h or a cheap family sheltw will.probably fool not even t h e pmpcr i v e builder for h g . Although a familysheltermight rak fewer psychologicat and miological problems tban a com-munity shelter, its cast would rule it out formostAmerican f w yfor the 50% of of ppuhtion wbose f d y ncome is under $frOO. Its vexynatllie would nJeout apomnent-dwellers.Ad , ofm,he family shelter,even if built, could p-t the whok family only a t night.For nU thew rrasons, most supportm of civil defense propase that theFederal government pay directly for the major expenses of pubk shelters


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a d or aupprt ive arrangtmenu Iike food storage a d ivil defense tmining,d hat F e d 4 ax incmtiva encowage the pr ivae buddingof f d ybuainws shelters. In one form or another, ebt money would come out ofFederal tru reven- or, through d d c i t speading, out of in&- If theIrumsy c m irectly out of revenue, (aoe oot of r s c i w ) , eithcr mmcF e d d program 0 t h han civil defense must be c d r taxa m ~ teincreased. If it comw from spseiat tax reductions given m incentives, eitherotber taxesmust bE j P cm d or 0 t h ~ t i v w efim;nlted I t should be noOcdthat the impct of the t b e ~f maey to civil dcfen~e ould n ~ tt ~ p m dover a long time. Even tbe minimal $20 billion suggesosd by rhe W e l dSukummi t te is aimed a t protection from current w m ~ .f a wapopsrevolurion every five yam is assumed (and that M -ti- a-ghistorysince1945J1. the$2O-bi l l ionspremdbeobsolete by 1966. Inotberwords, th e $20 on would h e o be spent in three or four yearn to havecven one or two years' vdue, and then P new and mow a+vc civil d e f a ~ l twould have tolx started immediptely.The impacts of the various budget and revenue psibilitiw must beexamined, If in order to encourage civil defense other tax incentives areeliminated, the thrust toward greater industrial &mcy and productivitywilI be d d t r a b l y w#kened. Sxhgy ef- would not evenhavetheby-praduct effect that taryspending dots inpouringnewm c ha d ew products into the civilian cwmmy . Thus, by endangering the in--ti- toward higher ptoductivity in privatt entctprk, civil defense mightbring about stagnation in the Ammican econorny iu the face of vigormampccition from memeas.While it b obviously i m w b l e to soy in advance what segments of thepopulation w d d be hardest hit by a tax increase for c h d defense or whatsegments of the budgetw d hanbt hit a m f e r of money t o civildefense, certain results would be fairly lid . Any general tax increasewauld bE certain to makemolr &cult the st;rres' task of Iiruling money forthe support of cducauon, Coasidtring the precarious condition or @tionof education in the Federal budget, it is a h ikely that o transfer of moneywithin the Federal budget would be likely to hurt the education appropria-tion. Since A h ducation provide the basic motive p e r n economicp w t h nd the myriad to keep frsc enocrpristping, and sinceAmericaneducation is altendy in d&ulty, a Wt of funds from education to civil&faouId probably have &oua long-run effects. If the came fromanti-deprtssion s z f egumb auch aa uacmpIoyment insurance, the m a y ' s&cultiea in br&g out of an economic down-dant could be multiplied.hdeed, it is &cult to sec how large sums of money could be transferredover a short period from any productive area of American life to an u n p mdt tc t ;~ tupe like civil defense witbout h w I p damaging the stability andp r o p of our free-cnterp* economy.Quite separate from tbe danger of economic flagnation would bt thedanger of centnlizsd governmental control over the economy. A programaimed at one f h t helter space for every American would xequirc FederPIintervention in building regulations,in city plnnning and zoning, indwtionof scarce ma& mi& a prisbable drugs, in loention of new industrial


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*centera away fmm @k militvy targets, in d c e and factory training.procedures in order to insure the d e c t i v m s of civil defense preparatiomond in abeof otherways through every aook and crznny of the Ammicaneconomy. h whipping civil defense into sbapc, it w d d not be p d l e to~ d the emmdc interests or convenience of managanent, labor orxmaumers, since the over-ridmg criteria would be military, S t r i c t Federalm g e m e n t wwld be wmtia l in order tomake sure that civil defense wouldrxkt in action, not d v m D P ~ .Let us laok'at what rh; F&A government might have to order a cityto do. Merely to secure fallout shelter epacm, huge excavations throughoutrtae businas and industrid dirtricta would have to be ~lanned or quick andl w d y aceas, dug regardless of the necessuy disturbance to normal b u s h ,and stocked with large, per+icaIly renewed oupplies of food, water, andmedicines. If the civil defense pmgram were enough to face theprobfem of htorms, tk city would have to be ordered to split itselfinto sections divided by huge empty awatcbea of concrete, intended to retardthe p r o w of he. (Thm areas c d e ossd neither as parka nor aa high-ways, since both mew snd busks and autumotive gasoline would be highlyflammable.) Wherever cmcentratioas of population would make it d S c u l tfor enough shelter apace to be easiry accwaiblc, bnsin- and residentid.arm wwld be f o r d to k t e . W h e families b d t shelters, not merelythe shelter but the distance between it and the bome and the m a h I s usedin building tbe bome wodd have to be FederalIy inspected and controlled,since P shelter too near a tm flammable house would be no shelter at all.Apartment houses, both old and new, would be required to include adequateshelter space fox their tenants. On number of Mcrent daya thoughout theyear and at diffeient times of day, shelter-t&g &ills wmId be orderedtithwt notice in order to ttst and train the population. Some drills mighthave to exfend over seven1 days in order to train people for hi og in theahelters zs well as getting to them. White m y single w e of these Fed&interventions might be worked into the pattern of business a d ndwtqwithout great &culty, the combination of them wil l demand close Federalsuper~isionof the economy to guard against totll economic disruption,Business relocations, staggering of work hours, temporary shut-downs andc o m d t y dmntionr would all be Federally d o m e d .While it would subject a11 private business to intense Federal regulationh d nspection, tht pmcess of building civil defense w w l d preseme a t hastthe forms of private enterprise.Those planners who expect =me Americansto survive and recuperate fmm a thermonuclear war are looking toward the~usptnsiorr r abolition of even the forms of free enterprise, Some cconomkstudiw of post-attack conditiom suggest that govgovunmentwould be the onlyp s i b l e employer after the war. They argue that government would bethe only instirution able to offer food, clothing, helter and other necwsitiain exchange for work, and they point aut that the necessarywork would beconstruction of such h g e public nseds as trampon, c w n m d c a t i mand water md amaze mtema.Thus even if private enterprise somehow survived with enwgh ~ C E Bto pay d ts workers in4 ecemitiea, the government w d ave to insist


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on suspension of privare pmjccta in order t o speed up public reconstruction..For at least the period of p t - n t ~ kmergency, thc onIy employ= would;be the State and every citizen would beDTMo do its work. Thc histoyof even partid nathmhatim of industry suggests that it would be exuunelydiBicdt, after m r a f pars of total nationalization, to bring about n re-.to private en-k Thus, men on the mast hopeful predictions of supporters of civil defense, after a thermonudear war a large proportion ofAmericans would have been killed and the rest would be working in a quasi-.Communist economy.I t may be questioned whether tbis nation could h g ndure hdf h dand half Red.

Civil Defense IW ti Dmger t o Political FreedomNot only free enterprise in the American economy but t h e political liberties

of America and of orha nations wouid suffer constriction under the n m i -ties of civil defense, Overseas, the constrictionwould come at second h a d ,Concentration on civil defense wodd make much more drfliculc the grantingof American aid to young and struggling democracies, which need the aid inorder to make economic progress without dictatorship. The hrsc small stepin this process lm already been t a b , with the assignment of cer& foodstocks ro civil defense storage centers in theUnited Staces instead of to Foodfor Peace grants overseas. As the civil defense program gains momentum,it wilt become necessary to set aside more and mare f d , medicine, con-struction tooh and development funds fo r building and stocking the shehers.Not only wiII such an inarruptionor reduction in aid damage the chancesof democracy overseas, but the general implications of an American civildefenseprogram might w d arom ktensc anger in the underdeveloped world.To uncommitted and underdeveloped nations, an Amcrican civil defenseeffort would look like a s ebh attempt to save our own population from theeaeets of great-power fouy in unleashing atomic war. Those parts of Asia,Africa, and Latin Auur ica that would be heavily affected by pout-war

f a h t would see themselva as h e a t victims of such a war, unable tod o r d the enormom eEorts that would be necessary to protect their ownpeople. For this reason, onAmerican&YIefense program might amuse thesame kind of antagonism in the new nations t ha t the testing of the H-bombshas aroused among them. Such antagonism would further hurt Americanchances of exercising political leadenhip among the new nations and wouldtherefore damage the chances of political democracy in the uncom-mitred world.At home in America, civil defense will have an evcn more direct anddangerous impact upon liberties, In c&ct, not merely young menbut all Americans would be made conscriptir in an army under Pentagoncontrol. A program that impinges upon every facet of social andlife can scarcely do otherwise. Already one local political leader in thesuburbs of Washington, D, ., as demanded that family sheiten be madecornphry, on the ground that any family's failure to build a shelter wouldweaken tbe national military posture. As civil defense picks up steam, suchcomments are sure to be multiplied. With the whole Federal government


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rooking the& the prsmre would soon be put on "'slackers" in much thefashion it w a during World War 1 upw people who failed to p r c b cp-ly "wluntarp" Liberty k i d s .Nor would this be d. ailure, because of apathy or abjection, to takepart in compuhry civil defense drills would be thought a dangerou~ othe community aa fdure to take part in vaccination programs (because forthe drills to succeed, teamwork wodd be absolutely necesslry). New Yorkhas h d y armfed and jailed non-participants, On a larger scale, thmmight be the danger tbat an entire state would decide civil defense was notworth disrupting its Iife and =fuse to enact the necessary local Iaws andregulatioar. Would the U p i d Statw Government permit mch a dangerowgap in i~ prepamtima to continue? If not, how c o d he intimateof civil defense be i m p d without practically putting the state intopolitical receivership?

Nor wwld overt action against civil defea~e e the ody problem. Pubkcriticism of civild e f m would bave the same deleterious dect that ctiticigmfrom the ranks would bave upon the m o d of an army on the4Attempting to argue against civil defense would probably be equated withencouraging a d m f t d d ger . In other words, the i m p t i v e m i t y ford v c r s a l d o r t if civil defense were even to seem practical might impel agovernment committed to civil defense to m p p m borh opposition to theprogrlm ad failure to join in it.Even supporters of civil defense would have of their liberties r edud .In an attempt to protect many kinds of civil d e f m centers from sabotageor attack, the loeations and purpabes of such as food smmg d e p yemergency government headquamrs or factories producing g d s crucialm t h e post-aruck emergency would have to bekt secret. Travel nmr rmchplaces and press reporting a b u t them would have m be carefully m w i dby the Federal government. Thege strictures apply now, of course, to m i l i t qinstallations, but the point is tbat civil defense installadons would be farmore numerous and far more widely scattered through t h e country, andrestrictions would therefore be far more onerous.Them would be other pressures, more subtle but just as real, upon the

fabric of American political liberty. Our liberty and in fact our nationidunity is built upon a web of assumptions about each other as citizens andpeople- ssumprim we rarely notice because we practically never questionthem. But already the mere beginnings of civil defense have Ied to loudthreats from Nevada to shoot down "invading" Californians, to unpublicizedbut uneasy questions about racial segregationor integration in fallout shelters,and t o angry remarb about the expendability of city residents as againstsuburban or country folk. The question of survivaI, because it involves b t hthe most i n b a perswa1 dispit ions and the most pressing national con-flicts, will inevitably divide Americans far more sharply than we bave everknown. Making concrete decisions about civil defense will rub our olddivisions to t h e raw.Fiaally, it should be pointed out thar many who believe some Amexicamcan survive a thermonuelclr war do not believe that democracy can sumivethe war. The mast conshnt and outspokenCongressional supporter of civil


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~ ~ c k t ~ , h a a s ~ # d t h a t h e r c c ~ " t h e rwilI bad aw a b t vitably," Congressmnn Wllinm Fitts Ryanhas wondtred whether, if any Amcricam sumive, the United Statts w d de v e r a g a i n b e m ~ t m t i o n - o r e ~ e n w h e t f i c r i t w o u l d b t a s i n ~nation or wlit inm component parta m t t d y wide areas of radioactivity.Thw even t h ewho hope that civil defense mightsave liva have no illwihmabout the dip& mtlmk forpliticd liberty after a tbermonuclePrwar.Tbe Twtk lid MauAnalyzing a!l the fac- of civil defense h w a hat it would tend to nuketharmonucley war more likely, could not reduce the roll of lmes from sucha war but might even increase tk immediaEp of death, w d u i d y slow

h a merican economic growth and d d ravely damage both politicaland d c y . ivil defense would incrclsc the c b hat k r i c awould in im kt years k o m e a "Red" h t y nd would then die anywayuadw thermonuclear attack.The dangers and inadequacy of civil defenseh l d be no surprise. Humanbeings have always had before tbem the object feason of the turtle, whichadopted a civil defense policy millenia ago and has ken unable to progressever since. The price for the one- tud b h t shelter has been stagnation inan evolutionary backwater.W s mceptwrs tm k & other path. Stripping d very static defenseagainst the other a n i d , man hns competed with his wits and his hibility.Man is soft andnaked and the turtle h98 P hard protective shell, but mankind

has made the turtle into a tasty dish. Frabdom has its uses as weU as its joy&Whac then would be a "humanaaplicy, a frep man's policy, on civildefense? The &st requirement should be frankness. The President should-plain clearly to the American people that the nature of thermonuclearmakes the death of a l l Americans and olI Russians highly probablegen=nudear war s b d d come. IL should exp& rhac civil defense istherefore &as. And be s h o d publicly vll lMlnce the abandonment of thecivil defense program.Havinggot rid of one major aspect of tht countet-forcestrategy, he shouldthen scrap all American weapons and p h dored to a counter-force or &st-

strike strategy. H2 should point out t o the R u s k s , while doing so, that thisact would give any Russian civil defense program a provocative appearance.He shouId also explain that civil defense is as u r n & tic in terms of physicalsurvival in Russia as in the Unitd Stam.*And he should publicly acbowIedge that in scrapping i t s first-strikecapability while still psmsing its retaliatory weapons, the United States waa* l ? l u e k n vigorom debace o w whether the Swiet Uniw now hnr t miour civil d c f wprogram The evidancu iadiwtts that whiile t h e So v i e t s have aaincd rhdr p ~ p u l a c i o ainmany civildefense rc~huiqw, bc necernv physical gnpuntionr have nor been made, Forexamplr, no failour rhdtm & t in Soviet apanmrnt b o w Rdermccs w aubwayr arddtm ignora ll~f d y dm sb- of f d mddd ock, bunk d aw toilcr frciIi-but tb liLdihPod tha t cha H-bomb h b d l would m p o h the subways w ram t hep p k in them. R w + hdim* for v c y h t a gathering of f d d aitcr andeven a e r g cn c y rbclttt-digging an keytd to rbe wa* tima of slow bombers, not ofmodern miwik.


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Eft with the radiation implications of thme weapons ntld b e he UnitedSmm would thus bt assuming, in effect if mt in incent, a stable dew-rent stratem.Th G d e n thould further explain that the stable deterrent, w h e km d y mplied w A i a l l y a d o p d , would be uaeful in tk h g un onfy asa bridge toward disarmament, h c e tcehwbgkal progress will ~ ~ l n c rrhtw " d e s t a W the simaticm by giving thermonuchr wapons to morenarioas and by breaking through the inwfnugbility of 4 - s a i k tweapons like Poluis.Tftc President should then tell the S& Union that we would neverbe the f b t to use rh e H-bomb. The a ink ty of this statement w d avebeen demonstrated in the repudiation of avil defense and the mpping of&st-strike weapons, a safe beginning for and a catalyst to a disarmament

pmcms. As for the "stable" titterrent strategy which would be a t this pointmum& from Ameficm w e a p capab;l;ty, it would not be necessary oradvisable for the President to comment- et. Nor would ir be re~wabfefor Fhe Preidene to repeat old b t s f retaliation, since the threaw areimplied in the weapons themselves and dncc he should be attempting toimprove the cha f e for disarmament negoeiah,Having explained the modern facts of dm& to both muons, the PresidentshouId urge the Soviet Union to follow suit in abolishing civil defense andrepudiating- counter-force trategy, backing up ts repudiationwith a scrap-ping of irst-strike weapons.In any case the Up i d States would abolish its own civil ddellse as afutile expense likely to force stagnation nnd coercion u p n us.Our initiatives in abandoning counter-force strategy and abolishing c i ddefense would greatly improve the atmosphere for negotiation toward dis-armament under inspectionand controL But our lack of scientific knowledgea b u t the p r e r e q ~ ~ t e sor disarmament and our constitutional limits onpresidential power in achieving disarmament w d ake it necessary forCongress to understand and nit upn the new Jtwtion.To begin with, Congress could tiansf- the useless funds at present in the

civil defense budget to the new Arms Contd and ]Disarmament Agency-$300 million to use for such research in the socid and na-1 sciences aswould apply t o negotiating, achieving and preserving disarmament. A mas-sive injection of restarch funds, as Americans have found in the fields ofmilitary defense, medicine and agricultural productivity, is likely to payamazing dividends; we should try it in the field of disarmament. The moneynow being wasted in civil defeast provides an obvious and appropriate sourceof funds, since in th e long run the only effective civil defense is likeIy to bethe elimination of the H-bomb.Finally, one of the most appealing elemenfs of eiviI defense should bemade applicable to more worthwhile and practical means of defendingliberty. Civil defcnse would give every citizen t he feeling that he himself,as an ndividual, is taking action against the threatsof tyranny and extinction.That the m e t M being used is unworkable does not mean that the feelingof personal participation is valueless. The President and Congras should askthose Americam who had considered putting time Md d o r t and money into


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building a f d y helter to put that same time, effort a d money inro theactive defense of hlxrty. The Peace Corps is a short step in this &don,but the idea could be put to use in orher leas drastic ways. Thw are thekinds of programs that arc needed:A m a ja Presidential campaign (like that recently devoted to civa dcfense)enwuraging the giving of such perm-m-person economic and technical aidas a CARE package of farm toohFree postage for individual mailin toAsians and Africans of controv~~siafEnd stimulatingAmericanused boo and magazines.Federally financed teaching ta American tourists of the spoke21 language ofone majorCommunist or uuwmmitted nation they were planning to visit.Tax deductions for private cont~utiom o the United Nations (andperhaps to other international organizations such as NATO and the Organi-zation of American States).Partial government support for family one-ywr "adoptio~~s" f childrenfrwn overseas, especially from Communist and uncommitted states.Federal provision of imporrant Russian, Chinese and other foreign-Ianguage publications to private citizens quahied and willing to transla#

them for u r y scholars, scientists and foreign policy experts.AIl these substitutes for c i d defense wauld quicken and diversify, ratherthan slow down and cmtralizc, the American economy. All of them wouldencourage rdm than suppmAmerican individuabm and the m e volunteerspirit of frcc men. AiI of them would make less likely, not more, the onsetof thermonuclearwar. They would k worthy and effectiveh m m w e a p owbased on inreliigence a d 0exiWty-rather than the heavy, hamperingdefense sought by the turtle.PoXticaUy, a reversal of present Administration policy on civil defensemight: be impractical. Powerful grwps wirhin t h e Pentagonmd major poli-tical figuresoutside the Administration are demanding a stronger civil d e f wand wotlld certainly fight an abandonment of it. But if the wiU to reversepolicy exists, a political way can be found. Congressman Ryan haa proposedthat a special congressional committee, not committed to supporting civildefense, reexamine the whole policy fmm top t o bottom. Such a reevaluationmighr provide the public understanding on which m inteuigent decisionabout civil defense a u l d be b a d . So might a public explanation by thePresident of the long-range implications of the Soviet $0-megaton bnmb.Other waysmight be found.But somehow, before it is too late, the American peopIe must lcarn tbis:There a re no fronriers--old or new--underground In the thermonuclear age,there am no defea~esunderground, either.

@ 1961 by Arthur Waskow


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P u b w as pn e d u u t i o d s e r v kbPeace Education Dhision

American Friends SuPice M t t e e160 Norrh 15th h t

Philadelphia 2, Pennsylvania

AUSTIN 3, TEXAS705 N. Lamar Blvd.

CAMBRlDGf 38, MASS.130 Brattie kf.P. 0. Box 247

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PES MOlNES 12, IOWA42I 1 Grand Ave.

H!GH POINT, N. C.1818 S. Main St.P. 0 . Box 1307

PASADENA 10, CALIFORNIA825 E. Union St,P. 0. Box w1

PHILADELPHIA 2, PA.1500 R a c e St.

218 E. 18th St.New York 3, N. Y .(N.Y.C. area only)PORTLAND 15, ORE-4312 S. E. Stark Sf.S A N FRANCISCO 21, CAUfORNIA

2160 Lake St.SEATTLE 5, WASHINGTON

3959 15th Ave., N. E.

f i e M w n rimnds krvlca C m m k athmph ta nl iova h u m ruffsdng ~ n dndr for nonvlolont lolutrani fo ronflic?~- .rmnnl, mtloml and Intern&nol. B a don t h m rmTTglour prlnriplor of the Sodaty of Friends, or Qudwr. tha AFSC: k s u p p o dand stoffsd by w p l s OF mny faiths. In addition to Mi bum Eduwtlon Oivirbn, Ih.A F X works in the U n W Smtes and about 20 otkr wuntrh on w m m u n l ~ okt ionl ,mminors nnd inatitutea for odult. md y w n a wpb, rmlid and nhabilitatW, andwial and technical assistance. Its work in - rkd on with& wrd tm mfa,4er pol l t i e r . It h s u pp od .nHmb by volvntaty wntr lbut iomr

Civil Defense Study (1961)

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Transcript of Civil Defense Study (1961)