Civil Defense History (1945)

8/14/2019 Civil Defense History (1945)

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H E

F EMA1 0 7 / J u

AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE 1945 - 1984EVOLUTION OF PROGRAMS AND POLICIES -

B. Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D.Planning Specialist for Civil Defense Programs

Federal Emergency Management Agency

National Emergency Training CenterEmmitsburg, Maryland

MONOGRAPH SERIES1985

Volum e 2 Num ber 2


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ABSTRACT

This monograph examines the modern civil defense system from its inception tothe present. The evolution of policies and programs is examined on the basisof five determinants: international crisis and change; quality of civildefense leadership and planning; congressional support and appropriations;presidential interest and support; and defense policy. This review is pre-

sented in terms of presidential administrations between 1945 and 1984. TheTruman years were characterized by disagreement over what branch and level ofgovernment should be responsible for civil defense. The program also sufferedfrom poor leadership during this period. Leadership problems also persistedin the Eisenhower years, coupled with the necessity for frequent policy changearising out of accelerated growth and greater understanding of nuclear weapontechnology. A defense policy and corresponding programs of "Massive Retalia-tion" left little funding for civil defense programs. Although civil defenseexperienced a shaky start in the Kennedy administration, it soon began to enjoyits greatest growth and support thus far. For example, a nationwide system offallout shelters was created during this period. The first part of the Johnsonadministration was marked by defense policy confusion, chiefly centered on theviability of Anti-Ballistic Missiles. As the confusion wore on, the concept ofmutually-assured destruction grew, and civil defense appropriations shrank.Despite President Nixon's expressed interest in civil defense, budget requestsreached an all time low during his administration. The "dual-use" policy,combining attack planning with disaster planning, was officially implementedduring this time. Federal money was distributed to state and local agencies.Crisis Relocation (or evacuation) Planning characterized the Ford administra-tion, with conflicts developing over federal funding of dual-use programs. The

. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA) became a part of the new FederalEmergency Management Agency under the Carter administration. PresidentReagan's civil defense budget request was attacked as "warfighting strategy",even though the use of civil defense funds for peacetime disasters was expli-citly authorized for the first time. The Integrated Emergency Management

System (IEMS) was a response to those criticisms. This monograph concludesthat the U.S. cannot expect to achieve a significant level of attack prepared-ness at current budget levels; but that the IEMS multi-hazard emergencymanagement approach may be endorsed by the Congressional committees concerned.


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PREFACE

Many emergency managers -- especially those new to the emergency managementprofession -- may not be aware of the dynamics that have affected theevolution of civil defense policies and programs. This monograph exploresthat evolution from a national defense, and civil defense, policy perspective.Those emergency managers who are not new to the profession may find this

monograph particularly informative in that it explains the reasons behind someof the sudden, and often confusing, policy shifts that have occurred duringthe past 40 years?

This monograph provides an opportunity for all emergency management personnelto understand the conflicts surrounding civil defense at the federal level,and the interrelationship of technology, defense policy, and civil defensepolicy. It is a summary of a doctoral dissertation on the history of postWorld War II civil defense in the U.S. written in 1980 and updated in 1984by Dr. William K. Chipman, Chief, Civil Defense Division, Office of CivilPreparedness, National Preparedness Programs, of the Federal Emergency Man-agement Agency.

Recent movies on network and cable television have sparked significant publicinterest in the subject of civil defense. Similarly, reports in the newsmedia regarding massive civil defense efforts by the Soviet Union have createdinterest in this Country's state of readiness.

Not only does this monograph tell us where we are, but it also explains how wegot here.


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AMERICAN CIVIL DEFENSE 1945 - 1984:THE EVOLUTION OF PROGRAMS AND POLICIESBy B. Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D.Planning Special ist For Civil Defense ProgramsFederal Emergency Management Agency

INTRODUCTION

A combina t ion o f even t s i n r ecen t yea r s has b rough t t o the fo re the i s sue o f c i v i l d e f e n s e . No t s ince the c iv i l de fense deba te o f t he ea r ly 1960s has th i si s sue been the ob jec t o f so much conce rn , specu la t ion , and con t rove r sy. The reh as been , a n d con t i n u e s t o b e , m u c h t a l k of m a s s i ve s ov ie t e f for t s i n c iv ildefense tha t a re so extens ive as to undermine deter rence and indica te tha t theS o v ie t s a r e , i n c on j u n ct i on w i t h t h e c on t i n u a t i on o f a b u i ld -u p I n con v e n t i on a la n d n u c l ea r for c e s, s e e k in g a wa r -fi gh t i n g a n d p e r h a p s w a r - wi n n i n g ca p a b i l it y.

In the Un i t ed S ta t e s , th is development has prompted some to advocate tha t theU . S . fo ll ow s u i t a n d p a r a l l e l t h e S ov i e t e ff or t s . T h e Ce n t r a l I n t e l li ge n ceAgency has e s t ima ted tha t t h i s wou ld cos t t he U .S . rough ly $3 b i l l i on a yea r.1(The U .S . cu r ren t ly spends abou t $170 mi l l i on pe r yea r on c iv i l de fense . ) Someh a v e u rg ed t h a t t h e U .S . a t l e a s t g e t s e r i ou s a b o u t c iv il d e fe n s e a n d a u g m e n tc u r r e n t e f f o r t s ( v i r t u a l l y n o n - e x i s t e n t ) t o t h e p o i n t t h a t U . S . c i v i l d e f e n s eca p a b i l it i e s w i ll b e of s om e v a l u e , e it h e r i n a n u c l ea r con f r on t a t i on or cr i s i sor in a nu clear a t t ack . U.S. progra ms involving average ann ual expendi tur es of $ 1 . 0 0 t o $ 1 . 6 0 p e r c a p i t a a r e m o s t o f t e n n o t e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e a r ethose whose views range from skepticism to disbelief concerning the claims madein the U .S . and the Sov ie t Un ion r e l a t ing to Sov ie t c iv i l de fense . Some arguet ha t c iv i l de fense , whe the r i n the U .S . o r t he Sov ie t Un ion , can neve r be soeffec t ive as to outpace the offens ive or undermine deter rence .

,Ru nn in g t h rou gh t h is deba t e, o n v i r t u a l l y a l l s i d e s o f a l l t h e i s s u e s , i s ap h e n o m e n o n t h a t i n a t l e a s t on e r e s p e c t p a r a l l e l s t h e e a r l i e r 1 9 6 0 s d e b a t eo n c i v i l d e f e n s e - - m a s s i v e i gn o r a n c e of c iv i l d e fe n s e ca p a b i li t i e s , p u r p os e s ,programs, pol ic ies , proposals , and poss ib i1 i t i es . l

Severa l obse rva t ions a re in o rde r- based on a doc to ra l s tudy o f t he evo lu t iono f c i v i l d e f e n s e p o l i c i e s a n d p r o g r a m s i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r t h e p e r i o d1945 to 1974 and r ecen t expe r i ence . 3 F i r s t , con t r a r y t o a n oft e n -r e pe a t edref ra in , c iv i l defense can work. Indeed, e v e r y g o v e r n m e n t s t u d y o f c i v i ld e f e n s e p u b l i s h e d d u r i n g t h e y e a r s c o v e r e d b y t h i s s t u d y h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a tc i v i l d e f e n s e m e a s u r e s c a n m a k e a d i f f e r e n c e o f t e n s o f m i l l i o n s o f l i v e ssaved in a nuc lea r a t t a ck . How, th en , does one r econc i le t h i s w i th th e fac tth a t a s of 1984 - - 35 yea r s a f t er t he Fede ra l C iv il Defense Admin is t r a t ion wasfo rmed - - t he U .S . h a s o n l y a r u d i m e n t a r y c i v i l d e f e n s e s y s t e m ? The majorp rob lems o f c iv i l de fense a re no t , and have no t been , t echn ica l p rob lems , bu tr a t h e r s oc ia l a n d p ol i t i ca l on e s . T h a t i s , t e c h n i ca l ca p a b i li t i e s h a v e n o tnecessa r i ly de t e rmined the evo lu t ion o f c iv i l de fense po l i c i e s and p rograms inthe Uni ted Sta tes in the pos t -World War I I e r a . R a t h er , t h e r e h a v e b ee n fi vemajor non- technica l de terminants of U.S. c iv i l defense pol icy:

e I n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s a n d c h a n g el Qual i ty o f c iv i l de fense l eade r sh ip and p l ann ings Congress iona l suppor t and appropr i a t ionsl P r e s i d e n t i a l i n t e r e s t a n d s u p p o r tl Defense policy.

L This monograph analyzes the ro le of the aforement ioned determinants in shapingU.S. civil defense policy from 1945 through 1984.

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THE TRUMAN YEARS

P r i o r t o 1 9 4 9 - - desp i t e t he f ind ings and r ecommenda t ions o f such s tud ie s a sthe S t r a t eg ic Bombing Survey Repor t , t he Bu l l Boa rd Repor t , and the Hop leyReport ,4 as we l l a s t he ca l l s by S ta t e and loca l gove rnmen t fo r a Fede ra l ly - l edci vi l d e fe n s e e f f o r t - - P r e s id e n t T r u m a n de cl in e d t o p r om ot e a p er m a n e n tFede ra l - l eve l c iv i l de fense o rgan iza t ion o r p rogram. Ins t ead , he conc luded tha tc i v i l d e f e n s e w a s b a s i c a l l y a S t a t e a n d l o c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y, w i t h t h e F e d e r a lr o le t o e m p h a s i ze p l a n n i n g for fu t u r e c r i s i s -i m p l e m e n t e d c on t i n g e n c i e s . T h emi l i t a ry were o f t he same mind . At the t ime, defense pol icy revolved aroundcon ta inmen t of t he Sov ie t Un ion , wh i l e de fense budge t s were cons t r a ined in aneffort to balance the budget and provide economic aid to Europe. T h u s , m i l i t a r yl eade r s were un respons ive to sugges t ions tha t c iv i l de fense become a r e spons i -b i l i t y o f t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t f o r f e a r t h a t i t w o u l d e a t i n t o a l r e a d ymeager de fense budget s . Moreover, i t was no t pe rceived th a t t he Un i t ed S ta t e sw o u l d f a c e t h e p r o s p e c t o f a t o m i c a t t a c k i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e . I n d e e d , theFinle t te r Commiss ion Repor t to the Pres ident of January 1948 predic ted tha t theS o v i e t s w o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o p r o d u c e a n a t o m i c bomb by ea r l i e r t han 1953 .

However , t h e S o v i e t s e x p l o d e d t h e i r f i r s t a t o m i c d e v i c e i n A u g u s t 1 9 4 9 . T h e

fol lowing J un e , Nor th Korea invaded the South . Then, in November, the PeoplesRepubl ic of China in tervened in force , pushing U.N. forces back a l l a long thef r o n t . I n Wa s hin gt on , con ce r n g r ew t h a t Kor e a w a s a d i v e r s i o n t o t i e U . S .forces down as a pre lude to a t t acks in Eur ope . There was even specula t ion tha tS o vi e t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t h e U . S . , i t s e l f , w e r e a p os s i b i l it y. I t wa s in t h i sc r i s i s a t m o s p h e r e t h a t P r e s i d e n t Tr u m a n e s t a b l i s h e d t h e F e d e r a l C i v i l D e f e n s eAdministrat ion (FCDA) in December 1949. C o n g r e s s q u i c k l y f o l l o w e d s u i t a n dpassed bo th the Fede ra l C iv i l Defense Ac t o f 1950 (g iv ing the FCDA s t a tu to rya u t h o r i t y ) a n d t h e D e f e n s e P r o d u c t i o n A c t ( s e t t i n g g u i d e l i n e s f o r i n d u s t r i a ld i s p e r s a l ) .

As e n a c t e d , t h e F e d e r a l C iv il D efe n s e Act o f 1 9 50 g a ve t h e F C D A a u t h o r it y t od raw up p l ans and to p rov ide the S ta t e s and the i r po l i t i ca l subd iv i s ions wi thgu id a n ce , c oo r d i n a t i on a n d a s s i s t a n c e , t ra in in g , a n d m a t c h i n g g r a n t s on af i f ty - f i f ty bas i s fo r t he p rocuremen t o f supp l i e s and equ ipmen t . The FCDA wasfu r the r i n s t ruc t ed to p rov ide fo r t he she l t e r ing and evacua t ion o f t he popu la -t ion where a ppropria te. For these pur poses, th e FCDA in i ts first Congressionalappropr i a t ion r eques t sough t $403 mi l l i on a s t he In i t i a l i n s t a l lmen t o f a c iv i ld e fe n s e p r og r a m t h a t w ou l d e v e n t u a l l y in v ol ve t o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e o f s o m e $ 3b i l l i on . The hear t of the program would be the es tabl ishment of a na t ionwides h e l t e r s y s t e m . To w a r d s t h i s e n d , $ 2 5 0 m i l l i o n w a s r e q u e s t e d t o b e g i n t h eimplementation of a three-stage shelter program which would (1) locate exist ings h e l t e r , ( 2 ) u p g r a d e p o t e n t i a l s h e l t e r , and (3 ) cons t ruc t new she l t e r i n de f i c i ta r e a s i n t h e N a t i o n s c r i t i c a l t a rg e t c it i e s a s d es ign a t ed by t h e F CD A a n d t h eDepar tm ent of Defense. Of the $403 mill ion, however, the Congress approved only$31.75 mill ion.

The re were seve ra l r easons fo r t h i s d ra s t i c cu t i n the FCDAs i n t i a l a p p r o p r i a -t i on r e q u e st . F i r s t , by March 1951 when the FCDA presented i ts appropriat ionr e q u e s t t o t h e C o n g r e s s , the cr i s i s a tmosphere in Washington had waned as thewar in Korea began- to stabil ize and as Soviet mi l i t a ry ac t ion in Europe f a i l edt o m a t e r i a li ze . S e con d l y, t h e C on g r e s s ion a l appropr i a t ions commi t t ee s (par-

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ticularly key members such as Clarence Cannon and Albert Thomas of the House)disagreed with the philosophy of the new Civil Defense Administration andto some extent with the basic law. Noting that the basic law proclaimed thatcivil defense was primarily a State and local responsibility, these committeesargued that the FCDA should not preoccupy itself with the procurement of"expensive things" such as shelters and stockpiles of food, medical supplies,and engineering equipment. Rather, the FCDA was told that its responsibilitylay primarily in the areas of training, planning, and guidance.

Finally, there was some Congressional concern regarding the quality of FCDAleadership and planning. Millard Caldwell, the Director of the Agency, was anex-Governor with no civil defense background who displayed a combative attitudein Congressional hearings. Both he and other FCDA officials at times haddifficulty in adequately answering committee questions concerning civil defensepolicies and programs. For years, civil defense would suffer because of theDirector's statement that it would take $300 billion to provide a comprehensivecivil defense system in the United States. He then compounded this mistake byhis inability to define this system in terms of the number of lives that wouldbe saved through such an expenditure. Despite the fact that the $300 billionfigure was only an initial "top of the head" estimate and the FCDA had no inten-tion of seeking a nationwide deep-blast shelter construction program for every

man, woman, and child (as was envisioned under the $300 billion program), theimpression was conveyed that an enormous program was envisioned; and that if theFCDA's plans were approved, such an enormous expenditure of funds might ulti-mately be involved; even though there was no conviction as to expected results.In Congressional debates over civil defense, this comprehensive "ultimate"conception of a civil defense system was transformed into the "merely adequate."It was argued that the expenditure of even a few paltry millions for civildefense would be foolish given the "fact" that it would take $300 billion (animpossible sum) to provide a merely adequate system.

The impression made by FCDA officials before the Appropriations Committeesconcerning the shelter program that was actually proposed was little better.Prior to, and during, the appropriations process in its first year of existence,the FCDA exhibited some confusion over the scope and nature of its shelterprogram. At various times, FCDA officials spoke of the construction of hugeunderground community shelters, of subsidies for family shelter construction, ofsubsidies for private and public dual-use shelter construction, and of surveysfor the identification of existing shelters to be followed by a sheltermodification program. It was for this final concept that $250 million wassought in the FY 1951 budget request. Curious as to how the FCDA had arrived atsuch a nice round figure, the House Appropriations Committee was told by an FCDAofficial that a massive job was ahead and that this sum had been decided on as agood first start. In other words, this was an arbitrary decision. But, FCDAwitnesses could not say exactly what the $250 million would purchase or how manylives might be saved because of this expenditure. The program was not approved.

While such confusion and lack of precision by a new agency about a new programmay be understandable, the FCDA's insistence on presenting the same $250 millionfigure for the following two years is not. Thus, for the remaining two years, ofthe Truman Administration, the FY 1951 civil defense appropriation process wasrepeated. FCDA sought budgets in the hundreds of millions each year, and each


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y e a r t h e A p p r o p r i a t i o n 6 C o m m i t t e e s c u t t h e c i v i l d e f e n s e a p p r o p r i a t i o n t o as m a l l f r a c t i o n o f t h e o r i g i n a l r e q u e s t . Desp i t e t h i s , the FCDA int rans igent lys t u c k t o i t s o r i g i n a l e s t i m a t e s . A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e r e p o r t s o f t h et ime r e fe r r ed to nebu lous FCDA p lann ing , t o l a c k o f c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h o t h e rGovernment agencies , to conceptua l problem6 wi th in the F CDA, and to unrea l is t ico rgan iza t iona l s t ru c tu r in g . Th i s was un for tun a te in tha t la s t ing impress ions of p r ob it y a n d r e p u t a b i l i t y w e r e m a d e d u r i n g t h e s e i n i t i a l a g e n c y-c om m i t t e emee t ings .

I f the performance of Federa l c iv i l defense off ic ia ls was not exemplary dur ingthe Truman Adminis t ra t ion , ne i ther was the performance of the Congress af ter thepassage of the Federa l Civi l Defense Act of 1950. A few congressmen, such asE s t e s Kefauver and Brien McMahon, sough t t o r e so lve the d i f f e rences be tween theFCDA and the Appropriation6 Committees. They were incredulous that the Appro-p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e s s h o u l d c u t t h e c i v i l d e f e n s e r e q u e s t s 60 d r a s t i c a l l y a n dsough t t o amend these b i l l 6 on the f loo r, bu t w i th l i t t l e o r no success. Loosep lann ing and loose ju s t i f i ca t ion l anguage worked to the de t r imen t o f t he FCDAduring these f l o o r d e b a t e s . Conce rned wi th ba l anced budge t s , economy, ande l imina t ing was te , a n d p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h c u r r e n t a p p r o p r i a t i o n r e q u e s t s , t h eCommit tees fa i led to take a long- term view of the need for c iv i l defense for

some fu tu re e ra o r c r i s i s . Some,6 U C h

as Representatives Cannon and Thomas inthe House, he ld concep t ions o f c i v i l d e f e n s e t h a t d i f f e r e d r a d i c a l l y f r o m t h ei n t e n t o f t h e b a s i c l e g i s l a t i o n . They be l i eved tha t t he FCDA was t ry ing tounde r t ake t a sks tha t were more p rope r ly the r e spons ib i l i t y o f t he c i t i zen , t helocal community, and the State.

For h is par t , Pres ident Truman suppor ted the programs S p o n s o r e d by the FCDA --af ter the Korean War provided the wherewi thal to develop an opera t ional Federa lorga ni za t ion . He approved civi l defense reques ts tota l ing more tha n one-and-a-ha l f b i l l i on dollars o v e r t h r e e y e a r s , and scolded the Congress when i t refusedto appropr ia te more than a smal l f rac t ion of th is amount . He did not , however,make an issue of the Congressional cuts or move beyond his statements of cri t i -cism as some thought he should - - r e s u l t i n g i n t h e c h a r g e t h a t h e g a v e t h e

p r ogra m on ly l i p se r v i ce . The re were , for Truman , o t h e r a n d h i g h e r p r i o r i t yconcern6 than c iv i l defense .

THE EISENHOWER YEARS

Ear ly du r ing h i s Admin i s t r a t ion , Pres ident Eisenhower indica ted tha t he agreedwith the philosophy of the Appropriat ion6 Committee6 in relat ion to the sharingo f c i v i l d e f e n s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . C i v i l d e f e n s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s b e l o n g e dpreponderan t ly to S ta t e and loca l gove rnmen t s , w i t h t h e j o b o f t h e F e d e r a lG o v e r n m e n t b e i n g d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f g u i d a n c e , t e c h n i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n , a n dsupport of a medical and engineering materials s tockp i l e p rogram. Proposa l s t oes t ab l i sh a na t ionwide she l t e r sys t em were qu ick ly she lved . E i senhower a l sochose a new Civil Defense Director (ex-Governor Val Peterson) whose views wereS imi l a r t 0 hi6 own.

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A new civil defense policy soon emerged as a result of the explosion of a Soviethydrogen weapon in 1953 and the part ial release of information soon thereafter,o n t h e e f f e c t s o f t h e 1 9 5 2 U . S . h y d r o g e n e x p l o s i o n . T h e b l a s t a n d t h e r m a l

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e f fe c t s of t h e s e w e a p o n s w e r e s o e n or m o u s l y d e s t r u c t i ve t h a t F C D A D i r e ct o rPeterson decided that the ci t ies would be doomed in a nuclear at tack; therefore,t h e on l y a l t er n a t i ve w a s t o r e p la c e t h e s i d et r a ck e d s h e l t e r con c ep t w i t h a nevacua t ion po l i cy.

Hardly had th is pol icy been publ ic ized , however, when the March 1954 BRAVOh y d r o g e n b o m b e x p l o s i o n b r o u g h t t o t h e f o r e t h e l e t h a l h a z a r d o f l o n g - r a n g er a di oa ct ive fa l lou t . Pr ior to the tes t ing of ground- level hydrogen weapons , thefa l lou t t h rea t had been though t o f a s a conce rn on ly in the immedia t e v i c in i tyof an explos ion - - and, even then, not a deadly concern . Given the knowledgetha t l e tha l r ad ioac t ive f a l lou t cou ld cove r thousands o f squa re mi l e s , she l t e r-ing r ega ined th eore t i ca l impor t an ce. I t wou ld be foolha r dy, it w a s a rg u e d t oseek to p lay ca t and mouse w i t h u n s e e n a n d d e a d l y f a l l o u t r a d i a t i o n . Never-theless, t h r ou g h ou t 19 5 4 a n d 19 55 , t h e E i s e n h o we r Ad m i n i s t r a t i on s t a y e d w it he v a c u a t i o n a s i t s b a s i c c i v i l d e f e n s e p o l i c y . P r o g r a m s f o r s h e l t e r w e r er e s t r i c t e d t o p l a n n i n g a s e a r c h f o r t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e s h e l t e r d u r i n g a s e v e r ec r i s i s o r e v a c u a t i o n . (One such p lan , for example , envis ioned the d igging of t r e n c h e s a l on g t h e N a t i on s h i g h w a y s d u r i n g a n e v a cu a t i on s o t h a t w h e n t h ewarn ing of impend ing a t t ack was given , she l t e r cou ld be foun d In t he t r enches ,which would then be covered wi th tarpaper to keep the fal lout out .)

Such planning, and the refusa l of the Adminis t ra t ion to pour Federa l funds in toa f a l l ou t s h e l t e r s y s t e m , c r e a t e d con s i d e r a b l e d i ff ic u l t i es for F C D A D i r e ct o rVal Peterson before two Congressional committees which had taken an interest inciv il d ef e n s e. These were Senat or Estes Kefau ver s Arm ed Services Subcommitt eea n d R e p r e s e n t a t i v e C h e t H ol i fi e l d s M i li t a r y O p e r a t i o n s S u b c om m i t t e e . Bothcommit tees under took lengthy inves t iga t ions of c iv i l defense dur ing Eisenhower sf i r s t t e r m .

B o t h t h e K e f a u v e r a n d Holifield I n v e s t i g a t i o n s h e i g h t e n e d i n t e r e s t i n c i v i ld e f e n s e a n d p r e c i p i t a t e d A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n i t i a t i v e . Holif ield was particularly-d e t e r m i n e d t o s e e t h e c r e a t i o n o f a n a t i o n w i d e s h e l t e r s y s t e m a n d h a d l i t t l er e g a r d f o r t h e Ad m i n i s t r a t i on s e v a c u a t i on p o l i cy. P e t e r s o n h a d l i t t l e o p t i o nb u t t o s u p p or t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s p o s i t i o n b e f or e H o l i fi e l d s c om m i t t e e ,

n e v e r t h e l e s s , h i s h a n d l i n g o f t h e s h e l t e r / e v a c u a t i o n c o n t r o v e r s y w a s n o te xe mp la r y. T h e s a m e ca n b e s a i d of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e C on g r e s s i on a lAppropriat ions Committees, w h i ch r e m a i n e d s t r a i n e d d e s p it e P e t e r s on s a t t e m p t sto improve re la t ions .

The Congressional Appropriat ions Committees (part icularly the House Committee)c o n t i n u e d t o c u t c i v i l d e f e n s e r e q u e s t s b y s i g n i f i c a n t p e r c e n t a g e s . Althoughth e level of ap propr ia t ions for c ivi l defense du r in g Eisenh ower s f ir s t t e rm wasan improvement over the Truman era level (appropriations rose from an average of $50 mi l l ion to an average of a lmost $65 mi l l ion - - a 28 pe rcen t improvemen t ) ,t he House Appropr i a t ions Commi t t ee con t inued to adhe re to a concep t o f c iv i ld e f e n s e t h a t d i f f e r e d f r o m t h a t h e l d b y t h e F C D A . Thu s, before th e HouseAppropriations Committee, Peterson was criticized for trying to do too much,and before Holifield's Committee he was critized for not trying to do more andfo r no t do ing be t t e r w i th the l imi t ed r e sources a t h i s d i sposa l .

Dur ing Eisenh ower s second ter m, the pace of c iv i l defense evolut ion quickened.C h e t H o l i f i e l d i n t r o d u c e d l e g i s l a t i o n ( H . R . 2125) wh ich ca l l ed fo r (1 ) t he r e -organization of civil defense into a Cabinet-level Executive Department; (2) the

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establishmentState, local,

of civil defense as a primarily Federal, rather than primarilyand citizen responsibility; and (3) the creation of a nationwide

shelter system. Similarly, the FCDA performed an about-face and submitted aproposal recommending a change of policy incorporating the development of ashelter system, with an estimated price tag of $32 billion.

Reacting to these developments, Eisenhower did two things. First, the Adminis-tration submitted its own amendments to the basic legislation (the mostimportant of which called for a new era of "joint" Federal and State/localresponsibility). In that these amendments were not as far-reaching asHolifield's bill and were Presidentially supported, they received a wider rangeof Congressional support and were subsequently enacted.

The second Presidential initiative was to appoint, in April 1957, a committee tostudy the FCDA shelter proposal. This was the Security Resources Panel of theScience Advisory Committee which came to be referred to as "the GaitherCommittee." The panel soon widened the scope of its investigation to includenational security policy in general, and it is for its work and recommendationsin this broader area that the panel gained national attention. In its reportand presentation before the President and the National Security Council, thepanel presented a rather alarming estimate of adverse U.S.-Soviet military

trends. After providing an analysis of the low state of active and passive U.S.defenses, the panel made a series of recommendations calling for improvements inthe SAC force; a speed-up of work on IRBM's, ICBM's, and the Polaris IRBMsystem; the hardening of ICBM sites; the improvement of tactical warningsystems; the provision of an ABM system and an increase in conventional forcesize and capability. While the panel accorded the highest priority to thesemilitary measures, it also noted that these would be "insufficient" unless theywere "coupled with measures to reduce the extreme vulnerability of our peopleand our ~ities."~ The committee, therefore, proposed programs for both activeand passive defense. In terms of passive defense, the committee recommended:

A nationwide fallout shelter program to protect the civilpopulation. This seems the only feasible protection formillions of people who will be increasingly exposed to thehazards of radiation. The Panel has been unable to identifyany other type of defense likely to save more lives for thesame money in the event of a nuclear attack.6

The panel, therefore, recommended the expenditure of $25 billion for a civildefense fallout shelter system over a multi-year period. This, it was argued,would "save nearly half the casualties" should nuclear war break out.

President Eisenhower, however, did not agree with many of the Gaither recom-mendations, including the proposed fallout shelter program. The proposals flewin the face of his economic and foreign policies. Balanced budgets and economyin government were cherished goals throughout Eisenhower's tenure in office. Inaddition, he was trying to create an atmosphere of peace by easing Cold War.tensions. A significant (or massive) step-up in defense (or civil defense)might jeopardize this budding environment. These views were buttressed by closeadvisors, such as John Foster Dulles, who opposed a shelter program for avariety of reasons. Moreover, Eisenhower must have been aware of the problems amulti--billion dollar shelter program would face in Congress.

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Even though Eisenhower was adamant in refusing to sponsor a Federally-fundednationwide fallout shelter program, the calls for Federal leadership in thecivil defense field hardly diminished. In addition to the pressure created bythe Holifield Committee and the Gaither Report was the pressure created when theSoviet Union fired the world's first successful ICBM in August 1957, followed inOctober by the first successful launching of an earth-orbiting satellite -- the184 pound Sputnik-l. In typical Washington fashion, the Administration reactedby reorganization. In a move publicized as promoting progress in the civildefense field, the FCDA and t h e Office of Defense Mobilization were reorganizedinto the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Another ex-Governor Leo Hoeghof Iowa, assumed leadership of the new organization.

The r t ? C i Y K c l i l ~ x r \ t . . l o a , however, had little real impact upon civil defense eventhough a "National Plan" was promulgated shortly thereafter calling for theStates and local political jurisdictions to create a shelter system with theFederal Government providing advice and guidance. It is hardly surprising thatthe Congress, noting a lack of strong Presidential interest in civil defenseduring the Eisenhower years, significantly cut each successive civil defensebudget presented to it. These cuts elicited little response from the military.Defense policy during theof 'Massive Retaliation."cal l ing for more emphasiscontext. Passive defensemilitary perceived civilmentality.

Eisenhower Administration was governed by the theoryIn the military, the offense reigned supreme. Voiceson active defense had to shout to be heard in thiswas given no serious consideration. Many in the

defense as a manifestation of a "Marginot Line"

THE KENNEDY YEARS

Under President Kennedy, the leadership of civil defense would improve vastly,but not before another political appointment resulted in a man -- Frank B. Ellis-- who would call for a "revival for survival" and who would seek to visit thePope in order to publicize civil defense and persuade him to incorporate fallout

shelters in church-owned buildings. This mission was aborted, but another blowhad been dealt to the reputation of civil defense. Nor was the reputation ofcivil defense enhanced with the ambiguities in a July 1961 speech by Kennedyrelating to what the individual citizen could or should do, combined with theBerlin Crisis atmosphere, to produce what was seen from Washington as a falloutshelter "scare."

To the credit of the Administration, civil defense planning was quickly rightedand placed on firmer ground when it was made known that civil defense was not tobe based primarily on individual initiative and backyard family shelters, butrather on the development of a Federally-based nationwide fallout sheltersystem. The reputation of civil defense was enhanced by the selection of aman of high caliber, Stewart Pittman, to head the new Office of Civil Defensecreated within the Pentagon -- a move which indicated the seriousness with whichthe Administration viewed civil defense.

The reasoning behind President Kennedy's reorientation of civil defense wassuccinctly stated by him during a "Special Message to Congress on UrgentNational Needs," on May 25, 1961:

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O n e m a j o r e le m e n t o f t h e n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y p r o g r a m w h i c ht h i s N a t i o n h a s n e v e r s q u a r e l y f a c e d u p t o i s c i v i l d e f e n s e .T h i s p r o b l e m a r i s e s n o t f r o m p r e s e n t t r e n d s , b u t f r o m p a s ti n a c t i o n . I n t h e p a s t d e c a d e w e h a v e i n t e r m i t t e n t l y c o n -s id e r e d a v a r i e t y o f p r o g r a m s , b u t w e h a v e n e v er a d op t e d ac o n s i s t e n t p o l i c y . P u b l i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a v e b e e n l a r g e l yc h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a p a t h y , i n d i f fe r e n c e , a n d s k e p t i c i s m ;w h i le , a t t h e s a me t im e , m a n y o f t h e c i v i l d e f e n s e p l a n sp r o p o s e d h a v e b e e n s o fa r - r e a c h i n g o r u n r e a l i s t i c t h a t t h e yh a v e n o g a i n e d e s s e n t i a l s u p p o r t .

T h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i on h a 6 b e e n l oo k i n g v e r y h a r d a t e x a c t lyw h a t c iv i l d e f en s e c a n a n d c a n n o t d o . I t c a n n o t b e ob t a i n e dc h e a p l y . I t c a n n o t g i v e a n a s s u r a n c e o f bla st p r o t e c t i o nt h a t w i l l b e p r o o f a g a i n s t s u r p r i s e a t t a c k o r g u a r a n t e ea g a i n s t o b s o le s ce n c e o r d e s t r u c t i o n . An d i t c a n n o t d e t e r an u c le a r a t t a c k .

We w i l l d e t e r a n e n e m y f r o m m a k i n g a n u c l e a r a t t a c k o n l y i f o u r r e t a l ia t o r y p o w e r i s 6 0 s t r o n g a n d s o i n v u l n e r a b l e t h a th e k n o w s h e w o u l d b e d e s t r o y e d b y o u r r e s p o n s e . I f w e h a v e

t h a t s t rength , c i v i l d e f e n s ei s

n o t n e e d e d t o d e t e r a na t t a c k . I f w e s h o u l d e v e r la c k i t , c i v il d e f e n s e w o u l d n o tb e a n a d e q u a t e s u b s t i t u t e .

B u t t h i s d e t e r r e n t c o n c e p t a s s u m e s r a t i o n a l c a l cu l a t i o n s b yr a t ion al m e n . An d t h e h i s t or y o f t h i s p l a n e t i s s u f fi c i e n tt o r e m i n d u s o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a n i r r a t i o n a l a t t a c k , am i s c a l c u l a t i o n , o r a n a c c i d e n t a l w a r w h i c h c a n n o t b e e i t h e rfo r e s e e n o r d e t e r r e d . T h e n a t u r e o f m o d e r n w a r e fa r e h e i gh t -e n s t h e s e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . It Is o n t h i s bas i s t h a t c i v i ld e f e n s e c a n r e a d i l y b e j u s t i f i e d - - a s i n s u r a n c e f o r t h ec i v i l i a n p o p u l a t i o n i n t h e e v e n t o f s u c h a m i s c a l c u l a t i o n .I t i s i n s u r a n c e w h i c h w e c o u l d n e v e r f o r g i v e o u r s e l v e s f o rfo r e g o in g i n t h e e v e n t o f c a t a s t r o p h e .

I n o r d e r t o i m p l e m e n t h i s n e w c i v i l d e f e n s e p o l i c y, P r e s i d e n t K e n n e d y s u b m i t t e dt o t h e C o n g r e s s a s u p p l e m e n t a l r e q u e s t f o r $ 2 0 7 . 6 m i l l i o n - - a s u m a p p r o x i m a t e l yt w i c e t h a t o f t h e c i v i l d e f e n s e r e q u e s t s p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g t h e E is e n h ow erAd m i n i s t r a t i o n . An d , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n t h e p o s t - W o r l d W a r I I e r a , t h eC o n g r e s s a p p r o v e d t h e e n t i r e a m o u n t . Wi t h t h e s e f u n d s , t h e n e w O f f i c e o f C i v i lD e f e n s e ( O C D ) i n s t i t u t e d a s u r v e y o f a l l e x i s t i n g f a l l o u t s h e l t e r s p a c e i n t h ec o u n t r y . A p p r o p r i a t e s p a c e s w o u l d t h e n b e m a r k e d a n d s t o c k e d w i t h f o o d , w a t e r ,a n d o t h e r s u r v i v a l su p p l ie s .

T h e f o l l o w i n g y e a r , K e n n e d y a u t h o r i z e d a c i v i l d e f e n s e r e q u e s t f o r $ 6 9 5 m i l l i o n

t o c o n t i n u e t h e S h e l t e r s u r v e y , m a r k i n g , a n d s t oc k p i l i n g p r o gr a m a n d t o i m p le -m e n t t w o n e w p r o g r a m s w h i c h w o u l d d e c r e a s e t h e d e f i c i t o f e x i s t i n g s h e l t e r :

9

3

(1) a s h e l t e r i n c e n t i v e p r o g r a m i n v o l v i n g t h e p a y m e n t o f F e d e r a l fu n d s ( u n d e r s p e c i fi c c o n d i t io n s ) t o n o n -p r o f i ti n s t i t u t i o n 6 e n g a g e d i n h e a l t h , e d u ca t Ion a n d w e l f a r ea c t i v i t i e s , f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n o r m o d i f i c a t i o n o f p u b l i c

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fallout shelters for 50 or more people; (2) a Federal-buildings shelter program involving the stimulation ofindividual, business, and community shelter constructionthrough the example of shelter incorporation in Federalbuildings.

Because there was some doubt that these two new programs could be adequatelyimplemented without explicit authorizing legislation, the Administration feltcompelled to transmit to the Congress the draft of a bill seeking suchauthorization. In both the House and the Senate, however, hearings on thislegislation were delayed, with the result that no appropriations could be madefor these programs. Moreover, the Appropriations Committees cut the funds forapproved programs to roughly half of the previous year's appropriation.

Several factors help explain the FY 1963 appropriations cutback and the failureof Congress to authorize the incentive and Federal-buildings programs. TheBerlin Crisis atmosphere, which had spurred the passage of the $207.6 millionsupplemental appropriation the year before, had passed. By early 1962, thelevel of civil defense involvement and concern on the Dart of the generalpopulation had just about receded to the pre-crisis level and, in Congress, theBerlin Crisis similarly had little legacy value in terms of civil defense.

Some in Congress still argued that civil defense was primarily a State, localcommunity, and citizen responsibility. Others, like Albert Thomas, the Chairmanof the House Appropriations Subcommittee responsible for approving civil defenseappropriations, did not think that most civil defense programs would work orwere worthwhile. For example, he did not think that cities the size of theNation's capital or larger could be evacuated in less than two weeks' time.Neither did he think that sheltering was a worthwhile concept. Thomas fre-quently related a conversation he had with the Mayor of Eamburg after World WarII in which the Mayor had stated that as a result of his experiences during thebombings of Hamburg, he had concluded that the best place to be when the bombsfell was outdoors rather than in shelters. Thomas further agreed with theMayor's assertion that the stockpiling of medical and survival supplies was awaste of money in that the U.S. already had an adequate and distributedstockpile system -- corner drugstores -- which, as Thomas put it, were"everywhere."

A final reason that the OCD's FY 1963 appropriation request and legislativeproposals were treated in the manner they were is that President Kennedy was nolonger as committed to civil defense as he had been in 1961. Kennedy had beendisturbed by the nature of the "national debate on civil defense" which hadfollowed his July 1961 speech on the Berlin Crisis. Civil defense officialshave noted that his commitment. to civil defense began to deteriorate as thecontroversy heightened. After the crisis ended, he made a decision to maintaina low civil defense profile in the future, while quietly pursuing the enhance-ment of the system. On the Hill, however, Kennedy's cooling support was dulynoted; and, in all likelihood, contributed to congressional budgetary cuts andlegislative inactivity on civil defense.

For these reasons, the prospects for civil defense seemed much dimmer bySeptember 1962 than they had just 12 months earlier. In that same month,however, one of those developments which occur from time to time in inter-

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national relations began to simmer. Before October was over, a full-blowncrisis had developed which brought the United States and the Soviet Union to thebrink of nuclear war. At this point, some Congressmen openly doubted the wisdomof the recent slashing of civil defense funds. .

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was an eye-opener in many respects. All over thecountry, people were asking their civil defense directors (if they had them)what they could do, where they could go, and why wasn't more being done? On theFederal level, shortly following the crisis, Kennedy ordered a speed-up in themarking and stockpiling of shelters, and the requirements for shelter qualifica-tions were relaxed, allowing a rapid increase in the size of the fallout sheltersystem. In the Congress, Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed ServicesCommittee, who had up to this time refused to sanction hearings on the OCD'sproposed shelter incentive program, withdrew his objections and scheduledhearings on the legislation. These began in May 1963 and, although no oneexpected it at this time, evolved into the most thorough examination of civildefense ever undertaken by a committee on Congress.'

Even though the Cuban Missile Crisis was only a few months in the past, and hadprovided the spark which allowed these hearings to take place, the greatmajority of the Congressmen comprising the subcommittee was skeptical of, if notopposed to,

the legislation.The Chairman of the subcommittee (F. Edward

Hebert, Dem., LA.) seemed to delight in calling witness after witness to testifyin opposition to the legislation, in particular, and civil defense, in general.Over the next few months, however, one by one the subcommittee members wereturned-off by the fatuous nature of much of the testimony that was offered bythe peace and religious groups comprising the bulk of those opposing thelegislation. Such testimony was in stark contrast to the cool, objective,reasoned testimony of the OCD officials who appeared before the committee,especially that of OCD Director, Stewart Pittman, who capably countered, pointby point, the more germane of the criticisms leveled against the civil defenseprogram. For Pittman, the basic issue was simple enough:

It was whether to face a crisis with a well-conceived plan

to contain the pyschological and physical damage of anuclear crisis or a nuclear attack, or whether to turn theother way until the last possible moment?

Not only did Hebert's House Appropriations Subcommittee agree and vote tosupport the OCD shelter program, but Chairman Hebert personally lobbied withother Congressmen for support. The efforts of Hebert and the subcommittee weresuccessful. In September 1963, the House passed the long fought for civildefense legislation (H.R. 8200).8 A major battle had been won by civil defenseproponents; some thought the major battle. But, before this measure couldbecome law, the Senate (perennially more supportive of civil defense than theHouse) would also have to approve. Even then, there would still be a veryhazardous bridge to cross in the form of the Thomas House AppropriationsSubcommittee. Momentum, however, seemed to be with civil defense. The Housewas now on record formally sanctioning the completion of the shelter system.

In October and Novemer, though, another major setback occured. In October,the Thomas House Appropriations Subcommittee slashed OCD's FY 1964 appropriationrequest of $346.9 million to $87.8 million. Thomas stated that, unlike the

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Hebert subcommittee, "We haven't changed our minds. We're not building anyfallout shelters, period." Moreover, the Thomas committee attached twoprovisions to their bill preventing the OCD from using any of the approved

, funds for the continuation of the shelter survey and stocking program or forthe provision of fallout shelters in Federal buildings. Any chance that theSenate might restore the funds to initiate the new programs was then dashedwhen Senator Henry Jackson's Senate Armed Services Subcommittee failed to holdhearings on the proposed legislation.

How President Kennedy might have reacted to these developments can only besurmised, since the final Conference Report on the FY 1964 appropriation was notreleased until December 10, 1963 -- 18 days after the President's assassinationin Dallas, Texas. What is clear, however, is that President Kennedy came intooffice and began a program of civil defense that offered the prospect of savingmillions from death due to radioactive fallout in the event of nuclear attack.

It is also clear that Kennedy had been disturbed by the so-called "sheltermania" that hit the Nation after his July Berlin Crisis speech. He decidedshortly thereafter that a responsible civil defense program would have to be alow-keyed program -i based on Federal funds, rather than private efforts.Although Kennedy declined to speak to the Nation on civil defense matters after

the July speech, he remained committed to mitigating the effects of nucleardestruction on the population as shown by the size of the OCD budget requests heapproved, as well as his actions following the Cuban Missile Crisis.

President Kennedy left a civil defense program that was beginning to reacheffective levels of operational readiness. At the time of his death in November1963, the shelter survey he initiated had located 110 million shelter spaces --more than twice the number anticipated. Of these, 70 million were immediatelyusable and had been approved by building owners for shelter use in time ofemergency, and 14 million of these spaces had been stocked. But, as the eventsof latter 1963 indicate, Kennedy's program would be working under severe handi-caps, unless the Congressional roadblocks to the continuation of his programcould be lifted. Moreover, the lifting of the appropriations roadblock to the

funding of Federal shelters would be virtually meaningless unless the SenateArmed Services Committee passed H.R. 8200 authorizing the incentive program.These items would have to be dealt with during the term of Kennedy's successor,Lyndon Baines Johnson. The success or failure of Kennedy's civil defense programwas not only left to Lyndon Johnson and those who served him, but to theirability to persuade key Congressional leaders to support the program.

THE JOHNSON YEARS

Civil defense during the Kennedy years had undergone a metamorphosis. From asystem which was nothing but a series of paper plans, the beginnings of a

nationwide system of fallout shelters had been created; and civil defense hadbeen upgraded organizationally with its placement in the Department of Defense.

The key factor in this metamorphosis was the Presidential involvement of John F.Kennedy. This commitment was vital to civil defense progress. As Kennedy's

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c a a m i t m e n t t o c i v i l d e f e n s e i n c r e a s e d I n t h e w a k e o f t h e p e r c e i v e d s h e l t e rmania of 1961, so did Congressional appr opriat ions an d support . Never t h eless ,P r es id en t K en n ed y ga ve a s p a r k o f l i f e t o c i v i l d e f e n s e ; a n d a l t h o u g h h i scommitment weakened, the spark was never ext inguished.

Thus , a s Lyndon Johnson as sumed the P res idency, t h e k ey qu es t ion fo r c iv i ldefense was whet her h e would cont inu e his predecessor s comm itm ent to civ i lde fen se . A t f i r s t , t he answer to th i s ques t ion was to be a t en ta t ive yes , forJ ohnson vowed to cont inu e wi th Ken nedys pol ic ies an d advisors . Much of ther e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r c i v i l d e f e n s e , t h e n , wou ld r e s t w i th Sec re ta ry o f DefenseRobert McNamara. As the Presidents advisor and spokesman on defense matters --i n cl u d i n g ci vi l d efe n s e -- McN a m a r a s s t a t e m e n t s a n d a c t i o n s i n t h e ci v i ldefense field would be most important .

As 1964 began, i t a p p e a r e d t h a t McNamaras c o m m i t m e n t t o c i v i l d e f e n s e h a dincreas ed. In Ja nua ry and Februar y, before the Armed Services Commit tees andthe Defense Appropriat ions Subcommittees of the Congress, McNamara appeared too p e n a n e w c a m p a i g n f o r C o n g r e s s i o n a l s u p p o r t f o r c i v i l d e f e n s e . From theb t a L e m e n t s made by McNamara be fo re these commi tmen t s , i t a p p e a r e d t h a t t h eD e f e n s e D e p a r t m e n t n o l o n g e r c o n s i d e r e d c i v i l d e f e n s e a s m e r e l y p r u d e n ti n s u r a n c e , a s K e n n e d y h a d s t a t e d i n 1 9 6 1 , b u t r a t h e r a s a n i n t e g r a l a n de s s e n t i a l p a r t o f o u r o v e r a l l d e f e n s e p o s t u r e .

Indeed, McNamara noted at onep o i n t , in r e f e r e n c e t o t h e N a t i on s s t r a t e g i c of fe n s i v e a n d d e f en s i v e fo r ce s ,that . . .

. . . a we l l p l anned and exe cut ed n a t i o n w i d e c i v i l d e f e n s eprogram c e n t e r e d a r o u n d f a l l o u t s h e l t e r s c o u l d c o n t r i b u t em u c h m or e , dol la r f or d ol la r , t o t h e s a v i n g of l i v es i n t h eevent of a nuclear a t tack upon the Uni ted Sta tesf u r t h e r i n c r e a s e s In either of those two programs.g

than any

As future events would indicate, however, not al l was necessari ly as i t seemed.Following the passage of H.R. 8200 in the House of Representatives in Septemberof 1963, Senator Henry Jackson at last scheduled hearings on the proposed civil

defense legislation before his Senate Armed Services Subcommittee. Beginning inD e c e m b e r o f 1 9 6 3 a n d c o n t i n u i n g i n t o e a r l y 1 9 6 4 , t h e c a s e f o r t h e f a l l o u ts h e l t e r i n c e n t i v e p r og r a m ( a n d f or c i vi l d e fe n s e ) w a s , i n S t e w a r t P i t t m a n s

2 ; ;: : ; r ; ;: ;E .lYenmore conc i se ly and more e ffec t ive ly than be fo re the

As had been the case before the Hebert committee, a numberof spokesmen appea red in oppos i t ion to the l eg i s l a t ion (p r imar i ly r ep resen t ingre l ig ious and peace groups) . Never the le s s , according to Pit tman, a majori ty of the subcommit tee appeared suppor t ive . Upon the close of the hearings, however,Sena to r Jackson ind ica ted tha t he wou ld de fe r ac t ion on the l eg i s l a t ion un les sh e h a d a c l e a r s i g n f r o m t h e P r e s i d e n t t h a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a n t e d t h eprogram .*

According to Pit tman s a ccou n t of t h i s d e ve l op m e n t , S en a t or J a c k s on w a s con -cerned that the Adminis t ra t ion was not behind the program. H e , t h e r e f o r e , d i dn ot wa n t t o g o o u t i n fr o n t on t h i s i ss u e u n l es s t h e Ad m in i s t r a t i on a f fi r m edi t s s u p p o r t o f H . R . 8 2 0 0 . Pl t tman promised that this would happen before theschedu led markup sess ion o f h i s Subcommi t t ee in ea r ly March . In Pi t tman 8words:

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I asked Secretary McNamara to send a short memorandum to thePresident urging him to sign an attached note to SenatorJackson. The memorandum went to the White House, but I wasunable to determine what had happened to it for severalcrucial days. At the Subcommittee meeting at which SenatorJackson intended to defer the matter, I was allowed 15minutes to report on the President's position. My telephonecalls to Mac Bundy the night before and outside the hearingroom established that there was doubt about whetherSecretary McNamara really meant what he had asked thePresident to do. In response to my last call from outsidethe hearing room, Bundy said he would talk to McNamara andcall back. There was no call. I appeared empty-handed andSenator Jackson deferred action as he said he would. Onreturning to my office, I was given the explanation that thePresident appreciated the effort, but that there was notenough time to resolve the matter.

In an effort to mitigate the effect on OCD morale that revelation of thePresident's lack of support for civil defense would create, Pittman drafted thefollowing statement which Jackson agreed to sign and present as the public

explanation for his subcommittee's action:

This decision was based on several factors not necessarilyrelated to the substance of the bill. Principally amongthem is the fact that ballistic missile defense and theshelter program have been closely related and it is believedthat a decision as to both should be similarly related.Likewise, all programs involving the expenditure of Federalfunds must be closely reviewed in the light of the currentprogram of economy.

Given the nature of the civil defense-ABM connection, this statement led someobservers to assume (correctly) that this explanation was but a smokescreen (butfor the incorrect reasons).

It was true that for several months the Department of Defense and OCD had drawnattention to the complementary relationship between civil defense and ABM's. OnFebruary 6, 1963, for example, McNamara told the House Department of DefenseAppropriations Subcommittee that "the effectiveness of an active ballisticmissile defense system in saving lives depends in large part upon the availa-bility of adequate fallout shelters for the population."ll The reason for thiswas the ease with which an ABM system could be circumvented simply by explodinglarge ground-level bursts upwind of cities and beyond the range of ABM's. Theresulting fallout would kill large percentages of urban populations downwindunless fallout shelters wer provided. Thus, McNamara told the subcommitteethat "it would be foolhardy to spend funds of this magnitude ($3 billion for theNike-Zeus) without accompanying it with a civil defense program." He went on tonote that "I personally will never recommend an anti-ICBM program unless afallout program does accompany it."12 In fact, in the justifications for boththe FY 1964 and FY 1965 appropriations, McNamara stated that "the very austerecivil defense program recommended by the President should be given priority Over

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any major additions to the active defenses."13 The CD-ABM connection was, thus,& ? a persuasive reason for postponing action on fallout shelters or H.R. 8200.

Adding to the concern created by the Jackson Subcommittee action and to theconfusion occasioned by the subcommittee's explanation were two other develop-ments in March that had significant impact upon civil defense. Several daysfollowing the March 2 Jackson Subcommittee vote, Stewart Pittman resigned toreturn to his Washington law practice. He was replaced by a career official,

William P. Durkee. A few weeks later on March 31, the OCD was reassigned fromthe Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Office of the Secretary of theArmy. The Defense Department insisted that this move was not a down-gradingof civil defense nor a demonstration of lessened significance, but this pro-testation fell on skeptical ears.

Civil defense was thrown into a state of shock by these developments. The(behind the scenes) Jackson decision and the Jackson Subcommittee vote effec-tively killed the shelter incentive concept and, thus, forced civil defense tobegin looking for other policy options. March 2, 1964, marked a major turningpoint for civil defense in the United States, scuttling several years of OCDpreparation and planning. Compounding the impact of these developments wastheir timing, coming as they did on the eve of the OCD's appearance before theappropriations committees of Congress in April, May, and June.

3

Not surprisingly, the $358 million OCD request was cut. Thus, 1964 was not agood year for civil defense. The shelter incentive program had been deferredindefinitely, an able administrator had been lost, civil defense had been moveddown from the Office of the Secretary of Defense within the Pentagon to theOffice of the Secretary of the Army, and a "modest" civil defense appropriationrequest has been cut significantly by the Congress. \

Despite statements made by McNamara following these developments to the effectthat civil defense was the most important element of the Department's damagelimitation package and would have to precede any other elements of the package

(ABM's, manned interceptors), civil defense programs began a long slide downhillin 1964. Contrasted with strong statements of support for civil defense on thepart of McNamara were weak actions of support. Smaller and smaller amounts forcivil defense were approved by McNamara's office for OCD submission to Congress.Similarly, fewer and fewer new programs were approved. Moreover, McNamara wouldbegin to link the future of civil defense to the ABM, despite his earlier state-ments that decisions could be made on civil defense independent of decisions onthe ABM, but not vice versa. This paradox suggests the possibility thatMcNamara was engaged in a political gambit to delay ABM funding.

McNamara was concerned with the feasibility of the ABM (given developmentalproblems) and with its costs and role in strategic policy. There were, however,strong pressures for the ABM. Since McNamara's strongest statements of support

for civil defense and his linkage of CD to the ABM case after the Johnson/Jackson deferral of H.R. 8200, it is conceivable that his latest push for civildefense was a ruse to delay the ARM and, at the same time, counter the pressuresfor ABM deployment. Knowing that the Congress was not about to pass the neededcivil defense legislation (especially since he was no longer proposing such

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legislation), McNamara could successfully make a nationwide fallout sheltersystem the prerequisite for an ABM, system he did not want to see deployed, andsafely extol the virtues of civil defense.

Whatever Secretary McNamara's motivations, the end result was steadily decreas-ing civil defense appropriation requests. And, as requests and appropriationsdeclined, so did program objectives. As this process unfolded, and the areassuitable for fruitful shelter survey efforts diminished, civil defense policy

was nudged increasingly toward a paper planning program centered around crisis-implemented civil defense efforts. The OCD began to speak in terms of"experimental" and "shelf': programs which could, if needed, be called upon --provided there would be enough time. The evolution caused a group of concernedcitizens to write President Johnson in 1966 warning that "the current inclina-tion to rely on stepped up preparations when the threat materializes is adangerous illusion," for "in an accelerating nuclear crisis, it might well betoo provocative or too alarming to call for readily avialable measures to savelives from fallout radiation and other emergency preparations."14 Nevertheless,these trends would continue.

In a book published in 1968, Stewart Pittman -- after noting the evolution ofcivil defense policy and the steady diminution of authorizations and funding

levels during the Johnson years -- wondered, "have we reverted back to thearmband days of civil defense ?*'15 The possibility was real. From a requestedauthorization of $358 million during Johnson's first year, the request droppedby more than $280 million to only $77.3 million in his last year. Of the fundsrequested, the amounts appropriated by the Congress dropped from $105.2 millionto $60.5 million. The trends were most unpromising.

Several factors explain this development, but major responsibility must beshared by the Congress and the Executive. It appeared that both PresidentJohnsonand Secretary of Defense McNamara supported a viable and active civildefense program in early 1964, but Johnson's failure to give Senator Jackson theneeded endorsement of H.R. 8200 and McNamara's cuts of the civil defense budgetthereafter suggest the contrary. Exhaustive hearings in the House in 1963 had

persuaded that skeptical branch of the Congress that civil defense was viableand needed. Support was given to continuing and concluding a comprehensivenationwide fallout shelter system. Senator Jackson's tabling of H.R. 8200 dueto lack of Administration support summarily prevented the passage of thislegislation -- the vehicle needed to bring the shelter program to fruition.

Faced with doubts about the viability of the elements in the damage limitationpackage, as well as the all-consuming nature of the Vietnam War, resourceconstraints, a Congressional mood of economy, a growing acceptance of the theoryof mutual assured destruction, and perhaps weary of providing a sounding boardfor outspoken peace and religious groups who perceived civil defenae as a steptoward nuclear war and away from the road to peace, Johnson and McNamara with-held the support that was essential if civil defense were to progress* Sensingthis, Congressional support also weakened. Pittman charged that Johnson hadbeen "less than responsible in failing to establish and to maintain a long-termcivil defense policy and to provide the necessary Federal leadership to c a r r y i tout.*1l6 As an indication of the strength of Johnson's canmitment to civil

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defense, one might further note that in Johnson's book, The Vantage Point,published after his departure from office, civil defense was not evenmentioned.17

THE NIXON YEARS

Shortly after assuming the Presidency, Richard Nixon ordered a study of theNation's civil defense shelter system "to see what we can do there to minimizeAmerican casualties" should deterrence fail.18 A further indication of Presi-dential interest in civil defense during Nixon's first year in Office came inlate October when he signed Executive Order 11490. This included a specificprovision encouraging all Federal agencies engaged in building construction toplan, design, and construct such buildings to protect the public against thehazards of nuclear war. In cases where Federal financial assistance wasprovided for construction, the responsible agencies were encouraged "to usestandards for planning design and construction which will maximize protectionfor the public."1g According to the OCD Annual Report of 1970, this ExecutiveOrder represented a ysignificant step forward" for the OCD, for this was thefirst time that Federal agencies engaged in building construction had been

requested (though not ordered) to encourage the incorporation of shelter ingrant and loan projects involving Federal financial assistance.

Despite these (and other) indications of a renewal of interest in civil defenseduring the first year of the Nixon Administration, Secretary of Defense Laird,in his written statement before the House Armed Services Committee in Februaryof-1970, indicated thatProgram."2o

"no major changes are proposed in the Civil DefenseThe ostensible reason for this was that the civil defense program

was still the subject of a review by the Office of Emergency Preparedness -- astudy that had been ongoing for nearly an entire year. A few weeks later, thenew OCD Director (John E. Davis, ex-Governor of North Dakota) appeared beforeCongress and presented an appropriation request for $73.8 million -- the lowestcivil defense request ever submitted to Congress.

In light of the minimum nature of the FY 1971 request, not only was the deteri-oration of the civil defense program not reversed, it in fact accelerated. Inthat the Executive and the Congress were approving smaller and smaller amountsfor civil defense against nuclear attack, Davis began investigating the prospectof giving the OCD greater responsibility in the peacetime (mostly natural)disaster field. Deciding that there were, indeed, possibilities in the localdisaster preparedness area, Da;&s announced this as "a major shift in emphasis**in his FY 1971 Annual Report. As Davis elaborated at another point, "thedevelopment of local capabilities for effective action in emergencies isessential to civil preparedness, both in peacetime or in the event of attack."22While this is true, provided that the "development of local capabilities"include those needed in nuclear attack situations (such as large-scale falloutprotection), in practice it did not work out satisfactorily during an era ofperceived detente. Many local directors became interested only in natural orpeacetime preparedness and the OCD became very lax in seeing that Federal moniesspent at the local area were, indeed, spent on programs having nuclear attackutility. In essence, national security considerations in civil defense becameof secondary importance to local preparedness for peacetime disasters.

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G

s

In the mean t ime, t h e Adm in i s t r a t ion was a l so mar k in g t im e on c iv i l defense.After more than a year in the works , th e long-awai t ed s t udy of c iv i l defense bythe OEP was completed and forwarded to the National Security Council in June of 1970. Now known as NSSM 57 (for National Security Study Memorandum No. 57), t hestudy would si t for more than two more years before action was taken. AlthoughNSSM 57 remains a classified document, i t i s no sec re t t ha t a r ange o f a l t e rna -t ive c iv i l defense programs was cons idered by th is s tudy, most of which wouldhave enta i led much higher appropr ia t ion levels than the Adminis t ra t ion had thus

far a pproved. These were not appr oved. Instead, the NSC directed (NSDM 184)t h a t the re be inc reased emphas i s on dua l -use p l ans , p rocedures , and p repa red -n e s s within t he l imi t a t ions o f ex i s t ing au tho r i ty ( and appropr i a t ion l eve l s , a si t w o u l d s o o n b e ,23de c l e a r ) , i n cl u di n g a p p r op r i a t e r el a t e d i m pr ove m en t s i ncr is i s management .

The method for implementing NSDM 184 was suggested by anot her Executive study-paper which was w r i t t e n b y t h e F i t z h u g h b l u e r i b b o n p a n e l o n t h e d e f e n s eest ab lishm en t. Forwarded in early 1971, this report recommended that the OCD bereorganized as a separa te agency at t he Secret ar ys level within th e Depart mentof Defense. Thus * on Ma y 5, 1 9 7 2 , OC D w a s of fi ci a l l y d i s e s t a b l i s h e d a n d i t sf u n c t i o n s t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e n e w l y - c r e a t e d D e f e n s e Civi 1 Pr epar ednes 6 Agency(DCPA) . A l t h o u g h i t w a s s t a t e d t h a t the new agency wil l provide preparedness

as s i s t ance p l ann ing in a l l a r eas o f c iv i l de fense and na tu ra l d i sa s t e r s , t he rewould come to be little doubt that the latter focus was ascendent over theformer.24

As sanctioned through NSDM 184, DCPA officially implemented its previous dual-u s e p o l i c y. O n e of t h e fi r s t a c t i on s of t h e n e w a g e n c y w a s t o d e c id e t h a tF e d e r a l s h e l t e r m a r k i n g a n d s tocking did not f i t into the new dual-use focus.These ac t iv i t ies , thus , became cr is i s - implemented programs, i . e . , the i r ac tua la c c o m p l i s h m e n t w o u l d b e d e f e r r e d u n t i l p e r i o d 6 o f i n c r e a s e d t e n s i o n . Th eShel ter Survey Program -- which had a t one t ime been the very essence of civi ld e f e n s e - - s u r v i v e d , b ut a t :a r e d u c e d l e v e l o f i m p o r t a n c e , w i t h t h e D C PAa d v oca t i n g t h e c r ea t i on o f S t a t e E n g in e e r S u p p or t Groups or in -house S ta t eo rgan iza t ion6 to conduc t t he su rvey in p l ace o f t he Fede ra l Eng inee r ing Surveysupport which had been provided since 1962.

Along with t hese chan ges, the DCPA noted in i ts 1972 Annual Report t hat one of the major elements of the new program would be the development or guidancefor loca l governments , b a s e d o n r i s k a n a l y s i s ,guidance for high risk a reas . 25

to inc lude evacuat ion p lanningHaving been abandoned a decade earlier, evacu-

ation planning would begin making a comeback under the Nixon Administrat ion.Fed e r a l - l eve l c ivi l de fense off ici a l s were qu ick to poin t ou t t ha t t hey werelooking a t the evacuat ion concept in a quite different context* than had beent h e c a s e e a r l i e r : Namely, t h a t o f a p a r t i a l d i s p e r s a l o f p e o p l e f r o m c i t i e sd u r i n g a p e r i o d o f i n t e n s e i n t e r n a t i y 6 a l c r i s i s w h i c h c o u l d w e l l p r e c e d e anuclear a t tack upon the Uni ted Sta tes .

L

I t is understandable that the DCPA wanted to divorce i tself from the discreditede v a c u a t i o n p o l i c y o f t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f a t o m i c - a g e c i v i l d e f e n s e . However,evacuation planning conducted under the Truman and Eisenhower Administrat ion6wa s n ot en t i r e ly t a c t ica l ly or ien te d . Al lowance had been made for the poss i -b i l i t y t h a t s t r a t e g i c w a r n i n g o f p o t e n t i a l a t t a c k w o u l d p e r m i t e v a c u a t i o n .

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Crisis relocation and "crisis implemented" evacuation are one and the same, yetthe differences between the two are largely determined by the undefined meaningattributed to "intense international crisis." Some crises are more intense thanothers. Moreover, it is always possible that a crisis could escalate over a re-latively short period of time. Thus, time and the ability of national leaders topredict the likely course of volatile events might not allow for the activation,much less the implementation, of crisis relocation planning. Intriguingly,the transformation of OCD into DCPA -- with the attendant focus on local pre-paredness and dual-use, crisis implementation, and crisis relocation -- camefast on the heels of the release of a General Accounting Office study of civildefense activities and status that recommended that more attention be paid toImproving the fallout shelter system and scarcely mentioned disaster planning orthe dual-use policy. After having studied the accomplishments of civil defenseover the past 10 years and the nature of nuclear destruction, the report con-cluded that even though huge increases in nuclear weapon strength and numbershad occurred over the lo-year period, this had not made survival hopeless.Indeed, the -report noted that millions of lives which would otherwise be lostcould be saved in the face of an all-out nuclear attack.27

The Administration, as we know, did not accept any of the augmented civildefense proposals contained in the GAO report or in NSSM 57, instead deciding to

reorganize civil defense and focus on dual-use local preparedness. Whileseveral factors account for this decision, most probably the deciding factorinvolved the SALT I Treaty which was signed by President Nixon in Moscow just 21days following the OCD/DCPA reorganization. The major accomplishment of thistreaty was in limiting ABM deployment in both the United States and the SovietUnion. Several participants in the negotiations that led to the signing of thisTreaty have since stated that a major assumption behind the agreement was thatboth sides were thereby implicitly accepting the doctrine of mutual assureddestruction which said, in effect, that each side could absorb a first strike bythe other and still have sufficient forces left to visit unacceptable damageupon the other. By agreeing to limit ABM deployment, it was perceived that eachside was agreeing that no steps would be taken to interfere with the otherside's capability to inflict unacceptable damage after receiving a first strike,for with effective ABM's, the determination of unacceptable damage became adangerously cloudy issue. In other words, safety lay in vulnerability.

Highly effective civil defense could create the same instability that ABM'screated. While "highly effective" levels of civil defense were not beingproposed by OCD, even marginally or moderately effective civil defense programsmust have seemed incongruous to the Administration in the context of the SALTenvironment of cooperation and the theory of hostage populations.

After the Presidential decision was made in May of 1972 to formalize the shiftin civil defense emphasis to local emergency planning by disestablishing theOffice of Civil Defense and transferring its responsibilities to the new Defense

Civil Preparedness Agency, very little high level executive interest wasevidenced. The new program continued to evolve in the direction of localemergency preparedness, as was made evident in DCPA appropriations requests andby congressional refusal to approve even a very modest shelter incentive subsidyproposal, fearing, perhaps, that this would be but the leading edge of thewedge. Funds flowing into State and local areas (and constituencies) steadily

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increased during the Nixon years, while funds for shelter programs decreased.This reorientation of appropriations generally took place within a stabilizedtotal budget level of approximately $80 million a year throughout the Nixonyears. In fact, however, the stabilized level was illusory in that a risingrate of inflation during this period translated into a steady decline of DCPAprogram scope and capabilities. In terms of non-inflated dollars, the appropri-ation authorizations of the Nixon Administration were very close to those of theEisenhower Administration (which were very low, indeed). In view of the factthat the Nixon era civil defense budgets included significantly more funds fornatural disaster programs than was the case during the Eisenhower era, it can beargued that civil defense preparedness against nuclear attack reached a very lowpoint during the Nixon years.

To those working in civil defense during the Nixon Administration, it might wellhave seemed that civil defense had reverted full circle to the days of paperplanning and low priority. Civil defense had been relegated by the Congress toa relatively low and unchanging budget level. With this budget level, inflationwas eating away program capabilities. The nationwide fallout shelter systembegun under Kennedy was deteriorating and the current emphasis on local disasterpreparedness was unlikely to lead to a reversal of this trend. The shelterstocking program had ended upon the depletion of all stocks procured in the

early 1960's; the shelter survey program was continued, but a substantiallyreduced level; enhanced warning and communication systems could not be procuredfor lack of funds; and OCD/DCPA personnel ceilings were reduced year after year.And, finally, the Administration seemed unconcerned and unwilling to attempt toreverse these trends in an atmosphere of SALT and mutual vulnerability.

Clearly, there was room for pessimism, but civil defense was far from dead orforgotten. "Since the Nixon Administration, several controversies have againfocused attention on the question of civil defense. A large and expensiveSoviet-civil defense program has been 'discovered,' Soviet conventional andstrategic forces continue to grow, doubts about mutual assured destructioncontinue to grow, and concerns have again been voiced about the role of civildefense in limited nuclear war."*8

THE FORD YEARS

In 1975, during the Ford Administration, Secretary of Defense Schlesingerdirected that the DCPA undertake a new program to improve attack preparedness.This was to commence development of crisis relocation (evacuation) plans orCRP's. The Secretary's February 1975 Annual Report stated that the U.S. shouldhave an option for crisis evacuation for two reasons:

(1) To be able to respond in kind if the Soviet Unionattempts to intimidate us in time of crisis by evacuat-ing the population from its cities; and,

(2) To reduce fatalities if an attack on our cities appearsimminent.

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The CRP effort was undertaken after extensive pilot and developmental work andi n c l u d e d s e v e r a l d o z e n r e s e a r c h p r o j e c t s o n i s s u e s , i n c l u d i n g m o v e m e n t f e a s i -b i l i t y ( e s p e c i a l l y i n C a l i f o r n i a a n d t h e N o r t h e a s t ) , f o o d r e d i s t r i b u t i o n ,medical care , e l ec t r i c power, and many othe r s . I t was dep loyed on ly a f t e rth o rough d i scuss ion wi th t he P r es iden t o f th e S ta t e d i r ec tor s a s socia t ion an da b o u t 1 0 o t h e r S t a t e C i v i l P r e p a r e d n e s s D i r e c t o r s , w h o a g r e e d t h a t p l a n n i n gshould be commenced. Relocat ion plans were to be developed by the fu l ly-fundedSta te p lanners , and th is effor t was underway in nearly al l States by 1976-1977.

In late 1975, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) administered a sharpshock to the CD communi ty a t a l l l eve l s . Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld hadrecommended a FY 1977 CD budget of $124 mil l ion ($203 mil l ion in FY 1984d o l l a r s ) - - about half again as large as the FY 1976 appropriat ion -- based onD e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e a n a l y s e s i n d i c a t i n g t h a t C D c a p a b i l i t i e s s h o u l d b eimproved. The OMB, however, directed that the program be cut to about half the.FY 1976 level , u s i n g a s i t s r a t i o n a l e t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t t h e p r o g r a m h a dbecome too much o r i en ted to peace t ime d i sas t e r s , wh ich were p rope r ly a S ta t ea n d l o c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y - - n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t i a l d i r e c t i v e , t h e no n l y t h r e e y e a r s o l d , t h a t t h e r e s h o u l d b e i n c r e a s e d emphasis on dual-usep lans , p rocedures ; and p repa redness .

Moreover, Federa l a s s i s t an ce . i n FY 1977 was to be so le ly for a t t a ck p repa r ed-n e s s . After negotiat ions within the Executive Branch, the FY 1977 request wasfo r $76 mi l l ion , which would have involved a 12 percent real decrease from theFY 1976 level. However, the Congress appropriated $87 mill ion. (This c on g r es -siona l increase over th e Administ ra t ions request was un precedented .) However,w h i l e t h e f i n a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n i n v o l v e d o n l y a s i x p e r c e n t r e a l d e c r e a s e f r o mthe p rev ious yea r, t he a t t ack -on ly emphasis persisted in FY 1977. This was af a c t o r i n S t a t e a n d l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s d e s i r e f o r , a n d e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n , aconsolidated agency, w h i c h w a s e f f e c t e d i n 1 9 7 9 w i t h t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h eFederal Em ergency Management &ency (FEMA).

Th e OMBs ac t ion , thus , r e v e r s e d DOD po l i cy on dua l -use , wh ich had been tha timproved capab i l i t i e s to dea l wi th peace t ime d i sas t e r s were a secondary bu td e s i r a b l e o b j e c t i v e o f t h e c i v i l d e f e n s e p r o g r a m . Th e i n s u r a n c e r a t i o n a l ef o r a t t a c k p r e p a r e d n e s s p e r s i s t e d , b u t i t s a i d n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e s i z e o f t h epermium to be paid. I t was used equally to justify the large Kennedy program of FY 1962 and t he m uch sm aller (and declining) request s of th e 1970s.

THE CARTER YEARS

S o o n a f t e r t h e a d v e n t o f t h e C a r t e r A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , s t u d i e s o f c i v i l d e f e n s eprograms and policies were undertaken, first within DOD and then a t t he Na t iona lSecur i ty Counci l level . The House Committee on Armed Services also conducted CD

hearings in 1976, fo r the f i r s t t ime s ince 1963 , wh ich r e su l t ed in Represen ta -t ive Donald Mitchel l s becoming an advocate of improved c iv i l defense . Act ionswere taken to provide for annual authorization hearings on civil defense by theHouse and Senate Committees on Armed Services.

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Th e DOD and NSC s tudies -- the la t ter involving the CIA and th e Arms Control andDisarmament Agency, as well as DOD - - r e s u l t e d e v e n t u a l l y I n a d o p t i o n o f P r e s i -dential Directive (PD) 41 in September of 1978. Professor Samuel Huntington of Harvard chaired the interagency group which developed PD-41. I t s k e y p o i n t sw er e t h a t t h e U .S . ci vi l d efe n s e p r og r a m w a s a n e l em e n t of t h e U . S . s t r a t e g icposture and that i t should:

l Enhance de te r rence and s t ab i l i t y ;

6 Reduce the poss ib i l i t y o f Sov ie t c r i s i s coe rc ion ;

6 Enhance the su rv ivab i l i ty o f the Amer ican peop le and i t sleadership in the event of nuclear war;

6 I n c l u d e p l a n n i n g f o r p o p u l a t i o n r e l o c a t i o n d u r i n g t i m eo f i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s ; a n d

6 B e a d a p t a b l e t o h e l p d e a l w i t h n a t u r a l d i s a s t e r s a n dother peacetime emergencies.

PD-41 d id no t p rov ide fo r comple t ion o f a spec i f i c p rogram by any spec i f i ed

d a t e .E n h a n c i n g d e t e r r e n c e w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e f r o m t h e i n s u r a n c e r a t i o n a l es ta ted by Pres ident Kennedy in 1961. The es sence o f PD-41 was l a t e r enac tedinto law in 1980 amendments of the Civi l Defense Act , adding a new Ti t le V,Improved Civil Defense Program, resu l t in g f rom th e effor ts of Represen ta t ivesIke Ske l ton and Dona ld Mi tche l l , i n pa r t i cu la r.

PD-41 did not , however, resu l t in an im media te increa se in civ i l defense budgetr e q u e s t s . While Secretary of Defense Harold Brown reportedly recommended an F Y1980 s tar t on a seven-year enhanced program, th e Admin i s t r a t ion s r eques t wasfo r a sum prov id ing es sen t i a l ly no r ea l g rowth - - and the FY 1980 appropr i a t ionenac ted was fo r an amoun t wh ich marked an a l l - t ime low, in cons tan t d o l l a r s .

T h e C ar t er A dm in is t r a tion , a s p a r t of it s g ov e r n m e n t r e or g a n i z a t i on e f for t s ,took s t eps which r e su l t ed in the fo rma t ion o f FEMA in 1979 , by conso l ida t ingf ive previous , agencies w i t h e m e r g e n c y - r e l a t e d p r o g r a m s a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .While former DCPA personnel were dispersed in a number of parts of FEMA, thec i v i l d e f e n s e p r o g r a m c o n t i n u e d t o b e a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e H o u s e a n d S e n a t eCommittees on Armed Services, and the CD budget was reviewed as a subset of thenew Agencys budget.

Th e M 1981 reques t marked the f i r s t s ign i f i can t inc rease in many yea r s . Thereques ted inc rease was no t l a rge , however ; and I t was , t he re fo re , t a rge ted oni n c r e a s i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s in a b o u t 6 0 counterforce a r e a s i n 3 6 s t a t e s - -communities near ICBM complexes, SAC bases, a n d b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s u b m a r i n ep or t s . T h e co u n t e r f or c e j u r i s d i c t i o n s w e r e t o b e t r e a t e d a s d e m o n s t r a t i ona r e a s , a n d w e r e t o be p r ov id e d a d d i t i on a l S t a t e -l ev el p l a n n i n g e ffor t , w a r n i n gp o i n t s , a n d o t h e r a s s i s t a n c e .

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THE REAGANYEARS

The FY 1982 budget vas ready for presentat ion in early 1981, and was discussedwi th t he Reagan Admin i s t r a t ion s N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l s t a f f . I t w a sdecided that the FY 1982 request (providing for sl ight real growth of about fourpercent ) should go forward , but tha t a shor t - te rm NSC projec t would be under-t a k e n t o d e v e l o p a N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y D e c i s i

Civil Defense History (1945)

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