City Response to Petition for Mandamus

8/9/2019 City Response to Petition for Mandamus

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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTEDONLY IF GRANTED TO RELATORS

No. 05-10-00805-CVIN THE COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXASAT DALLAS

IN RE MARCUSWOOD, THE KIRKWOOD TEMPLE,THE AFRICAN.AMERICAN PASTORSCOALITION,THE INTERDENOMINATIONAL MINISTERIAL ALLIANCE OF DALLAS,THE MT. TABOR BAPTIST CHURCH AND THE LIFEWAY CHURCH

RESPONSE O PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUSAND APPENDDVSUPPLEMENTALMANDAMUS RECORD

THOMASP. PERKINS, R. CITY ATTORNEY'SOFFICEDallasCity AttorneyCharles steeTexasBarNo. 06673600) 1500MarillaStreet, oom7D NorthBarbara . RosenbergTexasBar No. 17267700) Dallas,Texas 5201Assistant ityAttorneys Telephone:2l4-670-3519Telecopier214-67 -0622

ATTORNEYSFORRESPONDENTS


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IDENTITY OF PARTIESAND COUNSELPursuant o TBX. R. App. P. 38.2(a),counselfor Respondents,City of Dallas,

hereby adoptsRelators' Identity of Partiesand Counselwith the following supplement oRespondents'counseland dentification of the real parties n interest:PARTIESRelators:MarcusWoodUnidentified Coalition of Opponentsto Local Option ElectionKirkwood TempleAfrican-American PastorsCoalitionInterdenominationalMinisterial AllianceOf GreaterDallasMt. Tabor Baptist ChurchLifeway ChurchRespondents,n their respective

fficial capacities:City Secretary,City of Dallas, TexasDeborahWatkinsDallas Citv Council Members:Tom LeppertDelia JassoPaulineMedranoDavid A. NeumannDwaineR. CarawayVonciel JonesHillSteveSalazarCarolynR. Davis

Tennell AtkinsSheffie KadaneJerryR. AllenLinda KoopRon NatinskyAnn MargolinAngela Hunt

COUNSELLeland C. de aGarzaAndrewL. SiegelTimothy D. ZeigerDerekD. RollinsShackelfordMelton & McKinley3333Lee Parkway,Tenth FloorDallas,Texas75219Telephone 214-180-1400Facsimile:214-780-1401

ThomasP. Perkins,Jr.Dallas City AttorneyCharlesEsteeBarbaraE. RosenbergAssistantCity AttorneysCity Attorney's Office1500Marilla, Room 7D NorthDallas,Texas7520ITelephone214-67 -3519Telecopier214-670-0622

Real Parties In Interest:Signersof the Application for Local OptionElection(seeRelators'App'x Tab B)Signers of the Petitions for the Local OptionElection(seeMR 000006-000017)


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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENTOral argument is unnecessarybecause his Court does not have subject-matter

jurisdiction and Relators have an adequateremedy at law. Under well establishedprecedent, he Court lacks subject-matterurisdiction becauseof the Relators' lack ofstanding,mootness,and this Court's lack of authority to inquire into the validity of thecalling of an election. Further, under well-establishedprecedent, he Relatorscan bringan election contest, a statutorily created adequate emedy at law. Finally, a simplereading of the applicable statutesdemonstrates hat the Realtors' claims are withoutmerit. Accordingly, Relators' petition shouldbe summarilydenied.

In the alternative, if oral argument is granted to the Realtors, the Respondentsrequestoral argument o addresshe issues.


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TABLE OF CONTENTSIDENTITYOFPARTIES ND COUNSEL.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .STATEMENT EGARDING RALARGUMENT.......... ............. iiINDEXOFAUTHORITIES .........iRESPONSEO STATEMENT FJURISDICTION....... ..............iRECORD EFERENCES... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i iRESPONSEO SSUES RESENTED........... ............xiii

1. This Court does not have subject-matterurisdictionover thispetition or writ of mandamus.2. Realtorsare not entitledto mandamuselief becausehev cannotsatisfy hestandardsor mandamuselief.

INTRODUCTIONLocalOptionElection rocedures)............. ......STATEMENT FFACTS .............3SUMMARYOFARGUMENT... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5ARGUMENT... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7I. Relatorsare not entitled to mandamuselief because he Court lackssubject-matterurisdiction. ...................7

A. The Court does not have subject-matterurisdiction becauseRelators' laims rebarred y theseparationf powers octrine...............B. The Court doesnot have urisdictionbecause elators'mandamus

requests moot.... ....1lC. The Court does not have jurisdiction over Relators' mandamusrequestecausehey ackstanding... ........ 3

1. MarcusWoodhasno standingobring hismandamusction........3

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2. The churchesand relatedassociations o not have standing opetition for writ of mandamus or themselvesor on behalf oftheir ndividual espective embers.......... ....................5a. Members of Relator organizations do not have

standing. ............6b. Relator organizational goals are not germane to thel i t igat ion. . . . . . . . . . . . I7c. Relator organizationscannot show the relief requireddoesnot requiremember articipation............ .....19

II. Relatorsare not entitled to mandamus elief because hev cannotsatisfv thestandardor mandamuselief ..........-..... ..............qA. Mandamustandards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9B. Relators are not entitled to mandamusrelief because hey cannotshow hat hey do nothavean adequateemedyat aw. ............21C. Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because the CityCouncil ompliedwith tsdutyby call ing heelecrion..............................23D. Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because the City

Secretary complied with her duties by certifying that a sufficientnumberof qualified oterssigned hepetition.............. .............26E. Relators are not entitled to mandamus elief because he historicalboundariesof dry areashave no impact on the validity of calling thiselect ion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

CONCLUSION ND pRAyER ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35CERTIFICATEOF SERVICE .....36RESPONDENTS'SUPPLEMENTAL MANDAMUS RECORD ANDAPPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

CertificationAffidavit of DeborahWatkins .......Tab1

IV


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City Secretarymemorandum nd certification..... .. Tab2Excerptof web-page f the KirkwoodTemple............. ..Tab3Excerpt of the web-pageof the Lifeway Church Tab 4TEX.ALCoBBv.CooE$ 251 73 .......... Tab5Attorney GeneralOpinion M-355 .Tab 6Attorney GeneralOpinion DM-44 Tab 7Excerptof theTexasSecretary f Stateweb-page e local optionelections ...Tab8


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INDEX OF AUTHORITIESCASESAkers v. Remington,115S.W.2d714Tex.Civ.App.-For t Worth1938, r i t d ism'd) . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .25Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hallman,159S.W.3d640Tex.2005) .. . . . . . . . . . . . .1Blum v. Innier,997S.W.2d259 Tex.1999) 8,14,17,24Brady v. FourteenthCourt of Appeals,795S.W.2d7l2 Tex.1990) or ig. roceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6Brown v. Todd,53 S.W.3d297 (Tex.200l) 14,16Building and Constr.Tradesv. Downtown Dev., Inc.,448F.3d 38 (2dCir. 2006) ...............8Burns v. Kelly,658S.W.2d73l (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1983,orig.proceeding) ......20Bushv. Vela,535 S.W.2d803 (Tex.Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1916,orig.proceeding)..........21Callahanv. Giles.137Tex.511,155S.W.2d793 1941) orig.proceeding)............ ........20Carter v. FourteenthCourt of Appeals,789S.W.2d260 Tex.1990) orig.proceeding)............. .......6Citizensor Fair Taxesv. Sweetwaterndep.Sch.Dist. Bd. of Trustees,807 S.W.2d45l (Tex.App.-Eastland 199I, orig.proceedingleavedenied]).....6City of Austinv. Thompson,

219S.w.zd57 (Tex.1949) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8City of Dallas v. Dallas Consol. Elec. St. Ry.Co.,148S.W.292 Tex.1912) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8City of FarrnersBranch v. Ramos,235 S.W.3 462 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001 no per.) ............1


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City of Houstonv. Albright,666 S.W.2d2l9 (Tex.App.-Houston [14thDist.] 1984),writ ref'dn.r.e.,677 .W.2d487 Tex.1984)....... 21,28City of McAllen v. Garza,

869S.W.2d 58 Tex.App.-Corpus Christi1993,writ denied)............................8Coker v. Tex.AlcoholicBeveragesComm'n,524 S.W.2d570 Tex.Civ. App.-Dallas 1975,writ ref'd n.r.e.) ........33DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman,252 .w3d299Tex. 008) .. . . . . . . . . . . . .3Ellis v. Vanderslice,486 S.W.2d156 Tex.Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, o writ).. ...9,10, 12,22Estradav. Adame,951 S.W.2d165(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997 orig.proceeding) 19,20Ex parte Barcett,37S.W.2d 41 Tex.1931) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8Fed.Deposit Ins. Corp. v. NuecesCounty,886S.W.2d766Tex.1994) . . . . . . . .1t ,zFisher v. Harris County RepublicanExecutiveComm.,744 s.w.2d339 (Tex.App.-Houston [1stDist.] 1988,orig.proceeding).........20Gen.Land Office v. OXY U.S.A.,nc.,789S.w.2d569 Tex.1990) .. . . . . . . . . . . . .12Houchinsv. Plainos,110S.w.2d549 Tex.1937) .. . . . . . . . . . . . .32Hunt v. Bass,6645.w.2d323 Tex.1984) .. . . . . . . . . . . . .14Hunt v. Wash.StateApple Adver. Comm'n,432U.5 .333 1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 .16Hutsonv. Smith,191S.W.2d779 Tex.Civ. App.-Galveston1946, o writ)... ............12In re Baker,No. 01-10-00022-CV,2010 L 670185(Tex.App.-Houston [14thDist.] Feb.25,2010,orig.proceeding) ......7

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In re Bell,91 S.W.3d 84 Tex.2002) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21In re Davis,269S.W.3d 81 Tex.2008) . .10.24,32In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,148S.W.3 124 Tex.2004) orig.proceeding)........... ...... 9In re Roof,130S.W.3d4l4 (Tex.App.-Houston [4th Dist.] 2004,orig.proceeding).......28Jacksonv.State,118S.W.2d 13 Tex.Cr im.App.1938) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33Johnsonv.Hughes,

663S.W.2d11(Tex.App.-Houston [1stDist.] 1983, rig.proceeding)...........21Kennedyv. Burnett IndependentSch. Dist.,4745.W.2d742(Tex. iv.App.-Aust in l972,nowr i t ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9,22Izggett v. Cochran,193S.W.2d729 Tex.Civ. App.-1946, no writ) ...............12McGuire v. City of Dallas,151S.W.2d617 Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1941,writ dism'd,dgmt cor.)............21McSpaddenv. Carter,802 S.W.2d246 Tex.App.-Houston [1stDist.] 1990, rig.proceeding)...........6Myers v. Martinez,320 S.W.2d862 Tex.Civ. App.-San Antonio),wri t ref 'dn.r .e. ,326 .W.2d 7 (Tex.1959). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32Narro Warehouse,nc. v. Kelly,530 .w.2d146 Tex. iv. App.-corpus hristi1975, rit ef'dn.r.e.)...........21Oneyv. Ammerman,

458S.W.2d 4 (Tex.1970) orig.proceeding)............. .......20Ramirezv.Flores,505S.W.2d406 Tex.Civ. App.-San Antonio1973,writ ref'd n.r.e.)..............20Reese . Comm'rsCourt,861S.W.2d281(Tex. pp.-Tyler 1993, o writ) .............20

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RetiredChicago oliceAss'n . Cityof Chicago,7 F.3d5847thCir. 993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera,858S.W.2d366 Tex.1993) orig.proceeding)............ ......21Robertsv. Brownsboro Indep.Sch.Dist.,575S.W.2d37l Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1978, r i t d ism'd) . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22Rossanov. Townsend,9 S.W.3d357(Tex.App.-Houston [14thDist.] 1999, o pet.) ..........22Tatumv. Collier.No.C14-87-00870-CV,989WL 111365(Tex.App.-Houston [14thDist.]Sept. 8, 1989, o writ).... ..............22Taxpayers'Political Action Comm.v. City of Houston,596 S.W.2d147 Tex.Civ. App.-Houston [1stDist.]1979, rig.proceeding)...... .................20Tex.Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex.Air Control Bd.,852S.w.2d440 Tex.1993) . . . . . . . .13.5Tex.PeaceOfficersAss'nv. City of Galveston,944F.S. rpp .562S.D. ex .1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15Trulockv. City of Duncanville,

2775.W.3d920 Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, o pet.) ............lWalker v. Packer,827 S.W.2d833(Tex. 1992) orig.proceeding)........... 19,21STATUTESTBx.Ar-co. nv.ConB$ 251021........ .......29Tpx.Ar-co.Bev.Conpg 251.73 30,31,32,33Tex.Ar-co. Bv.Coos$ 251.80.. . . . . . . . . . 30,3I,32,33,34TBx.Ar-co. Ev.Cooe$ 25182 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32Tpx.Alco. BEv.Coopch.25l ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .TEx.Erpc.CooeS221.003.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22TBx.Er-Bc. oos$ 273.061 ...........7

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RESPONSE O STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONThe Court lacks subject-matterurisdictionbecause f the separation f powers

doctrine,mootness,nd heRelators' ackof standing.


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RECORDREFERENCESFor convenience,heRespondentsill refer o the recordas ollows:

Petition for Writ of Mandamus:MandamusRecord:Appendix to Petition for WritRespondents'Appendix/MandamusRecord

Pet.at p4pMR volume:pAgeRelators'App'x Tab_, at p4pCity's App'x Tab_, atIAE

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1.RESPONSETO ISSUES PRESENTED

This Court does not have subject-matterurisdiction over this petition for writ ofmandamus.Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief becausethey cannot satisfy thestandardsor mandamus elief.2.

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No.05-10-00805-CV

IN THE COURTOF APPEALSFORTHE FIFTHJUDICIALDISTRICTOFTEXASAT DALLAS

IN RE MARCUSWOOD,THE KIRKWOODTEMPLE,THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ASTORSCOALITION,THE INTERDENOMINATIONALMINISTERIALALLIANCEOFDALLAS,THE MT. TABOR BAPTISTCHURCHAND THELIFEWAY CHURCH

RESPONSE O PETITION FORWRIT OF MANDAMUS

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:On June 23, 2010, the City Council for the City of Dallas called for a citywide

local option election or November 2,2010 on whether o legalize the sale of beer andwine for off-premise consumption. The Relators seek mandamusrelief attacking thevalidity of the decision to call the election. This Court lacks subject-matterurisdictionover the contentionsassertedand the Relators have failed to establish hev are entitled tomandamus elief.

INTRODUCTION(Local Option Election Procedures)The local option election is a statutorily created procedureby which a political

subdivisionof the Statemay Legalizeor prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages hroughan election. SeeTnx. CoNST. rt. XVI, $ 20; Tpx. Er-Bc.Coos ch. 501;Tpx. Alco. Bpv.CooE ch.25l. Political subdivisionsaregiven a wide variety of optionsof the typesofsales o Iegalizeor prohibit. SeeTBx. Et-Bc.Cooe $ 501.035(b).


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The first step toward a local option election is that 10 or more qualified votersofthe municipality file an application with the city secretary and submit proof ofpublication n a newspaper. Tnx. EI-BC.CoDE $$ 501.023(a);501.109.1 The citysecretary hen issues a petition to be circulated among qualified voters of the city forsignaturesn favor of calling a local option election. Id.

From the date when the petition is issued, he applicantshave60 days o secure henecessary number of signatures and file the petition with the city secretary. Id.$$ 501 032(a);.109. Upon filing, the city secretaryhen checks he namesof the signersto determine if there were sufficient qualified voters of the city on the petition. Id.$$ 501.031(a), 109. For the election such as at issuehere, the number of necessarysignatureswas 35 percentof the registeredvoters n the city who voted in the mostrecentgubernatorialelection. Id. $$ 50t.032(a)(1)(A), .109. The city secretarymay use astatisticalsamplemethodto verify the signaturesunless a citizenof the city requestsandpays or thecost of verifying eachsignature n thepetition. /d. $$ 501.031(a), 109. Thecity secretaryhas approximately 30 days to determine whether sufficient signatureswereprovided. 1d.$$ 501.032(a),109At the city council's nextregularsession n or after hethirtieth day after the petition is filed with the city secretary, he city council shall orderthe local option election if the petition bears he sufficient numberof requiredsignatures.Id. $$ 501.032(a), 109. The petition and the action takenwith the respect o the petitionare then entered nto the minutesof the city council. 1d. $$ 501.033; .109. The city'Section 501.109provides hat a municipality that is located n more than one county, such as Dallas,shall conduct the local option election. Throughout the code concerning local option elections, anyreferenceto the county and county officials is to be construed as the municipality and its comparableofficials. TEX.ELEC.Coop $ 501.109.


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secretary s also to certify the number of qualified voters signing the petition. Id.$$501.031(a),109. Theelection roceedsnd he esults recertified. d. $$501.101-.155.

STATEMENT OF FACTSThe City Secretarywas presentedwith a request or an application for petition for

a local option election on whether to legalize the saleof beer and wine for off-premiseconsumption. (MR 000001-000005;City's App'x Tab 1, at 2).2 The applicationwasdeterminedo beproperand a petitionwas ssuedon March 23,2010. (City's App'x Tabl, at 2). On May 20, 2010, a petition supportedby approximately109,000signaturesrequesting hat a local option election be held was filed with the City Secretary. (MR000006-000016;City's App'x Tab 1, at 2). Whether the petition was supportedbysufficient signatures had to be determined by June 23, 2010. Tex. Emc. CoDE$ 501.032. (City's App'x Tab 1, at 2; MR 000124). The City Secrerarybegan astatisticalsamplingof the signatures. (City's App'x Tab 1, at 2). On June 3, 2010,MarcusWood requested hat all of the petition's signaturesbe verified ratherthan havingthe petition's signatures e verified by a statisticalsample. (MR 000041;City's App'tTab 1, atZ). On June8, 2010, he City Secretary dvisedMr. Wood of theestimated ostbut that such verification would not begin until receipt of payment. (MR 000040;City'sApp'x Tab 1, at 2). On June 15, 2010, the City SecretaryadvisedWood that the costwould increasebecauseof the shortened ime to complete he verification. (MR 000035;2Another petition for a local option election on whetherto legalize the sale of mixed beveragesin restaurants as submittedat thesame ime as he beerand wine petition. (City's App'* Tab 1,atZ).


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City's App'x Tab 1, at 2). On June 15, 2010,counsel or Relatorsmadepartial paymentfor the estimated ost of the total verification. (MR 39 [Relators'App'x TabE], 000104;City's App'x Tab 1, at2). The City Secretary roceededwith a verification eview of allthe signatures. City's App'x Tab 1,at 2). On June 17 2010,Relators'counselpaid theremaining portion of the estimatedcost. (MR 36 [Relators' App'x Tabs F], 000104;City's App'* Tab 1, at2).

On June 23, 2010, the City Secretary advised the City Council that a sufficientnumberof valid signatures ad beenverified. (MR 000043-00044;City's App'x Tab 1,at 2-3). As a result of the determination,the City Council called for the local optionelection. (MR 000046-000095; ity's App'* Tab 1, at 3).3 On July 16,2010, he CitySecretaryprovided a memorandum o the City Council advising them of the total numberof valid signatures.City'sApp'x Tabs1, at3,Tab2).

On July 2,2010, Relators iled this actioncomplainingof allegederrors n the callof the local option election. Relatorsclaim that the City Secretaryhad not yet provided atotal actual number of the signaturesdetermined o be valid, that the City Council couldnot call the election until such number was provided, and that any citywide electionwould be improper because hereneeded o be separateelections or eachso-calleddryareabut only if the petition containedsufficient signatures rom voters in each hosedryareas.' The signaturessupportingthe petition for the local option election regardingmixed beverageswere reviewed by statistical sample and the City Secretary determined that sufficient validsignatureso call the electionhad beenprovided. (MR 000043;City's App'^ Tab I, at 2). OnJtne23,2010, an electionon thatpetitionwasalsocalledby City Council. (City's App'x Tab 1,at2-3).


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As explainedbelow, the City disputes hese ontentions.SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Through this mandamusproceeding, he Relatorsseek o challenge he validity ofthe Dallas City Council's order of calling a local option election. The Relatorshavefailed to establish that the Court has subject-matter urisdiction, that their claims areappropriate or mandamus elief, or that the underlying legal and factualbasis s correct.

This Court lacks jurisdiction for three reasons. First, the separationof powersdoctrine requires hat the udicial branch of the government efrain from intervening n acalled election. No court is at liberty to question he validity or propriety of the petitionfor an election once the election is called, until after the election. Second, he Relatorscomplain and seek o compel actions hat are to occurbefore the election s called, but theelection has already been called and the requested elief is moot. Also, the Relatorscomplain about the lack of a certification of the actual number of valid signatures,butthis number has been provided to City Council and any claims based on that complaintare moot. Third, the Relatorsall lack standing. They bring this action like any othervoter and have no injury distinct from the generalpublic.

Even if the lack of jurisdiction is ignored, mandamus relief would beinappropriate. The Relators have an adequate remedy at law: an election contest.Through that statutorily createdprocess,any voter is given standing o challengewhetheran electionwasproperlycalled.

Even if the lack of jurisdiction and the presenceof an adequateemedyat law areignored, Relators are not entitled to relief because the City officials fulfilted and


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complied with their duties and Relatorshave disregarded he controlling statutes. Theobligation on the City Secretarywas to determinewhether the petition was supportedbythe required number of signaturesof qualified voters of Dallas. This she did. Theobligation of the City Council was to call the election once it was informed that thepetition was supportedby at least he requirednumberof signatures.This it did.

There is no obligation to limit the petition or the election to dry areasof Dallas.There is no obligation to verify signaturesbasedon the voters' residence n dry areasofDallas. There is no obligation to conduct separateelections or the dry areasof Dallas.The Relators ely on a statute hat appliesonly to justice precinctsand they simply fail todiscussthe statute that governs the controlling effect of a citywide municipal election.The legislature has dictated that a citywide municipal election can occur and controlsover all areasof the municipality even houghpartsof the municipality aredry becauseofprior electionsof other governmentalentities.a

Finally, while not a ground in the petition for writ of mandamus, he Relatorsclaim that the petition for the local option election was supportedby an insufficientnumberof valid signatures.(Pet.at 8,23). The City disputes he claim. (MR 000043-000044;City's App'x Tab 1, at2-3,Tab 2). The determination f the validity of petitionsignaturess a fact issue,discretionary,and nappropriate or mandamus eview.s

o The one exception is that justice precincts hat are wholly containedwithin a municipality areunchangedby the contrary resultsof a citywide election.t 5"" Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 7g5 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1990) (orig.proceeding);Carter v. FourteenthCourt of Appeals,789 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. 1990) (orig.proceeding);McSpaddenv. Carter, 802 S.W.2d 246,246-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]


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The Court shoulddismissthe petition for want of jurisdiction or, in the alternative,the Court shoulddeny the petition.

ARGUMENTI. Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because he Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.

Section273.061of theTexasElectionCodegrantscowts of appealsurisdictionto"issue writ of mandamus o compel the performanceof any duty imposed by law inconnectionwith theholdingof an election . . ." Tex. Elec. Cooe S 273.06L However,the statute does not dispensewith the need to satisfy the requisite of subject-matterjurisdiction. For example, if a relator lacks standing, then the court of appeals ackssubject-matterurisdiction to issuea writ of mandamus. n re Baker,No. 01- 0 -00022-CV, 2010 wL 670185,at xl (Tex. App.-Houston t14th Dist.l Feb. 25, 2010, orig.proceeding) mem.op.).

The City challenges he Court's subject-matterurisdiction to hear Relators'petition for writ of mandamuson threegrounds. First, the separationof powersdoctrinelimits this Court's authority to interfere in the City Secretary's count of signaturessupportingthe petition and the City Council's call of the local option election. Second,the City Secretaryand the City Council have performedthe acts hey were requiredunderstatute to perform making this action moot. And finally, none of the Relators havestanding o bring this action.

1990,orig. proceeding);Citizensor Fair Taxesv. Sweetwaterndep. Sch. Dis.tBd. of Trustees,807 s.w.2d 451,453(Tex.App.-Easrland 1991,orig.proceedingleavedenied]).


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A. The Court doesnot havesubject-matterjurisdiction ecause elators'claims are barred by the separationof powersdoctrine.Pursuant to the constitutional separationof powers between the legislative and

judicial branchesof government, his Court lacks authority or jurisdiction to either delay,prevent,or to inquire into the validity of this calledelection. SeeBlum v. Innier,997S.W.2d 259, 263 (Tex. 1999) (holding that the separation of powers and judicialdeference o the legislativebranch requiredthat udicial power not be invoked to interferewith or delay he electiveprocess);City of Austin v. Thompson,2IgS.W.2d 57, 59 (Tex.1949)("This court hasadopted he view that it is beyond thepower of a court of equity toenjoin an election or any incident to it, although the election may be called withoutauthority and thereforeabsolutelyvoid."); Ex parte Barrett,37 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex.1931)("Consequently he matterof stopping he progressof an election,merely for thepu{pose of inquiring into its validity, lies outside of the general scope of judicialpower."); City of Dallas v. Dallas consol. Elec. st. Ry.co., 148 S.w. 292,294 (Tex.1912) ("When it is declaredthat becauseof their relation to the political power of thegovemment,electionsare beyond the control of the judicial power, it is meant that thewhole election, including every step and proceeding necessary o its completion, isexempt rom judicial interference . . ."); City of McAllen v. Garza,869S.W.2d558, 561(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993,writ denied) ("Not one casestands or the propositionthat a district court has urisdiction over suit to declarean election order void while theelectionprocesss in progress.").


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Relators' petition for writ of mandamus s brought for the purposeof interferingwith a called local option election. Relators are opposed o this local option election.(Pet.at 9-I3; MR 97-102,217-218). They claim that the City Council's action n callingthe election was improper. (Pet. at 15). They seek mandamus elief to compel Cityofficials to take certain actions before a local option election s ordered." (Pet.at 13).Relatorsargue he election could not be properly called unlessor until the actual numberof valid signatorieswas known. (Pet. at 19-28). In their last issue,they argue that theelection could not be properly called becauseseparateelectionsfor the dry areaswererequiredand only after a determination hat sufficient signatures rom each dry areawereprovided. (Pet. at 28-32). The petitioning for and calling of an election is part of theelectiveprocess. Ellis v. Vanderslice,486 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas1972, no writ); Kennedyv. Burnet Indep. Sch.Dist., 474 S.W.2d 742, 146 (Tex. Civ.App.-Austin 1972, no writ). Thus, they put in question the call of the election andattempt o interferewith the ongoingelectionprocess. Pet.at 17).

This Court has alreadydirectly dealt with an attemptto judicially interferewith alocal option election and this Court concluded t had no authority, prior to the election,toinquire nto the validity of the petition requesting he election. Ellis,486 S.W.2dat 156.The Ellis case involved an attempt to prevent a county clerk from certifying to thecommissioners ourt the petition for a local option election. Id. at 156-157. Theopponents o the election claimed, like here, there were insufficient valid signatures osupport he petition. See d. at 157. This Court held:


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The rule is well establishedn Texas hat the equitablepowersof the cowtsmay not be invoked to interfere with public officials in taking any of thesteps involved in an election. This rule . . . is also based on the morefundamentalprinciple that an election is an exerciseof a political powerbeyond udicial interferenceat any stage.Id. at 159. The opponentsargued hat officials could be compelledby mandamus o dotheir duty but the Court noted there s a differencebetween udicial action that facilitatesan election and judicial action that interferes with that process; an official could becompelledto order an electionbut the calling of an election could not be restrained. 1d.at 159.6 The Court explainedtherewas no basis for distinguishingbetween he duty ofthe official to determine he statutoryrequisites or calling the election and the dutiesofpublic officers involved in any subsequent tageof the election process. Id. at 160. TheCourt added, "Since determination of the regularity of the petition is thus expresslyrecognizedas a part of the election processwhich may be attacked n a statutorycontest,the conclusion follows that it is a step in the processnot otherwise subject to judicialinterference." Id. at 160. The Court concluded hat the entireelection process,ncludingthe examining and certifying of the petition for local option elections,was immune fromjudicial interferenceuntil after the electionwas over. 1d.

Becauseall the caseauthority, ncluding this Court's, establisheshat this Courtdoes not have jurisdiction to interfere with a called local option election as Relatorsrequest, his Court shoulddismissRelators' petition for want of jurisdiction.

6Relators ely on In re Davis, 269S.W.3d581 (Tex. 2008), o suggesthat a court may inquireinto whether the petition is "proper." (Pet. at 29-32). But that case nvolved a decisiol not tocall an electionratherthan whetheran electionhad beenproperly called.r0


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B. The Court does not have jurisdiction becauseRelators' mandamusrequest is moot.The mootnessdoctrine implicates subject-matterurisdiction. Trulock v. City of

Duncanville, 277 s.w.3d 920, 923 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, no per.). courts lackjurisdiction over moot claims. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. NuecesCounty,886 S.W.2d766,767 (Tex. 1994). A case s moot if a controversy easeso existor the parties ack alegallycognizablenterestn theoutcome.Allstate ns. Co. v. Hallman,159 S.W.3d640.642 (Tex.2005). The mootness octrinedictateshata courtavoidrenderingan advisoryopinion by only deciding an issue that presentsa "live" controversyat the time of thedecision. City of FarmersBranch v. Ramos,235 S.W.3 462, 469(Tex. App.-Dallas2007,no pet.).

Here, Relators seek mandamusrelief to compel City officials to take certainactions"before a local option election s ordered." (Pet.at 13). On June 23,2010,theCity Council adopted an ordinance ordering the special local option election onNovember2,2010. (MR 47-95 [Relators'App'x Tab H]). Relatorssought elief in thisCourt ten daysafter the electionwas ordered. The requests or actionsbeforean orderedelectionaremoot.

Here,no relief can be affordedbefore the election is called becauset has alreadybeencalled. Furthermore, he exactnumber of valid signatureshas beencertified by theCity SecretaryCity App'x Tab 1,at 3; Tab 2). There s simply nothing o adjudicatehatcanaffect he electionproceeding. seediscussion ection .A., supra).

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There are two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the "collateralconsequences" xceptionand (2) the "capableof repetition" exception. Gen. -and Officev. OXY U.S.A., nc.,789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990). The collateralconsequencesexceptionapplies when the effects of prejudicial events hat have occurredwill continueto stigmatize ndividuals long after the udgment has ceasedo operate. Id. Any claimedprejudicial effect of an improperly called election will be reversedwith a successfuljudgment in an election contest. The capableof repetition exception requires that thecomplained of action be capable of repetition yet not effectively reviewable. SeegenerallyFed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 886 S.W.2d at 767.7But an issuedoes not evadeappellate eview if appellatecourts have addressedhe issueon the merits. See d. Andthe appellatecourts have addressed he proper manner to validate petitions and courtshavereviewedpetitions. See,e.g., Ellis,486 S.W.2dat 160 (challengeso local optionpetitioncan be brought n an electioncontest); eggettv. Cochran, 193S.W.2d 729(Tex.Civ. App.-1946, no writ) (electioncontestdetermined etition valid with typographicalerror); Hutson v. Smith, 191 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1946,no writ)(electioncontestdeterminedpetition valid though t did not state ssueexactlyas requiredby statute).

The City Secretary having counted the signatureson the petitions, certified therequirednumber to call the election, and certified the number of valid signaturesalong

' The SupremeCourt has yet to determinethe viability of a third exception,the public interestexception. If ever recognized it too requires that the complained of action is not effectivelyreviewable.Fed.Deposit ns . Corp.,886S.W.2dat767

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with the Council calling the election moots this controversy. Accordingly, the Courtshoulddismiss his petition for want of jurisdiction.

C. The Court doesnot have urisdiction over Relators' mandamus requestbecause hey lack standing.A basicsubject-matterurisdictional requirement s that the claimanthavestanding

to bring the lawsuit and seek ecovery. See Tex. Ass'nof Bus.v. Tex.Air ControlBd.,852s.w.2d440,443-45 (Tex. l9g3). The TexasSupreme ourt explained:

The requirement in this State that a plaintiff have standing to assertaclaim derivesfrom the TexasConstitution'sseparationof por"., amongthe departmentsof government,which denies the judiciary authority todecide ssues n the abstract,and from the Open Courtsprovision, whichprovidescourt accessonly to a "personfor an injury donehim." A courthas no jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff without standingtoassert it. For standing, a plaintiff must be personally aggrieved; hisalleged injury must be concreteand particularized, actual oi imminent.not hypothetical.DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304-05 (Tex. 200g) (citationsomitted).

Relators seeka writ of mandamusagainstcity officials in the calling of a localoption election. The Court must determinewhether Relatorsestablishedas a pleadingand factual basis that they meet the required elementsof standing. No Relator canestablishor hasestablishedstanding o requesta writ of mandamus.

1.. Marcus Wood has no standing to bring this mandamus action.In order to establish individual standing, Marcus Wood must demonstratehe

possesses n interestdistinct from the generalpublic suchthat the City's allegedactionshave causedhim some special njury. see Hunt v. Bass,664 s.w.2 d 323, 324 (Tex.

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1984). He cannot establishstandingby merely claiming participation in the electoralsystem;rather, he must establishan individualized, concrete njury that arises rom aninterest in the dispute that is distinct from the interestof the public at large. Brown v.Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex. 2001) ("No Texas court has ever recognized hat aplaintiff's statusas a voter,without more, confersstanding o challenge he lawfulnessofgovernmentalacts. Our decisionshave alwaysrequireda plaintiff to allege some njurydistinct rom thatsustained y thepublic at large.").

Marcus Wood allegeshe is a registeredvoter and resides n the City. Wood'sstatusas a voter or as a resident of Dallas is insufficient to grant him standing. SeeBrown,53S.W.3d t302.

Wood attemptsto distinguish himself from other voters becausehe requestedatotal signatureverification and "arranged" for paymentof the cost of the verification byan unidentifiedcoalition interestedn the outcomeof the proposedelection. (pet. at 9-10;MR 217-218). Wood does not have a stake n the count different from other votersbecauseWood did not pay for the count. To establishstanding n this case,Wood mustdemonstrate hat he possesses n interest distinct from the generalpublic such that theCity'sactions avecaused im somespecialnjury. SeeBlumv. Lanier,ggT5.W.2d25g.261 (Tex. 1999). He merely states that he aranged for payment. (MR 218). Thepayment for the count was made with a cashiers' checks from Andy Siegel. (MR 36

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[Relators'App'x Tab F], 39 lRelators'App'x Tab E], 104;City App'x Tab 1,at 2) . Thispaymentby Siegel doesnot createa special njury for Wood.8

BecauseWood has not andcannot show a special njury, he has not met his burdento demonstratehe has standing. Accordingly, this Court should dismiss for want ofjurisdiction Wood's requestor mandamus elief.

2. The churches and related associations do not have standing topetition for writ of mandamus for themselves or on behalf oftheir individual respectivemembers.An associationmay assertstanding n one of two ways: (1) on its own behalf,

having suffered a palpable njury as a result of the defendant'sactions(direct standing);or (2) as the representativeof its members(associationstanding). Hunt v. Wash.StateApple Adver. Comm'n,432 V.S. 333, 341-42 1977);Tex.PeaceOfficersAss'n v. City ofGalveston,944F. Supp.562, 563-64 S.D.Tex. 1996). Relatororganizationsnly claimassociational tanding. (Pet.at l2).

The Texas SupremeCourt has adopteda three-pronged est for representationalassociation tanding. SeeTex.Ass'n of Bus.,852 S.W.2d at 447. The test requires hatassociationsmeet the following criteria in order to have standing to bring suit in arepresentative apacity: (1) membersof the associationmust otherwisehave standingtosue in their own right; (2) the interests that the associationseeksto protect must begermane o the orgarization's purpose;and (3) the claim assertedand the relief requested8 Section501.031of the TexasElectionCode requiresa citizenof the city both requestandpayfor the cost of the verification. Furthermore in the petition Relators representthat Woodarranged for payment by "a coalition interested in the outcome of the proposed election."(Pet. 10 n.22). There is no evidence n the record to support the statement. Wood's affidavitmakesno suchassertion. MR 218).

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must not require the participation of individual associationmembers n the lawsuit. Id.Relator organizations ail to meettheseprongs.

a. Members of Relator organizations do not have standing.The petition and affidavits do not demonstrate that the members of Relator

organizationshave standing or a right to sue on their own. Relator organtzationsonlyassert hat some of their membersare registeredvoters. For example, the affidavit ofStephenC. Nash states hat the Ministerial Alliance represents egisteredvoters and Mt.Tabor Baptist Church includes 2000registeredvoters. (MR 97). Likewise, the affidavitof JerryL. Christian statesonly that the African-American Ministers Coalition representspastorsof churcheswith registeredvoters and that registeredvoters are membersof hiscongregationof Kirkwood Temple. Finally, the affidavit of Karen Hollie states thatLifeway Church ncludes egistered oters. (MR 101). The fact that theseorganizationshave members hat areregisteredvoters does not confer standing. SeeBrown, 53 S.W.3dat302.

Although the Kirkwood Temple, the African-American Pastors Coalition andLifeway Church state hey have membersopposed o the local option election (MR 100,101),oppositionto an election s not a different interestor injury from the generalpublic.SeeBrown, 53 S.W.3d at 302. The only other nterest hat they assert s the interest nhaving a lawfully called election. (MR 100) That too is an interestof the generalpublicand is not limited to the residentsof any particularpart of the City. The TexasSupremeCourt has not recognizedstandingto questionthe processof calling an election by anyone other than a signer or distributorof a petition. Brown,53 S.W.3d at 302. And for

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those personsstandinghas only been recognized o assurean election,nor prevent one.Id.; seeBlum, 997 S.W.2d at 261 (standing o preventmisleadingballot language).Themembersof Relator organizationsdo not claim to be signersof the petition nor do theyclaim they want the electionto proceed.

The only interestthat Relator organizationshave shown is that their membersarevoters. They have failed to show that their members would have standing. Withoutshowing their members would have standing to bring this mandamus,all of Relatororganizationsail to meetthe first elementof associational tanding.

b. Relator organizational goals are not germane to thelitigation.Next, the Relator organizationshave not and cannot show that the request for

mandamusrelief is germane to the goals of the organizations. Not all the Relatororganizationseven asserta purpose. Mt. Tabor Baptist Church and InterdenominationalMinisterial Alliance of Dallas havenot stated heir purpose. (MR 97-98). Thus, thoseRelator orgarizations have failed to demonstrateto the Court that their purpose isgeffnane o this litigation.

The other three Relator organizations Kirkwood Temple, the African-AmericanPastors Coalition and Lifeway Church)e assert that their purpose to advance the"religious, economic,safety,health,and community nterest." (Pet.at l3). There s noindication, however, that the actions complained of in the petition would affect theinterestsor membershipof the organizationsn any way. "The germanenessest simplyeTheseare he only Relator organizationso statea purpose. (SeeMR 96-101).

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requires hat 'an organization's itigation goalsbe pertinentto its specialexpertiseand thegroundsthat bring its membership ogether."' Retired Chicago Police Ass'nv. City ofChicago,T F.3d 584,607(7th Cir. 1993). The propergeffnanenessnquiry is as ollows:

A court must determine whether an association's lawsuit would. ifsuccessful, easonably end to further the general ntereststhat individualmembers sought to vindicate in joining the associationand whether thelawsuit bears a reasonableconnectionto the association'sknowledge andexperience.Bldg. & Constr.Tradesv. DowntownDev., nc.,448 F.3d 138,149 2d,Cir.2006).

The goal of this litigation is to inquite into the validity of the calling of the electionby requiring the City Secretaryand the City Council to take certain actions. (Pet.at 32-33). This request s not gennane o the expertiseof the organizationsor the reason hemembersare part of the organizations. In fact, the Kirkwood Temple on its websitestates hat the church s "committed to building a new community basedupon the Biblicalmandate to demonstrateour love for Christ through the love we show one another."(http\\kirkwoodtemplecme.org[City's App'* Tab 4]). Likewise, the Lifeway Church'smissionstatement tates:

We exist o reach p............ PraiseTo reach ut........... ...... vangelismAnd to reach n............. Discipleship(http\\www.lifewaychurchofdallas.comfCity's App'x Tab 5]). The purposesof theseorganizationsand their membershiphave nothing to do with city officials' conduct incalling an election.

None of the Relator organizationsare able to show that the interests that theassociationseeksto protect are gennane to the organization's purpose. Accordingly,

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Relator organizations have not met the second element for establishingassociationalstanding.

Relator organizations cannot show the relief requireddoes not require member participation.

Relator organizationspled no facts andpresentno evidence hat the litigation doesnot require the individual members of the organizations. They cannot becausethemembersof the associationsdo not have standingto bring the mandamusat all. (SeediscussionSection I.C.2.a, supra). Accordingly, the third element of associationalstandinghas not beenmet.

BecauseRelator organizationshavenot and cannotestablish he threeelementsofassociationalstanding,this Court does not have subject-matterurisdiction over Relatororganizations' equest or mandamus. The Court shoulddismiss for want of jurisdictionthe Relator organizations' equest or mandamus elief.

II. Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because hey cannot satisfy thestandard for mandamus relief.A. Mandamus standards.If the court has subject-matterurisdiction, it may issuemandamusonly to correct

a clear abuseof discretion or the violation of a duty imposedby law when there is noother adequate emedy at law. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., I48 S.W.3d 124, 135-36(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);Walker v. Packer, 827 S.w.2d 833, 839 (Tex. l99z)(orig. proceeding). Mandamusreview of the actions of an election officer applies thesamestandard hatapplies o actionsof a trial udge. Estradav. Adame,951S.W.2d 165,167(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997,orig. proceeding).Mandamuss appropriate nly

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when the election officer's duty to act is clearly fixed and required by law. Id. (citingOney v. Ammerman,458 S.W.2d 54, 54 (Tex. 1970)(orig. proceeding);Burns v. Kelly,658 S.W.zd 731, 733 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, orig. proceeding);Taxpayers'Political Action Comm. v. City of Houston, 596 S.W.2d 147, 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, orig. proceeding). In other words, a relator must clearly beentitled o the performance f the respondent's uty. Estrada,95l S.W.2dat 167(citingCallahanv. Giles, I37 Tex. 571, 155 S.W.2d793,795 (1941) (orig. proceeding).Amandamuswill issue to compel a ministerial duty, but an act is consideredministerialonly when the law clearly spells out the duty to be performed by the official withsufficient certainty that nothing is left to the exercise of discretion. Reesev. Comm'rsCourt, 861 S.W.2d28I,283 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1993,no writ). If an issueof fact existsas to either the right or the duty involved, the appellate courts lack jurisdiction to issuemandamus elief. Taxpayers'Political Action Comm.,596 S.W.2d at 148. Withoutmandamus, the relator must have no other plain, adequateand complete method ofredressing he wrong, or of obtaining the relief to which the relator is entitled, so that,without the ssuance f the writ, therewould be a failure of justice. Estrada,95l S.W.2dat 167 (citing Ramirezv. Flores,505 S.w.2d 406,411 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio1973,writ ref'd n.r.e.).

In a mandamusproceeding,a relator's petition must clearly and directly set out thefacts that entitle the relator to relief. Fisher v. Harris County Republican ExecutiveComm., 144 S.W.2d 33.9, 340-41 (Tex. App.-Houston llst Dist.] 1988, orig.proceeding); ush v. Vela,535 S.w.2d 803, 805 (Tex.Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1916,

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orig. proceeding). This "stringent est of exactness"s necessary, ecausemandamussan extraordinaryremedy that should not issue"without careful, individual scrutiny of thefacts alleged." Bush,535 S.W.2dat 805; seealsoJohnsonv. Hughes,663S.W.2d 11, 12(Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, orig. proceeding) "Mandamusactions requirecertainty n the pleadingsand as to the facts."). Therefore, he writ is not available unlessthe petition is "specific and positive in its averments" showing a clear and unqualifiedright to the writ. McGuire v. City of Dallas, 151 S.W.2d 617,618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1941, writ dism'd, judgmt cor.); see also Narro Warehouse, nc. v. Kelly, 530S.W.2d 146, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi I975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("In order toinvoke the jurisdiction of a District Court to hear and determine the issues raised in apetition for mandamus, t is incumbentupon the complainingpafiy to state n his petitionthe necessaryacts clearly, ully, and unreservedly, y directandpositiveallegations.").

Mandamus s an extraordinary remedy, not issuedas a matter of right, but at thediscretionof the court. RivercenterAssocs. . Rivera,858 S.W.2d 366,367 (Tex. 1993)(orig. proceeding). Mandamus may not be used to establish or enforce an uncertain ordisputedclaim. City of Houstonv. Albright, 666 S.W.2d279,281 (Tex.App.-Houston[14thDist.] 1984),writ ref'd n.r.e.,677 S.W.2d487(Tex. 1984) percuriam).

B. Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because hev cannot showthat they do not have an adequate remedy at law.

To obtain mandamus elief, the Relatorsmust showthey have no adequate emedyat law. Walker,827 S.W.2d at 839. Relatorsacknowledgehis basic equirement ut donot address t in their petition. (Pet. at 16). Relatorsdo not show they do not have an

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adequate emedy at law because hey cannot. The legislaturehas createdan adequateremedyat law through heprocess f anelectioncontest.SeeTBx.Elec. Coop. title 14.

After an election has occurred,a court has the authority to ascertainwhether theoutcome of a contestedelection was not the true outcome becausean election officialmade a mistake. TEX. Et-pc. Coon * 22L003(aX2)(C). If an attack is made on theelectiveprocess,t is an electioncontest. Robertsv. Brownsboro ndep.Sch. Dist.,575S.W.2d371,374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978,writ dism'd). Whethera petirionwassupportedby sufficient signaturesor whether an election was properly called is part ofthe electiveprocessand appropriate or an electioncontest. Ellis,486 S.W.2d at 160;Kennedy,474 S.W.2dat746; seealsoRossano . Townsend, S.W.3d357 (Tex.App.-Houston l4th Dist.] 1999,no pet.);Tatumv. Collier,No. C14-87-00970-CV, 9g9wL111365,at x1,3-5 (Tex. App.-Houston t14th Disr.l Sept.28, 19g9,no writ) (notdesignatedor publication). Chapter501 of the TexasElection Code, which governslocal option election,specifically referenceselection contests. See TEX. ELEC.Cone$$ 501.109(d);501.155. The legislaturedetermined hat any dispute regarding rhepropriety of an election once called should be addressedn an election contest. AsRelatorshave an adequate emedy at law, they are not entitled to mandamus elief. TheCourt mustdeny the writ.

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Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because he Citv Councilcomplied with its duty by calling the election.Relatorscontend that the City Council could not call for a local option election

until it received a certification with the actual number of qualified voters signing thepetition. (Pet.at 25-28). A readingof the statutedoesnot support he claim.

Section 501.032(a)of the Texas Election Code requires that a governing bodysuchas heCity Council:

shall order a local option election . . . if the petition is filed with the voterregistrar not later than the 60th day after the petition is issuedand bears heactualsignaturesof a numberof qualified voters of the political subdivisionequal to at least . . . 35 percent of the registered voters in the politicalsubdivisionwho voted in the most recentgubernatorialelection . . . .

Trx. Elpc. Coos $ 501 032(a). There is no requirement hat City Council be providedthe actual total number of signaturesof qualified voters on the petition before calling anelection. Indeed, if a statistical sampling method was used there would never be acertification of the actual total number of signatures. The statuteprovides that the CityCouncil "shall order" the election if the petition is supportedby signatures otaling atleast35 percentof the City of Dallas registeredvoters who voted in the last gubernatorialelection. Id. The City Secretarycertified to City Council that the petition was supportedby the necessary ignaturesand the City Council complied with its mandatedduty. (MR000043-000044; ity App'x Tab 2, at3).

The absenceof a fixed duty required by law is highlighted by the Relators'argument. They acknowledge hat this Court hasconcluded hat when governingbodieswere provided a certificate of sufficiency by the voter registrar,the governingbody hadno discretionbut to order an election. (Pet. at26). Thus,underthoseauthorities, he Citv

C.

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Council clearlyacted n accordance ith its duty by ordering he election. SeeBlum,99JS.W.2d at 262 ("When the requisitenumberof qualified citizenssign sucha petition, themunicipal authority must put the measure o a popular vote."). Relatorsarguethat thecases are of "dubious precedential value." (Pet. at 26). Again, the standard formandamus elief is a duty clearly fixed and required by law. The fact that the Relatorsquestionexisting case aw indicatesthat city officials complied with their duties underexisting aw.

Further the case they cite to questionprevious case law does not support theirassertion.Relatorscrte n re Davis,269 S.W.3d581 (Tex.2008), o suggesthat theCityCouncil had a duty to examine the petitions. (Pet.at 26-27). But In re Davis was not acase hat requireda specific examinationof petitions. The issue n that casewas whetherthe commissionerscourt was subject to mandamus elief for not ordering an election.The court concluded that the local option petition was not "proper" because t wascontrary to the express erms of the controlling statuteand thereforethe commissionerscourt could refuse to call the election. In re Davis, 269 S.W.3d at 585-86. Thecommissionershad the discretion to make the determinationbut the court did not holdthat the commissionershad a duty to independentlycertify the petitions.

Here, the City Council accepted the City Secretary's certification. Relatorssuggest hat the City Council had a duty independentof the City Secretary o verify rhesignatures. (Pet. at 28). The assertion s unsupportedby any authority and ignores thatsection501.031places hat duty on the voter registrarandnot the governingbody. TEX.Et-Bc.Cooe $ 501.031. Section501.032doesnot requirecertificationor verificationby

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thegoverningbody. TEX.ELEC.Coos $ 501.032.Further, he DallasCity Charterplacesthe duty on the City Secretary o examine petitions to determinewhether the requisitenumberof qualified voters have signed he petition. (Relators'App'x Tab R). Finally, acity council has the discretion o rely on the city secretary's erification. See Akers v.Remington, 15S.W.2d7I4,720 (Tex.Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938,writ dism'd) ("Thecommissionerscourt could adopt any means t thought right and proper to ascertain fthose signing the petition were legal voters . . . and whether or not 10 per cent of thequalified voters of the county had signed t.").

The TexasSecretary f State,as the state'schief electionofficial, is chargedwithobtaining and maintaining uniformity in the application,operation,and interpretationofthe election laws, Tex. Emc. CooB $$ 31.001, 31.003, and concludes hat theresponsibilityfor verifying signaturess with the city secretary,not the city council:

Generally, he county voter registrar s responsible or verifying the petitionsignatures. In countieswhich have an electionsadministrator,petitions areverified by the administrator. If the city or town is located n more thanonecounty, th9 city or town secretary is responsible for verifying thesignatures.lo

The law imposesno duty on the City Council to verify petitions. Relatorshave failed toestablish hat the City Council had any other obligation but to call the election. Theycertainlyhavefailed to establish hat the City Council violated any duty clearly fixed andrequiredby law.

r0 Local option Liquor Elections - Questions and Answers at $ IV(e) athttp://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/liquorelections.shtml.City'sApp'x Tab , p.25).25


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Moreover, the Relators have failed to articulate how the failure to identify theactual number of valid signatureson the certification made the petition improper.llRelatorsarguethat a certification of the actual number of qualified signaturesassists heCouncil in making the determinationof whether the petition was proper. (pet. at 27).Relators do not suggest how that information would assist the Council in thatdetermination. Whetherthe numberof valid signatureswas one or one million more thannecessary,he duty to call the electionwould be unchanged.

In that regard, none of the Relatorsexplain how they have been harmedby theCity Council's action in ordering an election based on a certification stating that thepetition was supportedby the requirednumberof signaturesas opposed o a certificationwith the actualnumber. The City's Council'sduty was o call an election f supported ythe requirednumberof signaturesrom registered oters. TEX.ELEC.CooB $ 501.032.The City Council performedthat duty. Thus, the petition for writ of mandamusshouldbedenied.

D. Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because the CitySecretary complied with her duties by certifying that a sufficientnumber of qualified voters signed the petition.The Relators complain that the City Secretaryhad a duty to certify the actual

number of qualified voters before the City Council could call the election. (pet. at 19-25). After completing her quality review, the City Secretaryhas certified the actualtt The Relatorsapparentlyargue hat the city council had discretionto refuse o call an electionyet had a ministerial duty to call if the petition was proper and properly certified. (pet. at 27,28). Relatorsdo not suggest hat the City Council abused ts discretionby calling an electionbasedon a certification that the statutory equirementshad beenmet.

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number of qualified voters signing the petition. (City's App'x Tab 2). The CitySecretarydid not abuseher discretionor fail to perform a ministerial duty.

Section501.031(a)of the TexasElection Codeprovides he method or signatureverification of a local option petition. TBx. Elsc. Coon $ 501.031(a). It states hat rhevoter registrar shall check the signatures o determinewhether the signerswere qualifiedvoters. Section501.031(a) lso euires he official chargedwith verification o certify thenumberof qualified voterssigning thepetition:

The political subdivision may use a statistical sampling method to verifythe signatures,except that on written request rom a citizenof the politicalsubdivision for which an election is sought, the political subdivision shallverify each signatureon the petition. The citizen making the requestshallpay the reasonable ost of the verification. The registrar shall certify to thecommissioners ourt the numberof qualified voterssigningthe petition.

Id. The Election Code is to be construed n considerationof the objective soughtto beobtained. In re Bell, 9l S.W.3d 784, 785 (Tex. 2002). The phraseo'thenumber ofqualified voters signing the petition" must be read in the context of its purpose. Thepurpose s to inform the governingbody whether here are sufficient signatureso requirecalling the election. That purpose s fulfilled if the governingbody is informed that thenumber of qualified voters signing the petition is equal to or greater han 35 percentofthosewho voted in last gubernatorialelection. Nothing in the statutestatesan actual otalnumber is required and if a statistical sampling was performed an actual total numberwould never be determined. Once the city secretarydeterminesa petition is supportedbysufficient signatures,he city secretaryhas a ministerial duty to certify the petition. See

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In re Roof, 130 S.w.3d 414, 416-19 (Tex. App.-Houston ll4th Dist.l 2004, oig.proceeding) involving petition for charteramendments).

Moreover, the statutedoesnot set a time requirementfor the certification of anexact number. None of Relators' argumentsaddresswhen the certification of numberneeds o be made. The Secretaryof State simply notes:

Most laws required the reviewer to certify that there are either enoughsignaturesor not enoughsignatures. For example, f there are 100 "good"signatures,and 100 s enough o require the election, t is irrelevant if thereare 500 additional "bad" signatures. Most reviewers find it helpful to gothrough the petition first to count of "perfect" signaturesbefore spendingtime on "borderline" signatures.rz

Accordingly, Relators have failed to establish the existenceMandamus cannot issue to enforce a non-existent or uncertainS.W.2dat28l.

of the claimed duty.claim. Albright, 666

As with their claim against the City Council, none of the Relators explain howthey have beenharmedby the City Secretary'saction in providing a certification statingthat the petition was supportedby the required signaturesas opposed o a certificationwith the actual number. The City's Secretary's duty was to determine whether thepetition was supportedby the requirednumber of signatures rom registeredvoters. TheCity Secretaryperformed that duty. For this additional reason, he petition for writ ofmandamusshouldbe denied.

12 Petition Questions and Answers al athttp://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/petitions.shtml.emphasis riginal).28

$(G)( l l )


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E. Relators are not entitled to mandamus relief because the historicalboundaries of dry areas have no impact on the validity of calling thiselection.Relatorsseek mandamus elief directing the City Secretary o count, verify, and

certify the number of registeredvoters who signed he petition who also resided n eachpolitical subdivision hat previously voted dry. (Pet. at 33). Relatorsarguethat thesignaturesof voters residing in the historically dry areasshouldbe consideredseparatelyfrom the signaturesof the restof the citizensof the City. (Pet at28-32). No suchduty isimposed on the City Secretary. Relators ignore the statutory requirements hat governdifferent govemmental entities covering the same area. The City has followed thestatutesapplicable o municipal local option elections.

Section 501.021 of the Election Code provides that on proper petition by therequirednumberof votersof a municipality, the governingbody of the municipality shallorder a local optionelection.l3 TBx. EI-Bc.Coon $ 501.021. Secrion501.031(a) tatesthat the voter registrarshall checkthe nameson thepetition and voting precincts n whichthe signers reside to determine whether the signers were qualified voters of themunicipality. Id. S501.031(a).Section501.102(b)states har municipal local optionelectionsshall use he municipality'selectionprecincts.TEX.ELEc.Cooe $ 501.102(b).For cities such as Dallas located in multiple counties, he city conducts he local option13regn proper petition by the required number of voters in a county, justice precinct, ormunicipality in the county, the commissionerscourt shall order a local option election in thepolitical subdivision to determinewhether the sale of alcoholic beveragesof one or more of thevarious typesand alcoholic contentsshall be permittedor legalized n the political subdivision."Tsx. Emc. Cons $ 501.021. Section 501.109 of the Texas Election Code stares hat formunicipalitieslocated n one or more counties,any reference o the county and countyofficials isto be construed s he municipalityand ts comparable fficials. Tpx. Elec. Coop $ 501.109.

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election,not the counties. TEx. ELEC.Coop $ 501.109.Nothing in thesesratutes r anyother applicable statute requires the City Secretary to count, verify, and certify thenumber of registeredvoters who resided in areas hat previously voted to be dry. AndRelatorscite to no statutoryauthority to support their claim. To the contrary, the onlystatutoryauthority for returning to old boundariess limited to justice precincts. See Tnx.ALCO.BBv. CooE $ 251.80. Accordingly, there is no statutory duty requiring thecountingas suggested y Relators.

Instead, he controlling statutes,which Relators fail to discuss,establish he CitySecretaryacted n accordancewith her duties. A municipality is authorized o determineor alter its wet or dry statusby election.TEx. Er-Bc.CooB $ 501.021;Tnx. ALCg.BEV.ConB S$251.71(b), .72. Section 25I.73, titled "Prevailing Status:ResolutionofConflicts." states:

To insurethat eachvoter hasthe maximum possiblecontrol over the statusof the saleof alcoholic beveragesn the areawherehe resides:

(l) the status that resulted from or is the result of a duly calledelection for an incorporatedcity or town prevails against he statusthat resulted rom or is the result of a duly called election n a usticeprecinct or county in which the city or town, or any part of it iscontained:and(2) the status hat resultedor is the result of a duly calledelectionfora justice precinct prevails against he status hat resultedfrom or isthe result of a duly called election in an incorporatedcity or town inwhich the justice precinct is wholly contained or in a county inwhich the usticeprecinct s located.

Id. S 251.73. Pursuant o this section, n conjunction with the authorization o determineor alter themunicipality's status,he resultsof mostrecentmunicipal ocal option prevail

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over the resultsof any prior local option election"called in a ustice precinctor county inwhich the city . . . or any part of it is contained." Thusoeven f therewas a prior county,justice precinct,or municipal election for any part of the municipality, the latestelectionof the municipality prevails for the entire municipality. The only exception is if thejustice precinct is wholly contained within the city. The statute recognizesthat thesmallest political subdivision is the municipality unlessthe whole justice precinct iswithin municipal boundaries.

Relators' reliance on section 251.80 is misplacedbecause: 1) it is limited tojustice precincts,and (2) Section 251.73controls over it: "Nothing in this section sintended o affect heoperationof section251.73of this code." 1d.g 251.80.

The legislaturewas confronted with the particular problemsrelated to conflictinglocal option election results over the samegeographicalareas. Pursuant o the grant ofauthority under article XVI, section 20 of the TexasConstitution,the legislatureadoptedrules to clarify just which election controls.ra Under that framework, if a local optionelection s called for an incorporatedcity, the resultsof that election prevail over all otherprevious elections n the geographicalarea of that city exceptas to justice precinctsthatare ocatedwholly within the city. Id. 5 251.73.Theseprovisionsconfroland he callingof an election or the entireCity of Dallas wasproper.toThe TexasConstitution grants he legislature he broad authority to enact aws related o localoption elections. TEx. CoNsr. art. XVI, $ 20. The only limitation is that if a county, usticeprecinct, town or city had voted to be dry prior to the adoption of this constitutionalprovision,then the political subdivision shall remain dry until the political subdivision conducts asubsequent lection to be wet. Id. Contrary to Relators' arguments,nothing in the constitutionrequires hat the subsequent lectionbe limited to the historical boundariesor to some ormerlv-existingpolitical subdivision.

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In the face of this direct statutorymandate,Relatorsattemptto rely on four casesas support for the contention that a local option election can only be held in thehistorically dry areas. However, each s distinguishableon the factsand the then-existingapplicableaw.

Relators irst rely on Houchinsv. Plainos, 110S.W.2d549 (Tex. 1937).Houchinswas not a local option election case. A former city had voted to be dry. It wassubsequently nnexed nto a wet city. The issuewas whetherthe actof annexing he areaor the 1935 adoption of the constitutional amendmentrevoking statewide prohibitionchanged he statusof the former city. The court concluded hat neithereventchanged hestatus. The court emphasizedhat when the former city voted dry and was later annexed,"the local option laws of this state governed,and governed exclusively the matter ofvoting upon such question." Id at 553. The case s limited to the proposition that a drycity could not be made into a wet city by simply dissolving the city and transferringtheterritory into another city that was wet. See Myers v. Martinez, 320 S.W.2d 862, 865(Tex.Civ. App.-San Antonio),writ ref'd n.r.e.,326S.W.2d171 Tex. 1959).Houchinsdid not involve the effect of a subsequentocal option election and certainly did notinvolve the effect of sections251.71to 251.82of the TexasAlcohol BeverageCode.Thus, t providesno support or Relators'claims.

Relatorsalso rely on In re Davis,269 S.W.3d581 (Tex. 2008),bu t its effect slimited to subsequent lections n justice precinctsand is governedby Section251.80.As notedabove, hat sectionstates, xceptas provided n section25l.73, oncea justiceprecinctvoteson a local option election the status emainsunchangeduntil a subsequent

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election n the same erritory. Tpx. Alco. BEV.Coos $ 251.80(a). The legislature nenacting sections 251.13 and 251.80 required that a change n a justice precinct statuscould happen only in an election in the same historical territory unless the electionoccurred n a city or town. The called election at issuehere is not for a justice precinctand hereforesection25I.73 controls.

Relators ext rely on Jackson . State,118S.W.2d313 (Tex.Crim. App. 1938),but it also is inapplicable. In that case,a justice precinct had voted to be dry and thecounty subsequently oted to be wet. The court concluded hat the dry statusstill appliedfor the justice precinct. Although the case was decided long before the adoption ofsection251.73(2), he holding s consistentwith the statute.The smallersubdivision otecontrolled over the larger subdivision. Again, a municipality is considereda smallersubdivisionunless he whole ustice precinct is within municipal boundaries.

Finally, Relators rely on Coker v. TexasAlcoholic Beverage Commission, 524S.W.2d570 (Tex.Civ. App.-Dallas 1975,writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, he casesupportsthe applicationof section251.73. The general acts are the sameas Jackson A justiceprecinct voted to be dry and a subsequent ounty election voted to be wet. The justiceprecinct election was held to prevail over the county election. But in discussingtheapplicable law, the court noted that in l9l3 the legislatureadopted he provisions nowfound in sections251.73and 251.80of the Alcoholic BeverageCode andconcluded hatthe statute"declaredthe law as it existedsincethe adoptionof the 1935amendment tothe Texas Constitutionl." Id. at 576. Thus, since 1935 the law has provided that a

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subsequentocal option election of a city prevails over prior local option electionsforareaswithin the city unless hat area s a ustice precinctwholly containedwithin the city.

This conclusion finds further support from the opinions of the Texas AttorneyGeneral. In the first opinion letter, the questionpresentedwas what was the effect of asubsequentocal option election on an annexedarea nto a city. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. M-335(1969) [City's App'x Tab 6]. An annexed reahadpreviouslyvoted o be wet for allpurposes.There was a subsequent itywide local option electionand, as a result, the saleof alcohol for on-premiseconsumptionwas prohibited but the sale of alcohol for off-premises consumption was approved. The Attorney General concluded that sincequalified voters n the annexedareaparticipated n the local option electionsubsequentoannexation, the latest expressionof the population of the entire city controlled. Id.[City's App'x Tab6, at2].

Another opinion involved the authority of county commissionerso setboundariesfor local optionelections.Op. Tex.Att'y Gen.DM-44 (1991)[City's App'r Tab 7]. TheAttorney General first noted that section 251.80of the TexasAlcoholic BeveraseCodeappliedonly to justice precincts. He thencontinued:

Accordingly, only those political subdivisions enumerated in theconstitution and statutesmay exercise local option through the electoralprocessprescribedby chapter251 of the Alcoholic BeverageCode, andsuchelectionsmust be held in the entirepolitical subdivisionfor which theelection is called. No provision of the Alcoholic BeverageCode authorizesthe disenfranchisement f voters in any portion of a city that is within thepolitical subdivision or which the election s to be held.

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Id. [City's App'* Tab 7 at 4]. The TexasSecretary f State ikewise concludes: Thereis no authority in the TexasElection Code nor the TexasAlcoholic BeverageCode for alocaloptionelection o be imited to partof a city."rs

The City Secretaryand the City Council were presentedwith a petition for a localoption electionfor the entire city of Dallas. The electionwill affect the entirecity. Thereis no statutory prohibition or caselawagainst calling such an election and there is noauthority for calling an election for just a portion of the city or to have petitionssegregated y sectionsof a city. Relatorshave not met their burden in contestingtheactions of the City officials or establishingthat the City officials had a clear duty toseparatelycount signatut'esn accordancewith the voters' residencesn particular formerpolitical subdivisions. The petition for writ of mandamusshouldbe denied.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYERThe Relatorshave failed to establish urisdiction, the lack of an adequate emedy

of law, or the failure of City officials to perform any duty imposedby law. For all thesereasons, he Respondentspray that the petition for writ of mandamusbe dismissedordenied n whole, or alternatively n part, and the electiveprocessbe allowed to continue.

15 Local option Liquor Elections - Questions and Answers at $v(H)http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/liquorelections.shtml.City's App'x Tab 8, at l0).35


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Respectfullysubmitted,

BarbaraE. Rosenberg exasBar No. 17267700AssistantCity AttorneysCity Attorney'sOffice1500Marilla Street,Room7D NorthDallas,Texas7520ITelephone214-67 -3519Telecopier214-670 0622ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEOn this the 19th day of July, 2010, a true and correct copy of thedocument was mailed to Realtors' counsel,Leland C. de la Garza, Andrew foregoingL. Siegel,

3333 Leeimothy D. zeiger, Derek D. Rollins, shackglfordMelton & McKinley,Parkway,Tenth Floor,Dallas,Texas752l

s Estee

THOMASP.PERKINS. R.

es EsteeTexasBar No. 06673600

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RESPONDENTS'SUPPLEMENTALMANDAMUS RECORD AND APPENDIX

Tab DescriptionCertification

1. Affidavit of Deborah Watkins2. City Secretarymemorandumand certification3. Excerptof web-page f the Kirkwood Temple4. Excerpt of the web-pageof theLifeway Church5. TBx.Alco Bsv.Coos9251.736. AttorneyGeneral pinionM-3557. AttorneyGeneralOpinionDM-448. Excerptof theTexasSecretary f Stateweb-pagere ocaloptionelections


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CERTIFICATIONSTATEOFTEXAS $sCOUNTYOFDALLAS $

Beforeme, he undersigned uthority,on this daypersonally ppeared HARLESESTEE, the personwhose name is subscribedbelow and who, on his oath and basedonpersonal knowledge, stated that the items contained in the attached SupplementalMandamus Record/Appendix for this mandamusproceeding,Exhibits 1-8, are originalsor true and correct copies of the originals docu

CHARLESESTEE

Given under my hand and offi of office hi,&^y of July, 2010.

NoreRy PusI-rc NANDFon THsSrnrp OpTexas]EBORAH.ANDRIESNotaryubllctvlyComm.)Qlree5'


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Tab 1


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No.05-10-00805-CV

IN THECOURTOFAPPEALSFORTHE FIFTHJUDICIAL DISTRICTOF TEXASAT DALLAS

IN RE MARCUSWOOD,THE KIRKWOODTEMPLE,THE AFRICAN-AMERICANPASTORSCOALITION,THE INTERDENOMINATIONALMINISTERIALALLIANCE OF DALLAS,THE MT. TABORBAPTISTCHURCHAND THELIFEWAY CHURCH

AFFIDAVIT OF DEBORAHWATKINS

STATEOFTEXASCOUNTYOFDALLAS

BEFORE ME, the undersignedauthority, on this day personallyappearedDeborahWatkins,who, being by me first duly swom, deposedand statedas follows:

"My name s DeborahWatkins. I am over 2I yearsof age and have neverbeen convicted of any felony or crime involving dishonesty or moralturpitude. I have served n the capacity of City Secretary or the City ofDallas sinceMarch 15,2006. Before that date, was the AssistantCitySecretary or the City of Dallas for approximately8 years,having held thatpositionsinceAugust I,1999.

I have personalknowledge of all the facts statedherein and they are trueand correct.The City of Dallas s a home-rulecity located n DallasCounty, Texas. Myduties asCity Secretary nclude the duty to 'serveas the electionofficial forall city elections'pursuant o DallasCity Charterchapter IIA, section3(7).As part of thoseduties, personallyand hroughmy City Secretary'sOffice

$$$

Affidavit of Deborah Watkins Page1 of3


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(sometimes eferred o as 'CSO') staff certiff the petitions for municipalelections.On March 16, 2010, the CSO was presentedwith two applications orpetitions for local option elections. One application was for a petition foran election whether to legalize the sale of beer and wine for off-premiseconsumption and the other was for a petition for an election whether toIegalize the sale of mixed beveragesat restaurants. The CSO determinedthat each application was in compliance with the applicable requirementsand on March 23,2010 a petition was issued or each ssue. On May 20,2010, a petition was filed with the CSO, supported by approximately109,000signatures, equesting hat a local option election be held onwhether to Iegalizethe sale of beer and wine for off-premiseconsumption.A petition was also filed at that time with a comparable number ofsignatures for a local option election on whether to legalize the sale ofmixed beveragesat restaurants. The next regular sessionon or after thethirtieth day after the petitionswere filed with the CSo wasJune23,2010.The CSO begana statisticalsampling of the signatures or eachpetition todetermine f the signersof the petitions were qualified voters of the City ofDallas.On or about June 3, 2010,Marcus Wood made a written request hat allsignatures for the beer and wine petition be verified rather than beingverified by a statisticalsample. On June 8, 2010, I wrote Mr. Wood andadvisedhim of the estimatedcost and told him that such verification wouldnot begin until receiptof payment. On June 15,2010, I wrote Mr. Woodagainand advisedhim that the cost would increasebecauseof the shortenedtime to complete he verification. On June 15,2010, the CSO receivedacheck from Andy Siegal for a portion of the estimatedcost of the totalverification. The CSO proceededwith a verification review of all thesignaturessupporting he petition for the local option electionon whethertoIegalizethe sale of beer and wine for off premiseconsumption. The CSOcontinuedwith its statisticalsampleof the signaturessupporting he petitionon whether to legalize the local option election for sale of mixed beveragesat restaurants.On June 17, 2010, the CSO receiveda secondcheck fromAndy Siegalfor the remainderof the estimatedcost of the total verif,rcation.On June23,2010, the CSO completedan nitial review of all the signaturessupportingthe petition for the local option election for the sale of beer andwine for off-premise consumptionand the statistical sampleof signaturessupporting the petition the local option election for the sale of mixedbeverages n restaurants. The CSo concluded that each petition wassupported by the required number of signaturesof qualified voters. I

Affidavit of DeborahWatkins Page of3


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certified in writing to the Dallas City Council that eachpetition containedsignaturesof the requirednumberof qualified voters.After the receipt of my certification, on June 23, 2010 the Dallas CityCouncil ordered or called for a local option election on whether to Iegalizethe sale of beer and wine for off-premise consumption and for a localoption election on whether to legalize the sale of mixed beverages nrestaurants. On July, 15,2010,I certified to the Dallas City Council thetotal number of qualified voters signing the petition for a local optionelection on whether to legalize the sale of beer and wine for off premiseconsumption. A true and correct copy of the notice is attachedas Exhibit 2.Further Affiant SavethNot."

SUBSCRIBEDAND SWORNTO BEFOREME on July 16, 2010, o certifywhich witness mv hand andseal of offi

RAH WATKINS

NoreRy Pueuc IN ANDFoRTHESrere oF TEXAS

Affidavit of DeborahWatkins Page3 of 3


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Ta


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CITYOFDALLASMemorandumJuly 16,2010

ro : HONORABLEMAYORANDMEMBERS OF'THE CITY COUNCILSUBJECT:INAL REVIEW. PETITION FOR LEGAL SALE OF BEER AND WINE FOROF'F.PREMISECONSUMPTIONONLY

On June 23,2010, pursuant o Section501.031,501 032 and 501.033of the TexasElectionCode(TEC), I confirmedby resolution 10-170S)a petition to legalize"the saleof beer and wine for off-premise consumptiononly" was signed by at least 35 percentofthe qualified voters in the City of Dallas who voted in the most recent gubematorialelection on any other ballot issue. A certification was included to confirm the requirednumberof qualified voters n the political subdivisionsigning the petition was sufficient.In accordancewith the normal practice of the City Secretary's Office, a review of thepetition confirms there were approximately 109,000 ndividuals who signed the petitionand 69,702 were confirmed asqualified votersof the City of Dallas.If you needfuither information, please et me know.

DeborahWatkinsCity SecretaryC: Mary K. Suhm,City ManagerThomasP. Perkins,Jr., City AttorneyRosa A. Rios, AssistantCity SecretaryMichelle Calloway,ElectionsManager

"DallaE, heCityThatWorks:Diverse,Vibrantand Progressive."


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Cityof Dallas

STATEOF TEXASCOUNTYOF'DALLASCITY OF DALLAS

I, Deborah Watkins, City Secretaryof the City of Dallas, Texashave duly examinedtheattached petition entitled "the legal sale of beer and wine for o{f-premise consumptiononly" filed with my office under Section 501.032of the Texas Election Code. Theafbrementionedsection of the Texas Election Code requires the petition to contain 35percentof the qualified voters in the political subdivision who voted in the most recentgubernatorialelection for an electionon any other ballot issue.The petition when filed containedapproximately 109,000signatures. In accordancewithSection 501.031of the Texas Election Code, after a review of the signatures,69,702qualified voterssigned he petition.I do hereby certiry a minimum of 35 percentof the qualified voters of the City of Dallassigned he petition.WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL OF THE CITY OF DALLAS. TEXAS. this the 15thdayof JULY,2010.

DEBORAHWATKINSCITY SECRETARYCITY OF DALLAS. TEXAS

OFFICEOFTHEClrYSECRETARYITYHALL OALIAS,TEXASTszol ELEPHONE214I87O-5I38


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Tab 4


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qry


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Tab 5


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WestlawPage l

V.T.C.A., Alcoholic BeverageCode $ 251.73

CEffective: [SeeText Amendments]Vernon's Texas Statutesand CodesAnnotatedCunentnessAlcoholic BeverageCode (Refs & Annos)Title 6. Local Option Elections (Refs & Annos)1f, Chapter251. ,ocal Option Status Refs& Annos)REgSubchapterD. Miscellaneous Local Option Provisions

.+ $ 251.73. Prevailing Status: Resolution of ConflictsTo insure that eachvoter has the maximum possiblecontrol over the statusof the sale of alcoholic beverages n thearea where he resides:

( I ) the status hat resulted from or is the result of a duly called election for an incorp

City Response to Petition for Mandamus

Documents

Transcript of City Response to Petition for Mandamus