Chen, Chung-Hwan - Different Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of Aristotle

International Phenomenological Society

Different Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of AristotleAuthor(s): Chung-Hwan ChenSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Sep., 1956), pp. 56-65Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2104687 .Accessed: 30/03/2014 21:59

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DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

Every one who is but superficially with the Aristotelelian corpus knows that there are certain pairs of technical terms which appear in nearly all of his writings. One of these pairs is dynamics and energeia (sometimes entelecheia). They not only serve as suitable topics under which his 'first philosophy' may be conveniently summarized, but also play an important role in the other parts of his thought, for example, in his physics, psychology, and ethics. As these concepts are the material with which he constructs his several influential theories, it follows naturally that one must first grasp the different meanings of these terms before one can understand his philosophy.

But it is not a simple task even to acquire this preliminary knowledge. As to the term dynamics, he devotes a chapter in the so called 'philosophical lexicon' 2 to the explanation of its various senses, however insufficient it may be. 3 But with regard to the term energeia it is much worse. For in the same book of the Metaphysics there is even no chapter in which its different meanings are explained, while, as a matter of fact, such an explanation is more needed because this term is employed in a still greater variety than the term dynamics. From the Greek commentators, who busied themselves generally with the exegesis of single passages, we cannot expect a com- prehensive explanation; modern scholars do not give us much help in this case, either. The same is even true of the famous composer of the 'Index Aristotelicus,' llermann Bonitz, whose contribution to the Aristotelian study is widely acknowledged.

Nowadays, the intellectual interest of the civilized world is no longer con- centrated on such historical studies as it was once in the foregoing century especially in Germany. Although the subjective situation of the problem has changed, yet the problem itself remains the same and still waits for solution. Hence a research is needed now, no less than before, to find out the different meanings of the term energeia as used by Aristotle, or at least to point out in how many different senses it was then chiefly used.

Bonitz writes in his monumental work under the word energeia the 1 The word energy, used now as a technical term in Physics, is a transcription of the

Greek word 'eyepxsLo -; but its meaning is quite different from that of the same word used by Aristotle. In order that one may not mistake the modern sense of the word for that of the Aristotelian term, we prefer to write this term here in its original form.

2 Met A 12. 3 For what is enumerated there does not cover all the cases in which the word dyna-

mis is used in different passages of his writings. What astonishes us greatly is the fact that dynamics in his 'first philosophy' is not mentioned there.

56


DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA OF ARISTOTLE 57

following: "Quoniam potentiae vel oppositur is motus et actus, quo res ad perfectionem naturae suae perducitur,vel ipsa illa perfectio 'evepyeta Xey'-eoa T( Aev Co xtvr~aL npo' 8&VocXVLv, TMt 3' ( oi'a?'X 7tp6q BlVoc is-v Met. 061048b8. Quod discrimen quamquam non potest ubique accurate observari, tamen ad perlustrandam varietatem usus aptum est." 4 His distinction is generally right, but it suffices in no way. The chief uses which Aristotle makes of this term are at least nine or ten in number; therefore it has chiefly so many different meanings. What each of them is, how they differ from each other, and what- kind of theory Aristotle uses this term in one or other of its senses to express, are not all evident to us at the first glance. A thorough understanding of its uses in his philosophy can be had only through a careful analysis of the theories in which it is employed. This we are going to do in the following.

1. Energia in the meaning of actuality - The well-known meaning of this term is "actuality." Energeia in this sense corresponds to dynamics in the sense of potentiality. Energeia and dynamics, or actuality and potentiality, denote a pair of principles which are, according to Aristotle, valid for the whole realm of being analogously. 5 They are not constructive principles as form and matter are, but principles of a quite different nature. In fact, he holds them to be ways of existence. 6 Hence they are the forerunners of the modal principles, 7 with which we are acquainted in the philosophy of later times. Yet he does not regard them as purely modal; both in his concept of actuality and in that of potentiality teleological moments are involved, 8 which are not contained in any purely modal

4 Aristotelis opera edidit Academia Regia Borussica, Vol. V 251a 21-27. 5 MetA. 5. 107la 3-5. 6 Met. 0. 6. 1048a 30-32. 7 That they are not purely modal principles is already evident from the fact that there

is nothing in Aristotle's metaphysics which, forming a triad together with dynamics and energeia, might denote the mode of necessity. It is true that in his logic he teaches three different modes, of which he has no definite term for the mode of reality (but uses simply the verb iu7okpXeLv to express this); but what ukrokpxetv and 'ev8exzeaOco u?kPXet expresses in his logical writings, is different from what 'ev~pyetoc and 86vocu express in his 'first philosophy.' Therefore energeia and dynamics are only forerunners of the modal concepts, but not modal concepts themselves. Cf. next n.

8 In the Aristotelian concepts of dynamics (in the sense of potentiality) at least the following teleological moments are involved:

1. Matter is according to Aristotetle the carrier of dynamics in this sense. If something is potentially something else, its dynamics is owing to its material constituent. Matter has then a natural tendency towards form; it aims at being actually so and so determined as the form is. So in his concept of potentiality finality is an important moment.

2. This actual determination is the end of the matter. A seed of a certain tree, for example, aims at becoming such a tree actually. If the conditions required for this change are fulfilled, it develops into such a one. Thus the basis of the development is the dynamis in the sense of potentiality. It forms the second important moment of his concept of potentiality. The same teleological moments are involved in his concept of actuality. For actuality is that state in which potentiality is actualized.


58 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

concepts as such. So let us call these Aristotelian principles rather quasi- modal principles. When the philosopher employs the terms energeia and dynamis to denote this teleologically colored modality of being, it may be said that they are used in the quasi-modal sense.

2. Energeia in the meaning of being actualized and of being perfect - closely related with the meaning of actuality there are two other meanings of the same term, "being actualized" and "being perfect." In the first case it is usually not easy to distinguis genergeia in the meaning of being actualized from that in the meaning of actuality when the term is applied to those things which are subject to the process of coming to be. For among those things what is actual is that which has become actual, that is, which is actualized; and, conversely, what is actualized is actual. Consequently, one is often at a loss to know whether in a given passage the term energeia has only this, but not also the other meaning at the same time. In the second case the meaning of being perfect and that of being actualized are inseparable from each other. For according to Aristotle matter has a natural tendency (3vovLcs) to be actually so and so determined. This actual determination is its end. When it has become actually so and so, its potentiality is actualized, and at the same time it has reached its end; it is then perfect. 9

3. Energeia in application both to form and to soul - Since when the term energeia is used to denote things which come to be, its meaning of being actualized is, on the one hand, closely connected with its meaning of actuality, and, on the other, inseparable from that of being perfect, it comes about that in that case (that is, in the case of yLyv6Vevo) it is usually difficult to locate the boundary between the meanings, actuality and perfection. But when it is employed to denote that which is subject to no actualization, it means unambiguously actuality. It is used just in this sense when Aristotetle characterizes form (ethoq) by the expression evlpyELc (actual).

Form will not only be characterized in this way - which is well known to the students of Aristotle - but also by the nominative case of the term,10 just as matter is not only described as potential, but also called potentiality. 11 What forms the background of this nomenclature is a certain theory of Aristotle concerning the form and the proximate matter. To discuss that theory here, it would lead us astray; therefore we reserve its discussion for another occasion.

9 Energeia in the sense of being perfect is used, for example, in Met. 0. 6. 1049b25, De gen. anim. II. 1.734b21, where man or other living beings are concerned. For a man is begotten by another man who is in his vital aspect fully developed, that is, vitally perfect.

'0 For example, Met. H.2.1043a6, 12. I Cf. Met. Z. 16. 1040b6.



What we are going to emphasize in this connection is the application of the same term to soul. Soul is related to body as form is to matter. If the latter two are called energeia and dynamics respectively, and soul is regarded as form, 12 it is very natural to transfer the name energeia to the soul. 13 In consequence of this conception of soul the strict unity of the living being is established. 14 The empsychon is then a unity (or rather a concrete whole aiuvoXov) of matter (body), which is dynamis, and form (soul), which is entelecheia, 15 or energeia. 16 The relation between soul and body will be no more like that between two things taken at random as it was practically supposed to be by certain predecessors of Aristotle, but soul and body are now, according to his own opinion, one and the same thing which exists in two opposite modes. The transition from that theory of form to this important psychological theory is well prepared in his "Discourses on Substance." 17

4. Energeia in the meaning of actualization - So much for the quasi- modal sense of the term energeia, the chief uses of which we have just discussed. In the following let us turn to the non-modal sense of the same term, of which there are also different shades of meaning. First of all, we consider this word as it is used in defining movement. In this case it does not mean actuality, but actualization. Aristotle's famous definition of movement runs thus: The actualization of what is potential, in so far as it is potential, is movement. 18 The expression "in so far as" (g) is of great importance. He illustrates it by a concrete example. Though bronze, as he shows, is potentially a statute, but the entelecheia 19 of bronze, in so far as it is bronze, is not movement. For to be bronze and to be potentially movable are not essentially the same; otherwise the entelecheia of bronze would have been certain movement. But they are not the same, as has been said. 20 What Aristotle means by this is the following: actualization is related only to what is potentially, but not to what is actually, existent. The proximate matter, for example, bronze, is potentially a certain thing, but apart from being this it has still another side; it is namely actually

12 Met. Z. 10. 1035bl4-16. 13 Ibid., H. 3. 1043a35-36, cf. De an. II. 1.412a27-28. 14 Ibid., 412b6-9. -15 Ibid., 11.2.414al4-19. 16 Cf. Met.H.3.1043a35. 17 In Met.Z.10.1035bl4-16 soul is regarded as el8u; in Z.13. and in H. energeia or

entelecheia is frequently used to denote ethos (for example, H.2. 1043a6,12; Z. 13.- 1038b6). Therefore soul is called 'evepyetoc a6c-Ot0coq rtLV6q in H.3. 1043a35-36, from whence the conception of soul in the De anima follows.

18 Met K91065bl6, cf. Phys.III.I.201alO-II. The comparison of these passages with each other shows that energeia and entelecheia when used to define movement are in the same sense.

19 See note 18. 20 Phys. III.I.201a 29-34; Met. K.9.1065b23-28.



bronze. The actualization does not concern its actual, but only its potential being. 21 Therefore movement is not the actualization of a thing, in so far as it is actually this (for in this respect it is already actualized), but the actualization of it, in so far as it is potentially something else, 22 (for only in this respect the actualization is possible).

The difference between energeia in the sense of actualization and the same term in the sense of actuality consists in the following: Actuality excludes potentiality completely while actualization includes the latter always, though in a continuously diminishing degree.

The word energeia is used to signify not only the process by which the potentially existent is actualized, but also that process which sets it in motion. Hence both action and passion are denoted with the same term by Aristotle. He arrived at this point from the following processes, but what occurs is only a single actualization, an actualization which is at the same time the actualization of the agent in the patient and the actualization of the patient through the agent. By -this unity he does not mean that the two processes were identical, but that they coincide in movement. It is just the same as the fact that though the steep ascent and the steep descent differ from each other, but there is only one way. 23

5. Energeia in application to both sensation and intellectual knowledge In his psychology Aristotle makes use of the term energeia to signify

both sensation and thinking or, more properly, intellectual knowledge. 24 Let us turn first to sensation. The Aristotelian psychology is the faculty psychology. That whose function consists in sensation is called by Aris- totle aisthetikon, i.e., that faculty 25 with which the subject acquires sensible perception. According to the exposition in the De anima this dynamics is to be regarded, in a certain sense, as faculty to suffer or be acted upon i.e., a passive faculty. 26 For it is aroused to function by what exists ex- ternally to the mind, by the sensible object; 27 only the expression "to suffer" or "be acted upon" is here not to be understood in the sense of being destroyed by its opposite, but in the sense of preserving what is potentially existent by what is actually existent and like it. 28

21 Phys.III.1.201a28-29; Met.K.9.1065b22-23. In both passages the reading o'yx ii 'oct o:u' iv xwr6v of Aspasius (cf.Ross's Aristotle's Physics, p. 537) is to be adopted. oaut"o, then, refers to 'evreXeyj6tc '6v. Bronze, for example, is actually bronze, but it energizes not in so far as it is bronze, but in so far as it is movable.

22 Phys. III.1.201b4-5; Met.K9.1065b33. 23 Phys. III. 1.202al8-20, b19-22; Met. K. 9. 1066a31-34. The same unity in the case

of sensation is discussed in De An. III. 2.245b25 sg. 24 De An. II. 4.425al6-20; Met. 0.6. 1048b33-35. 25 Aisthetikon is called dynamics, for example, in De An. II. 3. 414a32. 26 The term Nvocpu c-qnxd is found, for example, in Met. A15.1021 a15-16. 27 De an. III. 7.431a4-5, II. 5.417b20-21. 28 Ibid., II. 5.417b2-4.



This faculty is not only a dynamis in the non-modal sense of the term (i.e., "capacity)," but also 8uvkcet in its quasi-modal sense (i.e., "po- tentailly)." For what is capable of sensation, namely, aisthetikon, is potentially such as the sensible objects are in actuality. 29

Sensation is then the exercise of the faculty of suffering or being acted upon and, moreover, in this sense that by this exercise what was potentially existent before is now preserved in actuality, or to express more exactly, its characteristics, being actualized, are preserved. Hence sensation consists of two moments: the capacity to suffer or be acted upon and the actualization of potentiality. Aristotle calls it energeia.

Next we come to intellect and, moreover, to such intellect with which the soul thinks and conceives, 30 that is, not the so-called intellects agens which, as Aristotle holds, is independent and exists eternally by itself after its separation from the body. 31 Although in other respects sensation and intellectual knowledge differ from each other. As the sensitive faculty is a capacity for sensuous knowledge, the intellect is a contemplative faculty. 32 Just as sensation, the intellectual knowledge is in a certain sense, affection.33 Hence, even this contemplative faculty may be regarded as a faculty of suffering or being acted upon, too. Amd just as the sensitive faculty is potentially such as the sensible objects are actual, the intellect is in a manner potentially all the intellible objects, but is actually none of them until it exercises its function. 34 So the intellectual knowledge is made possible through the identity of characteristics which are common to the subject and the object, just as in the case of sensation. Hence the expression "to suffer" or "to be acted upon" is here not to be understood in the sense of being destroyed by the contrary, but in this sense that what is potentially existent is actualized by what is actually existent, and in this actualization its characteristics are preserved. For who has the wisdom and exercises it, is subject to no alteration; by this exercise there is only the development into actuality. 35 So, as sensation, the intellectual knowledge consists of two moments: the capacity to suffer in the given sense and the actualization of what is potentially existent. Consequently, Aristotle calls it energeia, too.

6. The term energeia employed in the definition of the chief good - The word energeia is further used as a technical term in Aristotle's ethics;

29 Ibid. , 418a3-4. 30 Ibid., III. 4.429a23. 31 Ibid., III. 5.430a17,22-23. 32 The expression av c6VoLLq is used in De An. II. 2. 413b25, where it is

identified with intellect. 33 Ibid., III. 4.429al3-15. 34 Ibid., III. 4. 429b29-430a2, cf. supra 429al5-24, 27-29, where intellect is said to be

aU&V&ml 62-N, i.e. vobqrak. 35 Ibid., II. 5.417b2-7.



then it signifies a definite activity of soul. 36 In his inquiry into the nature of the chief good he arrives at the conclusion that the human good - which is identified with happiness (s 8CLtLov0oc) 37 is the activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and if there is more than one virtue, in accordance with the best and most complete. 38

What the most complete virtue and what perfect happiness is Aristotle explains elsewhere in the Nichomachean Ethics. The perfect happiness is the activity of intellect and in accordance with wisdom. It is namely the contemplative activity of man. 39 What the word energeia in this ethical theory signifies is, therefore, the knowing activity of intellect. Thus the meaning in which this term is used here is rather one of its usual senses as discussed in section 5, in a special application than an entirely new meaning.

7. Energeia in the meaning of pure activity - We showed above that Aristotle uses the term energeia to denote the passive intellect and two characteristical moments of which are the capacity to suffer and the actualization of potentiality. The same term is further used to denote an activity which is neither the exercise of capacity nor the actualization of potentiality, an activity which has no dynamics either in the non-modal or in the quasi-modal sense for its foundation, i.e., the pure activity. In this sense we find energeia to be used in Aristotle's theory of God and that of the so-called intellects agens. 40 In his Theology, as stated in Book y of the Metaphysics, he starts from discussing the cosmical problem of eternal movement, and arrives at the conclusion that its principle must be an activity. 41 This activity is namely the pure activity. It is further identified with the unmoved mover, 42 intellect, 43 God 44 noesis or thinking,and finally with thinking of thinking. 45

It is meaningless to take the term energeia here in the sense of actuality. For now can the principle, upon which both heaven and nature depend, 46 be-in his mind only a mode of existence? 47 It is true that God is regarded by him as formal substance, 48 and the form is also called energeia in the

36 Eth. Nic. I. 6.1098a7 et abliot. 37 Ibid., I. 2.1095al7-20, 6.1097b22-23. 38 Ibid., I. 6.1098a8-17. 30 X. 7. II 77al2-18. In line 6 r -o6oX ZoxvpyrLoc is z zV~pyrLoc rov vov (1177bl9)

and xocmto r-'Jv &pzTrv is xc-to& L9v mayoc (1177a24). 40 Met. a. 6.1071b20,22; De An. III. 5.430a18. 41 Ibid., 1071b12-22. 42 Ibid., 7.1072a23 sq. 43 Ibid., 1072bl8 sq. 44 Ibid., 1072b26-30. 45 Ibid., 9.1074b33-35. 46 Ibid., 7.1072bl3-14. 47 See supra. 48 God is called -o o' iv LtvC l 7rp Otpcrov in Met. A 18.1074a35-36.


DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF THE TERM ENERGEIA OF ARISTOTLIE 63

quasi-modal sense, but this nomenclature should not be transferred to the divine. For the theory in consequence of which the form is called energeia concerns the proximate matter; therefore it cannot be applied here. 49 On the other hand, God is a substance with definite attributes and in no way only a mode of existence.

In the same sense the word energeia is used to signify the intellectus agens. 50

8. Energeia and movement - The two meanings of the term energeia which Bonitz distinguishes are indeed nothing else than the quasi-modal and the non-modal meaning, of which the former was discussed in sections 1-3, and the latter in sections 4-7. When the term energeia is employed in the non-modal meaning, it is used then in a broad or in a narrow sense. In the first case, it signifies movement as well as sensation, thinking or intellectual knowledge, the contemplative activity of human intellect, in which happines consists, the so-called intellects agens, the unmoved mover or God, who is, according to Aristotle, the thinking of thinking. 51 In the second case, it denotes all of them except movement. This is the reason why sometimes he holds movement to be energeia, 52 sometimes sets it in opposition to energeia. Energeia in the latter case is repeatedly illustrated by the example of seeing. 53 It is our next task to investigate how he distinguishes movement and energeia from each other. The distinction made by him is based upon three different points: (1) Movement is incomplete, energeia is complete; 54 (2) What is set in motion is imperfect, what energizes has reached its perfection; 55 (3) Movement is either quick or slow, energeia is neither. 56

1) In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle argues thus. Every movement (e.g., that of building) takes time and is in no moment complete, except in the last one when the building is finished or in the whole period of time which the movement lasts. On the other hand, seeing is in every moment complete; for it does not lack anything which coming into being later will make its form complete. 57

In the Metaphysics movement is again said to be incomplete. This time Aristotle emphasizes the fact that the end of movement is external to the

49 Cf. supra. 50 De An. III. 5.430a18. 51 Besides these there are still other things, for example, living, living well (Met. 0.6.

1048b25,27) which are signified by it. 52 Cf. definition of xvasLc' in Met. K. 9.1065bl6. 53 For instance, Met. q, 6, 1048b23-30. 54 Eth. Nic. X. 3. 1174al9sq.; Phys. III. 2.201b31-32, VIII. 5.257b 8-9; Met. K.

9.1066a20-21, q.6. 1048b21-23, 28-30; De An. II. 5. 417al6-17. 55 De An. III. 7. 431a6-7. 56 Eth. Nic. X. 2. 1173a31-b4. 57 Ibid., 3. 1174al9-29, 14-16.



movement. Of such actions which have a limit, as he points out, none is itself an end, but a means to the end, e.g., removal of fat. A person who is under the treatment of fat-removal, aims at being thin, as long, as this curing process continues, he has not yet achieved what is intended by him; but at that moment when he has become thin, the process is ended. Thus the end of fat.-removal lies beyond that movement. There it is no praxis or, at least, not a complete one. All movements are like fat-removal, and are, therefore, incomplete. On the other hand, the action which has the end in itself, is a praxis. 68 For example, seeing aims at nothing else than itself for the use of sight is the end. 59 Consequently, when a sensitive subject sees, the end of seeing is simultaneously reached; hence "at the same time it is seeing and has seen. 60 The same is true of thinking, being happy etc., ion contrast to which are fat-removal, walking, etc. The former are all energeiai or activities, the latter movements, which are all incomplete. 61

In the De Anima movement is distinguished from sensation on the ground that the subject of the one is differently determined from that of the other. For what is set in motion is imperfect; what energizes has reached perfection. Movement is the transitional process from the potentiality to actuality. 62 So long as anything is in motion, it has not yet been entirely actualized, it has not yet reached its end; it is still imperfect. On the contrary, one who sees, just during the moment when one is seeing, has seen, he has reached his end; it is then perfect.

That Movement is incomplete, as we have just learned from Aristotle's Ethics and Metaphysics, receives an explanation from this very passage of the De Anima. Movement, as defined in the Physics, is the actualization of the potentially existent, in so far as it is potentially existent. Anything which is potentially existent is not actualized, it has not reached its end and it is imperfect. Movement is the process by means of which it attains its end. Hence just as this end has not yet been reached by the thing in movement, so it lies also beyong the movement itself; it transcends both of them. In this transcendence both the imperfectness of the potentially existent and the incompleteness of the movement express themselves. Strictly examined, they are related to each other in the following way. When the potentially existent begins to actualize itself, its transcendent end is assigned to its movement, too. So from the imperfectness of what in movement the incompleteness of the movement itself follows. Our

58 Met. 0. 6. 1048bl8-23. The word ntp&o is in line 18 used to denote all actions which have either the end in themselves or that external to them, but in line 21 it is employed only to signify the former. In order to avoid this ambiguity we use "action" for np&EL in a general sense and "praxis" for the original word in the strict sense.

59 Met. 0.8. 1050a23-35. 60 Ibid., 1048b23 (with Bonitz's reading). 61 Ibid., 1048b23-25. 62 See supra, definition of movement.



interpretation finds a precise verification in a passage in Aristotle's Phy- sics. 63

3) We find the third difference between energeia and movement illustrated by the example of pleasure. It is evident that every movement, if it is not by itself, at least relative to other things, is quick or slow; pleasure, on the other hand, is neither. Although one gets the feeling of pleasure quickly or slowly, but one does not have it quickly or slowly. 64 This third characteristic of energeia is closely connected with the first one Pleasure, for example, just like seeing, is complete in every moment. For it is a whole, and at no time one can find a pleasure whose form will be completed if the pleasure lasts longer. 65 The quickness or slowness of a movement consists just in the fact that the movement takes a longer or shorter time to pass over a given distance. 66 So in either case it covers a number of time units; and it is, therefore, not complete in every moment.

To sum up: there are at least nine, respectively ten, different meanings, in which the term energeia is chiefly used in the philosophy of Aristotle. They are to be classified thus:

I. Quasi-modal meaning: - 1. actuality 2. being actualized or 3. being perfect 4. in application to form 5. in application to soul

II. Non-modal meaning: - A. in the broad sense: 1. actualization 2. in application to

sensation 3. in application to

intellectual knowledge

4. contemplative activity of human intellect

5. pure activity B. in the narrow sense: all of the five senses,

except the first one, in A are included here.

CHUNG-HWAN CHEN. UNIVERSITY OF TAIWAN, TAT PET, FORMOSA.

63 Namely III. 2. 201b31-33, of. K. 9. 1066a20-22. 64 Cf. n. 56. 65 Eth. Nhc. X. 3.1174al5-19. 66 Cf. Phy8. VI. 2. 232b 1420.


Article Contentsp.56p.57p.58p.59p.60p.61p.62p.63p.64p.65

Issue Table of ContentsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Sep., 1956), pp. 1-142Front Matter"Cognitive" and "Normative" [pp.1-21]A Theory of Subjunctive Conditionals [pp.22-35]Human Nature, Homeostasis, and Value [pp.36-55]Different Meanings of the Term Energeia in the Philosophy of Aristotle [pp.56-65]Created Truths and Causa Sui in Descartes [pp.66-78]Pragmatism and the Theory of Signs in Peirce [pp.79-88]DiscussionSome Issues in Current Psychological Literature [pp.89-104]Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature [pp.105-113]The Fundamental Types of Present Philosophic Anthropology [pp.114-121]Contradictories and Strict Implication [pp.122-124]

Reviewsuntitled [pp.125-127]untitled [pp.127-128]untitled [pp.128-129]untitled [pp.129-130]untitled [pp.130-131]untitled [pp.131-132]untitled [pp.132-133]untitled [p.133]untitled [pp.133-134]untitled [pp.134-135]untitled [pp.135-136]untitled [pp.136-137]untitled [pp.137-138]untitled [pp.138-139]

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