CHAPTER V MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND DIPLOMATIC … · Washburn, made a proffer of mediation to...

CHAPTER V

MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND DIPLOMATICADJUSTMENTS

The mediatory policy of the United States in a controversy between Argentina andFrance—Inn dispute between President Urquiza and Buenos Aires—In the ParaguayanWar—In the war between Spain and Republics the Pacific—In "the War of the Pa-thfc —Inn Central American war—The policy of the United States ton, ard 11 ispanic-American boundary controversies—Toward Argentina's boundary controversies—Toward boundary controversies of Central American nations—The Cerruti Affair—Disputes between the United States and Hispanic-American states bemuse of injuriesto United States citizens or property—Diplomatic adjustments and arbitral processes—President Wilson's peace proposa!—Diaputes concerning sovereign rights of Hispanic-American nations—The Mexican boundary—The Lobos Islands—The Falkland Island.—The Panama Affair.

In the relations between the hispanic-American states andtheir neighbor in the North, there have arisen in the course of acentury many questions of a controversial character. Thosequestions sprang from a variety of circumstances, accidental,economic, fiscal, political. To narrate in detail the history of allof those controversies is manifestly beyond the scope of thepresent volume. Certain inter-American relationships whichoccasionally partook of the controversial character were dis-cussed in the preceding chapter. The purpose of this chapteris to consider some other disputes between the United Statesand the Hispanic-American nations which were generally set-tled by diplomatic means. Considerable attention will bedevoted to controversies involving the Hispanic-American na-tions in which the United States Government essayed the roleof arbitrator or mediator.

An early attempt by an official of the United States to medi-ate in an international dispute about a Hispanic-Americancountry was concerned with a controversy between Argentinaand France. That controversy originated in the objections of

143

144 mSPANIC—AMERICAN RELATIONS

the French consul in Buenos Aires to a law of Argentina whichrequired military service from Frenchmen who were domiciled inthat country. By way of reprisal in March, 1838, AdmiralLeblanc of the French navy declared a blockade of the Argen-tine litoral of the Rio de Ia Plata. It has been presumed thatthis drastic procedure was partly due to the French dislike forJuan Manuel de Rosas, dictator of the "Argentine Confedera-tion." However that may be, in the following year a com-mander of the United States naval forces on the coast of SouthAmerica tried to reconcile Argentina and France. On April 4,1839, Captain John Nicholson, who had arrived with the UnitedStates frigate Fairfield in la Plata River, addressed a note toDictator Rosas making certain suggestions which he thoughtmight serve as a basis for the settlement of the differences be-tween Argentina and France. Among those suggestions wasa stipulation that Argentina should pay an indemnity toFrench citizens who had suffered injuries by her policy.Nicholson offered the decks of the Fairfield as neutral territorywhere representatives of the contending parties might treat.'

Eight days later Rosas sent Nicholson a letter declaring thathe would negotiate with accredited agents of France and en-closing his proposals for the adjustment of the differences.Among those propositions was a stipulation that Frenchcitizens in Argentina should enjoy the same protection andshould he subject to the same obligations as previously. Rosasalso proposed an agreement that French citizens who had beeninjured by unjust acts of Argentina should be indemnified, andthat France should indemnify Argentina for damages caused bythe blockade of the Rio de la Plata. 2 Through Nicholson thosepropositions were soon transmitted to Admiral Leblanc and M.Martigny, the French chargé in Montevideo. But, as Nichol-son had foreseen, the proposals of Rosas were inaeeeptable tothe French.' After those proposals had been declined, in May,

'Correeponde.ncia sosienida eSre ci ezc,no. gobierno de Bl4snos..Afrcs encaTgado cit lasref adoner exenare, de to confederation argen&na. y ci at. Juan B Nzcotson, capzldn ems

etandante c las fuerras nerds, cit Los Estados Un,dos sabre La costa del Braztl p Rio etc toPlate, sabre La citatiOn prom ovida par Los s, agentes etc to Franda, pp. 2-5.

2 Carrespondencia sosteni4a enire ci exemo • pp. 18-21.'Ibid.. pp. 27-50.

MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, DIPLOMACY 145

1839, Felipe Arana, the secretary of foreign relations for Dicta-tor Rosas, was directed by his master to express appreciationand gratitude at Nicholson's attempt to adjust the differences.'Possibly that attempt was not unconnected with the fact thaton October 29, 1840, a convention was signed between Argentinaand France which made stipulations concerning the settlementof their grievous controversy.

Another occasion for the adjustment of a dispute over Ar-gentine affairs arose during the internecine war between Presi-dent Urquiza of Argentina and the province of Buenos Aires,which declined to recognize his authority. On July 1, 1859,Benjamin C. Yancey, the United States chargé at Parana-Urquiza's capital—addressed a note to Urquiza proposing themediation of the United States in that war. This proposal waspromptly accepted by Urquiza. 5 Yancey then proceeded fromParaná to the city of Buenos Aires where lie initiated peacenegotiations with the provincial government. At an interviewupon August 10, 1859, the provincial officials absolutely refusedto take any measure preliminary to a cessation of hostilitiesuntil President Urquiza relinquished his civil and militarypower. If that retirement took place, those officials declaredthat Buenos Aires would participate in a national conventionto revise the Constitution of 1853. The demand for the retire-ment of the president of the Argentine Confederation—set forthas a sine qua non to the cessation of hostilities—was inaccept-able to Urquiza, and the attempt at mediation by MinisterYancey terminated abruptly.

The United States also proffered her good offices in a foreignwar which involved Argentina. That conflict originated in1864 in a difference between Brazil and Paraguay. Argentinaentered the conflict by virtue of an offensive and defensive al-liance which was signed on May 1, 1865, between Brazil,Uruguay, and herself against Paraguay. According to thattreaty, the three allies, declaring that their quarrel was not with

4 I&id,p SO.'Confederaeidn arfeniina, docitmento., oficiales mediatiOn del e,icargado de negocios de

los Estados Unidosde AmErica, d Benjamin Yancey, en lacuecl 1611 dclainteqridad nationaly pod... del prcndcnta de to confederatiOn arjeniiva, p.10

Aid, pp . 4-15,32.33.11

146 HISPANIC—AMERICAN RELATIONS

the people of Paraguay, agreed to make war upon their jointenemy until the Paraguayan government under Dictator Lopezshould be overthrown. After the allies had waged war againstParaguay for more than a year, on December 17, 1866, theHouse of Representatives of the United States adopted aresolution deprecating the Paraguayan War, as well as the warwhich was being carried on by Spain upon the Pacific shores ofSouth America, declaring that those wars were "destructive ofcommerce and prejudicial to republican institutions," and pro-posing that the United States should offer her "friendly of-fices" to promote "peace and harmony" in South America.

Three days later Secretary Seward addressed a dispatch toJ. W. %\r}fl, United States minister at Rio de Janeiro, proposingthat a conference of plenipotentiaries of the nations engaged inthe Paraguayan War should be held at Washington. Sewardproposed that President Johnson was to select a presiding of-ficer who should use his influence to compose the controversy.If the plenipotentiaries should be unable to reach a decision,that President was to select an umpire to adjust the dispute.Further, he proposed that, when the belligerent nations ac-cepted the proffer of good offices, an armistice should be de-clared until the peace conference terminated.' On January 21,1867, Minister Webb brought this proffer to the attention ofAntonio C. de Sà e Albuquerque, Imperial minister of foreignaffairs.'° General Asboth, minister of the United States atBuenos Aires, made the attitude of his government known toArgentina." The United States minister to Paraguay, C. A.Washburn, made a proffer of mediation to Marquez de Caxias,the commander of the allied armies in the field. 12 When newsof the policy of the United States reached the heart of SouthAmerica, it caused rejoicing in Paraguay. El semanatlo, theofficial organ of the Paraguayan Government, announced thatthe friendly mediation of the United States had been accepted

Registro oficial de In re$blica argentina, vol. v, pp. 209, 210.Congreedonai Globe, vol. xxxvii, pt. 1, p. 152.

° Relatorio do v,inietro dos estrangeiro,, 1867, pp 13-15."Ibid.,, pp. 11-15."Washburn, history of Fataguay, vol. ii, pp. 83-85.U Ibid. pp. 184, 197.


by the supreme government of the republic, alleging that thiswas the only solution of the conflict which would allow the alliesto emerge with honor and dignity." But when the offer of theUnited States was laid before the allied governments, it evi-dently evoked the response that no peace negotiations would beinitiated with Paraguay while Dictator Lopez was her ruler.The attempt of the United States Government to mediate ac-cordingly failed: the destructive war continued until thatdictator's power was completely annihilated.

Perhaps the most important act of mediation performed forthe Hispanic-American republics by the United States was in awar between Spain, on the one hand, and Peru, Chile, Bolivia,and Ecuador, on the other hand. As late as 1860 Spain had notrecognized the Peruvian Government. Certain Spaniards stillhad claims against Peru because of alleged injuries during thewars for independence. In 1863 the occasion for an acute con-tioversy was furnished by a quarrel between Peruvians andSpaniards on the hacienda of Talambo. Shortly afterwards asquadron under Admiral Pinzon, which had been dispatchedfrom Spain ostensibly on a scientific expedition, appeared in theharbor of Callao, and her agent, Salazar y Mazarredo, who wasentitled special commissioner, attempted to negotiate withPeru. When the Peruvian Government asked for an expla-nation of his title, Salazar y Mazarredo rejoined thesquadron, and Admiral Pinzon seized the Chincha Islands.For a time Peru refused to treat with Spain's representatives;but in January, 1865, a preliminary treaty of peace and friend-ship was signed by which Spain agreed to return the ChinchaIslands, while Peru promised to pay the Spanish claims and alsothe expenses of the expedition." This treaty, however, wasdiscredited by a new Peruvian government which broke withSpain and soon allied itself with Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuadoragainst the Spaniards."

"El scmonario, April 20. 1867.Re! aloño do min,sl,o do, nlrarigttros, 1867, pp 15-7; Washburn, vol n, pp 121.197.

"Ol,vart, Tratado, de Espafla, vol v, pp 167-69.16 Arauda, Itepuibl;ca del Peni' coleccidn de los Ira/ado,, covrenc,ones, capstulanones,

a,n,ist,csos p olro, act os dtplo,ndticos p politicos celcbrados dude to ,ndepn,deneta haifa cidIa, vol vi, p 712.


During the war which ensued the Spanish navy bombardedValparaiso, attacked Callao, and blockaded certain ports ofBolivia and Ecuador. In December, 1866, Secretary Sewardsent instructions to the diplomatic agents of the United Statesat the capitals of the belligerent nations directing them topropose a conference of representatives of those nations inApril, 1867, to agree upon a permanent peace. This proposaldid not hear fruit, however, because the governments of Chileand Peru desired to evoke from Spain expressions deprecatingthe seizure of the Chincha Islands and the bombardment ofValparaiso. Seward again tried to convoke a conference inMarch, 1868, declaring that the "technical continuance" of astate of war occasioned neutral powers "inconvenience" whichought to be terminated by a "formal armistice." Again Spainwas willing to accept the mediation of the United States, but allof the republics concerned did not meet Seward's proposalssatisfactorily. On October e2, 1869, Secretary Hamilton Fishsent instructions to ministers of the United States at the capi-tals of the five powers inviting them to send representatives toWashington "for the purpose of a conference with a view to aformal armistice if not a definite peace.""

Accordingly in Washington, on April 11, 1871, representativesof Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Spain agreed to an armis-tice which declared that "the suspension of hostilities existingde facto" between Spain and those republics was "convertedinto a general armistice or truce," which should "continueindefinitely" and could not be broken by any signatory powerexcept by notification through the government of the UnitedStates of the intention to renew hostilities." At another con-ference in Washington early in the following year, SecretaryFish tried to induce the five powers to sign a general peacetreaty." When this attempt failed, Fish suggested the "ex-pediency of framing separate treaties with Spain." By 1886such treaties were negotiated by each of the republics con-

" Moore, Ira entat tonal Arburateons, vol. v, p . 5050. 31emoria que presenta ci rainistra deest ado en ci departarnento decciactones erteriores culto a! congresonactonal. 1870, pp 10,11.

il Moore, Internal tonal A rbtt rat tons, vol. v, pp. 5050-52; Oliva, t. Tratadas tIc Espana,Vol VI, pp 289, 290.

''Moore, International ArtnI rat tons, Vol. v, 5052-so


cerned. 20 As a result of the mediatory policy pursued by theUnited States, Spain and four South American republics wereformally reconciled: a state of war which was detrimental notonly to the nominal belligerents but also to neutrals was at lastterminated.

The government of the United States also made an attemptto mediate in South America during the "War of the Pacific."This war had its origin in a dispute between Bolivia and Chile.According to the vti possidetis of 1810 there was embracedwithin the limits of Bolivia, the heir of the presidency ofCharcas, a strip of land upon the Pacific coast which includedthe desert of Atacama. When the wars for independence hadterminated, within that desert and even within the Peruvianterritory further north, enterprising Chileans undertook toexploit the saltpeter deposits. In 1874 Bolivia and Chile at-tempted to adjust a territorial dispute by a treaty which statedthat the parallel of 24°, which ran south of Antofagasta, wasrecognized as the boundary line between the two nations.Soon afterwards Bolivia ignored a concession which had beenmade by her former dictator to a Chilean saltpeter company ofAntofagasta and levied a tax upon its products. This actionwas inconsistent with a provision in the treaty of 1874 After avain attempt to settle the ensuing controversy by diplomacy, onFebruary 14, 1870, the date set by Bolivia for the sale of thesaltpeter company's property to pay, the imposts, the Chileanstook possession of the important Bolivian port of Antofagasta;and, on March 1, Bolivia declared that, because of this armedinvasion, a state of war existed between her and Chile. Earlyin April, after she became officially aware of a defensive treatybetween Peru and Bolivia,—Peru having declined to proclaimher neutrality imrnediately,—Chile declared war upon Boliviaand Peru. Victorious in naval conflicts with Peru's fleet, theChileans then invaded the Peruvian provinces of Tarapacá,Tacna, and Arica. On January 16, 1881, they captured Lima.

Meantime the United States Government had not been idle.20 OlivarL vol vu, pp 435-33; ,bid, vol. viii, pp. 339. 310; ibid., vol ix, pp. 25, 26.

See also Moore, Digest of Inien,atzonai Law, vol. vim. pp. ID. 11.


Partly because of rumors that certain European powers con-templated joint intervention in the war, the ministers of theUnited States to Chile and Peru had proposed that a peace con-fcrcncc should be held. Such a conference was held at Aricain October, 1880, on board the United States corvette Lacka-

wanna. It was attended by representatives of the three re-publics, and also by the ministers of the United States to thosepowers. Thomas A. Osborn, United States minister to Chile,declared that his government wished to terminate the war by anhonorable and lasting peace. But as the allies considered Chile'spreliminary demand for the cession of the Bolivian departmentof Atacama and the Peruvian province of Tarapacá as an in-surmountable obstacle, this attempt at mediation came tonaught.21 Soon afterwards, Secretary of State Evarts informedMinister Osborn that the United States wished to promote apeace between the belligerents "upon reasonable and honorableterms. " 22

A second attempt to mediate was made by the UnitedStates after James G. Blaine became secretary of state. OnJune 15, 1881, in instructions to Kilpatrick and Hurlbut, thenew ministers to Chile and Peru respectively, Secretary Blainestated his views about the peace negotiations. General Hurl-but was instructed to encourage the Peruvians in the estab-lishment of a native and orderly government. He was in-formed that the United States could not refuse to recognizethe rights which Chile had acquired by the success of thewar: a cession of territory was possibly the necessary priceto be paid for peace. There should, however, be "no pre-liminary conditions as an ultimatum oil side." Chileshould not insist upon the cession of territory as a necessarypreliminary. 23 Minister Kilpatrick was instructed to informthe Chilean Government that the United States was ready tofurnish her good offices to the warring nations. He was toldthat the United States recognized the right conferred upon Chile

21 3Iessagefron the President of the United States trans,nstling Papers relating to the Warto South Amenra, pp 195, 992.

Foreign Relation, of the United States, 1581, p. 124.Had.. pp. 911, 015


by her successful conduct of the war. But Blaine suggestedthat, only after Bolivia and Peru had failed to offer a reasonableindemnity, would it become a fair subject of considerationwhether territory might be exacted as the price of peace. Acession of territory should take place as the result of negotia-tions: it should not be the "absolute preliminary condition" ofthe victor. The minister to Chile was to express the hope ofthe United States that a settlement might be reached withoutinvoking the aid or intervention of any European power.24

At Lima Minister Hurlbut took a decided attitude against theforcible annexation of territory by Chile. His emphatic, and attimes, indiscreet statements, concerning the policy of his gov-ernment encouraged some Peruvians in the belief that theUnited States might intervene forcibly. The Chilean admiralLynch sent a cablegram to his government to the effect thatHurlbut had informed the provisional president of Peru,Francisco Garcia Calderon, that, under no circumstances,would the United States permit the annexation of territory byChile." iluribut's policy was not supported by Minister Kilpatrick, who publicly criticized his colleague's conduct and thusrendered their cooperation impossible.26

When the United States Government learned that PresidentCalderón, who was opposed to territorial cessions, had beenseized by the Chilean authorities at Lima, it entrusted the peacenegotiations to W. H. Trescott as special commissioner.Trescott was instructed to express to Chile the disappointmentand dissatisfaction of the United States at the insistence of theChilean Government upon territorial cessions. The UnitedStates held that Peru had the right to demand an opportunity tofind an indemnity and guarantee. A cession of territory shouldnot be exacted which would much exceed in value "the amplestestimate of a reasonable indemnity." The cession of Tarapacwas not inconsistent with justice. If the good offices of theUnited States were rejected, that government would hold itself

Ibid., pp. 131-35.2b Garland, Derecho inlernacional amencano; los conflictos sudomericanos en ,elac,ón

co. los Estados Undos, P. Is."ibid.. pp. 15. 16; Foreign Relations of the United States. 1881. pp. 137-41.

152 HISPAMc—AMERICAN RELATIONS

free to appeal to the other American republics "to join it in aneffort to avert consequences" winch could not be confined toChile and Peru."

When Trescott arrived in Santiago he was told by the secre-tary of foreign relations for Chile that she disclaimed any in-tention of offending the United States in the Calderón affair andthat she accepted the good offices of that government. Thissecretary declared that Chile was ready to make peace uponcertain conditions involving the cession of Tarapacá, conditionswhich Trcscott apparently considered harsh." At this juncturethe publication at Washington of Trescott's instructions asmodified by Blaine's successor, Frelingliuysen, discredited thatagent, who although stripped of mediatory authority, had beendirected to urge moderation upon Chile." Trescott soon ex-pressed to Frelinghuyscn his opinion that the United Statesshould adopt a definite policy about the peace negotiations, ifPeru were not to be led astray. 30 The efforts of Logan andPartridge, who had been made ministers of the United Statesrespectively at Lima and Santiago, to mediate in accordancewith instructions permitting the transfer of territory were alsofutile.

The good offices of the United States exerted through herministers and by the special commissioner accomplished little.Chile finally negotiated treaties of peace with Bolivia and Peruby which she secured control of valuable territory that she con-sidered essential to her future security. Bolivia allowed Chileto exercise sovereignty over the conquered territory lying be-tween the Andes and the ocean. Peru ceded to Chile the prov-ince of Tarapacá, while she allowed the conqueror to retainpossession of the provinces of Tacna and Arica upon the under-standing that, within ten years, their inhabitants should de-termine by plebiscite whether they wished to live under the ruleof Chile or of Peru. Some Peruvian writers have indeed sug-gested that the attempted mediation of the United States,

27 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1831 • pp. 143-49.29 Ibid., 1882, p . 0129 And pp 61, 73, Garland. Deree/zo international atneneano. pp 10. 20.20 Foreign Relations of the United States. 1882. p. 105.


which helped to prolong Peru's resistance to Chile's terms,eventually injured Peruvian interests. Alejandro Garland, thePeruvian publicist, made this comment:

Peru remembers whit sadness the fatal consequences for her of theinterference of the great North American Republic in her ill-omenedwar with Chile; but her misfortune does not so far disturb her judg-meat as to make her unwilling to recognize the noble intentions whichinduced the United States to offer her mediation."

The United States was more successful in her policy towardCentral America. During a war by Guatemala againstHonduras and Salvador in the midsummer of 1906, PresidentRoosevelt secured the cooperation of President Diaz in an at-tempt to secure peace, ordered the cruiser Marblehead toAcajutla, and offered joint mediation by the United States andMexico. In a cablegram to the presidents of Guatemala andSalvador, Roosevelt said that the war in Central America caused"the gravest concern to the United States." He urged thewarring nations to make a settlement and offered the deck of thewarship Marblehead as "a neutral place" where representativesof Guatemala and Salvador might confer about "terms ofagreement."

This offer was accepted, the ministers of the United Statesand Mexico to the belligerent nations were invited to attend themeeting in a friendly capacity, and on July 20, in the presenceof representatives of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, a peace treatywas signed between the warring states. Article V of the treatyprovided that any disagreement arising from it was to be re-ferred to the presidents of 1\Iexico and the United States foral-bitration. 33 In accordance with that convention, representa-tives of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Salvador soonmet at San José and arranged a general treaty of peace, amity,arbitration, and commerce.34

Upon several occasions the United States Government hasperformed important services to Hispanic-American nations by

1 Garland, Dneeho tnternao,onol omeneono, p. 32.Foreign Relation, of the United States, 1906. pt i, p- 837.

p. 848. ' Ibid.. pp 857-63.


acting as an arbitrator or mediator in their boundary disputes.Those disputes ordinarily originated because of the vague orunsettled character of the colonial boundaries which were sup-posed to determine the vU posidetis of 1810.

Certain questions which had arisen between Argentina andParaguay concerning their boundary were adjusted by a. treatydated February 8, 1876. This treaty provided that the disputebetween the two nations about territory located on the rightbank of the river Paraguay between the Verde River and thePileoinayo River, including Villa Occidental, should be sub-initted to the arbitration of the President of the United States.Within the period stipulated by the treaty diplomatic represent-atives of the contracting parties at Washington presented toPresident Hayes memoranda, books, periodicals, documents,and maps in support of their respective contentions." OnNovember fl, 1878, after considering the arguments and theevidence submitted, the President announced the award. Hisdecision was that Paraguay was "legally and justly" entitled tothe territory between the Pileomayo and the Verde Rivers.'°Thereupon the Paraguayans changed the name of Villa Oc-cidental to Villa Hayes.

When James G. Blaine became secretary of state tinder Presi-dent Garfield there were boundary controversiesbetweenHispanic-American nations which threatened to reach a seriousstage. A long standing dispute existed between Guatemalaand Mexico involving the title to territory that had been ii)-corporated with Mexico in the days of Agustin I. The govern-ment of Guatemala, claiming that it had exhausted peacefulmeans of settlement, on June 15, 1881, through its minister atWashington, appealed to the United States, "as the naturalprotector of the integrity of the Central American territory.""

On the following day Secretary Blaine indited a characteristicnote to Minister Morgan in the city of Mexico. He declaredthat the United States was an impartial friend of both parties,ready to tender advice upon anything which might menacethe peace and prosperity of her neighbors. n Blaine sent an-

Foretgn Relations of the United States. 1878, pp. 10-18,709,71016 Ibid., p. 711. "Ibid.. 1881. p. 698. "Ibid., pp. 766-.


other note to that minister on June 21 deprecating the prospectof a war between Guatemala and Mexico and suggesting thatthe United States had the right to use her good offices to pre-serve tranquillity among the Hispanic-American nations."

As Mexico seemed disinclined to accept the good offices of theUnited States, on November 28, 1881, Blaine instructed Morganto urge the Mexican Government to reconsider that offer.Blaine distinctly stated that his government would consider "ahostile demonstration" by Mexico against Guatemala as "notin harmony with the friendly relations" existing between Mexicoand the United States and injurious to the best interests of allthe American republics, He declared that the United Stateswould follow her policy of peace even though she failed to securethe cooperation of Mexico.40 After Blaine's resignation theUnited States Government did not push so vigorously its offerto arbitrate this dispute. Eventually, in August, 1882, theGuatemalan and Mexican ministers at Washington signed aconvention containing stipulations which were to serve as abasis for the final settlement of the boundary. An article ofthis convention provided that, in case of a disagreement be-tween the contracting parties concerning the delimitation ofthe boundary, the President of the United States should act asarbitrator." In September, 1882, a definitive boundary treatywas signed. 2 Differences which subsequently arose betweenGuatemala and Mexico about territory on the river Lacantunwere settled by an agreement dated April 1, 1895, which pro-vided that an arbiter should be mutually selected to fix theindemnity due to parties for the occupation or destruction ofproperty by Guatemalans.' The contracting parties selectedthe minister of the United States to Mexico as arbiter."

During Blaine's first secretaryship there was also a disputebetween Argentina and Chile concerning their Patagonianboundary. Before the inauguration of President Garfield theministers of the United States to Buenos Aires and Santiago hadin vain attempted to promote a peaceful settlement of the con-

"Ibid. pp. 768-70. "Ibid., pp 814-17."Ibid.. 188, pp. 532, 437, 438. 42 Ibid • p 439."Ibid., 1895, pt. xi, pp. 989, 990. "Ibid., pp. 991-94.


troversy. Blaine instructed those ministers that they shouldlose no opportunity to demonstrate the desire of the UnitedStates to see the dispute amicably adjusted. On June 13,1881, Blaine declared that although the United States did notseek the position of arbitrator yet she would not decline thatpost.° As Chile and Argentina had broken off diplomatic rela-tions, negotiations looking toward peace between those tworepublics were carried on by telegraph between the UnitedStates ministers at Santiago and Buenos Aires, who conferredconfidentially with the governments to which they were accred-ited about the conflicting territorial claims. By June 1, 1881, abasis of settlement was virtually agreed upon, which providedthat the boundary line should run from north to south betweenthe highest peaks of the cordilleras that divided the streamsflowing east from those flowing west.46

A treaty embodying this agreement, and with special provi-sions about the boundary in the extreme south, was soon signedby the Argentine secretary of foreign relations and the Chileanconsul in Buenos Aires. Consequently Argentina and Chilegratefully acknowledged the good offices of the United Statesgovernment." The Argentine minister at Washington saidthat this amicable and satisfactory settlement of the boundarydispute between two neighbors was due "to the unremittingefforts of the representatives of the United States in bothcountries." Some years afterwards Argentina and Chiledecided to submit to arbitration their dispute concerning theboundary line in the bleak plateau or puna of Atacama. To actas umpire upon the mixed commission which should delimit thatboundary the two countries selected W. I. Buchanan, ministerof the United States to Argentina. In a message to congress onMay 1, 1899, referring to the peaceful settlement of the Atacamaboundary controversy President Roca of Argentina said:

The participation taken in the solution of the difficulties of which Ispeak by Mr. Buchanan, the American minister, has been a motive forparticular gratification. To that solution he chiefly contributed, and

0 Foecign Relations of the United Stoic.,, 1881, pp. 6,130,121'JbtL, p. 8. ° Ibid. pp 11, 168. ' Ibid. p. 15.


thus rendered both the Republics an eminent service. This is not thefirst occasion upon which it has fallen to the lot of a minister of thegreat Confederation of the North to decisively intervene in our bound-ary disputes in the interest of international peace. Nor will this everbe forgotten by the people whose destinies have been at stake on oneor the other side of the mountains."

In 1882 there was a serious dispute between Argentina andBrazil regarding the müiones territory. This dispute aroseout of the fact that in a region where the Jesuit fathers hadplanted missions the boundary line between the colonialdominions of Spain and Portugal—sketched by the treaties of1750 and 1777—had never been definitively surveyed.° BothArgentina and Brazil maintained that between the JguassRiver and the Uruguay River the boundary line should followthe rivers Pepiri-guazá and San Antonio. But the govern-ments of Argentina and Brazil could not agree about thelimitary rivers indicated in the colonial treaties: Argentinamaintained that two streams lying several leagues eastward ofwhat Brazil claimed were the Pepiri-guazü and San AntonioRivers really constituted the limitary rivers; while Brazilargued that the streams which were designated by Argentina aslimitary rivers were actually the Chapecó and the Chopim.MOn October 7, 1889, those two governments signed a treatyproviding that, if they failed to settle their boundary disputeamicably within a limited period, the question should be sub-mitted to the arbitration of the President of the United States.This treaty stipulated that the boundary should be determinedby the rivers designated either by Brazil or by Argentina, as thearbitrator might deem just, in the light of "the reasons and thedocuments" which the parties might present. 52 PresidentPellegrini of Argentina addressed a letter to the President of theUnited States on April 1%, 1892, asking him to act as arbi-trator." Three days later Acting President Peixoto of Braziladdressed a similar request to the President.

"Ibid. 1899, p 7 '° See pp 12-13, supra.It Foreign Relations of the United States, 1882. pp 26-28, ibid., 1887, pp 48-53.

Ibid. 1892, p . 2. Ibid it 1Ibid. p 18. Moore, luinnational Arbitrations, vol n, p 1969, reproduces it imp

showing the dts1,uted territory


The functions of arbitrator accordingly devolved uponPresident Cleveland. To him E. S. Zebaflos, on behalf ofArgentina, and Baron Rio Branco, on behalf of Brazil, submitteddocuments, maps, and arguments to support the contentions oftheir respective governments. After careful consideration, onFebruary 5, 1895, President Cleveland announced the award.His decision was that the boundary line between the two re-publics should follow the westerly of the two river systems, inother words the rivers which Brazil had designated as deter-mining the boundary. The award was based upon the con-viction that the rivers which Brazil claimed to constitute theboundary line were identical with the rivers that were locatedupon the colonial boundary in the latter part of the eighteenthcentury by commissioners of Spain and Portugal." In ac-cordance with the treaty of arbitration President Cleveland'saward was accepted by both nations as constituting the finaldecision of a long standing controversy.

At other times the United States was invited to aid in thesettlement of boundary disputes between nations of CentralAmerica. In 1886 Costa Rica signed a treaty with Nicaraguasubmitting their dispute over the boundary line to the arbitra-tion of the President of the United States." About ten yearslater, in accordance with a treaty of limits, the United StatesGovernment was asked to appoint an engineer umpire to settlecontroverted points concerning the boundary between CostaRica and Nicaragua." And, as the republic of Panama in-herited a boundary dispute with Costa Rica which had not beencompletely settled by the arbitration of the president of theFrench Republic, in 1910 those two parties signed a conventionby which they agreed to submit the interpretation of thataward to the arbitral decision of the chief justice of the UnitedStates.

The arbitral services of the United States were also invoked tosettle an acrimonious dispute between Colombia and Italywhich was known as the Cerruti affair. That dispute was due' Foreign Relal zoos of the Untied Stein, 1893, Pt. I, 3) 1-3.

Ibid., 1887. p 89. 11 76i. 18)7. pp. 330, 331.bl Arnenean Journal of International Low, Supplement, vol. vi , pp. 1-4.


to the confiscation in 1885 by the Colombian state of Cauca ofthe personal property of Cerruti, an Italian citizen, and also ofthe property which he held by virtue of his membership in theColombian firm of E. Cerruti and Company, upon the chargethat he had taken part in a civil war. The government of Italydemanded that Colombia should pay an indemnity for the lossesand damages suffered by its subject. After some correspond-ence, in May, 1886, Italy and Colombia signed a convention bywhich they agreed to submit the demand for indemnity to themediation of the king of Spain to whom the respective govern-ments were to present documents and evidence concerning thecase." But the mixed commission which was organized in ac-cordance with that convention was unable to reach a decisionwithin the time agreed upon.°° Finally, after many confer-ences, on August 18, 1894, at Castellarnare, the Italian ministerfor foreign affairs and Colombia's minister to Italy, signed aprotocol agreeing to submit the Cerruti claims to arbitration inorder to terminate "the subjects of disagreement" between theirgovernments. According to the protocol the President of theUnited States was to be asked to serve as arbitrator iii the dis-pute and both parties agreed that he should have I till power toperform all acts which might be necessary to promote a settle-nient. That protocol specifically stated that the arbitratorshould decide which of the Cerruti claims were subjects for"international adjudication"; and, if any were such, the amountof said claims. This arbitrator was also to decide which of theCcrruti claims were proper subjects for adjudication by Colom-bian courts. The claims, with documents and evidence, wereto be duly submitted to the arbitrator. Both governmentsbound themselves to abide by his decision which should be final"and not subject either to discussion or appeal.""

Upon being requested to act as arbitrator by the two govern-ments concerned, President Cleveland agreed to serve.0 OnMarch 2, 1897, the President made his award. He decided:(1) that the Cerruti claims against Colombia were "proper

"Uribe, A,,ole, diptondtieos y cotta/ares de Colombia, vol i , pp. 494, 495Is Ibid., vol xv, pp 520-45, 60711 Foreign Relations of/he United States, 1895, vol ir, p 059 ° find, p. 960

160 JIISPANIC—AMERICAN RELATIONS

claims for international adjudication"; () that the claim sub-mitted to him by Signor Cerruti for personal damages should bedisallowed; (3) that Cerruti's request for expenses incurred inthe prosecution of the claim should be disallowed; (4) that be-cause of damages to his individual property and to his interestin the finn of E. Cerruti and Company Signor Cerruti should bepaid by Colombia the sum of sixty thousand pounds; and (5)that the Colombian Government was entitled to all of Cerruti'sproperty rights which had been in question.° On the followingday Selior Renflo, the Colombian minister at Washington,lodged a protest against the fifth paragraph of the award assert-ing that it dealt with matters which were not submitted to thearbitration of the President, it protest which was endorsed byhis government.'4 Subsequently the Italian minister atWashington asked the President to interpret the fourth para-graph of the award. To those representations John Sherman,secretary of state for President McKinley, replied that thePresident would not reinvest himself with the function ofarbitrator, especially after a change in the presidential office;and that he could only be asked to assume arbitral powers bythe joint action of both parties to the arbitration: in other wordsPresident McKinley held that he could "not revive the personalcharacter of arbitrator which his predecessor discharged by therendition of his award.""

It has been shown that in some important international dis-putes, as the war between Spain and her former colonies uponthe Pacific coast of South America, the United States essayed toplay the part of a mediator. Successful in her rOle upon thatoccasion and in her policy of joint mediation in Central America,she failed in her attempts to mediate in controversies and warsin which the national government of Argentina was involved.She signally failed in her policy of intervention in the war be-tween the Spanish republics upon the Pacific. But through herministers and her Presidents she played it dignified role as

#onqQ,L Relations of the United States, 1898, pp. 245, 216" ibid. p. 247 For the view of the Colombian government, see especially Urhe,

vol iv, pp. 749-53"Foreign Relations of the United States. 189S, pp. 271, V2.


arbitrator in several rancorous boundary disputes betweenHispanic-American states. In Article XXI of the treaty whichclosed the Mexican War the United States had indeed placedherself upon record as in favor of the settlement by diplomacyor arbitration of any disputes which might arise with I\Iexico.66Yet the credit for success in the use of arbitral procedure inAmerica does not by any means belong to the United Statesalone. To a large extent that success was made possible by theincreasingly favorable attitude which the Hispanic-Americanrepublics displayed toward arbitration as a mode of settlingtheir controversies:—as early as 18 12 Great Colombia hadsigned treaties with Chile and Peru which embodied thearbitral principle.dT

We shall now turn to disputes of a somewhat different char-acter—disputes to which the United States was herself a party.The number and complexity of these disputes renders it impos-sible to treat them all chronologically in this study. Contro-versies of some importance between the United States andHispanic-American states have arisen either from injuries tothe persons or the property of American citizens, or fromissues concerning the sovereign rights of Hispanic-Americannations.

Numerous disputes have arisen between the United Statesand Hispanic-American countries because of injuries to citizensof the United States in those countries. Brief mention of themost important controversies will indicate their diverse char-acter. in 1845 a controversy arose between the United Statesand Brazil out of a brawl which took place among United Statessailors in a park at Rio de Janeiro. This brawl resulted in thearrest by Brazilian police of Lieutenant Davis of the UnitedStates corvette Saratoga. A most serious dispute arose betweenthe United States and Chile in 1891 because of an affray betweensome Chileans or the lower class and certain sailors of theUnited States vessel Baltimore who were on shore at Val-paraiso. In that brawl one officer of this vessel was killed and

"Malloy. Trealku. vol.1, p. 1117° Cadena. Anemic, thplomdiicos y consulates de Colombia, pp. 304, 316.

12


several seamen were seriously wounded. As that attack hadapparently been provoked by the appearance of the UnitedStates uniform, it was considered by that country as an insultto her flag. With New Granada. the United States had a similardispute which originated in 1856 on the Isthmus of Panamafrom a squabble over a watermelon between a citizen of theUnited States called Jack Oliver and a negro vendor of fruit.The struggle between Oliver's compatriots and the Panamaiansbecame a fierce riot in which stones, clubs, and firearms wereused. This riot was followed by robberies and murders, whichthe local authorities could not control. Consequently theUnited States Government supported the claims of its citizensfor indemnities because of deaths, injuries, and losses suffered inthe riot. Against the Ecuadorian Government the UnitedStates prosecuted a claim because of the arrest of her citizenJulio R. Santos upon the charge of complicity in a revolution.Between the United States and Paraguay a very complicatedand troubfrsomc controversy arose mainly out of the colo-nizing and mercantile activities of E. A. Hopkins, a ven-turesome citizen of the United States who was ejected fromParaguay.

Many disputes have arisen between the United States andHispanic-American countries primarily because of damages tothe property of United States citizens. During a war betweenBrazil and the government at Buenos Aires which sprang fromtheir conflicting claims to Uruguay, Brazil declared that themouth of Ia Plata River was blockaded, and, in spite of theprotests of the United States, the Brazilian squadron madearbitrary seizures of vessels belonging to citizens of the UnitedStates. The most important controversy between the UnitedStates and Chile concerning property was the A]sop claim. In1875 Alsop and Company of Valparaiso, which was composed ofUnited States citizens, enfered into a contract with Bolivia forthe settlement of a debt that had been assigned to them by aBrazilian citizen. Bolivia provided for the liquidation of thatdebt by granting to this firm certain of her customs duties


collected in the Peruvian port of Arica; and by conceding to itthe right to exploit her silver mines near the Pacific coast. Asa result of the War of the Pacific, however, the hopes whichAisop and Company entertained of realizing their claim by vir-tue of Bolivia's grants disappeared. Subsequently the UnitedStates government took the view that, by virtue of the Bolivian-Chilean treaty of October 20, 1904, Chile had agreed to shoulderBolivia's obligations. From time to time various miscellane-ous claims have been urged by the United States, on behalf ofher citizens, against the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guate-mala, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Salvador; sometimes those claimshave been partly offset by claims urged by Hispanic-Americangovernments on behalf of their citizens. The United Statescarried on negotiations with Peru regarding the Georgian a andthe Lizzie Thompson, vessels belonging to her citizens that hadbeen seized and confiscated by the legitimate government ofPeru because they were engaged in the guano trade under acontract with a revolutionary government. On several oc-casions the United States has urged upon Venezuela the pay-ment of claims for damages caused to the properties of hercitizens which were frequently due to dissensions and revolu-tions. The largest claims presented by the United Statesagainst Venezuela were those made during the allied blockadeof that country.

Sooner or later those controversies were settled amicably.Sometimes financial disputes have been settled under a mutualclaims treaty between the United States and a certain countryof Hispanic Anerica. 68 The difference with Brazil arising outof a sailors' brawl came to an end after the United States ex-pressed her regret concerning certain actions of her minister toRio de Janeiro.60 In the dispute with Brazil concerning theseizure of United States vessels by her squadron that nationagreed by a legislative act to pay a sum of money in settlementof the dispute.°

"MaJloy, vol. r, pp. 185-59; it'td., pp 1195-3I; ,bid, vol. ii, pp. 1386-87. 1443.• Rdo4orio do nanutro do, nrranydro., 1847, pp. 10-1t; ibid., 1850, p. 17."Ibid., 1851. p. ix; Mailoy, Vol. 1. pp. 144, 145.


After threatening a serious rupture between the UnitedStates and Chile, the Baltimore affair was at last adjusted bythe offer of the Chilean Government to pay seventy-five thou-sand dollars for distribution as indemnity among the families ofthe Baltimore's sailors." The controversy concerning theactivities of Hopkins in Paraguay was by treaty submitted totwo commissioners who decided against the claim. Upon mak-ing that award the United States commissioner expressed thehope that the day was far distant when the United States wouldsanction the acquisition of fortunes "by the plunder of feeblestates extorted from them at the cannon's mouth."" The"affair of the melon" between the United States and New Gra-nada was settled by conventions providing for the choice of acommissioner by each party who were to choose an arbitratoror umpire." Mixed commissions, or similar modes of settle-ment, have also been used to adjust controversies between theUnited States and the following nations: Chile, Ecuador, Mex-ico, Peru, Salvador, and Venezuela. In this connection theopinion of the United States commissioner in rendering a de-cision against a claimant for damages from Ecuador is worthquoting:" While ever ready and vigilant to protect the rightsand interests of American citizens wheresoever or againstwhomsoever it may be, the United States will not oppresstheir sister republics with extravagant demands or unjustexactions."Th

Some disputes between the United States and Hispanic-American states have been adjusted by arbitral processes. Bya convention between the United States and Ecuador theSantos claim was submitted to the arbitration of the Englishconsul at Callao. According to a protocol between the UnitedStates and Chile the Alsop claim was adjusted by the arbitra-tion of the king of England." The claim for indemnity urged

7' Fweign Relations of the United States, 1802. pp 62, 63,"Moore, International Arbitrations, vol. ii, P. 1528." Malloy, Vol. 1, pp 319-21 Moore, International Artist rations. vol xi, pp. 1394. 1416

4 Moore. international Arbitrations, vol in, p. 2740Malloy, vol I. pp 438-41; Moore. International Arintrat,o,is, vol. IT, pp 1590-92.

"American Journal of International Law, vol. v, pp. 1079-1107.


by the United States Government, against Brazil for the loss ofthe whaling vessel Canada was submitted to the arbitration ofthe English minister at Washington .77 A claim against Chilefor the loss of silver taken by Chilean naval officers from UnitedStates citizens was arbitrated by the king of Belgium." Vari-ous claims urged by the United States against the DominicanRepublic have been settled by arbitral processes .79 In 1900 theUnited States and Guatemala submitted the claims of a UnitedStates citizen for damages caused by the recision of railroadrights to the arbitration of the English minister to Guatemala.Certain disputes between the United States and other CentralAmerican states have likewise been settled by arbitration. Thenegotiations between Peru and the United States regarding theGeorgiana and the Lizzie Thompson were settled in an admirablespirit. For when the United States learned of a chance remarkof the king of Belgium, who had declined to serve as arbitratorafter some study of the dispute, that, in his judgment, theUnited States was in the wrong, the cases were quietly allowedto drop.' A grievous dispute between Mexico and the UnitedStates regarding the so-called "Pious Fund of the Californias"—a fund composed of charitable contributions which duringSpanish rule supported the Jesuit missions in Upper California—was ended in 1904 by the Hague Tribunal which decided thatMexico should make an annual payment to the United Stateson account of future interest due from that fund to the CatholicChurch of California. 82

The following table presents a summary view of certain ar-bitrations and diplomatic adjustments that have taken placebetween the United States and nations of Hispanic America:

"Moore, international Arbit rations, vol ii. pp. 1733-47" Malloy, vol. i, pp IS3-85, Moore, International Arbitrations, vol Ii, pp 1463-6871 Moore, Digest of International Law, vol vi, PP 523, 521, 729, Foreign Rrlatsons of

the United States, 1898, pp 274-89, ibid., 1904, pp . 270-70; Dirby, Internatsoiiol Ar.bilrntwn International Trabirnatc, P 904, Malloy, vol 1. PP. 432-34

° Malloy, vol i, pp 871-75I Moore, Digest of International Low, vol. v, p 840, Moore, International Artntra'

lions, vol n. p 1612Foreign Relations of the U,,zled States, 1902. appendix fl, pp 11. 12.


Annoxn3An SUMW.EY OP ARSITEATIONS AND DIPWL4TIC SETTI.EIIENTa BETWEENTHE UNITED STATES AND ThSPANIC-MIEEICAN NATIoNS WHICH

INVOLVED FIN ANCUI. PAYMENTS II

Awards or settlements I TotaL awards

Conniries In faorAgainst Favor-in favor of I Againstof United United ing all

States States parties United States United States

Brazil -------------S ................5725.460 04.

Chile........... .... ..S I L245.9%% 58 $3,000 00Colombia 3 , - 618,003 66Costa Rica - I - 95,704 14DominIcan Republic . S 4,770,661 17Ecuador 2 ....................134,799 56Guatemala - - I 145,750 73Mexico .........

..

....1 1 3 4,835,663 55 3,358,815.37Nicaragua .......... I

.

.... 8,365.91Paraguay ........... - - - ......... IPeru ........... 2. I 193,047.26 82.561 20Solved.,. . .. ...... 2 ...... ..... ..541,676.14Venezuela

..

7 1 1 4,678,683 97 300 00

Total .......I 99 I 4 I 7 I $18,451,758.72 I $3,444,474,06

The foregoing table does not include one of the settlementsmentioned in the text, the indemnity paid to the United Statesby Chile for the injuries to sailors of the Baltimore. It does notinclude the annual interest due from Mexico on account of thePious Fund. Over three million dollars of the amount enteredin this table as recovered by Mexico from the United Statesrepresents the indemnity demanded by citizens of the UnitedStates who had claims against Mexico, an indemnity which theUnited States Government undertook to pay in consideration ofterritorial cessions by Mexico in the Treaty of GuadeloupeHidalgo. As this table demonstrates, a surprisingly largenumber of disputes between the United States and the nationsof Hispanic America have beer' settled by arbitrations or bydiplomatic adjustments. These cases furnish some conspicuous

'i Adapted and modified from Arbitration: and Diplomatic Se1tlementa of the UnitedStates, P. 20.


illustrations of the growing practice of submitting internationaldisputes about financial claims to arbitration for settlement.In strildng contrast with the policy adopted by certain Euro-pean nations, the United States has not adopted a policy ofcoercion in order to collect the claims of her citizens against thenations of Hispanic America. From another viewpoint therecord is creditable to the Hispanic-American nations whichhave, in less than a century, paid to the United States overeighteen million dollars on account of the claims of her citizens.The frequent diplomatic controversies which have been pro-voked by vexatious claims urged against American nations seemto indicate the necessity for the adoption of a definite procedureand the establishment of an impartial American tribunal for thesettlement of international claims.

Not the least significant sign of the belief of certain Hispanic-American nations in peaceful methods of adjusting internationaldisputes has been their adherence to the peace policy of Presi-dent Wilson. Early in 1913, "President Wilson's Peace Pro-posal" was given by Secretary Bryan to members of thediplomatic corps at Washington. This paper proposed thatevery dispute concerning questions of an international char-acter, which could not be settled by diplomacy should be sub-mitted to an international commission. While that commissionwas investigating a dispute neither of the parties to the con-troversy should declare war or begin hostilities against theother. In a memorandum which accompanied the project,Secretary Bryan made suggestions concerning the personnel andfunctions of the international investigatory commission. Hesuggested that, pending the investigation, there should be nochange in the military program of either party to the dispute. 84

As has been aptly said, the "underlying thought of the plan isthreefold: (1) That it furnishes an honorable means of suspend-ing controversy; (Q) that the suspension of controversy willtranquilize the minds of the disputants; and (3) that the reportof the commission of investigation probably will point the way

'1 World Peace Foundation, pamphlet series, vol. vi. no 5. The Conciliation Plan ofthe League to Enforce Peace, pp. 23, 24.


to a fair and equitable adjustment."" When Wilson's peaceplan was embodied in a treaty by the United States, includinga proviso concerning military programs, it was accepted by allof the Central American powers, except Costa Rica, the firstpeace treaty being signed with Salvador on August 7, 1913.86Arbitration treaties without that proviso have also been signedby the United States with Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.'

Controversies between the United States and Hispanic-American states concerning the sovereign rights of Hispanic-American nations have occasionally arisen in connection withproblems about territory. The United States has become in-volved in negotiations about territorial rights with Mexico,Peru, Argentina, and Colombia.

Boundary disputes which have arisen since the Treaty ofGuadeloupe Hidalgo was signed have been the subject ofdiplomatic correspondence and adjustment between the UnitedStates and Mexico. By the Gadsden Treaty in 1553 Mexico,in return for a monetary consideration, ceded to the UnitedStates her claim to a strip of territory the ownership of whichwas disputed." Those governments agreed to a treaty in 1884stipulating that the riparian line between the two nationsprovided by previous treaties should he "the center of thenormal channel" of the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers, eventhough by erosion and deposit of alluvium that channel was notidentical with an earlier channel." Five years later they agreedto submit differences in regard to the riparian boundary to aninternational boundary commission to be composed of one com-missioner appointed by each country.'° In 1894 the Mexicansecretary of foreign relations submitted to that commission acase relating to the claim of a Mexican citizen, Pedro Y. Garcia,who claimed title to land in the Chamizal tract, a tract whichhad been transferred from the Mexican bank of the Rio Grandeto the United States bank either by the formation of a new

' Moore, The Prtnci pie, of Amereca,i Diplomacy, p 856American Journal of Jnlernatzo,,el Low, vol vi', pp 824-26

' ibid., Supplement, vol. x, pp. 263-65, 271-72, 215-78, 284-88, 295-97, 507-9. ibid.,Supplement, vol. xi. pp I-B.

iMniloy, vol.,, pp. 1121-25. "ibid., pp. 1159-61. "ibid, pp. 116769.


channel or by gradual erosion.' Subsequently citizens ofMexico and of the United States claimed lands in this tract undertitles emanating from their respective governments. A modus

vivendi was later negotiated between the two governments bywhich they agreed that the United States should continue torequest a stay of proceedings in her courts for persons claiminglands in the Chaniizal tract under Mexican titles who assertedthat they or their predecessors had been in actual possession ofland in the disputed tract on March 15, 1910. An officer wasto be appointed by the United Slates Department of State topass upon the existence of such titles and to report to that de-partment cases in which claimants ought not to be ejected."

In the diplomatic relations of the United States with Peru theonly serious discussion that has ever arisen was connected withPeru's title to the Lobos Islands, which are situated in thePacific Ocean about twenty-five miles from the Peruvian coast.That question was precipitated in 1852 because certain citizensof the United States became interested in the guano deposits inthose islands. The views of the United States were clearlystated in a note of Secretary Webster to Joaquin J. de Osma,Peru's minister at Washington, on August 21, 1852. '[lie secre-tary asserted that citizens of the United States had fishedaround the Lobos Islands for fifty years. As those islands werein the open sea he asked whether Peru had exercised "such un-equivocal acts of absolute sovereignty and ownership over themas to give her a right to their exclusive possession." 'Websterdeclared that the United States was disposed to consider all thefacts which supported Peru's title to those islands: PresidentFillmore had considered it prudent to give instructions toUnited States naval forces to avoid collision with Peruvianauthorities until the controversy was settled."

On October 23, 1852, José M. Tirade, the Peruvian secretaryof foreign relations, sent a long note to J. R. Clay, United Stateschargé at Lima, summarizing Peru's claim to the Lobos Islands.

"American Journal of International Law, vol Iv, p 925.Ibid., Supplement, vol V. pp. 117-21.

"Message from the President of the United States communicating the correspondenceconcerning the 1,obos Islands, pt. 1, pp. 7-12; in part in Moore, Digest of InternatwnoiLaw, vol. r, pp. 265,266.


Tirado's historical survey conclusively demonstrated Pen'sgood title which that secretary offered to fortify by other proofsof jurisdictional acts over those islands. 94 Two days laterChargé Clay made a report to his government in favor of thePeruvian claim. 03 Hence, on November 16, 1852, Secretary ofState Edward Everett in a high-minded fashion sent a note toMinister Osma declaring that his government did not have theslightest reason to doubt Peru's sovereignty over the LobosIslands and other guano islands of the Pacific. 96 At once Osmaexpressed his pleasure at finding the President and the secretaryof state disposed to adjust the dispute" in a manner honorableand worthy of the relations which bound Peru to the UnitedStates.""

During the fourth decade of the nineteenth century therearose a dispute concerning the Falk-land Islands between theUnited States and Argentina. Those islands lie just off thecoast of Patagonia. Included within the dominions of Spain inAmerica by virtue of papal bulls, the objects of colonization byFrance, claimed for a time by Great Britain because of theiralleged discovery by Englishmen, on the eve of the Revolutionwhich separated the Spanish Indies from the motherland, theFalkland Islands were considered by Spain to form a part of theextensive viceroyalty of la Plata. It was natural that the of-ficials who directed the new state seated at Buenos Aires, should,as the heirs of Spanish officials, eventually have claimed juris-diction over those islands. On June 10, 189, Argentina pub-lished a decree announcing that she had exercised jurisdictionover the Falkland Islands, and stating that they should thence-forth be under the rule of a military and political commanderwho was to enforce the laws and regulations of the republie.°As commander of the islands the Argentine Republic appointedLuis Vernet who proceeded to exercise governmental authorityover them."

"Jfemorja4 of Alfred 0. Benson, op. 1I330."Ibid. pp. 106-12 "I&ld., pp. 169, 170. "Ibid., p. 175!,Is Registro oft ci a! Se !o rcpibliea argeuhna, vol. ii, p 288."Quesada, Recuerdos Se ml vido diploznd4iea: masin en Edo4oa Unzdos, p. 278.


In August, 1831, three fishing vessels from the United States,the Breakwater, the Harriet, and the Superior, appeared on thecoast of the Falkland Islands to catch seals. When GovernorVernet undertook to detain them for violation of the fishing laws,the Breakwater escaped, while the Harriet and the Superior wereseized. The Superior was eventually allowed to proceed to thecoast of Chile, as her captain pledged himself to return andabide by the judgment rendered in the case of the Harriet,which was taken to Buenos Aires.

That seizure initiated a protracted diplomatic correspondenceconcerning the Falkland Islands between Argentina and theUnited States. On November 91, 1331, G. W. Slocum, consulof the United States at Buenos Aires, addressed a note to T. M.de Anchorena, the Argentine secretary of foreign relations, af-firming that the Harriet had been engaged in legal traffic andasking if the Argentine Government intended to sustain thecapture. 10 ' Anehorena responded on December 3, declaringthat United States vessels had no right to fish near the FalklandIslands which were the property of his government. 102 In themeantime the government of the United States had dispatchedthe corvette Lexington under Captain Duncan to southernSouth America. After warning Anehorena, through Sloeuni, ofhis intention to protect United States citizens, Duncan leftBuenos Aires for the Falkland Islands.103 Upon his arrivalthere he released his imprisoned fellow-citizens and dispersedthe Argentine colonists. On February 14, 183, the ArgentineGovernment published a proclamation protesting against thisaction and expressing the opinion that the Government of theUnited States could not approve such acts of aggression.'°But after Francis Baylies, chargé d'affaires of the United Statesto Argentina, arrived at Buenos Aires, he characterized theproceedings of Governor Vernet as arbitrary and denied the

'°°Quesada, flecuerdos daiei villa diplomdtica, pp. 278-80.101 ColeeSn de dacumentos oficiate, . . . sabre tat Islas Malvinas (unpaged), docu•

mentno I'- Ibid. document no Iv10 Bntzsh and Forna Sae Papers, vol. xx. pp 517-19." Co(ecctdn de doc,nnentos oficiales , , . sabre las Is! as Malvinas, document no xxv,

EnIi.eh and Foreign Skits Papers, vol. xx, pp. 327, 328.

172 IIISPANIc—AMERICAN RELATIONS

right of the Argentine Government to prohibit United Statescitizens from fishing near the Falkland Islands.'" Early in1833 Captain Onslow of the British warship Clio forcibly tookpossession of the Falkland Islands in the name of his BritannicMajesty and replaced the Argentine flag at the port of Soledadby the British flag.'" Against this action, and especiallyagainst the seizure of the eastern island, Soledad, the ArgentineGovernment protested in 1841 through Manuel Moreno, itsminister in London; but Lord Palnierston advocated England'sprior claim to the islands against Spain, basing that claim upondiscovery and anterior occupation and maintaining that theretirement of British forces in 1774 did not invalidate thoserights.' 07

As a result of those proceedings the Argentine Governmentadopted a policy of protest toward the Government of theUnited States. In 1839 on behalf of his government, MinisterAlvear presented a claim to Secretary Webster for the damagessuffered because of Duncan's acts in the Falkland Islands."But no adjustment was made; for, in December, 1841, SecretaryWebster declared that, as the right of Argentina to those islandswas contested by Great Britain because of claims "long ante-cedent" to Duncan's acts, he thought that the United Statesshould not give "a final answer" to Alvear's note until theAnglo Argentine controversy was settled. 000 There the matterremained until 1884, when the secretary of foreign relations ofArgentina instructed L. L. Dominguez, her minister at Washing-ton, to urge the claim which had been presented by Alvear be-cause of the acts of Duncan in "assaulting and destroyingviolently the Argentine colony established at the port ofSoledad." Dominguez was instructed that lie should not dis-cuss with the United States the question of the legitimate sover-eignty to the Falkland Islands; for in 1831 they were in theundisputed possession of Argentina. As the basis of a claim for

Ill Bntzsh and Foreign State Papers, vol xx, pp 330-30.pp. 1194-07.

107 Ibid. vol xxii, pp 1366-94; llemoria del minietro de relac,onee extertores de InArgentina, 1888, pp 38-76

'°' Menwria del min,siro de relaciane., exter,'ores de in Argentina, 1885, p 136109 Moore, Digest of International Law, vol.,, p. 888


damages Dominguez was told that Vernet's colony was valuedat over two hundred thousand pesos; and he was instructed that,if a direct settlement could not be made, Argentina was willingto submit the matter to arbitration. ttO In September, 1884,Minister Dominguez accordingly renewed negotiations con-cerning the islands and presented to Secretary of State Freling-huysen a claim for two hundred thousand pesos in silver)"Before a definite response was given, however, Frelinghuysenwas succeeded by Bayard.

In President Cleveland's message to Congress, December 8,1885, lie alluded to the action of the Lexington in destroying "apiratical colony" in the Falkland Islands. The President de-clared that, in view of "the ample justification for the act of theLexington and the derelict condition of the islands, before andalter their alleged occupation by Argentine colonists," theUnited States considered the claim of Argentina as "whollygroundless. ""? Not aware that his conduct might be consid-ered improper, upon the following day Vicente G. Quesada, thenew Argentine minister, addressed a note to Secretary Bayardin which lie undertook to correct the President's statements andalso to elaborate an argument to the effect that the action ofBaylies in supporting the seizure of the Falkland Islands byEngland was "in flagrant opposition to the declarations ofMonroe."

On March 18, 1886, Secretary Bayard replied, declaring thatas the Monroe Doctrine was not retroactive, it had no applica-tion to the case; for England based her claim to the FalklandIslands upon rights antedating 1823. Bayard said that, "withthe tacit consent" of the Argentine Government, the UnitedStates had delayed "a final answer" to its demands, because adecision upon the question of the liability of the United Statesto the Argentine Republic would be interpreted as "an expres-sion of opinion" upon the rightful sovereignty over the Falk-land Islands, a dictum which the United States wished to avoid.

3fernoria dcl ,ninuiro de relaciones exter,ores de Is Argentina, 1885, pp 127, 128." Ibid., pp 137-41.

12 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. viii, p. 325.Il Quesada, Reci4erdos de S rida diplomdtica, pp. 207-13.


Further, the secretary affirmed that there was not the slightestrelation between Duncan's acts and the re-occupation of theislands by Great Britain which was made at a time whenArgentina actually had a small garrison at Soledad. In sum,he argued that it had not been demonstrated that the UnitedStates was responsible for the events which had occurred in theFalkland Islands from 1831 to 1838. He declined to acceptDomInguez's proposal to submit the matter to arbitration."

In the meantime Minister Quesada had been laboring upon amemorandum about the disputed islands. After securing theapproval of the Argentine secretary of foreign relations, on May4, 1887, Quesada sent to Bayard a lengthy and documentednote which embodied the results of his labors. In his note thatminister presented a strong ease in favor of undisputed Spanishjurisdiction over the eastern Falkland Islands, including Sole-dad, after the French evacuation in 1764. He declared thatthe revolutionary government of Buenos Aires took possessionof Soledad in 180, transmitting documents to prove Argentina'sjurisdiction before 1830 and excerpts from the judicial pro-ceedings against the Harriet. In his brief Quesada argued thatthe forcible occupation by England of Soledad in the FalklandIslands was in violation of the Doctrine of Monroe; for bythat occupation England took possession of this island for thefirst time.'" "The honor and the justice of the people and thegovernment of the United States as well as the aspiration whichthey cherish of furnishing an example of impartiality and ofprudence in the international relations of the republics of thecontinent encourage the presumption that, when the facts ofthis claim are made known, its right proved, and its bases justi-fied, the government of the United States will accept the pro-posed arbitration in order to close a debate, the settlement ofwhich was long ago postponed.""

To this memorandum the Government of the United Statesmade no reply. The question of indemnity due to the Argentine

'"Quesada, Reeverdos tie mi r,dadiplom4taca, pp. 214-21; in part in Moore, Digestof Ininnolienal Law, vol, i, pp. 889, 890.

116 Quesada, Reeuerdo, dent rids d.ploradtwa. p. 245.116 1M., 292.


Government for alleged injuries caused by Captain Duncan toVernet's colony on the island of Soledad is still unsettled. Uponmore than one occasion it has employed the pens of Argentinescholars, because they are keenly aware of the strategic valueof the Falkland Islands, because they maintain that the Mon-roe Doctrine is involved, and because they believe in the practi-cal application of the principle of arbitration to internationalcontroversies.

The policy which the United States should adopt toward atransistlunian transit has occupied that government upon manyoccasions. The first diplomatic step of importance was takenon December 12, 1848, when B. A. Bidlack, chargé d'affaires ofthe United States in Bogota, and M. M. Mallarino, secretaryof foreign relations for New Granada, signed a commercial treatywhich renewed certain stipulations of the Colombian treaty of1824. In addition, by Article XXXV, New Granada guaranteedto the United States and her citizens "the right of way or tran-sit across the Isthmus of Panama upon any modes of communi-cation that now exist, or that may hereafter be constructed":—in return the United States guaranteed, "positively and effi-caciously, to New Granada . . . the perfect neutrality of thebefore mentioned Isthmus," and her "rights of sovereigntyand property" over it." That significant article was insertedin this treaty at the instance of Secretary Mallarino who wishedto secure a guarantee of protection against territorial acquisi-tions by certain European nations upon the Isthmus of Panama,—that portion of territory located between the Americancontinents which, in Mallarino's words, "universal, commer-cial interest" required "should be free and open to all na-tions." Although President Polk had not authorized thenegotiation of this treaty, yet he approved it, and the Senateratified it.

The expansion of the United States to the Golden Horn as aresult of the Mexican War had an influence upon the Isthmianproblem. Hardly had the treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo been

Malloy. vol. i. p 812.us Rivas, R,lo.cione, ,nternaeionale, en!,, Colombia y to, E,lado, Undo,. pp. 151-56.


signed when an English fleet took possession of San Juan inCentral America, and, in spite of the resistance of Nicaragua,which claimed sovereignty over the town, established authoritythere in the name of the chief of the Mosquito Indians, who wasunder English protection." That action seemed to augurEnglish domination of an interoccanic transit. As a counter-blast, in 1849 Mr. use, chargé d' affaires of the United States toNicaragua, negotiated a treaty which embodied the idea of thedominant interest of the United States in a Nicaragua Canaland almost established a protectorate over Nicaragua'20atreaty, however, which was not ratified. A subsequent treaty,which likewise was never ratified, providing for a joint protec-torate of the United States and Nicaragua over a NicaraguaCanal, derived its chief interest from the fact that it prob-ably facilitated the negotiations between the United States andGreat Britain which in 1850 culminated in the Clayton-BulwerTreaty. 121

The preamble of that famous treaty declared that the purposeof the contracting parties was to enunciate their views in regardto any means of communication which might be constructedbetween the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by way of LakesManagua and Nicaragua. Neither power was ever to obtain ormaintain any exclusive control over the proposed canal. Uponthe completion of the Nicaragua Canal, both nations were toguarantee its neutralization and to protect that transit against"interruption, seizure, or unjust confiscation." Lastly, thetwo governments agreed to extend their protection by treaty toany other practicable Isthmian transitj 22 In fine, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty embodied the idea of a joint protectorate oftransistbmian communications by England and the UnitedStates. This treaty was for many years a serious obstacle tothe construction of a canal under the sole auspices of the UnitedStates Government, although its last stipulation was ignored by

" Travis, history of the CIa yton .Eulwer Treaty, Michigan Political Science Associa.boo Publication,, vol no, no 8. pp 45-50, 60.

020 more Island and Central America, pp 110-17.' Travis, pp 60, 07.m Malloy. vol 'PP 650-63. The negotiation of the Clnyton.Bulwer treaty is given

detailed consideration in \V,Ilmms. Anglo-American J.sthmoan Diplomacy, pp. 67-100.


that government in treaties subsequently negotiated withHonduras and Nicaragua," and although the United Stateswas asked to maintain order on the Isthmus of Panama in ac-cordance with the Treaty of 1846.

During the administration of President Hayes the problem ofan Jsthmian transit was brought forcibly to the attention of theUnited States through the activities of a company under Frenchauspices that began operations on a Panama Canal. Ferdinandde Lesseps, builder of the Suez Canal, had obtained the ex-clusive right—secured by Col. Wyse from the republic ofColombia in 1878—to construct a canal across the Isthmus ofPanamk. Subscriptions to the capital stock of the companywere made by many Frenchmen, grants of land were concededby Colombia, and in 1881 the gigantic task of digging the canalwas begun. By 1889, however, the company was bankrupt,only a small fraction of the excavating had been done, andvaluable machinery was rusting on the Isthmus."'

The war between the United States and Spain caused arevival of interest among the people of the United States con-cerning an tnteroceanic canal. In December, 1901, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was negotiated which superseded the Clay-ton-Bulwer Treaty. This treaty provided that a canal mightbe constructed under the auspices of the United States Govern-ment which was conceded the right to regulate and manage it.'"In the following year the so-called Spooner bill became a lawwhich authorized the President to secure the rights of the Pan-ama Canal Company and to acquire from Colombia the controlof a strip of hind on the Isthmus for the construction of a canaliii a reasonable time, or if this could not be done on satisfactoryterms, to secure a corresponding grant iii Nicaragua.mn

Negotiations then followed between Secretary Hay andColombia's diplomatic representatives at Washington in regardto a canal zone. The project of a treaty proposed by Colombiain April, 1902, showed clearly that it was her desire to secure the

In Malloy, vol 1, lip. 957-.

Williams, pp 271-99, discusses in detail the opposition in the United States to theClayton-Btilwer Treaty from 1860 to 1895.

" Malloy, vol. i, pp. 782-84."Statutes at Large of the United Stairs, vol. ,xxss, pt. s, pp. 421-84,

13

178 HISPANIC–AMERICAN RELATIONS

reenforcement of Article XXXV of the Treaty of 1846, whileauthorizing the Panama Canal Company to transfer its rightsto the United States and conceding to that government the rightto dig and protect a canal in Colombian territory." But thisproject did not suit Secretary Hay, who submitted a counterproject. The greatest difficulty was to determine the exactamount of remuneration to be granted Colombia in return forthe concession. On December 26, 1902, the Colombian Gov-ernment ordered its minister in the United States to ask tenmillion dollars and an annuityof six hundred thousand do)lars)28In a note which he declared was final Secretary Hay reduced theannuity to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars. To thisthe Colombian minister would not agree. 129 But on January10, 1903, Colombia sent a cablegram to Tornás Herthn, herrepresentative in Washington, instructing him to obtain alarger cash payment and to reduce the period after which theannuity should be paid. "If this is not possible"—so ran thetelegram—"and you see that all may be lost by delay, sign thetreaty." lao At last, convinced that he could obtain no betterterms, on January 22, 1903, Minister Hcrrkn signed the treaty.According to the Hay.Herrán treaty the United States agreedto pay Colombia ten million dollars cash, and, after ten years,an annuity of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for thelease of a strip of land five miles wide across the Isthmus ofPanama.'"

That treaty, however, was signed at an unfortunate juncturefor Colombia. The passions which had been stirred by a fiercecivil war—during which the president had been replaced byVice President Marroquin—had hardly subsided, and factionalspirit evidently played some part in determining the attitude ofColombia's statesmen toward the important treaty.

When the Hay-Herrán Treaty became known in Colombia itwas subjected to considerable criticism. In an article in El

relator of Bogota in June, 1903, Senor Diego Mendoza declared1" Libro azuZ documeiuos dptomdlzcos sabre ci canal y la rebct,On del 'alma de PanaTrid.

pp. 103-75.

" ibid. p. 329. " ibid., pp 329, 530.

Ibid., p. 335. al Ibid., pp. 341-56.


that the Panama Canal was "the providential road of the Mon-roe Doctrine. God has placed in this road a feeble barrier: therights of a small nation, which call destroyed by a single can-non shot. In defense of her rights, Colombia, as mistress of theonly route by which a canal can be opened, ought not to opposethe development of civilization; but neither should she sacrificeherself. The projected I-Jay-Herrán Treaty , in veiled words,provides for the unconditional transfer of the entire Isthmus ofPanamá."2

In a message oil 20 to a congress which lie had convenedin extraordinary session, Vice President Marroquin said thatany sacrifice would be justified which would improve Colom-bia's relations with the United States, implying that he favoredthe canal treaty; but he declared that the responsibility for theapproval or disapproval of the treaty was left with congress.13'On July 2 the Hay-llerilm Treaty was formally submitted tothe Colombian senate for consideration. At once a motion wasintroduced that this house should not consider the project untilit had been countersigned by the acting president. After adebate upon a question of constitutional procedure which dis-played a desire upon the part of certain senators to saddle theentire responsibility for the project upon the executive—a de-bate in which the government took the view that it had duly as-sumed responsibility by negotiating the treaty—the senatedecided that the signature of the chief executive was not anecessary and constitutional preliminary to the consideration ofa treaty. 134 The project was then referred to a special com-mittee composed of one member from each of the nine depart-ments of the republic.

Oil T a majority of this committee made a lengthy,formal report recommending that the treaty should be approvedwith nine modifications. Two members of this committeemade dissenting reports. Joaquin i\I. Uribe 13. declared thatthe proposed treaty was illegal and unconstitutional and that itviolated the sovereignty, jurisdiction, and territorial integrity

" El relator, flogoit, June 23, 1009." Foreign Relations of the Unitd Slates. 1903,1) 15;" Rep,liuiea eEc Colombia, angles del senado, series!, 1101 2,5,4, pp. 15, 10,22.22

ISO HISPANIC—AMERICAN RELATIONS

of the republic; while Juan B. l'ércz y Soto declared that thetreaty was inconvenient because it violated Colombia's consti-tution, decrees, and lawsi The debate which followed dealtlargely Nvith technical, and even personal, problems. Aspirited opposition to the treaty was led by ex-President M. J.Care. This opposition was probably not lessened by the un-diplomatic step of the United States minister at Bogota whoinformed Luis C. Rico, the Colombian secretary of foreign rela-tions, that, if Colombia wished to be on friendly terms with theUnited States and to secure the advantages that would resultfrom the construction of a Panama Canal, she should ratify theHay-Herrán Treaty "without any modifications whatever."136To the Colombian senate on August 1, Secretary Rico made arésumé of the debate. In conclusion he declared that his gov-ernment had agreed to the treaty in order that congress, as theorgan of the popular will, might decide upon its approval orrejection:

His Excellency the Vice President of time Republic has charged me togive the foregoing explanations to the honorable senate. These ex-planations have made evident that the initiation of the treaty was inobedience to a grand thought; that the negotiations were conductedwith ability and prudence; and that, if the conditions of the pact do notcorrespond to the desires of the Colombian people, this is because theother high contracting party did not yield to the proposal to improvethem. In a word: that the government of Colombia has proceededin this transcendental affair with the loftiest aims and inspired by themost refined patriotism 1 37

When a vote was taken upon the treaty, every senator presentdisapproved of it. In commenting upon that action on August14 El nuevo ticinpo, the Times of Bogota, expressed approval ofthe recommendation made by the majority of the specialcommittee:

The fact that the United States had made known that she wouldnot accept any modifications of the Hay-J-Ierrán Treaty, did not meanthat the Colombian Government should not make them: on the con.

"'EepmWica de Colombia, andes del :enado, series m, no,. 11, 12. 13. pp. 83-88, 91-104m Foreign Relations of the United Stata, 1903, p 176.Ut Repilbtica de Colombia. andes del seno.do, series r, no. 41. pp. 827, 328.


trary, this government ought to make reasonable and equitable modi-fications. If the Government of the United States does not acceptthem, Colombia will at least have the satisfaction of manifesting tothe world her desire to contribute to the work of progress and civiliza-tion and of demonstrating that, if it is not consummated, the blameis not ours but that of a country which does not wish to recognize thejust rights of another country, simply because she is weak, as thoughforce should prevail against right. Unfortunately at an evil hourthere have been influential in this affair passionate arguments pro-voked by the unfortunate communications of the minister of theUnited States to our chancellery. Those communications, offcnsive tonational dignity, which seem more worthy of an agent of the Grand'lurk than of a republican nation that boasts of being a friend and anexample to Spanish-American countries, should be rejected with theserene energy that arises from the right which we possess.

In truth, the Colombian Government had already recognizedthe significance of the action upon the Hay-Hcrián Treaty; foron August 13, Secretary Rico sent a cablegram to the Colombianminister in Washington which was couched as follows:

The senate by a unanimous vote has disapproved the canal treaty.Among the reasons voiced in the debate were that the treaty impairedour sovereignty, and that there was no previous arrangement of thePanama companies with this government for the transfer of theirprivileges. To that rejection there contributed also a total disapprovalof the notes of the American minister at BogotS declaring against themodification of the treaty and his memorandum with regard to thepossible rejection of the treaty and a delay in the exchange of ratifica-tions. You may consider it probable that congress will formulatebases for the renewal of negotiations. Communicate the news bycable to our legations in EuropeP'°

While the congress of Colombia was considering the properbases for the renewal of canal negotiations, events transpired onthe Isthmus of Panama which were not altogether unforseen bythe government at Washington. On November 3 a revoltbroke out in the city of Panama. By order of the UnitedStates Government to its naval commanders Colombian sol-diers were prevented from proceeding to l'anamâ to quell the

1 L.ko ansi, p. 562. See rurth, Reyes, The Two America., pp. 89. 70.

182 HISPANIC-AMERICAN RELATIONS

insurrection;—citizens of Panama soon declared that the de-partment. of Panama was independent of Colombia. On No-vember 6 the United States recognized the independence of therepublic of PanamS; and Secretary Hay instructed the Ameri-can minister at Bogota that the United States advised Colombiato make a peaceful and equitable settlement of all questions atissue with Panama. 139 That hasty recognition—against whichthe protests of Colombia were of no avail—was soon followedby the acknowledgment of Panama's independence by othernations of America and Europe. Fortunately for Colombia thewild dreams which some of her citizens entertained of declaringwar upon the United States were dismissed, and she resignedherself to attempts to secure redress by negotiations.

This redress it became difficult to secure after a new canalconvention was signed on November is, 1903, between Secre-tary Hay and Philippe Bmiau-Varilla, the agent of Panama.By that treaty the United States guaranteed the independenceof the new republic. Pnnam(t conceded to the United Statesforever a strip of land ten miles wide for the construction of acanal as well as the right of sovereignty over that zone and itsadjacent waters. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty stipulatedthat the financial remuneration which by the Hay-HerránTreaty would have been nuidc to Colombia should instead bemade to Panamá.'° In this manner did the United Statessecure permission to dig the Panama Canal—a permission whichignored the rights of Colombia guaranteed by the United Statesin the Treaty of 1846.

To adjust the difficulties arising with the United States be-cause of Panama's independence, Colombia dispatched toWashington a special commission headed by General Reyes.On December 23, Reyes presented to Secretary Hay a protestagainst the action of the United States as a violation of thetreaty of 1846. He asked that Colombia's claims which arosefrom the events that had transpired concerning Panama should

"'Correspondence oroicerning the Contention between the United States and Colombia/orthe construction of an Intcroceau,c Canal acro.c the 1st/oar, of Patio d, pp 104-7; Reyes,p.70. Sec further. Fish, APECnCWL Diplomacy, pp. 439-4

L40 Malloy. vol. U. pp. 1348-57.


be submitted to the Hague Tribunal for arbitration." Thisprotest was in vain. For May assumed the view that theproblems which might need adjustment lay between Colombiaand Panama; and he declared that the political questions whichhad arisen between the United States and Colombia could notproperly be referred to the Hague.'' An attempt was made tosettle the differences between Colombia and the United Statesin 1909 through a treaty negotiated between Colombia's agentEnrique Cortes and Secretary of State Ehihu Root. In conjunc-tion with contemporaneous treaties projected between Colom-bia and Panama, and between Panamó and the United States,the Cortés-Root Treaty provided that Colombia should recog-nize the independence of l'ananiâ, that the Treaty of 1846 shouldvirtually be abrogated, that Colombia should relinquish allclaims and declare Panama free from all indebtedness incurredprior to November 3, 1903, and that Panama should pay Colom-bia two hundred and fifty thousand dollars per year for tenyears-1908 to 1917 inclusive—from the cash payments madeby the United States upon the completion of the Panama CanalConvention."' But Colombian public opinion rejected thisadjustment, which legalized the loss of Colombia's most pre-cious jewel by a compensation that was judged inadequate.

In 1914 another attempt was made to settle the Panama af-fair. At the instance of his government, Thaddeus A. Thomp-son, minister of the United States in Colombia, initiated nego-tiations for the adjustment of the controversy. As a result, onApril 6, 1914, there was signed at Bogota by Minister Thompsonand Francisco J. Urrutia, secretary of foreign relations forColombia, a significant treaty. The Thoinpson-Urrutia Treatycontained some expressions of regret by the United StatesGovernment for the differences which had arisen between itselfand Colombia because of Panama. That treaty gave toColombia special privileges in the use of the 1 >anamá Canal.The United States agreed to pay Colombia twenty-five milliondollars as indemnity for injuries due to Panama's independence.

'' Moore, Agra of iniernotionat Law S vol. m, pp 78-00'"ibid.. pp. 90-105. 109. 110, 113. '° Uribc, vol v, pp. 40-49.


A law of the Colombian congress dated June 9, 1914, approvedthe treaty.' 44 Nevertheless, the Senate of the United States didnot ratify this treaty of reconciliation.'

A few quotations from the press of Bogota will suggestColombian sentiment about the Panama affair which was thusleft unsettled. To some Colombians the status of that affaireven seemed to justify a certain aloofness with regard to thepolicy of the United States toward the warring nations ofEurope. On February 13, 1917, in a discussion of "The Neu-trality of Colombia," Ismael Enrique Areinegas, the editor ofEl nucvo tiempo, expressed his opinion that each sovereign stateof Hispanic America should make an independent decision con-cerning the policy to be pursued during the World War. To

quote again:

Our Alliadophile scntin,ents arc so well known that it might be he-lieved that the attitude of this journal should be definitely in favor ofthe United States in the contention between that country and Ger-many. But,—higherthan tlioseopinions,—flrstin ourminds,is the sen-timent of love for onreoimtry, and that love will never allow us to forgetthe offenses which the Anglo-Saxon Republic has committed againstus. . . . That nation which invokes the principles of internationallaw to induce us to join her protest against Germany is engaged in amockery. Chivalrous indeed would he the policy of the White Housein assuming the role of a paladin of justice and humanity, if there didnot weigh upon it the crime of Panama, the most cowardly, the mostodious, and the most disloyal of the international crimes which arerecorded in modern history! With what authority.—after events likethose of November 3, 1903, can it nation speak in the name of interna-tional law?

On February QJ, 1917, in commenting upon a report thatPresident Wilson had sent a message to the Senate urging theratification of the Thoinpsor-Urrutia Treaty, the editor of Elnuevo tienipo said that public opinion in Hispanic America

l'raiado erd,-e to rcpdb&a tie Colombia v los £siodos Uni.dos de Arnénca pare Cl

anegla de aILS diferencia piovcnwntes de Ins aeon tccimientos realizados en €1 term tiePortend en Noncmb,c dc 1903, suscruo en Bopoid ci 6 tie A&rsl tie 1914, pp . 147-57.

145 i the tune that has eiapS since December, 1910, when this monograph wasready For the press, the modified Thompson-Urrutia Treaty has been ratified by bothparties.


favored the Allies and frowned upon the injustice and brutalityof Germany's submarine campaign.

We have always believed that the present President of the Anglo-Saxon Republic was animated by a just spirit toward our country.There is no doubt that a decisive influence must have been exertedupon his mind by the responses which have been given by almost all ofthe Hispanic-American states to his note concerning the submarinewarfare —responses in which there could be seen, more or less thinlyveiled, a lack of confidence in regard to that nation, which, until a fewlustrums ago, all of those states considered as the protector of theindependence and liberty of the nations in the New World.How can it nation speak of law after the spoliation of Pananuâ in whichshe did not respect her word pledged in public treaties and in vhikltshe most shamefully abused her own force and another nation's con-fidence? Even though theUnited StatesSenate does nothearkento the new message of Pres;dent Wilson, we will be sustained by theopinion of the Hispanic-American republics.

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