CHAPTER IV

THE CIVIL WAR IN CAMBODIA, 1970-1975

The history of Cambodia, from the date of the ouster of

Prince Norodom Sihanouk on 18 March 1970 to the liberation of

Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge on 17 April 1975, constitutes the

story of the struggle for power between the group headed by Lon

Nol and the other by Prince Sihanouk. Both had invested all

their resources and energies which were at their disposal to gain

an upper hand at .the political, diplomatic and military fronts.

At the ideological level while Lon Nol was backed by the us, 1 the

cause of Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge was backed by the

People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea and North Vietnam.2

As a result of the Civil war the relatively placid life of the

Khmer people was disturbed. The bombing raids of the US on the

Cambodian countryside, aimed at wiping out the Communist

strongholds of North Vietnam and of the Viet Cong, forced the

Cambodian peasants to abandon their homes and fields and flee to

the capital city to escape death. 3 About a million of them who

thus had migrated were to be taken care, which cost an additional

burden on the Lon Nol administration at a time when production

declined and the supplies from outside were blocked by the

Comrnunists. 4 The inability of the regime and its failure to

1. William Shawcross, Sideshow : Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, Great Britain, 1979, pp.112-127.

2. Prince Norodom SihanoukfWilfred Burchett, My War with the CIA, England, 1973, pp.30.-33.

3. Shawcross,n.1, p.183. 4. At the time of the overthrow of the Prince in March 1970,

Phnom Penh had a population of about 600,000 Khmers, Chinese and Vietnamese. By the end of war in April 1975, the population of the capital rose to 2-3 million. see ibid, p.183.

168

solve the country's major problems of security, inflation and

corruption disillusioned the people. The common man caught in

the crossfire of the contending forces of Lon Nol regime and of

the Khmer Rouge was not so much concerned with the ideology as

with the security of his life and property. The Khmer Rouge by

exploiting the weakness of Lon Nol and by using the support

extended by the -PRC, North Korea and North Vietnam, Prince

Sihanouk and well-trained revolutionary cadres, overthrew the

Khmer Republic on 17 April 1975 and established a Communist

Government, the first of its kind in the history of cambodia. 5

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RUMER REPUBLIC

Prince Sihanouk was ousted from power on 18 March 1970, when

he was abroad by Lon Nol Sirik Matak group in a vote of no

confidence passed by the Cambodian National Assembly and the

Council of the kingdom. 6 In his place Cheng Heng, whom the

Prince had appointed as acting Chief of State in January 1970,

was given the full title of Head of State. On 19 March 1970, the

US Government accorded the recognition to the new regime of Lon

Nol. 7 South Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia greeted the coup in

Phnom Penh with enthusiasm and extended recognition to Lon Nol. 8

5. Shawcross, n.1, pp.365-68. 6. "Cambodian Right-wing Clique Stages coup d'etat Against Head

of state Samdech Norodom Sihanouk", Peking Review, Peking, vol.13, no.13, 27 March 1970, p.22.

7. "President Nixon's News Conference of March 21", Department of State Bulletin, Washington D.C., 6 April 1970, pp.437-38.

8. The Times, London, 21 March 1970, see also Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War, New York, 1973, pp.266-67, 283. T.D.Allman, "We Have Not Been Wasting our Time", Far Eastern Economic Review, hereafter FEER, Hongkong, vol. LXVII, no. 15, 9 April 1970, p.18.

169

On 20 March the National Assembly voted to arrest Prince Sihanouk

on the charges of treason if he retunred to Phnom Penh. 9 On the

basis of a Manifesto issued on 31 March 1970 by a 'Committee of

Intellectual', the Cambodian National Assembly and the Senate

voted unanimously on 9 October to proclaim Cambodia a Republic.

The Government claimed that the proclaimation was made "on the

demand of the Khmer people of all social strata to revert to

constitutional legality".lO The Republic came into force on 1

November 1970. A new flag was adopted, and 10 October was

declafred as a Public holiday. All titles of nobility were

abolished. The new regime declared that Cambodia would remain

neutral and that it would honour international comrnitments. 11

Lon Nol, who had formed the Government on 12 August 1969

reorganized it on 2 July 1970 and retained Prime Ministership and

the portfolio of defence. Sir ik Matak became Deputy Prime

Minister.

Lon Nol, due to bad health, expressed his desire to stepdown

from the position of Prime Ministership on 20 April 1971. When

Sirik Matak, Chuop Hell and In Tarn expressed their inability to

form the Government, it was resolved on 3 May that Lon Nol was to

be the titular premier while effective power was to be exercised

9. Le Monde, Paris, 24 March 1970. 10. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, vol.XVI, no.51, 17-23 December

1970, p.9909, see also David P.Chandler, "Changing Cambodia", Current History, vol.59, no.352, December 1970, p.338, T.D.Allman, "Cambodia Dismantling the Monarchy", FEER, 5 September 1970, p.lO.

11. Asian Recorder, vol.XVII,no.22, 28 May 3 June 1971, p.l0175.

170

by Sirik Matak. 12 Three days later a new Cabinet was formed and

it expressed its desire to promulgate a new Constitution for the

country to adopt measures to improve the economic, financial and

social conditions and control the prices of the essential goods

and also its firm desire to put down the Viet Cong and North

Vietnamese Communists and to follow neutral and non-aligned

foreign policy.13

POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRINCE SIHANOUK

Following the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, his followers

organised mass demonstrations in several provinces. In Kompong

Cham, the students and other demonstrators demanded the

restoration of the Portrait of Prince Sihanouk which had been

removed earlier. Riots brokeout when the authorities refused to

do so. The provincial government offices and the law courts were

stormed, and two members of the National Assembly "who tried to

explain why they had voted to depose" the Prince were hacked to

death in Kompong Cham. The peasants seized Lon Nol's brother Lon

Nil adn killed him. 14 The rioters from Siem Reap, Prey Veng and

Svay Rieng moved towards the capital. Hence, the government

closed Phnom Penh and the airport, imposed curfew and prohibited

traffic in the capital. The demonstrators were turned away by

12. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, London, vol. no.XVIII, 4-11 September 1971, p.24811.

13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., vol.no.XVII, 13-20 June 1970, p.24027-28. see also

SWB FE/3444/A3/4, 4 April 1970.

171

the armed forces, in which nearly ninety people either got killed

or wounded. 15

In Phnom Penh, the middle class was happy with the removal

of the Prince.16 There were also a few anti-Sihanouk

demonstrations in the capital. On 5 and 11 April 1970, groups of

students led a demonstration in support of the new regime

chanting anti-Viet Cong and anti-North Vietnamese slogans.

DJAKARTA CONFERENCE

In order to avert the near war situtation in Cambodia and to

restore peace and neutrality, Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of

Indonesia proposed on 19 April 1970 an Asian Conference. 17 In

response to his call an 11-Nation Conference met in Djakarta

during 15-17 May 1970 which was attended by representatives of

Australia, cambodia, Japan, south Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New

Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and South

Vietnam. 18 The Conference revealed sharp differences of opinion

among the pariticipants. Yem Sambaur who attended as a "special

invitee" requested for economic, military and diplomatic help

which was declined by Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore.

The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese activities in Cambodia were

15. "Cambodian People Demonstrate against Right-wing clique", Peking Review, vol.13, no.14, 3 April 1970, pp.32-33. see also T.D.Allman, "Sealing Their Own Doom ?", FEER, vol.LXVIII, no.14, 2 April 1975.

16. T.D.Allman, "When the Khmers Kill Khmers", FEER, vol.LXVII, no.15, 9 April 1975, p.5.

17. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.14, p.24030. 18. Ibid.

172

criticized by South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand and New

Zealand. The suggestion of appointing a permanent body to

workout a solution for the Indo-China question and on sending an

inspection team to Cambodia to report on the situation was

opposed by Japan. The communique issued on 17 May 1970 by the

conference was, however, called for the ending of hostilities.

For the withdrawal of foreign troops, neutrality of Cambodia,

principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of

Cambodia, reactivating of the International Control Commission

(ICC), the participants of the Geneva Conference and other

interested parties had to convene an international conference to

solve the Cambodian problem. 19 It was suggested to consult the

USSR and the UK to ractivate the ICC and for convening an

International Conference. The us supported the decisions taken

at Djakarta Conference. 20

GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

After being informed by Kosygin, the Prime Minister of

the Soviet Union, of his ouster from power, Prince Sihanouk,

speaking to the members of the Khmer community at the Moscow

airport, said that if the Soviet Union and the PRC would not

19. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no. XVI.II,29 August-5 September 1970, p.24162. Thailand prom1se "military equipment" to Lon Nol see also T.J.S.George, "The Crusader's Crosses", FEER, vol.LXVIII, no.22, 28 May 1970, p.S.

20. ••us Supports Decisions Taken at Meeting of Asian Ministers", Department of state Bul.~etin, 8 June 1970, pp. 710-11.

173

recognize the new regime in Cambodia he would consider setting up

a Government-in-Exile, but if they chose to recongnize Lon Nol

regime his political career would come to an end. 21 The Prince

was accorded a warm welcome by the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou

En-lai on 19 March 1970 when he arrived in Peking. 22 On 23 March

the Prince issued a proclamation from Peking denoucning Lon Nol's

Government and at the same time announcing his intention to form

a 'Government of National Union' and to organize a "National

Liberation Army" and a "United National Front 11•23

The DRVN hailed the Prince's proclamation of 23 March and

pledged full support to the Khmer Liberation forces. Whereas,

the USSR was unwilling to respond favourably to the Prince's

call. At the same time, the PRC gave unconditional support to

him. 24 Before the formal announcement of ~he Government-in-Exile

on 5 May 1970 by the Prince, the Summit Conference of the Indo-

Chinese peoples was held during 24-25 April 1970 on Lao-Vietnam-

China border area at the initiative of the Prince. The three

Indo-Chinese people were represented by Prince Norodom Sihanouk

of Cambodia, Prince Souphanouvong, President of the Lao Patriotic

Front, Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the NLF of South Vietnam and

21. SihanoukfBurchett, n.2, p.27. 22. "Cambodian Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk Arrives in

Peking",Peking Review, vol.13, no.13,27 March 1970, p.3. 23. "Message to Compatriots and Solemn Declaration by Cambodian

Head of State Samdech Norodm Sihanouk, March 23, 1970, Peking Review, vol.13, no.13, 27 March 1970, pp.13-15.

24. Sihanouk/Burchett, n.2, pp.33-35.

174

Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the DRVN. They exchanged views

and expressed their unanimity in fighting against their common

enemy, the us. 25 It also expressed its full support to the 23

March 1970 Five-point proclamation of the Prince and expressed

"its resolute support to the heroic struggle of the Khmer people"

against the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak and the us imperialists. 26 Chou

En-lai attended the final session and endorsed it. 27

On 5 May 1970 the Prince announced the formation of the

Government-in-Exile with its headquarters in Peking. It was

composed of the leading members of his entourage and Communists

like Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim whom he once tried to

suppress. On 26 March 1970 the latter signed a declaration of

'unreserved support' to the Prince's call of 23 March 1970. 28

The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC}, the

Politburo and the Central Committee of the National United Front

of Cambodia (NUFC) and the People's National Liberation Armed

Forces of Cambodia (PNLAFC)were constituted. 29 Prince Sihanouk

was the Head of State.

25. SWB FE/3366/1, 30 April 1970. 26. "Joint Declaration of summit Conference of Indo-Chinese

Peoples, April 25, 1970", Peking Review, vol. 13, Special Issue, 8 May 1970, pp.3-6, 10.

27. "Chou En-lai's Speech", Peking Review, vol.13, Special Issue, 8 May 1970, pp.34-35.

28. "Three Cambodian National Assembly Deputies Statement", Peking Review, vol.13,no.16, 17 April 1970, pp.21-22. see also Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, Nancy Amphoux, trans England, 1977, p.189.

29. "Proclamation of the Royal Government of National Union under the leadership of the National United Front of Kampuchea", Peking Review, vol.13, no.20,15 May 1970, p.6.

175

THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT OF CAMBODIA (NUFC)

Penn Nouth became the President of the NUFc. 30 The People's

National Liberation Armed Forces of Cambodia (PNLAFC) consisted

of a President, three Vice-Presidents and two members. Khieu

Samphan was the president and Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and So Vanna

were the Vice-Presidents. Thieun Chhith and Son Sen were the

members.

The NUFC, which was formed in May 1970 to fight against Lon

Nol, consisted of Marxists, Progressives and right wing

mandarins. 31 The first group had five to six thousand Khmer

Communists who moved over to Hanoi after the Geneva Accords of

1954. They returned to Cambodia in 1970 to fight against Lon

Nol. The second group consisted of French-edcated Marxists like

Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim who served in the government

and moved into the maquis in 1967 after the Samlaut rebellion

fearing liquidation. This group emerged as a distinct entity in

the fighting force of the NUFC after 1970. 32 The third group

consisted of "Sihanoukists" i.e., the followers of the Prince.

30. "List of Members of Political Bureau of Central Committee of National United Front of Kampuchea", Peking Review, vol.13, no.20, 15 May 1970, p.11.

31. Thiounn Mumm and Thiounn Prasith were Marxists, Sarin Chhak, Chan Youran, Keat Chhom and Chou Seng were progressives, Ngo Hou, Hout Sambath and Chea San were right wing mandarins, see J. L. S. Girling, "The Resistance in Cambodia", Asian Survey, Berkeley, Cali, vol.XII, no.7, July 1972, p.561.

32. Roger Kershaw, "Cambodia", National Union - a Milestone in Popular Front Technique", The World Today, London vol. 22, no.2, February 1976, pp.60-61.

176

The political programme of the NUFC was aimed at guaranting

the democratic liberties to all Khmers, except 'traitors',

equality of sexes, abolition of polygamy, freedom of religion

with Buddhism as state religion and respect to the rights of the

national minorities. Right to property was assured and they

wanted to work out a fair system of land rents and rates of

interest on loans~ It was their policy to improve the formation

of Trade Unions, encourage industries and nationalise banks and

foreign trade. The foreign policy of the NUFC was 'one of

national independence, peace, neutrality, non-alignment,

solidarity, and friendship with peace' loving nations. It did

not want to participate in any military alliance, nor did it want

allow any foreign country to set up military bases. 33

On 5 May 1970 Peking announced the recognition of the RGNUC

and promised to grant unlimited loans and supply of arms. 34 As

the USSR was indifferent to the Prince's Proclamation, it was not

willing to support him. But countries like Albania, North Korea,

North Vietnam, Cuba, Syria, the PRG of South Vietnam, Yugoslavia

and Rumania recognised the Prince's government. Meanwhile,

Bulgaria renewed a commercial treaty with Lon No1. 35

33. "Political Program of National United Front of Kampuchea", Peking Review, vol.13, no.20, 15 May 1970, pp.7-11. see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVIII, 8-15 August 1970, p.24127.

34. "Chinese Government Formally Recognises Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia", Peking Review, vol. 13, no. 20, 15 May 1970, p.14, see also J.L.S. Girling, Cambodia and the Sihanouk Myth, Occasional Paper No.7, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, June 1971, p.7.

35. "Chinese Government", n.34, p.14.

177

By agreeing to come together to work with the Prince, the

Communists were able to persuade other partners in the NUFC to

accept their policies. The Prince on his part said : "I am an

admirer of Communism. . . but I am not a Communist ... I am a

nationalist, a Cambodian like my ancestors". On his personal

position, he said "I had chosen not to be with either the

Americans or the Communists, because I considered that there were

two dangers, American imperialism and Asian communism 11 •36 He

further said that even though his government was established

outside Cambodia, it was 'not a Government-in-Exile' as in fact

it had "its roots in Cambodia ...• our comrades in the guerrilla

movement tell us that for the moment our place is in friend's

countries 11 •37 The liberation struggle was conducted in the name

of the Khmer Rouge and was organized by Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn

and Hu Nim, and they were in charge of Eastern, Northwestern and

Southwestern parts of Cambodia respectively. 38

~ INYASION OF CAMBODIA ~ ~ US-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES

Lon Nol, who was bent on clearing the Vietnamese sanctuaries

on Khmer soil asked the North Vietnamese and the NLF troops on 13

March 1970 to vacate Cambodian territory within 48 hours. on the

expiry of deadline on 16 March the South Vietnamese forces began

shelling the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. After the coup,

36. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.33, p.24127. 37. Ibid. 38. Ponchaud, n.28, pp.173-189, see also Gir1ing, n.31, p.562.

178

Thieu said that the two countries would co-operate to push the

Communists out. The US command in Saigon established radio links

with Lon Nol army on 19 March and the next day the South

Vietnamese were authorised to provide forward artillery spotters

for the Cambodians, if they needed it.39

From 20 March onwards all the interested parties began to

act. Meanwhile, Khmer Krom began its attacks on the Communist

sancturies. South Vietnamese troops and the US advisers moved

into the Svay Rieng province. 40 In Kandal Communist positions

were attacked by the south Vietnamese. The NLF forces which

attacked an outpost of Lon Nol in the same area were shelled with

the South Vietnamese assistance and on 23 March Communist

positions were bombed. The attack by the US bombers continued the

next day also. on 27 March fifty five Communists were killed in

a combined Cambodian-South Vietnamese and the US operations. 41

By the end of March the Vietnamese Communists intensiified

and widened their military operations in cambodia. 42 During the

first half of April the ill-equipped Lon Nol forces were unable

to restrict the movement of the Vietnamese forces. 43 Lon Nol,

39. Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power : A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975, London, 1985, p.304.

40. The Times, London, 21 March 1970. 41. Kiernan,n.39, p.304. 42. "Ambassador Bunker Discusses Vietnam on 'Meet the Press'",

Department of state Bulletin, 1 June 1970, p.687. 43. Bernard K.Gordon with Kathryn Young, "The Khmer Republic :

That was the Cambodia that was", Asian Survey, vol.11, no.1, January 1971, p.34.

179

who was confident of tackling the problem of the Vietnamese

without foreign assistance changed his mind and made an

international appeal for arms. By mid-April 70,000 volunteers had

enlisted in the army. All AK-47 rifles seized in South Vietnam

were sent to Phnom Penh. Khmer Krom and Khmer Serei were ordered

to move into Phnom Penh and 1,500 Khmer Serei troops were ready

for deployment. 44 Son Ngoc Thanh was busy since February in

South Vietnam to recruit more persons.

But, Mike Mansfield, the Democrat Senator was opposed to the

extention of aid to Lon Nol on 1 April. 45 The Lon Nol government

had formally requested the US for military assistance. The State

Department had examined the request. 46 Lon Nol had asked

equipment for 400 batalions, communications, 2,500 military

trucks, 1,000 Jeeps, 30 helicopters, 30 fighters and 12 transport

aircraft. 47 on 29 April Nixon had approved the supply of 4-5,000

rifles to Lon Nol. A shipment of 1, 500 guns were sent to

Cambodia· from South Vietnam one week before. But the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee opposed Nixon's decisions. 48

Preparations were made for a full-scale intervention in cambodia

in which 32,000 US and 40,000 South Vietnamese troops had to

involve. 49

44. Shawcross, n.1, p.131. 45. straits Times, Singapore, 2 April 1970. 46. Times of India, New Delhi, 17 April 1970. 4 7. Shawcross, n. 1, p.132, see also Times of India, 23 April

1970. 48. Times of India, 30 April 1970. 49. Gordon with Young, n.43, p.35.

180

Massive killings of the Vietnamese at Parrot's Beak area

took place. At least 3,500 Vietnamese residents were killed and

20,000 were detained.so The Vietnam war was extended into

Cambodia with the invasion of Cambodia by the US-South Vietnamese

forces on 29 April 1970. Nixon described it "not an invasion of

cambodia ... on.ce enemy forces are driven out ... we will

withdraw". 51 The war effects were felt long ago because of the

use of the Cambodian territory by the Vietnamese Communists as a

result of the US "Menu 11 bombings on them. The government

repression in rice collection after 1966 helped the CPK to

mobilize its cadres.

THE RESISTANCE

In the 'heart land' ninety per cent of the seven million

people live in less than one-third of the territory, the rest

inhabit the 'empty lands' of the North, Northeast and South on an

average only two to three persons per square kilometre. The empty

lands consisting of hills, mountains and forest "has ceased to be

the preserve of the Phnom Penh Government, even in name". The

territory, which had not been under the effective control of the

Government, was occupied by the NUFC forces. 52

The Khmer Rouge who were active and opposed to the Prince

50. New York Times, 9 May 1970. see also T.D.Allmen, "The Cambodian Pogrom", FEER, vol.XLVIII, no.19, 7 May 1970, pp.22-23 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.14, p.24029.

51. New York Times, 1 May 1970, see also "The Cambodia Strike : Defensive Action for Peace", Department of State Bulletin, 18 May 1970, p.619.

52. Girling, n.31, p.549.

181

had to change their attitude towards him. His deposition in

March 1970 and his subsequent call of 23 March, the support

extended to him on 26 March by the three left deputies, Joint

Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese people's

of 24-25 April and the establishment of the RGNUC on 5 May in

exile, which was .supported the PRC, the DRVN and North Korea,

Compelled the Khmer Rouge to work with the Prince. It was a

marriage of convenience between the Prince and the Khmer Rouge.

The Prince also made it clear that the moment a 'genuine people's

government' had been established in Cambodia, he would resign

"as Head of State after our people's certain victory over their

enemies, reactionary oppressors and their masters - the US

imperialists. And on that very occasion I will give our

progressive youth and working people the possibility of fully

assuming the responsbility of national construction and defence"

with the co-operation of the entire nation". 53

Thus, the Prince made it clear that after the defeat of Lon

No1, real power could be edxercised by the Cambodian Communists.

Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge became active. The 5,000 Khmer Viet

Minh who had moved to Hanoi after the Geneva Accords of 1954,

began returning to Cambodia. At the same time, the Vietnamese

cadres began aiding the Khmer cadres in their operations against

Lon Nol. The Principal aim, apart from aiding the Khmer Rouge,

was to preserve their own supply lines and disrupt the enemy's

53. "Message to comptriots II • • • I n. 23, p. 14.

182

supply lines. 54

On 20-21 March both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese

Communists entered the southern Prey Veng province 55 and 700

people joined the revolutionaries from Peam Montea sub district

and formed insurgent battalion. The South Vietnames troops

attacked the villages near Krachap and they looted the property

of the people killing a monk at Wat Krassang in Svay Rieng. 56

The US which began their air strikes from 29 April attacked Snuol

on 3 May leaving seven dead. Then Mimot was attacked in which

dozens of villages were destroyed and Fish Hook was attacked by

the South Vietnamese. There were 8,000 US and 12,000 South

Vietnamese troops.57 The US air force which was at liberty to

bomb any target and responsible for large-scale destruction in

Cambodia left Cambodia on 30 June 1970 after two months stay.

Nixon said that they had captured arms, ~mmunition and rice and

killed 11,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian enemies. 58

At ·this juncture the Vietnamese Communists were active in

Kampot, Prey Veng and Takeo. Kampot was the stronghold of the

Khmer Rouge and had their headquarters in the Elephant mountain

regioin. 59 Lon Nol government used the South Vietnamese troops

54. "Ambassador Bunker Discusses ••• 11 , n.42, pp.686-88. 55. "A Report on the conclusion of the Cambodian Operation",

Department of State Bulletin, 20 July, p.69. 56. Kiernan, n.39, p.307. 57. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVII, 15-22 August

1970, p.24132. 58. "A Report on the .... ", n.55,p.71. 59. Keesing's contemporary Archives, n.14, p.24029.

183

and Khmer Krom to kill both ethnic Vietnamese and Khmer. At the

end of April 1970, Yem sambaur, Foreign Minister in the Lon Nol

government, had admitted that 3,554 deaths took place and he

blamed the North Vietnamese and the VietCong for these deaths.60

Lon Nol government treated the ethnic Vietnamese numbering

about five lakh i~ Cambodia as threat to his regime because they

may sympathize with the Viet Cong. Therefore, they were rounded

up and dumped them into 'concentration camps'. Killing of these

captives began in the first week of April. It was quite shocking

that hundrends of bodies began floating in Mekong. 61

With the outbreak of civil war in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge

began to control the rice-growing areas. They made routes to

Phnom Penh and provincial capitals. The US and South Vietnamese

air strikes burnt down the prosperous rubber plantations and

paddy fields in eastern cambodia. As a result, people became

homeless and unemployed. The looting and arson committed by the

troops of South Vietnam and undisciplined Lon Nol troops helped

to increase the ranks of the revolutionaries. As the economy of

Lon Nol government was on the verge of collapse, the US came to

his resuce with its aid to his government. 62

The liberation forces began to control the countryside. On

20 April, Saang, 18 miles away from Phnom Penh fell to the

60. Caldwell and Tak, n.8, p.299. 61. SWB FE/3352/6-7, 14 April 1970. see also A1lmen,n.so, pp.22-

23. 62. Caldwell and Tan, n.8, p.304.

184

revolutionaries. It was possible for the Khmer Rouge to attack

the capital from there. During the US invasion of Cambodia, May­

June 1970, 338 Americans were killed and 1, 529 wounded ·in

Cambodia. 63 The Khmer Rouge had established six main base areas

and commanding key areas in the countryside. Kompong Cham, Hu

Nim's old electoral district was a stronghold of the

Communists. 64 Their activity was intensified in Battambang and

Siem Reap. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge began recruiting cadres.

The Vietnamese Communists acted as advisers, instructors and

organizers, but leadership remained with the Khmer Rouge. They

also began to protect the civilian population and reorganize the

administration.65 People began to join the Khmer Rouge due to

their loyalty towards the Prince, social grievances and survival.

Though the US forces left Cambodia, as promised, the South

Vietnamese forces remained. The discipline maintained by the

North Vietnamese/Viet Cong created good impression in the minds

of the peasants. In the first week of July 1970, the Khmer Rouge

planned to attack on Kompong Thorn, but it was averted with the

arrival of the South Vietnamese forces. 66 Then the Khmer Rouge

63. "A Report on the ", n.55, p.69, see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.l4, p.24030.

64. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.l4,p.24029. 65. Caldwell and Tan, n.,8, p.314. 66. Times of India, 8 July 1970. see also Keesing's Contemporary

Archives, n.57, p.24136.

185

diverted their attention to the ancient Temple complex of Angkor

Wat, the erstwhile seat of Khmer culture, and captured it. They

wanted to snatch Siem Reap. 67 The South Vietnamese forces backed

by bombers and artillery, killed 69 North Vietnamese and Viet

Cong soldiers in clashes near Svay Rieng and the towns of Kompong

Trabek and Tuk Meas. 68 From 1 August 1970 onwards, the Communists

started harassing or attacking Government positions within four

miles of the capital in four separate occasions. But they were

beaten by the Lon Nol forces. 69 In September the village of

Taing Kouk was captured by the Khmer Rouge and put up stiff

resistance but it was recovered by Lon Nol forces on 26

September. The Prince claimed that two-thirds of the country was

liberated and the Lon Nol government controlled only the capital

and some important areas. 7 0 The US too agreed that Lon Nol' s

authority confined to one-third of the territory. 71

THE M ~ ~ THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT

As ·noted above, though Lon Nol felt that his government

might tackle the resistance problem he realized the need of

outside help. Thereofore,he appealed to the us in April for aid72

67. Times of India, 11 July 1970. 68. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 21 July 1970. 69. Times of India, 18 August 1970. 70. Patriot, New Delhi, 28 September 1970. see also

L. F.Goodstadt, "Calculated Revolution", FEER, vol.LXX, no.47, 21 November 1970, pp.5-6.

71. "Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird Interviewed on 'Issues and Answers", Department of State Bulletin, 2 November 1970, p.550.

72. SWB FE/3354/A3/1, 16 April 1970.

186

As noted above considerable amount of military aid was given.73

He also said that the US-South Vietnamese troops in cambodia had

killed 7,900 of the enemy and captured enough arms to equip more

than 30 battalions. 74 In order to solve the military problems

faced by Lon Nol in the fiscal year of July 1970-June 1971, it

was agreed by the US to give aid at least US$ 25 million. 75 By

the beginning of September, there was a financial crisis. On 11

September Secretary Laird asked Kissinger to give US $60 million

in aid to Cambodia without which the government of Lon No1 would

collapse and the US credibility would be at stake. on 15

September the us decided to increase aid to Lon Nol and it was

approved on 16 October 1970. As a result of the aid extended by

the us, Lon Nol was able to increase the army, from 40,000 to

150,000 by the end of the year. 76

To add to the complexity of the situatioin, the RGNUC

organised effective propaganda against Lon Nol regime and

established its administrative networks in several provinces of

Cambodia. 77 The organisation at the lowest level was Phums

(hamlets), Khums (villages), Sroks (district) and Khets

(provinces). The Committees were elected and the members were

73. Times of India, 30 April 1970. 74. The Hindu, Madras, 27 May 1970. 75. The Times, London. 11 July 1970. 76. "A More Balanced Sharing of the Burdens of Security",

(Statement by M.R.Laird, Secretary of Defence), Department of State Bulletin, 21 December 1970, p.754.

77. Gordon with Young. n.43, p.37.

187

assigned specific political, military, economic, cultural and

social responsibilities. Those who had devotion to the cause of

the NUFC and commanded honesty and moral character were eligible

for election.78

By November 1970 the Khmer Rouge infitration grew intense

in Battambang, S~em Reap, Pursat, Kampot, Takeo, Prey Veng,

Kampong Chhang and Phnom Penh. Nearly two-thirds of Cambodia's

territory was claimed to have come under the control of the rebel

forces. 79

THE KHMER ROUGE AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS

The establishment of the Worker's Party of Kampuchea (WPK)

in September 1960, the death of its Secretary-General, Tou

Samouth in July 1962, Pol Pot assuming the Party post in 1963 and

the Cambodian Communists armed rebellion against the Prince's

regime in 1967 were instances of the assertion of independence by

the Cambodian Communists from the Vietnamese tutelage. Regarding

the Prince's regime the Khmer Communists opposed the Vietnamese

view of supporting him because he was anti-imperialist and

helping for the cause of national unification of Vietnam. The

Khmer Rouge turned hostile towards the DRVN and moved closer to

the PRC and it reflected in the bilateral relations between the

Khmer Rouge and the DRVN during the 1970-1975 period.

78. Caldwell and Tan, n.8, p.315. 79. Gordon with Young, n.43, p.39.

188

After the establishment of the RGNUC in May 1970, some 1,500

cadres who returned to Cambodia from Hanoi in mid-1.970 had to

work in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge. 80 But the arrival of

these cadres from Hanoi was not liked by the Khmer Rouge. "Now

they were, at best, a tolerated minority and at worst seen as

infiltrators and ~nemies. For the CPK leadership, it seemed they

had come not to help, but to replace or destory". 81 Since the

Khmer Rouge had no faith in the Khmer Viet Minh, they were

physically liquidated. 82 The Khmer Rouge also began to liquidate

the Sihanoukists and the former members of his government. Thus,

both the Khmer Viet Minh and the Sihanoukists became the targets

of attack and they were branded as 'Third Force'. The Khmer

Rouge felt that it might divide the country's political forces

into three or four directions. on the purges the 1973 Party

History says "The Party took the position of strength,

attacking finally and chasing absolutely the third force which

was the· obstacle". 8 3 The local Khmer Rouge held political

positions in CPK organisations, where the Khmer Viet Minh were

80. Ben Kiernan, "Pol Pot and the Kampuchean", Communist Movement", in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds.), Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981, London, 1982, p.265.

81. Stephen Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle : The Origins of an Independent Revolution", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol.11, no.~, 1.979, p.l.9.

82. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, War and Hope : The Case for Cambodia, Paris, 1.979, pp.44-45.

83. summary of Annotated Party History, by Easten Region Military Political Service, September 1.973, Text reproduced in Karl D. Jackson (ed.), Cambodia, 1975-1978 : Rendezvous With Death, Appendix A, New Jersey, 1989, p.266.

189

assigned the combat positions. Half of the 1,500 retunred Khmer

Viet Minh died and it was presumed that the Khmer Rouge attitude

towards them might be the cause in the reduction of their

number. 84

When Nuon Chea, the deputy secretary of the CPK after

occupying large areas, wanted to start the combined military

operation against Lon Nol, it was opposed by I eng Sary and Son

Sen, who were in charge of the Northeastern zone. Pol Pot after

his return to Ratanakiri from Hanoi opposed the Nuon Chea's

proposal. But the Vietnamese and Hou Youn supported Nuon Chea.

The Vietnamese had offered a 200 bed military hospital,

establishment of a military training school in the Northeast, use

of Vietnamese cadres and technical advisers and they were all

turned down. Finally, the Vietnamese dropped the idea of a

combined struggle. Despite this, the Vietnamese retained their

cadre in the Northeast for about a year. 85

In Kratie there were no Khmer Rouge bases. But they

established their headquarters near Chinit river after Lon Nol's

Operation Chenla I in October 1970, which was aimed at clearing

the route to Kompong Thorn. In the East, the Vietnamese

recognized the authority of Pol Pot's Party centre and

established military, medical, radio-telegraphic and

84. Kiernan, n.80,p.266. 85. Kiernan, n.39,p.308.

190

aorninistrative schools. In the Southwest also they did the same.

When Pol Pot carne to know about them, they were closed down in

the middle of 1971. Both Heng Sarnrin and Hun Sen were graduated

from there. So Phirn, the Secretary of Eastern Zone was ignored

by Pol Pot. The Black Book claimed that the Party Centre

"devoted more time to political education than to technical

training. 86 The Vietnamese liberated a lot of territory in the

East and snatched weapons from the enemy and gave them to the

Khmers to raise a brigade.

In Kompong Thorn province, Southern zone, the local Khmer

Rouge forces fired on the Vietnamese Communists from behind

while the latter were attacking the Lon Nol forces in September

1970. 87 The Pol Pot group began its attacks on the Vietnamese

cadres. For sometime, communication between the Party Centre and

other zones was very limited. Therefore, there was some regional

autonomy. In Eastern zone, the Vietnamese met the Khmer

Communists on 7 October 1970 and guaranteed them that "when the

liberation of the country is achieved, they will participate in

the unified Khmer government. 88

According to the Black Book, the CPK Central Committee which

met in Plenary session in October 1970 decided that independence

and sovereignty of the country was important. Therefore, they

86. Ibid, p.J11. 87. Shawcross, n.1, p.250. 88. David E.Brown, "Exporting Insurgency The Communists in

Cambodia", in J .J. Zasloff and A. E. Goodman, (eds.) Indo­China in Conflict, Lexington, 1972, pp.1J0-131.

191

wanted to rely on their own forces. It was also decided that the

Vietnamese solidarity would continue with vigilance. In November

a week long inter-party summit meeting took place and the

relations strained. Hence, the Vietnamese were warned not to

divide Khmer people and the revolutionary army. The result was

that the Vietnamese assistance declined and the Vietnamese

advisers maintained low profile in late 197o. 89

THE ORGANISATION OF THE CPK

The CPK divided the areas which were under their

control as regions. They were :

I SOUTH WEST REGION : It included the provinces of Kampot, Koh

Kong, Sihanoukville, Kompong Seila, Takeo, Kompong Chhnang,

Kompong Speu, Oudong and Kandal provinces. 90 The zone was headed

by Koy Thuon who was assisted by Sreng, Deputy Secretary and Ke

Pauk, military commander. At a later date Ke Pauk got more

control over the zone.

II EASTERN ZONE : Kratie, svay Rieng, Prey Veng and Kompong Cham

provinces were included in the zone. The population of the zone

was equal to that of the Southwestern zone. But its area was

small in size. The zone was better organized and it was divided

89. Kiernan, n.39, pp.312-13. 90. Ith Sarin, "Life in the Bureaus (Offices) of the Khmer

Rouge", in Timothy Michael Carney ( ed.) , Communists Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia) : documents and Discussion, Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper n.106, Ithaca, New York, 1977, p.43.

192

into five regions (21, 22, 20, 24, and 23). For the next five

years its leadership remained stable. The zone executive

consisted of party secretary, Phim, Deputy Phuong and secretary

of Region 24, Chhouk.

Kratie. 91

Tiv 01 became the province chief of

III NORTHWEST ZONE : Kompong Thorn, Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey and

Banteay Chmar and regions from 1 to 7 were inclubed in the Zone

and headed by Muol Sambath. He was assisted by Khek Penn and

military commander Keu. Then he got control of the zone at a

later date.

IV NORTHEAST ZONE The Central Committee of the CPK directly

administered the zone headed by Son Sen.

V NORTH ZONE : The Regions numbered 31, 32, 35 and 36 included in

the zone. There were limited communication facilities.

VI Pursat, Battambang and Pailin provinces.

VII SPECIAL REGION : It was created at the end of 1971 and aimed

at controlling the area around Phnom Penh. The headquarters of

the Special Region were located on the Kompong Speu-Kompong

Chhnang border. Sok Thuok was the Chief of the Region. Besides

him there were Hang and Ros Chetthor.

VIII Preah Vihear, Stung Treng, Mondolkiri and Ratanakiri were

under the control of the Central Committee of the CPK. All these

provinces were the strong military bases of the CPK and close to

91. Kiernan, n.39, p.315.

193

Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. 92 In the liberated areas, elections

were held for the village and sub-district chiefs. The village

chief was elected by secret ballot and in turn he selected his

team. The Vietnamese encouraged those who commanded respect

including monks to contest for the post of village chief. The

CPK divided each region for the sake of convenience, into

sectors, (Damban), districts (Srok), village (Khum) and hamlet

(Phum). 93 The Chief of each Region had great influence in their

areas. These positions were occupied by the members of the

Central Committee of the CPK and the RGNUC.

THE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTHWEST ZONE

After the coup Non Suon and Phouk Chhay were released by Lon

Nol and they went into the countryside. But some others

remained in the capital. Pol Pot's brother Saloth Chhay who was

also released stayed in Phnom Penh in order to contest in the

elections which were due in September 1970. Meanwhile, Non Suon

went to the Southwest zone and began to work with the masses and

he became the Secretary of Region 31 in Kompong Chhnang province

in September. Phouk Chhay became the political commissar of the

zone armed forces. 94 Then there was some confusion regarding the

post of Secretary as there were Mok and Chou Chet equally

92. "Cambodian Peop1e 1 s War of Resistance Against US Aggression and for National Salvation in Fine shape", Peking Review,, vol.13, no.46, 13 November 1970, p.21.

93. Ith Sarin, n.90, p.43. 94. Ibid.

194

competent and popular. Therefore, the post of Chairman was

created for Chet who was in charge of political and

administrative affairs. Mok controlled military affairs. At the

same time, Prasith, Sangha Hoeun and Thuch Rin were also active

in the zone. 95

In the Southwest zone, the revolutionary movement became

popular because of genuine democratic elections and land reforms.

In Kompong Trach, a person was not allowed to retain over five

hectares of rice land. 96 In Kandal province land was scarce.

Hence, each family was given one hectare rice land and poor

people got benefit by this scheme. During 1970-73 period the

revolutionary organisation challenged the authority of Pol Pot.

Kandal area was led by Sok Thuok and his deputies were Heng and

Ros Chhetthor. 97 They belonged to the cc of the CPK. Non Suon

became a political commissar of Saang-koh Thorn sector of Kandal

province. Non Suon was the "most important Communist cadre in the

country 11 •98 By December 1973 in Kandal Province the Khmer Rouge

under the leadership of Khieu Samphan, established its authority

by quelling the pro-Sihanouk and Pro-Vietnamese elements. No

doubt it was a setback for Non Suon. After 1972 both Hang and

Ros Chetthor disappeared. On Kandal the Black Book criticized

the Vietnamese policy of keeping its cadres. It said

Some elements of this group attacked the Communist Party of

95. Kiernan, n.39, p.314.

openly Kampu-

96. "Prosperous Cambodian Liberated Zone", Peking Review, vol. 16, no.20, 18 May 1973, p.13.

97. Ith Sarin, n.90, p.34. 98. Ibid.

195

chea, when the others carried out manoeuvres of seduction. And they launched continuous attacks at the time when our party had not yet achieved its unity in the whole country. 99

During 1970-71, clashes occurred in Saang-Koh Thorn district

of southern Cambodia between the Khmer Communists and the

Vietnamese Communists. As a result of the trouble anti-Vietnam

policy gained ground. But in May 1972 Hou Youn in a meeting in

the Southwest zone advocated the unity with the Lao and the

Vietnamese Communists to drive the us out of Indo-China. 100

Hu Nim represented the Southwest zone at a resistance

Congress in May 1970. In 1972 Chou Chet became the chairman of

the zone and he had great influence in the zone. Phouk Chhay

became political commissar and Ta Mol< military commander. Hou

Youn, Minister of the Interior in the RGNUC was also in the zone.

Except Ta Mol< all others were purged at a later date. 101 These

purges helped Pol Pot to bring the zone under the control of the

Party Centre.

Regarding the political programme implemented in the

Southwest Zone during 1972-73 Ith Sarin said that each

administrator must have Love, respect and serve the people

sincerely and affectionately. They must always be modest and

simple towards the people. They should not steal people's

property and take bribe from them. In every possible way they

99. Kiernan, n.ao, p.269. 100. Ibid, p.270. 101. Ith Sarin, n.90, pp.43, 37.

196

should be honest towards the people.

According to Ith Sarin, the Cultural Revolution had eserted

great influence on the cadre training programme. The philosophy

of the party was that the Khmer Rouge had to help the people in

the field. When a peasant fell ill, the cadres had to give the

needed medicines. The people began to support the organisation

because of their close co-operation with them. 102

But by the end of 1973, the Pol Pot group was able to weild

considerable influence in the Southwest Zone and Chou Chet was

attacked by the Khmer Rouge. As the Pol Pot group began to

control the affairs, strict rules and stiff penalties for non-

compliance were imposed. The zone had a troop strength of

15,000. 103 But the cadres solidarity with the Prince and the

Vietnamese was not liked by the Khmer Rouge. Therefore, the

immediate concern was to control the affairs of the zone and

estabilsh the authority of the Party Centre and implement its

policies. The Southwest Zone suffered during its attack on Phnom

Penh in July due to lack of co-ordination.

suffered due to the US B-52 bombing. 104

The forces also

In late 1973, the Vietnamese and the Chinese cadres

disappeared and the Khmer forces stayed. With the dawn of 1974,

difficult days started. It is quite unfortunate that the zone

leaders such as Ta Prachha and Prasith were taken away and

killed. These developments forced the People to flee.

102. Ibid, pp.46-50. 103. Ibid, p.43. 104. Kiernan, n.ao, p.274.

197

People who committed mistakes were taken away and killed by the

Khmer Rouge. Youths of 16 years old were recruited into the army

and those who refused were killed. 105

For some time the Southwest Zone cadres had resisted the

Khmer Rouge encroachments. In November and December 1973 the

local cadres won two large battles against the Pol Pot forces. 106

Byt by 1975, the zone was brought under the effective control of

the Pol Pot group. Ta Mok, the military commander became the

dominant figure there. Cadres like Phouk Chhay, Hou Youn and

Chou Chet lost the positions and patronage of the Pol Pot

group.107

NORTHWEST ZONE

Leav Keo Moni, a Hanoi trained, began to command troops in

Battambang province by November 1972. The revolutionary

organization was loyal to the Prince. According to Lon Nol

district Chief Keo Moni was popular with the people and he

mobilized people for the cause of revolution. During 1970-71,

the Communists began to behave in a better way towards the

people. Even the captured soliders were not killed and were

asked to desert to the side of the NUFc. 108 Yun Soen a former

student of Paris, became the Deputy Secretary of Region 22 in

Kompong Cham. From 1973 onwards things changed here.

105. Ibid, pp.275-76. 106. Ibid. 107. Kampuchea Dossier, Part 2, Hanoi, 1978, p.37. 108. Kiernan, n.39, p.319.

198

Villagers were massacred in north of Pursat province by Pol Pot

forces from 1974.

Pot.109

Kornpong Thorn was the native Province of Pol

NORTHERN ZONE

Rath Sarnuoen played a co-ordinating role with the Lao and

Vietnamese Communists. Taing Sarirn was initially appointed as

CPK Secretary of a district in the Northern zone and then he

became a member of the CPK Committee for Region 31 by the end of

1970. 110

NORTHEASTERN ZONE

In this zone, violence occurred against the people from the

middle of 1974. The pro-Sihanouk cadres who refused to oblige

Pol Pot's policies became the targets of attack. The Cham

Muslims who had supported the Prince opposed the collectivization

process and they favoured the abolition of middle men. 111

EASTERN ZONE

There was conflict between the Pol Pot group and the pro-

Sihanouk and Pro-Vietnamese forces. Anti-Pol Pot forces

controlled the zone in 1974. In Prey Veng popular military

rebellions broke out.112 so Pum who came from Hanoi resolved

109. FBIS, 4 October 1977, p.H-38. 110. Kiernan, n.39, p.319. 111. Kiernan, n.ao, p.278. 112. Kampuchea Dossier, Part 2, n.107, p.39.

199

these problems. Then he became a Party Secretary of Reg ion 2 5.

The revolutionaries became popular through moderate land refoms

and were able to attract volunteers.

Despite the conflict between the Khmer Rouge and the

Vietnamese, the war was going on well on Lon Nol. By the end of

1970, there were. 15,000 Khmer Communists fighting in regualr

units. The September Chenla I operation was effectively stalled

by the Communists. Then the breaking of the siege of Kompong

Thorn failed. By January 1971, the Khmer Rouge claimed 12 well-

trained regiments. By June the CIA estimates of regular and

guerrilla forces put at 125,000. In July, the us Defense

Intelligence Agency "estimated that the Communists control some

two to three million.people in Cambodia out of a total of about

seven million".113

Lon Nol was able to retain control in towns and nearby

areas. The Communists succeeded in bringing the rural areas as

under their control. Thus, they won the political war in the

countryside. But their influence did not spread to all parts of

the country and they were not popular with the majority of the

people. Therefore, before the final victory, the CPK Centre

wanted to spread to all parts and wanted to attain "mastery over

the revolutionary qroups".114

Regarding the social analysis of the Khmer society, the ICP

113. Kiernan, n.39,p.322. 114. Ibid, p.323.

200

felt that the Cambodian society was considered in 1920s as one of

the 'nascent capitalism ... with many vestiges of feudalism'. It

is to be remember that Hou Youn also held the ICP view. But the

Khmer Rouge considered the Khmer society as 'a semi-colonial and

semi-fedual country' and it was in line with the Communist Party

of China's analysis of pre-revolutionary China. It was felt that

the peasantry was exploited by the fedual landlords. But the

Khmer peasant was indebted to the ethnic Chinese adn it was not

mentioned by the Khmer Rouge. 115 Even though they wanted to rely

on the 'worker peasant forces' to win revolution, they 'did not

depend on the forces of the workers' because, in fact, they did

not become the vanguard but they were only the peasants. 116 The

CPK felt that the exploiting classes resisted the people's war.

Those who experienced oppression were fully determined to wage

war against the exploiting and imperialist classes.

THE CONGRESS OF THE CPK, JULY 1971

A two week conferende of the CPK was held in the Northern

Zone at Pol Pot's headquarters in July 1971. The participants

ere Pol Pot, Noun Chea, Vorn Vet, Non Suon, Ney Sarann, Um

Neng, Chou Chet, So Phim, Phuong, Chhouk, Seng Hong, Koy Thuon,

Ke Pauk, Mok, Muol Sambath, Khieuu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim,

some ethnic minority representatives and many Hanoi-trained

115. W.E.Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party", Pacific Affairs, vol.54, no.2, Summer 1981, p.210.

116. Kiernan, n.39,p.324.

201

Khmers. 117

A new Central Committee was elected with thirty members.

Chou Chet, Urn Neang, Kang Chap, So Doeun and Khieu Samphan became

new full members. Both Hou Youn and Hu Nim became candidate

members. Entry of Hanoi-trained Khmers was stalled and Keo Meas

was left out and the Politburo remained unchanged.

National Democratic Revolution became the party policy

followed by Collectivization and evacuation of towns. But Hou

Youn, Hu Nim, Khieu Samphan, So Phim and Koy Thuon opposed

collectivization and they favoured mutual aid teams. 118 Hou Youn

as Minister of Interior, Communal Reforms and Co-operatives was

against to use his name as a screen and made him a 'puppet

minister'. He also sensed the elimination of markets.

The CPK wanted to establish contacts with foreign powers on

the basis of equality and non-interference in the internal

affairs of others. Non Suon treated the 1971 Congress as a study

session. Vorn Vet claimed that the Congress took place after the

study session. 119 It can be presumed that it was a secret

Congress and passed resolutions favourable to Pol Pot group.

DECLINE OF KHMER REPUBLIC'S WAR EFFORTS

The Khmer Rouge intensified its attacks on the Khmer

117. Ibid, p.327. 118. For a discussion of mutual aid teams see Hou Huon, "Solving

Rural Problems A Socialist Programme to Safeguard the Nation", trans by Chanthou Boua in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds.), Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981, London, 1982, pp.136, 139-42, 144-50.

119. Kiernan, n.39, p.328.

202

Republican forces. On 21 January 1971 Pochentong airport was

fired with rockets by the Viet Cong forces. On the Khmer

Republic's side efforts were not effective to resist the

enemy. 120 The US rushed war materials to Cambodia on 23 January

to help the Khmer Republic to recover from devastation caused by

a Communist attack in which the Cambodian Air Force was almost

completely destroyed.121 There was a steady decline of the

territory administered by Lon Nol and steady increase of the

terri tory under the Khmer Rouge control. The Khmer Rouge also

increased its strength between 30 to 40 thousand men. With their

strength, they were in a position to challenge the authority of

Phnom Penh government with the control of rice producing areas by

the Khmer Rouge, it 'created serious food shortages and food

riots' brokeout. To avert starvation, the us began to airlift

120 tons of rice daily into Phnom Penh. People began to move

into the capital from Kompong Cham, svay Rieng and Prey Veng

provinces as a result of the US B-52 bombings on heavily

populated Khmer Rouge controlled areas. 122 Keeping in view the

military weakness of Lon Nol, who was unable to resist the enemy,

Secretary Laird in June asked the US president to help to

increase the Republican troops to 220,000 and an aid of US $350

million for the next year. 123 It was agreed to increase the

120. "Behind the Facade of the Phnom Penh Administration", Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, no.?, December 1972, p.22.

121. The Hindu, 24 January 1971. 122. Asian Recorder, vol.XIX, no.13, 26 March - 1 April 1973,

p.11299, see also Ibid, vol.XIX, no.24, 11-17 June 1973, p.11435, Laura Summers, "The Cambodian Civil War", Current History, vol.63, no.376, December 1972, p.259.

123. Shawcross,n.1, p.194. see also Asian Recorder, vol.XIX, no.31, 30 July-S August 1973, p.11517.

203

Cambodian army to 220,000 by January 1973.

In August 1971, Lon Nol launched operation Chenla II to

clear the Highway through Region 31 to Kompong Thorn City. The

Republican forces which were around 200,000 was not effectively

fielded a division for the task and it led to the catastrophic

collapse of the Chenla II operation on 4 December 1971. 124 The

Republic recruited more number into the army. It lacked "any

ideological preparation for the civil war and a total pre-

occupation with a foreign enemy defined a racial and religious

terms. "After the failure of the Chenla II in December 1971,

when the fleeing soldiers to Phnom Penh were asked, they said

that they could not kill the other Khmers. They were recruited

'to defend Khmer culture, they could not in turn contribute to

its destruction". Several soliders defected to the Khmer Rouge

side. 125 From the military point of view, the failure of Chenla

II appeared to be problematic for the survival of the Republic.

From a political point of view, prospects for the consolidation

of the Republic were equally doubtful. Hence, the failure of the

"Chenla II marked the turning point in the Cambodian war because

it was a political as well as a military defeat for Lon Nol; it

signaled the beginning of widespread public recognition of civil

war".126

124. "Big Victory on Highway 6", Peking Review, vol.14, no.51, 17 December 1971,pp.l7,22.

125. Summers, n.122, p.260, see also Zudith Coburn, "The Army Nurses its wounds", FEER, vol.LXXIV,no.51, 18 December 1971, p.16.

126. Summers, n.112, p.259.

204

During the Chenla II operation in August 1971, the peasants

who had been given shelter to the Vietnamese were killed by the

Khmer Rouge in Baray, Kornpong Thorn. There took place anti-

Vietnamese demonstrations in the Northern and Eastern Zones. It

was alleged that Ke Pauk, the Zone military Commander, was

responsible for th violence. Meanwhile, Speical Zone around

Phnom Penh was created. The Party's Centre strategy was

implemented by using dernestic Communists against Hanoi-trained

Khmers. Regarding the elimination of such people, a local CPK

member said thus :

We called those Khmers from Hanoi to come to study and someone led them away. So, really we were expelling them... When we began pulling them out the others did not realize what was happening. And so we were able to get rid of almost all of them. Very few realized what was happening in time and escaped to Vietnam. 127

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

During 1970-71 period the revolutionaries introduced certain

reforms in the liberated areas. The policies of land

distribution became popular among poor peasants. Therefore, they

supported the revolution. But with the dawn of 1972, pro-

Sihanouk, Hanoi-trained Khmers and the Vietnamese were gradually

liquidated by the Khmer Rouge. They were friendly with the

people. After their elimination in all the regions attempts were

made to install pro-Pol Pot Party Centre cadres to important

127. Quoted in Kiernan, n.39,pp.334-35.

205

positons. After this Pol Pot set in motion the ideas of National

Democratic Revolution to give a shape to the liberated areas.

According to Ith Sarin the party was not mentioned in the

liberated areas. In order to preserve the ~ecrecy and the

existence of the party, the government was ascribed to the

'Angka' or 'Organisation' . 128 The process of collectivization

was in tune with the ideas of mutual aid teams proposed by Hou

Youn and other Khmer left intellectuals. At village level a group

of about 12 to 15 people were put together headed by a chairman

who was, in turn, elected by the village chief. These groups

were responsbile for the organisation of agricultural

produciton. 129

Tensions prevailed between the Khmer Rouge and the North

Vietnamese. According to Hou Youn, the party 'has foreseen all

in preparing for danger from the VC/NVA'. He felt that the Khmer

Rouge" seems to have control over all activities in its zones.

The VC/NVA are far from being the masters 11•130

The Khmer Rouge had introduced strict rules for its cadres".

Consumption of liquor, gambling, adultery and feudal terms of

address were eliminated. Personal characteristics were to be

replaced by a collective spirit. Short-tempered cadres were

accused of having 'thick individual traits'. One should

128. Ith Sarin, n.90, p.34. 129. Hou Yuon, n.118, pp.136-50. see also Laura Summers

"Translator's Introduction", in Khieu Samphan's "Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development", Data Paper no.111, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1979, pp.1-19.

130. Carney, n.90, p.18.

206

observe a cadre and cr i ticiae in order to help them better

socialists. Every one was expected to have trust in the Angkar

because the organisation has as many eyes as a "pine apple and

cannot make mistakes". It was hoped that the Khmer Rouge might

hate the Republican government. To make revolution they had to

depend on their own strength, i.e., self-reliance. To win the

favour of the people the cadres had to respect, 'the ways of the

people' and had to 'study from the people in order to be like the

people. Interaction between the cadres and the peasant was

necessary in order to educate each other in the way which

Communists called 'construction'. Moreover, they emphasized the

need of more production and encouraged to hate Lon Nol. The

movement under Pol Pot became totalitarian by the end of 1972.

But the peasants remained passive, very attached to their habits

and customs. The New collective life being imposed upon them

frightened them. Most of them kept secret their attachment to

Sihanouk and his regime. The Khmer Rouge knew pretty well that

he was popular among the peasants and abroad. Therefore, they

wanted to convert his popularity for their own advantage. "The

Central Committee of the Khmer Communist Party pulled Sihanouk

into their trap by means of Peking. Having got him in hand, the

Khmer Rouge got ready to squeeze him dry 11•131

From mid-june 1972, the people in the Regions of 13 and 35

in Takeo and Kampot were asked to wear black dress and family

131. Ith Sarin, n.90, pp.34-55.

207

bonds were discouraged. Hanoi-trained Khmers were relieved of

their duties and dubbed them as revisionists, lazy and cowards.

The captured Lon Nol solders were killed by the Khmer Rouge, but

the Vietnamese never killed, instead encouraged defection to the

side of revolutionaries. In Region 15, Northwest of Phnom Penh

500 Lon Nol soldiers were killed by the Khmer Rouge in 1972. The

CPK Centre used ~he domestic veterans to eliminate the Hanoi-

trained Khmers and Sihanoukists. Then the Purge of domestic

Issarak veterns pegan. In the Eastern Zone, Yun Soeun, Zone's

deputy secretary tried to re-establish secondary education, but

it was opposed by the Party Centre. In Region 21, anti-

Vietnamese demonstrations were organized in mid-1972 and Vietnam

was branded as the acute enemy by the CPK. Attacks also took

place on the Khmer Rumdos by the CPK in Region 32 in the Northern

zone. The CPK sought the help of the Khmer Rumdos to expel the

Vietnamese from Cambodia. 132

As a result of attacks on the Vietnamese, their troop

strength came down to 8,000. But nearly 30,000 troops stationed

on the border and at supply routes and the CPK began to

confiscate food and anununi tion from the Vietnamese. In April

1972, the CPK forces drove the Vietnamese where they did not

accept the CPK state power. The conflict helped the South

Vietnamese forces to reopen highway 2 in mid-1972 and establish

the authority of the Republic. 133 When the Paris peace tasks

began for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, the CPK refused

132. Ibid, p.42. see also Shawcross, n.1, p.251. 133. Shawcross, n.1, p.251.

208

for a negotiated settlement to the Cambodian war. 134 At the same

time, Pol Pot obtained guarantees from Prince Sihanouk to that

effect. The Khmer Rouge feared that Vietnam may incorporate

Cambodia in the Indo-China Federation. On 7 February 1973, a

joint communique from the DRVN and the RGNUC insisted that in

Cambodia war would continue. 135

The Khmer Ro~ge objected to the Vietnamese buying of draught

animal, fearing that it may affect local agriculture, and

objected to the taxing of river traffic by the Vietnamese and

felt that their withdrawal would stop the US aerial bombings. On

1 December 1971 Chau Seng, Minister of Speical Missions in RGNUC,

claimed that the Khmer Rouge controlled four-fifths of Cambodia's

territory and five-sevenths of the population. 136 In view of

this Lon Nol was jokingly called the 'Mayor of Phnom Penh',

rather than as president of the Khmer Republic. 137

The Khmer Rouge continued their military operations during

1972 in and around Angkor Wat. Lon Nol government feared that

the North Vietnamese troops, which occupied the temple area,

would invite Prince Sihanouk to install him at the Angkor area.

At Phnom Bakleng area, Lon Nol forces were able to recapture

Phnom Bakleng which restored some strategic advantage to the

government. 138 The Khmer Rouge continued to register success

134. Ith Sarin, n.90, pp.20-21. 135. Shawcross, n.1, p.264. 136. Peter A.Poole, "Cambodia The Cost of Survival", Asian

survey, vol.XII, no.2, February 1972, p.150. 137. Gordon with Young, n.43, p.39. 138. Peter A.Poole, "Cambodia : Will Vietnam Truce Halt Drift to

Civil War ? 11 , Asian Survey, vol.XIII, no.1, January 1973, p.78.

209

after success with its army which rose to an estimated 40 to 50

thousand men which made rubber plantations area as its

headquarters. Apart from the Khmer Rouge forces, there were some

independent regiments, answerable only to the headquarters. The

average battlion consisted of several hundred men which included

ten or fifteen No~th Vietnamese radio operators and advisers. 139

The Khmer Rouge claimed that it controlled 90% of the Cambodian

territory and a population of 5,500,000. 14° Khieu Samphan said:

"The liberated zone in Cambodia is vast in expanse whereas the

areas temporarily occupied by the enemy are small and ever

contradicting, consisting only of Phnom Penh and a few provincial

capitals 11•141

The Khmer Rouge, apart from controlling more area and

population, had achieved more effective rural administration

through mass organisations. They were : Peasants' Association,

Patriotic Monks' Association and the Secret Alliance of Communist

Yough of Kampuchea. These organisations helped to recruit

members with middle class background. 142

ECONOMIC CRISIS

The activities of the Khmer Rouge affected the economy of

139. Donald Kirk, "Cambodia 1973 : Year of the Bomb Halt", Asian Survey, vol.XIV, no.l, January 1974, p.94.

140. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XIX, 18-24 June 1973, p.25941.

141. Donald Kirk, "Cambodia in 1974 Governments on Trial", Asian Survey, vol.XV, no.1, January 1975, p.54.

142. "Prosperous Cambodian Liberated zone", Peking Review, vol.16, no.20., 18 May 1973, pp.14-15.

210

Cambodia. To weaken Lon Nol's power base, the Khmer Rouge began

cutting off roads leading to towns and villages from the

beginning of April 1970. On account of the conflict, rubber

plantations in Memot and Snoul could not be maintained properly.

As a reult, the Chup plantations, covering 20,000 hectares, the

largest in the country, had to be abandoned. A 5, 000 hectare

tract, owned by the French Societie Khmere de Culture Tropicale

in Kompong Thorn province, was closed in December 1970.

Therefore, the rubber exports declined. 143

This affeted rice production also. War conditions

discouraged the peasants to plant normal quantities of rice and

were unable to harvest what they had planted. The US bombings

forced the peasant to abandon the lands and took refuge in Phnom

Penh. Hence, the rice cultivation declined to 30%. 144 In 1970

rice export declined due to less production and dislocation of

transport system. By August 1970 bridges were blown up by the

Khmer Rouge. Therefore, the Battambang-Phnom Penh rail system got

disturbed and the closure of Route 4 to Kompong Som and other

routes leading to the Gulf of Thailand greatly hindered the rice

exports. 145

By June 1971 there was acute shortage of rice in Phnom Penh.

Cambodia, a rice exporting country, had to import 32,000 tons of

143. Cambodia exported 47,485 tons of rubber in 1969. It declined to 18,426 tons by November 1970. see Donald Kirk, "Cambodia's Economic Crisis", Asian Survey, vol.XI, no.3, March 1971, p.248.

144. Ibid, p.249. 145. Ibid., see also Poole, n.138, p.81.

211

rice to feed the people of Phnom Penh and the army. So, Khung

Thay Ly, Minister of Industry, Trade and Food was forced to

resign on 23 July 1971. When the guerrilla raids destroyed the

civilian fuel stocks In Tarn, Minister of Interior and security,

was asked to resign. Thus there was no security to the

Government establishments and the common man was unable to get

rice at reasonable price.146

Lon Nol was faced with yet another problem. By 11 September

1971 elections were due to the National Assembly which had

already been given an year's extension in September 1970. The

situation was not conducive to elections. Hence, he proclaimed

an emergency on 20 October 1971 and suspended the freedom of

Press, freedom of expression and secrecy of correspon-dence. The

newspapers which had been suspended earlier were not allowed to

reappear. 147

LON NOL.BECOMES HEAD OF STATE

On 10 March 1972 Cheng Heng, Head of State, announced his

resignation in favour of Marshal Lon Nol. Soon after assuming

off ice the Marshal dissolved the Consti tutent Assembly. The

National Assembly was converted into Constitutent Assembly after

the expiry of its date on 11 September 1971. On 12 March,

146. Boris Baczynskj, 11 In Cambodia Two's company", FEER, vol.LXXIV, no.40, 2 October 1971, p.14, see also T.D.Allman, "One Man's Pinnacle 11

, Ibid, pp.14-15. 14 7. Keesing 's Contemporary Archives, vol. no. XVII, 13-20 May

1972, p.25256, see also Judith Coburn, "Cambodia : New Game­Old Wicket", FEER, vol.LXXIV, no.44, 30 October 1971, p.12.

212

Sirik Matak, the Prime Minister was dismissed following the

corruption charges levelled against him by law students. 1 48 Lon

Nol also assumed the position of the President of the Council of

Ministes and promised to appoint a new Prime Minister soon.

SON NGOC THANH BECOMES PRIME MINISTER

Yem Sambaur, the former President of the Assembly and Sim

Var, Cambodian Ambassador to Japan, were persuaded by Lon Nol to

accept the premiership. As they declined the offer Lon Nol

appointed Son Ngoc Thanh, an old, staunch rival of Prince

Sihanouk, as the Prime Minister on 18 March 1972 the second

anniversary of the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk was power. 149 On

14 October he stepped down after the elections to the National

Assembly in favour of Heng Thun Hak.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

A new constitution, providing for a strong chief executive

had been submitted for referendum on 30 April 1972, which was

approved by 96% of the voters. 150 Basing on the new

consititution, elections were held for the presidentship on 4

June 1972. Besides Lon Nol, In Tam, Cabinet Minister, and

Professor Keo An, Dean, Law Faculty at Phnom Penh University

148. Judith Coburn, "And Now, A King in Khaki", FEER, vol.LXXV, no.12, 18 March 1972, pp.5-6.

149. Poole,n.138,p.79. see also T.J.S.,George, "Last Round for Lon Nol", FEER, vol.LXXV, no.13, 25 March 1972, p.5.

150. "A US Instigated Referendum", Vietnam Courier, no.1, June 1972, p.18.

213

contested for the. post. In the elections Lon Nol got 574, 738

votes (55%) and his rivals In Tam and Keo An got 250,900 (24%)

and 214,522 (21%) votes respectively. 151 On 3 July Lon Nol was

sworn in as Cambodia's first elected President.

ELECTIONS ~ THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

According to. the new electoral law promulgated on 15 July

1972 the provinces under Sihanoukists control each was to be

represented by at least two deputies, elected from among the

refugees of those provinces. 152 The Republican party and the

Democratic party led by Sirik Matak and In Tarn respectively,

boycotted the elections protesting against the 'unconstitutional

and un-democratic' electro! law. Hence, the Social Republican

Party led by Lon Non, the President's brother and the Pracheachon

led by Pen Yough contested in the elections, which were held on 3

September 1972. All the 126 seats were won by the Social

Republican Party. In the Senate elections held two weeks later

also all the seats were bagged by the Social Republican Party. 153

On 14 October Hang Thun took the reigns of Pr irne Ministership

from Son Ngoc Thanh.154

On 4 November Lon Nol announced the formation of a committee

151. "Electoral Farce in Phnom Penh", Vietnam Courier, no.2, July 1972, p. 19. see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVIII, 15-22 July 1972, p.25368.

152. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVIII, 28 October -4 November 1974, p.25546.

153. Kirk, n.139, p.92. see also Cynicism, FEER, vol.78,no.44, Regime in Distress", Vietnam p.15.

Boris Baczynskj, "Socio-28 October 1972, p. 24. "A Courier,no.5, October 1972,

154. "Behind the Facade ... ", n.l20, p.24.

214

to handle the problems of national reconciliation and

reconstruction after cease-fire. He offered complete amnesty to

the Khmer Rouge. After expulsion of the Prince and laying down

of arms, they could serve in the army or take employment. Thus

they could return to the civilian life.

THE KHMER ROUGE ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT

On 4 June 1972, two rockets were fired by the revolutio-

naries at the Ministry of Defense. A third rocket was aimed at

Lon Nol' s private building killing three small girls. A few

days later, terrorists fired thirty more rockets at the capital

resulted in killing two people and wounding five persons. The

North Vietnamese troops attacked a provincial headquarters at

Takhmau, 6 miles away from Phnom Penh on the same day . 155 It

exposed the security weakness of Lon Nol.

As a result of the disruption of rail line between Phnom

Penh and Battambang, and the Route 5 by the enemy, food riots

borke out on 7 and 8 September. On 9 September, the US announced

the airlifting of rice from Saigon. Thailand also supplied some

rice and it helped to normalize the situation. 156 The riots

exposed the short supply of rice and the inability of the Lon Nol

Government to meet the situation.

At the diplomatic level, the representatives of the RGNUC

were allowed to participate for one session of a meeting of Non-

155. Poole, n.138, p.ao. 156. Ibid, pp.S0-81.

215

Aligned States at Georgetown, Guyana in August. 157 Definitely it

was a diplomatic victory for the Khmer Rouge. Sensing danger,

the Khmer Republic sent a delegation to the UN led by Foreign

Minister at the end of 1972, who were able to retain seat in the

General Assembly. 158 There were rumours by the end of 1972 that

the Republican officials were in touch with the PRC and the DRVN

and with some dissident Khmer groups. But at this stage

rapproachment betw·een the warring Khmer factions appeared

doubtful.

BOMB ATTACK ON PRESIDENTIAL PALACE

By the beginning of March 1973, rumours were ripe that Phnom

Penh was on the verge of a non-Communist coup. The teachers went

on agitation against the government. 159 The government's desire

to win popularity by celebrating the third anniversary of the

overthrow of the Prince on 18 March 1973 foundered when on 17

March Captain So Pothra, son-in-law of the Prince, made a bomb

attack on Presidential Palace. 160 In the attack 43 people lost

their lives and 50 were wounded. However, the President escaped

unhurt. 161 Immediately after the attack, the President

157. "The Cambodian People March On", Peking Review, vol.15,no.46, 17 November 1972, p.10.

158. International Herald Tribune, 24 November 1974, see also Bangkok Post, 25 November 1974.

159. "Lon Nol Clique's Sharpening Crisis", Peking Review, vol.16, no.12, 23 March 1973, p.19.

160. Asian Recorder, vol.XIX, no.19, 7-13 May 1973, p.11372. see also "Phnom Penh SOS", Vietnam Courier, no. 12, May 1973, p.20.

161. Asian Recorder, n.160. p.11372.

216

Proclaimed again state of emergency, the third after the advent

of the Republic. Consequently, Civil liberties wre suspended for

six months. Fifty five members of the royal family, including

Queen Kossamak, and several opposition leaders, journalists,

editors, commanders, teachers and students were arrested. 162

Following the resignation of Hang Thun Hak on 17 April

1973, 163 Lon Nol announced the appointment of a Supreme State

Council, the country's highest decision-making body, composed of

the leading members of various political parties. The leaders of

the opposition parties demanded the restoration of democratic

institutions. These developments, in one way or other helped in

the formation of a new cabinet on 14 May 1973 by In Tam and he

said that his government would negotiate with the Khmer Rouge,

reorganize the army and form a Natioal Security Police. He also

assured that he would improve the economy and regulate food

supplies. 164

PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE KHMER ROUGE

The Khmer Rouge during 1972 and 1973 effectively

demonstrated their strength in attacking the Lon Nol

establishments. It was due to their high-level training and

motivation imbued by their leaders to its cadres that they

achieved this. Meanwhile, they had established their

headquarters in the rubber plantations 100 miles away from Phnom

Penh. 165

162. Ibid., see also Kirk, n.139, p.92. 163. Asian Recorder, vol.XX, no.24, 11-17 June 1973, p.11434. 164. Ibid, vol.XIX, no.28, 9-15 July 1973, p.11480-81. 165. Kirk, n.139, p.93.

217

In January 1973, the Prince became favourable for

reconciliation, but by February he changed his mind, presumably

under pressure from the Khmer Rouge. 166 Kissinger also said on

23 January that the us halt bombing Cambodia from 29 January, if

the other side reciprocated and a defacto cease-fire would come

about. 167 Already cease-fire agreements were signed in case of

Laos and Vietnam. But both sides were unwilling to negotiate

with each other.

PRINCE SIHANOUK'S VISI'I' TO THE "LIBERATED" ZONES

As the resistance was in progress the position of Prince

Sihanouk, interestingly enough, began to decline in the resist-

ance setup. He indeed claimed that he was recognized by the

Khmer Rouge as the legitimate Head of State. But, the Khmer

Rouge systematically liquidated pro-Sihanouk cadres. 168 His

weakend position however became clear when he visited the

'Liberated zone' in cambodia accompanied by his wife Princess

Monique and his Special Envoy Ieng Sary in order to strengthen

his ties with the Khmer Rouge operating in Cambodia. There

developed a split between his Roylist supporters and the forces

of the Khmer Rouge. When he came to address a meeting at Phnom

Kulen, the Khmer Rouge forces drove away the cadres who were

invited to the meeting. 1 69

166. Ibid, p.94. 167. Shawcross, n.1, pp.261-62. 168. Ith Sarin, n.90, p.39. 169. Ponchaud, n.28, p.l90.

218

Prince Sihanouk, Princess Monique and !eng sary travelled

into the 'Liberated zone' in March 1973. 170 They travelled from

the northeastern Province of Stung Treng to the Angkor Wat in

Siem Reap province. 171 The significance of the Prince's journey

was aimed at providing the needed propaganda and support to the

RGNUC leaders. Secondly, it may be presumed that the Khmer Rouge

carried out the insurgency. So he had to follow their wishes. 172

PEACE OVERTURES TO THE PRINCE

Meanwhile, Lon Nol regime tried for peace settlement with

Prince Sihanouk. On 6 July 1973, Long Baret, Republican Foreign

Minister tried for peace by requesting all parties to apply

Article 20 of the Paris Agreement of January 1973 which called

for the ending of Military activities in Cambodia by foreign

countries. 173 The Prince rejected the peace proposals. 174

Meanwhile, In Tam, the Prime Minister, resigned on 7 December

1973 and was succeeded by Long Baret as Prime Minister on 20

December 1973.

As noted above, the Prince Sihanouk was opposed to a

negotiated peace settlement, as the Khmer Rouge intensified their

attacks on Phnom Penh and very often cutting the roads and firing

170. "A Historic Tour'', Vietnam Courier, no.l2, May 1973, p.19. 171. "Warm Congratulations on the Great success of Samdech

Sihanouk' s Inspection Tour of the Liberated Zone in Cambodia", Peking Review, vol.16,no.15,13 April 1973, pp.4-5.

172. Kirk, n.139, pp.94-95. 173. Asian Recorder, vol.XIX, no.37, 10-16 September 1973,

p.11589. 174. "Summary of Negotiating Efforts on Cambodia", Department of

State Bulletin, 31 March 1975, p.401.

219

on oil tankers. On 20 July, the Khmer Rouge started its most

virulent offensive against Lon Nol. In August 1973, the Prince

advised all foreigners and diplomats to leave Cambodia or become

'victims' of the war for Phnom Penh. In August 20,000 - 30,000

Khmer Rouge troops were operating within 25 - mile radius of the

capital. 175 Then, they penetrated the defenses of Kompong Cham,

4 7 miles northeast of Phnom Penh and overran it by early

September. 176 But Lon Nol forces, after a months fighting,

snatched a vital airstrip. The Khmer Rouge had to vacate Kompong

Cham due to lack of supplies. 17 7

On 9 November 1973, the seat of the resistance government

was transferred from Peking to the NUFC controlled area in

Cambodia and Khieu Samphan was chosen as the acting Prime

Minister. 178 There was speculation that Lon Nol would step downn

and a coalition government would be formed under the leadership

of Prince Sihanouk.l79

EVACUATION OF VILLAGES

In 1973, a tough young militant cadre came to the Southwest

zone and forced the villagers to move to uninhabited forest

175. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XIX, 5-11 November 1973, p.26186.

176. Ibid. 177. Kirk, n.139, pp.96-99. 178. "Cambodia : To Move Back Those RGNU Ministries Functioning

Abroad", Peking Review, vol.16, no.46, 16 November 1973, p.12.

179. Kirk, n.139, p.99.

220

land. This programme was carried out in Karnpot, Takeo and Kandal

provinces. "This large-scale relocation process which lasted

from July to December 1973 had extremely harsh results, was

bitterly opposed by most people and caused many to flee to South

Vietnarn". 180 The relocated villages were not allowed to bring

many things with them. Their harvest was confiscated by the

State and the rice was rationed. It is very interesting to note

that in a Buddhist dominated country like Cambodia, even religion

was also attacked; monks were forced to join the army or forced

to leave the pagodas to work in the fields. Families were

separated and Communal eating was introduced. State monopoly was

established over rice, salt, fuel, cloth and petrol. When the

government policies were implemented in Region 31 at the instance

of Ke Pauk and Khieu Ponnary 50,000 peasants fled to Kompong Thorn

City.181 There were low food rations. Soldiers had to work

along with other people. Black dress was compulsory for all of

them and violation of rules resulted in death sentence. The

towns people were asked to clear the forest for cul ti vat ion.

Work was collective and the harvest was confiscated to meet the

demand of the army Money was abolished. In the Northeast, the

tribal people opposed the idea of collectivization.

The number of Buddhist festivals were reduced to two per

year. The Cham rnuslirns were totally forbidden. Islamic practices

were forbidden and they "threatend to destroy all mosques by the

180. Kiernan, n.BO, pp.278-79. 181. Kiernan, n.39, p.371.

221

end of 1974". When more Buddhist monks were not willing to serve

in the army there were large-scale killing of monks in July in

Kampot. 182

In Southwest people portested the CPK's attempts to relocate

people and confiscate rice. In March 1974 10,000 Khmer Rumdos

surrendered to Lon Nol forces and wanted to fight against the

CPK, but they wer.e not allowed to do so. 183 Above 16 years old

youth were drafted into the army and it was followed by the

execution of Prasith in mid 1974. Therefore, 200 of his

followers escaped arrest and went to Cardamom mountains on Thai

border and they had the backing of the ethnic Khmers and local

Thai officials across the border. 184

The Cham Islamic movement in the Eastern Zone was disbanded

and its leader Sos Man was asked to live quietly in a village in

Region 21. The white Khmers (Khmer Saor) mostly muslim Khmers

broke away with the Khmer Rouge and went into the forest. Their

leaders were former Communist officials.

and oppose collectivization of property.

the abolition of middlemen 11 •185

"They support Sihanouk

They believe simply in

In 1974, the remaining Vietnamese were dirven out from the

Eastern Zone and most of the Hanoi-trained Khmers were arrested.

The Vietnamese women who had married Khmer men were exempted.

182. SWB FE/ 4 7341 A3 /2, 14 August 1973. see also Kiernan, n. 39, p.382.

183. Washington Post, 8 March 1974. 184. Wilfred Burchett, The China, Cambodia, Vietnam Triangle,

London, 1981,pp.195-96. 185. Kiernan, n.39, p.387.

222

Anti-Vietnamese policy was floated and Vietnam was criticised as

revisionist because of its peace agreement with the US and its

opposition to the Co-operatives in Cambodia. The Prince was also

not supported by the Khmer Rouge who had described him as "a

leech on the revolution". Freedom of speech was also curtailed

and people were scared to criticize the Khmer Rouge even in their

homes. If it was overheard the persons were taken away, tcrtured

and killed. As part of the Khmer Rouge policies, all the rubber

plantations in the 'liberated zone' were nationalized. 186

THE US BOMBINGS

During February - August 1973, the us dropped 257,465 tons

of bombs on Cambodia. The US bombings resulted in killing of

civilians and destroying villages. Many people fled fearing

bombing. Therefore, the us bombing was the main reason for

refugee movement187 and several thousand got killed and wounded.

The war created 3,389,000 refugees out of seven million Cambodian

population. Half of these were displaced during 1973. The

massive suffering of the 1973 bombing and the outrage it provoked

helped the Pol Pot group to gain a political leverage within the

revolution. During the February-August bombings, 16,000

insurgents were killed. 188 The Khmer Rouge who had lived in the

186. Asian Recorder, vol.XX, no.37, 10-16 September 1974, p.12187.

187. Kiernan, n.80, pp.280-81. see also Shawcross, n.l, p.272. 188. Kiernan, n.80, p.282.

223

jungle for ten years in isolation were prompted to attack on

Phnom Penh. It "was a madness born of desperate isolation, which

bred a dreadful hatred of their enemy and a contempt for the

attitudes of the outside world. 189

FORMATION OF HX2H EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

On 31 March 1974 Lon Nol dissolved the Supreme State Council

and formed the High Executive Council composed of the President,

Prime Minister, and two opposition leaders, Cheng Heng and Sirik

Matak to assist the Assembly in its work. 190

ABDUCTION OF THE EDUCATION MINISTER

On 19 January 1974 the secondary school students protested

against corruption. The teachers demanded for higher pay to meet

the price rise. On 16 March two teachers were arrested, allegedly

one teacher was in possession of a Sihanouk banner • 191 Even

after their release the strike continued. Hence, the government

suspended civil liberties on 13 May 1974. 192 When the

prohibitive orders were defied, 61 students and teachers were

arrested. All were released except five students and four

teachers. From 31 May onwards demonstrations were organized. On

189. Shawcross, n.1, p.299. 190. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XX, 19-25 August

1974, p.26679. 191. Ibid.,, vol.no.XX, 19-25 August 1974, p.26679. 192. "New Storm of Patriotic Student Movement in Phnom Penh",

Peking Review, vol.17, no.24, 14 June 1974, p.17.

224

4 June the students kidnapped Keo Sang Kim, the eduction minister

and his secretary. By holding them as hostages, they demanded

the release of students and teachers. The minister was killed by

an unidentified person, allegedly a Khmer Rouge agent to foment

trouble in Phnom Penh. 193 The students demanded drastic steps to

solve corruption and inflation. On 15 September the government

announced a series of measures to check economic distress. But

inflation and corruption continued to evade solution.

Both Pauk and Mok led the combined forces of the CPK

Northern and Southwestern zone and took control of Oudong on 18

March 1974. The 20,000 Oudong People were pushed into the

jungle.

killed.

All teachers, students, and Lon Nol soldiers were

Buildings were destroyed and People were evacuated and

sent to Pursat and Battambang.

EXTERNAL AID

The Khmer Republic pursued collaboration with the US during

its five year rule. Thailand supplied military equipment

consisting of 20 gun boats and reconnaissance aircraft and other

material to petrol the Mekong. The Thai government also sent

Thai citizens of Cambodian origin as volunteers to Cambodia to

assist the army. 194

The US dispatched 32,000 of its troops to Cambodia in May

1970. To Nixon, it was not an invasion of Cambodia but extension

193. Keesing's Contemporary Archives,, n.191, p.26680. 194. New York Times, 3 June 1970, see also Statesman, 7 June

1970, Caldwell and Tan, n.S, pp.331-32.

225

of the Vietnam War. 195 Nixon promised to withdraw troops within

two months but, the US Congress was not convinced and therefore,

it opposed additional military and economic aid. However,

therefore, Nixon's request was approved by the House Foreign

Affairs Committee. Apart from the aid, the US Congress fixed 200

US officials and 85 third country nationals to assist Cambodia.

The US was committed to spend more than half a billion dollars a

year on Lon Nol regime, most of it as military aid. 196

During the fiscal year 1974 the US provided Cambodia with

some US $ 400 million worth in military assistance, another US $

180 million in foodstuffs, mainly rice and US $ 95 million in

other forms of economic aid mostly for refugee relief. 197 The US

spent seven bi 11 ion on Lon Nol during the War period. 198

Correspondingly the Communist powers, the PRC, North Korea, North

Vietnam and the PRG of South Vietnam aided the NUFC. They gave

arms, equipment and medical supplies and North Vietnam provided

military instructors. The Prince, in his foreign visits,

emphasized the importance of his war against the us imperialists.

He visited Rumania, Algeria, Albania, Mauritania and Yugoslavia

dUring 19 June- 19 July 1972. 199 The decision to replace Lon Nol

representation at the UN was postponed in December 1973. 200 On

13 March 1975 the Prince threatened all foreign embassies

195. Gordon with Young, n.43, pp.34-35. 196. Kirk, n.139, p.95. 197. Kirk, n.141, p.60. 198. International Herald Tribune, 7 February 1975. 199. SWB FE/4019/A2/1, 20 June 1972. 200. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XXI,

1975,p.27154.

226

2-8 June

foreign embassies stationed in Phnom Penh to vacate, otherwise,

he might not establish diplomatic relations with them after the

liberation of Phnom Penh. 201 In consequence, by the end of March

1975, Australia, France, the UK, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand

recognized the legitimacy of the Prince and closed their

embassies in Phnom Penb. 202 on 5 April 1975 Japan, South Korea

and South Vietnam closed their embassies.

officially recognized the RGUNC regime. 203

On 28 March the USSR

Thus, the situation

turned in favour of the RGNUC at the diplomatic level and became

hostile to Lon Nol.

THE KHMER ROUGE OFFENSIVE - FALL OF PHNOM PENH

The Khmer Rouge forces, after having established their

control over practically the whole of Cambodia, turned their

attention towards capturing Phnom Penh. At about 1. 00 AM on 1

January 1975 they launched an offensive on the capital from all

sides. 204 The decision to liberate Phnom Penh and the other

territories outside the Khmer Rouge control was taken by the CPK

Central Committe in June 1974. By the end of January goods

ceased to reach Phnom Penh through the Mekong river. 205 Water-

mines, which had been imported from the PRC, were used to block

201. SWB FE/4855/1, 15 March 1975. 202. SWB FE/4866/A3/3, 1 April 1975. 203. Asian Recorder, vol.XXI, no.18, 30 April - 6 March

p.12559. see also Ibid, vol.XXI, no.21, 21-27 May pp.12591-93.

204. Bangkok Post, 3 January 1975. 205. Strait Times, Singapore, 11 March 1975.

227

1975, 1975,

the Mekong river to supply essential items. Thus, it became a

graveyard. Therefore, flying of ships stopped in Mekong.

previously, it used to supply eighty per cent of the Capital's

needs. By the end of February they were in firm control of Tuol

Leap, 12 miles west of Phnom Penh, from where they could hit the

capital. 206 The 6 March rocket raid temporarily suspended the

air supplies. On 13 March a shell blew up an ammunition dump at

the airport. 207 On 24 March the NUFC forced the Republicans to

evacuate Tuol Leap. 208 On 1 April, the National Bank of Cambodia

ordered a New York bank to pay US $ 1,000,000 to Marshal Lon Nol

on condition to leave the country. 2 °9 On 2 April the NUFC's

forces captured a marine base, two-and-a-half miles northeast of

the capital city. On 5 April Phnom Penh was attacked and on the

following day the Khmer Rouge forces advanced into Highway 4.

Then they occupied Kompong Speu temporarily. 210

Representatives of teachers, students, Buddhist monks and

trade union orgnaisations announced on 8 April to form a

Committee to negotiate with the NUFC and it demanded the

resignation of all Republican leaders. The positon of the

Republicans became very weak and its request for US aid was

declined by President Ford. By 10 April the Republican defenses

were crumbling on all sides. A temporary Supreme Committee,

206. SWB FE/4843/A3/1, 1 March 1975, see also Asian Recorder, vol.XXI, no.13, 26 March-1 April 1975, p.12501.

207. SWB FE/4848/A3/2-3, 8 March 1975. 208. SWB FE/4864/A3/6-7 26 March 1975. 209. Bangkok Post, 2 April 1975. 210. SWB FE/4873/A3/1, 9 April 1975.

228

headed by General Sutsa Khan, was established in the place of

Parliament to tackle the situation.2ll In view of the serious

deteriorating military situation around the Phnom Penh city, the

US embassy staff was asked to vacate by the us President Ford.212

On the night of 13-14 April NUFC troops occupied the

positons east of Pochentong cutting off the airport from the

city.213 On the morning of 14 April a pilot of the Republican

Air Force dropped two bombs on the General Staff Headquarters

before defecting. 214 Two days later Pochentong airport and the

entire east bank of the Bassac river was occupied. Thousands of

the Republican soliders abandoned their positions and joined the

stream of refugees moving into the centre of the city.

The Supreme Committee unanimously decided on 16 April to ask

the Prince for an immediate cease-fire and transfer of power to

the Royal Government on condition that the cease-fire should be

supervised by the UN. The Prince declined the offer, and asked

the Republicans to 'flee Cambodia if they can'. By then, the

Khmer Rouge leaders were in firm control of the city. Even

though some sporadic fighting was going on in the South, it was

considered no more than a nuisance. The commander of the elite

parachute brigade, instead of surrendering, committed suicide.

211. SWB FE/4878/A3/7, 15 April 1975. 212. "US Personnel Evacuated From Phnom Penh", Department of

State Bulletin, 28 April 1975, p.540-41. 213. SWB FE/4879/AJ/7-8, 16 April 1975. 214. SWB FE/4880/AJ/12, 7 April 1975.

229

Some Republican soliders aimed their guns at their leaders who

resisted to surrender and some others fled.

Before the arrival of NUFC troops, the Ministry of

Inforamtion was occupied by an organization called 'Nationalist

Movement'. It consisted of 300 young men, most of whom were

students who wore black Pyjamas and its leader Gen.Keth Dara, son

of a former Republican Interior Minister, broadcast a statement

around 12 noon on 16 April calling upon all Republicans to lay

down their arms. 215 The NUFC disarmed his followers who branded

him as an agent of CIA, who had acted to sow division.

It was believed that the collapse of the Republican leaders

was due to the NUFC's superior efficiency. The Republicans had

223,000 men whereas the NUFC had 60 to 70 thousand men. The NUFC

troops outmanoeured to be enemy troops with superior strategy.

The Republicans were also short of man power, the reason being :

Government ineffectiveness, callousness and corruption have turned the populace sour and resentful. Some students and teachers have gone to the jungle to join the insurgents. People do not vounteer for the Army any more; ~nsiiid, they do everything possible to escape l.t.

Hence, the Republicans had to recruit into the Army even

boys of 10 or 12 years of age. The Republican leaders also

215. SWB FE/4881/A3/1-2, 18 April 1975. 216. Keesing's Contemporary Archives,, vol.no.XXI, 2-8 June 1975,

p.27154.

230

lacked public sympathy because of corruption and ineffeciency.217

Thus widespread corruption, low level of public morale and

impotency of the Republican Army paved the way for the

establishment of the first Communist Government in the history of

Cambodia. The US expresses its sadness at the fall of Lon Nol

government. 218

217. International Herald Tribune, 7 February 1975. 218. "Us Expresses Sadness at Fall of Government of Khmer

Republic", Department of state Bulletin, 5 May 1975, p.566.

231