CHAPTER III

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT : RECENT DEVELOFMENTS

CHAPTER III

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT RECENT DEVELOR-1:ENTS

The contemporary period in the history of the

Indian Ocean area is marked by the elimination of a single

dominant power concept. The modern.history of this area I

I

'-m.s ushered by the introduction of one power controlling

the traae in tb.e region through its political, economic and

strategic influence. As discussed in the previous chapter,

the pre-Gaman era was Largely characterized by peaceful

traders who did not give much attention to the military

aspects of seapower. The Europeans, especially the ~ortuguese,

had a different worldview of trade and economic prosperity.

Albuquerque's grand design was to controL the ingresses and

egresses of the Indian Ocean in order to control the trade

in the area, thereby increasing its economic migt:lt 1dth the

help of its miLitary superiority. Thus started the age of

systematic coLonisation of the area which was unprecedented

in the history of the Indian Ocean region. This ~ystem was

adopted by Britain which took control of the area after

eliminating the Portuguese. Seapower had its greatest

influence UI:)On world affairs between early seventeenth

- 70

71

ttWi late nineteenth century which was incidentally the higtl

water mark of the British naval prowess. But, unlike the

Portuguese, the British daninated this area for a very long

period, more than two centuries, making a judicious blend

of both sea and land p0111er \lklic:h the oi:her European nations

failed to achieve. A more permanent naval strength was

estabiished with trading posts and colonies, shore

establistliilents, weli-sigh.ted bases, ccmmercial shipping,

international alignments, industries, internal communications

etc. Britain was abie to project its military strength

more effectively beyond the seas, and prevented enemies

frcrn doing the same.

'l'he two world wars had teiling effect on the

British naval mastery, and the a1anged international

situation pushed Britain to the back seat. It can aisO be

argued that Britain's naval rise and fall has been closely

bound up with its economic rise and fall. The depletion of

resources caused by the World War II and the loss of over­

seas colonies served to diminish its significance in world

affairs. The decline of the empire was due to, what Liddell

Hart called, •strategic over extension•. There were

numerous defence burdens and obligations without correspondinG

capacity to sustain them. 1 British strategic withdrawal,

1 Paul 1"1. Kennedy, '.Ib.e Rise and Fall of British Naval Hastery (London, 1976}, pp. -'41::S.1

72

coupled with the reopening of the Suez Canal and the logic

of nuclear deterrence, drove the United States and the

Soviet Union to the Indian Ocean area. The augnented extra­

regional navalfair forces, search for bases and their

upgradation, raising of swiftly deployable forces, supply

of arms to regional surrogates etc., cause heightened

insecurity in the region, and add to regional conflicts,

Which subsist for a host of historical, ethnic, religious

and territorial reasons. 2 It is further argued that in the

present cold war situation between the United States and

the soviet Union, unlike the period 1945-72, there are two

super-powers of equal capability, waging the war in an area

comprising no~aligned nations, the Indian Ocean arc.

Apart frcm the super powers, other extra-regional powers,

\'lhich have high econcmic stakes in the area, are reinforcing

their Indian Ocean fleet. Such efforts on the part of

extra-regional powers and support by their 'regional

surrogates' finds a response by the littoral and hinterland

states. In response to the unfolding political and

strategic scenario in the Indian Ocean, the peace-zone

concept t~s been evolved by the littoral and hinterland

countries. It has been pointed out that the great power

2 P.R. Chari, "Zone of Conflict", \'lorld Focus (New Delhi), vol. 2, no. 1, January 1931, p~ 4.·

73

rivalry, if not controlled, can assume dangerous proportions.

Thus the study of strategic situation in the Indian Ocean

area includes four sets of countries - (i) The Western

Alliance led by the United States; (ii) The Soviet Union;·

(iii) Other outside powers with commercial interests in the

area; (iv) The littoral and hinterland states. Two factors

which have played important role in big power rivalry in

the Indian Ocean area are need for the security of supplies

and transportation route, and to foil the designs of

domination by a rival group. Hili tary presence and anns

supply agreements are important conponents of the Indian

Ocean strategies of big powers.

The \</estern Presence

'lhe very fact that almost all the countries on the

Indian Ocean littoral and its islands were the colonies of

major Euro~ean countries, explains the continued interest of

those powers in the area. The most important new entrant

was the United States after the Second World War. It

undertook the responsibility of defending the combined

western interest in the area. Before World War II, the

United States confined itself to the Atlantic and Pacific

Oceans and left the Indian Ocean to the then daninant

power, the Great Britain. i'li ttl the impending British /

74

withdrawal on the 'eastern side' , the United States began

to look at the Indian Ocean region an~. 3

The US presence in the Indian Ocean is seen as a

deterrent against any disruption of vital sealanes. Even

if the US interests are not affected to a great extent by

the disruption of trade routes, the loss of the economic

might of its two most vulnerable a.L.Lies, namely West Gennany

and japan, could tilt the balance of the industrial might 4 against the West. Moreover, there are ores and critical

materia.ls in the Indian Ocean littoral on which the industrial ·

economies of the United States, Europe and Japan depend

heavily. Except for offshore oil in the Persian Gu.lf,

the development of sea resources in the Indian Ocean area

lag far behind the rest of the world. The developed

countries are heavy users of the Indian Ocean both in

terms of resources and their sea line of communication

(SLOC). It offers them the best access to the lands around

it, as good land routes are not available due to geographic

peculiarities of the region and conflicts among sane

lit-coral states.

3 Manoranjan Bezboruah, u.s. Strategy in the Indian Ocean: The International Response (New York, 1971), p. 55.

4 Ibid., pp. 39-4o.

75

Powerful maritime nations have traditionally used

gunboat aiplamacy in order to secure advantage and avert

losses. Gunboat diplomacy comes in the form of interve~

tion, offensive deployment of surface ships and mi.ssile

submarines, ring of bases along with stations of military

communications and raising of swiftly deployable force.

The US attempt to intimidate the littoral countries was

witnessed during the Bangladesh War of 1971 and the Arab­

Israeli \far of 1973. Tne US Task Force-74, headed by ' the aircraft carrier Enterprise, entered the Indian Ocean

on 16 December 19'71, the day on vmich the UN General

Assembly adopted a resolution calling that warships and

military aircrafts may not use the Indian Ocean for any

threat or use of force against any littoral or hinterland

state. A few days Later, American journalist Jack

Anderson disclosed that the fleet was designed to ensure

the safety of US interests in the area. 5 Similarly in

October 1973 the Carrier Hancock, accompanied by a

tanker and destroyers, was despatched to the Persian Gulf

through the straits of MaLacca. This was resorted to

under the pretext of a periodic demonstration at the t~e

of ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. 'lbe main reason

for such intimidation tactics is that the economic and

5 Washington Post, 3'1 December 1971. Cited in Jagdish Vibhakar, AfrO-Asian Security and Indian Ocean (New De.ihi, 1974) , p. ·1 ).

76

political transformation in many developing countries has

substantially narrowed sphere of Western influence. The

attempt to counter these changes have resulted in

Brzezinski's globally oriented theory of the. arc of crises

or arc of instabiiity. 6

Mahan's theoretical basis of the control of the

iifeline has cane a long way from battleship to nuclear

carriers and nuclear strike submarines \SSBNs). The

American military strategy today is not to attack or destroy

the enemy fleet or hameiand, but to destroy its means to

interfere with the American seapower. 7 'fhe overthrow of

the Shah of Iran and the entry of Soviet troops in

Afghanistan have resu..L ted in an enormous naval building,

acquisition and modernization programme on the part of the

United States. The sanction of $1.6 trillion for this

purpose includes a ~S 183.6 billion ship construction

progrrunme over ten years.8 This includes the deployment

of the new Ohio class sul:marines fitted wifu Trident C4

6

8

-

Aiexander Chicherov, "South Asia and the Indian Ocean in the 1980s", Asian Survey tBerkeley), vol. 24, no. 11, November 1~4, p. 11~1.

Seymour J. Dietchman, New Technology and Military; Power t Colorado, 1979) , pp. 83-87;

77

missiles. Towards the end of the decade, these missiles

will be replaced by Trident n5 missiles which have greater

throw-weigpt and accuracy to make it effective in attacking

Soviet missile silos. With ti1e ccmpletion of the sea

launched cruise missile \ SLCM) programme, nearly every

type of ship would become a potential nuclear attack

platfonn. 9 'lhe ship constr'Uction programme includes

carriers, cruiser-destroyers, guided weapons,frigates,

amphibious forces, mine counte~measures (MCM) etc. The

extent of funds and other resources coupled with rapid

technological innovations point towards the shape of things 10 to came. lne Indian Ocean is a major source of deployment

of these modern weapon systems. The enormous build-up

of forces do not take into account only the Soviet threat.

'l'he r'alklands and Lebanon wars have proved that challenges

other than that of the Soviet Union are far more likely to

confront the US and its allies. I1any third world countries .

have established substantial armed forces, as well as some

9 SIPRI, World 4 (London, 1 , p. :; ; r< .• J.L • .IJ~c\.er an onnan Friedman, "The 19tl5 u.s. Navy Lea~e Show : More Competitive than Ever", International Defense Review (Geneva), vol. '18, no. 6, 1 SB5, pp. 949=56.

10 For details of the US Naval building programme, see F. de Blocq Van Kuffeler, "Navies in 1984 : \'larsaw Pact and NA'1'0 11 , Na~ International (Surrey), vol. 9), no. 2, Fabruary 198 , pp. 112-13; IISS, 1he r11li tary Balance, 1934-85 ~London, '1934), pp. 3-lf.

78

key regimes have became vulnerable to internal and external

forces. A~l these developments in the third world in

general, and the Indian Ocean area in particular, have

prompted the United States to enhance its capabilities

in tenns of combat, sea control and surveillance.

The second important component of power projection

is a military base where fuel, ammunition and spare parts

can be stored, where planes of all sizes can land, and Where

a carrier task group can anchor, if need be. 11 American

s~rategists believe that US objectives in the Indian Ocean

area can be realized only through access to the region. In

order to have access, a country has to go back to the

tradi tiona~ concept of chokepoints. 'l'he United States has

agreements with various c~tries, in return of economic

aid and arms supplies, to use bases and other facilities:

wLth Egypt to use r<.as Banas, with Oman to use Salalah and

l'lasirah, with Kenya to use the .t-ort of Hombasa, and with

Britain to develop Diego Garcia as a major base and

communication station. ~~en the situation was reversed

in the Horn of Africa after the 11..)77 Wdr, the US gained

Soviet facilities in 13erbera a.Long "1i til fully developed

11 Elmo ~umwal t, On vlatch tNew York, 1976), pp.- 454-5.

. 79

12 airstrips. Moreover, South Africa and Australia, bordering

the Indian Ocean on ~vo sides, form important elements in

the strategy of the West, providing base and communication

facilities.

Diego Garcia, together with other bases, canmun1-

cation facilities and military forces, enables a quick

response build-up of forces to the region. It was chosen

under the strategic island concept of the Pentagon, for its

strategic location, protected lagoon and necessary ground

for airstrip. It could be used for urgent redeployment of

naval forces between the Atlantic and the Pacific, as

carriers could not transmit through Panama Canal, and the

Indian Ocean route was preferred to the one around South

America. The development of strategic submarine strike

system needed very low frequency (VLF) communication stations

to link them with the complex net-vrork of the US c001munications

system, including satellites. Initially the US Navy had

chosen Diego Garcia for its strategic location for

surveillance, low profile presence and the capability for

contineency operations by carriers, vbich were politically

no~ alarming and military limited goals. 13 Having foreseen

12

13 For the development of the Di.ego Garcia base, see K.S. JawaLkar~ Diego Garcia in International Diplomacz ~Bombay, 1 933;, -pp. 31-83; Bez'boruah, n. 5, pp. 53='78; A. J·. Cottrell and others, Sea po,·rer and Stratggf in the Indian Ocean (Beverly Hills arid London, 1 ), pp. 124=5.

80

British withdra,~ from the Indian Ocean in the early

sixties, the Pentagon persuaded Britain to announce the

creation of British Indian Ocean Territory \BIOT) in 1965.

Three islands from the ~eychelles group \Aldabra, Desroches

and farqahar) and Chagos archipelago from Maritius were

detached for the construction of communications facilities.

Later the British decision to withdraw from east of

Suez and regular deployment by the Soviet Union favrured

the decision on Option B Plan \modest presence), a carefully

developed limited logistic facility on the island. The

construction of the base started in 1972, and became

operational in 1973, to become a link in me world v1ide

command and control system and to transmit satellite

in!'onnation to the Navy and the Air 1''orce. 14

·J.'he US strategic thinking was further reinforced

in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Vlhen sane Arab

countries threatened to withdraw facilities given to the

United States• forces, thus making it difficult to move

supplies to Israel. Even thou~ the Senate Armed Services

Committee did not approve of expansion of logistic, it

was started on the plea that Soviet Union was constructing

maJOr base at Berbera ( Sanalia). 'lhe military construction

14 Dieter Braun, 'lhe Indian Ocean :. Re~ion of Conflict or • Peace Zone•? /(Delhi, -1 §33), p. 1.

81

programme included further facilities of anchorage, ai~

strip \for B-52 bombers) and improvement of radio

installations etc. 15 Apart fran Diego Garcia, there are

VLF communication systems instailed at Masirah \Oman),

North-West Cape and Cockburn Sound \Australia) etc., to

form a communication network for submarines. But VLF

communication can be effective only when submarines move

at shallow depth at low speed, thus jeopardising their

defences. '£he United .States is now well ahead witl1 a

project on extreme low frequency \ELF) ccmmunica tion

system, due to be completed in 1985, which can reach

submarines travelling at operational depth and cruising

speed. This will enhance -che command and control system

for s-crategic rruclear and space warfare.. 'Ihough the ELF

project a-c present does not cover the Indian Ocean area,

thel.'e are reports of plans for its installations in

Sri Lanka, extending the US- Sri Lanka agreement of December

1983 !'or establisllffient of Voice of America transni tters. 16

'1't1is syste-n will provide a sure method of ccmmunication

with s-crategic submarines, starting a more lethal arms

race in the Indian Ocean area.

15

16 Jas ji t Singh, "U.s,.. ·rransmi tters in Lanka: Grim Dangers for the Region", Times of India, 6 March 1935, p. 8.·

82

Strategic mobility is a very important component

of seapower. The SLOC is the ability to resupply and re­

inforce the military com~onents deployed overseas. After

the collapse of Shah's government in Iran and Soviet entry

in Afghanistan, President Carter made clear his concern

for the security of fue Persian Gulf. 17 'lhe Rapid

Deployment Force (RDF) was established in 1980 to improve

the capability to deploy the US military forces to distant

areas. The policy of military sea lift and air lift is

the logical extension of bases, SSBNs, and communication

systems. The co~nand and control exercises, and field

exercises of the HDF ( Gal.lant Knitj'l t and Bright Star

manoeuvres) with some local powers like Egypt, Oman,

Somalia and Sudan clearly demonstrate the efforts to enhance

logistic capabilities for the Indian Ocean area. 18 In the

new structure, the capabilities of the Harine Corps and

infantry forces assume renewed relevance, and lanclpower

and sea[_)ower get closely linlced. Thus they v..rere reorganized

and further strengthened under a unified Central Command

17 'l'.A. l•'abyanic, 11Conceprual Planning and the RDJ.'l'F", Anned Forces and Societx (r'laryla:nd) , vol. 7, no. 3, spring 1981, p. 344.

18 Andrew Ambrose, 11U. s. Central Command : Revised Support Structure", Janes Defence Review (London), vol. 4, no. 7, ·1933, pp. 621-2; R. Lung'lerich, 11U. S. rta.pid Deployment Forces- LJSCENTCCM 11 , Anned Forces Journal (Washington, D.C.), vol. 23, no. 3, uctober 1934, pp. 88-120.

83

(CENTCOM) in 1983, with a clearly defined geographical res­

ponsibility over Southwest Asia. 19 'l'he cartographic projec­

tion of the Ct:NTOI11 touches the Indian borders, and hence

has serious security implications for us. RDF when tully

operational with about 45,000 marines in the area, covered

by the CE.l'l1'Cm1, will give the US forces in the Indian Ocean

tremendous mobility and strike pov;er. Its highly sophisticated,.

c3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence) is

sustained by spy satellites, AV!ACS and Orion. ::iurveillance

aircrafts in Diego Garcia, increasing the surveillance,

sea control ·1nd can bat capabilities.

While analysing the US and Soviet presence in the

Indian Ocean, we should remember that it was facilitated by

the brealc-up of colonial empires and the departure of

colonial powers. The loss of ti1eir colonies and economic

migp t compelled in em to shape their Indian Ocean strategy

within the overall NATO framework. They respond favourably

to the American strategy in the area to protect their

interests. According to Article VI of the NATO agreement,

un nnned attaclc o.c;:11.nst one or more of ii:lan in Europe and

North America ,~uld be considered as an attack against them

19 For a discussion on the concept, missions and structure of the USCENTCCM, see US, Congress, Senate, Armed ::>ervices Committee, De~arilnent of Defense.- Author.ization for ~ppropriation for Y 1984, 98 Congress, iession 1, 2:J Harch 1~:.>, pp. 31o2-li3.

84

all. '1he forces of the manber countries canplanent each.

other and co-ordina·t;e their activities in the form of joint

exercises, communication links and use of each. other•s

facilities. The NATO doctrine of early escalation of

conflict in the event of a large scale Soviet attack to

the nuclear level has been supplemented,in recent times,

by large-scale strengthening of their conventional forces. 20

Thus in spite of economic constraints in recent years the

NATO powers have increased their naval build-up. They

realise that, in a lengthier conflict, the SLOC would be

essential for NATO logistics and fuose of local allies like

South Africa, ·~ustralia and some \'lest Asian countries.

Among NATO pov1ers, Britain has considerable

stake in the Indian Ocean area. In spite of its military

witi1drawal from the Indian Ocean area, Britain gives its

· t t . "d t' 21 It ti t overseas ~n eres s ser~ous cons~ era ~on. con nues o

maintain substantial trade, and even security ties, with

some littoral states in the Indian Ocean area. But now

the· security of its se<-tborne trade is almost fully dependent

on an alliance headed by the United States. Within ttle

20 Norman Friedman, "\1estern European and NATO Navies", Proceedings l US Naval Institute, Annapolis) , vol. 110, no. 5, lviarcn ·1 ~t}4, p. j5; see also vol. 111, no. 3, March 1985, pp. 37-~.

21 G. R. Villar, "Trends in f·1ari ~ime ·v/arfare' : 'Ihe Need for .I:-' ower Overseas?" in RlJSI, RUSI and Brass$::Y~s Defence Yearbook 193 4 (Oxford, 1 SB4) , pp. Z7 b.

85

NATO alliance, the British Navy was driven into a single­

scenario oriented deep water anti-submarine role, as its

part in the con-cribution to NATO strategy. 22 '!he agreements

with Australia, Nev1 Zealand, Bahrain, Qatar and UAE were

meant to safeguard its commercial interests, under the

cover of maintaining peace and stability in the area. Now,

of course, it has surrendered most of its pedce-keeping

res lJOnsi bili ty to the US Navy, and has identified itself wi til

the latter'$' Indian Ocean strategy.

Tnough ccrnmi iment to NATO is the cornerstone of

the British defence policy, it has given enougp attention

towards building its ovm individual forces. The Falkland

war highli01ted the point that elements of presence and

operational effectiveness of their forces were as important

as allied cohesion. :fran an operational point of view it

seems significant that a substantial P~ber of British

23 warships still operate east of Suez. The ~oyal Navy has

very .Limited funds and scme defence cuts were also introduced

before the Falklands war. In spite of u1ose cuts continuing,

Britain s-cill spends the highest percentage of its ffi~P on

its navy as cern pared to other NATO allies. 'lhe Tnatcher

22 ,t-Jeter Stanford, 11 '1he Current Position of Royal Navy", Proceedings, fvJarch ·193 4, p. 103•

23 Friedman, n. 20, p. 41.

86

government is going ahead with the construction of strategic

submarines Which will carry the latest Trident D5 missiles,

V/STOL carriers, minesweepers, torpedoes etc. 24 Though it

does not imply that Br~tain can operate outside the NATO

framework, it certainly has the capability to intervene

overseas, as demonstrated by the Falklands war.

France also considers the Indian Ocean within its

economic and strategic concern, and insists on maintaining

its capability to intervene in areas where it has interest

and commitment. It emphasises its complete independence

vis-a-vis other powers vmo have interest in the region.

The French navy is'unique in Europe for concentration on

strategic and overseas missions. 'i'he strategic mission is

symbolised by the construction of new SSBNs which is but

one aspect of the heavy nuclear weapons orientation of the

French defence policy. 'Ihe overseas mission derives fran

the assumption of responsibility in former French

possessions, particularly in Africa. 25 In the second half

of 1S63 the French navy kept a strong squadron of~Beirut

to support the peace-keeping forces. 'fhose ships '\'/ere

drawn fran the Nedi terranean fleet and others stations.-

'l'heir allocation to the Indian Ocean is limited to one

24 Ibid.; Van Kuffeler, n. 10, pp. '113-14.

25 Friedman, n. 20, p./ 38.

87

extra small aviso, with occasionally a submarine for few

monfus. 26 France has an Indian Ocean l'liavaL Canmand which

patrols the Ocean with submarines, frigates, landing ships,

fast patrol boats, repair and maintenance.ships etc.'Zl

After 1976, the French developed a more mobile navy,

increasing the number of ships, \\bich vras further

strengchened by the operation of naval patrol aircrafts

fran .Ujibouti. Even after decolonisation, France maintained

its forces in Djibouti, Reunion, Hayotte and Mozambique

channel. This makes France one of the best naval facilities

in the Indian Ocean region having daninant influence in

and around the Red Sea-Suez approach and the lower Gulf.

After the energy crisis in the Seventies, France developed

bilateral relations vn·ti1 some oil-producing countries which

included bilateral supply agreements for arms, nuclear

technology etc. It also publicly supported the Arab cause 28 against Israel.

Due to its commi tnent in distant areas, the

French navy plans to continue operating aircraft carriers

in the foreseeable future, with a nuclear powered carrier

26 Van Kuffeler, n. 10, pp. '114-15.

27 Pierre Hanehouse, 11 France and the Indian Ocean11 ,

NayY International, vol. 86, no. 5, May 1~1, pp. 294=7 ..

28 Braun, n. 14, pp. / 103-4.

88

due to be deployed in 1985. The French five-year defence

plan (1984-88) reflects the traditional orientation towards

nuclear forces, including nevr generation SSBNs, SSNs and

nuclear attack aircraft carriers. 29 Naval yards at

Cherbourg, Brest and Lorient have been expanded with new

facilities not only for the construction of nuclear sub-

marines and carriers, but also destroyers, minehunters,

patrol boats and amphibious crafts etc. 30 , 'i'hougtl France

does not participate in the military planning and exercises

of NATO, there is greater interest on its part in recent ,

times for close co-operation 'VIi th the latter in a major

East- 1.'/est confrontation. 31

Soviet Response

It has been suggested that the Russians have had

a historic interest in the Indian Ocean area. An outlet to

the warm water, all-weather ports of the Indian Ocean v.ras

an extention of the old Czarist desire, dating fran the

time of Peter the Great. In 1940, this desire was reflected

in Ilrticle 4 of the secret protocol of Holotov-Ribbentrop

29 Friedman, n. 20, p. 38.

30 Van Kuffeler, n. 10, p. 115.

31 Ibid. ; I ISS , n. 10 , p. 31 • (

89

talks, carving out spheres of influence south of Baku and

Batum, in the general direction of Persian Gulf. 32 SUch

speculations were a result of the British withdra~rcQ from

the area and the subsequent Soviet movements here. But

other strategic dnalysts have pointed out that it was

~ussophobia on the part of Britain that made too mud} out

of the lirni ted Czarist aspirations. 'Ihe naval thinking of

Klado and Hakarov, the Potemkin mutiny and the revolutionary

activities of Baltic sailors during world War I, and obscure

amphibious operations are hardly sufficient material on

vmich to predicate a naval heritage of the Soviet Union. 33

'l'he rise of the Soviet naval power in the 1950s under the

guidance of Admiral Gorshkov does not represent the fulfil-

men-c of me old Czarist dream; it "'as the product of new

interests and the need to respond to the massive \vestern

command of the seas. Admiral Gorshkov assesses the Western

naval threat in these words: " ••• The camp of imperialism

employs oc(•anic strategy as a basic concept of military·

doctrine. 'l'he ..Last war vvas a continental war ••• nov; "'e are

tnreatened by a coa~ition of maritime powers which, together

with land annies and aviation missile forces, deploy modern

j2 A. J·. Cottrell and J·.l"'l. Burrell, 11 The Soviet Navy in the lndian ucean 11

, Strate~c Keview \ \•lashington, D. c.) , vol. 2, no. 4, fall ·i 4, p. 2li0.

33 .1:-'.J· • .R.ollins, ".t-tussia• s Ficti:tiou.s Naval· Traditionn, Proceedings, vol. ~~.no. 1, January 1~73, pp. 65-71.

90

naval forces. u34 'fhe teclmological changes and strategic

doctrines in the West shape the military strategy of the

Soviet Union even today. Soviet strategic thinkers, from

r'iakarov to Gorshkov, have follO\.'Ted developments in the West

European and American navies in order to introduce changes

in the Soviet naval forces. After the publication of

R. \'/. Herrick• s bool~ Soviet Naval Strategy (US Naval

Institute, Annapolis, 1968), each issue of Morskoi Sbornik

(Naval Digest) contains articles devoted to strategic conse-

quences of the Western revolutions in v1eapons technology,

and follow closely the discussions of American theorists. 35

The soviet Union• s commercial and trade relations

':Ji til the Indian Ocean countries have been maintained

continuously for a long time. It has a substantial fish

eaten frcm the Indian Ocean, and has fishing agreements with

some littoral countries. 'Iheir ships use the Indian

Ocean route, including same friendly countries' ports, as

it is an ice free route between western and eastern provinces.

It a~so reduces the burden on the trans-Siberian'railway,

and solves the problem of the northern route which is

marred due to tt1e Sino-Soviet dispute. The Soviet Union

34 Quoted in Souih (London), no. 49, November 1934, p. 16.

35 K.J-. Hagan and J.}v. Kipp, "U.S. & U.S.S.R. Naval Strategy", t:rocecdinss, vol; 99, no. 11, November 1~73, pp. 38-44._

91

has also entered into international carrying trade, mostly 36 with the developing countries. In order to cater to the

needs of smaller countries, the soviet Union has concentrated

on medium size cargo ships and small tankers, rather than

giant super-tanlcers and container freigp.ters. It is.

alleged that the Soviet Union is interested in denying the

Hest the resources of the Indian Ocean area, especially

oil, and wants to co.11pete with the United States for off­

shore concessions fr~1 the littoral states. Since it has

abundant energy resources of its own, it is said that the

Soviet Union' s strategy would be to cut off oil supplies

to the V/est and Japan in the event of a conflict.

Soviet military presence in Afghanistan has put it within

350 mil~s of the Arabian Sea, and ·~t:is has led to ala.nnist

projections of soviet threat. 37 Compared to the Soviet

Union, the American offensive capability is far ~~perior

as it includes at-sea logistic mobility, an overseas

network of bases, and sophisticated and balanced \·Tarfleet

in ti1e area. Its strategic umbrella stretching from the

oil.t'ields of Saudi Arabia to the far reach of Pakistan

malces the Soviet Union vulnerable.

36 Cordier, n. 8, pp. 49-50.

37 B. N. Banerjee, Indian Ocean VJh:irlpool· of Unrest \Delhi, 1 93 4) , .;;;.p,..-p ... --ri181:--3r_-,4;-;.~;,_.:,..,_;.;,.;:.;;.;;.~~.;.;;;;;..--.;;;;.....;;--.,...-;;,.-

'92

The Soviet Union kep G a close watch on American

activities in the Indian Ocean area, and made itso~n moves

for politico-diplomatic influence in the littoral countries.

The major objective of the Soviet policy has been to

11reduce the US military presence in the Indian Ocean which

is considerably more powerful". 38 The first appearance

of the soviet forces in the Indian Ocean was during the

Yemeni civil war in the early 196os, when TU-16 bombers of

Egyptian markings manned by Soviet crews, flew bombing

missions from Cairo against the Royal Yemeni forces.

Britain's delay in transferring pO\ver to Aden's moderates

resulted in the South Yemen' s government turning to the

Soviet Vnion. 39 Two strategic locations of Aden and

Socotra became available to the Soviet Union for fishing

bases. Simila1·ly it got a fooinold for fishing rights

in Hauri tius, v.Ji1.en Britain refused to assist the latter

in establishing a fishing industry. 'lhe military presence

of the soviet Union is supported by economic aid and

trade policies, and they took the advantage when the

\·/estern countries failed to respond to tile requirements of

)8 VJ. K. Anderson, "Soviets in the Indian Ocean : Much Ado About .::iomett1.ing - But \vhat?" Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. ~, September 1984, p. 928.

39 Havi Kaul, 11 'lhe Indo-Pakistani \'lar and the Changing Balance of Pov.rer in the Indian O.cean", Proceedings, vol. Y':l, no. 5, Nay 1973, p •. 178.

93

aid requested by lit~oral countries of the Indian Ocean.

This has provided them with anchorage and other facilities

in Asia and the African coast. After 1977 they gained

Perim at the mouth of the Red Sea, and Dahlak port, off

I'ftassawa (the Eri trean Port). 'lhis was due to the fact that

the war in the Horn of Africa resulted in reversal of

influence for the United States and the Soviet Union; the

Soviet Union lost influence in Somalia but gained in

Ethiopia, and vice versa for the United States. The Soviet

Union ctlso has facilities at Hodeida in Yemen Arab kepublic,

Aden in South Yenen, and Cam ttanh Bay in Vietnam for major

repairs and storage of strategic equipment. 40 Apart from

these faci~ities, the Soviet Union employs a system of

maintenance of ships, moored to buoys located outside

territorial waters of many countries in the Indian

ucean.

In spite of some maintenance, replenishment and

repair facilities, the main naval stay of the Soviet Union

is in the hi§h seas due to political and economic costs

associated ·with the policy of bases and shore-based

facilities. A form~dable Soviet fleet has emerged in the

1~j70s and l:BOs with a long-range impact. 41 Operations

4o H. '1'. Kaufman, "Soviet Objectives in the Indian Ocean", Times of India, 28 April 'l ':::B 1, p.· 8~

41 Cordier, n. ~, pp. 43-44; li-. Jacobs, "Soviet Navy : An update", Asian uefence Journal ~Kualalampur), April 1934, pp •. 62-'(2, 89.

94

far fran hane waters have vast.ly increased for the Soviet

fleet and their most dramatic deployment have been to the

Pacif'ic and "tile Indian Ocean. Initially sane cruisel'S and

destroyers v1ere detached fran V.iadivostok-based Pacific

fleet . .;.nd sent to the Indian subcontinent, Persian Gulf

and bast Africa. Since 1970 a somewhat permanent fleet was

stationed in the area, consisting of destroyers, fleet

mines-sweepers, cruisers, oilers, supply ships and oceano­

graphic ships. 42 Additional ships, including guided

mis.sile frigates, attack submarines, helicopter carriers

etc. were sent during 1971 Bangladesh war and 1973 Arab-

Israeli "riar. Another instance was that of sending ships to

l'laputo narbour (IvJ:ozambique) against the South African

com::Jcmdo raid on black nationalist headquarters.

'lhe US deployment of SSBNs and precision guided

munitions have resu.l ted in Soviet investment in SSBN

procramne wi "th the latest SS-N- 20 missiles. An advanced

strategic armament technology including submarine strike

system gives them an enhanced strike capability fran their

for~vard based systsns. 43 Its Bast European allies have

42 us,congress, Senate, Foreign Affairs Corrunittee, Soviet B.ole in ii.Sia, I:;B Congress, session 1, 28 July 1~3, pp. 236:J21; Bezboruah, n. 3, p. 146.

43 J. J. TritJ:;en, "Soviet Navy : Threat Asses·sment 11 ,

IJavl International, vo.L. 813, ·no. "10, October 1934, p. 20.

95

serious economic difficulties which restricts their ability

to expand and modernise their armed forces. Except for

Poland and Homania, which recently acquired missile

corvette and frigates respectively, and East Germany which

has so~me production facilities, no other \'!TO ally has given

any inaication of even a small independent naval build up.

The total figure of the WTO military expenditure is heavily

domin.:l.tect by the Soviet Union, and the allies are totally

dependent on the former for their defence needs. 44

Recently, the Soviet Union has concentrated on completing

new snips, and integrating them into its fleet. It has

tried to compensate for the lack of embarked long-range

fixed-wing aviation laircraft carriers) by SSBNs and ships

mounted by long range SSMs. 45 The Soviet units are furnished

with redundant combat systems and alternative operative

modes which ensure a high degree of reliability and

survivability. ·1heir merchant mg.rine is an armed forces

auxiliary, "Gightly integrated into the operations of the

navy. Hundreds of cargo ships and tankers are designed

and equipped to function immediately in the long-range

m 1.li tary ro.Le. 'l'heir roll-on, ro.il-off ships and large

44 i,lilc.n Vego, "E~st Europe~n Navy", Proceedink[, vo.L. ·110, no • .?, Harch 't984, pp. 44-48; SIP , n. '9, p. 87; IISS, n. '10, p. 15.

45 Darry i·l. Blechman and t;dward N. Luttwak, International Security Yearbook 193:5-84 ~London, 1934), pp. 150-51; Van Lut.1.elel·, n. 'tO, pp. ·110-12.

96

carriers can carry vehicles and equipment safely in their

hold, and disgorge the cargo by a stern ramp without benefit

of port facilities. Merchant ships have an advantage that

tney have greater freedom of access to ports t~·rlo navy

ships, and tl:n.l.s can purchase fresh water and other supplies

for naval use from ports where warships are denied visit~~ '.l'he efforts on the part of the Soviet Union at enhancing its

influence among the littoral states of the Indian Ocean have

stimulated further American build-up in the area. Its

multilateral efforts to place constraints on the United

States througn political, economic and strategic manoeuvres

have not been successful. Moreover, the SoViet navy still ~

laclcs favourable geography, significant sea-based aviation

and sustainability of most of its forces. 47 1heir force

procurement should not be confused witil ability to operate

in actual war against modern opposition. Soviet operations

against even smaller powers can also be met by the United

States by either extended dete1·rence or the rapid

upgradation of the threatened nations' military capability

by rapid air lift/ sea-lift of hi£#1 force multipliers.

1\mong the countries that do not belong to the

lnctio.n Oceo.n area geographically but have shown their

46 Cordier, n. 8, pp. 49-50.

47 'l'rJtten, n. 43, p.-· 621.

97

presence in the region for centuries, China figures prami-

nently. China• s diplanatic, military and economic

activities in the African littoral and Asian countries

bear ample evidence to its ability to project its inf~uence

far afield. China started an independent naval programme

in 1964 when Admiral Hsiao began to develop a respectable

inshore navy. It \~S divided into three fleets: the North

Sea Fleet fr~ Yalu to Shantung, the East Sea Fleet

facing Fonnosa and guarding Shan§:lai, and the South Sea

fleet fran Swatmt to Gulf of Tonkin and centred on qg

Canton. At present the Chinese navy is third in the

world in terms of personnel strength, but it is largely

a coastal defence force. Though it has considerable

number of submarines, destroyers, frigates, patrol crafts,

amphibious ships and auxillaries, they are technologically

backward and are based on two decades-old Soviet designs. 49

'l'ne1·e are indigenous efforts to develop SSBNs, but the system

is not yet at sea. However, the Chinese have been fairly

successful in producing missiles, electronic equipment

and sensors. It should also be remenbered that they have

sited land-based missiles in the mountains of 'fibet, and

lJ8 Clarl{ G. Reynolds, Conu"!"land of the Sea (London, '1976), p. 5'15.

49 Van Kuffeler, "Navies in 1933 : Non-NATO and Third ~.-lorld", NavT International, vol. "89, no.· 3, T1arch 1934, p. 15 ; G. Jacobs, "PLA: Navy : An Update", Asian Defence Journal, i'1ay '19:34, pp. 50-56.

98

their nuclear arsenal consists of intennediate and medium

range missiles of considerable megatonnage. 50 'lheir aspira­

tion to long-range naval deployment is reflected by their

production of Jiansshu and ~ destroyers, replenishment

ships etc. Their submarines can operate as far south as

Halacca.

China maintains trade reLations with many littoral

countries in the Indian Ocean, and exchanges with them.

agricultural products like rice, rubber etc. It has had

a lot of influence in Tanzania and Zambia where a 1,050-

mile '11an- Zorn Railway \'Ja.S built in order to link the copper

mines of Zambia with Dar-es-Salaam port of Tanzania. The

naval facilities on this port \vere built by China as was

an airfield 80 miles vrest of Nzwenger. Apart from this

China gave substantial militar-y aid to Tanzania, such as

tanl<s, patrol boats, HiG-17 aircrafts etc. 51 Pakistan

too has some Chinese aircrafts and other equipment in its

arsenal. China's open support to Pakistan during the

Inde-~akistani war of 1965 made India apprehensive of its

intentions in the Indian subcontinent. After 1971 the

beginn.int of Chind.' s rapprochement with the United States

50 D. c. uaniel and H. \'1. Jencks, "Soviet Hili tary Confron­tation with China", 'l'he J·ournal of East Asian Affairs (Seoul), vol. :;, no. 2, fall/vrinter 1933, p. 584.·

51 .K..aul, n. 39, pp. 1'16-77; Nartin .Bcti..Ley, . 11 '11anzania and China", A!'ric;m l\.l'.l~1irs (OxfQrd), vol. 74, no. 294, January 1975, pp. j§:SO. ·

99

brou@t a new configuration of forces into being v.hich,

.i'or a variety of reasons, are opposed to Soviet influence

in the area. Tl1ere has been grO\dng military contact

between China and the United States \llhich includes purported

US material assistance for Chinese monitoring of Soviet

ballistic missile defence, high level exchange between the

t'IITO defence hier·archies and an expanding Chinese shopping

list for modern US military hardwa1··e. In 1932, a

Congressional SubcQ1~ittee was required by the US Under

Secretary of ~tate for Security Assistance, James Buckley,

to lift the .legislative ban on foreign assistance to

China. 52 In return ~hina accepts the broad American

per-ception on tl1e containment of the Soviet Union.

For Japan the Indian Ocean constitutes the life­

line for its oil imports. Apart from oil, it imports

rubber and tin frQn South East Asia, and iron ore, coal,

ZJ.nc, copper, and uranium from \'lest Australia, East

Africd, South Asia etc. Aft~r the oil embargo in 1973

japan developed a somewhat independent policy towards the

l.Jersian Gulf. It developed bilateral trade rel.ations \'lith

oil- ex!Jorting countries. Bilateral export agreements have

:..t.Lso t1een concluded wi tl1 Australia, the ASEAN countries

52 .J. S. 13reemer, 11 U. S.-Cl1inese Cooperation : 'l.he Naval Dimensionu, Proceedings, vol. ·1o~, no. 2,, February l';k)j, p. 71.

100

and even South Africa. 53 Japan opposed the moves on the

part of Indonesia and ~1,;.laysia in 1969 to extend their

terri toria.L ;·,aters to a 12-mile limit, and restricting

tanker traffic in order to prevent environmental problens

in the Nalacca Straits. The alternative to Halacca. are

Sunda Straits (south of Sumatra) and the Lanbok, further

south. But Sunda poses problems to the supertankers due

to its slmllow northern approaches, and the Lanbok

increases the distance by at least three days.54 The

I1alacca dispute, that arose due to Indonesia's archipelago

concept, aroused Jo.pan' s interest in the Kra canal, across

the n:trrow isthmus in southern Thailand. The Japanese

industrialists ·were, at one stage interested in preparing

so::1et~ing like a PaYl3ffia CanG.l which ;,·:Ould lessen the

distance from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea by

h~L~dreds .of miles. 55

Japan h8.s no military presence of any kind in

the Indian Ocean area, and wo1,1ld in any case be prevented

53 Braun, n. 'IL't, pp. 8l::I-<J1; Koji Nakamura, "Oil : Re­assessr,1ent in Japan", Far Eastern Economic Review \ lionc l\one;), vol. 84, no. ·13, 1 April 1974, pp. 53-54.

54 Bezboru~, n. 3, p. 164.

55 '.'!.F. Libby, "Thailand's Kra Canal: Site for \·lorld's First Huclear Industrial Zone", Orbis (lJhiladelphia), vol. ·19, no. ·1, spring 19'/5, pp. 350-08. .

101

by its constitution from contemplating such projection of

power •. It has coordinated its policies with the West and

other allies in the South East Asia to ensure its security

as well as that of its shipment. 56 Its numerous trade

arrangements in South East Asia and West Asia take care of

its economic and transportation problems, though British

wi thdravJal from the Indian Ocean and that of the United

States from Korea made its security problEIDS more pressing.

The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSFD) has

recently shown a trend towards gradual expansion of its

missions and capabilities •. The five-year construction

programme of the ~1SDF (1983-87) is to provide a force of

60 destroyers and frigates, 15 submarines, 6 fast attack

crafts and 33 mine countermeasure (!1CN) vessels. 57 They

t1ave a regular modernisation and replacenent progrannne,

and their shipyards work efficiently within a building

time-frame. The United States plays an important role in

Japcm':.:; weapons procurement process, as the Self Defence

Force prefers advanced \veapon system from the United States

whenever n ccmpar~:"tble indigenous systen is not available:

56 In recent times, the United .States has urged Japan to increase its defence spending and capabilities to contribute to tne combined defence of the Pacific and Indian Ocean seo.lanes. See US, Coneress, House, Foreign Affairs Committee, US-Japan Relations, 97 Congress, sessio!l 2, 24 Narch ·1982, pp.- 465-SO.

57

102

a case is that of Harpoon missiles for the new submarines.58

Moreover, there is close alignment of the JMSDF capabilities

v,ri th those of the US Navy through certain joint wartime

operations.

Littoral Countries

The littoral countries of the Indian Ocean area

have to be viewed in the global strategic framework of

superpowers v~ich have increased their military presence in

the area and threaten to intervene for the cause of 'political

stability•. If stable political situation does not suit

them, they instigate instability and try to-change the

leadership which would accept their strategic framework.

Some countries in the Indian Ocean littoral acquiesce in

such 'strategic consensus• and play the role as dictated

by the big powers. On the other hand, there are countries

\vhich gained inctepenuence after the Second world War as a

result of sustained struggle over a long period. The

aspirations of people in those countries led to the desire

to play an independent role in international relations,

wnich is canmensuratc with their long-term socio-econanic

and ~olitical interests. They consider the military presence

58 J.F. Bouchard and D.J·. Hess, 11 '1'he .. Japanese Navy and Sea-Lanes Defense1;, Proceedings, l11ar·ch 1~4, p. 95.

103

of external powers in the Indian Ocean as a factor leading

to tension and rivalry among local countries too. The

concept of • power vacuum' was used by the big powers to

justify their military presence here, and also to undermine

the capacity of littoral countries to look after their own

interests. Outside presence in the Indian Ocean has turned

the area in-co an arc of crisis·, ranging fran South Africa

to the Indian subcontinent through East Africa, the Horn

of Africa, Arabian peninsula and southwest Asia. This has

serious implications for India's security interests. 'Ihe

role of same important littoral countries, from South Africa

to Aus-cralia, has to be seen in the litil t of two wrld

views, -chose of domination and of self-determination.

Australia had a Pacific-oriented posture for a

long time uue to "the presence of ·the B:ei tish Navy on the

\ale.stern side. The mineral v.real th. of \'lest Australia, its

industrial products, export of agricultural products and

import o.l oil fran the Persian Gulf were all protected by

the British Navy, until the latter• s decision to withdraw

from the Indian Ocean. Australia initially did not attach

much importance to the appearance of the Soviet ships in the

Indian Ocean; its External Affairs Hinister Gordon Freeth

asked his countr~nen not to panic at the sight of the

Soviet ships. HiG idea may have been to contain China with

the Soviet help in the light of Chou En· Lai 1 s desire to use

104

Australia as a gate\'Ja.Y to the south. 59 The Labour Govern­

ment headed by Gough \'lhi tlam adopted an independent policy

and identified Australia with its Asian neighbours. It

reco~!ized the Communist regime in China, discontinued aid

to South Vietnam and Kampuchea, opposed' American build-up

in the Indian Ocean and identified itself strongly with the

UN declaration on the peace zone. rJialcolm Fraser' s

government reversed the policy after 1976, welcomed i:ile

American naval build-up including the expansion of Diego

Garcia, and removed Labour Party's restrictions on American

nuclear weapons-carrying units making calls on Australian

ports. Under Bob Havvke, AustrCJ.lia continues to consider

ANZUS as the lynch-pin of Australian defence policy. 60 The

mild anti-nuclear stand of Hawke dissolved after his

visit to the United States in 1 SB4. Aust1 alia has played

a very important role in the communications network for the

American SSBN deterrent force. The Battle-Barwick agreement

in 1963 provided for a VLF communications base in the

N ortb.- \'lest Cape \'lhere high frequency transmitters ties

this s~tion into the US defence satellite communications

59 BP.zboruah, n. 3, p. 3JO.'

60 T. D. Bridge, 111.J,.ustralian Defence under Hawke", Army Quarterly and Defence Journal ~Devonshire), vol. 114, no. 2, April 1984, p. 148; '1'. B. Millar~ 11 The Defense of Australia ", Daedalus ( Ca'1lbridge), vol. 114, no. 1 , vJinter 1935, pp. 2590-79.

105

systen. 'l'here is also a defence research station at Pine

Gap (Central Australia), and a naval base at Cockburn sound,

HIJrAS t· 1; .,..,,. 61 .'! Sl.r;~•

Australia has a well-balanced economic infra-

structure, industrial production base, and foreign trade

which is equivalent to 35 per cent of its GDP. The military

planners of Australia feel that it should develop a

considerable deterrent ca~ability to protect its sea lines

as well as to provide • viOrthvklile support to the US in its

world-wide peace-keeping activi ty•. 62 'fhe key elements of

deterrence are surveillance· and reconaissance (performed

by the airforce and navy together), sea control measures,

strategic strike capability with submarines and F-111

aircraf~1and the ability to deploy a1n support balanced

gr01..md forces in threatened areas. But the financial

climate in Australia has not been very bright "Vlhich led to

the cancellation of order for the aircraft carrier

Invincible from l:lri tain by Hawke's Lc:. bour Government. It

seems the Australian navy would be an all-helicopter force,

wi tl1 the ASW role of Seakinp; helicopters, operating from

61 Desmond Ball, 11 'l'o.rget Australia : i-'inpointing the \). s. Installadons ", 1-'acific Defence R~orter l Victoria) , vol. e, no. 3, September 1 1, p.· 26; Bezboruah, n. 3, p. 3J2.

62 David Leach, "Navy's Views of Australia' s·Defence Need.s ", Paci1'ic Defence Reporter, vol. 11, no. 2, August 1 ~4, p. 1?.

106

new Adelaide frigates. 63 'l'he ne\11 suhnarines built in Europe

will also be available by 19~, whereas the old Oberon

suhnarines have mounted new \>J"eapon systens. 'Ihe guided

missile destroyers, Perth class, are going to be modernized

with ne\·J sensors and ueapon systems including the capability

to fire Ilar[_)oon missiles. 64 Even if the fixed-wing elanents

of the fleet arm of the navy is disbanded, the modernization

of surface ships, ASW and MCM forces, sul:marines,. and the

fleet support duties of the airforce are going to provide

Australia a considerable strike capability in the Indian

Ocean.

South Africa's strategic importance lies in the

sealanes around the Cape, its strategic minerals, harbours,

airfields, and communications and industrial capacity. It

is considered that South Africa is the only loya~ ally of

the \vest in South of Sahara. Its raw materials and

facili tics are cruci<::.l to the \'Test in the event of war,

and their loss to the Soviet Union would be catastrophic. 65

63

64

65

Van Kuffeler, n. L:9, p. 152; P.L. Young, "The Royal Australian N3vy 11 , Navx International, vol. 89, no. 2, February ·1 ::£4, p. '91.

Go.Ldrick and Jones, n. 57, p. 65.'

1~. L. Dodd, 11 South African Navy", Nav~ International, vol. 89, no. 10, October 1984, p. 60 •

107

South Africa looks at Soviet presence in Angola as a threat,

and considers itself, along with Australia, as great defence

circle of the West. It has continued to stress that its

navy can no longer be relied upon to safeguard the Cape rcute;

and that it must be the responsibility of the Western powers. 66

The Western powers realise this, as Britain once called South

Africa the •southern Gibraltar•. Apprehending Soviet control

of the Cape route in the event of a clash, South Africa

proposed a treaty along the lines of NATO. Britain entered

the Sirnonstown agreanent in 1955 and supplied arms to expand

the South African military force. This 'gibralter of the •

southern hemisphere' is closely linked with the overall

American reconaissance system. Its communications station

scans Indian Ocean shipping as far as Bay of Bengal, !or the

Pentagon.

South Africa has developed a sound econcmic

infrastructure aP~ military force with the help of Western

powers. There is a strong opinion ~n the West that the UN

arms embargo against South Africa should not be followed by

' the Western countries as they have high stakes in that

country. 67 Apart from receiving arms supplies !rem the West

it has considerable naval construction and repair facilities -.A.

at Simonstown; the Dorbyl and Sandrock Austral Yards in

66 N.L. Dodd, "African/Navies South of Sahara", Proceedings, vol. 110, no. 3, March 1984, p. 57.

67 Dodd, n. 65, p. 6o9.

108

Durban build Corvettes and other crafts. The technological

standa1 d and manpower of South Africa's defence industries,

their dockyards in particular, is very higp resulting in

efficient maintenance of vessels imported from the

West. 68 South Africa is the only state in the sub-Saharan

region comparable to a medium sized European power. Apart

from improving its military potential, South Africa has

opted for aggressive defence ~1ich consists of cross-border

raids on guerrilla bases and campaigns of destabilisation

in nearby countries that support the rebels. 69 Apart frcm

maintaining old contacts 'VIi th Israel, South Africa has

developed relations with ti1e navies of Chile and Taiwan

too, serving the global US strategy.

'l'he arc bet\;reen South Africa and the Indian sub-

continent l1as beccme extre11ely volatile a:rxl conflict-ridden

in recent times. External powers have also increased their

military presence and lift capability in the area, leading

to increased tension. In spite of the changed policy of

the ls.Lamic regime wh1..ch led to stoppage of arms and

spares irom the West, the Iranian armed forces have stretched

the war with Iraq for five years. It \·las believed that,

with the stopping of anns purchases, depletion of indigenous

68 uodd, n. 66, p. 57.

69 VI. G. Thorn, 11Sub-Saharan Africa'· s Changing Military Environment", Armed Forces and, Society, vol. 11, no. 1, fa.LL ·1 ':£4, p. 48.

109

infrastructure and the expulsion of American maintenance

s-caff, trw sophisticated arms of Iran WOUld fall into

d~se. But on the contrary, the Iranian forces are hitting

lra.qi targets wi tt1 vengeance. 'lheir major units are

occasionally si@lted at sea and the long range Orion airc~afts

still make reguJ.ar sorties. 70 l"lOr'eover, Khomeini has threatened

to close dovm Persian Gulf if Iraq uses French Super Etendard

i'i0l1ter bombers; and Iran can do it by sowing the most

rudimentary minefields. In order to keep the sea-route

open t11e United States has obtained bases closer to the

Persian Guli, and also could use sane ports in energency:

those of Saudi Arabia (Jubail and Yanbo), Israel (Eilat),

Bo.hrain U·Iana"J.a), Oman (rvluscat) and Egypt ( Ras Banas). The

US Navy could also use South African ports of Simonstovm,

Dur·ban and Port Elizabeth, as well as the French base at

. '/1 Reun~on. 'l'he Saudi early v.rarning aircraft, Ai:TACS, as

'dell 00 joint exercises v1i th scme other countries are also

designed to play important role in the swift movement of

r·apid deployment iorces in the region.

L ran uncier the .3roh, with its sophisticated armed

torces ~1d 1irfield facilities, occupied an important position

70 rr;:; iddle Eastern, North African and South Asian Navies 11 ,

Proceedings, Barch 1934, p. 50.

71 cnandra Kumar, 11 The Indian Ocean : ·Arc of Crisis or Zone of Peace", International Affairs (London), vol. 60, no. 2, sprinG 1984, p. z38.

110

in the American military reconaissance operations. 'rhe Orion

.ceconaissance and AS~tl aircrafts \'lere given to the Shah for

serving this purpose. 'lhe role has since been transferred

to Pakistan and is backed by arrangffi1ents for the rapid

deployment of American troops. 72 .tJal-::istan does not have

an extensive infrastructure, but has a substantial ccmbat

experience due to ext~~sive participation in CENTO military

exercises in the past. Their efficient crew and manpower

have been sent to many West Asian countries to train their

airf'orces. Recently Pal\:istan has expanded its capabilities

with new Agosta subnarines frcm France, US Navy• s Gearing

Fram I destroyers, British guided missile destroyers, and

ennanced e.Lectronic warfare and anti-aircraft capabilities. 73

\'Ji th ~ ts ennanced strike power and offer of military

fa.cili ties to the \vest, 1:-'a1~istan plays an important role

in the 1\rnerican strategic consensus. The main crisis spots

in the 'arc of crisis• are East Africa, l:'ersian Gulf and

South Asia, which can disturb the general trade pattern in

the area or result in big power intervention.74

72

'73

74

Cr1icherov, 11. 6, p. -1124; Cecil Victor, "Sea Defence : Indocentric or Regional", Patriot, 15 1vtarcl1 19::15, p. 4.

Keith Jacobs, i•PakistaJ1' s Navy", t'roceedims, March 1 '::)<34, p. 54; see also, 11 .[-laKistan Defence ~rectory", Defence and Foreie;n Affairs (Washington, D.C.), vol. 1..?, no. 2, ;,•'ebr·uary ·i%5, pp • .2.9-..?0; New York Times, 6 February 1 951, p. '( 4.

Ibid.

111

In South-East Asia, the ASEAN bloc is a major force

to reclean with, ·chough it has made its mark only on the

diplomatic front. Communist victories in Vietnam, Kampuchea

and Laos have broug~t these countries together. It should

also be remanbe1·ed that the United States, Japan, Austra.lia,

Ne1·1 Ze.J.land, the EEC and Canada are their partners, and

have hie;h st.J.l<:es in tl1e abundant resources of rubber, tin,

vegetable oil, timber, sugar and petroleum from the ASEAN

countries. '/'j '1nou13h there is no formal military alliance

with the \'Test, tl1e ASEAN countries are regular recipients of

arms from NATO countries, provide facilities to then and

have been tal\.ing part in joint exercises. f'llili tarily,

Indonesia is an important pov1er in the region and has

recently expanded its capabilities 1·!1 th Type 202 sutmarines·

i rom '.'!est Ger;nany, Boeing 7 j7 maritime patrol aircrafts,

corvettes, frigates, fast a ttacl<: crafts and missile boats

etc. 76 l'houc11 i t.s no..vy is not big enough to patrol the

area, it guards one of tt1e most important trade routes,

the ~·1alacca ::Jtrai ts •.

India • .s lone coa.stline o.f over 6,000 kilometres

D.al·:es it V<tlnerable to -cl1reats from .seaside, especially clue

to the natnre of ti.1e medium where instruments of war can be

75 Asio. Ye:trbook 1983 (Hong Kong, 1%3), p. 96.

76 Goldrick and Jones, n. r:·7, p. 64.

112

stored v1i thout being detected easily. Indian scholar and

diplomat K.r-1. Panikkar had v~arnted four decades ago that

India's freedom was dependent on the freedom of the water

surface, "no industrial development, no commercial growth,

no stable political structure is possible for her unless

her shores are protected 11 •77 In the early days of India's

independence the importance of seapov1er was not given serious

consideration due to apparent tranquility and distance

from the main arena of big power rivalry. India's first

experience of nav.:1l \·.Jarfare was in 1965 when two Pakistani

destroyers I\haibar and ~ carried out a hit and run

bombardment of Dv1arlm, south of the Gulf of Kutch. The

Indian fleet continued its exercise in the Bay of Bengal,

ancl t1us tool" sane tune to reach its \V3.r station in the

78 Ar3.bL111 sea. The Indian navy took .Lessons from the 1965

war and adO[)ted a bolder strategy for future engagenents,

namely, destruction of the eneny' s rnari time forces, attack

on shore targets, blockade, and [)rotection of trade. In

the 1971 1VD.r, ever-y Indian ship 1·1as employed to achieve these

obj(~ctives, nnd India fou[j:lt a .full-scale naval v1ar for the

!'i rst tir:le. Towo.ros the end of the vmr the United States

tried to usc force by sending the Task Force-74 in order

77 K.~.;. Panikkar, India o.nd the Indian Ocean ,(Bombay, 1971), p. 85.

78 I\auj_, n. 39, p. 18.6.

113

to coerce India into stopp~ng its operations. Though

it \V3.S not successful in this strategy, the very use· of

gunboats nonetheless brings into focus the problem of big

power intervention in local conflicts. Geography has . placed the Indian Ocean and its hinterland in the logical

area of military deployment and forv.rard bases. The military

and no.val presence of the big powers and their-calculated

interference in the local matters have a hi~ly disruptive

efiect on tl1e development potential of the littoral

countries.

1he shared experience of imperialism has united

most of the countries in the region in a resolve to keep

out of international power politics and military participation.

The non-aliQ1.ed movement has given than a common platfonn to

cane togeti1er and develop collective self-reliance. This

sharec! concern fmmd its manifestation in the concept of a

' zone of peace' which counters the concept of 'power

vacuum' used by the ~·fest to provide an excuse for the

British to v1elccme American forces in the Indian Ocean,

and to dismember the territories of Hauri tius and Seychelles

by the creation of i:he BIOT. 'l'he non-;iligned conference,

and otJ.1er re:3iona1 and internatiOil3.l meetings have

repeatedly deplored the external naval build-up which is

an extension of neo-colonialism and intimidation-of Afro-

114

Asian countries. 'lhe Lusaka no~aligned conference of 1970

for the first time appealed for support for the declaration

of the Indian Ocean area as a zone of peace. 79 The first

formal shot was fired by Sri Lanka• s ambassador to the United

Nations, Shirley Amarsingrre, who requested the UN Secretary

General to put the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a

zone of peace on the agenda of the 26th session of the

General Assembly. 'l'he efforts of Sri Lanka and 'l'anzania

led to the passage of Resolution 2832 which stated that the

• Indicm ucean, within limits, together with airspace above

and the ocean-floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated

for all times a zone of peace•.80 The 27th session of

1 '::!72 -ct1rough Resolution 2992 decided to establish an ad hoc

commit·cee to study the implications of the earlier

resolution, and measures to be -caken in furtherance of

its objectives. The UN General Assembly n~s repeatedly

requesteu the li t·coral and hinterlanci states to consult

with a view -co convening a conference on the Indian Ocean,

and nas invited all states, especially big powers, to ce-

' •t "h •tt 81 O()ercn::e wl n -c e canml ee. .Since the early 1970s, the

79 11 First CommuniltUe 11 , neviev.,r of International Affairs \UC.L(;.t'ade), vol. 21, no. 4CJ1, 20 Se[Jtember 1~70, pp. 22, 33. -

80 Ku1,ar, n. 71, pp. 241-2.

(j 1 UN, General Assembly, Report of· tne Ad Hoc Comm1. ttee on the Indian Ocean, j8 session, Supplement No. 29, A/38/29, pp. 7-9 •.

115

membership of the corruni ttee has increased fran 23 to 47,

including many external rnari time users of the Indian

ucean.

~he efforts to convene the Con£erence on Zone of '

.b'eace at Colombo have repeatedly been foiled by the United

States and its allies. It raised the issues of armed

conflict amonG the. states of the region, establishnent of '

a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Indian Ocean territories, and

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, ~nich supposedly ~nper

any meaninc;l\.tl progress towards realisation of the Indian

Ocean as a zone of peacc.82 'l'he \'/estern menbers of the

committee led by tile Vni ted States insist that the situation

has changed after the Soviet invdsion of Afghanistan and

that, .tirst of all, there should be ag!'eement on the issue

of the ·v1i tndrawal uf its forces iran ·fuere. ' But it v1ould

not be correct to as::;wnc that the in-cere·sted parties opposed

the peace zone movement· only on. the above-~entioned issues.

'l'hey il:1d done so in 1')'/lf :::t'iso vhen a con11Ui ttee consisting of

Frank Barnaby, K. 0ubrahmanyam and .:3ham Safave (of the

I rani:':m Navy) prep.:1red a 'statement about great power ·,_

military pre:;ence in -che Indian Ocean, at the instance of

the UN Secretary General. 'l'he report included both :::' -~·.f::::.ce

82 '.layne I•Ierry, u.s. 1-1.1'!'irms Cornmi tment Zone of i.Jeace Ne1v Del i: USIS,. 193 •

116

surface ships and submarines, the use of staging facilities

and airfields, the naval use of bases, mooring buoys, and

communications and fuelling faci~ities. The experts were

highly critical of the Diego Garcia base, which was paving

the way for intensified anns rivalry in the future. 8 3 But

this report was replaced in its entirety by the General

Asse::toly in consultation \·Ti th V/illiam Epstein, \.bo prepared

a revised report. Ho\vever, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted

the earlier report, and suggested that the Committee be

transformed in~o a negotiation forum to consult with

permanent members of the UN Security Council, with a view

tuwaras lessening arms rivalry.

'l'he big powers nave tended to import the cold

'~r atmosphere in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee,

and have transfonned it into a forum 1or propaganda \·Jarfare

and l'olemics. A sepa.J:·ate call for denuclearization of the

region does not l1.old much relevance ':ben the aircraft

carriers stationed in the area carry iRmdreds of liG1t and

medium vreieht nuclear bombs, nuclear depth charges, anti-

submarine ,1nd an-ci-aircraft missiles etc. The United States

is replacing its older aircrafts and artillery \-ti th new

ones · h,J.ch :Jt·e nuc.Le:J.r certified, ana enh.tnce the nuclear

artillery poten~i:ll of ti1e marine corps and other units. 84

83 U1., General Assenbly, Doc. A/AC. 15<3/·l, 3 May 1974.·

84 B:~ner jee, n. 37, pp. 253-4.

117

Moreover, it is quite improbable to achieve international

security through denuclearization of a particular area.

Denuclearisation is 9art of ~1e wider question of nuclear

disarmrunent, \mereac the peace zone idea is re~ated to the

issue of rreventing super pov1er competition fran intensi­

fying in the third I"JOrld area. 85 Conceptually the peace

zone idea includes the element of nuclear weapon--free zone.

Otherv.rise there vra.s no justification \iha tsoever in calling

upon outside powers not to deploy nucleaP-weapons in the

area.

·rr1e big powers increased their naval presence on

the plea of the freedo~ of nigh seas and condemned the

attempt to impose rnili tary restrictions \vithout their

consent. But it should be remer1bered that ~1e peace zone

propos2l does not in any \·JaY affect the peaceful uses of

the se;t, lilce fisllinc, l:tyin[3 of ripeline or submarine

cables, overfliglt ts etc. 'l'ne objection arises when the

bases and naval presence are used for ·the purpose of

intervention - and t11reatenin[j the no.tions in the Indian

Ocean o.rea. The preconditions like stOpLJage of anned

conflict · .. u!long the nations of the area are merely a pretext

to kL!l the r)eace zone proposal. In going beyond the

85 K.P. I'-Iishra, Quest for an International Order in the Indian Ocean tNe·l'! Delhi, ·1977) _, p. SJ2; K. S. SidhU, '~'ldL:n Ocean as a Zone of l!eace (New Delhi, ·1933), !J. 7o.

118

original framework of Resolution 2B32 (XXVI) vkl.ich declared

tl1e India.n Ocean as a zone of peace, i:he US and its allies

have signalled to ~1e regional powers in the area that the

validity of an argunwn.t depends upon the power of the

86 country concerned. Problems arise when some li ttora.l

states are manipulated by big po~o'ler machinations in order

to provide them b3.ses and other facilities on the plea that

limited super power presence is desirable. But they forget

that it wo~d legitDnise sDnilar efforts on the part of

other big powers, v-lhich prevent the littoral states fran

asserting tneir rights vis-a-vis [)O\.,rerful external countries.

Growinc; tension and conflict in the ree;ion is not in the

inter est of the ':rorld ccrnmuni ty because the sea lines of

commu::lication should remain open for transportation and trade.

Tl1.us,o.respons i ble behaviour on t11 e part of rna jor powers is an

important element in rcso.Lving differences in order to

tr:J.nsfonn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. 'lhe states

o£ the region should also mobilise public opinion for the

cduse, establish unity 3IIlong thenselves and co-operate in

evolvin~ a tool for implementation of the pe;:tce zone idea.

Only tncn tlley c::m develop collective self-reliance and

concentrate on their ecor..omic and social development.

eG Ashol~ Kapur, The Inuian Ocean : H.e[-)ional and International Power Politics l)Jew York, ·\ '.1£32}, p. 212.