CHAPTER- II

DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA: THE OFFICE OF PRESIDENT

As we have seen in the last chapter, ideas of democracy as well as civil

society were put on the agenda of Russian people by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the

last President of the erstwhile USSR, in late 1980's. But Gorbachev could not

implement this agenda. However, his failure led to the emergence of a new and

vigo10us movement for democracy and civil society under the opposition leader

Boris Yeltsin.

Meanwhile, in December 1989, Yeltsin was elected as the Chairperson of

Supreme Soviet of Russian Federation, then a constituent part of the erstwhile

Soviet Union. He immediately turned the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of

Russian Federation into a platform for what he conceived as the struggle for

democracy and civil society in Russia. As early as June 1990, he got a

declaration of sovereignty adopted by this Parliament and this document in fact

soon became one of the basic documents of democracy and civil society in

Russia. In addition, the credit of creating the directly elected President for

Russian Federation goes to Y eltsin. It was Boris Y eltsin who persistently

struggled for the. establishment of directly elected President in the Supreme

Soviet; in addition, he also mobilised people for this important political reform

in Russia. Thus, insurmountable public pressure generated due to Yeltsin's

effort compelled Supreme Soviet to put the question - directly elected President

of Russian Federation - before the public. In other words, this important

political issue was to be decided by the referendum. In the referendum, held on

1 7 March 1991, people of Russia favoured the creation of office of directly

elected President. And in the elections held on June 12, 1991 for the office of

directly elected President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin was elected

by 57 percent of the Russian electorate. In December, 1991, after the collapse

of the Soviet Union, he formally assumed power as the President of

33

independent Russian Federation, and thus he became the first directly elected

President of Russia in its history.

With his promises on democracy and initial crucial steps taken, B.

Y eltsin did succeed in opening up a new chapter in the chequered history of

democracy in Russia. This was a new Russia totally committed against Tsarist

form of rudimentary democracy and later Soviet form of controlled democracy

(democratic centralism). However, the promises had to be translated into

practice. How this exercise began ?, How democracy developed in Russia

during Yeltsin era particularly m its institutional and functional

terms?,needs to be examined. We propose to deal with these aspects in

the following pages.

Boris Y eltsin, after assuming the office of Presidency of a constituent

republic of the USSR in June 1991, proposed to continue the sequel of reforms

initiated by Gorbachev in mid- 1980's. But his efforts of political and economic

reforms were repeatedly jeopardised by the communist dominated Congress of

People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet of Russian Federation in the period

between 1991-1993, even after Soviet disintegration. Y eltsin did not even have

the option of overruling the Congress and Supreme Soviet and moving ahead

with reforms as the amended Brezhnev constitution had provided superior

powers to these legislative organs of Russian state. As per 1991 constitution,

which was in fact a heavily amended version of 1977 Brezhnev constitution,

The Congress of People's Deputies was legally supreme, the highest organ of

state power. It, alone, would amend the constitution. The Congress could

determine the general lines of foreign and domestic policy and it elected from

its membership the Supreme Soviet, which both legislated and controlled the

Government. The President's cabinet had to be approved by the Supreme

Soviet. The Congress could enlarge or diminish Presidential power or even do

away with office entirely. It could even impeach the President}

Presidential powers are discussed elaborately in Zafar Imam, "An Intelligent Person's Guide to Glasnost and Perestroika", op.cit., pp. 18-19.

34

Though the amended Brezhnev constitution which was in force in 1991

designated President as the supreme official and head of executive power of the

Russian Federation [article 1] but it did not provide him with adequate powers.

In other words, Presidency in Russian Federation was legally subservient to the

legislature (Congress and Supreme Soviet).2 The directly elected President of

Russian Federation was accountable to the public for the policies of the

Government but the outline of policies of the Government was made by the

Congress. The amended Brezhnev constitution (1991) was full of such

ambiguities about the role of institutions in Russia. These ambiguities of the

constitution could be attributed to endeavours by political leaders of Russia to

adopt a Soviet era 1977 constitution to entirely new political system - liberal

democracy. The mixing together of Soviet constitution with liberal democratic

features had led to a lop-sided arrangement. In fact, it lacked any consistency

of a coherent constitutional principles. It could not define clearly what type of

governance was it opting for - Presidential or Parliamentary? The result was

confusion all round, in public and among political leaders and legal experts.

The confusion about the functions of constitutional authorities was

reflected in the working of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress as well. These

two important branches of the legislature consistently blocked the economic

reform measures of President Y eltsin and the proposal for more powerful

Presidency in Russia. The opposition to all the proposals of Y eltsin was led by

Khasbulatov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. He launched a blistering

attack on the Y eltsin reform programmes and always argued for the supremacy

of Parliament over the President in Russia. 3

2 "Law ofRSFSR Presidency", SWB, 2 May 1991, p. C/3.

3 See Khasbulatov's Speech in Congress, SWB, 13 March, 1992, p. C/2.

35

In fact, anti-Yeltsin group in the legislature obstructed every reform

programme of Yeltsin and made the office of President, non-functional.4 The

fierce opposition to all Y eltsin's programme by anti-Yeltsin groups was resisted

by pro-Yeltsin groups and this resulted in frequent stalemates in the legislature. 5

Such recurrent stalemates in the legislature in 1992-93 reduced the government

to a non-performing institution. Yeltsin, frustrated of heading a non performing

government called for referendum in April, 1993. In the referendum, the

opinion of public on four issues - confidence in Y eltsin as the President of

Russia, approval of social and economic policy of the President, holding of

early elections for the Congress and the President - were sought.6 People

expressed overwhelming support to Yeltsin in the referendum.7 It indirectly,

gave mandate to Yeltsin to enact a new the constitution in his own way.

Yeltsin gaining confidence after public support in the referendum,

immediately set up a Constitutional Assembly to consider two central questions8

( 1) Whether Russia was have Presidential or Parliamentary system.

(2) What should be nature of division of powers between the

government in Moscow , the Republics and the regions.

The Constitutional Assembly, in its final draft submitted in July 1993,

recommended a federal constitution with a Presidential form of political

system9 • This draft proposal was opposed by the communists in the Congress

and the Supreme Soviet as they were afraid of losing power in the new political

4 CDPSP, 6 May , 1992, pp. 6-8.

5 CDPSP, 20 May, 1992, p. C/8.

6 CDPSP ,3 April, 1993, p. B-7.

7 "Report on 25 April , 1993 Referendum in Russia", Special Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 12 May, 1993, p. 11.

8 Richard Sakwa, Russia's Politics and Society, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 79-83 ..

9 Ibid.

36

system. Hence, they decided to protest tooth and nail the final draft of the

Constitutional Assembly. They would not allow the draft to be passed in the

Congress under any circumstances. Khasbulatov, according to some media

reports, started even preparing for a legislation that would have reduced the

President to a "figurehead" .10

Opinions were sharply divided both inside and outside Parliament.

Moscow was on the brink of a major civilian unrest. On September 21, 1993

the President suddenly dissolved the Parliament and called for an election to a

new Federal Assembly in December 1993. 11 Justifying his action, Yeltsin said

"The past few days have destroyed, once and for all, hopes for the restoration of

any sort of constructive cooperation. The majority of the Supreme Soviet is

outrightly flouting the will of Russian people and is pursuing a course aimed at

weakening and eventually removing the President and at disorganizing the work

of the present government". 12 But the Congress and Supreme Soviet was not

willing to take the decision of Yeltsin lying down, they called for protests in

Russia. The people of Moscow responded by a series of protests which

turned violent. They seized and destroyed five stories of the Moscow Mayor's

office; they also stormed the Ostankin television station. 13 Meanwhile,

'K.hasbulatov called for seizure of the Kremlin from inside the Parliament.

Responding to his call, thousands of anti Y eltsin protesters assembled outside

the Kremlin and the Parliament. 14 Yeltsin calling these protests as "armed

fascist-communist rebellion", ordered a military crackdown on the Parliament

and declared a state of emergency. The armed clashes resulted in several

casualties and Khasbulatov and Rutskoi and other members of Parliament held

10

11

12

13

14

CDPSP, 21 September, 1993, p. B-3.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23 September , 1993, p. 1.

Ibid.

SWB, 7 October, 1993, p. A-7.

Ibid.

37

up m the building were arrested. On October 4, 1993, the opposition was

ruthlessly suppressed. 15

Yeltsin justified his dictatorial action - dismissal of the Parliament,

declaration of emergency, military crackdown - on the grounds of the

uncooperative spirit showed by the Congress. Further, he moved ahead and

decided to settle the complicated political issue - Parliamentary or Presidential

system, through referendum. The new constitution, which was drafted by

yonstitutional assembly in July 1993, was put to referendum in December 1993.

The new constitution was endorsed by the majority of Russian electorate with

59 percent voting in favour of it. 16 This resulted in the replacement of the

Soviet era constitution that gave primacy to the Parliament with one that

established a strong Presidential republic. Russians, thus, through December

1993 referendum had opted for Presidential system of governance.

The 1993 constitution covered new grounds in other significant spheres

· iio:. '.'.'P.ll. It declared Russian Federation to ·be a democratic federative law

governed state [article 1]. 17 Democracy, for the first time in Russian history was

recognised as the basis of Russian state. As in the established democracies,

people were recognised as the foundation stone of democracy. Article 3 of the

Russian Constitution called people as the bearer of sovereignty and the sole

source of power of the Russian Federation. 18

In addition, the rights and freedoms of man found elaborate mention in

the new constitution. Article 2 defined the rights and freedom of man to be of

supreme value. Moreover, it was the obligation of the state to recognise,

observe and protect human and civil rights and freedoms. The importance

15 Ibid., p. A-13.

16 CDPSP,1 June, 1994, pp. 1-3.

17 The Constitution of Russian Federation, 1993, (Moscow: Publishing House of Juridicial Ukreture, 1998), p. 84.

18 Ibid., p. 84.

38

attached to human and civil rights and freedom in the 1993 constitution can be

seen from the fact that one full chapter - chapter two - deals solely with such

rights and freedoms. 19 The chapter two of the 1993 Russian constitution contains

47 articles which deals with rights such as equality before law, right to life,

right to vote, freedom of thought, speech, religion, movement, right to form

associations and right to join political parties etc. 20 The Russian constitution of

1993, promises to provide human and civil rights and freedoms and to guarantee

these, according to the universally recognized principles and norms of

international law [article 17]. 21 It is worth noticing that it has defined human

and civil rights as per international norms and conventions, while the Soviet

constitutions particularly 1924, 1936 and 1977 had refused to abide by the

international norms and it had defined these rights in the framework of

socialism. The 1993 Russian constitution had indeed, set new landmarks in the

constitutional history of Russia.

The 1993 constitution also established entirely new representative system

in Russia - Federal Assembly consisting of Federal Council and state Duma.

The Federal Council (upper house) is composed of members from 89 regions

and Republics of Russia , while state Duma (lower house) is elected by a

combination of single member constituencies and a national party list. 22 The

Federal Council has 178 members, two from each of the Republics and regions

and it is accordingly, the chamber that consider all questions of Federal

significance. 23

The lower house, state Duma, has 450 members. It performs more

important Parliamentary functions than the Federal Council. The state Duma

19 The Constitution of Russian Federation, 1993, op.cit., pp. 90-108.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid, p. 90.

22 The Constitution of Russian Federation, 1993, ()p.cit., pp. 128-138.

23 Ibid.

39

approves of the Prime ministerial candidate [article 1 03], it can express no

confidence motion in the government [article 117], it confirms some important

appointments like Chairman of the State Bank, Chairman of the Accounting

Chamber and the Commissioner of Human Rights. 24 The state Duma, in

addition, discusses and passes legislations, which eventually become law. The

President of Russian Federation has the right to veto the legislations which

however, can be overridden by two-third majority in both the chambers [article

107].25 The State Duma and the Federal Council, undoubtedly, enjoy some

important powers in Russian political system but overriding powers over

Federal Assembly have been vested in the President of the Russian Federation,

as Russia in 1993 constitution is declared to be a Presidential republic.

Thus, Russians, in the December 1993 referendum, had opted for a

strong political executive. This option for such political system had been

perhaps shaped by the belief of the Russians that only a strong political

executive could retrieve them from the political and economic chaos prevailing

in Russia and it could provide effective governance in Russia.

Such a faith in strong executive must be considered against the long

standing tradition of a strong executive in Russia. All the previous Russian

political systems were characterized by a strong executive, with powers

concentrated in a small governing elite. During the Tsarist period, the

centralised autocracy was organized on the basis of a steep power hierarchy,

with the Tsar enjoying all important supreme position and all the decision­

making powers vested in him. An administrative bureaucracy supporting the

political executive emerged under the Tartars. By early eighteenth century,

Peter the Great had rationalised and professionalised the bureaucracy, while

simultaneously enhancing the power of the central executive agencies. An

extensive system of ministries and advisory councils assisted the Tsar by early

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., p. 107.

40

nineteenth century. There were efforts to develop representative bodies ranging

from the assembly of nobility, clergy and bourgeoisie to elected councils and

assemblies. The endeavour of creating representative bodies finally culminated

in the formation of the State Duma. It was created by Tsar Nicholas II in

1905. But the Tsar was never constrained by such institutions - the executive

ignored and even dissolved them, when necessary.

The tradition of a powerful political executive continued in the Soviet

period, as well. The core feature of the Soviet political system was its

centralised, hierarchical structure with the massive set of interconnected

bureaucracies linking all institutions and interests into an apparatus, ruled by a

small group namely Party Politburo and General Secretary. The General i

Secretary within the Communist Party apparatus was the country's top

executive, wielding supervisory power over all other secretaries and all

subordinate party and state bodies. With General Secretary at the helm, the

sphere of policy making was looked after .~y the Party Politburo and the

Secretariat. CPSU Central Committee (CC) with roughly 350 members drawn

from all major federal and lower level institutions also had an important role in

supervising the policy making. In the Soviet system, the sphere of policy

implementation and administration fell to government institutions (Council of

Ministers and subordinate ministries). However, the Communist Party

maintained indirect control over policy implementation and administration by

appointing members in the ministries. Though the function of policy making

and the policy implementation was looked after by different set of institutions in

the Soviet political system but at the apex of hierarchies of policy making and

policy implementation was CPSU General Secretary. It was, indeed very

important and powerful position in the Soviet Union.

The tradition of strong political executive dominated political system

was replicated in Perestroiked political system of Gorbachev. On the one hand,'

Mikhail Gorbachev's Perestroika of late 1980s began to distribute the powers of

strong executive among the wider set of institutions; but on the other hand,

41

Gorbachev created a new office of Presidency which was vested with

tremendous executive powers. This new office of Presidency in Soviet political

system, enjoyed more powers than the powers ever enjoyed by the General

Secretary of CPSU.

The idea of Soviet Presidency was not new in USSR: it had been under

discussion at the time of adoption of 1936 constitution; Stalin, however,

declared against a Presidency that could challenge the newly established

Supreme Soviet and the idea made no further progress.26 The same idea was

proposed during the time of Khrushchev (1964); however, it could not be

pursued. In 1985, after Gorbachev had become General Secretary, the idea was

put forward by two senior members of the leadership - Georgi Shekhnazarov

and Vadim Medvedev. Gorbachev, however, was still committed to a system of

elected Soviets and in a system of this kind, there was no place for Presidency. 27

The idea of Presidential government was discussed again during the

Nineteenth Party Conference in the summer of 1988. But Gorbachev argued

against it saying that Presidency would concentrate too much power in the

hands of a single person.28 In spite of repudiation of the Soviet Presidency by

Gorbachev, the issue refused to die. Gorbachev associates continued the

discussion about the issue and thought about its introduction, as part of a large

series of changes in the structure of government. Andrei Sakharov, released

from his exile in Gorky, proposed for the office of President of Union of Soviet

Republics of Europe and Asia who would be elected for every five years and

would hold supreme power in the country, not sharing it with leading bodies of

26

27

28

J. Stalin, Sochinemya, Vol.l (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967), p. 177 as cited in Ray Taras (ed) ,Post Communist Presidents (Cambridge UhiversityPress, 1997), p. 39.

Gorbachev quoted in Gosudarstvo i pravo 5(1996), p. 95 as cited in Ray Taras (ed.), op.cit., p. 39.

Ibid., p. 40.

42

the party. 29 Gorbachev was finally convinced of the need to move to a

Presidential system at a discussion with his closest advisers that took place after

the Second Congress of People's Deputies in December 1989. The discussion

was based upon a memorandum prepared by Medvedev and Shakhnazarov,

which was very close to the proposals that were put into effect in the following

year.Jo

As Medvedev and Shakhnazarov explained,31 the new state system was

working badly - the chairman of Supreme Soviet was fully engaged in the

management of Parliamentary proceedings and had no means of enforcing his

own decisions. And the Soviet government was busy defendin'g its position in

the committees and commissions of the new Parliament and Parliament itself \

was holding up the implementation of important state decisions. They proposed

rather different but efficient political system, based on directly elected President

who would lead a cabinet of ministers. The CPSU would propose its own

general secretary for the position; he would preside over the meetings of the

Politburo in his Presidential capacity and general secretaryship as such would

be abolished. It was agreed that, in the first instance, the President would be

elected by the Congress of People's Deputies and not by population at large.

The issue of Soviet Presidency continued to be discussed by Deputies at

the informal meetings. Some Deputies were attracted to it since it would allow

Gorbachev to develop a political base that was independent of his more

orthodox colleagues in the party leadership. Other Deputies were concerned at

the possible extension of a Presidential system to the Republics. What, it was

asked, would be the relationship among the fifteen Presidents that might emerge

29

30

31

A.D.Sakharov, Trevoya Inedezhda (Moscow 1990), pp.258- 272 as cited in Ray Taras (ed.), op. cit., p. 40.

Medvedev and Shakhnazarov "Memorandum" in "Demokratizatsiya", 22, (Spring, 1994), pp. 317-322, cited in Ray Taras (ed.), op.cit., p. 40.

Medvedev speaking at Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies, 12 March 1990 as quoted in SWB, 15 March 1990, pp. C/2-3.

43

as a result'r.. Shakhnazarov urged Gorbachev to ensure that there was just a

single President in such circumstances; Gorbachev in a fateful decision

preferred the institution to develop more widely, with 30-40 Presidents at lower

levels of the government. 33

After the discussion at informal meetings, the question of Presidency was

placed on the agenda of Supreme Soviet; and after Supreme Soviet had

approved the introduction of a Presidency by a large majority, the issue was

placed before a specially convened session of Congress of People's Deputies.

Anatoly Lukyanov, who presented the proposals, argued that the Presidency

would encourage a dialogue among the various political movements that had

been brought into being by Perestroika and help to develop a political

consensus. 34 The President would be able to act quickly in the event of public

disorders or other emergencies and an executive agency of this kind would help

to resolve the impasse that had developed between the Soviet government and

the Congress and Supreme Soviet. Nor was there any reason to fear that

Presidency would lead to a new form of authoritarian rule as there was an

"entire system of safeguards" against any such eventuality;the safeguards

envisaged were the limits on age, tenure and ability of the Congress to recall

the President and overrule his decision. 3~ As jurist Boris Lazarev explained,

laws were adopted but rarely put into practical effect and sometimes when there

was a need to take decision quickly, even the Supreme Soviet Presidium had

failed to act promptly. 36 In short, it was "either a Presidency or chaos", as the

32

• 33

34

35

36

Kuznetsov, "Iz istorii", Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo I Pravo, 7 (1990), p. 98, as cited in Ray Taras (ed.), op.cit., p. 41.

Ibid., 40.

Proceedings of the Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies, 15 March 1990, SWB, pp. C/1-C/7.

Ibid.

Ibid

44

sources "close to the government" told Pravda shortly after the vote had been

taken.

Understandably, perhaps, some Deputies were concerned that an elected

Presidency of the kind that had been proposed would encourage a slide back to

personal dictatorship. Despite the fears of skeptics, the office of Soviet

Presidency was established with the majority of votes at Congress of People's

Deputies.37 Gorbachev was the only candidate when the elections to the new

post took place on 14 March 1990 and he was sworn in the following day as the

first President of the USSR with the support of 71 per cent of the Deputies . 38

The new important office of the Soviet political system had been vested

with tremendous powers. 39 He could propose the candidates for the premiership

and other leading state positions, he had a suspensory veto over the legislation

and he could dissolve the government and suspend its directives. He could

declare a state of emergency and introduce direct Presidential rule. The

President was to report annually to the Congress of People's Deputies and would

brief the Supreme Soviet on the most important questions of USSR's domestic

and breign policy. The President headed a new Council of Federation

consisting of fifteen Union Republics; he also headed a Presidential Council

which was responsible for. the main direction of USSR's foreign and domestic

policy.40

i

37

38

39

40

Demokraticheskaya Rossiya, 17 May 1991, as cited in M.E. Urban, "Boris Yeltsin: Democratic Russia and the Campaign for Russian Presidency", Soviet Studies, Vol. 44, no. 2, 1992, p. 188.

SWB, 15 March ,1990, p. B/7.

The qualifications and powers of President are elaborately discussed in Draft Law in USSR Presidency, lzvestiya, 6 March ,1990 as cited in SWB, 7 March 1990, Cl/1-115.

Zafar Imam, "An Intelligent Person's Guide to Glasnost and Perestroika" ,op.cit.,pp. 18-19.

45

The powers of the President were further increased by Parliamentary vote

m September 1990. It vested him with the powers to nominate the Prime

minister and the council of ministers . 41 The President, meanwhile, became the

head of new security council with overall responsibility for defense and public

order and he appointed Vice-President responsible for carrying out the functions

that were entrusted to him.

Formally, at least the President of USSR possessed greater powers than

Stalin had commanded. The possession of such powers by a political executive

caused deep the concern to Deputies and Gorbachev opponents. They feared

that it could lead to dictatorial regime.42 For the inter-regional group, as well,

new Presidency represented the "usurpation of powers" leaving too much

authority in the hands of a single person.43 Boris Yeltsin went further,

complaining that central authorities were seeking to constitutionalize an

absolutist and authoritarian regime which would ultimately be used to provide a

legal context for any high handed act.44

Though, the office of President assumed tremendous powers but some

limitations were placed upon the powers of the new President like the President

could be impeached by a two-third vote of the Congress of People's Deputies,

his ministerial nominations required the approval of the Supreme Soviet and the

President had to report annually to Congress of People's Deputies.45 In any

case, as Gorbachev told a gathering of Miners in April 1991, he had voluntarily

surrendered extraordinary powers that he possessed as the General Secretary of

CPSU, would he have done so if he had been seeking unlimited personal

41

42

43

44

45

Ibid.

SWB, 20 February, 1990, p. C/7.

SWB, 23 March,1990, p. C/7.

Interview ofBoris Yeltsin, SWB, 24 March ,1990, p. B/6.

Draft Law on USSR Presidency, SWB, 7 March, 1990, Cl/1-Cl/5.

46

uuthority?46 Gorbachev assured people of USSR that Soviet Presidency was the

need of time and it won't lead to dictatorship.47

Gorbachev's position as Soviet President was undermined by increasing

reluctance of the Union Republics to accept the decisions of what they came to

describe as "Centre". The Republics were led by Russia Federation, where

Boris Yeltsin had been elected Chairman of Supreme Soviet in May, 1990.

Boris Y eltsin further strengthened his hold over leadership of Russian

Federation by winning the office of directly elected President in June 1991.48 By

the end of the year, most of the other Republics had moved in the same

direction, towards the Presidential system with an elected chief executive. 49 The

Russian Presidential election was thus a decisive moment in the politics of

USSR. It led to shifting of legitimacy from USSR to its Republics, from

Gorbachev and CPSU towards Yeltsin and radical democrats, and from the

Parliaments to the Presidents.

The decision to create the office of Russian Presidency had not been

without controversies. It involved bitter wrangling between Communists and

Y eltsin supporters. The Communists opposed the creation of office of Russian

Presidency since the chances of Y eltsin becoming President seemed imminent.

However, at second Congress of People's Deputies in December 1990, it was

agreed that the Supreme Soviet and its constitutional committee should consider

appropriate amendments to Russian constitution for the establishment of office

of the President. As a constitutional amendment required a two-third majority

in Congress of people's Deputies, Yeltsin opponents seemed well placed to

46

47

48

49

Gorbachev Speaking to Miners, SWB, 17 April, 1990, B/5.

Proceedings of Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies, SWB, 15 March , 1990, pp. C/1-C/7.

Yeltsin Polled 56 percent votes in direct Presidential elections, SWB, 14 June, 1991, p. Cl/3.

Tataria elected its President on 12 June, 1991, SWB, 15 June, 1991, p. Cl/3. Ukraine Supreme Soviet introduced Presidential Post ori 24 June, 1991, SWB, 25 June, 1991.

47

resist any change that would be to their disadvantage. 50 The decision to call a

referendum on the future of USSR altered the position once again. On 25

January 1991, the Presidium of Russian Supreme Soviet proposed an additional

question - the issue of directly elected Presidency,in the referendum. 51 The

Russian voter's favoured overwhelmingly the establishment of the office of

President in the referendum. [70 percent of voters approved the change to

Presidential system].

The referendum in January 1991, thus, resolved the controversy over the

establishment of office of Presidency. The Congress of People's Deputies met

after the referendum and decided to hold Presidential election on 12 June 1991.

In the first Presidential election held in June 1991, Yeltsin secured 59

percent of the votes polled. Yeltsin's position was strengthened further when he

headed the resistance to attempted coup of August 1991. After the coup,

Yeltsin became a popular figure in Russia which in turn helped him to negotiate

the association of sovereign Republics in the Soviet Union.

Moreover, Y eltsin owed his authority to the fact that he had been directly

elected, unlike Gorbachev who had been chosen by Soviet Parliamentarians.

Yet Y eltsin had to govern through the Congress of People's Deputies that had

been chosen by the popular vote and which claimed the same right to represent

the will of the electorate as the President.

It often led to piquant situation, when the two important institutions of

Russian political system - the Congress and the President - claimed superior

powers than the other. Yeltsin, being head of political executive of the Russian

Federation (as per amended Brezhnev constitution, 1991) proposed to

implement the policies of political and economic reforms in Russia in 1991.

These policies were vehemently opposed by the Congress and the Supreme

50 Ibid

51 SWB, 19 February, 1991, p. B/10.

48

Soviet for they had not being taken into confidence, while framing the policies.

The Parliamentarians accused the Government of neglecting the legislature -

Congress and Supreme Soviet. R. Khasbulatov, the speaker of Supreme Soviet,

arguing on behalf of Parliamentarians, demanded the accountability of the

Government to the Parliament.52 He, in the opening session of Russian

Parliament (13 March, 1992), accused the Government of an attack on

democracy and complained that individual ministers had a dismissive attitude

towards representative institutions in general.53 He further, clarified in the

session, that by law, legislature had the right to initiate laws, had power over the

budget and could review Government policies and it could also annul

Presidential decrees.54 The President, he believed, was trying to abrogate all

these powers of Parliament. Parliament thus, led to speaker Khasbulatov

opposed all the reform policies ofYeltsin in 1991-92.

Y eltsin exasperated by regular blockade of his reform policies, proposed

a referendum on a new constitution to create a strong Presidential form of

Government at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies on December 1,

1992.55 Instead, he received from the assembled Deputies a blistering attack on

his reform measures and adoption of several constitutional amendments to curb

the powers of the President.56 Hardliners in the Congress secured another

victory with the adoption of constitutional amendment which would

automatically strip the President of all powers if he ordered a dissolution of the

Congress or Supreme Soviet. 57 Feelings were so antagonistic between the

52 Khasbulatov Speech in USSR Congress, SWB, 13 March, 1992, p. C/2.

53 Ibid

54 Ibid

55 Joseph L. Nogee and R. Judson Mitchell, Russian Politics, The Struggle for a New Order, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997), p. 102.

·56 Ibid

57 Ibid.

49

reformers and the conservatives that fighting broke out on the floor of the

Congress.

To find a way out of this Stalemate, Yeltsin came out with a compromise

formula. In an effort to obtain Congressional approval of E. Gaidar, a reformist,

as a Prime minister, Yeltsin agreed to let the Parliament have the right to

confirmation over four critical ministries - defense, security, internal affairs and

foreign affairs. The Congress accepted the control over the four ministries and

then proceeded to reject Gaidar's nomination by a vote of 486 to 467. 58 Yeltsin

counter attacked with vigour and accused Congress of breach of trust. The

actions of Congress, at 7th session made him adamant, then, he was not willing

to settle for anything less than the· referendum on the constitutional question,

while the Congress was willing to call for the referendum only on the issue of

early Parliamentary and Presidential elections. The issue of referendum, thus,

reached the position of deadlock - neither the President nor the Parliament

willing to budge an inch from its original position. The Congress decided to

settle the issue in its own favour by moving impeachment motion against the

President on 28 March 1993. Yeltsin, however, survived the impeachment

motion. 59 The Congress unperturbed by their inability to impeach Y eltsin,

decided to move ahead and conduct the referendum on the issue which it

desired. The Ninth Session of the Congress decided to put the question of

confid.;:nce in Y eltsin as the President and his social and economic policies

since 1992 in the referendu111. 60 This referendum was held on 25 April , 1993.

Russian electorate expressed confidence in Y eltsin and his social and

6conomic policies by a convincing majority in this referundum. The results of

the April 25, 1993 referendum bolstered the confidence of Yeltsin. He, then,

started pressing for a "Presidential republic" in Russian Federation. His desire

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid, p. 106.

60 Ibid

50

for a strong Presidential system in Russian Federation was given shape by the

Constitutional Assembly set up on June 5, 1993. The constitution drafted by

constituent assembly came to be called as "1993 constitution". This

constitution was put to approval of public in referendum , held in December,

1993 - 59 percent of Russian electorate approved of it.61 Russian Federation,

thus, had a constitution which provided overwhelming powers to the President.

The 1993 Russian constitution conferred on the federal President's

extensive decision-making powers. 62 The contemporary President is at the apex

of pyramid of power which dominates all the institutions and executive

branches. Under the 1993 Russian constitution, President defines the basic

directions of the domestic and foreign policy of the state and also represents the

Russian federation domestically and internationally [these formal powers were

set out in Article 80-93, 1993 Russian Constitution]. The President enjoys

direct influence over the Government through supervision of Prime minister and

other high level ministers. He has power to appoint and remove the Prime

minister, deputy Prime ministers and other federal ministers, as well as to

dismiss the Government. He has some influence over the composition of

minister's staff as Prime minister Chernomyrdin learned when his own chief of

staff was forced out. The President also nominates other top federal officials

including the State Bank Chairman, member of the constitutional court,

Supreme Court and members of the Security Council. He initiates legislation,

reports annually to the legislature on the Government's domestic and foreign

policy, while under certain conditions, he can dissolve the State Duma. He can

call referendums; while as Commander in Chief, he can introduce a state of

emergency. The policies are mostly made through Presidential decrees which

have the force of law and which have allowed Yeltsin to set policy unilaterally

in many areas. The Presidential decision-making powers also extend to include

61

62

The results of Parliamentary Elections and Referendum, SWB, 14 December, 1993, pp. B/1-B/5.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993, op.cit ..

51

dispute mediation between federal and regional bodies and annuling the action

by regional executive bodies.

Meanwhile, 1993 constitution has made procedures for impeachment of

the President quite cumbersome . and time consuming. The impeachment

procedure involves numerous top federal offices. The State Duma initiates the

impeachment of the President by indicting him for serious violations of the

constitution, with the Supreme Court and constitutional court confirming the

appropriateness of such an action and verifying that correct procedures have

l,Jeen followed. After these steps have been taken and the necessary hearings

held, State Duma and Federal Council subsequently vote for impeachment, with

two-third majority in both chambers needed to remove him from office. The

complicated impeachment procedure, in addition to the powers provided to the

President in 1993 Russian constitution, makes it most powerful institution in the

Russian political system.

While the hegemonic Presidency is grounded in wide ranging unilateral

decision-making prerogatives, it is also based upon a large and growing

Presidential administration which includes over forty advisory bodies, policy

making and policy implementing agencies and a massive support of staff of

approximately 7000. 63 Top proteges of President Yeltsin including Yuri Petrov,

Sergei Filatov, Nikolai Y egorov and Anatolii Chubais have headed the

administrative apparatus with many Perestroika generation officials from

research institutes holding senior policy posts. This apparatus has been subject

to almost constant reorganization as the Presidential powers have expanded and

his policy interests changed. 64 The huge administrative apparatus, at the

prerogative of the President further adds on to the powers of President in the

Russian political system.

63 John P. Willerton Jr., "Presidential Power", Stephen White, Alex Pravda, Zvi Gitelman (ed.), Developments in Russian Politics, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 47.

64 Ibid

52

A massive Presidential administration, reminiscent of the CPSU Central

Committee apparatus in its size, complexity and policy making has been set up

in aid of the President. A few of important department of Presidential

administration are: 65

*

*

*

*

*

Presidential Council designed to deal with both domestic and foreign policy and to facilitate the President's interaction with other federal political bodies.

A Council of Chief Administration to facilitate the executive branch interaction with regional and local authorities.

Analytical Centres dealing with the range of policy initiatives were established to provide the necessary informational and support services to the President and his advisers. One of the important analytical centres is the expert council which provides specialist advice in the formulation of major social, economic, scientific and other projects.

State Legal Affairs Administration formulate the Presidential decrees and drafts laws which are forwarded to the Parliament.

Reorganization of Security Ministry into Federal Counter Intelligence Service made the security forces directly accountable to the President.

A Presidential decree of February 1996 formalised the organizational

arrangements of the Presidential apparatus which had evolved over the previous

five years. The 1996 decree identified six main administrative divisions, each

dealing with major policy concern: 66

i) constitutional guarantee of citizens rights ii) state domestic and foreign policy iii) civil service and Government personnel iv) programme and policy analysis v) state legal affairs vi) oversight

65 Ibid pp. 47-50.

66 Ibid

53

Each of these six divisions is to be headed by deputy chief of staff with all six

working with federal Government departments to prepare draft decisions.

All the formal Governmental administrative structure is headed by

Prime minister, a nominee of President. The Prime minister is responsible for

day to day administration of the country and together with other Government

ministers, assists the President and his advisers in the formulation of policies.

The Russian President has thus, both the informal and formal

administrative structure to assist him, both of them are subordinate to his

authority. The formal administrative structure headed by Prime minister is

accountable to the legislature but informal administrative structure is immune

from legislative oversight; thus, President Yeltsin has shielded Presidential

administration from any legislative review by locating them within Presidential

apparatus. The Russian President having his own administration, is not

dependent on formal Government administration for policy formulation; neither

is he dependent on legislature for approval of his policies, as he rules mostly by

the decrees. The draft constitution of 1993 has thus, vested tremendous powers

in the office of the Russian Presidency, thereby making the Russian President

more powerful than the US President and French President in their own political

systems. Moreover, the Russian President has multiplied on to his

constitutional position by creating informal administrative structure. The office

of the Presidency, thus, has become supreme authority in Russian political

system.

Widespread fears were expressed in the media by the people and the

intellectuals about the powers enjoyed by the Russian President; speculations

were being made about 'dictatorship of Russian President' in the grab of

democracy. Y eltsin tried to end all speculations by establishing channels to link

administration with public and he made an effort to smoothen the relations

between executive and legislature. The executive was made accountable to the

public with the formation of Information Administration (April 1994) which

54

linked the Presidential staff, its analytical centers, Government ministries and

departments with country's media. Yeltsin, by creating Department for

Interaction (August 1994) tried to make executive-legislature relations cordial.67

Y eltsin tried to be accommodative to legislature, hence he proposed Civic

Accord (April 1994) in order to help all elements (Federal and regional

institutions, parties and officials) reconcile their policy differences within the

confines of new constitutional arrangements. 68 The Reconciliation Committees

and the Round Table Discussion Group were formed to sort out the differences;

it was augmented with more informal relationships and negotiating channels

among the Government officials and the l~gislators. Some influential elements

from powerful economic sectors (e.g. industrial associations and agriculture)

were also drawn into these negotiations, reinforcing the important role for

informal politics in lubricating the federal decision-making process as it was

linked to the transforming economy.69 These information channels of

communication between executive and Parliament brought about policy

continuity and stability in the political and economic reform process.

The informal channels of communication proved its efficacy, when 1994

and 1995 budgets were passed after long negotiations between the

representatives of Duma and the Government. 70 During 1994-96 period, the

cooperative spirit between Parliament and executive continued, as some

important legislations71 namely part one and part two of civil code, the law on

. 67 Ibid., p. 48.

68 (i) Rossiiskya Gazeta, 29 April1994, as cited in SWB, 30 April, 1994. (ii) Civil Accord Draft altered to draw wider support. CDPSP, 18 May, 1994, p. 12.

69 (i) John P. Willerton Jr., "Presidential Power", op.cit., p. 45. (ii) Yeltsin broadened membership of Presidential Council to give representation to regional leadership, CDPSP, 25 May, 1994,p.l3.

70 CDPSP,6 July, 1994, p. 4 and CDPSP,20 July, 1994, p. 20.

71 After much negotiation Duma adopted "Special Laws" on organized crime, CDPSP, 14 December , 1994,p.l6.

55

local self-Government, the law on elections of Duma72 and the law on the

production sharing, were passed. In mid 1996, after two years of work,

Parliament passed and the President signed new criminal code. 73 In each case,

compromises were. hammered out by commissions representing the major

factions and the executive branch which led to smooth passage of measures in

the Parliament and by the President.

In spite of reconciliation committees and discussion groups, executive­

legislative struggles continued. It even led to several important Parliamentary

no confidence votes against the Y eltsin Government over several issues

including invasion of Chechnya in 1995 and 1996.74 But most politicians

worked within the formal arrangements set out by the new constitution. The

informal arrangements, too, had its role in reconciliation between the Parliament

and the executive.

The working relationship between the Parliament (Duma) and the

President continued to be mediated through constitutional arrangements and

reconciliation commissions, even during Yeltsin's second term as the President

(1996-2000). Though, at times, reconciliation arrangements between the

Parliament and the Presidency failed . It was evident from an important case of

Parliament - President wrangle in 1999, when the Parliament rejected for the

second time the President's request to dismiss the Prosecutor General, Mr. Yuri

Skuratov.75 Skuratov had charged Yeltsin's Government of thwarting his

72

73

74

75

Duma approved election law through the mediation of reconciliation commission, CDPSP, 5 July, 1995, p. 17.

Duma adopted new criminal code, CDPSP,30 August, 1995, p. 1.

Duma moved no confidence motion against Government on 22 June , 1995. At the same session, it adopted several important constitutional amendments e.g. strengthening Parliamentary oversight over Government activity, approval of Duma to appointment of Prime minister, Foreign minister, Defence Minister. CDPSP, 7 July, 1995. pp 14-15.

Hindu (Madras), 25 April, 1999.

56

investigation of massive corruption in the Kremlin. The Federal Council

refused to bu~ge from its stand on anti-corruption issue by pointing out to the

President that it would approve of a new Prosecutor General only if new

occupant to this office would continue anti-corruption drive.

The hot and cold relations between the Parliament and the Presidency

had become a regular feature of the Russian political system. The

1 Parliamentary - Presidency relations again reached a boiling point, when Yeltsin

dismissed well performing Prime minister Primakov in May 1999. This was,

however, not the first instance of Yeltsin's salvo; in March 1998, he had

dismissed Victor Chernomyrdin; in August~ 1998, Yeltsin dismissed Sergei

Kiriyenko, a young upstart whose four month long stint culminated in the

financial crisis at that time. 76 The dismissal of popular Prime minister

Primakov by President Yeltsin set in motion a major conflict of Yeltsin with the

Communist dominated Duma which within hours of dismissal voted 245 to 4 for

a resolution calling for the President to resign. 77 On May 13, 1999, State Duma

began a three day debate over the impeachment charges against the President.

The special Parliamentary commission had established five charges of

impeachment against Yeltsin including instigating Soviet Union collapse,

ordering the shelling of Parliament in 1993, launching a botched war in

breakaway Chechnya, ruining Russian armed forces and waging genocide

against the Russian people through economic destruction.78 When the

impeachment motion was put to vote, State Duma collected 283 impeachment

votes on the most serious charges facing Y eltsin - his role in launching the

bloody and brutal 1994-96, Chechen war. The outcome was short of two-third

majority, 1.e. 300 votes necessary to formally launch impeachment

proceedings. 79 The confrontation between the Parliament and the Presidency

76 Hindu (Madras), 23 May,1999.

77 Los Angeles Times, 13 May,l999.

78 Times of India, (New Delhi.), 16 May 1999.

79 Times of India, (New Delhi),16 May,1999.

57

came to an end temporarily, with Duma failing in its effort to impeach the

President. The Duma, thus subdued, approved of Y eltsin nominee for Prime

minister Stepashin by 305 to 55 in favour ofnomination.80

Another round of confrontation between the legislature and the

executive is likely with taking over of Putin as the President of Russia in 2000.

Putin's handling of the Chechen problem has given the impression of a tough

leader with the 'iron fist' and one who is capable of holding the reins of the

country that is vast and diverse. In some interviews, Putin has hinted that the

Russian constitution should be changed to strengthen the President's power. 81

He also feels that four years term is too short and suggests extending it to seven

years. He has suggested a referendum to confirm such a change. If this would

materialize, Putin could stay in power till 2011; further, Putin is hinting at

abrogation of the legislature's power82 - such proposals are bound to be opposed

vociferously by the legislature. So, in coming days, we are sure to witness a

contest over distribution of powers between legislature and the executive.

After the analysis of legislature-executive relations in post 1993 period,

one can easily conclude that executive (i.e. President) enjoys predominant

position not only in the executive spheres but also ip. legislative spheres. But

President Yeltsin has shown some consideration for the legislature by working

through compromises and reconciliation committees. This kind of working

relationship has not been a regular feature of executive legislature relations.

Y eltsin has been dismissing Prime ministers frequently and ruling mostly by

decrees without taking into account the opinion of legislature. The Presidential

system in Russia has come to be established without proper checks and balance.

The immense constitutional as well extra-constitutional powers of President

80 International Herald Tribune, (Paris),20 May, 1999.

81 Newsweek, I 0 January,2000.

82 Time,3 April,2000. p. 41.

58

attest to the continued presence of authoritarian elements in the political system

of Russia.

As the constitutional powers of the President are enshrined into new

constitution of 1993, in articles 80-93,83 they have constitutional validity.

Hence the democratic orientations of the constitution could well be doubted.

However, the crux of the issue appears to be the practice of constitutional

powers which have been entrusted to the Presidency in Russia. In other words,

the way President of Russia has exercised these powers since December 1993.

It is not generally known that Y eltsin has ruled mainly through decrees

formulated and presented to him by the Presidential staff for approval and

signature. Such practices of the President of Russia may be regarded as extra

constitutional which does not reflect well on the constitution of Russia, 1993.

It may be worthwhile to examme these powers and functions of the

President of Russia in a global context, particularly in the context of

Presidential systems in the established democracies. Our obvious choice is

French and American Presidential system. A comparative constitutional

analysis of the French and American Presidential systems vis-a-vis Russian

Presidential system would help us in understanding the significance of the

powers and functions of Russian President for democracy in Russia. We shall

be able to answer better such questions as: whether these powers both in theory

and practice could lead to further strengthening of democracy, if one goes by

the French and American experiences.

We shall now analyse briefly the power and functions of the French and

American Presidential system. We begin here with French Presidential system.

The French constitution, though framed within a short period of time

under the stress and strains of the Algerian war, introduced prominently the

ideas of General De Gaulle. Two major themes constitute hub of entire

83 See Chapter 4 of TheConstitution of Russian Federation, 1993, op.cit.

59

framework of French constitution: first, the reconstitution of authority of state

under the leadership of strong executive and second, the establishment of

rationalized Parliament i.e. Parliament with limited political and legislative

powers. The constitution makers in 1958 were trying to reconstruct a strong

and stable executive in place of unstable multi party political system of the

Fourth Republic.

They endeavoured to make the President of the Republic the repository

of prestige and prerogatives. So that the office may provide the continuity to

the state and vigilantly supervise the functioning of the constitution. The

President in their opinion was "key stone of the arch" of the constitution to be

established, both the symbol and instrument of reinforced executive authority.

The President, in the 1958 constitution, has been vested with

wideranging powers which overwhelm both the Prime minister and the

Parliament. The President derives his authority directly from the people; he is

directly elected by universal adult suffrage for a term of seven years. The

election takes place in two ballots unless a candidate obtains an absolute

majority of the votes cast at the first. The President as head of state appoints

the Prime minister and accepts his resignation. 84 He presides over the meeting

of the council of Ministers, of councils and committee of National Defense85 and

of superior council of Judiciary. 86 The President is Commander in Chief of

Armed Forces of the country. He negotiates and ratifies treaty. He signs

ordinances and decrees that have been considered in council of ministers, sends

messages to Parliament, promulgates laws and may ask for reexamination of a

84 Article 8, Jean Blonde!, Govt. of France, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1974), p. 269.

85 Article 15, Ibid., p. 270.

86 Article 65, Ibid., p. 283.

60

bill. 87 The President even enjoys right to dismiss Prime minister. [in 1964

President De Gaulle dismissed Prime minister M. Pompidou].88

The President of the Fifth Republic is also vested with substantative

discretionary powers. The President can dissolve National Assembly (lower

house) at any time, on any issue and for any reason. 89 The President of Russia

also enjoys similar discretionary powers. The second discretionary power of

French President relates to calling for referendum on any bill or issue without

the countersignature of Prime minister.90 The third discretionary power relates

to promulgation of emergency. The President can promulgate emergency when

independence of Nation - the integrity of territory of France, the execution of

,international engagements, the regtdar functioning of public powers are in grave

danger. The President need not consult the Prime minister, National Assembly

and Senate in this matter. The President needs to inform the nation by message

and to consult constitutional council on the measures taken. 91 The fourth

discretionary power that is vested in the President - he signs all decrees and

ordinances prepared by council of ministers. He promulgates laws passed by

the Parliament. He may send back bills to the Parliament and ask for

reconsideration of bill or certain articles. The Parliament has no power to

refuse such reconsideration.92

The Parliament has no power to encroach upon the decisions made by

executive, it is only concerned with legislative issues. The constitution of 1958

created a "rationalised" Parliament in an effort to enhance the position of the

87

88

89

90

91

92

Article 15-20, Ibid., pp. 270-272.

Dorothy Pickles, The Fifth French Republic, (London: Lowe and Braydone, 1962), p. 133.

Article 12, Jean Blonde), op.cit., p. 269.

Article 19, Ibid., p. 271.

Article 16, D. Pickles, op.cit., p. 238.

Article 61, Ibid.p. 247.

61

Government and to protect the executive from legislative encroachments. The

Parliament, in France, works under severe restrictions e.g. Parliament can

ilegislate only on those matters defined in the constitution and overall control

over Parliamentary activity is provided by constitutional council. Moreover, the

President has the power to dissolve the Parliament at his own will. 93 The

Parliament is not only institution to express the will of the people, it can also be

expressed through referendum. Through these restrictions, "rationalised"

Parliament has been created in France. The constitution of 1958, thus, has

weakened the Parliament and enhanced the influence and prestige of the

executive.

The 1958 constitution was designed to give France a stable and strong

Government by eliminating pitfalls of the earlier constitution. The Fifth

Republic retained the Parliamentary system of Government but at same time

rendered the President of the Republic exceptionally strong and endowed him

with emergency powers and other powers, more extensive than even possessed

by the American President.

However, in British Parliamentary system, the Head of State keeps aloof

from politics and he doesn't preside over the cabinet meetings where policy is

formulated and decided. It is the prerogative of the Prime minister in Britain, to

advise the head of State to dissolve the Parliament and such an advise is

generally accepted. Unlike British Parliamentary system, the President in

France presides over cabinet meetings and he has power to dissolve the

Parliament.

The constitution of 1958, therefore, seeks to make the President and his

Government very strong vis-a-vis the Parliament.

Any discussion on the Presidential systems is incomplete without

reference to American Presidential system as it was American constitution

93 Jean Blonde!, op.cit., pp. 60-62.

62

which, for the first time in history, had given shape to Presidential form of

governance.

The Philadelphia convention (1787) after much deliberation and

discussion had opted for Presidential form of governance as it could bring about

unity into diversity of the nation. The framers of the constitution rejected

Parliamentary democracy as it could weaken national solidarity and create sharp

cleavages and narrow loyalities. They strove to establish an energetic yet

dignified executive capable of enforcing laws firmly and one that should lend a

note of stability. E. Barker in "Essays on British Government" described

monarch as a symbol of unity, a magnet of loyalty and a centre of ceremony.

The President as head of State serves the American people in the same capacity.

Apart from performing executive functions, American President has symbolic

value, a symbol which cements national feelings.

The powers of American President as defined in the American

constitution are based on doctrine of separation of power and checks and

balance. The doctrine of separation of power means that the three functions of

Government - Legislative, Executive and Judicial - must be vested in the

separate organisation of the Government. The accumulation of all powers i.e.

legislative, executive and judicial may lead to dictatorship and tyranny. The

American constitution following doctrine of separation of powers, has vested

legislative powers in Congress (Article 1 ), executive powers in President

(Article 2) and judicial power in Supreme Court and inferior courts (Article 3).94

The doctrine of separation of powers does not require that legislative, executive

and judicial departments should be wholly unconnected with each other. These

three departments must be connected and blended as to give each constitutional

control over the others. Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers is quite

related to doctrine of checks and balance. As unlimited powers in separate

branches may lead to tyranny, therefore, each branch should keep a check on

94 The Constitution of USA, S.E. Morison, H.S. Commager and W.E. Leuchtenburg, Growth of American Republic, (OUP, 1969), pp. 867-78.

63

other branch. The objective of doctrine of checks and balance is to make

exercise of power limited, controlled and diffused. The framers of the

American constitution has divided the Government into three distinct

departments and evoked an intricate system of checks and balance in order to

avoid tyranny emanating from any sources, e.g. legislative branch is checked by

the President through his veto power but Congress if it can muster a two third

vote, may enforce its view and override his veto. The Senate confirms the

appointments made by the President and approves treaties made by him. The

President can declare war only on authority and approval of Congress. 95 The

American President is thus, not as powerful as Russian President or French

President. An elaborate mechanism of checks and balance has been created in

the constitution to curb the powers of American President.

Despite the doctrine of checks and balance in the American constitution,

the President of USA has been vested with wideranging powers which makes it

superior to the Congress. Thus the political system of USA is categorised as

Presidential form of governance.

Unlike the political system of France and Russia where President is

directly elected, the President of USA is indirectly elected. The President of

USA is elected by electors of the States. The total number of electors

constituting the Electoral College is 538. A simple majority of 538 electoral

votes i.e. 270 is needed for a candidate to win the office of Presidency. Each of

the state possesses as many Presidential electors as it has senators and

representatives in the Congress.96 The President has the term of four years and

he ca.1 be elected twice for the office. The President can be removed from

office by impeachment for treason, bribery, high crimes and misdemeanours.

The House of Representatives has power to initiate impeachment proceedings

by a majority vote. The case is then tried by Senate with Chief Justice of the

95

96

Jewell C. Phillips, Henry J. Abraham, Cortez A.M. Ewing, Essentials of National Government, (London: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971), pp. 29-31.

Ibid, pp. 160-170.

64

Supreme Court presiding, if the impeachment motion is passed by Senate with

two third majority then the President ts removed from office.97 The

impeachment proceeding of President m USA is much simpler than

impeachment of Russian President. The impeachment of Russian President is

cumbersome time consuming and involves numerous top federal offices. The

complicated impeachment proceedings indirectly puts into hands of Russian

President, enormous powers; thereby making office of Russian President more

powerful than American and French President in their respective countries. Let

us now analyse power and functions of American President.

The President of USA is vested with executive and legislative powers

with considerable checks and balance.

President as Chief Administrator - The President is head of the national

administration. It is the duty of the President, as chief executive to see that the

constitution, laws and treaties of United States and decisions rendered by the

Federal courts are duly enforced throughout the country. He may accordingly

direct the heads of the departments and their subordinates in the discharge of the

functions vested in them by the acts of the Congress. 98

Power of Law Enforcement - The constitution commands the President to take

care that the laws be faithfully executed. The President takes the oath "he will

to best of his ability preserve, protect and defend the constitution of USA. "99

Power of Appointment - The constitution gives the President the power to

nominate and by and with advice and consent of the Senate to appoint

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, Judges of Supreme Court and

other officers of USA. 100

97

98

99

Ibid., pp. 199-201.

Chearles A Beard, American Government and Policies, op.cit., pp. 170-172.

Article II, Section 3, Morison, Commager and Leuchtenburg, op.cit., pp. 874-876.

100 Phillips, Abraham and C.A.M. Ewing, op.cit., pp. 234-235.

65

Military Powers - The constitution declares that the President shall be the

Commander-in Chief of the army, navy and the State militia. Provisions of law

empower President to appoint military and naval officers with the advice and

consent of the Senate. But the power to declare war belongs to the Congress. 101

Conduct of Foreign Affairs- President is the chief foreign policy maker and the

accredited official spokesman of the country in international affairs. He

appoints ambassadors and receives foreign ambassadors. The Congress

. provides money for the conduct of foreign affairs and unless it provides what

the President asks for no President can succeed in his efforts. It is an example

of checks and balance operating in conduct of foreign affairs. 102

Emergencies - The constitution of the USA does not specially provide for any I

kind of emergency. The exercise of emergency power of the President is based

either on his military power, his responsibility to see that the laws are faithfully

executed or an emergency power delegated to him by Congress. Thus Congress

has some checks on emergency powers of the President. The Judiciary also

limits the emergency powers of President as has been shown in Youngstown

sheet and Tube Co. V s. Sawyer Case (1952). In the above mentioned case,

Supreme Court refused to uphold the order of President Truman, when he issued

the order to take possession of land and operate most of nation's steel mills.

The President's justification for his action was that it order to avert national

catastrophe, it was necessary. The Supreme Court declared that there was no

source of authority for the President's action either in the constitution or in any

act of Congress. 103 So, both the judiciary and the Congress maintain

considerable checks on emergency powers of American President. However, in

France and in Russia, President emergency powers are not limited or checked by

any authority, which makes the office of President quite powerful in both the

countries.

101 Ibid., pp. 241-242.

102 Ibid., pp. 242-243.

103 Rossiter Clinton, American Presidency, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1960), pp. 64-66.

66

• Legislative Powers - Though, the chief duty of American President is to execute

the laws, yet he is expected to guide the Congress in law making activity within

the limits of constitutional and political propriety. 104

The President can send messages to the Congress, when he shall judge

necessary and expedient. He can convene both the houses of Congress on

extraordinary occasions. 105

Another important legislative power of the President is presentation of

Budget to Congress. He requests Congress for the grant of funds. It is yet

another measure of control by Congress over the President. 106

Under the legislative functions of the President may be included power

of issuing ordinance or executive orders. Such ordinances have general

applicability and legal effect. 107

Finally, the President is given an important share in legislation through

his Veto power. The President can stop a bill from becoming a law by returning

the bill to the Congress with objections. But Congress, by two third majority in

each chamber may override his Veto. The Congress has superior rights over the

President in legislative affairs. 108

As we have seen in the above discussion, the American President has

been vested with considerable executive and legislative powers but his power is

restrained by checks and balance provided in American constitution. The

American President is less powerful than French and Russian Presidents. The

French and Russian Presidents are directly .elected; they have the power to

dismiss the Congress and Prime minister; emergency powers of the French and

Russian President are not restrained by the Congress or the judiciary; they enjoy

104 Ibid, p. 19.

105 Phillips, Abraham and Ewing, op.cit., pp. 236-237.

106 Ibid., p. 237.

107 Ibid., pp. 239-240.

108 Ibid., pp. 237-238.

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the power to veto a bill which can not be overrided by the Congress - these

powers have made French and Russian President very powerful in their political

system. Their impeachment is quite complex and cumbersome where as the

impeachment of American President is relatively quite simple. The French and

Russian Presidential systems have not been provided with adequate checks and

balance while the American Presidential system is hemmed in with appropriate

checks and balance. The Presidency in France and Russia enjoy unchecked and

unparalleled powers, which makes it prone to undemocratic behaviour.

All said and done, the office of President in Russia is the pivot of

democracy in the country given the fragile nature of democratic system as it was

during the two Presidential elections. The future of democracy in Russia would

certainly depend on how this pivot of democracy in the country would function

in practice now, and in future.

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