Limitations on the appointing power of the president1. Relatives- Art VII Sec 3 par. 2

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

2. Midnight Appointment- Art VII, Sec 15 Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

a. In Re: Hon Mateo Valenzuela and Hon Placido Vallarta, 298 SCRA 408, November 9, 1998

b. De Castro vs JBC GR No 191002, April 20, 2010 Relate with Art VIII Sec 4 (1), 3rd sentence

The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

c. De Rama vs CA, 353 SCRA 94, February 28 2001

3. Losing Candidate- Art IX-B, Sec 6Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

4. Military- Art XVI, Sec 5 (4)(4) No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-

owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.

Limitations on the appointments extended by an Acting President- Art VII Sec. 14

Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.

Military powers or the Commander- in-Chief Clause- Art VII Sec 18

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

1. Subject to judicial review- Art VII, Sec 18 3rd paragraph and Art VIII Sec 1 par 2

Art VII, Sec 18 3rd paragraphThe Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must

promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

Art VIII Sec 1 par 2Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

IBP vs Zamora GR No 141284 August 15, 2000

Powers of the Commander in Chief of all AFP1. Calling out Powers

a. Requisite?

Commander-in-chief powers [Art. VII, Sec. 18](1) He may call out such armed forces to prevent orsuppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.(2) He may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,or(3) He may proclaim martial law over the entire Philippines

or any part thereof.

David vs Macapagal-Arroyo GR 171396, May 3, 2006

Kulayan vs Tan GR 187298 July 3, 2012

2. Power to Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

Suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus"Writ of habeas corpus"Is an order from the court commanding a detaining officerto inform the court(1) if he has the person in custody; and(2) his basis in detaining that person

a. Requisite

The requisites for the suspension are:(1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and(2) The public safety requires the suspension.

Duration: Not to exceed 60 days unless extended byCongress.

b. Effects of the suspension of the privilege-Art VII Sec 18 par 5A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military

courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

-Art III Sec 2; Art VII Sec 18 par 6

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Art VII Sec 18 par 6During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Art 125 of the Revised Penal CodeArt. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and 272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987, respectively).

Art III Sec 13Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Effects of the suspension of the privilege:

(1) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies onlyto persons "judicially charged" for rebellion or offensesinherent in or directly connected with invasion (art. VII,sec. 18[5]).(a) Such persons suspected of the above crimes can bearrested and detained without a warrant of arrest.(b) The suspension of the privilege does not make the arrestwithout warrant legal. But the military is, in effect,enabled to make the arrest anyway since, with thesuspension of the privilege, there is no remedyavailable against such unlawful arrest (arbitrarydetention).(c) The arrest without warrant is justified by the emergencysituation and the difficulty in applying for a warrantconsidering the time and the number of persons to bearrested.(d) The crime for which he is arrested must be one relatedto rebellion or invasion. As to others, the suspension ofthe privilege does not apply.

(2) During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, anyperson thus arrested or detained shall be judiciallycharged within 3 days, or otherwise he shall bereleased. (art. VII, sec. 18[6])(a) The effect therefore is only to extend the periods duringwhich he can be detained without a warrant. When theprivilege is suspended, the period is extended to 72hours.(b) What happens if he is not judicially charged norreleased after 72 hours? The public officer becomesliable under RPC Art. 125 for "delay in the delivery ofdetained persons."

(3) The right to bail shall not be impaired even when theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.(art. III, sec. 13)

Power to proclaim Martial Law1. RequisitesThe Requisites in proclaiming Martial Law are:(1) There must be an invasion or rebellion, and(2) Public safety requires the proclamation of martial lawall over the Philippines or any part thereof.

2. Effects of the Proclamation

A State of martial law does not:1. Suspend the operation of the Constitution2. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts orlegislative assemblies3. Authorize the conferment of jurisdiction onmilitary courts and agencies over where civil

courts are able to function4. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.(Section 18)

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to person judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.

Suspension of privilege does not suspend right to bail [Sec. 13, Art. III].

c. Limitations- Art VII, Sec 18 4th par.A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

Open Court Doctrine"Open Court" doctrine. —Civilians cannot be tried bymilitary courts if the civil courts are open andfunctioning.If the civil courts are not functioning, thencivilians can be tried by the military courts. Martial lawusually contemplates a case where the courts arealready closed and the civil institutions have alreadycrumbled, i.e. a "theater of war." If the courts are stillopen, the President can just suspend the privilege andachieve the same effect.

Olaguer vs Military Commission No 34, 150 SCRA 144

d. Role of Congress

The Role of Congress (See art. VII, sec. 18, par. 1,2)(1) Congress may revoke the proclamation of martial law orsuspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusbefore the lapse of 60 days from the date ofsuspension or proclamation.(2) Upon such proclamation or suspension, Congress shallconvene at once. If it is not in session, it shall convenein accordance with its rules without need of a callwithin 24 hours following the proclamation orsuspension.(3) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or thesuspension, the President shall submit a report, inperson or in writing, to the Congress (meeting in jointsession of the action he has taken).(4) The Congress shall then vote jointly, by an absolutemajority. It has two options:(a) To revoke such proclamation or suspension.When it so revoked, the President cannot setaside (or veto) the revocation as he normally woulddo in the case of bills.(b) To extend it beyond the 60-day period of its validity.

Congress can only so extend the proclamation orsuspension upon the initiative of the President.

The period need not be 60 days; it could be more, as Congresswould determine, based on the persistence of theemergency.

Note: If Congress fails to act before the measure expires, itcan no longer extend it until the President again redeclaresthe measure.Congress cannot "validate" the proclamation orsuspension, because it is already valid. (see Carpio,dissenting, in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, infra)

If Congress extends the measure, but before the period ofextension lapses the requirements for the proclamation orsuspension no longer exist, Congress can lift the extension,since the power to confer implies the power to take back.

e. Ways to lift the proclamation1. Lifting by the President himself2. Revocation by Congress3. Nullification by the Supreme Court4. By operation of law after 60 days

Delegated Emergency Powers- Art VI Sec 23 (2)

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

1. Conditions of granting emergency powers

1. Requisites for the delegation: (1997 Bar Q)(1) There must be a war or other nationalemergency(2) Law authorizing the president for a limitedperiod and subject to such restrictions asCongress may prescribe(3) Power to be exercised must be necessary andproper to carry out a declared national policy.

2. Duration of the delegation:(1) Until withdrawn by resolution of Congress(2) Until the next adjournment of Congress

2. Grant of Emergency Power vs Commander-in-Chief Clause

Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary GR 159085, February 3, 2004

3. Relate with Art XII, Sec 17

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

David vs Macapagal Arroyo GR 171396, May 3, 2006

4. Relate with Art XVI Sec 5 (7)(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty.

Executive Clemencies- Art VII Sec 19

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Non-delegable power and must be exercised by thePresident personally.

Clemency is not a function of the judiciary; it is anexecutive function. The exercise of the pardoningpower is discretionary in the President and may not becontrolled by the legislature or reversed by the courts,save only when it contravenes its limitations.

Forms of Executive Clemency (1988 Bar Question)

1. Reprieves- a postponement of a sentence toa date certain, or a stay in the execution.

2. Commutations- reduction or mitigation of thepenalty.

3. Pardons- act of grace which exempts theindividual on whom it is bestowed form thepunishment which the law inflicts for the crime hehas committed.4. Remission of fines5. Forfeitures6. Amnesty- commonly denotes the ‘generalpardon to rebels for their treason and other highpolitical offenses’.

1. Limitations: Art IX-C, Sec 5

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

Pardon- Act of grace which exempts the individual onwhom it is bestowed from the punishment whichthe law inflicts for the crime he has committed.

2. Kinds of Pardon

Classification of Pardon

1. Plenary- Extinguishes all the penaltiesimposed upon the offender, includingaccessory disabilities.

2. Partial-Does not extinguish all thepenalties.

3. Absolute- One extended without anystrings attached.

4. Conditional- One under which the convictis required to comply with certainrequirements.

a.Pardonee may reject conditionalpardon. Where the pardon is conditional,the offender has the right to reject thesame since he may feel that the conditionimposed is more onerous than the penaltysought to be remitted

b. Condition, lawful. It is necessarythat the condition should not be contraryto any provision of law.

c.Condition, co-extensive. Thecondition of the pardon shall be coextensivewith the penalty remitted.Hence, if the condition is violated after theexpiration of the remitted penalty, therecan no longer be violation of theconditional pardon.

d. When the condition is that therecipient of the pardon should not violateany of the penal laws, who determineswhether penal laws have been violated?Must the recipient of pardon undergo trialand be convicted for the new offenses?The rule that is followed is that theacceptance of the conditions of thepardon imports the acceptance of thecondition that the President will alsodetermine whether the condition has beenviolated. (Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA272 (1987)) (1997, 2005 Bar Question)

3. Pardon vs ProbationProbation - disposition where a defendant after convictionand sentence is released subject to (1) conditions imposedby the court and (2) supervision of a probation officer.(PDNo. 968, sec. 3[a])

4. Pardon vs ParoleParole- suspension of the sentence of a convict granted by

a Parole Board after serving the minimum term of theindeterminate sentence penalty, without granting apardon, prescribing the terms upon which the sentenceshall be suspended. (REYES)

5. Pardon vs AmnestyAmnesty- Grant of general pardon to a class of politicaloffenders either after conviction or even before thecharges are filed. It is the form of executiveclemency which under the Constitution may begranted by the executive only with the concurrenceof the legislature.

Echagaray vs Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96, January 19, 1999

Monsanto vs Factoran 170 SCRA 190

Garcia vs Chairman GR 75025 September 14, 1993

In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709, December 29, 1995

Risos Vidal vs COMELEC GR 206666 January 21, 2015

The diplomatic /treaty making power- Art VII Sec 21; Art XVIII, Sec 25

Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. Bayan vs Zamora GR 138570, October 10, 2000

Treaty vs Executive Agreement- Abaya vs Ebdane GR 167919 February 14,

2007

Power of ImpoundmentPHILCONSA vs Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, August 9, 1994

Power of Augmentation- Article VI, Section 25 (5)

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

Araullo vs Aquino GR 209287, February 3, 2015 (Reso on the MR to the July 1, 2014 Decision)

__________________

CASE DIGESTS__________________

In Re Appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta[A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, November 9, 1998]

Facts:1. Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and CabanatuanCity, respectively.

2. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any appointments two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Issue:Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII

Held:During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two months immediately before the

next presidential elections and up to the end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6 years. The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban

De Castro vs JBC GR No 191002, April 20, 2010

FACTS:This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.

ISSUE (Section 4):Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?

RULING:The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on nepotism.Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up

to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in the Supreme Court.

De Rama vs CA, 353 SCRA 94, February 28 2001

Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees.

Petitioner de Rama justified his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Issue: Whether or not Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution applies to appointments in LGU.

Held: Constitutional prohibition on so-called midnight appointments, specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President.

In the absence of any showing that these alleged midnight appointments were defective in form and in substance, nor is there evidence presented to show that subject appointments were issued in contravention of law or rules, these appointments are deemed valid and in effect.

IBP VS ZAMORA

G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]

FACTS:

Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, President

Estrada, in verbal directive,  directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.

ISSUE:

1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review.

2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.

RULING:

1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1)  the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question  is the lis mota of the case.

2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.  The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement.  The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority.  Moreover, the

deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.  Neither does it amount to an “insidious incursion” of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.

David vs Macapagal-Arroyo GR 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts of the Case

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.

Issue:

1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

2.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation?

3.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?

Held:1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.

2.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi (right to be heard in court), for they suffered “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

3.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.

Kulayan vs Tan GR 187298 July 3, 2012

Facts:Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by

three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.

Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnappingincident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agenciesto suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.

Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 wasissued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, ArticleVII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of aPresident

HELD:

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armedforces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to militaryexperts; but the ultimate power is his.

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation,Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the LocalGovernment Code.

Olaguer vs Military Commission No 34, 150 SCRA 144

FACTS:In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Ologauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.

ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal has the

jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are

open and functioning.

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all

decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals

during the period of martial law in all cases involving

civilian defendants. A military commission or

tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even

during the period of martial law, over civilians for

offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the

civil courts are open and functioning, and that any

judgment rendered by such body relating to a

civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the

part of the military tribunal concerned.

Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary GR 159085, February 3, 2004

On July 27, 2003, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City demanding, among others, the resignation of the President, the

Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police.

In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.

By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiation, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of rebellion and did only on August 1, 2003 through Proclamation No. 435 “DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST.”

Issue:

WON the President have the power to declare a state of rebellion?

Held:

Yes. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, has a “sequence” of “graduated power[s].” From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. These conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

David vs Macapagal Arroyo GR 171396, May 3, 2006

Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of

national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The PNP warned that it would take overany media organization that would not follow “standards set by the government during the state of national emergency.”

Issue: Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

Held:No. PP 1017 does not authorize President Arroyo during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. However, knowing that duringgrave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise itspowers, the framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergencypowers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus: (a)there must be a war or otheremergency; (b)the delegation must be for a limited period only; (c)the delegation must be subject tosuch restrictions as the Congress may prescribe; and (d)the emergency powers must be exercised to

carry out a national policy declared by Congress. The taking over of private business affected withpublic interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus,when Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution states that the “the State may, during the emergency and underreasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to her pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. There is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a state of national emergencyand her authority to exercise emergency powers. Her authority to declare a state of national emergency isgranted by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can beraised. The exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility orbusiness affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over ofprivately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can she determine whensuch exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has nopower to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over.

Echagaray vs Secretary of Justice 301 SCRA 96, January 19, 1999

Facts:On January 4, 1999 , the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

Issue: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in

effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

Held: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

Monsanto vs Factoran 170 SCRA 190

FACTS In 1983, Salvacion Monsanto, the petitioner, who was assistant treasurer of Calbayog City was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of estafa and was sentenced for imprisonment. Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court which affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration which during the pendency of that motion, she was extended pardon by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of the said pardon, Monsanto requested the Ministry of Finance that she be restored to her former post, being vacant and stressing that the absolute pardon has wiped out the crime implying that her service to the government has never been interrupted thus entitling her to reinstatement from the date of her preventive suspension and a back pay.   The basic theory of the petitioner is that having her case pending final judgement during the extension of executive clemency, her employment was therefore not terminated or forfeited.

ISSUE :Whether or not absolute pardon granted by Chief Executive entitles Monsanto reinstatement to her former position without the need of a new appointment.

HELD :The Ministry of Finance referred the request of Monsanto to the Office of the President which gave a statement through its Deputy Executive Secretary that it is only during an acquittal, not absolute pardon, as the only ground for reinstatement of previous position and entitlement of salary payment of a public officer.   The petitioner, being convicted for the crime of estafa with a penalty of prision correccional carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension from public office. The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of Deputy Executive Secretary stating that the pardon granted to the petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but that cannot go beyond it. That to regain her former post, she must re‐apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. That in considering her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds.

Garcia vs Chairman GR 75025 September 14, 1993

Effects of Presidential PardonVICENTE GARCIA, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV, respondents.

Facts: Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. He was accused of stealing telegraph poles from the company. Thus, public respondents filed a criminal case against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner was found guilty and was later dismissed from the service. With respect to the criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted by the court due to insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now claiming before the COA for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to present. But COA on the other hand reluctantly denied his pleadings. Meanwhile,

petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute pardon) by the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners claim.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

Held:Yes. Petitioner's reinstatement in the instant case which was ordered pursuant to a grant of executive clemency was effected not because of lack of sufficient proof of his commission of the offense but that, more importantly, he did not commit the offense charged. Verily, law, equity and justice dictate that petitioner be afforded compassion for the embarrassment, humiliation and, above all, injustice caused to him and his family by his unfounded dismissal. This Court cannot help surmising the painful stigma that must have caused petitioner, the incursion on his dignity and reputation, for having been adjudged, albeit wrongfully, a dishonest man, and worse, a thief. Consequently, this Court finds it fair and just to award petitioner full back wages from 1 April 1975 when he was illegally dismissed, to 12 March 1984 when he was reinstated. The payment shall be without deduction or qualification.

In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709, December 29, 1995

Held: A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one (Alvarez v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 50). By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order “the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.” It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound

judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.

It matters not that the pardonee has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputably solely and absolutely in his office. (In Re: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, 251 SCRA 709, Dec. 29, 1995 [Hermosisima])

Risos Vidal vs COMELEC GR 206666 January 21, 2015

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

NATURE:These are petitions including:1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively.

(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for

Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s) disqualification to run for and hold public office

FACTS:On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12

of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

Petition was dismissed.

Bayan vs Zamora GR 138570, October 10, 2000

FACTS :

On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.

In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defence and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA.

On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard.

The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the

VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondents in ratifying the agreement.

ISSUE : Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional.

RULING :

Petition is dismissed.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : “After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other contracting state”.

The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.

In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.

Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet the following requisites :

a) it must be under a treaty

b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress, ratified by a

majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum

c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State

There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite implies that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the constitution.

The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA.

Abaya vs Ebdane GR 167919 February 14, 2007

FACTS :

This a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside and nullify Res. No. PJHL-A-04-012 dated May 27, 2004 issued by the Bids and Action Committee (BAC) of the DPWH. This resolution recommended the award to private respondent China Road and Bridge Corporation of the contract which consist of the improvement and rehabilitation of a 79.818-km road in the island of Catanduanes.

Based on an Exchange of Notes, Japan and the Philippines have reached an understanding that Japanese loans are to be extended to the country with the aim of promoting economic stabilization and development efforts.

In accordance with the established prequalification criteria, eight contractors were evaluated or considered eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC. Prior to the opening of the respective bid proposals, it was announced that the Approved Budget for the Contract (ABC) was in the amount of P738,710,563.67. Consequently, the bid goes to private respondent in the amount of P952,564,821.71 (with a variance of 25.98% from the ABC). Hence this petition on the contention that it violates Sec. 31 of RA 9184 which provides that :

Sec. 31 – Ceiling for Bid Prices. – The ABC shall be the upper limit or ceiling for the bid prices. Bid prices that exceed this ceiling shall be disqualified outright from further participating in the proceeding. There shall be no lower limit to the amount of the award.

The petitioners further contends that the Loan Agreement between Japan and the Philippines is neither an international nor an executive agreement that would bar the application of RA9184. They pointed out that to be considered as such, the parties must be two (2) sovereigns or states whereas in this loan agreement, the parties were the Philippine government and the JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from the Japanese government.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the assailed resolution violates RA 9184.

RULING :

The petition is dismissed. Under the fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, which is in fact, embodied is Section 4 of RA9184, “any treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory, shall be observed”. The DPWH, as the executing agency of the project financed by the Loan Agreement rightfully awarded the contract to private respondent China Road and Bridge Corporation.

The Loan Agreement was executed and declared that it was so entered by the parties “in the light of the contents of the Exchange of Notes between the government of Japan and the government of the Philippines dated Dec. 27, 1999.” Under the circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an adjunct of the Japanese government. The JBIC procurement guidelines absolutely prohibits the imposition of ceilings and bids.

PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, August 9, 1994

Held: Impoundment refers to the refusal of the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type.

Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the President’s role as Commander-in-Chief. Third is the Faithful Execution Clause.

The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law. (PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506, Aug. 9, 1994 [Quiason])

Araullo v. Aquino III, G. R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014The Araullo v. Aquino III, G. R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 on the other hand assailed the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the Department of  Budget and Management (DBM) implementing  the DAP of the Executive Department.  The Supreme Court decided that use of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of the Legislative Department and the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) of the Executive Department are both unconstitutional.    Plunder cases relating to the use of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)  have been filed by the Office of the Ombudsman at the Sandiganbatan against  three incumbent  Senators, Senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Ramon Revilla, Jr. and Jose P. Ejercito-Estrada. All the three incumbent Senators are under detention.