Relative Roles of Breeders vs ALWRs In Indias Nuclear System, and U.S.s and Indias Perceptions of the 123 Agreement

Chaim BraunConsulting ProfessorCenter for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Stanford University

Presented at theUniversity of ReadingConference on the India United States Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Reading, U.K., September 14, 2009

U.S.-India Nuclear DealIndia agrees to:Separate civilian from military facilitiesCivilian sites subject to IAEA safeguardsSupport Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty negotiations and continue unilateral moratorium on testingU.S. agrees to:Cooperate on civilian nuclear technology developmentAssure reliable supply of nuclear fuelCongressional approval obtainedNuclear Supplier Group consensus obtained

Indias Perceptions of its Nonproliferation Status Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement

India views itself as an effective Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), having in place most of the requisite attributes:- It tested both fission and fusion weapons- It developed strong indigenous materials protection control and accounting system (MPC&A)- It has a significant system of operating nuclear power plants of Indigenous design- It demonstrated and operates an entire closed nuclear fuel cycle for both military, civilian uses- It didnt export proliferating or dual-use nuclear technologies to suspect end-users

Indias Perceptions of its Nonproliferation Status Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.)India refrains from further nuclear weapons testing despite demands from some weapons designersIndia, however, didnt sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) claiming the Treaty inherently unequalIndia refused to abide by NPT disarmament provisions (Article VI), while claiming rights of NWS under Article I, III, and IVIndia refuse to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Unclear position on Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

Indias Plans for Nuclear Electricity Generating System India developed its Three Phases nuclear energy growth scenario:- First phase PHWRs (HINDU CANDU), of limited total capacity due to insufficient Uranium supplies & mining capacity. PHWRs produce Plutonium supplies to fuel Second Phase reactors- Second Phase FBRs 1,000 Mwe breeders, high gain breeding, metallic Plutonium fuel. Large capacity growth 250,000 MWe by 2052. Large 4,000 6,000 MWe FBR stations, each with dedicated fuel reprocessing & re-fabrication plant.

Indias Plans for Nuclear Electricity Generating System (Cont.)Third Phase Transition of FBRs system to operate on Pu-Th fuel cycle. Main fissile material is U-233, bred in FBR Thorium blankets. Introduction of Advanced converter (AHWR) to burn excess fissile material. Long-term equilibrium operation of FBRs-AHWRs system based on Thorium fuel cycleCentral Role of FBRs technology, first large demonstration plant 500 MWe PFBR, now under construction in Kalpakkam. Operation by 2012Advanced Light Water Reactors (ALWRs) viewed as limited stop-gap measures, useful until FBRs capacity takes off

India Near-Term Nuclear Capacity Projections

Reactor Types and CapacitiesCapacity (MWe)Cumulative Capacity (MWe)17 Reactors at Six Sites in Operation; Tarapur, Rawatbhata, Kalpakkam, Narora, Kakrapar, Kaiga4,1204,1203 PHWRs under Constructon at: Kaiga 4 (220 MWe), RAPP 5 & 6 (2 x 220 MWe)6604,7802 LWRs under Construction at Kudankulam (2 x 1,000 MWe)2,0006,780PFBR under Construction at Kalpakkam (500 MWe) 5007,280Total Installed Capacity by ~ 20127,280Future PHWRs by 2010 - 2020 (8 x 7oo MWe) 5,60012, 880Future FBRs 2012 2020 (4 x 500 MWe)2,00014, 880Future AHWR (1 x 300 MWe)30015,180Total Year 2012 Capacity Plus India Technology Nuclear Plants by 202015, 180Future Imported LWRs 2012 - 2020 (6 x 1,000 MWe)6,00021,180Total Installed Capacity by 202021,180

Projected Installed Nuclear Power Capacity build-up Reactor Type Breakdown

3360 MW in operation

3920 MW under construction

8800 MW new sites identifiedNuclear Power Plants in India - Sites2820 MWe4460 MWe

Narora, UP 2 (440 MWe)

IN OPERATION UNDER CONSTRUCTION NEW SITES

Rawatbhata Raj. 4 (740 MWe) 2(440 MWe) 2(1400MWe)

Kudankulam, TN 2 (2000 MWe) 4 (4000 MWe)

Kaiga,Karnataka 2 (440 MWe) 2 (440 MWe)

Kalpakkam, T.N. 2 (440 MWe) 1 (500 MWe)

Kakrapar, Gujarat 2 (440 MWe) 2 (1400 MWe)

Tarapur, Maharashtra 2 (320 MWe) 2 (1080 MWe)

Jaitapur, Mah. 2 (2000 MWe)

Map not to exact scale

Role of ALWRs in Indias Nuclear ProgramImported ALWRs will have to import their lifetime Uranium fuel requirements, due to lack of indigenous fuel suppliesALWRs viewed by DAE as near-term capacity-fillers until domestic FBRs program matures DAE concerned that imported ALWRs will: - Create competition by foreign vendors, construction companies-Create regional nuclear generating corporations independent of NPCIL- Siphon-off Engineering talents from DAE reactors, R&D programs - BREAK DAEs NUCLEAR MONOPOLYAmbivalent attitude to nuclear technology imports constraining domestic nuclear development program

U.S.s Proliferation-related Perceptions Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement

U.S. global nonproliferation concerns different than Indias domestic, regional positionsU.S. cannot accept Indias claim for recognition as NWS status:- Impossible by NPT definitions- Similar demands could be raised by Pakistan, Israel other NPT non-signatories- North Korea, ultimately Iran, could demand equal status based on developing capabilities- New Pandoras Box of latent nuclear weapons states could emerge, eventually claiming future similar status to India

U.S.s Proliferation-related Perceptions Prior to Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.)- Concessions to India on terms of 123 Agreement willcomplicate similar Agreements then entering review with Korea, UAE, other Middle East countries- Indias Nonproliferation record not so pristine :- India clandestinely imported centrifuge enrichment technology (not unlike Pakistan)- India tested nuclear weapons twice:In 1974 (prompting the creation of the NSG)In 1998 (Prompting testing by Pakistan)- India maintained nuclear, missile proliferation-related contacts with Iran- India refused to sign NPT, CTBT, FMCT(?), etc

U.S. Perceptions of India Nuclear Energy SystemIndia had only limited success with domestic PHWRs program 4,000 MWe, 6 Nuclear plant sites, all developed in forty yearsPHWRs program afflicted by lack of Uranium fuel, reduced generation, declining capacity factors Importing ALWRs will significantly increase Indias nuclear capacity. Just three GE-Hitachi ABWRs (1,340 MWe each) equal to total PHWRs capacity India installed in forty years ALWRs are proven, commercially ready, large-scale, fast-growth, nuclear electricity option for India

U.S. Perceptions of India Nuclear Energy System (Cont.)It could be to Indias benefit to give up its experimental, proliferative PFBR, fuel cycle, in exchange for ready ALWRs, fresh Uranium supplies to existing PHWRsGiving up PFBR: - Small price to pay for large-scale benefits- Will burnish Indias nonproliferation credentials- Will hinder other countries demands for closed fuel cycle, sensitive fuel cycle facilities - Will slow the spread of dreaded Plutonium economy

Indias Proliferation-related Perceptions After Signing of the 123 Agreement

India considers it got a clean i.e. unconditional exemption from Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Conditions of supply:- It can import Uranium for its operating PHWRs- It requires foreign ALWR vendors to provide Uranium supplies for lifetime of reactors imported- It demand rights to import enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies, given its equivalent NWS status, NSG exemption:- Enrichment plants to convert fresh Uranium supplies to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel for future ALWRS

Indias Proliferation-related Perceptions After Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.)- Reprocessing plants to reprocess spent ALWRs, PHWRs spent fuel, extract Plutonium for its evolving FBRs program - It demands blanket approval rights to reprocess U.S. origin fuel , or spent fuel from U.S. ALWRs, as part of implementing negotiations following signing of 123 Agreement - It demand rights to export, under safeguards, its PHWRs technology to developing countries, despite proliferative characteristics of PHWR designGeneral approach of Lets hit the iron while its hot

Indias Perceptions of Nuclear Reactor ImportsIndias Singh Government paid high political price to pass the Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement) in Indian ParliamentIndia supported U.S. positions regarding Irans nuclear program in IAEA, UN Security CouncilIndia cancelled its participation in Iran Pakistan India (IPI) natural gas pipeline projectGeneral feeling of sacrificing legitimate regional energy, security concerns, for global goals of U.S. Indias Government possibly needed to dress-up benefits obtained from 123 Agreement to justify political costs incurred

Indias Perceptions of Nuclear Reactor Imports (Cont.)Main benefits now claimed by Indias Government:- Fresh Uranium supplies to operating PHWRs- Inflated numbers of ALWRs expected to be installed by 2020 60 GWe, rather than 8 GWe in pre-Agreement estimate (2005)- Inflated numbers of all nuclear plants to be installed:63 Gwe by 2030, increasing to even 470 GWe by 2050 If the Country Thinks Big and Executes its Plans Correctly per Prime Minister Singh, on September 2009 - Exporting Indian PHWRs to less developed countries to demonstrate Indias technological prowess

Indias Perceptions of Nuclear Reactor Imports (Cont. II)Important role of domestic FBRs seem forgotten in irrational exuberance over importing ALWRsIntroduction of foreign vendors, deals with Indian suppliers, could reduce Department of Atomic Energy (DAE)s monopoly over Indian nuclear program

U.S.s Proliferation-related Perceptions After Signing of 123 AgreementU.S. cannot accept Indias claim as effective NWSU.S. insisted on India signing comprehensive safeguards Agreement (CSA) with IAEA, filing Facility Attachment document for each reactor, fuel cycle facility, to be safeguarded, & bringing signed India-specific CSA into forceU.S. still needs India nonproliferation assurances to approve nuclear technology export (Part 810) licensesU.S. not enthusiastic about blanket reprocessing approval. Issue now under discussion. Could complicate pending 123 Agreement negotiation with Korea

U.S.s proliferation-related Perceptions After Signing of 123 Agreement (Cont.)U.S. opposed to Indias requests to import ENR technologies:- On long-term policy basis (1978 NNPA)- Since India did not sign NPT - Inconsistent with NSG Conditions of Supply (Indias exemption not completely clean)- Contrary to requirements of 2006 Hyde Act- Contrary to G8 Statement of May 2009U.S. concerned about renewed nuclear testing in India following claims of 1998 thermonuclear test fizzle. Singh Government tries to finesse situation, claiming test results were sufficient, no more required now

U.S. Perceptions on Reactor Exports to India Following Passage of 123 AgreementVery limited progress to date, but cautiously optimisticOnly available, licensed sites handed to Russian, French reactor vendor CorporationsU.S. nuclear vendors sites identified only in August 2009. These include Mithi Virdi in Gujarat State, Kovada in Andhra Pradesh State. Licensing status of both sites yet unclearLimited progress on third-party liability laws in India, India signing to 1998 Vienna Convention, updating coverage limits. India Government promised action by 2009 year-endNeed to resolve negotiations on blanket reprocessing approvals, India ENR technologies import rights. Supporting Indias claim conflicts with G8 Statement

U.S. Perceptions on Reactor Exports to India Following Passage of 123 Agreement (Cont.)Need to de-conflict with UAEs, other Middle East countries, Draft & pending 123 Agreements, where a Return Clause has been inserted. Will U.S. insist on similar right in Indias 123 Agreement? Under what circumstances? How to implement?Part 810 export licenses to U.S. vendors not yet issued pending clarifications on open nonproliferation issuesU.S. supported Indias applications, spent political capital, in securing NSG exemption, passage of 123 Agreement in Congress, yet major economic benefits promised are presently claimed by Russians, French

The Path Forward Resolving Past Differing Interpretations Personal Observations

India could now be defined as Virtual NWS within nonproliferation regimeSuch definition allows each side to interpret it any way it wishes. Face is saved all around Real test is in finding acceptable solutions to specific issues, while each side maintains its basic positionsOn ENR technologies India already posses rudimentary enrichment, reprocessing technologies. If India further develop these technologies using its own resources, constructs, operates its plants under IAEA safeguards this represents best near-term option

The Path Forward Resolving Differing Interpretations Personal Observations (Cont.)In time, as confidence builds in implementation of 123 Agreement, & in Indias nuclear program, sensitive technology imports could be considered, as parts of large ALWRs ordersIndia might be able to construct ~ 8-12 GWe of ALWRs by 2020, > 30 GWe by 2030ALWRs program will buy India time in developing FBR reactor technology, FBR fuel cycle facilities commercialization, using mostly its own resources, unless FBR technology is brought under safeguardsFuture cooperative progress will be made, but at slower pace than currently estimated

BACKUP SLIDESIndias Breeder Program

Relative Roles of Breeders vs ALWRs In Indias Nuclear System, and U.S.s and Indias Perceptions of 123 Agreement - IntroductionIndia and U.S. had different perceptions of Indias nonproliferation situation & expansion mode of nuclear electricity generation system These differences complicated, slowed down, negotiations for the Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation (123 Agreement)There have occurred reversals in some of the positions of the two sides after the passage of the Agreement, as compared with the initial positionsSeveral issues still need to be resolved before the full value of the 123 Agreement is realized

THREE STAGE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMStage I PHWRs

16- Operating 4- Under construction Several others planned Scaling to 700 MWe Gestation period being reduced POWER POTENTIAL 10,000 MWe

LWRs 2 BWRs Operating 2 VVERs under constructionStage - II Fast Breeder Reactors

40 MWth FBTR - OperatingTechnology Objectives realised

500 MWe PFBR- construction commenced POWER POTENTIAL 540,000 MWeStage - III Thorium Based Reactors

30 kWth KAMINI- Operating

300 MWe AHWR-Under Regulatory Examination POWER POTENTIAL Very Large. Availability of ADS can enable early introduction of Thorium on a large scale

COMPARISON OF PHWR AND PFBR CORES

ParametersThermal Neutron Reactors (PHWR)Fast Neutron Spectrum Reactors (PFBR)FuelNatural UO2(Pu-U) O2Clad material Zircaloy-220% CW 15Cr-15Ni-Mo-TiCoolantHeavy WaterLiquid SodiumCore outlet temp, oC293547Core power density, W/cm3100400 Neutron energy 0.025 ev> 100 kevBurnup6,700 MWd/t100,000 MWd/tNeutron Flux, n/cm2/s10144.5x1015Life of core ~180 Days2 Years

FBR PROGRAMME IN INDIAIndia started FBR program with construction of FBTR FBTR is a 40 MWt (13.5 MWe) loop type reactor. Design is same as that of Rapsodie-Fortissimo except for incorporation of SG and TG (agreement signed with CEA, France in 1969). FBTR is in operation since 1985.500 MWe Fast Breeder Reactor Project (PFBR) through Indigenous design and construction Government. granted financial sanction for construction in Sep 2003. Construction of PFBR has been undertaken by BHAVINI. PFBR will be commissioned by 2011. Beyond PFBR: 4 units of 500 MWe FBR (twin unit concept) similar to PFBR with improved economy, enhanced safety, by 2020. Subsequent reactors would be 1000 MWe units with metallic fuel

Reactor Vault

Safety Vessel with Thermal Insulation Panels

*Fabrication Technology for MOX Fuel EstablishedExperimental irradiation of PFBR MOX fuel (with U-233) in FBTR: fuel has reached 60 GWd/t burn-upFuel specifications optimized for product recovery as well as performanceR&D on metallic fuel for achieving shorter doubling time PFBR type MOX pins for experimental irradiationAnnular MOX pellet Fuel Fabrication for PFBR

Constraints on Implementing Indias Fast Breeder Reactors ProgramSuccessful Completion & Startup of PFBRClosing Nuclear Fuel Cycle in PFBR & Follow-up FBRs - On-site Reprocessing & Re-FabricationFuel Cycle Transition from Oxide to Metal Plutonium Fuels, Thorium-U-233 FuelsFunding Future FBRs, Fuel Cycle Facilities ConstructionConstructing ~250 GWe in Forty Five Years- Past Record ~ 7 GWe in Forty YearsManaging Interfaces between FBRs constructors, Operators, Fuel Cycle Providers & Regulators at each siteOpening up New FBR Sites One to Two Sites/Year for Forty Years- Past Record - Seven New Power Plant Sites in Forty YearsTraining Manpower for all FBRs, Fuel Cycle Facilities, Construction corporations, regulatorsIndustrial Fabrication Capacity dedicated to DAE Missions

***India also agrees to adhere MTCR and NSG rules without actually joining the treaties.

By 2014, 14 of 22 reactors will be put under IAEA safeguards. All future reactors will also be safeguarded.

Nuclear Supplier Group Consensus needed?-In 2001, Russia exported uranium to India for Tarapur even though 32 of 34 NSG members saw this as a violation of Russias NSG commitments. (Source: The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) at a Glance, Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, June 2004.) *********************************