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Privileged by EU/NATO Neighborhoods: Moldova’s CommitmentsTowards Integration

«Privileged by EU/NATO Neighborhoods: Moldova’s Commitments TowardsIntegration»

by Igor Munteanu

Source:SEER ­ South­East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs (SEER ­ South­East Europe Reviewfor Labour and Social Affairs), issue: 02 / 2006, pages: 129­139, on www.ceeol.com.

1292/2006 South-East Europe Review S. 129 – 140

Igor Munteanu

Privileged by EU/NATO neighbourhoods: Moldova’s commitments towards integration

BackgroundMoldova is certainly privileged by its proximity to the expanding western alliances.Thanks to its geography, size and cultural links, Moldova is becoming a part of a re-discovered south-east Europe. It is already taking full benefits from the ‘accessiondividends’ paid directly or indirectly to it by its close neighbours (Romania, as well asthe central European countries which have passed their way into the enlarged Eu-rope).

Getting a different perspective as regards the relationship with the EU has been ofparamount importance because this has served as a catalyst for domestic reform whilethe promise of enlargement has created an atmosphere in which strategic incentiveshave been directed towards domestic leaders for reconciliation. Thus far, three ingre-dients have shaped the practical content of the integration trajectory for Moldova: ge-ography; internal cohesion; and vision.■ geography: Moldova is predestined to live up to the geopolitical pressures of the

region to which it belongs, i.e. south-east Europe and a ‘close relative’ of thelarger Balkan region: this is what brings competitive advantages to Moldova ifcompared to other ex-Soviet descendents located today in the south Caucasus

■ internal cohesion: this seems to be a kind of sine qua non prerequisite to any sub-stantial social, political or economic development (particularly if compared withthe lack of sustainable stability in the neighbouring Ukraine); this is usually anequivalent of a strong civic network of political and non-governmental actors,aiming to achieve or dispute competitive strategies

■ vision: this is perhaps the most painful, albeit necessary, expression of national in-terests, indicating the country’s priorities in terms of the achievement of long-termstability and the prosperity of its citizens, as termed by ‘full-fledged and institu-tional integration in the EU’.Some authors have recently insisted on a so-called ‘asymmetric perception’ con-

cerning the European Neighbourhood Policy. Indeed, we are very apprehensive thatthe European Commission has almost excluded from official speeches any further ref-erences to possible membership of, or integration in, the EU for those which remainoutside the latest waves of accession. However, the European Neighbourhood Policycannot be seen as a substitute for EU membership. Simply, we are not neighbours toEurope, but to the EU; we cannot perceive ourselves as neighbours to Europeans, aswe are Europeans by culture, by language, faith and aspirations. Is it the neighbour-hood policy – or is this not good enough for us? This is clearly a major questionwhich demands that we analyse what is ‘good’ and what could be ‘enough’ in ourcase.

I think that the lack of integration perspectives may inhibit pro-European eco-nomic and social reforms. On the other hand, there is no particular identity amongstsouth-eastern Europeans that would keep Moldovans and Ukrainians outside the EUformat.

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In contrast to middle eastern neighbours, there are no cultural or civilisation draw-backs as regards Moldova’s European identity. No-one can rightly tell us whyMoldova, nor Ukraine nor Georgia similarly, should be denied the perspective of ac-cession at some point as a full-right member of NATO or the EU. No-one can stop usfrom using the Copenhagen criteria, or political, economic and administrative instru-ments, in our domestic legislation so as to tone down everything that makes us today,perhaps, ineligible or unappealing.

But, nevertheless, nothing can replace a gradual, but profound, EU membership.There is a certain risk which is largely related to the over-circulation of negative state-ments towards future waves of integration in the EU. It is, therefore, absolutely natu-ral and legitimate to see, for instance, Moldova’s future as a prospective candidate forEU integration. To understand why a neighbourhood cannot be seen as satisfactory,nor overwhelming to our countries, one should look attentively to the different pathsof transition explored in our countries.

Projecting EU integrationFollowing the collapse of the USSR, ‘returning to Europe’ has been the most appeal-ing political paradigm of change for those countries that emerged from the Soviet (infact, Russian) ‘geopolitical hemisphere’. This has implied a strong emphasis on na-tional identity, the recovery of historical memory and efforts made towards forgingcivic statehood. The integration of the Baltic States into NATO and the EU has beenseen almost as a practical textbook for other nations as regards how they can succeedin securing domestic cohesion and modernise their economies and societies.

The ‘discrete charm’ of this integration has created a kind of ‘successful transi-tion’ pattern that has guided the elites and fostered nations towards democratic andeconomic reforms. Nevertheless, Moldova has apparently failed to book a ticket onthat train and a large number of justifications are usually brought in this respect: do-mestic instability; the brief but fierce territorial conflict in 1992 in Transnistria; lim-ited size or no strategic resources, which explains the lack of genuine interest inMoldova; and even a so-called ‘donkey complex’, cited here to describe the frequentstumbling block of indecisiveness between looking west or east, with all the afore-mentioned respective consequences. However, in blaming ourselves for these undis-puted mistakes, one cannot dilute the extent of responsibility of the west. Thus, EUpolicy towards the Baltic States was largely inclusive, wide-generous and far-reach-ing whereas it has remained quite inflexible towards the rest of the CIS and toMoldova in particular. It has provided a statute-first approach to the most advancedpart of the ex-USSR, while failing even to mention the necessary standards whichcould be requested from those countries which had hoped to encounter equal, or al-most equal, treatment. I will not delve into either the subjective or the objective rea-sons behind this approach, which has certainly played a huge role in keeping us out-side the main policy perspectives of the EU.

A Partnership and Co-operation Agreement has shaped the relationship betweenthe EU and Moldova since 1994, but this is focused mainly on trade and economic co-operation and is only a modest extension of the 1989 EC-USSR Agreement, if com-pared with the political relevance of the EU agreements signed with the rest of centraland east European countries. In the last decade, the promise of enlargement has some-times been more powerful than the reality. The initial partnership agreement, signed

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in 1994, did not proved to be satisfactory, despite various ways of interlocking co-op-eration with EU. Recovering from the Russian financial crisis (February 1998), whichbrought significant losses to the national economy of the country, the Moldovan elitesrealised that only an EU perspective could ensure the country’s security, stability andprosperity. The crisis of 1998 exposed to its greatest magnitude the vulnerability ofthe Moldovan economy and shattered many dreams linked to Moldova’s pro-CIScourse, stressing the need for increasing strategic orientation towards the EU as a real‘exit strategy’ out of the CIS (q.v. Russian suzerainty rules). Chiºinau has seen it as anevolutionary step, as likewise did the Balkan and Baltic states succeed in signing sim-ilar documents as ‘agreements of accession to the EU’.

South-east European status provided the next best accession pathway to the EUand was definitely preferable to the lack of regional perspectives for the rest of theNIS/CIS. Consequently, Moldovan diplomacy decided to focus its efforts on joiningthe Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. The prospects of signing a Stabilisationand Association Agreement had a magnetic attraction from the very beginning, but ithad a special value for Moldova because the opportunity to gain statutory recognitionas a ‘south-east European state’ was much more promising than the ex-Soviet ‘brand’.Membership of the Stability Pact was received only in June 2001, after the CPMgained power in Moldova, while similar memberships have been received for SECI(South-east European Co-operation Initiative) and, in 2006, of the Process of Co-op-eration of South-East European countries.

From 2001 until the end of 2003, the communists (CPM) attempted to mapMoldova in the most nostalgic of ‘Russian tones’. Full integration in the Russia-Bela-rus union and a revision of the privatisation process were the main elements of theprogramme of the CPM, while EU integration was almost omitted as a priority. Ap-parently, this helped Moldova to improve some aspects of its relationship with Mos-cow but, in spite of gaining huge leverages in this, the CPM leadership had to give upits procrastinated drang nach Ost’, as Moscow’s imperial policies have frightenedeven the most stubborn promoters of this course. With the exception of the FriendshipTreaty, signed in October 2001 with Russia, nothing has resulted from the conflictregulation process, in which Moscow has clearly bided on the ‘secessionist’ forces,supporting the Smirnov administration in the breakaway region of Transnistria. It hascontinued to provide huge financial and military support to the separatist enclave, inspite of the provisions of the Russian-Moldovan Treaty of 2001. In the face of theirearlier promises, Russians have sought simply to take full control of the industrialisedeconomy in Moldova, i.e. the eastern rayons of Transnistria, while leaving a decora-tive role to the constitutional authorities in Moldova. Even participation in the Euro-Asian Economic Community was provided to Moldova on the basis of the rights of an‘observer’ and not as a full rights member, which was allocated only to slavic-basedex-USSR states. Similarly, in September 2003, Moldova received no invitation to joinEFTA (the Economic Free Trade Agreement), set up by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstanand Belarus, which was seen in Chișinau as a policy by the ‘CIS great four’ to mar-ginalise Moldova. On the same day as he returned from Yalta, President Vladimir Vo-ronin commented exiguously on the emerging EFTA, stating that this was a result ofoverall CIS ‘failure, [as a] distrustful, ineffective and unstable club of states’.

Subjective and objective assessments had already made Chișinau totally changethe priorities of the country by the end of 2003, turning westwards. In less than one

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year, the programmatic views of the ruling party had changed almost to its opposite.After the failure of the Kozak Memorandum in late 2003, Moldova’s leadership wasin a search for new alternatives to the previous CIS-based approach, while revising itsearlier pious relationship with Moscow’s administration. This coincided with theadoption of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Brussels, with the aim of assistingthe systemic transformations in those countries which were neither included in nor in-vited to join any sort of stabilisation or association agreements with the EU but whichwere judged as ‘extremely important’ for security reasons (migration flows, territorialconflicts, border disputes). As a distinct part of the wider Europe policy on the EU’sforeign policy agenda, the Neighbourhood Policy coincided also with two big ideaslaunched in 2003 by the Commission: the European Security Strategy, prepared byJavier Solana; and the hint of a grand western strategy for the greater middle east, alsocalled the Wider Black Sea Strategy (sponsored by the US).

These changes produced immediate and visible domestic echoes on the Moldovanpolitical landscape. The CPM soon cancelled almost all coherent references to its2001 election manifesto (i.e. the redistribution of ownership, or joining the Russia-Belarus union, developed since taking office, and redefined their political position inconnection with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the EuropeanBank for Reconstruction and Development, looking for new prospects for goodneighbourhood relations with Romania and Ukraine). The Communists changed al-most overnight, prior to the March 2005 elections. They claimed that Moldova’splace was in Europe and that its policy should be consistently pro-EU; accordingly,the governing coalition should take responsibility for strategic integration in all west-ern alliances. On 4 April 2005, on the basis of a common platform, also called the ‘tenconditions platform’, part of the opposition parties in the parliament of Moldova de-cided to back the desire of the CPM leader to keep his position as the President ofMoldova. Thus, the 2005 election results brought to light a new paradigm of co-oper-ation among political actors – that of ‘national consensus’ on a specific list of practi-cal priorities.

It seems that this westwards orientation in Moldova describes the attempt to catchup with the last chance of being seen as included on the agenda of future integration.This shift is a quite cost-effective and timely step and, if compared with the Georgianand Ukrainian ‘colour’ revolutions, it leaves Moldova’s political actors at least onerevolution in reserve. On 26 February 2005, Moldova had already signed an ActionPlan with EU (the first one signed with a CIS state) which – in spite of all its objectivelimitations – is proving to be the foundation of a new framework of dialogue andguidelines for co-operation with the EU. It has to be emphasised that the Action Planrepresents a new generation agreement, launched by the EU in relation to its immedi-ate neighbours, with the aim of building a new sort of co-operation with countries onthe border of the enlarged EU-wider Europe, based on ‘shared political and economicvalues’. In the meantime, the European Neighbourhood Policy aims to compensatefor the lack of an immediate path of integration for those states remaining outside thecurrent scheme of political integration, while EU officials are keen to try to fight anyrequests for specific data regarding future integration deadlines, leading some ana-lysts to say that the ‘era of the success story with the EU is over’.

Signing a new generation of co-operation agreements with the EU, these countriesintend to benefit fully from the advantages promised in Brussels, i.e. those known as

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‘the four freedoms: trade; capital; a visa-free movement regime for people; and serv-ices’. Signing Action Plans with its neighbours, the European Neighbourhood Policyimplies that the EU intends over the next five years to create an enhanced system ofpolitical dialogue and a pathway towards prosperity and democratic stability as Brus-sels seeks to extend the zone of peace, stability and prosperity to countries around theEU. On the basis of its Action Plan template, Moldova aims to modernise its economyand institutions in line with existing EU standards. Sequencing reforms and combin-ing domestic efforts with EU support clearly provides a considerable incentive to thetransformation of the country. This is apparently perceived today as a unifying ele-ment of the political consensus in Moldova: for its political elites, as well as for ordi-nary people, it provides ferment for continued domestic reforms, modernisation andstability.

A number of key reforms launched since 2005 – including the wide-sweeping re-form of the judiciary; the modernisation of central and local governments; reform ofregulatory policy; and other vital steps to reduce governance flaws – increase the ac-countability of governments and expand the rule of law across the whole of society.When that is achieved, we believe that ‘European accession is a matter of formalagreements’. Sometimes, we tend to regard the non-accession clause as a conse-quence of poor homework execution and something that can be changed. The wide-spread belief within the political class is that:

As soon as the reforms are better implemented and the economy is in better shape, the non-ac-cession clause will be ruled out for Moldova.

For its part, the EU has also imported parts of the most anguish-ridden problemsof Moldova. The EU has designated its special representative to deal in Moldova withconflict resolution in Transnistria. The EU has also gained an observer seat within thecurrent conflict settlement format aside of Russia, US, OSCE, Moldova and Ukrainewhile, at the same time, it has set up an EU delegation in Moldova and granted it aGSP+ trade package. That entails greater co-operation between Moldova and the EUin the field of wide areas of domestic reforms and a greater role for the EU in the set-tlement of the Transnistrian conflict, i.e. a monitoring of the Moldova-Ukrainian bor-der regime, mediation of the conflict, etc. The best solution for accelerated integrationwith the EU is to make a domestic offer that should be almost irresistible in order towin the confidence of the EU, and even our own Eurosceptics, as well as to overcomethe opposition of those who want to see us only behind some sort of new ‘Berlinwall’; this time made up of visa restrictions, prohibitive trade arrangements, negativestereotypes associated with ‘post-soviet identity’ and many other policies aiming onlyto keep us outside the sphere of euro-gravitation.

The Action Plan has a clear instrumental role in reshaping the policy agenda inMoldova. This mainly encompasses principles, norms and standards guarded by well-equipped institutions and tied together by common values. Integrating the EU into theresolution of the Transnistrian conflict, increasing the participation of Moldova in theEuropean economy and the structural reforms being undertaken will, in the long-run,bring Moldova to the position of asking for EU accession. In 2006, we can also seri-ously consider the effects of the one-year implementation of the Action Plan. Thisdoes not guarantee a statute for immediate accession, but successful implementation

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is a key to re-starting long-delayed domestic reforms. Of course, not everything yetmeets our expectations. After one year of implementation, there is still a chronic lackof capacity regarding the adjustment of mechanisms and policies towards EU stand-ards and regulations. Adequate EU awareness and skills within the staff of the variousstate agencies and ministries are still dramatically missing. In fact, few public offi-cials outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration know even thebasics of the EU and EU architecture. Very few of them show real capacity to learnfrom the lessons of transition while quite a large part of state bodies remain literallyuntouched by the reforms. Poor financing and excessive reliance on external fundingprohibit innovative solutions while allowing some civil servants to show no commit-ment at all to the key sectors of which they are in charge. There is also stark opposi-tion from the bureaucracy, which fears staff cuts and the ‘war on corruption’, as wellas the massive re-organisation of public administration.

Expanding Euro-Atlantic linksAt the same time, the need for stronger Euro-Atlantic ties has become exceptionallyimportant in Moldova in the last few years, not because of the overspreading waves ofNATO enlargement but because of a deep insecurity complex which cannot be re-solved outside of an over-arching partnership with the North-Atlantic alliance.

Since May 2006, Moldova has already reached an approved International Partner-ship Action Plan (IPAP) with the North Atlantic Council, serving as a blueprint fordeepening Moldova’s relations with the Alliance; thus, this enhanced partnership isseen in Moldova as a farewell to its ‘post-soviet identity’. Moldovan officials say thatMoldova’s goal is to join the common security system in the Euro-Atlantic space.Chiºinau is today interested in any technical and financial assistance from NATO forthe evacuation or scrapping of Russian ammunition stockpiles in Transnistria and thewithdrawal of Russian military equipment and troops. At the same time, Euro-Atlan-tic integration can be seen as the most effective guarantee against self-isolationism orany pressures imposed violently on these countries from outside. Moreover, IPAPdeals extensively with implementing defence, political and economic reforms and italso concerns human rights in the country. It also depends on the strategic magnitudeof enlargement as an ‘open-door’ policy, which cannot reach its full meaning andphilosophical scope on prosperity, freedom and security for everyone in Europe un-less it expands eastwards; transforms older rivalries into friendships; builds trust andconfidence; and paves the way towards common values and aims.

Surveys show the existence of an important group of respondents in Moldova (al-most 30-35%) which has clear-cut NATO-minded attitudes. This group seems to bequite positive towards Moldova joining NATO and ready to assume the costs andstages of the changes. In contrast, another group of respondents (20-25%) is moreconservative, setting some ‘conditions’ for NATO membership or which is unwillingto support such a policy. It must be emphasised that these views are in stark contrastwith opinions on EU integration. Over 35% believes that the expansion of relationswith NATO, through an IPAP, will result in ‘strengthening national security’, while33% believes Moldova should follow the example of the first ten states which re-cently joined the EU, subsequent to being integrated in NATO. Of course, joiningNATO/EU is not a ‘piece of cake’ for our countries: it requires significant efforts andnot only the ‘walking talking’ of the politicians. The largest part of the population

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(35%) thinks that the best way to ensure the country’s security is as a ‘neutral state’;23% thinks that this would be met by full and unconditional integration in NATO;while 15% thinks that Moldova should be part of the CIS Collective Treaty.

By multiplication and diffusion, this approach has served as a strong incentive tore-start security sector reform and the framework of regional co-operation, to inspirenew trust and confidence building in bilateral relations, which is a key to enhancedco-ordination among our countries – Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – none of whichwill feel secure unless they are fully integrated in the EU and NATO. The complexityof the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the sophistication of modern threats make us seeintegration into the Euro-Atlantic space as imminent and definitely linked with theprocess of EU enlargement, which brings a civilisation cement towards vulnerableMoldova, Ukraine, Georgia and the other ex-soviet entities.

The timeframe of the future EU/NATO format depends, however, on the speed ofdomestic reforms and not only on the gratitude of those western agencies leading theprocess. What Moldovan authorities have today realised is that European integrationis more a matter of internal politics than one of foreign affairs. Sometimes, our ambi-tions perhaps look different to someone in the west. Ukraine is large and geopoliti-cally attractive, whereas Moldova is small and still too vulnerable to its domesticweaknesses, largely infused by third party sponsorship or even the direct sponsorshipof separatist movements. Ukraine has announced its firm course towards NATOmembership, but Moldova is continuing to refer to its neutrality, despite the obviousfacts concerning every logical or illogical argument on neutrality. In fact, Moldova’sneutrality has never been seriously considered either by the west or by Russia, whosearms and special services have taken under de facto control a considerable part of theterritory and population of Moldova, hijacking by force or by privatisation the consti-tutional bodies and thus creating an ideal ‘springboard’ for its influence over the re-gion, a hot-spot for the smuggling of goods and exports of arms. Therefore, whensome politicians demonstrate that they are still reluctant to accept a fully-fledged pro-NATO stance, public opinions react and learn fast and in the most positive way.

Of course, Russia has not abandoned the idea of controlling the former Sovietspace, i.e. the Baltic States, despite EU and NATO membership. Political and eco-nomic pressures continue to be applied, which makes us particularly sensitive to whatis happening further east and south-east of our national borders. In Moscow’s eyes,the only difference between the Baltic States and the in between countries is that theformer now belong to the second tier of Russian influence while those countries thathave not escaped into the EU and NATO are not yet protected and hence fall into thefirst tier or sphere of influence. The only way to change this situation is to becomefully integrated and inter-operational with the western institutions. We should againconsider the Baltic States, which had a tough time in resisting Russian’s annexationistpolicies and which used a huge plethora of tools in doing so, but which never, ulti-mately, gave up their path because of the democratic solidarity of the west with theirown aspirations and legitimate rights.

So, it is not a coincidence that the failure to adopt the EU Constitution, resultingfrom the Dutch and French negative votes, was quickly followed by a huge offensiveby Russia to regain its so-called political, economic and historical ‘right’ to keep un-der its roof the whole region of the former USSR, as a kind of legitimate ‘trophy ofwar’ and not as independent states, internationally recognised. Over support provided

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to rampant crime-torn suspects, in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the di-rect financing of separatist regimes and their military, militia and special servicesprove evidence of Russian culpability for these conflicts which can only prolong themetastasis of the separatist enclaves that deny the legitimate rights of people to livewithin a rule of law state, disrupt business stability and dismay the hope of seeingthese regions fully integrated territorially. The short, but highly mediated, gas episodein the winter of 2005 illustrated to the utmost degree how Russia’s Gazprom attemptsto substitute diplomacy and politics with economic blackmail and ultimatums whichcannot be regarded as a legitimate means in a civilised world.

This approach is fully applicable to the conflict regulation process. For years,Moldovan authorities have fully relied on the help of others, typically Russia, hopingthat the good ‘lord’/barin vseh rassudit will, in the end, judge the right situation but,in spite of numerous concessions, separatist enclaves have become more arrogant,better equipped, fully-armed. However, only after 2004 has a new paradigm of con-flict resolution through democratisation, de-militarisation and de-criminalisation, har-boured by civil society and positively assimilated by politicians across the region,changed the principles. These are key to a democratic solution for the region. TheNAC has repeatedly stated that the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe will notbe ratified until Russia fully withdraws its forces from Moldova ‘unconditionally andcompletely’. At the same time, the EU has installed its first Border Assistance Mis-sion (BAM) on the Moldova-Ukrainian border, appointed its Ambassador to the 5+2talks and opened up its political representation in Moldova.

The Ukrainian government agreed in December 2005 to institute a new customsregime on its border with Moldova, including the Transnistrian section, to ensure thetransparency of all trade and the sovereignty of Moldovan customs regulations – anagreement that was implemented as of March 2006. The new customs regime on theborder, combined with Ukraine’s agreement to the EU BAM, reflects a radical shift inKyiv’s policy towards supporting Moldovan sovereignty de facto and not only dejure, and towards an alignment with EU approaches to the conflict. Despite signifi-cant wavering after the Orange Revolution, Kyiv has finally changed its approach to-wards both Moldova and the settlement process. Ensuring the legality and transpar-ency of trade across the Ukrainian border is key to creating new conditions around theconflict because it will strengthen the Moldova government and induce the normalisa-tion of economic transactions in and around Transnistria, while placing pressure onthe separatist authorities.

No significant changes have, however, occurred in Russia’s involvement in thisconflict. For Russia, it has become a frontline in the struggle for influence within theformer Soviet Union and for ensuring that Russia’s voice is respected in the overallEuropean security order. For Moscow, the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict hasbecome a small part of a wider game in which rising EU influence in the sharedneighbourhood is seen to be occurring at the expense of the Russian voice. So, noconcrete steps to evacuate Russian troops out of the country have been successful thusfar, as Russia has been pushing towards an unacceptable, unfair federalisation whilethe separatists have used this situation to earn huge money from smuggling, export ofarms and illegal privatisation. Today, divergences run deep while Russia has shown apreference for bilateral relations with Moldova and not trilateral ones (i.e. with theEU and/or the US), even less multilateral ones. Moscow has rejected the European ar-

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gument that the Kozak proposal was too flawed to be acceptable. The prevailing viewis that a zero-sum struggle for influence is being waged.

It is crystal clear that Moldova cannot be successful here without the strong sup-port of the western allies through the increased internationalisation of the conflict. In-itial positive steps should be followed by more harsh policies towards the repressivenature of the regime in Transnistria. No excuse shall be admitted here, irrespective toethnic belonging or political sympathies. Despite some hopes of a nuanced oppositionemerging inside Transnistrian politics, there has been no breach within the elites ofthe separatist region on the central questions of independence and relations with Rus-sia. In the last year, the authoritarian nature of the regime has only hardened, with awell-orchestrated information campaign against the so-called ‘blockade’, and newlaws tightening control over NGOs in the separatist region. These changes offer newopportunities for pursuing the settlement of the conflict, but they have also entrenchedold difficulties.

Lessons learned from the first steps towards EU enlargementCynicism and pessimistic views on the future prospects for integration have, since thelast referendums in the EU, become almost a bon ton in public speeches, while the‘optimists’ have to show, more than courage, a candid naïveté which has its own po-litical and public costs. Prospects of EU membership are the kind of benefit that en-courages states and nations to bear the costs of it. Some may say that it is too late orthat it is too little to achieve this objective when no-one in Europe is, apparently, infavour of a new wave of integration: it is a tacitly-accepted dogma that Europeans arefed up with the costs of integration and that ‘digestion’ is needed, particularly whenother regional conflicts deserve more attention, resources or security involvement (theIsrael-Lebanon conflict, the war on terrorism, etc).

Nevertheless, EU integration is certainly a ‘carrot’ that cannot be replaced insouth-eastern Europe by any sort of ‘charitable sponsorships’, by ‘constructive ambi-guities’ or by the categorical refusal so often used to justify integration ‘fatigue’ inEurope. This leads us, however, to look for the most adequate priorities for action,policies that must be filled in with the right content of democratic and market-basedinstitutions. In terms of the lessons learned, it is very important always to take onlythe commitments that can be observed. The monitoring process is severe and fair, andit is a question of credibility to report only what’s on the ground, implemented and re-formed. And credibility is lost only once!

So, what are the lessons learned after the first year of Action Plan implementationin Moldova?■ first of all, there is a need for more effective reforms and more concrete results in

the implementation of the individual Action Plans, which have to replace puresymbolic integration with institutional convergence. Instead of getting discour-aged, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, which is in chargeof the Moldova-EU Action Plan, is both motivated and pressured to accomplishmore. The timeframe depends only on the performance of each country, on the se-riousness of its political leadership, on the will and cohesion of the population forthe EU course set out by each one and on the capacity for adapting to the newrules of the region

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■ secondly, greater conditionality should be accepted and included in the bilateral‘country-EU framework’, since conditionality should be paired with an objectiveevaluation of concrete policies on the ground. Nothing is likely to spur the reformsof the Moldovan government as negative appreciation on the part of the EuropeanCommission. At the same time, Moldova, Ukraine and the other EU neighboursmay consider the creation of representative common bodies to speak out on sharedinterests as regards the EU. In particular, this may help them to associate and toassimilate some parts of the acquis communautaire; it may also facilitate their ac-cession to a number of EU instruments, such as security and foreign policy, judi-cial and home affairs, the environment, trade, etc. It may, furthermore, create addi-tional leverage to influence the EU to make accessible some parts of the structuralfunds to their recognised neighbours

■ the differentiation mechanism needs to be accepted and advocated in the relation-ship with the EU. That is because the EU course involves multiple trade-offs forthe countries involved, particularly as regards bilateral links, which could begreatly influential in overcoming the pessimistic views expressed by the EuropeanCommission. This may create an exceptionally appealing roadmap for Ukraineand Moldova towards formal/gradual acquisition of the criteria which are met byEU members. The benefits are also obvious to us, as well as for the EU. Therefore,it is obvious that the place of Moldova within Europe and the perceived finality ofthe European integration process can have a major impact on future performances.On the basis of this argument, Chiºinau and Kyiv officials cannot accept any treatyof neighbourhood which does not have the prospects of integration, even whenthey are promised after a very long period of time

■ therefore, a fourth component is to increase and expand the use of bilateral rela-tions in promoting domestic reforms. Another very important point is to maintaina particularly close relationship on bilateral grounds with all the member coun-tries. It is necessary to have a very strict agenda in meeting officials from all EUcountries, so that step-by-step checks can be made on all concerns and new ideas,as well as a good information programme for all European citizens. The most re-cent events have proved that the influence of European citizens in accession poli-cies can be very important and can be demonstrated at the most delicate moments.Therefore, it is good proactive policy to promote an information policy on re-forms, development and the people of new aspirant countries. The absence of thisincentive would certainly discourage the neighbours from socially and politicallycostly reforms and this argument seems to be a quite substantiated one

■ the fifth important point is to refer to the transfer of experiences and the lessonslearned in the process of accession. Every country has unique experiences in ne-gotiating different chapters and good ideas can come from every single experi-ence. A good state of preparation can avoid the extension of negotiations. If somecountries have concerns related to one problem or another, it is a good step to askfor a counsellor on the specific chapter, a counsellor who comes from this particu-lar country and who can monitor and help find a suitable solution to the problem.It is better to have this form of co-participation in the process because someone in-volved knows better the difficulties and will provide recommendations that makesense

Privileged by EU/NATO neighbourhoods: Moldova’s commitments towards integration

1392/2006 South-East Europe Review

■ last but not least, take up all the available help that is on offer to you from neigh-bouring EU-accessed countries. Our experience has proven that all EU countriesare interested in helping, not in making barriers in the process. The concerns thatfrequently appear are legitimate and refer to the possibility of the population ac-cepting and assuming the reforms, changes and adjustments. Our experienceshave shown that the Baltic States, Romania, Poland and Ukraine were the first topropose their support, because it is in their national interests to increase their owncontribution to regional security, to emphasise the country’s potential and mutualbenefits. Eurosceptics blame us for being too exalted, too unrealistic – but howcan they request us to be different? Countries with no aspirations for integrationlose nothing if they will not be integrated in institutional terms, while we may loseeverything.