EN

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

DG H

COUNCIL OFTHE EUROPEAN UNION

EUSchengen Catalogue

POLICE CO-OPERATIONRecommendations and Best Practices

J u n e 2 0 0 3

"Free movement within the territory of the Schengen States is afreedom which as a counterpart requires not only the

strengthening of the common external borders and theadministration of third country nationals, but also enhanced

co-operation between law enforcement authorities of Schengenstates.

The current volume of the Catalogue consists of two mainparts: the first one on mutual assistance and information

exchange, and the second one on operational co-operation. This division acknowledges the fact that information

exchange is the most important element of any co-operationbetween law enforcement bodies. A short general section

describes the basic concepts underlying the recommendationsand best practices."

Volume 4

EUSchengen Catalogue

Volume 4

June 2003

POLICE CO-OPERATIONRecommendations and Best Practices

Preface by the Greek Presidency.

In accordance with decision of the Council on 28 May 2001, the Working Party on SchengenEvaluation has initiated the drawing up a Catalogue of recommendations for the proper applicationof the Schengen acquis and of best practices.

The purpose of the Catalogue is to clarify and detail the Schengen acquis and to indicaterecommendations and best practices, in order to provide an example for those States acceding toSchengen and also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. The aim is not to give an exhaustivedefinition of the whole of the Schengen acquis but to put forward recommendations and bestpractices in the light of the experience gained through the continuous evaluation in the SchengenStates of the correct application of the Schengen acquis.

The first volume of the Catalogue regards external borders, removal and readmission. It wasadopted and handed over to the candidate countries at the Council on 28 February 2002. The secondvolume of the Catalogue addresses specifically the Schengen Information System and SIRENE. Itgives a good indication to candidate countries for accession to the European Union as to what isexpected of them, particularly in practical terms, regarding Schengen.

Greece, which has held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union during the firstsemester of 2003, considers it very important to continue the work on drafting the Catalogue.

On 13/01/2003 the Schengen Evaluation working group adopted the following mandate for thedrafting of a catalogue of Cross Border Police Co-operation. ("Outcome of proceedings of theSchengen evaluation Working Party on 13 January 2003 n° 5610/03 COMIX 41, item n° 5 BestPractices Catalogue: The Greek Presidency is willing to proceed with the efforts of the previousPresidencies to draft volumes of the "best practices catalogue". (…..) Experts involved in theinspection in Spain will be invited with other interested experts to the first meeting in Brussels.These drafting committees are open for every Member State and for the Commission services.")

This catalogue regards the recommendation and best practices for Police Co-operation.

The Greek Presidency would like to thank the Schengen States and the Commission for help andgood co-operation in drawing up the catalogue and in this connection addresses special thanks toBelgium for helping the Greek Presidency.

Of course, like the other catalogues, the purpose of the new catalogue is explanatory and it has nolegally binding status. It shows, set out in separate columns, on the one hand, the levels whichshould be required in order to comply with the Schengen acquis, and on the other hand, the bestpractices recorded in some of the Schengen states.

The catalogue will be handed over to the acceding countries and the candidate countries. The GreekPresidency is confident that it will constitute a useful and additional instrument for ensuring thesuccessful integration of the new Schengen states of the European Union.

Athens, June 2003Greek Ministry of Public OrderThe MinisterMichalis Chryssohoidis

INTRODUCTION

1. At its meeting on 28 May 2001, the Council set as an objective for further work by theWorking Party on Schengen Evaluation the identification of "... best practices, particularly asregards border controls, so that they can serve as examples for those States acceding toSchengen but also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. These evaluations and theidentification of best practices shall serve as inspiration for the establishment of standardsdefining the minimum application of the Schengen acquis (…) in the relevant workinggroups" (mandate for the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation) (8881/01 – SCH-EVAL 17,COMIX 371).On the basis of this mandate, the Working Party on Schengen Evaluation worked out theprinciples and procedure for drawing up the Catalogue of recommendations for the correctapplication of the Schengen acquis and best practices, hereinafter referred to as the Catalogueof recommendations and best practices, or Catalogue.The purpose of the Catalogue is to clarify and detail the Schengen acquis and to indicaterecommendations and best practices, in order to provide an example for those States accedingto Schengen and also those fully applying the Schengen acquis. With this in mind theCatalogue gives a good indication to the future Schengen states and the Candidate countriesfor accession to the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the "EU") (at their request) asto what is expected of them, particularly in practical terms, regarding Schengen. The aim isnot to give an exhaustive definition of the whole of the Schengen acquis but to put forwardrecommendations and best practices in the light of the experience gained by the WorkingParty on Schengen Evaluation in verifying the correct application of the Schengen acquis inseveral countries.The text of the Catalogue does not seek to introduce new requirements but should also make itpossible to draw the Council's attention to the need where appropriate to amend certainprovisions of the Schengen acquis so that the Commission and, where appropriate, theSchengen states take the recommendations and best practices into account when puttingforward proposals or formal initiatives. This exercise is inter alia the first stage of the processof defining minimum standards by the Council.Moreover, the Catalogue will serve as a reference tool for future evaluations undertaken in thecandidate countries. It will therefore also serve as an indicator for these countries of the tasksthat they will be assigned and in this respect should be read in conjunction with the Police co-operation Manual.

2. The Working Party on Schengen Evaluation adopted the following definitions to conduct thisexercise:Recommendations: non-exhaustive series of measures which should make it possible toestablish a basis for the correct application of the Schengen acquis and for monitoring it.Best Practices: non-exhaustive set of working methods or model measures which must beconsidered as the optimal application of the Schengen acquis, it being understood that severalbest practices are possible for each specific part of Schengen co-operation.

3. Where the Catalogue mentions the Member States which apply the Schengen acquis, this iscurrently to be taken as meaning the thirteen Member States of the EU referred to in Article 1of the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the EU annexed to theTreaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community(hereinafter the "Schengen Protocol"), to which must be added Iceland and Norway, pursuantto the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union, the Republic of Icelandand the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters' association with the implementation,application and development of the Schengen acquis, signed on 18 May 1999 (these 15 Statesare hereinafter referred to as the "Schengen States").

The United Kingdom and Ireland have expressed the wish to participate in certain provisionsof the Schengen acquis. The arrangements for the United Kingdom's participation wereadopted in the Council Decision of 29 May 2000 (2000/365/EC), those for Ireland in theCouncil Decision of 28 February 2002 (2002/192/EC). The Council has not yet decided on theimplementation of the provisions in question.The Schengen acquis and the other measures taken by the institutions within the scope of theacquis are, under Article 8 of the Schengen Protocol, regarded as an acquis which must beaccepted in full by all States candidates for accession. The Accession Treaty signed in Athenson 16 April 2003 sets out in detail the position of the acceding States with respect to theprovisions of the Schengen acquis.

4. The Schengen Protocol integrated the Schengen acquis into the EU framework. The extent ofthe acquis is defined in Council Decision 1999/435/EC, published in OJ L 176 of 10 July1999.Since its integration into the EU, the Schengen acquis has undergone developments andamendments which lend it an evolutionary character.The Schengen acquis has also taken on board the results of the evaluations, which have beenconducted within the framework of the Standing Committee for the application, andevaluation of the Schengen acquis, now called the "Working Party on Schengen Evaluation".Under the Working Party's mandate, reports are submitted to the Council to establish whetherthe conditions required for the entry into force of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in acountry wishing to participate in those provisions (or in some of them) have been met and,secondly, to monitor the correct application of the Schengen acquis by the Schengen States, inparticular by detecting problems and proposing solutions.

5. The first volume of the Catalogue, which was handed over to the candidate countries at theCouncil of 28 February 2002, dealt with borders, border surveillance, and border control (firstpart) and with removal and readmission (second part). The second volume of the Cataloguethat was adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 19 December 2002, deals withthe Schengen Information System, notably the application of the SIRENE Manual. The thirdvolume of the Catalogue deals with issuing of visa and was adopted by the General Affairsand External Relations Council on 8 March 2003.

6. The current volume of the Catalogue consists of two main parts: the first one on mutualassistance and information exchange, and the second one on operational co-operation. Thisdivision acknowledges the fact that information exchange is the most important element ofany co-operation between law enforcement bodies. A short general section describes the basicconcepts underlying the recommendations and best practices. These are presented in tabularform, with recommendations on the left and best practices on the right, alongside the relevantrecommendations.Free movement within the territory of the Schengen States is a freedom which as acounterpart requires not only the strengthening of the common external borders and theadministration of third country nationals, but also enhanced co-operation between lawenforcement authorities of Schengen states. Accordingly, the measures adopted in this contextseek to strengthen European integration and in particular to enable the EU to become morerapidly an area of freedom, security and justice.

PART IV : POLICE CO-OPERATION

DETAILS OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND BEST PRACTICES

A. General section

The list of recommendations and best practices set out hereunder has been compiled mainly on thebasis of the outcome of different evaluations carried out over the last years.

Because police co-operation takes place in the preserve of national sovereignty, the SchengenConvention merely sets out a set of basic principles. The implementation of these principles(procedures, competent authorities, possible authorisations, channels, etc) underlie national law.Best practices have therefore to be formulated in a sufficiently abstract manner to cater for thesenational specifics. This Catalogue is complementary to the Police Co-operation handbook thatprovides details on the procedures to be complied with.Besides, where police co-operation has been shaped by bilateral agreements best practices stet outwhat the practices are in that respect.

When entering into a bilateral agreement it should be considered whether it is more appropriate toestablish a direct co-operation between the competent authorities with a view to ensure efficient co-operation.

The implementation of the recommendations and best practices contained in this document shalltake place within the framework of the relevant provisions of the Schengen Convention, bilateralagreements and national law, including provisions on the competences under national law, whileaiming at ensuring the most efficient co-operation

This catalogue is divided in three main chapters, mutual assistance and information exchange,operational co-operation and structures and training. These sections follow as much as possible theSchengen Convention.

Police co-operation via the Schengen Information system and SIRENE is not covered in thisvolume of the catalogue, as it was part of the second volume (see there).

Police co-operation within the Schengen States takes place at three geographically distinctlocations.In the first place within the territory. The main thrust of police co-operation lies in the borderregions where need for daily cooperative effort is most clearly present. Since the entry into force ofthe Schengen Convention between the original signatory States in 1995, a score of bilateralarrangements and agreements have been concluded to tailor the co-operation to the needs of aspecific border or border region. The assessments conducted in the context of the SchengenEvaluation have demonstrated that the main activity lies in fighting organised crime. This cataloguedoes however cover the enabling articles of the Schengen Convention that fosters police co-operation at the internal borders. Additionally, police co-operation inside the Schengen territorytakes place between the States applying the Schengen acquis. Examples are the mutual assistancebetween central authorities and the use of the Schengen Information System (hereafter referred to asSIS) that allows each State to trigger law enforcement action in another State.

Secondly at the external borders, law enforcement action is dedicated to the policing of the externalborder and, as a consequence, the territory within these borders.

Thirdly, the Schengen Convention makes it possible that Member States agree that liaison officersseconded in a third country may also represent the interests of another Member State. Because ofthe presentation of the subject, these three locations are found throughout the catalogue.

B. Recommendations/Best practices

Recommendations Best practices

SECTION A - GENERAL

A common evaluation on an annual basisof ongoing police co-operation referred toin this catalogue should be produced.

A central authority responsible forinternational police co-operation shouldbe set up and designated as the singlepoint of contact for each Schengen State.

The Handbook on cross-border police co-operation should be updated according tothe provisions of the Schengen ExecutiveCommittee Decision of 16.12.1998(SCH/Com/Ex(98) 52= OJ L 239,29.09.00, p. 408).

Changes to the Handbook should benotified immediately to the CouncilSecretariat.

All offices responsible for internationalpolice co-operation (Europol, SIRENE,Interpol, etc) should be accessed through asingle point of contact, be integratedwithin the same management structureand located at the same site.

1. Article 39 - Mutual assistance1.1. Requests for assistance exchanged via central authorities The Schengen States undertake to ensurethat their police authorities shall, incompliance with national law and withinthe scope of their powers, assist eachother for the purposes of preventing anddetecting criminal offences. - central authority is at hand 24/24 h- national police authorities havepermanent and direct access to centralauthority ;central authorities constitute anoperational network between themselvesto develop practical modalities of their co-operation and generally improve thequality of their service. - police units that forward requests to thecentral authority must have adequateknowledge about the limits their nationallaw imposes on the legality of therequests for assistance;The central authority double-checks thelegitimacy of requestsSchengen States should explore thepossibility of a common informationexchange system.

Central authority is equipped to forwardand process requests rapidly ;

The central authority oversees theforwarding of the request to the competentauthority or, when letters rogatory arerequired, informs the central authority ofthe requesting state of this.

Schengen States shall inform each othervia the central authorities of the wayauthorisation for use of writteninformation in criminal proceedings mustbe obtained.

Schengen States may agree that thepolice and/or judicial authorities maytransmit requests for authorization andthe documents resulting from dealingwith such requests by any secure and

Recommendations Best practicesreliable means that allow swifttransmission, provided the transmissionprovides a written trace of the document'sauthor (e.g. telefax, E-Mail).

Requests for assistance are grantedsubject to the following conditions: - requests for assistance and reply mustbe exchanged via central authorities - requests must be authorized by nationallaw - requests must be within the scope of thepowers of the authorities concerned;where the authority concerned is notempowered to grant assistance, therequest must be forwarded to thecompetent authority. - activities to be carried out to respond toa request should not be those that are theexclusive responsibility of the judicialauthorities or require their consent - implementation of the request must notinvolve the application of coercivemeasures - written information may only be usedas evidence with the prior consent of thejudicial authorities of the requestedcountry

- information exchange must beadmissible under the domestic law of therequested State. The following information qualifies to beexchanged on the basis of a request formutual assistance:� identification of vehicle owners and

drivers,� driver’s license enquiries,� tracing whereabouts and residence,� identification of telecommunications

subscribers (telephone, fax andInternet), provided this information ispublicly available,

The central Authority should be in aposition to deal with such requestsdirectly, as far as possible, withoutreferring them to another agency forenquiry.

Recommendations Best practices� obtaining information from the

persons concerned by the police on avoluntary basis (Under the nationallaw of Austria, Germany and theNetherlands, the principle ofvoluntary police interviews applies),

� identification of persons,� transmission of police intelligence

from police databases or files, subjectto compliance with the relevant legalprovisions governing data protection,

� preparation of plans and coordinationof search measures and the initiationof emergency searches(independently of SIS queries)

� tracing the origins of goods,particularly weapons and vehicles(tracing sales channels),

� examination of evidence (such asvehicle damage after hit and runaccidents, erasures in documents,etc.).

- Improvement of Co-operation betweenCentral authorities

With a view to fostering co-operationbetween the central authorities, thePresidency shall, if necessary, convenemeetings of the heads of the centralauthorities to be held on a regular basis.

The heads of the central authorities shallthen discuss matters of common interestand assess the efficiency of the co-operation. They shall endeavour to pooltheir organizations’ knowledge by, forinstance, organizing exercises, exchangesand training courses for their staff.

1.2. Assistance in urgent situations

- in urgent situations, requests forassistance may be addressed directly tothe competent authorities of the countryconcerned, who may respond directly.

- the requesting authority mustimmediately notify the central authorityof the requested State of this directrequest.

Common interpretation of urgency: whengoing via channel of the central authoritywould prolong the transmission of therequest to the local authorities andjeopardize the success of the preventativeor investigative action.

- police units have access to a completeand up-to-date list of names and contactdetails of police units in other Schengenstates they can directly contact in urgentcases ;- police units will avail themselves of theminimum necessary equipment toexchange requests and replies in a rapidand secure manner.

Recommendations Best practices- Central authorities are responsible forupdating the contact list and informing thenational police units.

in cases of urgency, they will immediatelyinform the central authority of the policeunit they have approached with directrequest for assistance ; with the samesense of urgency they will notify theirown central authority of the request theymade and the reply they have received.

- simplification of procedures Criminal investigations, particularly inurgent situations, can also be acceleratedby simplifying procedures. This isexemplified in the arrangements alreadyexisting between some States whereby, atthe instigation of the judicial authorities,the police authorities cooperate directly byassisting each other with policeinterviews, searches and the seizure ofobjects when a delay could harm theongoing investigation.

1.3. Bilateral agreements (art.39§4 and 5)

Schengen states should explore thepossibility of pursuing bilateralagreements.

Develop such bilateral agreements onareas such as setting up of Joint PoliceStations or Common Police and CustomsCo-operation Centres; networkingbetween these bilateral structures ; directaccess of the officials in these centres tonational databases ; alleviation of theburden on the central authority ;maintenance of supervision andinformation oversight on national level.

Crossborder agreements extendingthe scope of the Schengen Convention

In order to strengthen crossborder policeco-operation in border areas, the SchengenConvention enables Schengen states tosign complementary bilateral agreements.(art 39.4 and 5)

- In multi-border areas : the creationof a multiparty structure gathering allborder actors must be given as an example(the Luxembourg centre is made ofservices from Luxembourg, Belgium,Germany and France) ;

Recommendations Best practices(Some specific agreements have beensigned with Third Countries,.) Thesebilateral agreements can follow the samepattern, :1. on the one hand, the creation ofpolice and customsco-operation centres;2. on the other hand, direct co-operation between police forces andcustoms units.

The police and customs co-operationcentres/Joint Police Stations are locatedon the borders and are composed ofmembers of the police forces and customsof the two neighbouring countries

They have no operational jurisdiction butprovide assistance and advice to the unitsin their cross-border relations.

LOCATION

Joint Police Stations/Police and CustomsCo-operation have to be set up at internaland external borders. The office should beset up in the immediate vicinity of theborder processing point.In addition, the occupation of theemployees could possibly haveconsequences in terms of work/residencepermits and even in terms of salaries.

In the border regions, on the basis ofbilateral agreements, Joint PoliceStations/Police and Customs co-operationcentres can be established to bringtogether into one place all the constituentelements of the internal security services.

Common Contact Points also require theco-operation of the safety authorities ofeach country

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

All represented authorities must havecomplete online access to nationalinvestigation and secure informationsystems. Telephone and fax connectionswith an international dialling capabilityare an absolute requirement.

OPERATION

The working procedures of Joint PoliceStations/Police and Customs co-operationhave to be largely specified in advance inthe common agreement. The openinghours and staffing hours have to bedetermined according to need.

If needed, the opening hours could beextended. Because of the amount of work,“the 24H”basis is very quickly going tobecome necessary.

STAFF

A high standard has to be applied in theselection of staff. The job description

• The staff should be assignedpermanently to the Joint PoliceStations/Police and Customs co-

Recommendations Best practicesshould include flexibility, andcommunication skills.Good practice of foreign languages isrequired for officers working in the co-operation centres.A thorough knowledge of the provisionsof the Schengen Convention along withthe bilateral agreement in question isrequired so that the border system doesnot interfere with the Convention system.

operation.• Staff selection should be based on a

particular training.• This training should include aspects of

the neighbouring state's legal systemwith a special focus on the structuresof its authorities, administration andpolice services.

• Particularly for work at internalborders, detailed knowledge of EUlaw is required.

TASKS

The range of tasks to be assigned to JointPolice Stations/Police and Customs Co-operation is plentiful. The following arethe main tasks:• Building up and maintaining contacts;• Finding and exchanging information;• Drafting joint situation reports• Providing logistic assistance for joint

operations and joint investigationteams operating in the area

In respect of the finding andexchanging of information in support ofPolice operations the following shouldbe included in the responsibilities of therelevant agencies.

Confirming the identity of vehicle owners;Checking home addresses;Searching for and investigating personsand objects;Examining documents;Consulting driving licence databanks;Telephone subscriber checks;Collaboration on internationalinvestigations, pursuits and observations;Coordinating police activities in respect ofinternational road traffic;Processing border-related incidents;Collaboration on international majorincident and contingency plans.

Relationship with Central authority The Joint Police Stations/Police andCustoms Co-operation should reportsystematically to the central authorityconcerning the application of the articles

Recommendations Best practices39,40,41 and 46 of the SchengenConvention

2. Article 46 - Unsolicited communication of information and co-operation inmatters relating to public policy and national security

As a general rule the transmission ofinformation will take place by theintermediary of the designated centralauthority

The designated central authority should beconsidered as the first route for thetransmission of information under Article46. Even in particularly urgent cases theirexperience and structure should permit thebest results for the prevention anddetection of crime and maintenance ofpublic policy and national security.

To ensure the information can besupplied as early as possible and can behandled in a confidential manner a secureand reliable means of communicationsmust be available

A variety of secure and reliable means ofcommunication should be available.

The adoption of a system for validation ofthe information is encouraged. SchengenStates will be more able to respond toinformation, which is supported by arecognized validation by the transmittingstate.

When, in urgent cases, the directtransmission of information takes placebetween national units the centralauthority must be notified immediately. The information supplied should bedetailed to such an extent that thereceiving state can make a realisticevaluation of its worth or conduct a riskassessment. When the source of the information issensitive or has to be protected, thisshould be included in the originalmessage. The designated central authority must bein a position to act or respond to theinformation supplied. - information shall be exchanged via acentral authority - content of information exchange

The central authorities shall supply oneanother, requested or not, withinformation if circumstances arise or ifsizeable groups of persons who may pose

Recommendations Best practicesa threat to public order and security movethrough or towards other Schengen States.The information shall be supplied at asearly a stage as possible. Save asotherwise provided for under national law,the exchange of information within themeaning of this manual may take placedirectly between the police servicesconcerned in urgent cases. The centralauthority shall be informed as soon aspossible.

- Content of the Information: Theinformation which Schengen States supplyone another must be dealt withconfidentially and shall be usedexclusively for the purpose for which it isprovided. The information to be providedshall be supplied in accordance withrelevant national legislation.

- Communication: In order to exchangeinformation, the central authority may usethe Liaison Bureaux and, if appropriate,joint police stations or the contact pointsreferred to in this catalogue. Thefollowing means of communication maybe used when exchanging information:telephone, fax, e-mail, radiocommunication and other means of datacommunication. By decision of theExecutive Committee of 16.12.1998 onthe handbook on cross-border police co-operation "The Schengen Secretariat shallbe responsible for constantly updating theHandbook". To this end the SchengenStates shall keep the General Secretariatabreast of any amendments to be made totheir national fact sheets.2.2. Urgent situations

In particularly urgent cases, the exchangeof information within the meaning of thisArticle may take place directly betweenthe police authorities concerned, unlessnational provisions stipulate otherwise.The central authority shall be informed ofthis as soon as possible.

See observations under 1.2.

Recommendations Best practices3. Articles 7, 47 and 125 - Liaison officers3.1. Liaison officers in other Schengen States

- At the request of the authorizedpolice authority of each of the SchengenStates, liaison officers may be sent toother Schengen States.- The task of liaison officers shall beto advise, facilitate and assist.

Liaison Officers should be posted to theCentral authority.

Co-operation between liaison officersshould be encouraged.

Initial contact between the police unitsand the liaison officers should betransmitted via the central unit.

- According to Article 47, liaison officersshall not be empowered to executeautonomously any police measures. Theyshall supply information and shalldischarge their duties on the instructionsissued to them by the Schengen Statewhich they come from and by theSchengen State to which they areseconded. The host police authority of theSchengen State is bound to provide for theprotection of liaison officers.

-The relevant police authority of the hostSchengen State shall determine theactivities of liaison officers and theconditions in which these are carried out.The liaison officers are bound to followinstructions issued by the competentauthorities.3.2. Co-operation between liaison officers in third countries

Schengen states should take underconsideration the provisions laid down bythe Council Decision 2003/170/JHA of27.2.03 (re: OJ.L 67, 12.03.O3, p. 27)

The Nordic co-operation in respect ofliaison officers could serve as an examplefor future posts.

Schengen States should inform each otherof their intention to second a liaisonofficer to a third state.

4. Article 7 - Exchanging information in view of ensuring effective externalborder controls and surveillance

With a view to improving theeffectiveness of checks and surveillance atthe external borders, Article 7 provides foran exchange of all relevant and importantinformation relating to such checks, withthe exception of data on namedindividuals.

Such information, which may inter aliaconcern migration flows, shall beexchanged via the Central authorities.

Recommendations Best practices

SECTION B - OPERATIONAL CO-OPERATION

5. Article 40 (Cross-border surveillance)5.1. The principle

According to article 40, when a crime hasbeen committed and when it is within theframework of their competence, nationallyauthorised officers are allowed to continuethe surveillance, which has started in theirown country, across the border towardsanother Schengen State under very strictlydefined conditions with the approval ofthat state. Cross-border surveillance ispermitted to take place on all types ofborder crossings, on land in the air and atsea.According to the main rule an approvalmust be obtained in advance, i.e. beforethe border is crossed, to continue thesurveillance into the territory of therecipient state.When there is a risk of delay thesurveillance is allowed to continue acrossthe border into the territory of therecipient state without prior approvalunder certain conditions.In article 40 the following two cases areseparated:Normal or Ordinary surveillance (OS) andUrgent or Emergency surveillance (ES)

The form for cross-border surveillancemust be filled in as accurately as possible,especially with information aboutweapons, police personnel, vehicles andtechnical equipment. Hand-written formsare never allowed.

Full explanation of the reason justifyingthe request should be included on theform.

(In the form a special column forinformation about weapons ought to beadded as complementary information.There ought to be a box where therecipient state can sign to indicate whetherit approves or rejects the request.)

There is a need of harmonising inparticular communications, technicalequipment and procedures for policeservices which carry out cross-borderoperations.

The state that is planning the cross-bordersurveillance shall inform the recipientstate as soon as possible. The general ruleis that all requests should be sent to thecentral national unit.

5.2.1. Conditions for normal or ordinary surveillance: (OS)

• A preliminary investigation hasstarted.

• The individual who is going to beobserved must be suspected ofcomplicity in a crime that can be liableto extradition.

• Only nationally authorised officers areallowed to carry out cross-bordersurveillance.

• The state that received the requestmust give its approval of thesurveillance (certain conditions can beincluded in the approval).

• The nationally authorised officers whocarry out the surveillance are allowed

It has been proposed in a draft CouncilDecision amending the provisions ofArticle 40 that persons other than thesuspect - if required by the pendinginvestigation and if there are reasonablegrounds to assume that the observationwill contribute to identify or track downthe suspected perpetrator - will also besubject to these provisions in the future.

In addition to being authorised, officersconducting cross border surveillanceshould be trained to an appropriatelevel, be equipped to a level of selfsufficiency and be fully aware of their

Recommendations Best practicesto carry service weapons if therecipient state has not forbidden this,but the weapons can only be used inself-defence.

• The Central authority must be able toforward the request within the state tothe unit responsible for the operationon a 24/24 hr basis.

powers and responsibilities pursuant toArticle 40.

The general rule is that all requests shouldbe sent to the central national unit.

5.2.2. Conditions for urgent or emergency surveillance: (ES)

• Prior approval could not be obtainedbecause the case was very urgent.

• A criminal investigation must havestarted.

• It is suspected that the individual orother persons than the suspect – ifrequired by the pending investigationand if there are reasonable grounds toassume that the observation willcontribute to identify or track downthe suspected perpetrator and who aresubject to surveillance are related tocrimes presented in the list mentionedin article 40.

• Only nationally authorised officers areallowed to carry out surveillance.

• The border-crossing is immediatelyreported to the central authority in therecipient state.

• A request for legal assistance issubmitted without any delay.

Even in cases of urgent or emergencysurveillance the designated centralauthority should still be considered as thefirst route for the transmission of requestsunder Article 40. Even in particularlyurgent cases their experience and structureshould permit the best results for theprevention and detection of crime andmaintenance of public policy and nationalsecurity.

Particularly in respect of urgent oremergency surveillance, in addition tobeing authorised, officers conductingcross border surveillance should betrained to an appropriate level, beequipped to a level of self sufficiencyand be fully aware of their powers andresponsibilities pursuant to Article 40.

5.3. The surveillance must be interrupted:

• At the request of the recipient state.• If no approval has been obtained from

the recipient state within five hoursafter the border was crossed.

5.4.1.

For a request to continue cross-bordersurveillance from a Schengen State toanother it is a general rule that this shouldbe sent to the central national unit.The Central national unit main role is tomake sure that all available informationon the place where it is assumed that thesurveillance will be conducted will come

In urgent cases a request can be receivedfrom the foreign authority on thetelephone, but in that case the informationshall be confirmed in writing as soon aspossible.The central unit shall have updatedtelephone numbers of the law enforcementauthorities, which are the closest to the

Recommendations Best practicesto the recipient state in a correct way andto facilitate contacts between the officersin charge of the surveillance and the lawenforcement authorities.

border.

5.4.2. An urgent reply is necessary fromthe recipient state as to whether therequest is approved or rejected.

The recipient state replies on the sameform as the one which was sent to it. (Seepoint 1.1 about complementaryinformation on the form in question.)

5.5. Practical regulations to carry out the surveillance5.5.1. Before crossing the border

• Even in urgent cases, a request forassistance shall be sent through thecentral authorities in each state.

• In urgent cases a request shall be sentas soon as possible.

• The submission of a request to crossthe border shall be handled by thecompetent authorities in the recipientstate as a request for assistanceaccording to article 40.1 of theconvention. This request for assistanceshall contain all the information asrequired by the Handbook on Policeco-operation and be available at thetime of the request.

• An approval of the request must begiven by the recipient state. Certainconditions can be linked to anapproval.

5.5.2. Once the border has been crossed.

The officer shall be subject to the lawsand regulations in the state where he/sheoperates and follow the instructions fromthe competent authorities.• The officers carrying out the

surveillance must at all times be ableto give proof of their acting in anofficial capacity.

• If the recipient state does not opposethis explicitly, the officer is allowed tocarry a service weapon, which canonly be used in self-defence.

• It is forbidden to enter domestichomes and places which are not opento the public.

• The individual who is subject to

Definitions in the Schengen States of theterms self-defence, service weapons anddomicile, can be found in the handbook onpolice co-operation.

Recommendations Best practicessurveillance should neither be arrestednor challenged by the foreign officerscarrying out the surveillance.

• The application shall be submitted tothe central authorities before thesurveillance starts. In urgent caseswhen the surveillance team crosses theborder, the central authority shallcontact its counterpart.

5.5.3. When the surveillance is over

• When the operation is over, this shallbe reported to the authority in therecipient state; the supervising officerscan be instructed to appear in person.The report shall be written on the formcontained within the Handbook onPolice Co-operation.

• The authorities in the recipient statecan request that the police officerswho are sent will participate in thefollow-up of the operation, includinginvestigations and legal proceedings.

Consideration should be given to hold ajoint de-brief between the agenciesinvolved to ensure lessons are learned.

In addition to a report being prepared bythe surveillance team consideration shouldbe given to having a report prepared onthe procedures followed by the variousauthorising parties involved in theprocess. This will highlight both anyprocedural difficulties and best practice.

5.5.4. The follow up

A standard form for statistics has beendeveloped to provide reliable, generalinformation on how often and howefficiently a surveillance operation iscarried out.This form must be filled in by the centralauthority of the requesting state as soonas a request for surveillance has beenmade, no matter the outcome, (even if theborder is not crossed in the end).

The central national unit shall havestatistics regarding reports on article 40.

All units shall report systematically to thecentral national unit.

Later on it can be of interest that theconcerned authorities make a jointassessment on the results of the operationand write a report on it. Then it is possibleto consider obtained experience and tointroduce improvements.

6. Article 41 (Cross-border pursuit)6.1. Principle According to Art. 41, officers in pursuitof a person may continue pursuing on theterritory of a Schengen State with whichtheir State has a common border. Thisoption, for which prior authorization isnot required, is subject to very strictconditions and precise arrangements. Some of these conditions andarrangements are of a general nature,others are specific to each country andhave been laid down in unilateral

Best practices would have it that pursuitswhich are today limited to land should beextended to air and sea, the way it is todayprovided for in some bilateral agreements.

The Nordic co-operation on cross borderpursuit where officers face no restrictionon location or time could serve as anexample for the future Schengenprocedures.

Recommendations Best practicesdeclarations. According to the SchengenConvention, each State is free to choosebetween two options concerning theoffences which may give rise to pursuitand is free to restrict the powers of thepursuing officers (whether or not theyhave the power to stop and interrogate,restrictions on the scope and duration ofthe pursuit).6.2. Conditions - Pursuit may only be performed acrossthe land borders - Only nationally authorised officers areallowed to carry out cross-border pursuits

Pursuits would be more efficient ifrestrictions to only land border could belifted.

- Conditions linked to the type ofoffence: each State has the choicebetween two options for the type ofoffences allowing the power of pursuit tobe exercised: either the restrictive list ofoffences stipulated in Art. 41(4)(a) orextraditable offences

It would be "best practices" if SchengenStates could apply the same criteria.

- Reference must be made to the nationalfact sheets to find out which option hasbeen chosen by an individual State.However, the following conditions applyin all the States: = the person concerned must havebeen caught in the act of committing orparticipating. in one of the offences = pursuit is also authorized wherethe person concerned is under provisionalarrest or serving a custodial sentence.

National fact sheets should be bothwidely available and widely knownabout by operational officers operatingin border areas.

- Conditions for emergency pursuit:emergency pursuit requires that = it has not been possible toadvise the requested authorities inadvance owing to particular urgency = or the authorities have beenadvised but have not been able to take upthe pursuit in due time themselves = the pursuing officers consult theauthorities of the requested State at thelatest upon crossing the border = the pursuit ceases at the firstrequest of the requested State. 6.3. Restrictions on the power of pursuit

Recommendations Best practices There are three types of restriction whichmay be imposed on the power of pursuit,which each individual State is free tochoose:

Harmonisation of the restrictions inrespect of time and location and thepowers of pursuing officers would help.

- territorial restriction: some SchengenStates authorize pursuit on their entireterritory, others only authorize it on acertain number of kilometres along theborder. - time restriction: pursuit may have to besuspended after a certain amount of timehas lapsed.

Fact sheets available to operationalofficers should reflect the specific typeof restriction that applies in the borderarea they are policing.

- a restriction on the powers of thepursuing agents: some Schengen Statesauthorize them to stop and interrogate,others do not. This does not affect theright to make a citizen’s arrest in theState on the territory of which the pursuitis carried out when an offender is caughtin the act.6.4. Practical arrangements During pursuit: - It is mandatory to inform the centralauthorities of the State on the territory ofwhich the pursuit is being carried out atthe latest upon crossing the border. Thismust be done by contacting = either the first police authorityof the State concerned = or one of the liaison authoritiesdesignated by the State concerned

Best practices would be that as soon as thepursuing officers realise that a bordercrossing is possible, they should informtheir central authorities who will thencontact their counterpart.

- The officer must act in compliance withthe national law of the state in which heis operating and must follow theinstructions of the locally competentauthorities. - The power to exercise road trafficprerogatives during pursuit is granted tothe pursuing officers in accordance withthe national law of the State on theterritory of which a pursuit is continued - The pursuit must be stopped at therequest of the local authorities. - The officer must be in possession of his

Recommendations Best practicesservice badge or pass and be easilyidentifiable (uniform, armband, vehicle,etc.) - The officer may carry his serviceweapon; its use is forbidden except incase of self-defence under the nationallaw of the requesting state - Entering homes and places notaccessible to the public is forbidden Once pursuit has been concluded: - The officers involved must appearbefore the locally competent authoritiesto make a report after every pursuit, nomatter the outcome; if the locallycompetent authorities so wish, theofficers must remain available andprovide assistance, if requested, with thefollow-up, investigations and judicialprocedures. - If the person is arrested and is not anational of the country where the arrestwas made, he must be released six hoursafter arrest if no provisional arrestwarrant for extradition is forthcoming(the hours between midnight and 9 a.m.do not count). - The persons arrested may only besubjected to a security search for thepurpose of bringing them before the localauthorities. They may be hand-cuffed andobjects on their person may be seized.6.5. Follow-up information A standard form for statistics is attachedso as to give the central authoritiesreliable, general information on howoften and how efficiently the power ofpursuit is exercised. This form must be filled in by anyauthority having engaged in a pursuit,whatever the outcome, as soon as theborder is crossed and sent to the centralauthority of the home state.

Central Authorities should record statisticsconcerning the application of article 41.

All units should report within 24 hours tothe Central Unit concerning theapplication of article 41.

Recommendations Best practices7. Organisational structure and strategy

Each Schengen State should develop anational plan defining the steps to betaken in each country to establish anorganisational structure and strategy tosupport police co-operation as required bythe Schengen Convention. This nationalPlan should provide practical operationalguidance on how each state applies therespective Articles of the SchengenConvention.

A central authority must be set up anddesignated as a single point of contact foreach M/S.

Central authority must provide 24/7 coverfor communications with all M/S andnational authorities.

For utmost efficiency in bilateralcommunication, languages familiar toboth parties shall be used.

Central authorities should hold a list ofrequests for which direct assistance can bemade in urgent situations withoutinvolving judicial authorities.

Central authority should compile bothmanagement information and operationalinformation on Police co-operation.

Local police should have permanentaccess to central authority.

Central authority should have an in depthknowledge of national and internationallegislation supporting police co-operationand act as a centre of excellence fornational services.

Coordination should exist between Centralauthority, Joint Police Stations and Policeand Customs Co-operation Centre.

A joint operational plan could beestablished between neighbouring states inorder to agree co-operation andarrangements on a practical level. Planshould be updated regularly.

Equipped to forward and process requestsrapidly.

Experts in different fields available24/24 h.

It is clearly desirable that nationallyauthorised officers are knowledgeable inthe most commonly spoken languages,both for direct communication and theability to manage documentation in theabsence of translation support.

The standard practice is to exchangeforms in the language of the issuingcountry and in English.

A thorough knowledge of the provisionsof the Schengen Convention along withthe bilateral agreements is required.

This should be a key element in therecruitment process and for the design oftraining sessions.

Centralised supervision and instructionswill ensure national standards are met.

Recommendations Best practices

Central authority should be responsiblefor maintaining an up to date list ofcontact points at international and nationallevel.

The national plan should includeprocedures to facilitate operationalassistance and exchange of informationbetween Central authorities, Joint PoliceStations and Police and Customs Co-operation Centres in order to fight cross –border crime.

Information should be handled in aconfidential and secure manner.

Means of communication. Telephone, fax,e-mail, radio-communications, mobiletelephones should all be utilised.

Schengen states should agree to adopt aset of standard forms to be used for allaspects of police co-operation. Theseforms should be designed to simplifyprocedures and be included as an annexeto the Handbook on police co-operation.

No handwritten request.

The information shall be supplied at asearly a stage as possible.

Permanent and regular updated training toimprove the knowledge of the staff.

Schengen states should jointly developoperational standards and a legislativeframework to facilitate the use ofspecialist surveillance techniques in crossborder operations.

Urgent Cases.

Where requests for assistance may beaddressed directly to the competentauthorities the requesting party must alsonotify the central authority of therequested State.

Central authorities should be in a positionto advise other Schengen States of anyspecialist surveillance techniques theirnational services may employ.

8. Training8.1. Basic training

All officers seconded to the centralauthority should have successfullycompleted a training course covering theirtasks, which should include :

- knowledge of relevant Schengenand EU provisions;

Training programmes should be flexible,taking into account the changes in riskassessment.

Recommendations Best practices- in depth knowledge of the

handbook on police- co-operation;- basic rules and procedures;- in depth knowledge of relevant

bilateral agreements;- genuine and forged travel and

identity documents;- Dublin, and readmission

provisions;- Schengen Information System;- Europol;- Judicial co-operation.

8.2. Further training

A training programme with regulartraining/briefing should be established aspart of working hours.

A training program should be establishedon local and central level to ensure acontinued offer of education on issuesrelevant to co-operation.

Regular exchange of nationally authorisedofficers, common training, at least once ayear.

8.3. Linguistic training

All officers should be able to speak aforeign language useful to their work. Allofficers should have adequate knowledgeof English.

Encourage staff to learn other languages.Set up language programs for thoseofficers particularly involved in cross-border co-operation. e.g. at the Police andCustoms Co-operation Centres ifnecessary.

8.4. Training for management levels

• Relevant common training on Policeco-operation should be provided bythe European Police College.

• Seminars and workshops may be setup according to the model adopted bythe Sirene Working Group for theSirene officers.

International experience is an asset.

Exchange programmes between statesshould be considered as a means ofbroadening management experience.

9. National Coordination

All the Schengen states must be able toprovide data concerning the situation at itsinternal borders. An integrated approachinvolving all authorities responsible fortackling transborder crime is essential tocreate an efficient national coordination.This coordination should be implementedat local, regional and central level on thebasis of a specific development of a riskanalysis, intelligence structure and flow

Co-operation between local authoritiesand the Central Authority, on the basis ofa specific development of a risk analysis,intelligence structure and data flowmanagement, should be implemented.

Recommendations Best practicesdata management.

The Central Authority must be able tosolve possible disputes of competencebetween the authorities involved in thepeculiar field of the internal securitysafeguard.

In case of missions that will have a bigimpact in all the territory of the concernedcountries, especially if that will involve agreat number of officers and many means,the coordination has to be carried out bythe Central Authorities.

An efficient national co-operation systemis a necessary requirement in order toallow a better definition of specificagreements with neighbouring states.

Encourage the creation of:- a joint database structure;- meetings between heads of

service;- joint training sessions

Information exchange between competentauthorities is essential in order to preventcrimes as well as the development of anappropriate working mechanism based ongood communication channels, localcontact points, emergency procedures, etc.

Management systems, used by theservices, should be able to generateintelligence, by using the results from thefield work and analyse it.

10. Joint patrols

Article 39 of the Schengen Conventionimposes an obligation of assistancebetween the police services of theSchengen States in order to prevent anddetect indictable offences. Paragraph 4 ofthis article stipulates that in border areas,this co-operation can be set throughagreements between the competentministers of the States concerned.

Paragraph 5 underlines that thoseprovisions are not an obstacle for moreexhaustive present or future bilateralagreements between Schengen States witha common border.

Agreements for co-operation of police andcustoms services are generally dividedinto 2 main branches :- one of these is related to thecommon centre for co-operation of policeand customs services;- the other one is related to thedirect co-operation between units, and

- The agreements must expressly mentionthe setting up of common patrols ;

- The type of personnel and the competentadministration must also be defined ;

- The carrying of firearms, of a uniform,or of any distinctive sign (armband)must be defined ;

- The agreement must indicate the serviceweapons which are authorised;

- The conditions to use firearms and therules of intervention must be explicitlymentioned in the bilateral agreementsand the personnel must be trained ;

- A training session concerningadministrative and criminal law andcriminal procedures used in border areasmust be set up.

- Patrols may be conducted as cross-border surveillance patrols in theexecution of a judicial co-operationrequest, or in favour of the

Recommendations Best practicesunderlines the operational units. Eachcommand level can take all the necessarycontacts with its counterpart in order tofacilitate the conduct of crossborderinvestigations, with the exception ofcoercion measures. Common activities orjoint patrols may also be organised.The neighbouring states should gettogether in order to establish theguidelines and the main goals to beimplemented on cross-border police co-operation matters.

administration in charge of thesurveillance of external borders.

- The officers are competent for carryingout autonomous police measures ;

- The State where the joint team operatesguarantees a protection to the officers ofthe other State acting on its gterritory; itprovides them with the same protectionand assistance as the one it gives its ownofficers. All officers are submitted to therules of civil and criminal liability inforce on the territory in which they act.

11. Radio-communications (Article 44 Schengen Convention) SCH/Com-ex(99) 6

11.1. short Term Measures

- Measures should be taken bySchengen States in border areas forthe purposes of cross-bordersurveillance and hot pursuit tofacilitate police and customs co-operation :

- installation of telephone, radio ;- exchange of telephone directories;- exchange of equipment ;- posting liaison officers equipped

with suitable radios ;- establishing a common contact

point for police and customsservices operating in the sameareas.

- Such measures can be part of bilateralagreements for setting up joint policestations and police and customs co-operation centres

11.2. Long term measures

- Schengen States shall implementnational digital radiocommunicationsnetworks for their emergency services,

- in the harmonised frequency band of380 – 400 MHz.

- The networks shall be based onTETRA or TETRAPOL systems,

- and they shall meet the Schengentechnical, operational and tacticalrequirements.

- Interworking measures shall be set upin border areas to connect theneighbouring networks. Thesemeasures meet at least the following

- Three combinations provide therequired interworking level in mostcases :

- overlapping networks providingnormal functionality within alimited range into the neighbouringstate in question ;

- the use of two-terminal

Recommendations Best practicesrequirements :- between officers of each side of

the border area :- individual calls ;- group calls ;- direct mode ;

- between officers and headquartersof each side of the border area :

- individual calls ;- group calls ;- direct mode ;

- between headquarters of each sideof the border area :

- individual calls ;- group calls ;

- for special operations : airinterface encrypted voice

- Schengen States are encouraged toreach bilateral agreements theimplementation of which is reported tothe Council.

functionalities (transponders, extraterminals, combined mobileinstallations) when service isrequired beyond overlapping area ;

- simple interconnections betweencontrol rooms;

- interconnections between bothnetworks providing cross borderindividual calls and group calls

- In case the preferred solution is notadequate (e.g. communications forsurveillance units across the totalterritory of Schengen States) standardGSM functionalities may providesolution.

12. Article 73 - Controlled deliveries12.1.

1. Each Schengen State takes measures,according to its constitution andnational legislation, with a view toallowing controlled deliveries withinthe illegal trade in narcotic drugs andpsychotropic substances

2. The possibility of controlled deliveriesshould be extended to other criminaloffences.

3. Decisions are taken in each separatecase to use the controlled delivery as amethod of surveillance after obtaining apermission from each state that isinvolved.

4. The state concerned shall be responsiblefor leading and monitoring theoperation on its territory and shall havethe authorisation to intervene.

Even if the main focus has been oncontrolled deliveries of narcotic drugs inthis catalogue, it should be noted thatsimilar operations in most Schengen Statesare allowed for the control of other goods

Recommendations Best practices12.2.

A controlled delivery can be carried out inall the Schengen States if permission wasgranted in advance. However, the specialconditions and ways of sanction differbetween the Schengen States.Harmonisation of practices and oflegislation is recommended.12.3.

Due to the fact that the handling ofcontrolled deliveries is a complicated task,both from a practical and a legislativepoint of view, these cases ought to behandled by especially appointed nationalcontact points.

In order to facilitate the ways of operating,a central Authority should be establishedconsisting of an integrated office whereInterpol, Europol, liaison officers andSIRENE are included.

12.4.

Definitions and limitations: In certainSchengen States there is a differencebetween a "monitored” delivery meaningthat there is no direct control but that theconsignment is being followed. A”controlled” delivery meaning that anundercover officer takes part in thedelivery.In this catalogue the expression "controlleddeliveries" is used in a wide sense.

12.5.

Fundamental information that is requiredfrom each Schengen State that carries outa controlled delivery.• The reason and the background for the

operation;• Statement of facts justifying the

operation;• Type of products, quantity;• Other goods;• Expected place of entry to the

requested state. When appropriate,information about the exit from therequested state;

• Expected transportation and route;• The suspect's identity (name, birth,

residence, citizenship, physicaldescription);

• Indicate who has authorized theoperation;

Best practice would be that there is noadditional condition to those alreadymentioned.

Recommendations Best practices• Indicate the name of the competent

officer in charge of the operation andthe way of contacting(communication, transportation...);

• customs;• Information about specialist

surveillance techniques;• The Schengen States should create

documents on the basis of the formavailable for article 40.

12.6. The foreign police and other law enforcement agencies' role.

Information on how to handle controlleddeliveries:• Nationally authorised officers are

permitted to take part in operationsconcerning controlled deliveries in allSchengen states, usually when anauthorisation has been given.

The recipient state normally requests thatits own agencies exercise the finaloperational control.• Special techniques may be used

provided that the method is legal inthe recipient state.

Law enforcement Agencies involved incontrolled deliveries have to exchange anupdated list of contact points, telephonenumbers and details of the technicalequipment. The officers from the lawenforcement agencies taking part in theoperation should know each otherpersonally.

12.7. Partial replacement of the consignment

The advantage of a partial replacement is tominimise the risks of spreading theconsignment if the operation fails and at thesame time to leave a sufficient amount ofthe consignment in order to prosecute.

12.8. Follow-up

It could be of value for the concerned lawenforcement agencies to jointly evaluateand submit a report on the result of theoperation.

Based on the acquired experience it wouldthen be possible to make actualimprovements and at the same time gainknowledge of each other's legislation,methods and priorities.

--------------------------

EN

GENERAL SECRETARIAT

DG H

COUNCIL OFTHE EUROPEAN UNION

EUSchengen Catalogue

POLICE CO-OPERATIONRecommendations and Best Practices

J u n e 2 0 0 3

"Free movement within the territory of the Schengen States is afreedom which as a counterpart requires not only the

strengthening of the common external borders and theadministration of third country nationals, but also enhanced

co-operation between law enforcement authorities of Schengenstates.

The current volume of the Catalogue consists of two mainparts: the first one on mutual assistance and information

exchange, and the second one on operational co-operation. This division acknowledges the fact that information

exchange is the most important element of any co-operationbetween law enforcement bodies. A short general section

describes the basic concepts underlying the recommendationsand best practices."

Volume 4