Cases in law

8/11/2019 Cases in law

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GOYA, INC., Petitioner, v.GOYA, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rulesof Civil Procedure seeks to reverse and set aside the June 16,2005 Decision1and October 12, 2005 Resolution2of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87335, which sustained the October26, 2004 Decision3of Voluntary Arbitrator Bienvenido E.Laguesma, the dispositive portion of which reads:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that theCompany is NOT guilty of unfair labor practice in engaging theservices of PESO.

The company is, however, directed to observe and comply withits commitment as it pertains to the hiring of casual employeeswhen necessitated by business circumstances.4?r?l1

The facts are simple and appear to be undisputed.

Sometime in January 2004, petitioner Goya, Inc. (Company), adomestic corporation engaged in the manufacture, importation,and wholesale of top quality food products, hired contractualemployees from PESO Resources Development Corporation(PESO) to perform temporary and occasional services in itsfactory in Parang, Marikina City. This prompted respondentGoya, Inc. Employees UnionFFW (Union) to request for agrievance conference on the ground that the contractual workersdo not belong to the categories of employees stipulated in theexisting Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).5When thematter remained unresolved, the grievance was referred to theNational Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntaryarbitration.

During the hearing on July 1, 2004, the Company and the Union

manifested before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Bienvenido E.Laguesma that amicable settlement was no longer possible;hence, they agreed to submit for resolution the solitary issue of"[w]hether or not the Company is guilty of unfair labor acts inengaging the services of PESO, a third party service provider,under the existing CBA, laws, and jurisprudence."6Both partiesthereafter filed their respective pleadings.

The Union asserted that the hiring of contractual employeesfrom PESO is not a management prerogative and in grossviolation of the CBA tantamount to unfair labor practice (ULP). Itnoted that the contractual workers engaged have been assignedto work in positions previously handled by regular workers andUnion members, in effect violating Section 4, Article I of theCBA, which provides for three categories of employees in the

Company, to wit:cralawlibrary

Section 4. Categories of Employees. The parties agree on thefollowing categories of employees:cralawlibrary

(a) Probationary Employee. One hired to occupy a regular rank-and-file position in the Company and is serving a probationaryperiod. If the probationary employee is hired or comes fromoutside the Company (non-Goya, Inc. employee), he shall berequired to undergo a probationary period of six (6) months,which period, in the sole judgment of management, may beshortened if the employee has already acquired the knowledgeor skills required of the job. If the employee is hired from thecasual pool and has worked in the same position at any time

during the past two (2) years, the probationary period shall bethree (3) months.

(b) Regular Employee. An employee who has satisfactorilycompleted his probationary period and automatically grantedregular employment status in the Company.

(c) Casual Employee, One hired by the Company to performoccasional or seasonal work directly connected with the regularoperations of the Company, or one hired for specific projects of

limited duration not connected directly with the regularoperations of the Company.

It was averred that the categories of employees had been a partof the CBA since the 1970s and that due to this provision, a poolof casual employees had been maintained by the Company fromwhich it hired workers who then became regular workers whenurgently necessary to employ them for more than a year.Likewise, the Company sometimes hired probationary employeeswho also later became regular workers after passing theprobationary period. With the hiring of contractual employees,the Union contended that it would no longer have probationaryand casual employees from which it could obtain additionalUnion members; thus, rendering inutile Section 1, Article III(Union Security) of the CBA, which states:cralawlibrary

Section 1. Condition of Employment. As a condition of continuedemployment in the Company, all regular rank-and-fileemployees shall remain members of the Union in good standingand that new employees covered by the appropriate bargainingunit shall automatically become regular employees of theCompany and shall remain members of the Union in goodstanding as a condition of continued employment.

The Union moreover advanced that sustaining the Companysposition would easily weaken and ultimately destroy the former

with the latters resort to retrenchment and/or retirement ofemployees and not filling up the vacant regular positionsthrough the hiring of contractual workers from PESO, and that apossible scenario could also be created by the Company wherein

it could "import" workers from PESO during an actual strike.

In countering the Unions allegations, the Company argued that:(a) the law expressly allows contracting and subcontractingarrangements through Department of Labor and Employment(DOLE) Order No. 18-02; (b) the engagement of contractualemployees did not, in any way, prejudice the Union, since not asingle employee was terminated and neither did it result in areduction of working hours nor a reduction or splitting of thebargaining unit; and (c) Section 4, Article I of the CBA merelyprovides for the definition of the categories of employees anddoes not put a limitation on the Companys right to engage the

services of job contractors or its management prerogative toaddress temporary/occasional needs in its operation.

On October 26, 2004, VA Laguesma dismissed the Unions chargeof ULP for being purely speculative and for lacking in factualbasis, but the Company was directed to observe and complywith its commitment under the CBA. The VA opined:cralawlibrary

We examined the CBA provision Section 4, Article I of theCBAallegedly violated by the Company and indeed theagreement prescribes three (3) categories of employees in theCompany and provides for the definition, functions and duties ofeach. Material to the case at hand is the definition as regardsthe functions of a casual employee described asfollows:cralawlibrary

Casual Employee One hired by the COMPANY to performoccasional or seasonal work directly connected with the regular
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employees particularly with respect to casual employees serveas limitation to the Companys prerogative to outsource parts ofits operations especially when hiring contractualemployees."???r?bl???r??ll?? l?br?r

A collective bargaining agreement is the law between theparties:cralawlibrary

It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBAis the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply

with its provisions. We said so in Honda Phils., Inc. v. Samahanng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda:cralawlibrary

A collective bargaining agreement or CBA refers to thenegotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization andthe employer concerning wages, hours of work and all otherterms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. As inall contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish suchstipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deemconvenient provided these are not contrary to law, morals, goodcustoms, public order or public policy. Thus, where the CBA isclear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the partiesand compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy ofthe law.

Moreover, if the terms of a contract, as in a CBA, are clear andleave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, theliteral meaning of their stipulations shall control. x x x.24?r?l1

In this case, Section 4, Article I (on categories of employees) ofthe CBA between the Company and the Union must be read inconjunction with its Section 1, Article III (on union security).Both are interconnected and must be given full force and effect.Also, these provisions are clear and unambiguous. The terms areexplicit and the language of the CBA is not susceptible to anyother interpretation. Hence, the literal meaning should prevail.

As repeatedly held, the exercise of management prerogative isnot unlimited; it is subject to the limitations found in law,collective bargaining agreement or the general principles of fairplay and justice25Evidently, this case has one of the restrictions-

the presence of specific CBA provisions-unlike in San MiguelCorporation Employees Union-PTGWO v. Bersamira,26DeOcampo v. NLRC,27Asian Alcohol Corporation v. NLRC,28andSerrano v. NLRC29cited by the Company. To reiterate, the CBA isthe norm of conduct between the parties and compliancetherewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.30?r?l1

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed June 16, 2005Decision, as well as the October 12, 2005 Resolution of theCourt of Appeals, which sustained the October 26, 2004 Decisionof the Voluntary Arbitrator, are hereby AFFIRMED.
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BANKARD, INC., Petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION- FIRST DIVISION,PAULO BUENCONSEJO,BANKARD EMPLOYEES UNION-

AWATU, Respondents.

MENDOZA, J. :

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Courtseeks to review, reverse and set aside the October 20, 2005Decision

1and the February 21, 2006 Resolution

2of the Court of Appeals

{CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 68303, which affirmed the May 31, 2001Resolution

3and the September 24, 2001 Order

4of the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC) in Certified Cases No. 000-185-00 and000-191-00.

The Facts

On June 26, 2000, respondent Bankard Employees Union-AWATU(Union) filed before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board(NCMB) its first Notice of Strike (NOS), docketed as NS-06-225-00,

5alleging commission of unfair labor practices by petitioner Bankard,

Inc. (Bankard), to wit: 1) job contractualization; 2) outsourcing/contracting-out jobs; 3) manpower rationalizing program; and 4) discrimination.

On July 3, 2000, the initial conference was held where the Union clarified

the issues cited in the NOS. On July 5, 2000, the Union held its strike voteballoting where the members voted in favor of a strike. On July 10, 2000,Bankard asked the Office of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdictionover the labor dispute or to certify the same to the NLRC for compulsoryarbitration. On July 12, 2000, Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma (LaborSecretary) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issuedthe order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC.

6

On July 25, 2000, the Union declared a CBA bargaining deadlock. Thefollowing day, the Union filed its second NOS, docketed as NS-07-265-00,

7alleging bargaining in bad faith on the part of Bankard. Bankard then

again asked the Office of the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction,which was granted. Thus, the Order, dated August 9, 2000, certifying thelabor dispute to the NLRC, was issued.

8

The Union, despite the two certification orders issued by the LaborSecretary enjoining them from conducting a strike or lockout and fromcommitting any act that would exacerbate the situation, went on strike on

August 11, 2000.9

During the conciliatory conferences, the parties failed to amicably settletheir dispute. Consequently, they were asked to submit their respectiveposition papers. Both agreed to the following issues:

1. Whether job contractualization or outsourcing or contracting-out is an unfair labor practice on the part of the management.

2. Whether there was bad faith on the part of the managementwhen it bargained with the Union.

10

As regards the first issue, it was Bankards position that jobcontractualization or outsourcing or contracting-out of jobs was alegitimate exercise of management prerogative and did not constituteunfair labor practice. It had to implement new policies and programs, oneof which was the Manpower Rationalization Program (MRP) in December1999, to further enhance its efficiency and be more competitive in thecredit card industry. The MRP was an invitation to the employees totender their voluntary resignation, with entitlement to separation payequivalent to at least two (2) months salary for every year of service.Those eligible under the companys retirement plan would still receiveadditional pay. Thereafter, majority of the Phone Center and the ServiceFulfilment Division availed of the MRP. Thus, Bankard contracted anindependent agency to handle its call center needs.

11

As to the second issue, Bankard denied that there was bad faith on itspart in bargaining with the Union. It came up with counter-offers to the

Unions proposals, but the latters demands were far beyond whatmanagement could give. Nonetheless, Bankard continued to negotiate ingood faith until the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) re-negotiating theprovisions of the 1997-2002, Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) wasentered into between Bankard and the Union. The CBA wasoverwhelmingly ratified by the Union members. For said reason, Bankardcontended that the issue of bad faith in bargaining had become moot andacademic.

12

On the other hand, the Union alleged that contractualization started inBankard in 1995 in the Records Communications Management Division,

particularly in the mailing unit, which was composed of two (2) employeesand fourteen (14) messengers. They were hired as contractual workers toperform the functions of the regular employees who had earlier resignedand availed of the MRP.

13According to the Union, there were other

departments in Bankard utilizing messengers to perform work loadconsidered for regular employees, like the Marketing Department, Voice

Authorizational Department, Computer Services Department, and RecordsRetention Department. The Union contended that the number of regularemployees had been reduced substantially through the managementscheme of freeze-hiring policy on positions vacated by regular employeeson the basis of cost-cutting measures and the introduction of a moredrastic formula of streamlining its regular employees through the MRP.

14

With regard to the second issue, the Union averred that Bankardsproposals were way below their demands, showing that the managementhad no intention of reaching an agreement. It was a scheme calculated to

force the Union to declare a bargaining deadlock.

15

On May 31, 2001, the NLRC issued its Resolution16

declaring that themanagement committed acts considered as unfair labor practice (ULP)under Article 248(c) of the Labor Code. It ruled that:

The act of management of reducing its number of employees thruapplication of the Manpower Rationalization Program and subsequentlycontracting the same to other contractual employees defeats the purposeor reason for streamlining the employees. The ultimate effect is to reducethe number of union members and increasing the number of contractualemployees who could never be members of the union for lack ofqualification. Consequently, the union was effectively restrained in theirmovements as a union on their rights to self-organization. Managementhad successfully limited and prevented the growth of the Union and theacts are clear violation of the provisions of the Labor Code and could be

considered as Unfair Labor Practice in the light of the provisions of Article248 paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

17

The NLRC, however, agreed with Bankard that the issue of bargaining inbad faith was rendered moot and academic by virtue of the finalizationand signing of the CBA between the management and the Union.

18

Unsatisfied, both parties filed their respective motions for partialreconsideration.1wphi1Bankard assailed the NLRC's finding of acts ofULP on its part. The Union, on the other hand, assailed the NLRC rulingon the issue of bad faith bargaining.

On September 24, 2001, the NLRC issued the Order19

denying bothparties' motions for lack of merit.

On December 28, 2001, Bankard filed a petition for certiorari under Rule65 with the CA arguing that the NLRC gravely abused its discretionamounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when:

1. It issued the Resolution, dated May 31, 2001, particularly infinding that Bankard committed acts of unfair labor practice;and,

2. It issued the Order dated September 24, 2001 denyingBankard's partial motion for reconsideration.

20

The Union filed two (2) comments, dated January 22, 2002, through itsNCR Director, Cornelio Santiago, and another, dated February 6, 2002,through its President, Paulo Buenconsejo, both praying for the dismissal
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of the petition and insisting that Bankard's resort to contractualization oroutsourcing of contracts constituted ULP. It further alleged that Bankardcommitted ULP when it conducted CBA negotiations in bad faith with theUnion.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA dismissed the petition, finding that the NLRC ruling was supportedby substantial evidence.

The CA agreed with Bankard that job contracting, outsourcing and/orcontracting out of jobs did not per se constitute ULP, especially whenmade in good faith and for valid purposes. Despite Bankard's claim ofgood faith in resorting to job contractualization for purposes of cost-efficient operations and its non-interference with the employees' right toself-organization, the CA agreed with the NLRC that Bankard's actsimpaired the employees right to self-organization and should be struckdown as illegal and invalid pursuant to Article 248(c)

21of the Labor Code.

The CA thus, ruled in this wise:

We cannot agree more with public respondent. Incontrovertible is the factthat petitioner's acts, particularly its promotion of the program enticingemployees to tender their voluntary resignation in exchange for financialpackages, resulted to a union dramatically reduced in numbers. Coupledwith the management's policy of "freeze-hiring" of regular employees andcontracting out jobs to contractual workers, petitioner was able to limit and

prevent the growth of the Union, an act that clearly constituted unfair laborpractice.

22

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the May 31, 2001 Resolution andthe September 24, 2001 Order of the NLRC.

Aggrieved, Bankard filed a motion for reconsideration. The CAsubsequently denied it for being a mere repetition of the groundspreviously raised. Hence, the present petition bringing up this lone issue:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERBANKARD, INC. COMMITTED ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICEWHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND DENIEDTHE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER.

23

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Well-settled is the rule that "factual findings of labor officials, who aredeemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, aregenerally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts whensupported by substantial evidence."

24Furthermore, the factual findings of

the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on thisCourt.

25When the petitioner, however, persuasively alleges that there is

insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support the factualfindings of the tribunal or court a quo, then the Court, exceptionally, mayreview factual issues raised in a petition under Rule 45 in the exercise ofits discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

26

This case involves determination of whether or not Bankard committedacts considered as ULP. The underlying concept of ULP is found in Article247 of the Labor Code, to wit:

Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecutionthereof. -- Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workersand employees to self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interestsof both labor and management, including their right to bargain collectivelyand otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom andmutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion ofhealthy and stable labor-management relations. x x x

The Court has ruled that the prohibited acts considered as ULP relate tothe workers right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. Itrefers to "acts that violate the workers right to organize."

27Without that

element, the acts, even if unfair, are not ULP.28

Thus, an employer mayonly be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his actsaffect in whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize.

29

In this case, the Union claims that Bankard, in implementing its MRPwhich eventually reduced the number of employees, clearly violated

Article 248(c) of the Labor Code which states that:

Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful for anemployer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:

x x x x

(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by unionmembers when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees inthe exercise of their rights to self-organization;

x x x x

Because of said reduction, Bankard subsequently contracted out the jobsheld by former employees to other contractual employees. The Unionspecifically alleges that there were other departments in Bankard, Inc.which utilized messengers to perform work load considered for regularemployees like the Marketing Department, Voice AuthorizationalDepartment, Computer Services Department, and Records Retention

Department.30

As a result, the number of union members was reduced,and the number of contractual employees, who were never eligible forunion membership for lack of qualification, increased.

The general principle is that the one who makes an allegation has theburden of proving it.1avvphi1While there are exceptions to this generalrule, in ULP cases, the alleging party has the burden of proving theULP;

31and in order to show that the employer committed ULP under the

Labor Code, substantial evidence is required to support the claim.32

Suchprinciple finds justification in the fact that ULP is punishable with both civiland/or criminal sanctions.

33

Aside from the bare allegations of the Union, nothing in the recordsstrongly proves that Bankard intended its program, the MRP, as a tool todrastically and deliberately reduce union membership. Contrary to thefindings and conclusions of both the NLRC and the CA, there was no

proof that the program was meant to encourage the employees todisassociate themselves from the Union or to restrain them from joiningany union or organization. There was no showing that it was intentionallyimplemented to stunt the growth of the Union or that Bankarddiscriminated, or in any way singled out the union members who hadavailed of the retirement package under the MRP. True, the programmight have affected the number of union membership because of theemployees voluntary resignation and availment of the package, but itdoes not necessarily follow that Bankard indeed purposely sought suchresult. It must be recalled that the MRP was implemented as a valid cost-cutting measure, well within the ambit of the so-called managementprerogatives. Bankard contracted an independent agency to meetbusiness exigencies. In the absence of any showing that Bankard wasmotivated by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was aimed at interferingwith its employees right to self-organize, it cannot be said to havecommitted an act of unfair labor practice.

34

"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It meanssuch relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequateto support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable mightconceivably opine otherwise."

35Unfortunately, the Union, which had the

burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of ULP,failed to discharge such burden.

36

The employers right to conduct the affairs of its business, according to itsown discretion and judgment, is well-recognized.

37Management has a

wide latitude to conduct its own affairs in accordance with the necessitiesof its business.

38As the Court once said:

The Court has always respected a company's exercise of its prerogativeto devise means to improve its operations. Thus, we have held that
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management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion andjudgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments,supervision and transfer of employees, working methods, time, place andmanner of work.

This is so because the law on unfair labor practices is not intended todeprive employers of their fundamental right to prescribe and enforcesuch rules as they honestly believe to be necessary to the proper,productive and profitable operation of their business.

39

Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment ormanagement prerogative. Absent any proof that management acted in amalicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exerciseof judgment by an employer.

40Furthermore, bear in mind that ULP is

punishable with both civil and/or criminal sanctions.41

As such, the partyso alleging must necessarily prove it by substantial evidence. The Union,as earlier noted, failed to do this. Bankard merely validly exercised itsmanagement prerogative. Not shown to have acted maliciously orarbitrarily, no act of ULP can be imputed against it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68303, dated October 20, 2005, and itsResolution, dated February 21, 2006, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Petitioner Bankard, Inc. is hereby declared as not having committed anyact constituting Unfair Labor Practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.

VICTORINO OPINALDO, Petitioner, v.NARCISARAVINA,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal under Rule 45 is the Decision1dated October 19,2010 and Resolution2dated March 17, 2011 of the Court ofAppeals (CA), Cebu City, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04479 whichreversed and set aside the Decision3and Resolution4of theNational Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cebu City, anddismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal againstrespondent.

The facts follow.

Respondent Narcisa Ravina (Ravina) is the general manager andsole proprietor of St. Louisse Security Agency (the Agency).Petitioner Victorino Opinaldo (Opinaldo) is a security guard whohad worked for the Agency until his alleged illegal dismissal byrespondent on December 22, 2006. The Agency hired theservices of petitioner on October 5, 2005, with a daily salary ofP176.66 and detailed him to PAIJR Furniture Accessories (PAIJR)in Mandaue City.5cralawlibrary

In a letter dated August 15, 2006, however, the owner of PAIJRsubmitted a written complaint to respondent stating asfollows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

I have two guard[s] assigned here in my company[,] namely[,]SG. Opinaldo and SGT. Sosmenia. Hence, ... I hereby formalizeour request to relieve one of our company guard[s] and I[choose] SG. VICTORINO B. OPINALDO[,] detailed/assigned atPAIJR FURNITURE ACCESSORIES located at TAWASON,MANDAUE CITY. For the reason: He is no longer physically fit toperform his duties and responsibilities as a company guardbecause of his health condition.

Looking forward to your immediate action. Thank [y]ou.6

Acceding to PAIJRs request,respondent relieved petitioner fromhis work. Respondent also required petitioner to submit amedical certificate to prove that he is physically and mentally fitfor work as security guard.

On September 6, 2006, respondent reassigned petitioner toGomez Construction at Mandaue City. After working for a periodof two weeks for Gomez Construction and upon receipt of hissalary for services rendered within the said two-week period,petitioner ceased to report for work.7The records show thatpetitioners post at Gomez Construction was the last assignmentgiven to him by respondent.

On November 7, 2006, petitioner filed a complaint8againstrespondent with the Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE) Regional Office in Cebu City for underpayment of salaryand nonpayment of other labor standard benefits. The partiesagreed to settle and reached a compromise agreement. OnNovember 27, 2006, petitioner signed a Quitclaim andRelease9before the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City for theamount of P5,000.10cralawlibrary

After almost four weeks from the settlement of the case,petitioner returned to respondents office on December 22,2006. Petitioner claims that when he asked respondent to signan SSS11Sickness Notification which he was going to use inorder to avail of the discounted fees for a medical check- up,respondent allegedly refused and informed him that he was nolonger an employee of the Agency. Respondent allegedly toldhim that when he signed the quitclaim and release form at theDOLE Regional Office, she already considered him to have quit

his employment.12Respondent, on the other hand,counterclaims that she did not illegally dismiss petitioner andthat it was a valid exercise of management prerogative that hewas not given any assignment pending the submission of therequired medical certificate of his fitness to work.13cralawlibrary

On January 26, 2007, petitioner filed a Complaint14for IllegalDismissal with a prayer for the payment of separation pay in lieuof reinstatement against respondent and the Agency before theNLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, Cebu City. After trialand hearing, Labor Arbiter Maria Christina S. Sagmit rendered aDecision15on June 18, 2008 holding respondent and the Agencyliable for illegal dismissal and ordering them to pay petitionerseparation pay and back wages. The Labor Arbiter ruled,

In the instant case, respondents failed to establish thatcomplainant was dismissed for valid causes. For one, there is noevidence that complainant was suffering from physical illnesswhich will explain his lack of assignment. Further, there is noadmissible proof that Ravina even required complainant to

submit a medical certificate. Thus, complainant could not bedeemed to have refused or neglected to comply with this order.

x x x x

Considering that there is no evidence that complainant wasphysically unfit to perform his duties, respondents must be heldliable for illegal dismissal. Ordinarily, complainant will be entitledto reinstatement and full backwages. However, complainant hasexpressed his preference not to be reinstated. Hence,respondents must be ordered to give complainant separation

pay in lieuof reinstatement equivalent to one months salary forevery year of service. Complainant is also entitled to fullbackwages from the time he was terminated until the date ofthis Decision.

WHEREFORE, respondents Narcisa Ravina and/or St. Louis[s]eSecurity Agency are ordered to pay complainant the totalamount EIGHTY[-]TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FORTYPESOS (P82,340.00), consisting of P22,500.00 in separation payand P59,840.00 in full backwages.

SO ORDERED.16

Respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however, affirmed thedecision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the appeal for lack of
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judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion forreconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motionis required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be countedfrom notice of the denial of said motion.

x x x x

x x x xTo reiterate, the NLRC promulgated its challenged Decision on24 April 2009. Ravina alleged that her former counsel received acopy of said decision on 08 June 2009. However, she changed

her counsel who, in turn, obtained a copy of the decision on 17June 2009. The NLRC then promulgated its assailed Resolutionon 30 June 2009 which Ravina received on 29 July 2009.Ravinas Petition for Certiorari, dated 28 August 2009, was filedon 09 September 2009.

The reckoning period for the filing of a certiorari petition is sixty(60) days counted from notice of the denial of saidmotion. Prescinding from the foregoing, the Petition forCertiorari was filed within the 60- day period.

At this stage of the proceeding, it is futile to belabor on thetimeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration. This is due to thefact that the issue of timeliness has become moot and academicconsidering that Ravinas Motion for Reconsideration was givendue course by the NLRC. In fact, the NLRC even decided the

motion on the merits and not merely on technicality.

Moreover, Opinaldo should have filed a Comment or Oppositionas soon as the Motion for Reconsideration was filed. Opinaldoshould not have waited for the termination of the proceedingsbefore the NLRC. In point of fact, the belated questioning of theissue of timeliness even operated to estop Opinaldo.26(Emphasisours.)

Time and again, we have ruled and it has become doctrine thatthe perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementaryperiod and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and

jurisdictional. Failure to do so renders the questioned decisionfinal and executory and deprives the appellate court of

jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain

the appeal.

27

In labor cases, the underlying purpose of thisprinciple is to prevent needless delay, a circumstance whichwould allow the employer to wear out the efforts and meagerresources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained

to settle for less than what is due him.28cralawlibrary

In the case at bar, the applicable rule on the perfection of anappeal from the decision of the NLRC is Section 15, Rule VII ofthe 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National LaborRelations Commission:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 15. Motions for Reconsideration. Motion forreconsideration of any decision, resolution or order of theCommission shall not be entertained except when based onpalpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is under oathand filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of decision,

resolution or order, with proof of service that a copy of the samehas been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverseparty; and provided further, that only one such motion from thesame party shall be entertained.

Should a motion for reconsideration be entertained pursuant tothis SECTION, the resolution shall be executory after ten (10)calendar days from receipt thereof.

We are not, however, unmindful that the NLRC is not bound bythe technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal inthe application of its rules in deciding labor cases. Thus, underSection 2, Rule I of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of theNational Labor Relations Commission it isstated:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberallyconstrued to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, theLabor Code of the Philippines and other relevant legislations, andto assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious andinexpensive resolution and settlement of labor disputes.

It is significant that the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, underSection 2, Rule I thereof, also carries exactly the sameprovision. Further, the 2005 Revised Rules and the 2011 Rulescarry identical provisions appearing under Section 10, Rule VIIof both laws:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 10. Technical rules not binding. The rules ofprocedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equityshall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every andall reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedilyand objectively, without regard to technicalities of law orprocedure, all in the interest of due process.

In any proceeding before the Commission, the parties may berepresented by legal counsel but it shall be the duty of theChairman, any Presiding Commissioner or Commissioner toexercise complete control of the proceedings at all stages.

All said, despite this jurisdictions stance towards the exercise ofliberality, the rules should not be relaxed when it would renderfutile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality isadopted.29 The liberal interpretation stems from the mandatethat the workingmans welfare should be the primordial andparamount consideration.30 We are convinced that thecircumstances in the case at bar warranted the NLRCs exerciseof liberality when it decided respondents motion forreconsideration on the merits.

The subject motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision wasfiled on June 25, 2009. The evidence on record shows that thedecision of the NLRC dated April 24, 2009 was received byrespondent herself on June 17, 2009. The same decision was,however, earlier received on June 8, 2009 by respondentsformer counsel who allegedly did not inform respondent of thereceipt of such decision until respondent went to his office onJune 23, 2009 to get the files of the case. If we follow a strict

construction of the ten- day rule under the 2005 Revised Rulesof Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission andconsider notice to respondents former counsel as notice torespondent herself, the expiration of the period to file a motionfor reconsideration should have been on June 18, 2009. The

NLRC, however, chose a liberal application of its rules: it decidedthe motion on the merits. Nevertheless, it deniedreconsideration.

We defer to the exercise of discretion by the NLRC and upholdits judgment in applying a liberal construction of its proceduraland technical rules to this case in order to ventilate and resolvethe issues raised by respondent in the motion for reconsiderationand fully resolve the case on the merits. It would be purelyconjectural to challenge the NLRCs exercise of such liberality forbeing tainted with grave abuse of discretion especially that it did

not reverse, but even affirmed, its questioned decision whichsustained the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that respondentillegally dismissed petitioner. In view of such disposition, thatthe NLRC gave due course to the motion in the interest of dueprocess and to render a full resolution of the case on the meritsis the more palpable explanation for the liberal application of itsrules. It is significant to note that neither did petitioner everraise the issue of the NLRCs ruling on the merits of the subjectmotion for reconsideration. And the reason is clear: the motionfor reconsideration was resolved in favor of petitioner.Furthermore, if the NLRC accorded credibility to the explanationproffered by respondent for its belated filing of the motion, wecannot now second-guess the NLRCs judgment in view of thecircumstances of the case and in the absence of any showingthat it gravely abused its discretion.


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In light of the foregoing, we cannot uphold the stand ofpetitioner that the petition for certiorari before the CA was filedout of time, and at the same time rule that the NLRC acted inthe proper exercise of its jurisdiction when it liberally applied itsrules and resolved the motion for reconsideration on the merits.To so hold would nullify the latitude of discretion towards liberalconstruction granted to the NLRC under the 2005 Revised Rulesof Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission including the decisions and resolutions rendered in the exerciseof such discretion.

Petitioner also claims that the verification in respondentspetition for certiorari before the CA suffers from infirmitybecause it was based only on personalbeliefand information.As it is, petitioner argues that it does not comply with Section4,31Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, as amended,which requires a pleading to be verified by an affidavit that theaffiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein aretrue and correct of his personal knowledgeor based onauthentic records.32The petition must therefore be consideredas an unsigned pleading producing no legal effect under Section3,33Rule 7 of the Rules and should have resulted in the outrightdismissal of the petition.

It is a matter of procedural consequence in the case at bar thatwhether we strictly or liberally apply the technical rules on the

requirement of verification in pleadings, the disposition of thecase will be the same. If we sustain petitioners stance that thepetition before the CA should have been outrightly dismissed,the NLRC decision finding the dismissal of petitioner as illegalwould have reached finality. On the other hand, if we adoptrespondents view that the defect in the verification of thepetition is merely a formal defect and is neither jurisdictional norfatal, we will be sustaining the appellate courts giving duecourse to the petition. However, on substantive grounds, wereverse the appellate courts decision and reinstate the finding ofillegal dismissal by the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter.

The appellate court reversed both the NLRC and the LaborArbiter in consideration of the following factors: that petitionerdid not counter respondents receipt of the letter-complaint of

PAIJR relative to his work performance; that petitioner did notrefute the fact that respondent required him to submit a medicalcertificate; and, that petitioner failed to comply with therequirement to submit the medical certificate. Hence, when

petitioner failed to submit the required medical certificate, theappellate court found it to be a valid exercise of managementprerogative on the part of respondent not to give petitioner anywork assignment pending its submission.

We do not agree.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases recognizing the right of theemployer to have free reign and enjoy sufficient discretion toregulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative toinstill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties,including dismissal, upon erring employees. This is a

management prerogative where the free will of management toconduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose takesform.34cralawlibrary

Even labor laws discourage interference with the exercise ofsuch prerogative and the Court often declines to interfere inlegitimate business decisions of employers.35However, theexercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. Managerialprerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law, collectivebargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and

justice.36Hence, in the exercise of its management prerogative,an employer must ensure that the policies, rules and regulationson work-related activities of the employees must always be fairand reasonable and the corresponding penalties, whenprescribed, commensurate to the offense involved and to thedegree of the infraction.37cralawlibrary

In the case at bar, we recognize, as did the appellate court, thatrespondents act of requiring petitioner to undergo a medicalexamination and submit a medical certificate is a valid exerciseof management prerogative. This is further justified in view ofthe letter-complaint from one of respondents clients, PAIJR,opining that petitioner was no longer physically fit to performhis duties and responsibilities as a company guard because ofhis health condition.38To be sure, petitioners job as securityguard naturally requires physical and mental fitness underSection 5 of Republic Act No. 5487,39as amended by Presidentia

Decree No. 100.40cralawlibrary

While the necessity to prove ones physical and mental fitness tobe a security guard could not be more emphasized, the questionto be settled is whether it is a valid exercise of respondentsmanagement prerogative to prevent petitioners continuedemployment with the Agency unless he presents the requiredmedical certificate. Respondentargues, viz.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Thus, respondents in the exercise of their MANAGEMENTPREROGATIVE required Complainant to submit a MedicalCertificate to prove that he is PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY FITfor work as Security Guard. Unfortunately, however, up to thepresent time, complainant failed to submit said MedicalExamination and Findings giving him clean bill of health, torespondents. Herein respondents are ready and willing to accepthim as such Security Guard once he could submit said MedicalExamination and Findings.

The requirement anent the presentation of such MEDICALCERTIFICATE by Complainant to Respondents is but aManagement Measure of ensuring Respondents includingComplainant that Complainant is physically and mentally fit forcontinued Employment and will not in any manner pose a dangeror, threat to the respondents properties and lives of theircustomers and other employees as well as to the person and lifeof Complainant himself.41

It is utterly significant in the case at bar that a considerably longperiod has lapsed from petitioners last day of recorded work on

September 21, 2006 until he was informed by respondent onDecember 22, 2006 that he was no longer an employee of theAgency. In the words of petitioner, he had been on a floatingstatus42for three months. Within this period, petitioner did nothave any work assignment from respondent who proffers the

excuse that he has not submitted the required medicalcertificate. While it is a management prerogative to requirepetitioner to submit a medical certificate, we hold thatrespondent cannot withhold petitioners employment withoutobserving the principles of due process and fair play.

The Labor Arbiter and the CA have conflicting findings withrespect to the submission of the medical certificate. The LaborArbiter observed that there is no admissible proof that[respondent] even required [petitioner] to submit a medicalcertificate. Thus, [petitioner] could not be deemed to have

refused or neglected to comply with this order.43The CAcountered that while there is no documentary evidence to proveit, the admission of both parties establishes that there is apending requirement for a medical certificate and it was notcomplied with by petitioner. We agree with the appellate courtthat despite the lack of documentary evidence, both parties haveadmitted to respondents medical certificate requirement. We sohold despite petitioners protestations that what respondentrequired of him was to submit himself to a medical check-up,and not to submit a medical certificate. Even if petitionersallegation is to be believed, the fact remains that he did notundergo the medical check-up which he himself claims to havebeen required by respondent.

All said, what behooves the Court is the lack of evidence on


11/18

record which establishes that respondent informed petitionerthat his failure to submit the required medical certificate willresult in his lack of work assignment. It is a basic principle oflabor protection in this jurisdiction that a worker cannot bedeprived of his job without satisfying the requirements of dueprocess.44Labor is property and the right to make it available isnext in importance to the rights of life and liberty.45Asenshrined under the Bill of Rights, no person shall be deprived oflife, liberty or property without due process of law.46The dueprocess requirement in the deprivation of ones employment istranscendental that it limits the exercise of the management

prerogative of the employer to control and regulate the affairs ofthe business. In the case at bar, all that respondent employerneeded to prove was that petitioner employee was notified thathis failure to submit the required medical certificate will result inhis lack of work assignment and eventually the termination ofhis employment as a security guard. There is no iota ofevidence in the records, save for the bare allegations ofrespondent, that petitioner was notified of such consequence fornon- submission. In truth, the facts of the case clearly show thatrespondent even reassigned petitioner to Gomez Constructionfrom his PAIJR post despite the non-submission of a medicalcertificate. If it was indeed the policy of respondent not to givepetitioner any work assignment without the medical certificate,why was petitioner reassigned despite his noncompliance?

That is not all. In addition to invoking management prerogative

as a defense, respondent also alleges abandonment. Respondentclaims that after petitioner received his last salary from hisassignment with Gomez Construction, he no longer reported forwork. The assailed Decision found that petitioner indeedabandoned his work, viz.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It was only when Opinaldo refused to report for work on hisassignment for Engr. Gomez after having received his salary forwork rendered starting on 06 September 2006 that Ravinabecame firm that the medical certificate should be submitted.But, Opinaldo did not heed Ravinas order. It was Opinaldo whoaltogether failed to report for work.47

We disagree.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of anemployee to resume his employment.48To constituteabandonment of work, two elements must concur: (1) theemployee must have failed to report for work or must have beenabsent without valid or justifiable reason; and, (2) there must

have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to severthe employer-employee relationship manifested by some overtact.49None of these elements is present in the case at bar. Assuccinctly stated by the NLRC:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

From respondents own admission in their position paper, it isclear that they prevented [petitioners] continued employmentwith them unless the latter presents a medical certificate that heis physically and mentally fit for work x x x.

x x x x

Moreover, if it was really true that complainant abandoned hiswork, then why have not respondents sent him a notice toreport back for work? It is evident then that respondents foundan excuse to decline complainants continued stay with them onthe pretext that he has to submit first a medical certificatebefore he could be allowed to resume employment.50

Finally, respondent harps that she could not be held liable forillegal dismissal because, in the first place, she did not dismisspetitioner. Respondent maintains that she merely refused to givepetitioner any work assignment until the submission of a medicalcertificate. On this issue, the CA concurred with respondent andruled that petitioner failed to establish the facts which wouldpaint the picture that [respondent] terminated

him.51cralawlibrary

We need not reiterate that respondent did not properly exerciseher management prerogative when she withheld petitionersemployment without due process. Respondent failed to provethat she has notified petitioner that her continuous refusal toprovide him any work assignment was due to his non-submission of the medical certificate. Had respondent exercisedthe rules of fair play, petitioner would have had the option ofcomplying or not complying with the medical certificaterequirement having full knowledge of the consequences of his

actions. Respondent failed to do so and she cannot now hidebehind the defense that there was no illegal termination becausepetitioner cannot show proof that he had been illegallydismissed. It is a time- honored legal principle that the employerhas the onus probandi to show that the dismissal or terminationwas for a just and authorized cause under the Labor Code.Respondent failed to show that the termination was justified andauthorized, nor was it done as a valid exercise of managementprerogative. Given the circumstances in the case at bar, it is notfair to shift the burden to petitioner, and rule that he failed toprove his claim, when respondent had successfully tenninatedthe employer-employee relationship without leaving a paper traiin a clear case of illegal dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.The assailed Decision dated October 19, 2010 and Resolution

dated March 17, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.04479 dismissing petitioner's Complaint for Illegal Dismissal arehereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. The Decision andResolution dated April24, 2009 and June 30, 2009, respectively,of the NLRC in NLRC Case No. VAC 01-000081-2009 (RAB CaseNo. Vll-01-0208-2007) requiring respondent Narcisa Ravinaand/or St. Louisse Security Agency to pay petitioner VictorinoOpinaldo the total amount of 82,340 consisting of 22,500 inseparation pay and 59,840 in full back wages, areherebyREINSTATED and UPHELD.


12/18

RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC., and/or MIA CONCIO,President, LEONOR LINAO, General Manager, LOURDES ANGELES,HRD Manager, and IDA BARRAMEDA, AGM-Finance,Petitioners,vs.RUTH F. YAP, MA. FE DAYON, MINETTE BAPTISTA, BANNIE EDSELSN MIGUEL, and MARISA LEMINA,Respondents.

REYES, J :

Before us is a petition for review of the Resolutions of the Court ofAppeals (CA) dated November 14, 2008

1and March 9,

2009,2respectively, dismissing the petition for certiorari and denying the

motion for reconsideration thereof for petitioners' failure to attach certainpleadings in CA-G.R. SP No. 105945.

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN), represented by theOffice of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), is a governmentsequestered corporation with address at Broadcast City, Capitol HillsDrive, Quezon City, while petitioners Mia Concio (Concio), Leonor Linao(Linao), Ida Barrameda (Barrameda) and Lourdes Angeles (Angeles) werethe President, General Manager, Assistant General Manager (AGM) forFinance, and Human Resources Manager, respectively, of RPN who were

impleaded and charged with indirect contempt, the subject matter of thepresent petition. Respondents Ruth F. Yap (Yap), Bannie Edsel B. SanMiguel (San Miguel), Ma. Fe G. Dayon (Dayon), Marisa Lemina (Lemina)and Minette Baptista (Baptista) were employees of RPN and formermembers of the Radio Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU),the bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the said company.

On November 26, 2004, RPN and RPNEU entered into a CollectiveBargaining Agreement (CBA) with a union security clause providing that amember who has been expelled from the union shall also be terminatedfrom the company. The CBA had a term of five (5) years, commencing onJuly 1, 2004 and expiring on June 30, 2009.

A conflict arose between the respondents and other members of RPNEU.On November 9, 2005, the RPNEUs Grievance and Investigation

Committee recommended to the unions board of directors the expulsionof the respondents from the union. On January 24, 2006, the union wroteto RPN President Concio demanding the termination of the respondentsemployment from the company.

On February 17, 2006, RPN notified the respondents that theiremployment would be terminated effective March 20, 2006,

3whereupon

the respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegaldismissal and non-payment of benefits.

On September 27, 2006, the LA rendered a decision4ordering the

reinstatement of the respondents with payment of backwages and fullbenefits and without loss of seniority rights after finding that the petitionersfailed to establish the legal basis of the termination of respondentsemployment. The LA also directed the company to pay the respondentscertain aggregate monetary benefits.

On October 27, 2006, the petitioner, through counsel submitted aManifestation and Compliance dated October 25, 2006 to the LA statingthat:

"In compliance with the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated September 27,2006, Respondent RPN9 most respectfully manifests that it hascomplied with the reinstatement of the complainants, namely: Ruth Yap,Ma. Fe Dayon, Bannie Edsel San Miguel, Marisa Lemina and MinetteBaptista by way of payroll reinstatement."

5

A copy of the said Manifestation was sent to the respondents byregistered mail on even date.

6

Alleging that there was no compliance yet as aforestated and that nonotice was received, respondents filed with the LA a Manifestation andUrgent Motion to Cite for Contempt

7dated November 3, 2006.

Therein, they narrated that on October 27, 2006, they went to RPN topresent themselves to the petitioners for actual reinstatement to theirformer positions. They arrived while a mass was being celebrated at thelobby, at which they were allowed to attend while waiting for RPN GeneraManager Linao to meet them. Linao informed them that they had beenreinstated, but only in the payroll, and that the company would endeavourto pay their salaries regularly despite its precarious financial condition.

Four (4) days later, on October 31, 2006 at 11 a.m., the respondentsreturned to RPN to collect their salaries, i t being a payday; but they werebarred entry upon strict orders of Concio and Linao. The respondentsreturned in the afternoon but were likewise stopped by eight (8) guardsnow manning the gate. Respondents nonetheless tried to push their wayin, but the guards manhandled them, pulled them by the hair and armsand pushed them back to the street. Some even endured having theirbreasts mashed, their blouses pulled up and their bags grabbed away.This incident was reported to the police for the filing of charges. Later thatafternoon, the respondents somehow managed to enter the RPN lobby. Itwas AGM for Finance Barrameda who came out, but instead of meetingthem, Barrameda ordered the guards to take them back outside the gate,where she said they would be paid their salaries. Their removal was soforcible and violent that they sustained physical injuries and had to bemedically treated. Claiming that RPNEU President Reynato Sioson alsoassisted the guards in physically evicting them, they concluded from theirviolent ouster that Concio and Linao played a direct role in their expulsion

from RPNEU.

The respondents prayed that the LA issue an order finding Concio andLinao liable for contempt after hearing; that the respondents be reinstatedwith full benefits, or in case of payroll reinstatement, that they be paidevery 15th and 30th of the month as with all regular employees; that theirsalaries shall be paid at the Cashiers Office, and finally, that therespondents shall not be prevented from entering the premises of RPN.

8

On November 14, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance oWrit of Execution/Garnishment,

9alleging that in addition to the violent

events of October 31, 2006, the respondents were again forcibly deniedentry into RPN to collect their 13th month pay on November 10, 2006.They prayed that a writ of execution/garnishment be issued in order toimplement the decision of the LA.

10

In their joint Opposition11

to the respondents Manifestation and UrgentMotion to Cite for Contempt, as well as the Motion for the Issuance of Writof Execution/Garnishment, the petitioners denied any liability for thenarrated incidents, insisting that the respondents had been duly informedthrough a letter dated November 10, 2006 of their payroll reinstatement.The petitioners explained that because of the intra-union dispute betweenthe respondents and the union leaders, they deemed it wise not to allowthe respondents inside the company premises to prevent any moreuntoward incidents, and to release their salaries only at the gate. For thisreason, the respondents were asked to open an ATM account with theLand Bank, Quezon City Circle Branch, where their salaries would bedeposited every 5th and 20th day of the month, rather than on the 15thand 30th along with the other employees. "This measure was for theprotection not only of complainants [herein respondents] but also for theother employees of RPN9 as well," according to the petitioners.

12

On January 19, 2007, the respondents moved for the issuance of an aliaswrit of execution

13covering their unpaid salaries for January 1-15, 2007,

claiming that the petitioners did not show up at the agreed place ofpayment, and reiterating their demand to be paid on the 15th and 30th ofthe month at RPN, along with the rest of the employees. In theirOpposition

14dated January 30, 2007, the petitioners insisted that they

could only pay the respondents salaries on the 5th and 20th of the monthconformably with the companys cash flows.

On February 20, 2007, the petitioners manifested to the LA that therespondents could collect their salaries at the Bank of Commerce inBroadcast City Branch, Quezon City.

15On March 9, 2007, the petitioners

manifested that the respondents salaries for the second half of February2007 were ready for pick-up since March 5, 2007.

16On March 15, 2007,

the petitioners informed the LA that the respondents refused to collect
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their salaries. To prove their good faith, they stated that the respondentssalaries shall, henceforth, be deposited at the National Labor RelationsCommission (NLRC)-Cashier on the 5th and 20th of every month.

Unswayed by these manifestations, the LA in his assailed Order17

datedMay 3, 2007, cited the petitioners for indirect contempt for "committingdisobedience to lawful order." The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution be issued. [RPN] is ordered toreinstate the [respondents] in the payroll, pay their unpaid salariescomputed above with deductions for SSS, income tax, union dues andother statutory deductions. [RPN] is also ordered to have the payment ofthe salaries of the respondents at the companys premises. [RPN] are(sic) also guilty of committing disobedience to the lawful order of this courtand are (sic) therefore cited for indirect contempt and hereby ordered topay the amount of [P]700 for committing indirect contempt in every payrollperiod.

SO ORDERED.18

On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the same in a Resolution dated May 27,2008, and on August 15, 2008 it also denied the petitioners motion forreconsideration.

19

Thus, on November 3, 2008, the petitioners filed with the CA a petitionfor certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of

preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 105945. In itsResolution

20dated November 14, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition for

failure to attach copies of pertinent pleadings mentioned in the petition,namely: (a) respondents Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ ofExecution (Annex "H"); (b) petitioners Opposition to said motion (Annex"I"); (c) petitioners Manifestation dated February 20, 2007 (Annex "J"); (d)petitioners Manifestation dated March 9, 2007 (Annex "K"); and (e)petitioners Manifestation dated March 15, 2007 (Annex "L").

In their motion for reconsideration,21

the petitioners pleaded with the CAnot to "intertwine" the LAs contempt order with the main case for illegaldismissal, now subject of a separate petition for certiorari in the said court.They contended that the respondents Urgent Motion to Cite forContempt

22and Motion for the Issuance of Writ of

Execution/Garnishment,23

and the petitioners Opposition24

thereto, sufficeto resolve the charge of indirect contempt against the petitioners.

On March 9, 2009,25

the CA denied the petitioners motion forreconsideration, citing again the failure to submit the documents itenumerated in its Resolution dated November 14, 2008. The CA statedthat the petitioners should have attached these supporting documents tothe petition for certiorari. Without them, the allegations contained in thepetition are nothing but bare assertions.

26

Issues

Hence, this petition for review, upon the following grounds:

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED NOT IN ACCORDWITH LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DISMISSEDTHE PETITION A QUO ON A MERE TECHNICALITY, CONSIDERINGTHAT:

A.

PETITIONER HAS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED AND INTENDS TOFULLY COMPLY WITH THE RULES CONCERNING THEATTACHMENT OF PERTINENT DOCUMENTS AND PLEADINGS TO APETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

B.

PETITIONER HAS A MERITORIOUS CASE AS PETITIONER HASACTUALLY FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE DECISION OF THE LABORARBITER. HENCE, THERE IS NO CAUSE OF ACTION TO HOLDPETITIONER IN INDIRECT CONTEMPT FOR ALLEGED NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE AFORESAID DECISION.

27

Discussion

Sect ion 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of

Court author izes the dismiss al of a

pet i t ion for fai lure to attach

relevant, not merely incidental,

p leadings.

The requirement in Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to attachrelevant pleadings to the petition is read in relation to Section 3, Rule 46,which states that failure to comply with any of the documentaryrequirements, such as the attachment of relevant pleadings, "shall besufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition."

28Section 3 of Rule 46

provides:

SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance withrequirements.

x x x x

The petition shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together withproof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intendedfor the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall beaccompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy ofthe judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such materialportions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documentsrelevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished bythe proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by theproper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his dulyauthorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of thepetition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of alldocuments attached to the original.

x x x x

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoingrequirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

In relation to the above section, Section 1 of Rule 65 provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of thejudgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings anddocuments relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

The court is given discretion to dismiss the petition outright for failure ofthe petitioner to comply with the requirement to attach relevant pleadings,

and generally such action cannot be assailed as constituting either graveabuse of discretion or reversible error of law. But if the court takescognizance of the petition despite such lapses, the phrasing of Section 3,Rule 46 sufficiently justifies such adjudicative recourse.

29

In their Comment30

to the petition, the respondents harp on thetechnicalities invoked by the CA. Invoking the third paragraph of Section 3of Rule 46, they insist that the petitioners failed to comply with Section 1of Rule 65, giving sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition. Theycite the Resolution of the CA dated November 14, 2008 stating that "acareful perusal of the instant petition reveals that copies of pertinent andrelevant pleadings and documents x x x were not attached therein inviolation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended."

31The

court specifically enumerated the five (5) documents described below, allmentioned in the petition forcertiorari, without which "the allegations in thepetition are nothing but bare assertions":
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_187713_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_187713_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_187713_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_187713_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/aug2012/gr_187713_2012.htm

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