Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

39 Phil. 660 Political Law Delegation of Powers Liberty anddue processRubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very low culture.One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught and wasplaced in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf byRubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. was challenged.ISSUE:Whether or notSection 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.HELD:I.No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor.The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.II.No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degreesof civilization. The term non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low gradeof civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to arrest their seminomadiclifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the changing times.The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degreeof civilizationof the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say thatdue processof law has not been followed. To go back to our definition ofdue processof law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

People vs CayatG.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.CAYAT,defendant-appellant

Facts:

Cayat was a native from Baguio, Benguet, Mt. Province who was found guilty of violation of Sections 2 and 3 of Act 1639: It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.Issues:1.If said law is discriminatory and denies EP of laws;2.If said law is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.Held:1. Said statute does not deny EP of laws; the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable:a.must rest on substantial distinctions;b.must be germane to the purposes of the law;c.must not be limited to existing conditions only; andd.must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act 1639 meets all such requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.

When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer.The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation. The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in that enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exists.The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.2.Said statute is not an improper exercise of the PPS. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is legitimate exercise of police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual. Act 1639 is designed to promote peace and order to non-Christian tribes and to eventually hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers.

PT&T vs NLRCPT&T vs. NLRC272 SCRA 596FACTS:PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991.On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies.ISSUE:Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee.HELD:Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law.PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.

The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code:ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

Estrada v. Escritor Digest

Estrada v. EscritorA.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003Puno, J.:Facts:1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The complainant Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because, 1)She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society, 2)That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs, and 3)That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.Held:Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct.Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedomsincluding religious freedommay be enjoyed.In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.Estrada v. Escritor Digest

Estrada v. EscritorA.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003Puno, J.:Facts:1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The complainant Estrada requested for an investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because, 1)She is a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society, 2)That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs, and 3)That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovahs witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.Held:Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct.Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedomsincluding religious freedommay be enjoyed.In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.ADONG VS. CHEONG SENG GEESENG GEE, 43 PHIL 43FACTSCheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga and left property worth nearly P100,000.The estate of the deceased was claimed by Cheong Seng Gee, an alleged legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. On the other hand, Mora Adong, the alleged lawful wife of the deceased who married him in 1896 in Basilan, and her daughters are also claiming as heirs of the decedent.The conflicting claims to the estate were ventilated in the CFI of Zamboanga.The trial judge reached the conclusion that the proof of the marriage of Tan Dit to the decedent was not sufficient.Cheong Seng Gee should share in the estate as a natural child.On the other hand, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and thedeceased had been adequately proved, but, under the laws of the Philippine Islands, it could not be held to be alawful marriage; thus, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children.The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of thedeceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.Thus, both parties appealed.

ISSUE:1.W/N the marriage between Tan Dit and the decedent is valid.2.W/N the marriage between Mora and the decedent is valid considering that it is a Mohammedan marriage.

RULINGFirst issue:SC ruled that to establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to provebefore the Philippine courts the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.THE PROOF PRESENTED IN COURT DID NOT SUSTAIN THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE OF TAN BIT ANDTHE DECEDENT.The Court noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. The Court also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, hewas in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands.The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother ofCheong Seng Gee.

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of HialeahFACTSThe city of Hialeah passed an ordinance banning animal sacrifice. The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye filed a lawsuit against the city of Hialeah for violating the churchs rights under the Free Exercise Clause. The District Court supported the ordinances and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.ISSUEAre the ordinances that the city of Hialeah passed constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause?HOLDINGNo, these ordinances are not constitutional because the ordinances violate the rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye.REASONINGRule:The U.S. Supreme Court said that,a law is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.A law is neutral if this law does not infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation The court looks at the object, text, historical record, and effect of the law to figure out whether this law is neutral or not. The object or purpose has to be determined by looking to the text of the law. A law must not discriminate on its face. The record of the case cannot suppress a religious action. The effect of a law cannot affect just a religion. The effect must affect all of society.APPLICATION:The law at hand is not neutral. These ordinances lack neutrality on its face because the lawmakers used the words ritual and sacrifice with strong religious suggestions. The record of this case suppresses the fundamental component of the Santeria worship services. The text of these ordinances says that the citizens of Hialeah stated concerns of a certain religion. The effect of the law affects the members of the Santeria religion. The issues at hand are genuine governmental concerns, but the ordinances together reveal a purpose outside of these genuine governmental concerns. The first ordinance omits almost all killings of animals except for religious sacrifices. The second ordinance falls on Santeria supporters, but almost no other religions or groups. The third ordinance says that the killing of animals for religious purposes is unnecessary, but other killings fall out of this prohibition. The second part of this rule is the strict scrutiny rule. The city of Hialeah said that they had two governmental interests when making these ordinances: protecting the public health and stopping the cruelty to animals. These ordinances neglect to forbid nonreligious behavior that jeopardizes these interests. Thus, these ordinances cannot survive the rule of strict scrutiny. All of these ordinances are too general and could be narrower to not burden religious practices.

TANGONAN VS CRUZ PANO

FACTS:Petitioner brought suit for mandamus to compel the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing to admit her for the academic year 1976-1977.She had been previously provisionally admitted the previous school year, but she failed in Psychiatric Nursing.She tried to take the courseagain in another school, but she was refused admission bec. she tried to bribe the dean of the school.When she tried to re-enrol at the Capitol Medical Center, she wasdenied admission.She brought the matter on certiorari..ISSUE:WON the school canbe compelled by thecourt to re-admit petitioner.

NO.HELD:Any duty on the part of the school to enrol pet. is not merely a ministerial duty but one w/c involves the exercise of discretion not compellable by Mandamus.Capitol was perfectly justified in refusing to admit her, its refusal (being)sanctioned by the Manual of Regulations of Priv. Schools w/c considers academic delinquency & violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing enrollment of a student. Further, to grant relief to pet. would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by Capitol enshrined under Act. XV sec. 8(2) Consti.Academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish & teach thetruth as they see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by w/c truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of the school or college to decide for itself how best to attain them - the grant being to institutions of higher learning - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the over-riding public welfare calls for some restraint.It has a wide spread of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent.

Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996), was a decision by theUnited States Supreme Court, which held thatinnocent owner defenseis not constitutionally mandated byFourteenth AmendmentDue Processin cases ofcivil forfeiture.Tina B. Bennis was a joint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute. In declaring the automobile forfeit as a public nuisance under Michigan's statutory abatement scheme, the trial court permitted no offset for petitioner's interest, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husband's activity. TheMichigan Court of Appealsreversed, but was in turn reversed by theState Supreme Court, which concluded, among other things, that Michigan's failure to provide an innocent-owner defense was without federal constitutional consequence under this Court's decisions.

Riley v. CaliforniaDocket No.Op. BelowArgumentOpinionVoteAuthorTerm

13-132Cal.Apr 29, 2014Tr.Aud.Jun 25, 20149-0RobertsOT 2013

Disclosure: Disclosure: Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to this blog in various capacities, was among the counsel to the petitioner in this case at the certiorari stage through the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, but it is not participating in the case at the merits stage.Holding: The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cellphone seized from an individual who has been arrested.Judgment:Reversed and remanded, 9-0, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts on June 25, 2014. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Holding

Police generally may not, without awarrant, search digital information on acell phoneseized from an individual who has been arrested.

Court membership

Chief JusticeJohn G. Roberts

Associate JusticesAntonin ScaliaAnthony KennedyClarence ThomasRuth Bader GinsburgStephen BreyerSamuel AlitoSonia SotomayorElena Kagan

Case opinions

MajorityRoberts, joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan

ConcurrenceAlito

Laws applied

/L;Lnd belongings. The court then proceeded to applyUnited States v. Edwardsto hold that the search was valid despite the fact that it had occurred 90 minutes after arrest. In the Edwards case, an arrestee's clothing was seized 10 hours after arrest in order to preserve evidence (paint chips) that might be present on the clothes. Given these cases, the court concluded that the search and seizure of Riley's cell phone was valid.The case ofRiley v. Californiaas heard before the Supreme Court combined two cases,Rileyitself andUnited States v. Wurie. Petitioner Riley argued, based on]Opinion of the Court[edit]Chief JusticeJohn Robertsdelivered the opinion of the Court, concluding that a warrant is required to search a mobile phone.[6]Roberts wrote that it fails the w the ruling ofPeople v. Diaz, the digital contents of a smartphone do not threaten the safety of police officers. Therefore limiting searches to circumstances where officers have a reasonable belief of evidence of a crime still violates constitutional rights.[citation needed]InRiley v. California,Stanford Universitylaw professorJeffrey L. Fisherargued on behalf of petitioner David Riley. Fisher claimed that at least six courts hold that theFourth Amendmentpermits searches of this type, but that three courts do not.[4]Edward C. DuMontdelivered the oral argument on behalf of the respondent. Michael R. Dreeben acted as the deputy solicitor supporting the respondent.Fisher warned that it could open up "every American's entire life to the police department, not just at the scene but later at the station house and downloaded into their computer fo410112 2 /DAF //rever".[5]Fisher also told the justices there are "very, very profound problems with searching a smartphone without a warrant".[5]Many people believe that if the pol6 ic 001e can access your cell phone without a warrant, they can access your entire life.[citation neededarrantless search test established inChimel v. California:"Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee's escape. Law enforcement officers remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon--say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden between the phone and its case. Once an officer has secured a phone and eliminated any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one."[7]Although possible evidence stored on a phone may be destroyed with either remote wiping ordata encryption, Roberts noted that is "the ordinary operation of a phone's security features, apart from any active attempt by a defendant or his associates to conceal or destroy evidence upon arrest".[8]He then argues that a warrantless search is unlikely to make much of a difference:"Cell phone data would be vulnerable to remote wiping from the time an individual anticipates arrest to the time any eventual search of the phone is completed ... likewise, an officer who seizes a phone in an unlocked state might not be able to begin his search in the short time remaining before the phone locks and data becomes encrypted."[9]Roberts then cites several common examples to either turn off or prevent the phone's security features. Furthermore, Roberts argued that cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects in a person's pocket:"Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans the privacies of life". The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought."[10]Alito concurring opinion[edit]JusticeSamuel Alitowrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, citing his dissent inArizona v. Gantthat calledChimel's reasoning "questionable". That said, he agreed that"we should not mechanically apply the rule used in the predigital era to the search of a cell phone. Many cell phones now in use are capable of storing and accessing a quantity of information, some highly personal, that no person would ever have had on his person in hard-copy form."[11]However, in trying to find a balance between law enforcement and privacy issues, he expressed concern that the majority opinion creates anomalies: "Under established law, police may seize and examine [hard copies of information] in the wallet without obtaining a warrant, but under the Court's holding today, the information stored in the cell phone is out."[12]Alito further suggested that Congress or state legislatures may need to consider new laws that draw "reasonable distinctions based on categories of information or perhaps other variable",[13]otherwise "it would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt instrument of the Fourth Amendment".[14]