Cases for Elections

8/12/2019 Cases for Elections

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Whether or not a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has beenfiled, is a prohibited pleading in an election protest pending beforethe Regional Trial Court is the issue posed in this petition forcertiorariwith prayer for preliminary injunction challenging theResolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated July6, 1999[1]dismissing Comelec Case SPR No. 52-98.The COMELECs challenged order summarizes the relevant facts ofthe controversy thus:

1. Petitioner and private respondent were bothcandidates for Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong,Lanao del Sur and voted as such in the last May 11,

1998 national and local election (sic). Petitioner is are-electionist and a veteran politician;2. The election in Marogong functioned on May 11,1998, and after the voting the ballot boxes weretransmitted to the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitolof Lanao del Sur at Marawi City where the automatedcounting of votes and canvass of election returns

were centralized;

3. During the counting of votes, serious irregularities,anomalies and electoral frauds were committed at theinstance of petitioner or his followers in that votesactually casted (sic)for the private respondent werenot counted and credited in his favor thru (sic)theconcerted acts, conspiracy and manipulation of theBoard of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer

and the Machine Operator who happens to be anephew of the petitioner;4. In Precincts Nos. 1A-1A1, 7A1, 8A, 10A-10A1 and11A about 115 official ballots were refused or rejectedby the counting machine which the privaterespondents watchers or representatives haverequested and insisted to be re-fed to the automated

machine for the second and third times pursuant tothe provisions of Comelec Resolution No. 3030 buttheir requests were not heeded by the Election Officer


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and the Machine Operator, Solaiman Rasad, who is aclose kin of the Petitioner, and instead considered thesaid ballots as finally rejected, while in Precincts Nos.12A, 23A1 and 6A, around 56 ballots were foundtherein which were not drawn from the official ballotsand were included in the counting of votes over theobjection of the private respondents watchers orrepresentatives;5. Before the termination of the counting of votes andthe consolidation of the results, the machine operatorand the Election Officer carried away from theKalimodan Hall the diskette and brought the same to

the down town without the knowledge of the privaterespondents watchers or representatives;6. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomaliesand electoral frauds, the petitioner was illegallyproclaimed as winner because he appeared to haveobtained 2,020 votes while the private respondentgarnered 2,000 votes with a slight margin of only 20

votes;

7. After the counting of votes, the ballot boxes werekept at the Kalimodan Hall, Provincial Capitol, MarawiCity guarded and secured by military and PNPpersonnel together with the watchers/representativesof the petitioner and the private respondent and othercandidates or political parties until they weretransported and delivered to the respondent court at

Malabang, Lanao del Sur sometime on August 13,1998 by 1Lt. Napisa AG together with the dulyauthorized representatives of both parties.

xxx xxx xxx1. On May 22, 1998, private respondent, knowing thathe was cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed

before this Honorable Commission a petition to annulthe proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom


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as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Surdocketed as SPC No. 98-226.[2]2. As precautionary measure to avoid any technicality,private respondent filed on May 25, 1998, an ordinary

"Protest ad Cautelam"against the petitioner beforethe Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanaodel Sur entitled "Hadji Jamil D. Dimaporo vs.

Abdulmadid Maruhom" for election protest (ManualJudicial Recount, revision and reappreciation ofballots) docketed as Election Case No. 11-127.[3]3. On June 1, 1998,petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom

filed an answer with counter-protest in Election CaseNo. 11-127special and affirmative defenses andcounter-protest.[4]In his answer petitioner prayed tohold in abeyance further proceedings since the protestis ad cautelamor subject to the petition filed beforethis Honorable Commission.4. On July 2, 1998, before SPC No. 98-228 could be

set for hearing by this Honorable Commission, theprivate respondent as petitioner therein, filed a motionto withdraw his petition in said SPC No. 98-228 albeitsaid case was among those cases the proceedings ofwhich were ordered to be continued beyond June 30,1998, under Comelec Resolution No. 3049promulgated on June 29, 1998.[5]xxx5. On July 17, 1998, an order was issued by this

Honorable Commission, (First Division)granting theprivate respondents motion to withdraw petition inSPC No. 98-228 and considered the same withdrawn.[6]xxx.6. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, dated July 17,1998, private respondent filed an urgent motion beforethe respondent court on July 27, 1998, praying for the

issuance of an order directing the proper officials/officers concerned to bring and produce before saidcourt the ballot boxes subjects of the protest and


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counter-protest and to set the case for hearing asmandated by law.[7]xxx7. After the delivery of the ballot boxes involved in theprotest and counter-protest, the public respondent

issued an order, dated August 17, 1998, settingElection Case No. 11-127 for hearing (a) for thecreation of the Committee on Revision andappointment of the Chairman and Members thereof;(b) making of the cash deposit and payment of therevisors compensation; (c) partial determination of thecase, etc. on September 1, 1998, at 8:30 oclock inthe morning.[8]8. When the case was called for hearing onSeptember 2, 1998, a Revision Committee wascreated and its membership were duly appointed inopen court which committee was directed by therespondent court to finish the revision of ballots, ifpossible, within 20 days from the commencement ofthe revision[9]xxx9. After the Revision Committee was directed by therespondent to commence the revision of ballots, the

petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru counsel orallymoved for the dismissal of the proteston the groundsthat (1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in theprotested and counter-protested precincts have beenviolated; (2) Automated counting of ballots does notcontemplate a manual recount of the ballots; and (3)

Protestant is guilty of forum shopping warrantingsummary dismissal of the petitioner of the protest.10. The private respondent thru (sic) undersignedcounsel, vigorously opposed the said oral motion todismiss and orally argued that the motion is clearlydilatory having been made only after the RevisionCommittee has been ordered to commence the

revision of ballots on September 1, 1998 andmaintained that (1) The motion to dismiss is not


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allowed in an election protest; (2) The sanctity andintegrity of the ballot boxes subject matter of theprotest and counter-protest have been preserved andnever violated; (3) The automated counting of ballotsdoes not preclude the filing of the election protest forthe judicial recount and revision of ballots; and (4) Theprivate respondent is not guilty of forum shoppingbecause his petition of protest is clearly and explicitlya ProtestAd Cautelamin view of the pendency of hispetition before this Honorable Commission which waswithdrawn by the private respondent before it could beset for hearing or acted upon by this HonorableCommission.11. After the oral arguments of both parties, thepetitioners counsel asked that he be given ample timeto file a written Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and therespondent court thru then Acting Presiding JudgeRasad Balindong, issued an order dated September2, 1998, giving ten (10) days to Atty. Tingcap T.Mortaba to file an Omnibus Motion in substantiation of

all the oral motions he made, furnishing a copy thereofto the undersigned counsel for the private respondentwho was likewise given an equal period of time tocomment.[10]12. On September 11, 1998, petitioner filed his motionto dismiss[11]and on September 21, 1998, the privaterespondent filed a vigorous opposition to motion todismiss.[12]13. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss andthe opposition thereto on September 21, 1998, thepetitioners counsel requested for ample time to file arejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion todismiss submitted by the private respondent whichwas granted by the court and on September 28, 1998,petitioner filed his rejoinder[13]and on October 5, 1998

private respondent filed his comment[14]thereto and


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thereafter all incidents were submitted for resolution ofthe court.14. On November 10, 1998, the respondent court thruHonorable Presiding Judge Moslemen T.

Macarambon, issued the assailed order denying thepetitioners motion to dismiss for lack of merit andordering the Revision Committee to report to the courton November 19, 1998, at 8:30 oclock in the morningfor their oath taking and to receive the instruction ofthe court in the revision of the ballots and other alliedmatters.[15]15. On November 18, 1998, the petitioner filed amotion for reconsideration of the order datedNovember 10, 1998,[16]and on November 23, 1998,private respondent filed a vigorous opposition [tomotion] for reconsideration.[17]16. Finding no compelling reason to disturb its orderdated November 10, 1998, the respondent court

issued the assailed order dated December 1, 1998which denied the motion for reconsideration for lack ofmerit. In the same order, the respondent courtreiterated its previous order to the members of theRevision Committee to take their oaths before Atty.Raqueza T. Umbaro or Atty. Khalil Laguindab andthereafter to convene and start the revision of ballotson December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998, morningand afternoon.[18]17. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay ofthe proceedings of the case more specifically therevision of ballots, the petitioner filed on December10, 1998, the instant petition for certiorari andprohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction andon December 11, 1998, petitioner filed an urgentmotion before the respondent court praying that

further proceedings in Election Case No. 11-127 bedeferred until after protestees petition for certiorari


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and prohibition before this Honorable Commissionshall have been finally resolved, copy of which wasserved upon the undersigned counsel only onDecember 12, 1998, at 10:50 A.M.[19]xxx18. That before the undersigned counsel could file hisopposition to said urgent motion on December 14,1998 and in the absence of a restraining order or writof preliminary injunction issued by (the COMELEC),the respondent judge already issued an order grantingthe same motion and ordering the RevisionCommittee to hold in abeyance the scheduled revisionof ballots on December 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, 1998,

etc. until further order from the court xxx.[20]Petitioner alleges that in dismissing the petition the COMELECacted in excess of, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting tolack of jurisdiction in

1.] holding that a motion to dismiss an election protestcase filed in the Regional Trial Court is a prohibited

pleading;

2.] holding that the motion to dismiss filed after theanswer is not allowed;3.] failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No.52-98 which are sufficient legal bases to dismissElection Case No. 11-127.

In sum, petitioner insists that in refusing to pass upon the three (3)principal issues raised in COMELEC Case SPR No. 52-98, to wit:

1. Whether or not public respondent acted in excessof, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting tolack of jurisdiction in holding that a motion to dismissan election protest case in the Regional Trial Court isa prohibited pleading;2. Whether or not public respondent acted in excessof, or with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to


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lack of jurisdiction, in holding that a motion to dismissfiled after the answer to an election protest case in theRegional Trial court is not allowed; and3. Whether or not public respondent gravely abused

its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in failingto resolve the relevant material and substantial issuesraised in SPR No. 52-98.

the COMELEC "abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedureand under the Constitution and the election laws." Such abdicationof duty, according to petitioner, amounts to grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.It must be borne in mind that the purpose of governing statutes onthe conduct of elections

[i]s to protect the integrity of elections to suppressall evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will ofthe voters. The purity of the elections is one of themost fundamental requisites of popular government.The Commission on Elections, by constitutionalmandate must do everything in its power to secure afair and honest canvass of the votes cast in theelections. In the performance of its duties, theCommission must be given a considerable latitude inadopting means and methods that will insure theaccomplishment of the great objective for which it wascreated to promote free, orderly and honestelections. The choice of means taken by the

Commission on Elections, unless they are clearlyillegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, shouldnot be interfered with.[21]

Section 2 (1) of Article IX of the Constitution gives the COMELECthe broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulationsrelative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,referendum and recall." There can hardly be any doubt that the text

and intent of this constitutional provision is to give COMELEC allthe necessary and incidentalpowers for it to achieve the holding offree, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.


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In accordance with this intent, the Court has been liberal in definingthe parameters of the COMELECs powers in conducting elections.Sumulong v. COMELEC[22]aptly points out that

Politics is a practical matter, and political questions

must be dealt with realistically not from thestandpoint of pure theory. The Commission onElections, because of its fact-finding facilities, itscontacts with political strategists, and its knowledgederived from actual experience in dealing with politicalcontroversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous positionto decide complex political questions xxx. There areno ready made formulas for solving public problems.

Time and experience are necessary to evolve patternsthat will serve the ends of good government. In thematter of the administration of laws relative to theconduct of election xxx we must not by any excessivezeal take away from the Commission on Elections thatinitiative which by constitutional and legal mandatesproperly belongs to it.

Succinctly stated, laws and statutes governing election contestsespecially the appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed tothe end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officialsmay not be defeated by technical infirmities.[23]An election protest isimbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispeluncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people isimperative,[24]much more so in this case considering that a meretwenty (20) votes separates the winner from the loser of thecontested election results.The primordial issue to be resolved herein is whether or not theCOMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing SPR No.52-98.In support of his cause, petitioner insists that there is "nothingirregular or anomalous in the filing of the motion to dismiss" afterthe filing of the answer because in effect he is merely insisting on a

preliminary hearing of his special and affirmative defenses. Thus,he claims that the summary dismissal of his motion to dismiss is


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tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excessof jurisdiction.We disagree.The filing of the motion to dismiss, in fact, appears to be part of aperfidious plot to prevent the early termination of the proceedings inElection Case No. 4847 as evidenced by a confluence of eventsclearly showing a pattern of delay employed by petitioner to avertthe revision ballots. These events, pointed out by privaterespondent[25]and borne by the record, show that

1. It was only on September 1, 1999 after the creation

of the Revision Committee and the appointment of itsChairman and Members and after the said committeewas ordered by the trial court to commence therevision and to render its report within 20 days that thepetitioner orally moved for the dismissal of the caseon the flimsy grounds that (1) the ballot boxes subjectof the protest and counter protest have beenviolated; (2) the automated counting of ballots does

not contemplate a manual recount of ballots; and (3)protestant is guilty of forum-shopping warrantingsummary dismissal of the protest;2. After the oral arguments on the oral motion todismiss the petitioner requested for ample time withinwhich to file an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and overthe vigorous opposition of the private respondent thesame was granted by the court and the petitioner was

given a period of ten (10) days to file the same andthe private respondent was likewise given a period often (10) days to file his comment;3. On September 11, 1998, the motion to dismiss[26]and during the hearing on the said motion and theopposition[27]thereto on September 21, 1998, thepetitioner again asked for ample time to file a rejoinder

to the vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss whichwas again granted by the court and it was only onSeptember 28, 1998 that said rejoinder was filed;


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4. After a denial of the motion to dismiss on November10, 1998,[28]the petitioner filed a motion forreconsideration on November 18, 1998;[29]5. When the motion for reconsideration was denied on

December 1, 1998,[30]petitioner filed on December 18,1998 before the Commission on Elections a petitionfor certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminaryinjunction and asked the trial court to defer theproceedings of Election Case No. 11-27 until after hispetition shall have been finally resolved which wasgranted by the trial court. Hence, the scheduledrevision of the ballots on December 14, 15, 16 and 17,

1998 was cancelled and the proceedings of the caseheld in abeyance;[31]6. As the Comelec En Bancdid not give due course topetitioners prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, thetrial court, upon motion of the private respondent,issued an order for the revision of ballots on February8, 1999.[32]On said day, neither the petitioners

counsel nor his designated revisors appeared, insteadthe petitioner, assisted by his numerous armed men,numbering around 30 stated (sic) in strategic places,prevented the court personnel to enter the courtpremises. Were it not for the maximum toleranceexercised by the PNP personnel and the interventionof the local datus/leaders, there would have beenbloodshed;7. On February 9, 1999, the petitioners counsel filed awithdrawal of appearance with the attached letter-request of the petitioner asking for the deferment ofthe revision of ballots for at least two (2) weeks toenable him to engage the services of another counsel.Considering that the incident was designed to delaythe further the early disposition of the case whichwould frustrate the ends of justice, the court held in

abeyance its ruling on the withdrawal of appearance


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of and directed petitioners counsel to handle the caseafter the appearance of a new counsel;[33]8. To further delay the proceedings of the case, thepetitioner filed a petition for transfer of venue of the

trial to from RTC, Branch 11, Malabang, Lanao del Surto Iligan City or in Metro Manila which the privaterespondent did not oppose so as not to delay the earlyresolution of this Honorable Supreme Court on thesaid petition;9. Again, the proceedings of the case was held inabeyance in view of the pendency of the said petition

for transfer of venue;10. After the dismissal of the petition in Election CaseNo. 52-98, the petitioner filed the instant petition forcertiorari before this Honorable Supreme Court with aprayer for issuance of temporary restraining order;11. As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay ofthe proceedings of the case, the petitioner filed anurgent motion before this Honorable Supreme Courtpraying for the immediate issuance of a TRO directingthe Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch III, Iligan City tocease, desist and refrain from conducting any furtherproceedings of Election Case No. 4847 until theinstant case shall have been resolved. This HonorableSupreme Court, without granting the prayer for TRO,directed the RTC, Branch III, Iligan City not to

promulgate any decision in the said election case untilfurther order[s] from this most Honorable Court.[34]

It is clear, given the foregoing facts of this case, that the roundaboutmanner within which petitioner virtually substituted his answer bybelatedly filing a motion to dismiss three (3) months later is afrivolous resort to procedure calculated to frustrate the will of theelectorate. As pointedly observed by the COMELEC in its

challenged Resolution dated July 6, 1999,[35]petitioner only filed hismotion to dismiss "when the results of the trial appear[ed] to beadverse to him"[36]or right after the creation of the Revision


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Committee had been ordered by the trial court. If petitioner trulyintended to move for the preliminary hearing of his special andaffirmative defenses as he claims, then he should havesimultaneously moved for the preliminary hearing of his special andaffirmative defenses at the time he filed his answer. Otherwise, heshould have filed his motion to dismiss "within the time for butbefore filing the answer" pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.Suffice it to state in this regard that such a whimsical change ofmind by petitioner can not be countenanced much more so inelection cases where time is of the essence in the resolutionthereof. Indeed, the Omnibus Election Code states in no uncertain

terms that SEC. 258. Preferential disposition of contests incourts. The RTC, in their respective cases, shall give

preference to election contests over all othercases, except those of habeas corpus, and shall,without delay, hear and within thirty (30) days from thedate of their submission for decision, but in every case

within six (6) months after filing, decide the same.xxx[37](emphasis and italics supplied)Petitioner further argues that his submissions that a.] the integrity ofthe ballot boxes has been violated; b.] only rejected ballots orballots manually counted are the proper subjects of an electionprotest; and c.] private respondent is guilty of forum-shopping, areenough grounds to dismiss the case.We remain unconvinced.

As aptly observed by the COMELEC in the challenged Resolution,these grounds are "evidentiaryin nature and can be best ventilatedduring the trial of the case."[38]It needs be stressed in this regardthat the purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether thecandidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is reallythe lawful choice of the electorate.[39]In an election contest where

the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the best andmost conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves; where theballots can not be produced or are not available, the election


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returns would be the best evidence.[40]In this case, the countedofficial ballots are available and there is no evidence, other than thebare allegation of petitioner, that the sanctity of the ballot boxessubject matter of the protest have been violated or the officialballots contained therein impaired. The best way, therefore, to testthe truthfulness of petitioners claim is to open the ballot boxes inthe protested precincts followed by the examination, revision,recounting and re-appreciation of the official ballots thereincontained in accordance with law and pertinent rules on the matter.Needless to state this can only be done through a full-blown trial onthe merits, not a peremptory resolution of the motion to dismiss onthe basis of the bare and one-sided averments made therein.Petitioners reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2868[41]tosupport his restrictive claim that only rejected ballots or ballotsmanually counted in case of failure of the automated countingmachines are the proper subjects of an election protest, is just asunpersuasive.There is admittedly a lacuna legesin R.A. No. 8436 whichprescribes the adoption of an automated election system. However,

while conceding as much, this Court ruled in Tupay Loong v.COMELEC,[42]that the Commission is nevertheless not precludedfrom conducting a manual count when the automated countingsystem fails, reasoning thus:

In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviouslyfailed to provide a remedy where the error in countingis not machine related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the

law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitatingabove the problem.Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) ofthe Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power"to enforce and administer all laws and regulationsrelative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, thetext and intent of this provision is to give theCOMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers

for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,honest, peaceful and credible elections. Congruent to


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this intent, this Court has not been niggardly indefining the parameters of powers of COMELEC inthe conduct of our elections In the case at bar, theCOMELEC order for a manual count was not onlyreasonable. It was the only way to count the decisivelocal votes ... The bottom line is that by means of themanual count, the will of the voters of Sulu washonestly determined. We cannot kick away the willof the people by giving a literal interpretation toR.A. 8436. R.A. 8436 did notprohibit manualcounting when machine count does notwork.Counting is part and parcel of the conduct of anelection which is under the control and supervision of

the COMELEC Our elections are not conducted under laboratoryconditions. In running for public offices, candidates donot follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often,COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meetunforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert thewill of our voters. In the process, the actions of

COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may evenbe debatable. We cannot, however, engage in aswivel chair criticism of these actions often takenunder very difficult circumstances.

Verily, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take itsbearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that"clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy."[43]Be that as it may, the fact is the averments in petitioners counter-protest and private respondents protest already justified thedetermination of the issues through a judicial revision andrecounting of the ballots pursuant to Section 255 of the OmnibusElection Code which provides that

Sec. 255. Judicial counting of votes in electioncontest.- Where allegations in a protest or counter-

protest so warrant or whenever in the opinion ofthe court the interests of justice so require,it shall


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immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes andtheir keys, ballots and other documents used in theelection be brought before it and that the ballots beexamined and votes recounted. (Italics supplied)

So too must fall petitioners procedural objection that privaterespondent should be faulted for forum-shopping vis--vis thisCourts pronouncement in Samad v. COMELEC[44]which states inno uncertain terms that

As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or apetition for quo warranto precludes the subsequentfiling of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amounts to

the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus deprivingthe COMELEC of the authority to inquire into andpass upon the title of the protestee or the validity ofhis proclamation. The reason is that once thecompetent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of anelection protest or a petition for quo warranto, allquestions relative thereto will have to be decided inthe case itself and not in another proceeding. This

procedure will prevent confusion and conflict ofauthority. Conformably, we have ruled in a number ofcases that after a proclamation has been made, a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is no longerviable.The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where: (1)the board of canvassers was improperly constituted;(2) quo warrantowas not the proper remedy; (3) what

was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto oran election protestbut a petition to annul a

proclamation; (4)the filing of a quo warrantopetition or an election protest was expressly madewithout prejudice to the pre-proclamationcontroversy orwas made ad cautelam; and (5) theproclamation was null and void.


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Petitioners argument that the filing of a motion to dismiss in anelection contest filed with a regular court is not a prohibited pleadingis well taken. As we pointed out in Melendres, Jr. v. COMELEC: [45]

Neither can petitioner seek refuge behind his

argument that the motion to dismiss filed by privaterespondent is a prohibited pleading under Section 1,Rule 13 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedurebecause the said provision refers to proceedings filedbefore the COMELEC. The applicable provisions onthe matter are found in Part VI of the Rules ofProcedure titled "PROVISIONS GOVERNINGELECTION CONTESTS BEFORE TRIAL COURT"

and as this Court pointedly stated inAruelo v. Court ofAppeals[46]

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of theCOMELEC Rules of Procedure is it providedthat motions to dismiss and bill of particularsare not allowed in election protests or quowarranto cases pending before regular courts.Constitutionally speaking, the COMELECcannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of acertain pleading in the regular courts. Thepower to promulgate rules concerningpleadings, practice and procedure in all courtsis vested in the Supreme Court.[47]

The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner

from his predicament because the denial of petitioners motion todismiss was based on the fact that the other grounds relied thereinwas considered unmeritorious and not because the said motion is aprohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the challengedCOMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct indismissing the petition in this regard, the soundness of its discretionto accord unto the trial court the competence to resolve the factualissues raised in the controversy cannot be doubted. Indeed, as

reasoned by the COMELEC, the


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Commission assumes the competence of the trialcourt to handle electoral protest and cannot encroachon its original and exclusive jurisdiction on electoralprotest cases involving the contested mayoralty seat.To our mind, the trial court should be allowed toresolve the case on the merits to be able to rule onthe factual and legal grounds raised by the petitioneras his defenses in his Answer. Should the petitionerbe dissatisfied with the outcome of the case in thelower court, he can still appeal, as his relief, to thisCommission within the reglementary period providedby law.

Moreover At balance, the question really boils down to a choiceof philosophy and perception of how to interpret andapply the laws relating to elections; literal or liberal;the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or theultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice;in isolation or in the context of social conditions;

harshly against or gently in favor of the votersobvious choice. In applying elections laws, it wouldbe far better to err in favor of popular sovereigntythan to be right in complex but little understoodlegalisms.[48]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is herebyDISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

PENA VS. HRET

Assailed herein is the October 12, 1995 Resolution[1] of theHouse of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the

Petition Ad Cautelam of the Petitioner Teodoro Q. Pea in HRETCase No. 95-014. Petitioner questioned the election of the privaterespondent Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr. as Member of the House of


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Representatives representing the Second District of the province ofPalawan.

Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for thesaid Congressional Office in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12,

195, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board ofCanvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as thewinner.

On May 22, 1995, the instant petition was filed with the HRET,wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that:

7. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan weretainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and

terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during andafter the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of

election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the

election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioners

known supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of

voters, allowing persons to vote in excess of the number of registered

voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of protestants ballots

and other irregularities.8. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, theprotestee allegedly obtained 52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly

obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944 votes. A copy of saiddocument is attached hereto as Annex B.9. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and otherserious irregularities not been committed, the result of the elections forMember of the House of Representatives would have been different andthe protestant would have garnered the highest number of votes for the

Office Member of the House of Representatives in the Second District of

Palawan, which was the true expression of the will of the voters of the

Province of Palawan.10. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board ofCanvassers of Palawan that the protestee was allegedly the duly electedMember of the House of Representatives for the Second District of


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Palawan is contrary to law and to the true expression of the will of the

voters of the Province of Palawan.[2]Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With

Affirmative Defense, Counterclaim and Counter-Protest[3] on June5, 1995, to which Pea filed a Reply on June 23, 1995. Subsequentto the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] thePetition on June 22, 1995, averring that the HRET has not acquired

jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form andsubstance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challengeon the fact that the petition failed to allege the precincts where themassive fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor did itpoint out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a

result of the same.

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss[5]on July10, 1995, attaching thereto a Summary of Contested Precincts,naming 700 precincts where election irregularities allegedlyoccurred.

In its Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRETruled that although it had jurisdiction over the petition, as the sole

judge of all contests relating to the election, returns andqualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, thesaid petition, however, fails to state a cause of action, and istherefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal.

The HRET states pertinently:

There are 743 precincts in the second congressional district of Palawan

which is comprised of Puerto Princesa City and the municipalities of

Aborlan, Balabac, Bataraza, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon, and Marcos(Ordinance appended to the 1973 Constitution). The Protestant failed tospecify which are the 700 precincts, out of the said 743 precincts, that are

included in his protest; he even failed to allege the municipalities where

the protested precincts are located. Worse, the body of the Petition doesnot even mention the 700 precincts. Reference to them is made only in thePrayer. These omissions prevent Protestee from being apprised of theissues which he has to meet and make it virtually impossible for the

Tribunal to determine which ballot boxes have to be collected.


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The Supreme Court, in Fernando vs. Pastor M. Endencia, Judge of First

Instance of Bulacan, et. al. (No. 46099, 66 Phil 148, 150, August 30, 1938)

observed that, [w]hile the election law does not say so directly, it is

clearly inferred from its relevant provisions that where the grounds of

contest are that legal votes were rejected and illegal votes received, themotion of protest should state in what precincts such irregularities

occurred. xxx The specification in the motion of protest of the election

precinct or precincts where the alleged irregularities occurred, is required

in order to apprise the contestee of the issues which he has to meet. xxxIn its more recent resolution in Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD) vs.

COMELEC (G.R. No. 78302, May 26, 1987, 150 SCRA 665), the

Supreme Court held that the petition therein could have been dismissedoutright as deficient in form and substance, being couched in general terms

only, without precise indication of the time, place and manner of the

commission of the alleged irregularities. xxxSimilarly, this Tribunal, in dismissing an election protest, observed that the

protest, in general language, impugns, contests and protests the illegal,

improper and fraudulent electoral practices, acts and deeds of the

protestee and impugns and contests all the election returns in the lonedistrict of Catanduanes. The tribunal held that this scattershot allegationis not allowed in election contests and that it is necessary to make a

precise indication of the precincts protested and a specification of the

claimed offenses to have been committed by the parties. (Alberto vs.Tapia, HRET Case No. 37, January 23, 1989)While Protestant has attached as Annex A to his Opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss, filed on 10 July 1995, a Summary of contestedPrecincts, the defects in his Protest were not cured thereby as the Summary

was submitted only after the Motion to Dismiss had been filed. TheOpposition and the attached Summary do not amend the original Petition.There is not even a prayer in the Opposition suggesting such amendment.Moreover, in a Resolution promulgated on 17 June 1995, the Commission

on Elections en banc(COMELEC) dismissed herein Petitioners Petition

(SPA Case No. 95-258) to declare a failure of elections in the seconddistrict of Palawan. Copy of said Resolution was sent to Petitioner Peas


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PetitionAd Cautelamwas thus converted into a regular protest (notAdCautelam) effective upon the finality of the official COMELEC resolution,

thereby providing him an opportunity to amend it to cure the defects cited

above, Protestant took no positive and affirmative steps for that purpose.Protestant alleges in his Opposition that Protestee has likewise failed to

specify the 47 precincts he contests in his Counter-Protest. This omissionmerely renders Protestees Counter-Protest defective for insufficiency in

form and substance and for failure to state a cause of action. It does notcure the fatal defects in Protestants Petition.WHEREFORE, for failure of the petition (Protest) to state a cause of

action because it is fatally insufficient in form and substance, the Tribunal

Resolved to GRANT Protestees Motion to Dismiss and to DISMISS, as it

hereby DISMISSES, the instant Petition of Protest. As a logicalconsequence thereof and also for the same reason, Protestees Counter-

Protest is DISMISSED.No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.[6]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said resolutionwas denied by the respondent tribunal on November 14, 1995.

In this Petition for Certiorari, filed on December 29, 1995,petitioner argues that the respondent HRET acted with grave abuseof discretion amounting to having acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction in dismissing the election protest of petitioner

considering that:I

THE PETITIONAD CAUTELAMDATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A

CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND

SUBSTANCE.II

ASSUMINGARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLYDEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY THE CONTESTED


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PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER

SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS

WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT

HRET.It is the Petitioners view that the instant election protest is

sufficient in form and substance even while failing to specify theprecincts where irregularities allegedly occurred. Nowhere is itprovided that the specification of the precincts is a jurisdictionalrequirement that must be complied with in order that an electionprotest can be entertained by the HRET. To support his submission,petitioner cites the cases of Yalung vs. Atienza, 52 Phil 781, Araovs. COMELEC, 210 SCRA 790 and Gallares vs. Casenas, 48 Phil

362, the latter stating that:

From a reading of the allegations of the protest, it may be seen that

frauds, irregularities and violations of the law are alleged therein, which, if

true, would undoubtedly change the result of the elections.The fact that in the protest the number of votes which would result in favor

of the protestant after the judicial counting is not specified, does not affect

the right of the protestant, for it being known that said omission is a defectof the protest, the same may be cured by a specification of the votes

mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the protest, without thereby adding

new grounds for those already alleged by the protestant.Applying the same principle to the specification of precincts in

the instant case, the defect in the petition should have been curedby the opposition to the private respondents Motion to Dismiss.

Moreover, the fact that the HRET did not summarily dismiss thePetitionAd Cautelam, and instead, required the private respondent

Abueg to file an Answer, the HRET has thus made a priordetermination that the petition is sufficient in form and substance.

We do not agree.

In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answerthe petition, the HRET was not ruling on the formal and substantive

sufficiency of the petition. The order to require an answer is but a


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matter of course, as under the Revised Rules of Procedure of theHRET, it is provided that:

RULE 22. Summons. - Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of theTribunal shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the protestee

or respondent together with a copy of the petition, requiring him within ten(10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer.

As to the adequacy of the protest, we agree with respondentHRET in ruling for the insufficiency of the same.

A perusal of the petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitionermakes no specific mention of the precincts where widespreadelection, fraud and irregularities occured. This is a fatal omission,

as it goes into the very substance of the protest. Under Section 21of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in formand substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the immediatedismissal of the Petition.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form andsubstance means that the petition must be more than merelyrhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by

even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there isno other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, theassumptions of an elected public official may, and will always beheld up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate.

Notably, the instant petition ad cautelamposes a more seriousinadequacy than a mere failure to specify the number of voteswhich would inure to the protestant, as was the case in Gallares vs.Casenas, or the failure to impugn the validity of some of the ballots

cast, as in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of which cases weredecided in the 1920s. The defect in the instant case arises from thefailure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation ofmassive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and otherserious irregularities, without specification, and substantiation, ofwhere and how these occurences took place, appears in thepetition. We cannot allow an election protest based on such flimsyaverments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election process will

deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other,racing to disembank from the water.


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On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails toimpress. The Court has already ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET,[7] that substantial amendments to the protest may be allowed onlywithin the same period for filing the election protest, which, underRule 16 of the HRET Rules of Procedure is ten (10) days afterproclamation of the winner.

While it is conceded that statutes providing for election contestsare to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people inthe choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technicalquestions, the rule likewise stands, that in an election protest, theprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in hisoriginal or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory

period for filing of the protest.[8]Admittedly, the rule is well-established that the power to annul

an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involvesthe free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extremecases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to thefullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law thatelections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossibleto take any other step.[9] xxx This is as it should be, for the

democratic system is good for the many although abhorred by afew.

In sum, this Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and ordersof electoral tribunals operates only upon a showing of grave abuseof discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such a graveabuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere withthe electoral tribunals judgment. There is such showing in thepresent petition.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolves toDISMISS the present petition for lack of merit. The resolution of therespondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal datedOctober 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.

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