Case Study: Hazard Assessment of Ethylene and LNG Loading ...eurocorr.efcweb.org/2017/abstracts/PS...

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Case Study: Hazard Assessment of Ethylene and LNG Loading-Unloading Process in

Cirebon Port

Hary DEVIANTO1, Mitra EVIANI2, Isdiriayani NURDIN3, Pramujo WIDIATMOKO4

1Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia, [email protected]

2Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Republic of Indonesia LEMIGAS, Jakarta,

Indonesia, [email protected] 3Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia, [email protected]

4Institut Teknologi Bandung, Bandung, Indonesia, [email protected]

Abstract

Cirebon Port under PT Pelabuhan Indonesia II (Persero) Cirebon is located in West Java, Indonesia,

which has spacious work and water area that provides opportunities for Cirebon port to be developed

in industrial sectors, particularly the petrochemical industries. One of the petrochemical industry

activities that is done in the port area is loading and unloading the raw materials, such as liquefied

natural gas (LNG) and ethylene.

In atmospheric condition, ethylene and LNG is classified as volatile gas. Ethylene in the storage

system still has a probability to be released to the environment and may lead to a fire or explosion, and

is increased in the existence of coal stock pile in the port area which can evoke a fire if it reaches its

autoignition temperature. Therefore, a safety study is needed to identificate the hazard and risk of the

ethylene and LNG loading and unloading activities. From the safety study, a suitable handling and

safety system can be recommended to ensure the activities’ safety viability. The safety study for this

activity was done between two regions of the port; close to the sea and coal stockpile.

Keywords

Hazard assessment; LNG; ethylene; loading and unloading process; quantitative risk assessment

(QRA)

mailto:[email protected]



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Introduction

Cirebon Port, managed by PT. Pelabuhan Indonesia II (PELINDO II), located on the north

coast of West Java approximately 250 km from Jakarta to the east. Geographically, this port is

located at coordinates 6° 42' 55.6" S and 108° 34' 13.89" E. This harbor area has a working

area of 51 hectares and seawater area of 8.410,91 hectares. In this area, Cirebon Port is

expected to accommodate all needs in supporting the loading and unloading activities of

goods including petrochemical industry raw materials such as ethylene, propylene, LNG,

LPG, and butadiene. Figure 1 shows the map of Cirebon Port area.

Figure 1. Map of Cirebon Port.

Problems

This Cirebon Port (PELINDO II) will be used as a place for loading and unloading certain

chemicals for petrochemical industry raw materials, such as Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and

Ethylene. The loading and unloading terminal are located at the former location of Pelita

Stock Pile Coal.

The loading and unloading process of LNG and Ethylene is done without using a temporary

storage tank on the ground (floating storage/direct from ship to filling shed using pipeline).

LNG and ethylene are included in hazardous materials because it is highly flammable and

must be stored in cryogenic temperatures. In addition, LNG and ethylene storage adjacent to a

coal deposit may cause explosion and fire hazards. Therefore, it is necessary to study the

identification of the potential hazards of the plan for placing the filling shed in the Pelita

Stock Pile area.

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Methods

The analysis of risk assessment of LNG loading and unloading at Cirebon Port was conducted

using the following methodologies:

1. Literature study

2. Determine the jetty location

In this step, the selection of jetty location is done by considering several factors such as

economic considerations and the effectiveness of gas transmission to the filling shed.

3. Identification of hazardous nodes

Nodes are identified based on potential hazards that may serve as initiating events. The

reference used is CCPS (Center for Chemical Process Safety) issued by AIChE (American

Institute of Chemical Engineers).

4. Qualitative risk assessment

From the nodes that have been identified are selected nodes that can cause accidents with

the most harmful impacts if occurred. The selection is based on the operating conditions,

the type of fluid, and the possibility of corrosion in the relevant nodes. In the selected

nodes, the hazards are further evaluated along with possible accident scenarios.

5. Quantitative risk assesment

The risks then evaluated quantitatively by:

a. Calculate the frequency and probability of the consequences of each occurrence that

often occurs on hazardous nodes using event tree and fault tree analysis. This analysis

is intended to facilitate in quantifying the consequences of each hazard. Each initial

event along with possible event stages that culminate in a given scenario are

evaluated. References used in determining frequency and probability are OREDA

(Offshore Reliability Database) textbooks and from UK HSE Body (UK).

b. Calculate the consequences of each hazard by using dispersion analysis. Analysis is

done with the help of ALOHA ver 5.4.4 software taking into account the assumptions.

From each dispersion model it can be estimated the number of accidents (N) based on

literature such as IRPA and PLL as well as a logical consideration of other similar

events. The number of accidents (N) states the likelihood of an accident causing

fatality.

c. Put the frequency and consequences of each of the dangers on the F-N curve

(Frequency to the Consequences) so that the tolerability of the hazard can be known,

for example the danger is included in the category acceptable, ALARP (as low as

reasonably practicable), or unacceptable. Therefore, it can be said that the F-N curve

can give a conclusion whether a risky event is safe or not. Note that events with

ALARP or unacceptable categories that need to be anticipated.

6. Finally, recommendations and their implementations are selected as a solution to reduce

the risk of incidents that belong to ALARP or unacceptable categories, so that all events

are safe; most importantly, the loading and unloading can be done as desired. Risk

reduction efforts must be balanced with cost considerations. In other words, the risk is

attempted to be tolerable or eliminated at the lowest possible cost.

Considerations and assumptions used in this assessment are:

1. The location of the filling shed area is at the coordinate range of 6° 42' 46.92" S - 6° 42'

47.49" S to 108° 34' 12.75" E - 108° 34' 16.42" E. There are several areas adjacent to the

filling shed locations such as floating storage, coal stock piles, workshop, and office

buildings.

2. Wind speed and direction data at Port-Cirebon is obtained from BMKG (Meteorology

Climatology and Geophysics Agency) on 26-27 April 2015. Wind speed of 6.94 m / s

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leads to the Northwest. In addition, the height at related sites is 2.1 - 2.4 meters above sea

level. The ambient temperature is 24-33 ° C with an average of 28.5 ° C with an air

humidity of 57-92% with an average of 75% (wet).

3. Assumed, the rate of air change: 1.33/ hour (unsheltered single storied), the environment

around the land is open country (terrain terrain, many buildings). Cloud-covered weather

conditions: 5 tenths (partly cloudy), and stability Class is D (auto).

4. LNG and ethylene loading and unloading is done without using a temporary storage tank

on the ground (floating storage from ship to filling shed using pipes, then transported to

the truck tank).

5. The assumption of LNG in the vessel has a pressure of 10 barg and temperature of -

125°C.

6. Horizontal cylindrical LNG tank on truck with capacity 25,000 L, 2 m in tank diameter

and 7.96 m in length. The amount of LNG inserted into the tank meets 80% of the volume

of the tank. For the tank on the truck, it is assumed the leak occurs only at the bottom of

the tank.

Results and Discussions

Evaluation of Jetty Location and Nodes

The jetty is selected to be in the same area as the filling shed location. The reason for this

selection is that as compared to the ship's dock at the other two locations, the distance

between the unloading point and the filling shed entry point becomes the shortest so that:

1. The cost of procurement and installation of pipes becomes the cheapest

2. Pipeline maintenance and maintenance needs become smaller

3. Possible location of leakage occurrence becomes the least

4. In case of pipeline leakage, the leak point becomes more easily detected and found.

Nodes that become the probable point of initiating event are presented in Table 1. Nodes

become dangerous because they contain flammable matters and electricity.

Table 1. Nodes list.

Node (s) Description

Node 1 Storage tanker

Node 2 Unloading arm

Node 3 Piping System

Node 4 Filling shed

Node 5 Container

Node 6 Coal stockpile

Node 7 Compressor

Node 8 Genset

Node 9 Electricity substation

Node 10 Water storage tank

Node 11 Pump House PMK

The nodes are then evaluated to prioritize nodes that can generate the most likely accident

with the most harmful impacts if they occur. The selection is based on the operating

conditions, the type of fluid, as well as the possibility of corrosion in the relevant nodes.

Therefore, nodes 1-6 are selected, because:

1. Equipment at nodes 1-5 operates at a high pressure, ie 12 bar and a temperature of -25.8 °

C so at risk of sudden increase in pressure and temperature

2. The equipment on nodes 1-5 is made of carbon steel material so that the possibility of

high corrosion can end up in leakage

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3. Equipment in nodes 1-5 contains flammable fluids which when released into the air due to

leakage and there is a source of fire, there may be a fire or even an explosion if the release

of energy is so rapid

4. Node 6 contains an open flammable matters mound of coal that is very easily ignited due

to heat from the outside

5. The possibility of accidents on nodes 1-6 is generally difficult to prevent from the

beginning except with regular inspections and maintenance. Meanwhile, nodes 7-10 are

not selected even though it is possible to cause a fire because the possibility of accident on

nodes 7-11 more likely to be prevented from the beginning.

The evaluation of these Nodes 7-11 is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Preventive actions on Nodes 7-11.

Nodes Description Hazard Risk Mitigation

Node 7 Compressor The fluid flow rate

inside the

compressor is too

small or too large

(outside the safe

operating range)

There is a vibration

that leads to the

explosion of the

compressor

because the area of

operation is on the

surging line or

stone wall

The operation on

the surging line is

prevented by

recycle and the

operation on the

stone wall is

prevented by the

bypass

Node 8 Genset Short-circuit

happened

The emergence of

sparks that can

ignite leaking

ethylene gas / other

combustible gas

components

resulting in a fire

Short-circuit is

prevented by

grounding

The generator

temperature rises

drastically due to

excessive load

It ignites the

flammable gas

components around

the genset at the

autoignition

temperature so that

there is a fire

Overload is

prevented by load

control and

grounding

Node 9 Electricity

substation

Short-circuit due to

internal

components not

working properly /

overheating

It ignites the

flammable gas

components around

the PLN substation

at the autoignition

temperature so that

there is a fire

Short-circuit is

prevented by

grounding

Node 10 Water storage

tank

Leakage of water Resulting accidents

due to slippery

workplace

Accidents are

prevented by

personal safety to

be more careful

Node 11 Pump House

PMK

Pump does not

work when a fire

occurs

The fire is getting

bigger causing an

explosion

Prevented by the

availability of

external fire

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extinguisher

LNG Hazard Identification

From the evaluation nodes that have been done hazard identification can be done that may

occur in this port area. The hazards are shown in Table 3. The total hazards associated with

this process are 16.

Table 3. Hazard identification for LNG loading-unloading process.

No. Hazard Consequence Impact Mitigation

1. Flow stops during transfer from tank ship to onshore

- Incorrect connections

- Excessive movement

of the loading arm.

- Extreme waves and

winds

Leakage of LNG

in small quantities

Impacts the

environment

- Implement

bunkering procedure

- Maintain

communication with

all bunkering workers

- Ensure ESD system

function

- Using PPE

- Create an

emergency response

plan

- Install a flammable

detector

- Perform inspection

of equipment before

bunkering

LNG leakage

causes cryogenic

hazard to workers

Injury or death

2. Leakage on pumps, pipes, hoses as it flows LNG from ship to Filling Station

- Corrosion

- Erosion

- External interference

- Fatigue failure

- Gasket failure

- Hose failure

- Improper hose

connection

- Material defect

- Seal failure

- Improper pipes materal

selection

- Leaks on the valve

- Vibration

- Excessive movement

on the loading arm

- Earthquake

LNG Leakage Environment

impact

- Implement

bunkering procedure

- Maintain

communication with

all bunkering workers

- Ensure ESD system

function

- Using PPE

- Create an

emergency response

plan

- Install a flammable

detector

- Perform inspection

of equipment before

bunkering

- Pressure testing

Leakage LNG

resulting in brittle

fracture on deck,

fire / explosion

hazard on

surrounding

equipment

Economy impact

Causes cryogenic

hazard

Injury or death

3. ESD system can not work in the event of a leak / Problem on pipeline connection

- Failure of ESD

instruments

- Freezing of pipes /

valve connected to ESD

LNG leakage in

large quantities

Environment

impact

- Set up manual ESD

procedure

- Using a control

system for bunkering Leakage LNG

that causes brittle

Economy impact

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- There is no ESD

system on the truck

- Operator errors

- Programming error

- Using nonstandard

equipment

fracture, fire,

explosion in the

environment

equipment

- Run bunkering

procedure

- Checking ESD

system periodically

- Use of PPE

- Classification of

electrical connections

in the bunkering area

- Preparing

emergency

procedures

Causes cryogenic

hazard

Injury or death

4. Excessive movement in the loading arm

- External hazards

- Maintenance is wrong

- Failure of control

system on loading arm

- Operator error

- Structural failure

- Extreme wind

- Earthquake

Leakage of LNG

on pumps, pipes,

hoses during

LNG transfer

Environment

impact

- Implement

bunkering procedure

- ESD system

- Standard loading

arm checking

- Implement

maintenance

procedures

- Fire caused by

passengers

- Hole 1 "on the transfer

pipe to the filling shed

due to corrosion

Leakage of LNG

into the air. May

cause vapor cloud

explosion or zet

fire if there is an

ignition source

Injury, death,

economic loss,

death and

damage

- Run an emergency

response

- Installation of gas

detector, use of PPE

(personal protective

equipment),

inspection of

equipment on a

regular basis

Pipe broken by vibration

or corrosion

LNG leak into the

air. May cause a

vapor cloud

explosion if there

is an ignition

source

Economic

losses, death and

damage

Installation of gas

detector, use of PPE,

inspection of

equipment on a

regular basis and do

the replacement of

pipes.

5. Leakage of LNG on the filling shed pipe connection to the truck

1 inch hole at the end of

the filling shed pipe due

to damage to the gasket

LNG leak into the

air. May cause

vapor cloud

explosion or jet

fire if there is an

ignition source

Economic

losses, death and

damage

Installation of gas

detector, gasket

replacement

periodically, use of

PPE

6. Leakage of LNG occurs at the bottom of the truck tank at the filling shed location

1 inch hole at the bottom

of LNG tank in truck

near filling shed. The

holes are formed by

LNG leak into the

air. May cause

vapor cloud

explosion or jet

Economic

losses, death and

damage

Installation of gas

detector, gasket

replacement


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corrosion fire if there is an

ignition source

PPE

7. LNG leakage occurs from piping during pumping to filling shed

1 inch hole at the bottom

of LNG transfer pipe to

filling shed. The holes

are formed by corrosion

LNG leak into the

air. May cause

vapor cloud

explosion or jet

fire if there is an

ignition source

Economic

losses, death and

damage

Installation of gas

detector, gasket

replacement


PPE

Pipe broken by vibration

or corrosion

LNG leak into the

air. May cause

vapor cloud

explosion or jet

fire if there is an

ignition source

Economic

losses, death and

damage

Installation of gas

detector, gasket

replacement


PPE

8. LNG leakage occurs in the filling shed pipe connection to the truck

1 inch hole at the end of

the filling shed pipe due

to damage to the gasket

LNG leak into the

air. May cause

vapor cloud

explosion or jet

fire if there is an

ignition source

Economic

losses, death and

damage

Installation of gas

detector, gasket

replacement


PPE

9. LNG leakage occurs from piping during pumping to filling shed

1 inch hole at the

transfer pipe to filling

shed. The holes are

formed by corrosion

LNG leak into the

air. May cause

vapor cloud

explosion or jet

fire if there is an

ignition source

Economic

losses, death and

damage

Installation of gas

detector, gasket

replacement


PPE

10. LNG leakage occurs on the boil-off gas pipes at the discharge flow of the compressor

- Corrosion

- Vibration caused by

compressur surging

Boil-off gas leak

into the air.

Economic

losses, VCE, jet

fire, death and

damage

Choose standard

material, design

standard PSV, install

gas detector

LNG Quantitative Risk Assessment and Dispersion Analysis

After identifying dangerous nodes, then a quantitative risk analysis is conducted to determine

whether the impact of each malicious node is acceptable or not. Quantitative risk analysis is

done by calculating the frequency of events using the event tree and fault tree and calculating

the consequences of death by dispersion analysis. The frequency of occurrence analysis is

done by compiling scenarios of several frequent events using the event tree and scenarios of

some dangerous events using the fault tree. The preparation of the event tree begins the

initiating event as shown in the Table 5. Then proceeds with wind direction to the office or

stock pile of coal, then the failure of the shutdown valve that does not open, then continued

with the possibility of ignisi or not causing the jet fire or vapor vloud explosion. The

frequency of occurrence and probability of safety function failures are obtained from the HSE

UK and OREDA Textbook Guidelines.

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Table 5. Event simulation variation for LNG process.

Event Impact Frequency

(impact/yr)

1” hole in the

transfer pipe

VCE 6,03x10-9

Jet fire 6,70x10-9

Toxic release 5,43x10-8

Fracture of transfer

pipe

VCE 5,85x10-10

Jet fire 6,50x10-10


1” hole in the

filling shed pipe

VCE 4,50x10-7

Jet fire 5,00x10-7


1” hole in the

connection between

platform and ship

VCE 3,60x10-6

Jet fire 4,00x10-6


1” hole in the boil-

off pipe

VCE 6,03x10-9

Jet fire 6,70x10-9


After an occurrence frequency analysis, dispersion analysis was performed to calculate the

consequences of death from each accident scenario.

1. 1” Hole in Platform Connection with Tank Ship

Figure 2. A 1-inch leakage simulation result on platform connection with LNG tank for

the case: (a) Toxic release, (b) Jet fire, and (c) Flammable area.

(a) (b)

(c)

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The leak area profile is divided into three areas indicated by red lines, yellow inner lines

and outer yellow lines. From the Figure 2(a), red bounded areas are potentially deadly

areas where the LNG compounds contain concentrations of 17000 ppm. If the area is

multiplied by the assumed uniform human density then the area will be 6.75 x 10-2 per

year.

From the Figure 2(b), red-bounded areas are potentially deadly areas where there is heat

radiation greater than 10 kW / m2. If the area is multiplied by the assumed uniform human

density then the area will be 8.06 x 10-2 per year.

2. 1” Hole in Transfer Pipe

There are three impacts that can be generated by leakage of 1" in the transfer pipeline,

such as toxic release, jet fire, and VCE. The simulation and calculation of the source

model can be seen the amount of LNG leakage to the environment of 27.1 kg/s with the

assumption leakage duration for 1 hour. There are 3 danger zone results from the

simulation for each incident, where the red zone is the zone causing death when exposed

to the hazard at the concentration of exposure. Table 6 resumed the zone division of each

case.

Table 6. Zone division for 1” Hole in Transfer Pipe case.

Case Distribution Distance (m) / Concentration Exposure

Red Zone Orange Zone Yellow Zone

Toxic release 168 17000 ppm - - 440 2900 ppm

Jet fire 21 10 kW/m2 29 5 kW/m2 44 2 kW/m2

VCE - - - - 149 1 psi

3. 1” Hole in Filling Shed

There are three impacts that can be generated by leakage of 1" in the filling shed, such as

toxic release, jet fire, and VCE. Through the simulation and calculation of source model

can be known the amount of leakage of LNG to the environment of 27.1 kg / s with the

assumption of leakage duration for 1 hour. There are 3 hazard zones resulting from the

simulation for each event, in which the red zone is the zone causing death if exposed to

the hazard at the concentration of the exposure. Table 7 resumed the zone division of each

case.

Table 7. Zone division for 1” Hole in Filling Shed case.





VCE - - - - 149 1 psi

4. Rupture of Transfer Pipe

There are three impacts that can be generated by leakage of 1" in the filling shed, such as

toxic release, jet fire, and VCE. Through the simulation and calculation of source model

can be known the amount of LNG leakage to the environment of 1069.5 kg / s with the

assumption of leakage duration for 1 hour. There are 3 hazard zones resulting from the

simulation for each event, in which the red zone is the zone causing death if exposed to

the hazard at the concentration of the exposure. Table 8 resumed the zone division of each

case.

Table 8. Zone division for Rupture of Transfer Pipe case.

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VCE - - - - 1100 1 psi

5. Leakage in Boil-off Gas Pipe

Figure 3(a) shows the affected area when boil off gas leaks from a pipe with a 1” hole.

The red line indicates the most fatal area with a gas concentration of 17,000 ppm. The

area of yellow line boundary contains a leaking gas concentration of 2900 ppm. The

orange area is the confidences line from the wind direction. From this simulation obtained

the number of deaths as many as 4 people.

Figure 3(b) shows the thermal affected areas due to the occurrence of jet fire. The red

circle shows the most fatal area with a thermal impact of 10 kW / m2. The circumscribed

area of the orange circle is subject to a thermal impact of 5 kW / m2. The area inside the

yellow circle gets a thermal impact of 2 kW / m2 with the risk of burns. From this

simulation obtained the number of deaths as many as 13 deaths.

Figure 3(c) shows the area affected by the explosion from a boil off gas leak in a pipe with

a 1 inch hole. The area bounded by the yellow line is impacted by an explosion with a

pressure of 1 psi with damage to the glass.

Figure 3. A leakage simulation result on Boil-off Gas Pipe for the case: (a) Toxic release,

(b) Jet fire, and (c) Flammable area.

(a) (b)

(c)

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LNG F-N Curves

After obtaining the frequency value of the Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and the number of

deaths, an F-N curve can be made indicating the safety level of a possible accident incident on

a processing device. The F-N curve is divided into three zones, namely acceptable, ALARP,

and unacceptable. A process device can be said to be safe if it is in acceptable zone. When in

the ALARP zone, additional security equipment is required to reduce the frequency value of

the incident, so that the position of the point on the F-N curve can be moved to the acceptable

zone. In this report, the F-N curve is used in accordance with the British HSE standard.

The results of the incident analysis are plotted, as shown in Figure 4. The detailed frequency

and number of deaths are presented in Table 9. From the analysis results, no accident incident

scenarios exist in the unacceptable zone. However there are 7 incident scenarios in the

ALARP zone. Therefore, an additional safety tool design is required to enable the processing

equipment to be used with a tolerable level of security.

Table 9. Results of Security Level Analysis of Possible Incidence with F-N Curve

Event Impact Frequency

(impact/year) Fatality Zone

1” hole in the

transfer pipe

VCE 6,03x10-9 85,56 Acceptable

Jet fire 6,70x10-9 2,12 ALARP

Toxic release 5,43x10-8 24,95 Acceptable

Fracture of

transfer pipe

VCE 5,85x10-10 4078,63 ALARP

Jet fire 6,50x10-10 228,93 Acceptable

Toxic release 5,27x10-9 1380,45 ALARP

1” hole in the

filling shed pipe

VCE 4,50x10-7 85,56 ALARP



1” hole in the

connection

between

platform and

ship

VCE 3,60x10-6 4,42 ALARP

Jet fire 4,00x10-6 9,83 ALARP


1” hole in the

boil-off pipe

VCE 6,03x10-9 3,16 Acceptable



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Figure 4. F-N curve analysis.

Ethylene Hazard Identification

From the evaluation nodes that have been done hazard identification can be done that may

occur in this port area. The hazards are shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Hazard identification for ethylene loading-unloading process.

No. Unit Hazard Impact Mitigation

1. Platform There is a gap

between the

unloading arm

and the pipe due

to improper

installation or

movement of

ships due to

ocean waves

Occurrence of ethylene

release which can cause

jet fire if directly

ignited or culminate in

VCE (Vapor Cloud

Explosion)

Ensure perfect unloading

arm installation procedure

and install double ball

safety release on arm and

complete system unloading

with emergency shutdown

system

2. Pipe Pipe leakage due

to corrosion of

materials or

cracks due to

construction

defects





VCE (Vapor Cloud

Explosion)

Perform monitoring and

checking periodically so

that the possibility of leak /

rift can be detected as early

as possible

3. Filling shed There is a gap

between the

container hose

and the ethylene

filler station due

to incomplete





VCE (Vapor Cloud

Explosion)

Ensure perfect unloading

arm installation procedure

and install double ball

safety release on arm and

complete system unloading

with emergency shutdown

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mounting system

4. Container There was a leak

of ethylene tank





VCE (Vapor Cloud

Explosion)

Install a leak detector and

regularly check the tank so

that leaks may be prevented

An increase in

temperature of the

ethylene tank

resulting from an

increase in

environmental

temperature

drastically or

other heat sources

The occurrence of

BLEVE (Boiling

Liquid Expanding

Vapor Explosion)

resulting in an

explosion

Install the insulator in the

tank and adjust the distance

of the tank with the source

of heat exposure within the

safe limits and install a fire

protection system

The occurrence of

excessive

pressure on the

container tank

due to excessive

loading of

ethylene (overfill)

The occurrence of

BLEVE (Boiling

Liquid Expanding

Vapor Explosion)

resulting in an

explosion

Monitor the amount of gas

put into containers and

install relief systems to

reduce overpressure and

emergency shutdown

system

An electron

accumulates due

to friction on the

connection during

charging

The emergence of

sparks that can ignite a

fire

Ensure all connections are

neutralized by connecting

them to the ground

(grounding). Additionally it

can add anti-static agent

(The electron carrier) and

enter the gas slowly.

There is air in the

container tank

There is a fire when the

oxygen content meets

the limit

Clear air in the container

tank before loading through

purging and inerting during

loading

Leakage of the

channel of

ethylene to the

container

The presence of

ethylene may cause fire

and explosion if ignited

Perform regular checks and

install emergency shutdown

system

The emergence of

sparks from the

container vehicle

engine due to free

or hot electric

charge

There will be a fire

when there is an

inflammable

combustible gas

component

Install a fire alarm system

to detect sparks

5. Compressor The fluid flow

rate inside the

compressor is too

small or too large

(outside the safe

There is a vibration that

leads to the explosion

of the compressor

because the operation is

on the surging line or

Monitor the operation of the

compressor in the safe

range

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operating range) stone wall

6. Genset Short-circuiting The emergence of

sparks that can ignite

leaking ethylene gas /

other combustible gas

components resulting in

a fire

Break the power outlet and

prevent it by fitting the fuse

Genset

temperature

increases

drastically due to

excessive load

It ignites the flammable

gas components around

the genset at the

autoignition

temperature so that

there is a fire

Monitor the generator load

and place the generator at a

safe range from the

ethylene tank

7. Pump

House PMK

Pumps do not

work when there

is an increasingly

severe fire

The fire is getting

bigger causing the

explosion

Install standby pumps and

equip other fire

extinguishers such as

hydrant and FMD gas

cylinders

8. Electricity

substation

Short-circuit due

to internal

components not

working with balk

/ overheating

It ignites the flammable

gas components around

the PLN substation at

the autoignition

temperature so that

there is a fire

Break the power outlet and

prevent it by fitting the fuse

9. Water tank Water leakage Resulting in work

accidents (workers fall

due to slippery surface)

Make a ditch under a water

tank so it can fit before

water seeps into the work

area

10. Coal

pilestock

The emergence of

sparks due to high

environmental

temperatures

It ignites a fire when

there is an ethylene

dispersion or other

flammable gas

Install a fire alarm system

to detect sparks

11. Natural

disasters

Earthquake The occurrence of

cracks resulting in

leakage, especially in

the pipe and ethylene

tank so that a fire

occurs when ignited

Evacuate workers to secure

areas and build earthquake-

resistant construction

equipment

Ethylene Quantitative Risk Assessment and Dispersion Analysis

The preparation of the event tree begins the initiating event as shown in the Table 11.

16

Table 11. Event simulation variation for ethylene process.

Variation Component

Type of event 0.25” hole

1” hole

4” hole

Rupture of pipe

Type of dispersion Puff

Plume

From the simulations that have been done can be shown three zones consisting of red zone

(most dangerous zone), orange zone, and yellow zone. These three zones have their own

limitations depending on the type of accident that occurs such as the spread of toxic

substances, the spread of combustible substances, and explosions. From the simulation of this

dispersion obtained range of area from each zone to do the calculation of the number of

accidents that may occur. The number of accidents is shown in Table 12 to Table 14.

Table 12. The number of people affected by the leak (toxic release).

No. Dispersion Type Diameter (inch) Zone No. of people

1. Puff 0.1 Red 0

2. Orange 0

3. Yellow 20

4. 0.25 Red 0

5. Orange 111

6. Yellow 31

7. 0.5 Red 9

8. Orange 45

9. Yellow 306

10. 1 Red 15

11. Orange 90

12. Yellow 1195

13. Rupture Red 26

14. Orange 158

15. Yellow 2116

16. Plume 0.1 Red 0

17. Orange 0

18. Yellow 0

19. 0.25 Red 0

20. Orange 0

21. Yellow 13

22. 0.5 Red 0

23. Orange 5

24. Yellow 43

25. 1 Red 3

26. Orange 11

27. Yellow 198

28. Rupture Red 38

29. Orange 243

30. Yellow 2263

17

Table 13. The number of people affected by the leak (flammable area).


1. Puff 0.1 Red 0

2. Orange 0

3. Yellow 6

4. 0.25 Red 7

5. Orange 0

6. Yellow 23

7. 0.5 Red 31

8. Orange 0

9. Yellow 81

10. 1 Red 35

11. Orange 0

12. Yellow 291

13. Rupture Red 69

14. Orange 0

15. Yellow 252

16. Plume 0.1 Red 0

17. Orange 0

18. Yellow 0

19. 0.25 Red 0

20. Orange 0

21. Yellow 5

22. 0.5 Red 3

23. Orange 0

24. Yellow 7

25. 1 Red 5

26. Orange 0

27. Yellow 21

28. Rupture Red 91

29. Orange 0

30. Yellow 482

18

Table 14. The number of people affected by the leak (explosion).


1. Puff 0.1 Red 0

2. Orange 2

3. Yellow 10

4. 0.25 Red 0

5. Orange 19

6. Yellow 65

7. 0.5 Red 0

8. Orange 61

9. Yellow 211

10. 1 Red 0

11. Orange 266

12. Yellow 854

13. Rupture Red 0

14. Orange 210

15. Yellow 789

16. Plume 0.1 Red 0

17. Orange 0

18. Yellow 1

19. 0.25 Red 0

20. Orange 2

21. Yellow 6

22. 0.5 Red 0

23. Orange 6

24. Yellow 20

25. 1 Red 0

26. Orange 23

27. Yellow 64

28. Rupture Red 0

29. Orange 330

30. Yellow 1077

The results of this Quantitative Risk Analysis show some potential hazards in ALARP or

intolerable zones. This QRA is represented in Table 15 to Table 35.

Table 15. QRA for 0.1” leakage of pipe.

Release Case Incident type Frequency Consequence Risk

Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 6 0.00028655

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 6 4.91112E-05

VCE 1.22816E-05 12 0.000147379

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 6 3.18744E-05

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 6 8.1624E-06

VCE 0.000000912 12 0.000010944

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 6 7.75E-07

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 3.8E-08 6 2.28E-07

19

VCE 2.28E-08 12 2.74E-07

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 0 0

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 0 0

VCE 1.22816E-05 0 0

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 0 0

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 0 0

VCE 0.000000912 0 0

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 0 0

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 0.000000038 0 0

VCE 2.28E-08 0 0



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 30 0.001432752

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 30 0.000245556

VCE 1.22816E-05 258 0.003168653

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 30 0.000159372

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 30 0.000040812

VCE 0.000000912 258 0.000235296

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 30 3.88E-06

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 3.8E-08 30 1.14E-06

VCE 2.28E-08 258 5.88E-06

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 5 0.000238792

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 5 0.000040926

VCE 1.22816E-05 8 9.82528E-05

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 5 0.000026562

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 5 0.000006802

VCE 0.000000912 8 0.000007296

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 5 0.000000646

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 0.000000038 5 0.00000019

VCE 2.28E-08 8 1.824E-07



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 112 0.005348941

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 112 0.000916742

VCE 1.22816E-05 272 0.003340595

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 112 0.000594989

Flash Fire + 1.3604E-06 112 0.000152365

20

Pool Fire

VCE 0.000000912 272 0.000248064

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 112 1.45E-05

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 3.8E-08 112 4.26E-06

VCE 2.28E-08 272 6.2E-06

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 10 0.000477584

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 10 0.000081852

VCE 1.22816E-05 26 0.000319322

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 10 0.000053124

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 10 0.000013604

VCE 0.000000912 26 0.000023712

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 10 0.000001292

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 0.000000038 10 0.00000038

VCE 2.28E-08 26 5.928E-07

Table 18. QRA for 1” leakage of pipe.


Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 326 0.015569238

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 326 0.002668375

VCE 1.22816E-05 1120 0.013755392

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 326 0.001731842

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 326 0.00044349

VCE 0.000000912 1120 0.00102144

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 326 4.21 E-05

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 3.8E-08 326 1.24E-05

VCE 2.28E-08 1120 2.55E-05

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 26 0.001241718

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 26 0.000212815

VCE 1.22816E-05 87 0.001068499

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 26 0.000138122

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 26 3.53704E-05

VCE 0.000000912 87 0.000079344

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 26 3.3592E-06

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 0.000000038 26 0.000000988

VCE 2.28E-08 87 1.9836E-06

Table 19. QRA for rupture pipe.


Puff SDV Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 321 0.015330446

21

Succeed to

Close

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 321 0.002627449

VCE 1.22816E-05 999 0.012269318

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 321 0.00170528

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 321 0.000436688

VCE 0.000000912 999 0.000911088

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 321 4.15E-05

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 3.8E-08 321 1.22E-05

VCE 2.28E-08 999 2.28E-05

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Pool Fire 4.77584E-05 573 0.027365563

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 8.1852E-06 573 0.00469012

VCE 1.22816E-05 1407 0.017280211

SDV Failed

to Close

Pool Fire 5.3124E-06 573 0.003044005

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 1.3604E-06 573 0.000779509

VCE 0.000000912 1407 0.001283184

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Pool Fire 1.292E-07 573 7.40316E-05

Flash Fire +

Pool Fire 0.000000038 573 0.000021774

VCE 2.28E-08 1407 3.20796E-05



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Horizontal Jet Dispersion

9.74817E-05 6 0.00058489

Vertical Jet Dispersion

9.71346E-05 6 0.000582808

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 20 0.000431472

Horizontal Flame Jet

5.9274E-06 6 3.55644E-05

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 6

3.54042E-05

SDV Failed

to Close Fireball 1.4151E-06 6 8.4906E-06

Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 6 1.76E-06


0.000000267 6 1.6E-06

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 20 5.87E-06


1.335E-08 6 8.01 E-08

Vertical Flame Jet 1.335E-08 6 8.01 E-08

Plume SDV

Succeed to


9.74817E-05 0 0

Vertical Jet 9.71346E-05 0 0

22

Close Dispersion Gaussian

Dispersion 2.15736E-05 0 0


5.9274E-06 0 0

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 0 0

SDV Failed

to Close Fireball 1.4151E-06 0 0

Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 0 0


0.000000267 0 0

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 0 0


1.335E-08 0 0

Vertical Flame Jet

1.335E-08 0 0



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close


9.74817E-05 30 0.002924451


9.71346E-05 30 0.002914038

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 142 0.003063451


5.9274E-06 30 0.000177822

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 30 0.000177021

SDV Failed

to Close Fireball 1.4151E-06 30 0.000042453

Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 30 8.81 E-06


0.000000267 30 8.01 E-06

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 142 4.17E-05


1.335E-08 30 4.01 E-07

Vertical Flame Jet 1.335E-08

30 4.01 E-07

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close


9.74817E-05 5 0.000487409


9.71346E-05 5 0.000485673

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 13 0.000280457


5.9274E-06 5 0.000029637

Vertical Flame 5.9007E-06 5 2.95035E-05

23

Jet

SDV Failed


Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 5 1.47E-06


0.000000267 5 1.34E-06

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 13 3.82E-06


1.335E-08 5 6.68E-08

Vertical Flame Jet

1.335E-08 5 6.68E-08



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close


9.74817E-05 112 0.01091795


9.71346E-05 112 0.010879075

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 360 0.007766496


5.9274E-06 112 0.000663869

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 112

0.000660878

SDV Failed


Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 112 3.29E-05


0.000000267 112 2.99E-05

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 360 0.000106


1.335E-08 112 1.5E-06

Vertical Flame Jet 1.335E-08 112 1.5E-06

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close


9.74817E-05 10 0.000974817


9.71346E-05 10 0.000971346

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 48 0.001035533


5.9274E-06 10 0.000059274

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 10

0.000059007

SDV Failed


Detection

and SDV


2.937E-07 10 2.94E-06

Vertical Jet 0.000000267 10 2.67E-06

24

Failed Dispersion Gaussian

Dispersion 2.937E-07 48 1.41E-05


1.335E-08 10 1.34E-07

Vertical Flame Jet

1.335E-08 10

1.34E-07



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close


9.74817E-05 326 0.031779034


9.71346E-05 326 0.03166588

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 1300 0.02804568


5.9274E-06 326 0.001932332

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 326 0.001923628

SDV Failed


Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 326 9.57E-05


0.000000267 326 8.7E-05

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 1300 0.000382


1.335E-08 326 4.35E-06

Vertical Flame Jet 1.335E-08 326 4.35E-06

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close


9.74817E-05 26 0.002534524


9.71346E-05 26 0.0025255

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 212 0.004573603


5.9274E-06 26 0.000154112

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 26

0.000153418

SDV Failed


Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 26 7.64E-06


0.000000267 26 6.94E-06

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 212 6.23E-05


1.335E-08 26 3.47E-07

Vertical Flame 1.335E-08 26 3.47E-07

25

Jet

Table 24. QRA for pipe rupture.


Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close


9.74817E-05 321 0.031291626


9.71346E-05 321 0.031180207

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 2300 0.04961928


5.9274E-06 321 0.001902695

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 321 0.001894125

SDV Failed


Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 321 9.43E-05


0.000000267 321 8.57E-05

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 321 9.43E-05


1.335E-08 2300 3.07E-05

Vertical Flame Jet 1.335E-08

321 4.29E-06

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close


9.74817E-05 573 0.055857014


9.71346E-05 573 0.055658126

Gaussian Dispersion

2.15736E-05 2544 0.054883238


5.9274E-06 573 0.0033964

Vertical Flame Jet

5.9007E-06 573 0.003381101

SDV Failed


Detection

and SDV

Failed


2.937E-07 573 0.000168


0.000000267 573 0.000153

Gaussian Dispersion

2.937E-07 2544 0.000747


1.335E-08 573 7.65E-06

Vertical Flame Jet

1.335E-08 573 7.65E-06

Table 25. QRA of pressure build-up for 0.1” leakage of pipe.


Puff SDV

Succeed to

Cloud Fire 0.0001172 6 0.0007032

Explosion 0.0001115 12 0.001338

26

Close Flash Fire 5.02E-05 6 0.00030138

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 6 8.60727E-05

Explosion 1.36692E-05 12 0.000164031

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 6 3.67218E-05

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 6 2.1528E-06

Explosion 3.4155E-08 12 4.0986E-07

Flash Fire 1.518E-07 6 9.108E-07

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 0 0

Explosion 0.000111539 0 0

Flash Fire 0.000050232 0 0

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 0 0

Explosion 1.36692E-05 0 0

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 0 0

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 0 0


Flash Fire 1.518E-07 0 0



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 30 0.00351486

Explosion 0.000111539 258 0.028776933

Flash Fire 0.000050232 30 0.00150696

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 30 0.000430363

Explosion 1.36692E-05 258 0.003526665

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 30 0.000183609

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 30 0.000010764

Explosion 3.4155E-08 258 8.81199E-06

Flash Fire 1.518E-07 30 0.000004554

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 5 0.00058581

Explosion 0.000111539 8 0.000892308

Flash Fire 0.000050232 5 0.00025116

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 5 7.17272E-05

Explosion 1.36692E-05 8 0.000109354

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 5 3.06015E-05

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 5 0.000001794

Explosion 3.4155E-08 8 2.7324E-07

Flash Fire 1.518E-07 5 0.000000759



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 112 0.013122144

Explosion 0.000111539 272 0.030338472

Flash Fire 0.000050232 112 0.005625984

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 112 0.00160669

Explosion 1.36692E-05 272 0.003718035

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 112 0.000685474

Detection

and SDV

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 112 4.01856E-05

Explosion 3.4155E-08 272 9.29016E-06

27

Failed Flash Fire 1.518E-07 112 1.70016E-05

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 10 0.00117162

Explosion 0.000111539 26 0.002900001

Flash Fire 0.000050232 10 0.00050232

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 10 0.000143454

Explosion 1.36692E-05 26 0.0003554

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 10 0.000061203

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 10 0.000003588

Explosion 3.4155E-08 26 8.8803E-07

Flash Fire 1.518E-07 10 0.000001518

Table 28. QRA of pressure build-up for 1” leakage of pipe.


Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 26 0.003046212

Explosion 0.000111539 1140 0.12715389

Flash Fire 0.000117162 26 0.003046212

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 26 0.000372982

Explosion 1.36692E-05 1140 0.015582939

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 26 0.000159128

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 26 9.3288E-06

Explosion 3.4155E-08 1140 3.89367E-05

Flash Fire 1.518E-07 26 3.9468E-06

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 26 0.003046212

Explosion 0.000111539 87 0.00970385

Flash Fire 0.000050232 26 0.001306032

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 26 0.000372982

Explosion 1.36692E-05 87 0.001189224

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 26 0.000159128

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 26 9.3288E-06

Explosion 3.4155E-08 87 2.97149E-06

Flash Fire 1.518E-07 26 3.9468E-06

Table 29. QRA of pressure build-up for rupture pipe.


Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 321 0.037609002

Explosion 0.000111539 999 0.111426962

Flash Fire 0.000050232 321 0.016124472

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 321 0.004604888

Explosion 1.36692E-05 999 0.013655576

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 321 0.001964616

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 321 0.000115175

Explosion 3.4155E-08 999 3.41208E-05

Flash Fire 1.518E-07 321 4.87278E-05

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

Cloud Fire 0.000117162 573 0.067133826

Explosion 0.000111539 1407 0.15693467

Flash Fire 0.000050232 573 0.028782936

SDV Failed

to Close

Cloud Fire 1.43454E-05 573 0.00821994

Explosion 1.36692E-05 1407 0.019232628

28

Flash Fire 6.1203E-06 573 0.003506932

Detection

and SDV

Failed

Cloud Fire 3.588E-07 573 0.000205592

Explosion 3.4155E-08 1407 4.80561 E-05

Flash Fire 1.518E-07 573 8.69814E-05

Table 30. QRA of temperature rise for 0.1” leakage of pipe.


Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 12 0.000882324

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 6 0.000809248

Explosion 2.17034E-05 12 0.000260441 Flash Fire 1.91101E-05 6 0.00011466

SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06 12 1.25904E-05

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 12 6.19E-06

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 6 7.74E-07

Explosion 0.000000172 12 2.06E-06

Flash Fire 0.000000215 6 1.29E-06

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 0 0

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 0 0


Flash Fire 1.91101E-05 0 0

SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06 0 0

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 0 0

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 0 0

Explosion 0.000000172 0 0

Flash Fire 0.000000215 0 0



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 258 0.018969963

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 30 0.00404624


SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06 258 0.000270694

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 258 0.000133

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 30 3.87E-06

Explosion 0.000000172 258 4.44E-05

Flash Fire 0.000000215 30 6.45E-06

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 8 0.000588216

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 5 0.000674373

Explosion 2.17034E-05 8 0.000173627

Flash Fire 7.3527E-05 8 0.000588216

SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06 8 8.3936E-06

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 8 4.13E-06

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 5 6.45E-07

Explosion 0.000000172 8 1.38E-06

29

Flash Fire 0.000000215 5 1.08E-06



Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 272 0.019999341

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 112 0.015105962


SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06 272 0.000285382

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 272 0.00014

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 112 1.44E-05

Explosion 0.000000172 272 4.68E-05

Flash Fire 0.000000215 112 2.41 E-05

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 26 0.001911702

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 10 0.001348747

Explosion 2.17034E-05 26 0.000564288

Flash Fire 7.3527E-05 10 0.000191101

SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06 26 2.72792E-05

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 26 2.72792E-05

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 26 1.34E-05

Explosion 0.000000172 10 1.29E-06

Flash Fire 0.000000215 26 4.47E-06

Table 33. QRA of temperature rise for 1” leakage of pipe.


Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 1120 0.082350229

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 326 0.043969139


SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06

1120 0.001175104

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 1120 0.000578

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 326 4.21 E-05

Explosion 0.000000172 1120 0.000193

Flash Fire 0.000000215 326 7.01 E-05

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 87 0.006396848

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 26 0.003506741

Explosion 2.17034E-05 87 0.001888195

Flash Fire 7.3527E-05 26 0.000496862

SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06

87 9.12804E-05

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 87 4.49E-05

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 26 3.35E-06

Explosion 0.000000172 87 1.5E-05

Flash Fire 0.000000215 26 5.59E-06

Table 34. QRA of temperature rise for rupture pipe.

30


Puff

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 999 0.073453463

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 321 0.043294766


SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06 999 0.001048151

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 999 0.000515

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 321 4.14E-05

Explosion 0.000000172 999 0.000172

Flash Fire 0.000000215 321 6.9E-05

Plume

SDV

Succeed to

Close

BLEVE 7.3527E-05 1407 0.103452475

Cloud Fire 0.000134875 573 0.07728318

Explosion 2.17034E-05 1407 0.03053667

Flash Fire 7.3527E-05 573 0.010950064

SDV Failed

to Close BLEVE 1.0492E-06 1407 0.001476224

Detection

and SDV

Failed

BLEVE 0.000000516 1407 0.000726

Cloud Fire 0.000000129 573 7.39E-05

Explosion 0.000000172 1407 0.000242

Flash Fire 0.000000215 573 0.000123

Table 35. QRA of other source.

Source Incident

Type

Frequency Consequency Risk

Static

electricity

source

Explosion 0.00000928 999 0.009271

Inlet air Explosion 1.17292E-06 999 0.001172

Conclusions

LNG

Based on the results of QRA, it is concluded that there are 9 events included in the ALARP

category (As Low As Reseanobly Practicable) and the remainder is included in the acceptable

category. Incidents included in the ALARP category include the impact of jet fire from hole

leak occurrence 1" in the transfer pipeline, VCE (vapor cloud explosion) and toxic release of

the fracture in the middle of the transfer pipeline, VCE (vapor cloud explosion) and toxic

release from the occurrence of a 1" leakage leak on the filling shed pipe, VCE, jet fire and

toxic release from a 1" hole leak on the platform connection to the vessel, and toxic release of

hole leak occurrence 1 "in the boil-off pipeline. A more detailed category classification is

shown in Figure 5. Any incidents included in the ALARP category should be prevented in the

form of recommendations to be tolerable or acceptable risk categories tolerable or acceptable

categories.

31

Figure 5. ALARP region.

Table 36. Explanation of ALARP region.

No. Incident

1. VCE, 1" hole transfer pipe

2. Jet Fire, 1" hole transfer pipe

3. Toxic Release, 1" hole transfer pipe

4. VCE, rupture transfer pipe

5. Jet Fire, rupture transfer pipe

6. Toxic Release, rupture transfer pipe

7. VCE, 1" hole on platform connection

8. Jet Fire, 1" hole on platform connection

9. Toxic Release, 1" hole on platform connection

10. VCE, 1" hole on boil-off gas pipe

11. Jet fire, 1" hole on boil-off gas pipe

12. Toxic Release, 1" hole on boil-off gas pipe

13. VCE, 1" hole on pipa filling shed pipe

14. Jet Fire, 1" hole on pipa filling shed pipe

15. Toxic Release, 1" hole on pipa filling shed pipe

Ethylene

1. The most common hazards are pipe leaks that may pose risks of jet dispersion, flame jet,

gaussian dispersion, and fireball. These Hazards have a frequency level of 1.19 x 10-5 to

9.75 x 10-5.

2. The most dangerous Hazards are rupture tank leaks due to increased temperatures that can

cause BLEVE, cloud fire, flash fire, explosion, and flash fire. These hazards have a fire

severity of 321, a 2300 explosion, and a 999 toxic vapor spread.

3. Evacuation measures against workers and local residents need to be done when the

rupture tank leaks due to the increase in temperature occur.

32

Recommendations

LNG

1. Installation of Gas Detector

Gas detector is a tool to detect the presence of a gas in the factory area, especially in the

event of gas leakage. Because it can be detected at the beginning, it is expected that

personnel within the factory can handle it quickly. Typically, gas detectors are installed at

vulnerable points of leakage, such as in pipelines, joints / welding joints, and on

platforms. The detector gas will be connected to the alarm which the operator will get

notified if there is a leak. Figure 6 shows the location of the gas detector. This tool will be

placed at simulated and analysis locations using F-N curves in the ALARP zone.

2. Installation of Green Belt

Green Belt can be used as a protector in case of leakage of substance in an accident at the

factory. Green belt in the form of green and high plants are placed in certain areas. The

purpose of putting green belt siantaranya ie reduce gas concentration, break down the

concentration of vapor cloud, and sabagai barrier of toxic substances. Figure 6 shows

where the green belt is installed. These protective plants will be placed around the factory

area so as to reduce the risk of impact.

Figure 6. Design of Installation of Green Belt and Gas Detector.

No. Name

1. Workshop and workplace area

2. Platform/loading dock area

3. Pump house and water tank area

4. Filling shed area

5. Border area with coal stockpile



8. Compressor area

9. Parking area

33

3. Scenarios and Results of Recommendation Implementation

In implementing the recommendation, 3 scenarios of recommendation were first installed

gas detector, second installed green belt, third installed gas detector and green belt

simultaneously. Figure 7 to Figure 9 shows the F-N curve of the implementation results of

each scenario. The probability of implementation failure of the gas detector and the green

belt is obtained from the literature.

Based on the analysis it can be said that the implementation of gas detector can reduce all

the risk of occurrence belonging to ALARP category, but still left 5 events that still

belong to ALARP category. Likewise with the implementation of the green belt can not

reduce all the risk of occurrence to belong to the category acceptable, because there are

still 3 events that belong to ALARP category. At the time of implementation of the third

scenario is the installation of gas detectors and green belt simultaneously, it is obtained a

good result where all events can be reduced to acceptable categories. Therefore, the

proposed recommendation is a third scenario where the installation of gas detectors and

green belts simultaneously.

Figure 7. F-N Curve after addition of gas detector.

34

Figure 8. F-N Curve after addition of green belt.

Figure 9. F-N Curve after addition of gas detector and green belt.

Ethylene

Based on the QRA that has been done, it can be seen that for all scenarios generated risks

categorized in ALARP and intolerable groups. In general, the most dangerous and most

frequent risks are initiated events in the form of release of ethylene vapor into the air. The

scenario with the greatest impact of risk is the tank rupture due to the increase in temperature,

while the most frequent scenario is caused by a pipe leak at the tip of the filling shed.

35

Rupture of the tank due to an increase in storage tank temperatures is a case with risk grouped

as intolerable with the greatest number of fatalities compared to other cases, namely 321

persons (fire), 999 (toxic vapor spreading), and 2300 (explosion). The radius of the hazardous

area generated from this incident is as far as 1.2 km. This risk is most likely to occur by

preceding the leakage of ethylene vapor from the tank and the presence of an ignition source

resulting in a fire around the tank that ultimately increases the temperature of the ethylene

fluid in the tank. Increased temperatures of ethylene tanks have the potential to trigger

BLEVE. BLEVE occurring under fire conditions around the tank area will result in an

explosion followed by fireball.

To mitigate the occurrence of this risk, it is necessary to build a blast wall in the area around

the ethylene loading and unloading terminal which aims to protect the area around the loading

terminal of ethylene from the widespread explosive effect. The blast wall is preferably built in

a location that leads to a coal stockpile. With the construction of the blast wall is not expected

to occur escalation of hazard areas due to the occurrence of BLEVE or fire in coal stockpile,

so that the level of risk can be decreased and classified as ALARP.

For the prevention of this risk, it is recommended to install the temperature element connected

to the alarm temerature in the storage tank. If it is identified that there is an increase in

temperature above the safe limit, it should immediately cool down the tank by spraying it

using a refrigerant.

References

ABS, Bunkering of Liquefied Natural Gas-fueled Marine Vessels in North America

American Chemistry Council. 2004. “Ethylene Product Stewardship Guidance Manual”.

American Chemistry Council. 2004. “Handling and Transportation Guide for Ethylene,

Refrigerated Liquid (Cryogenic Ethylene)”. Arlington.

A. Crowl, Joseph F. Louvar, 2011, Chemical Process Safety Fundamentals with Applications,

3rd Ed, Pearson Education, Inc.

Center for Chemical Process Safety. 1994. “Guidelines for Evaluating the Characteristics of

Vapor Cloud Explosions, Flash Fires, and BLEVEs”. American Institute of Chemical

Engineers. New York.

Danielle Holden, 2014, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Bunkering Study, Maritime

AdministrationDaniel.

Ronza, Felez.; Darbra, Carol.; Vilchez, Casal. 2003. “Predicting the Frequency of Accidents

in Port Areas by Developing Event Trees from Historical Analysis”. Barcelona.

Suhardi, 2011, Orientasi Umum Seksi Process Train, Technical Department PT Badak LNG.

Michelle Michot Foss, 2012, LNG Safety And Security, Center for Engergy

Econimics (CEE), Texas.

http://meteo.bmkg.go.id/prakiraan/propinsi/13

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