Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-40296 November 21, 1984ALLIED THREAD CO., INC., and KER & COMPANY, LTD., petitioners, vs.HON. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, HON. CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, HON. LORENZO RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch II, CFI of Manila, respondents. Antonio A. Nieva for petitioners. Santiago F. Alidio, S.M. Artiaga, Jr. and Jose A. Perella for respondents. ABAD SANTOS, J.:This is a Petition for Review challenging the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila presided by then Judge, now Justice Lorenzo Relova, which upheld the validity of Manila Ordinance No. 7516, as amended by Ordinance Nos. 7544, 7545 and 7556, and adjudging petitioner Allied Thread Co., Inc. taxable thereunder considering that its products are sold in Manila. On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7516 imposing on manufacturers, importer porters or producers, doing business in the City of Manila, business taxes based on gross sales on a graduated basis. The Mayor approved the said Ordinance on June 15, 1974. In due time, the same ordinance underwent a series of amendments, to wit: on June 19, 1974, by Ordinance No. 7544 approved by the Mayor on the same date; Ordinance No. 7545 enacted by the Municipal Board on June 20, 1974 and approved by the Mayor on June 27, 1974; and Ordinance No. 7556, enacted by the Municipal Board on July 20, 1974 and approved by the Mayor on July 29,1974. Ordinance No. 7516 as amended, reads as follows: Sec. 1. Business Tax. There is hereby imposed on the following business in the City of Manila an annual tax collectible quarterly except on those for which fixed taxes are already provided for as follows: A. On manufacturers, importers, or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the following schedule: xxx xxx xxxPROVIDED HOWEVER, that for purposes of collection of this tax, manufacturers and producers maintaining or operating branch or sales offices elsewhere shall record the sale in the branch or sales office making the sale and the tax thereon shall accrue to the City of Manila if the branch of sales office is in Manila. In cases where there is no such branch or sales office in the city, the sale shag be duly recorded in the principal office along with the sales made in the principal office. Sixty percent of all sales recorded in the principal office shall be taxable by the City of Manila if the principal office is in Manila, while the remaining forty percent shall be deemed as sales made in the factory and shall he taxable by the local government where the factory is located. In cases where a manufacturer or producer has factories in Manila and in different localities, the forty per cent sales allocation mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be appropriated among the City of Manila and the localities where the factories are situated in proportion to their respective volumes of production during the period for which the tax is due.The records show that petitioner Allied Id Co., inc. is engaged in the business of manufacturing sewing thread and yarn under duly registered marks and labels. It operates its factory and maintains an office in Pasig, Rizal. In order to sell its products in Manila and in other parts of the Philippines, petitioner Allied Thread Co., Inc. engaged the services of a sales broker, Ker & Company, Ltd. (co-petitioner herein), the latter deriving commissions from every sale made for its principal. Having been affected by the aforementioned Ordinance, being manufacturers and sales brokers, on July 22, 1974, Allied Thread Co., Inc. and Ker & Co., Ltd. filed with the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, a petition for Declaratory Relief, contending that Ordinance No. 7516, as amended, is not valid nor enforceable as the same is contrary to Section 54 of Presidential Decree No. 426, as clarified by Local Tax Regulation No. 1-74 dated April 8, 1974 of the Department of Finance, reading as follows: J. GENERAL PROVISIONS 1. All existing tax ordinance of provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios shall be deemed ipso facto nullified on June 30, 1974. 2. The local boards or councils should enact their respective tax ordinances pursuant to the provisions of the Local Tax Code, as amended by P.D. 426, to take effect not earlier than July 1, 1974. 3. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 42 of the Code, as amended by Section 18 of the said Decree, a local tax ordinance shall go into effect on the 15th day after approved by the local chief executives in accordance with Section 41 of the Code. 4. In view hereof, and considering the provisions of Section 54 of the Code, regarding the accrual of taxes a local tax ordinance intended to take effect on July 1, 1974 should be enacted by the Local Chief Executive not later than June 15, 1974. (Emphasis supplied) Otherwise stated, petitioners assert that due to the series of amendments to Ordinance No. 7516, the same Ordinance fell short of the deadline set by Sec. 54 of P.D. No. 426 that "for an ordinance intended to take effect on July 1, 1974, it must be enacted on or before June 15, 1974." Necessarily, so it is asserted, the said Ordinance No. 7516 as amended, is not valid nor enforceable. Petitioners further contend that the questioned Ordinance did not comply with the necessary publication requirement in a newspaper of general circulation as mandated by Sec. 43 of the Local Tax Code. Petitioner Allied Thread Co., Inc. also claims that it should not be subjected to the said Ordinance No. 7516 as amended, because it does not operate or maintain a branch office in Manila and that its principal office and factory are located in Pasig, Rizal. We agree with the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 7516 as amended, and finding petitioner Allied Thread Co., Inc. the proper subject thereto. There is no dispute that Ordinance No. 7516 was enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila on June 12, 1974 and approved by the City Mayor on June 15, 1974. Fifteen (15) days thereafter, or on July 1, 1974, the said ordinance became effective pursuant to Sec. 42 of the Local Tax Code. It is clear therefore that Ordinance No. 7516 has fully conformed with P.D. No. 426 and Local Tax Regulation No. 1-74 which require that "a local tax ordinance intended to take effect on July 1, 1974 should be enacted by the Local Chief Executive not later than June 15, 1974 ". The subsequent amendments to the basic ordinance did not in any way invalidate it nor move the date of its effectivity. To hold otherwise would limit the power of the defunct Municipal Board of Manila to amend an existing ordinance as exigencies require. Petitioners complain that they were not fully apprised of the enactment of Ordinance No. 7516 for the same was not duly published in a newspaper of general circulation. Respondents argue however, that copies of Ordinance No. 7516 and its amendments were posted in public buildings, government offices, and public places in lieu of publication in newspaper of general circulation. We are persuaded that there was substantial compliance of the law on publication. Section 43 of the Local Tax Code provides two modes of apprising the public of a new ordinance, either, (a) by means of publication in a newspaper of general circulation or, (b) by means of posting of copies thereof in the local legislative hall or premises and two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Respondents, having complied with the second mode of notice, We are of the opinion that there is no legal infirmity to the validity of Ordinance No. 7516 as amended. Finally, petitioner Allied Thread Co., Inc. claims exclusion from Ordinance No. 7515 as amended on the ground that it does not maintain an office or branch office in the City of Manila, where the subject Ordinance only applies. This contention is devoid of merit. Allied Thread Co., Inc. admits that it does business in the City of Manila through a broker or agent, Ker & Company, Ltd. Doing business in the City of Manila is all that is required to fall within the coverage of the Ordinance. It should be noted that Ordinance No. 7516 as amended imposes a business tax on manufacturers, importers or producers doing business in the City of Manila. The tax imposition here is upon the performance of an act, enjoyment of a privilege, or the engaging in an occupation, and hence is in the nature of an excise tax. The power to levy an excise upon the performance of an act or the engaging in an occupation does not depend upon the domicile of the person subject to the excise nor upon the physical location of the property and in connection with the act or occupation taxed, but depends upon the place in which the act is performed or occupation engaged in. Thus, the gauge for taxability under the said Ordinance No. 7516 as amended does not depend on the location of the office, but attaches upon the place where the respective sale transaction(s) is perfected and consummated. (See Koppel (Phil.) vs. Yatco, 77 Phil. 496 [1946]) Since Allied Thread Co., Inc. sells its products in the City of Manila through its broker, Ker & Company, Ltd., it cannot escape the tax liability imposed by Ordinance No. 7516 as amended. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, and Cuevas, JJ., concur. Teehankee and Relova, JJ., took no part. Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 118233 December 10, 1999ANTONIO Z. REYES, ELISEO P. OCAMPO and EDITHA ARCIAGA-SANTOS, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FRANKLIN DRILON and MAYOR JINGGOY ESTRADA (JOSE EJERCITO) OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN, METRO MANILA, respondents.R E S O L U T I O NQUISUMBING, J.: For review is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, dated August 3, 1994 and its resolution 2 dated December 8, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 32473. Said decision dismissed the prohibition case brought by the petitioner against respondent officials of the Municipality of San Juan to stop the enforcement of Tax Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101.The factual antecedents are as follows:The Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan, Metro Manila implemented several tax ordinances as follows:Ordinance No. Title87 An ordinance imposing a municipal tax of fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross receipt on business of printing and publication91 An ordinance imposing a transfer tax equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the total consideration on the sale, donation, barter or any other mode of transferring ownership or title of real property situated in San Juan, Metro Manila, or its fair market value, whichever is higher95 An ordinance imposing fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) for social housing tax on the assessed value of all real estate property in San Juan, Metro Manila in excess of P50,000.00 value as provided in the New Urban Land Reform Law, also known as R.A. 7279.100 An ordinance imposing new rates of business taxes of the Municipality of San Juan Metro Manila101 An ordinance levying an annual "Ad Valorem" tax on real property and an additional tax accruing to the special education fund (SEF)On May 21, 1993, petitioners filed an appeal with the Department of Justice assailing the constitutionality of these tax ordinances allegedly because they were promulgated without previous public hearings thereby constituting deprivation of property without due process of law.On June 10, 1993, respondent Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time. Citing Section 187, R.A. No. 7160, he said:It appears that the tax ordinances in question took effect on September 24, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance No. 87, until October 22, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance Nos. 91 and 95, and until October 29, 1992, in the case of Tax Ordinance Nos. 100 and 101, or more than thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof when the appeal was filed and received by this Department on May 21, 1993 and therefore not in accordance with the requirements provided for under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991.WHEREFORE, the instant appeal, having been filed out of time, is hereby DISMISSED. 3Undaunted, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA-G.R. SP No. 32473). But respondent court affirmed the decision of the Secretary. On December 8, 1994, the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied for lack of merit.Hence, the present petition for review, raising the following questions:1. Whether or not the questioned tax ordinances are violative of the Constitution, considering the undisputed fact that no public hearings were ever held on the ordinances before they were passed and approved as required by the Local Government Code of 1991, thereby constituting as they do a deprivation of property without due process;2. Whether or not the wording of the law under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that "any question on the constitutionality . . . of tax ordinance . . . may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof . . ." is a reductio as absurdum, since if the tax ordinance is found to be unconstitutional, it will be considered as never having become effective at all from the very beginning, for which reason the thirty-day appeal period cannot be reckoned and cannot be enforced;3. Whether or not the constitutionality of a tax ordinance, or any law for that matter, can be questioned at any time despite the prescription of a limited period within which to question it, as in case at bar; and4. Whether or not the constitutionality of an ordinance or a law may be questioned even if the question of constitutionality may not have been originally or initially raised, or is not the lis mota of the case, if it appears that a determination of the question of constitutionality is necessary to a decision of the case. 4In our view, the pertinent issues for our resolution now are:1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the Secretary of Justice who dismissed the prohibition suit, on the ground that it was filed out of time?2. Whether or not lack of mandatory public hearings prior to enacting Municipal Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101 render them void on the ground of deprivation of property without due process?3. Whether or not the constitutional validity of Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code could be raised for the first time on appeal?According to petitioners, respondent Secretary erred in declaring that they failed to file their appeal on time. Also, they assail Municipal Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101, for alleged failure of the Municipal Council of San Juan to conduct mandatory public hearings. Because of this, they claim the ordinances are inoperative, as through they were never passed. Consequently, no prescriptive thirty-day period to question the validity of the ordinance could toll to bar their appeal to the Department of Justice.Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160, cited by respondent Secretary, provides as follows:Sec. 187 Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.Clearly, the law requires that the dissatisfied taxpayer who questions the validity or legality of a tax ordinance must file his appeal to the Secretary of Justice, within 30 days from effectivity thereof. In case the Secretary decides the appeals, a period also of 30 days is allowed for an aggrieved party to go to court. But if the Secretary does not act thereon, after the lapse of 60 days, a party could already proceed to seek relief in court. These three separate periods are clearly given for compliance as a prerequisite before seeking redress in a competent court. Such statutory periods are set to prevent delays as well as enhance the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial functions. 5 For this reason the courts construct these provisions of statutes as mandatory. 6A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. 7 Consequently, any delay in implementing tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. In the instant case, it is our view that the failure of petitioners to appeal to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days as required by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160 is fatal to their cause.On the second issue, petitioners allege that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan did not comply with the prescribed procedure for enacting an ordinance because they failed to conduct public hearings.In Figurres vs. Court of Appeals, 8 where the municipality failed to conduct public hearings prior to enacting the revisions on the schedule of fair market values and assessment level of classes of real estate properties, the Court said:Petitioner is right in contending that public hearings are required to be conducted prior to the enactment of an ordinance imposing real property taxes. R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 186, provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges "shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose."However, it is noteworthy that part from her bare assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were conducted prior not the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims the public hearings were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidences showing that procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment . . . .Furthermore, the lack of a public hearings is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their constitutionality or legality. 9We find Figuerres instructive. Petitioners have not proved in the case before us that the Sangguniang Bayan of San Juan failed to conduct the required public hearings before the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 87, 91, 95, 100 and 101. Although the Sanggunian had the control of records or the better means of proof regarding the facts alleged, petitioner as not relieved from the burden of proving their averments. 10 Proof that public hearings were not held falls on petitioner' shoulders. For failing to discharge that burden, their petition was properly dismissed.In any event, for the purpose of securing certainty where doubt would be intolerable, it is a general rules that the regularity of the enactment of an officially promulgated statute or ordinance may not be impeached by parol evidence or oral testimony either of individual officers and members, or of strangers who may be interested in nullifying legislative action. 11 This rules supplements the presumption in favor of the regularity of official conduct which we have upheld repeatedly, absent a clear showing to the contrary.Finally, on the validity of Section 187 of R.A. 7160, the Local Government Code, we must stress that the constitutionality of an act of Congress will not be passed upon by the Court unless at the first opportunity that question is properly raised and presented in an appropriate case, and is necessary to a determination of the case, particularly where the issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. 12 The constitutional validity of a statutory provision should not be entertained by the Court where it was not specifically raised below, insisted upon, and adequately argued. 13 Moreover, given the circumstances in this case, we find no genuine necessity to dwell on the issue of constitutional invalidity of Section 187 in relation to issue of valid enactment of the subject ordinances, as shown in the foregoing discussion. Suffice it now to say that, having resolved the first and second issues, we find no grave abuse of discretion nor reversible error in the decision of respondent appellate court. Further constitutional scrutiny of Section 187 is unwarranted.WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.THE CITY OF MANILA, LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as THE TREASURER OF MANILA and JOSEPH SANTIAGO, in his capacity as the CHIEF OF THE LICENSE DIVISION OF CITY OF MANILA, petitioners,- versus -COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.G.R. No. 181845Present:

August 4, 2009

D e C I S i o n

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to review and reverse the Decision[footnoteRef:1][1] dated 18 January 2008 and Resolution[footnoteRef:2][2] dated 18 February 2008 of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc (CTA en banc) in C.T.A. EB No. 307. In its assailed Decision, the CTA en banc dismissed the Petition for Review of herein petitioners City of Manila, Liberty M. Toledo (Toledo), and Joseph Santiago (Santiago); and affirmed the Resolutions dated 24 May 2007,[footnoteRef:3][3] 8 June 2007,[footnoteRef:4][4] and 26 July 2007,[footnoteRef:5][5] of the CTA First Division in C.T.A. AC No. 31, which, in turn, dismissed the Petition for Review of petitioners in said case for being filed out of time. In its questioned Resolution, the CTA en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners. [1: ] [2: ] [3: ] [4: ] [5: ]

Petitioner City of Manila is a public corporation empowered to collect and assess business taxes, revenue fees, and permit fees, through its officers, petitioners Toledo and Santiago, in their capacities as City Treasurer and Chief of the Licensing Division, respectively. On the other hand, respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling beverages, and which maintains a sales office in the City of Manila. The case stemmed from the following facts:Prior to 25 February 2000, respondent had been paying the City of Manila local business tax only under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794,[footnoteRef:6][6] being expressly exempted from the business tax under Section 21 of the same tax ordinance. Pertinent provisions of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 provide: [6: ]

Section 14. Tax on Manufacturers, Assemblers and Other Processors. There is hereby imposed a graduated tax on manufacturers, assemblers, repackers, processors, brewers, distillers, rectifiers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits, and wines or manufacturers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, in accordance with any of the following schedule:x x x xover P6,500,000.00 up to P25,000,000.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- P36,000.00 plus 50% of 1% in excess of P6,500,000.00 x x x xSection 21. Tax on Businesses Subject to the Excise, Value-Added or Percentage Taxes under the NIRC. On any of the following businesses and articles of commerce subject to excise, value-added or percentage taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code hereinafter referred to as NIRC, as amended, a tax of FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of ONE PERCENT (1%) per annum on the gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year is hereby imposed:(A)On persons who sell goods and services in the course of trade or business; and those who import goods whether for business or otherwise; as provided for in Sections 100 to 103 of the NIRC as administered and determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the said Code.x x x x (D)Excisable goods subject to VAT(1)Distilled spirits(2)Winesx x x x(8)Coal and coke(9)Fermented liquor, brewers wholesale price, excluding the ad valorem taxx x x xPROVIDED, that all registered businesses in the City of Manila that are already paying the aforementioned tax shall be exempted from payment thereof.Petitioner City of Manila subsequently approved on 25 February 2000, Tax Ordinance No. 7988,[footnoteRef:7][7] amending certain sections of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, particularly: (1) Section 14, by increasing the tax rates applicable to certain establishments operating within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; and (2) Section 21, by deleting the proviso found therein, which stated that all registered businesses in the City of Manila that are already paying the aforementioned tax shall be exempted from payment thereof. Petitioner City of Manila approved only after a year, on 22 February 2001, another tax ordinance, Tax Ordinance No. 8011, amending Tax Ordinance No. 7988. [7: ]

Tax Ordinances No. 7988 and No. 8011 were later declared by the Court null and void in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila[footnoteRef:8][8] (Coca-Cola case) for the following reasons: (1) Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was enacted in contravention of the provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and its implementing rules and regulations; and (2) Tax Ordinance No. 8011 could not cure the defects of Tax Ordinance No. 7988, which did not legally exist. [8: ]

However, before the Court could declare Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 null and void, petitioner City of Manila assessed respondent on the basis of Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by the aforementioned tax ordinances, for deficiency local business taxes, penalties, and interest, in the total amount of P18,583,932.04, for the third and fourth quarters of the year 2000. Respondent filed a protest with petitioner Toledo on the ground that the said assessment amounted to double taxation, as respondent was taxed twice, i.e., under Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by Tax Ordinances No. 7988 and No. 8011. Petitioner Toledo did not respond to the protest of respondent.Consequently, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, an action for the cancellation of the assessment against respondent for business taxes, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107088. On 14 July 2006, the RTC rendered a Decision[footnoteRef:9][9] dismissing Civil Case No. 03-107088. The RTC ruled that the business taxes imposed upon the respondent under Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7988, as amended, were not of the same kind or character; therefore, there was no double taxation. The RTC, though, in an Order[footnoteRef:10][10] dated 16 November 2006, granted the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent, decreed the cancellation and withdrawal of the assessment against the latter, and barred petitioners from further imposing/assessing local business taxes against respondent under Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011. The 16 November 2006 Decision of the RTC was in conformity with the ruling of this Court in the Coca-Cola case, in which Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 were declared null and void. The Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners was denied by the RTC in an Order[footnoteRef:11][11] dated 4 April 2007. Petitioners received a copy of the 4 April 2007 Order of the RTC, denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the 16 November 2006 Order of the same court, on 20 April 2007. [9: ] [10: ] [11: ]

On 4 May 2007, petitioners filed with the CTA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, praying for a 15-day extension or until 20 May 2007 within which to file their Petition. The Motion for Extension of petitioners was docketed as C.T.A. AC No. 31, raffled to the CTA First Division. Again, on 18 May 2007, petitioners filed, through registered mail, a Second Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, praying for another 10-day extension, or until 30 May 2007, within which to file their Petition.On 24 May 2007, however, the CTA First Division already issued a Resolution dismissing C.T.A. AC No. 31 for failure of petitioners to timely file their Petition for Review on 20 May 2007. Unaware of the 24 May 2007 Resolution of the CTA First Division, petitioners filed their Petition for Review therewith on 30 May 2007 via registered mail. On 8 June 2007, the CTA First Division issued another Resolution, reiterating the dismissal of the Petition for Review of petitioners. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolutions dated 24 May 2007 and 8 June 2007, but their motion was denied by the CTA First Division in a Resolution dated 26 July 2007. The CTA First Division reasoned that the Petition for Review of petitioners was not only filed out of time -- it also failed to comply with the provisions of Section 4, Rule 5; and Sections 2 and 3, Rule 6, of the Revised Rules of the CTA. Petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review before the CTA en banc, docketed as C.T.A. EB No. 307, arguing that the CTA First Division erred in dismissing their Petition for Review in C.T.A. AC No. 31 for being filed out of time, without considering the merits of their Petition.The CTA en banc rendered its Decision on 18 January 2008, dismissing the Petition for Review of petitioners and affirming the Resolutions dated 24 May 2007, 8 June 2007, and 26 July 2007 of the CTA First Division. The CTA en banc similarly denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners in a Resolution dated 18 February 2008Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the following issues:I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD TO TIMELY APPEAL THE CASE FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE [CTA DIVISION].II. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THIS COURT IN THE EARLIER [COCA-COLA CASE] IS DOCTRINAL AND CONTROLLING IN THE INSTANT CASE. III. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CITY OF MANILA CAN STILL ASSESS TAXES UNDER [SECTIONS] 14 AND 21 OF [TAX ORDINANCE NO. 7794, AS AMENDED]. IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ENFORCEMENT OF [SECTION] 21 OF THE [TAX ORDINANCE NO. 7794, AS AMENDED] CONSTITUTES DOUBLE TAXATION.Petitioners assert that Section 1, Rule 7[footnoteRef:12][12] of the Revised Rules of the CTA refers to certain provisions of the Rules of Court, such as Rule 42 of the latter, and makes them applicable to the tax court. Petitioners then cannot be faulted in relying on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 42[footnoteRef:13][13] of the Rules of Court as regards the period for filing a Petition for Review with the CTA in division. Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day period, reckoned from receipt of the adverse decision of the trial court, within which to file a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The same rule allows an additional 15-day period within which to file such a Petition; and, only for the most compelling reasons, another extension period not to exceed 15 days. Petitioners received on 20 April 2007 a copy of the 4 April 2007 Order of the RTC, denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the 16 November 2006 Order of the same court. On 4 May 2007, believing that they only had 15 days to file a Petition for Review with the CTA in division, petitioners moved for a 15-day extension, or until 20 May 2007, within which to file said Petition. Prior to the lapse of their first extension period, or on 18 May 2007, petitioners again moved for a 10-day extension, or until 30 May 2007, within which to file their Petition for Review. Thus, when petitioners filed their Petition for Review with the CTA First Division on 30 May 2007, the same was filed well within the reglementary period for doing so. [12: ] [13: ]

Petitioners argue in the alternative that even assuming that Section 3(a), Rule 8[footnoteRef:14][14] of the Revised Rules of the CTA governs the period for filing a Petition for Review with the CTA in division, still, their Petition for Review was filed within the reglementary period. Petitioners call attention to the fact that prior to the lapse of the 30-day period for filing a Petition for Review under Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, they had already moved for a 10-day extension, or until 30 May 2007, within which to file their Petition. Petitioners claim that there was sufficient justification in equity for the grant of the 10-day extension they requested, as the primordial consideration should be the substantive, and not the procedural, aspect of the case. Moreover, Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, is silent as to whether the 30-day period for filing a Petition for Review with the CTA in division may be extended or not. [14: ]

Petitioners also contend that the Coca-Cola case is not determinative of the issues in the present case because the issue of nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 is not the lis mota herein. The Coca-Cola case is not doctrinal and cannot be considered as the law of the case. Petitioners further insist that notwithstanding the declaration of nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011, Tax Ordinance No. 7794 remains a valid piece of local legislation. The nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 does not effectively bar petitioners from imposing local business taxes upon respondent under Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as they were read prior to their being amended by the foregoing null and void tax ordinances.Petitioners finally maintain that imposing upon respondent local business taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 does not constitute direct double taxation. Section 143 of the LGC gives municipal, as well as city governments, the power to impose business taxes, to wit:SECTION 143. Tax on Business. The municipality may impose taxes on the following businesses: (a)On manufacturers, assemblers, repackers, processors, brewers, distillers, rectifiers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits, and wines or manufacturers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, in accordance with the following schedule:x x x x(b)On wholesalers, distributors, or dealers in any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature in accordance with the following schedule:x x x x(c)On exporters, and on manufacturers, millers, producers, wholesalers, distributors, dealers or retailers of essential commodities enumerated hereunder at a rate not exceeding one-half (1/2) of the rates prescribed under subsections (a), (b) and (d) of this Section:x x x xProvided, however, That barangays shall have the exclusive power to levy taxes, as provided under Section 152 hereof, on gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or less, in the case of cities, and Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) or less, in the case of municipalities.(e)On contractors and other independent contractors, in accordance with the following schedule:x x x x(f)On banks and other financial institutions, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) on the gross receipts of the preceding calendar year derived from interest, commissions and discounts from lending activities, income from financial leasing, dividends, rentals on property and profit from exchange or sale of property, insurance premium.(g) On peddlers engaged in the sale of any merchandise or article of commerce, at a rate not exceeding Fifty pesos (P50.00) per peddler annually. (h)On any business, not otherwise specified in the preceding paragraphs, which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax: Provided, That on any business subject to the excise, value-added or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year.Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 imposes local business tax on manufacturers, etc. of liquors, distilled spirits, wines, and any other article of commerce, pursuant to Section 143(a) of the LGC. On the other hand, the local business tax under Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 is imposed upon persons selling goods and services in the course of trade or business, and those importing goods for business or otherwise, who, pursuant to Section 143(h) of the LGC, are subject to excise tax, value-added tax (VAT), or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Thus, there can be no double taxation when respondent is being taxed under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, for under the first, it is being taxed as a manufacturer; while under the second, it is being taxed as a person selling goods in the course of trade or business subject to excise, VAT, or percentage tax. The Court first addresses the issue raised by petitioners concerning the period within which to file with the CTA a Petition for Review from an adverse decision or ruling of the RTC.The period to appeal the decision or ruling of the RTC to the CTA via a Petition for Review is specifically governed by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282,[footnoteRef:15][15] and Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. [15: ]

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282 provides:SEC. 11. Who May Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal. Any party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry or the Secretary of Agriculture or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals or the Regional Trial Courts may file an Appeal with the CTA within thirty (30) days after the receipt of such decision or ruling or after the expiration of the period fixed by law for action as referred to in Section 7(a)(2) herein.Appeal shall be made by filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CTA within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision or ruling or in the case of inaction as herein provided, from the expiration of the period fixed by law to act thereon. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA statesSEC 3. Who may appeal; period to file petition. (a) A party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on disputed assessments or claims for refund of internal revenue taxes, or by a decision or ruling of the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Secretary of Agriculture, or a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction may appeal to the Court by petition for review filed within thirty days after receipt of a copy of such decision or ruling, or expiration of the period fixed by law for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the disputed assessments. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)It is crystal clear from the afore-quoted provisions that to appeal an adverse decision or ruling of the RTC to the CTA, the taxpayer must file a Petition for Review with the CTA within 30 days from receipt of said adverse decision or ruling of the RTC.

It is also true that the same provisions are silent as to whether such 30-day period can be extended or not. However, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282 does state that the Petition for Review shall be filed with the CTA following the procedure analogous to Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 42[footnoteRef:16][16] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Petition for Review of an adverse judgment or final order of the RTC must be filed with the Court of Appeals within: (1) the original 15-day period from receipt of the judgment or final order to be appealed; (2) an extended period of 15 days from the lapse of the original period; and (3) only for the most compelling reasons, another extended period not to exceed 15 days from the lapse of the first extended period. [16: ]

Following by analogy Section 1, Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the 30-day original period for filing a Petition for Review with the CTA under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, as implemented by Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, may be extended for a period of 15 days. No further extension shall be allowed thereafter, except only for the most compelling reasons, in which case the extended period shall not exceed 15 days.Even the CTA en banc, in its Decision dated 18 January 2008, recognizes that the 30-day period within which to file the Petition for Review with the CTA may, indeed, be extended, thus: Being suppletory to R.A. 9282, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allow an additional period of fifteen (15) days for the movant to file a Petition for Review, upon Motion, and payment of the full amount of the docket fees. A further extension of fifteen (15) days may be granted on compelling reasons in accordance with the provision of Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x.[footnoteRef:17][17] [17: ]

In this case, the CTA First Division did indeed err in finding that petitioners failed to file their Petition for Review in C.T.A. AC No. 31 within the reglementary period.From 20 April 2007, the date petitioners received a copy of the 4 April 2007 Order of the RTC, denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the 16 November 2006 Order, petitioners had 30 days, or until 20 May 2007, within which to file their Petition for Review with the CTA. Hence, the Motion for Extension filed by petitioners on 4 May 2007 grounded on their belief that the reglementary period for filing their Petition for Review with the CTA was to expire on 5 May 2007, thus, compelling them to seek an extension of 15 days, or until 20 May 2007, to file said Petition was unnecessary and superfluous. Even without said Motion for Extension, petitioners could file their Petition for Review until 20 May 2007, as it was still within the 30-day reglementary period provided for under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282; and implemented by Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. The Motion for Extension filed by the petitioners on 18 May 2007, prior to the lapse of the 30-day reglementary period on 20 May 2007, in which they prayed for another extended period of 10 days, or until 30 May 2007, to file their Petition for Review was, in reality, only the first Motion for Extension of petitioners. The CTA First Division should have granted the same, as it was sanctioned by the rules of procedure. In fact, petitioners were only praying for a 10-day extension, five days less than the 15-day extended period allowed by the rules. Thus, when petitioners filed via registered mail their Petition for Review in C.T.A. AC No. 31 on 30 May 2007, they were able to comply with the reglementary period for filing such a petition.Nevertheless, there were other reasons for which the CTA First Division dismissed the Petition for Review of petitioners in C.T.A. AC No. 31; i.e., petitioners failed to conform to Section 4 of Rule 5, and Section 2 of Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. The Court sustains the CTA First Division in this regard. Section 4, Rule 5 of the Revised Rules of the CTA requires that:SEC. 4. Number of copies. The parties shall file eleven signed copies of every paper for cases before the Court en banc and six signed copies for cases before a Division of the Court in addition to the signed original copy, except as otherwise directed by the Court. Papers to be filed in more than one case shall include one additional copy for each additional case. (Emphasis supplied.)Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the CTA further necessitates that:SEC. 2. Petition for review; contents. The petition for review shall contain allegations showing the jurisdiction of the Court, a concise statement of the complete facts and a summary statement of the issues involved in the case, as well as the reasons relied upon for the review of the challenged decision. The petition shall be verified and must contain a certification against forum shopping as provided in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. A clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the decision appealed from shall be attached to the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)The aforesaid provisions should be read in conjunction with Section 1, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, which provides:SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rules of Court on procedure in the Court of Appeals, exception. The procedure in the Court en banc or in Divisions in original or in appealed cases shall be the same as those in petitions for review and appeals before the Court of Appeals pursuant to the applicable provisions of Rules 42, 43, 44, and 46 of the Rules of Court, except as otherwise provided for in these Rules. (Emphasis supplied.)As found by the CTA First Division and affirmed by the CTA en banc, the Petition for Review filed by petitioners via registered mail on 30 May 2007 consisted only of one copy and all the attachments thereto, including the Decision dated 14 July 2006; and that the assailed Orders dated 16 November 2006 and 4 April 2007 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-107088 were mere machine copies. Evidently, petitioners did not comply at all with the requirements set forth under Section 4, Rule 5; or with Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. Although the Revised Rules of the CTA do not provide for the consequence of such non-compliance, Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily, as allowed by Section 1, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court reads:SEC. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)True, petitioners subsequently submitted certified copies of the Decision dated 14 July 2006 and assailed Orders dated 16 November 2006 and 4 April 2007 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-107088, but a closer examination of the stamp on said documents reveals that they were prepared and certified only on 14 August 2007, about two months and a half after the filing of the Petition for Review by petitioners. Petitioners never offered an explanation for their non-compliance with Section 4 of Rule 5, and Section 2 of Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. Hence, although the Court had, in previous instances, relaxed the application of rules of procedure, it cannot do so in this case for lack of any justification.Even assuming arguendo that the Petition for Review of petitioners in C.T.A. AC No. 31 should have been given due course by the CTA First Division, it is still dismissible for lack of merit.Contrary to the assertions of petitioners, the Coca-Cola case is indeed applicable to the instant case. The pivotal issue raised therein was whether Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 were null and void, which this Court resolved in the affirmative. Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was declared by the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) as null and void and without legal effect due to the failure of herein petitioner City of Manila to satisfy the requirement under the law that said ordinance be published for three consecutive days. Petitioner City of Manila never appealed said declaration of the DOJ Secretary; thus, it attained finality after the lapse of the period for appeal of the same. The passage of Tax Ordinance No. 8011, amending Tax Ordinance No. 7988, did not cure the defects of the latter, which, in any way, did not legally exist. By virtue of the Coca-Cola case, Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 are null and void and without any legal effect. Therefore, respondent cannot be taxed and assessed under the amendatory laws--Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011.Petitioners insist that even with the declaration of nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011, respondent could still be made liable for local business taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7944 as they were originally read, without the amendment by the null and void tax ordinances.Emphasis must be given to the fact that prior to the passage of Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 by petitioner City of Manila, petitioners subjected and assessed respondent only for the local business tax under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, but never under Section 21 of the same. This was due to the clear and unambiguous proviso in Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, which stated that all registered business in the City of Manila that are already paying the aforementioned tax shall be exempted from payment thereof. The aforementioned tax referred to in said proviso refers to local business tax. Stated differently, Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 exempts from the payment of the local business tax imposed by said section, businesses that are already paying such tax under other sections of the same tax ordinance. The said proviso, however, was deleted from Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 by Tax Ordinances No. 7988 and No. 8011. Following this deletion, petitioners began assessing respondent for the local business tax under Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as amended. The Court easily infers from the foregoing circumstances that petitioners themselves believed that prior to Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011, respondent was exempt from the local business tax under Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794. Hence, petitioners had to wait for the deletion of the exempting proviso in Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 by Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 before they assessed respondent for the local business tax under said section. Yet, with the pronouncement by this Court in the Coca-Cola case that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 were null and void and without legal effect, then Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as it has been previously worded, with its exempting proviso, is back in effect. Accordingly, respondent should not have been subjected to the local business tax under Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 for the third and fourth quarters of 2000, given its exemption therefrom since it was already paying the local business tax under Section 14 of the same ordinance.Petitioners obstinately ignore the exempting proviso in Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, to their own detriment. Said exempting proviso was precisely included in said section so as to avoid double taxation. Double taxation means taxing the same property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, taxing the same person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing. It is obnoxious when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but once. Otherwise described as direct duplicate taxation, the two taxes must be imposed on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the taxes must be of the same kind or character.[footnoteRef:18][18] [18: ]

Using the aforementioned test, the Court finds that there is indeed double taxation if respondent is subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, since these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose to make persons conducting business within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues; (3) by the same taxing authority petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the same taxing jurisdiction within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods per calendar year; and (6) of the same kind or character a local business tax imposed on gross sales or receipts of the business. The distinction petitioners attempt to make between the taxes under Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 is specious. The Court revisits Section 143 of the LGC, the very source of the power of municipalities and cities to impose a local business tax, and to which any local business tax imposed by petitioner City of Manila must conform. It is apparent from a perusal thereof that when a municipality or city has already imposed a business tax on manufacturers, etc. of liquors, distilled spirits, wines, and any other article of commerce, pursuant to Section 143(a) of the LGC, said municipality or city may no longer subject the same manufacturers, etc. to a business tax under Section 143(h) of the same Code. Section 143(h) may be imposed only on businesses that are subject to excise tax, VAT, or percentage tax under the NIRC, and that are not otherwise specified in preceding paragraphs. In the same way, businesses such as respondents, already subject to a local business tax under Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 [which is based on Section 143(a) of the LGC], can no longer be made liable for local business tax under Section 21 of the same Tax Ordinance [which is based on Section 143(h) of the LGC].WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 135337. October 19, 2000]THE CITY OF OLONGAPO, petitioner, vs. THE STALLHOLDERS OF THE EAST BAJAC-BAJAC PUBLIC MARKET OF OLONGAPO CITY, , respondents.D E C I S I O NKAPUNAN, J.:On June 30, 1993, the Olongapo City Council enacted Ordinance No. 14 (Series of 1993), fixing the monthly rental fees for the different stalls in the new public market. Respondents questioned the validity of said ordinance by filing an appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The appeal was made pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code,[endnoteRef:1][1] which states: [1: ]

SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. (Underscoring supplied.)As grounds for their appeal, respondents alleged that the ordinance: (1) violated Sections 130[endnoteRef:2][2] and 186[endnoteRef:3][3] of the Local Government Code as the rates fixed therein are unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory, not equitable, not based as far as practicable on the market vendors' ability to pay, and contrary to declared national policy; (2) was sought to be implemented despite lack of publication; and (3) did not comply with "the essence and spirit of the public hearings."[endnoteRef:4][4] [2: ] [3: ] [4: ]

In a Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Secretary of Justice upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 14 (Series of 1993).Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Justice Secretary's Resolution. The Secretary of Justice, however, refrained from taking action on respondents' motion for reconsideration apparently in view of the pendency of a case[endnoteRef:5][5] filed in this Court questioning the validity of said Section 187. In a Letter dated November 23, 1993 and addressed to counsel for respondents, Chief State Counsel Elmer T. Bautista wrote: [5: ]

With reference to your Motion for Reconsideration on the Resolution of this Office dated September 29, 1993, upholding the constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. 14, s. 1993 of the City of Olongapo, please be informed that in view of the adverse ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 33) dated October 26, 1993, and pending final determination by the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the Secretary of Justice deemed it appropriate to refrain from taking action thereon in the meantime.Per the Secretary's Memorandum dated November 5, 1993, copy attached, you are, however, advised to file your appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction.[endnoteRef:6][6] [6: ]

The contents of the "Secretary's Memorandum" referred to in the above letter is reproduced below:In view of the adverse ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 33) dated October 26, 1993, and pending final determination by the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of Section 187 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) which empowers the Secretary of Justice to pass upon on appeal, the legality and/or constitutionality of tax ordinances or revenue measures adopted by local government units, you are hereby directed to refrain from taking action on and/or accepting petitions/appeals filed in accordance with said legal mandate, and inform the appellants thereto to file their appeal directly with the courts.[endnoteRef:7][7] [7: ]

On December 22, 1993, respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City an "action to declare void Olongapo City Ordinance No. 14, s. of 1992 and for writ of prohibition."The City of Olongapo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. The RTC, however, held in abeyance the resolution of this motion until after trial on the merits shall have been terminated, the ground relied upon by the City being "not indubitable."[endnoteRef:8][8] [8: ]

At the pre-trial, the parties agreed to limit themselves to the following issues: (1) whether the ordinance was void; and (2) whether the proposed fees are equitable, justifiable and affordable.[endnoteRef:9][9] [9: ]

Thereafter, the City of Olongapo filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Finding there were no genuine issues as to any material fact, the RTC granted the motion in an Order dated October 20, 1995. On January 30, 1996, the RTC, without trial, rendered a decision sustaining the validity of Ordinance No. 14 (Series of 1993). The dispositive portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, and the foregoing premises considered, the legality or constitutionality of Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1993, enacted by the City Council of Olongapo City on June 30, 1993 and which took effect on July 7, 1993, is UPHELD.The Complaint is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.[endnoteRef:10][10] [10: ]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning the following errors:(A.)THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECIDING THE CASE ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT.(B.)THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ACCORD DUE PROCESS TO THE APPELLANTS.(C.)THE DECISION IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE EVIDENCE.[endnoteRef:11][11] [11: ]

In its Decision dated August 31, 1998, the Court of Appeals held that the issue of the ordinance's publication did not require any trial and that the City had complied with the requirements of publication. It declared:As to the issue [of] whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1993 is void insofar as the procedural requirements of the Local Government Code or R.A. 7160 on the approval of revenue measures under Rules 187 and 188 thereof is concerned, we find that the trial court did not err in finding that no genuine triable issue exists that requires trial on the merits.Exhibits "4", "4-A", "5", "6", "7", "8", "9" and "10" attached to the Answer undisputedly show that proper publication, posting in public places, and public hearings were complied with in accordance with the requirements of the Local Government Code of 1991. We find no genuine triable issue on this matter and therefore the trial court committed no reversible error in rendering summary judgment thereon. We agree with the RTC that the procedural requirements have been met by the City Council of defendant Olongapo City in the enactment of the subject ordinance. There were publications, posting and public hearings as shown by the aforementioned exhibits of defendants. The fact that appellants' views were not considered by the City Council does not render the enactment of the ordinance invalid.[endnoteRef:12][12] [12: ]

However, as regards the question of whether the market rental rates were unjust, excessive, confiscatory and inequitable, the Court of Appeals held that the same was a factual issue that required the presentation of evidence. Consequently, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial on this issue.Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals, the City of Olongapo brought the instant petition for review.The nature of the proceedings conducted before the RTC is at issue in this case.Petitioner City of Olongapo submits that the RTC merely reviewed the decision of the Secretary of Justice upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 14 (Series of 1993). As such, the review by the RTC was confined to the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings. Petitioner, citing the cases of Santos vs. Moreno[endnoteRef:13][13]and Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works and Communications,[endnoteRef:14][14] argues that evidence not presented before the Secretary of Justice should not be admitted and considered by the reviewing court. The RTC's function, according to petitioner, is limited to determining whether there is evidence in the administrative record substantial enough to support the findings therein; hence, the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case for trial. [13: ] [14: ]

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the petition filed in the RTC was an original action. The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents, holding that, based on the allegations of the complaint, the case brought by respondents was an original case.We find no error in this ruling for it is elementary that the nature of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint or petition.[endnoteRef:15][15] Respondents explicitly alleged in their petition that: [15: ]

1. This is a petition to declare void the rates for market stalls at the Pag-asa Public Market imposed under Ordinance No. 14 s. of 1992 of the City of Olongapo for being unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory, and, contrary to declared national policy.[endnoteRef:16][16] [16: ]

The petition alleged the same grounds for declaring the ordinance void as those raised in the appeal to the Secretary of Justice, thus:III.Grounds For Voiding Ordinance No. 46 s. of 19929. Ordinance No. 14, s. of 1993 violates Section 130, and, 186 of the Local Government Code of 1991, because the rates therein fixed are unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory, not equitable and based as far as practicable on the market vendors['] ability to pay, and, contrary to declared national policy.10. Ordinance No. 14, s. of 1993 is sought to be implemented already, yet, as far as known to the appellants, it has not yet been published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation.11. The essence and spirit of the public hearing was not complied with.[endnoteRef:17][17] [17: ]

Consider, too, the circumstances under which respondents sought relief from the RTC. Perhaps doubting his jurisdiction to entertain respondents' appeal as a result of the filing of Drilon vs. Lim, supra, the Justice Secretary issued a Memorandum directing the Chief State Counsel to refrain from acting on or accepting appeals filed under Section 187 of the Local Government Code and to "inform the appellants (herein petitioners) to file their appeal directly with the courts." The Chief State Counsel, complying with the Memorandum, advised in his letter to respondents to "file their appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction," the "appeal" referring to an action to question the validity of the subject ordinance. The Memorandum and the accompanying letter thus amounted to an abdication by the Secretary of Justice of his jurisdiction over the appeal, as conferred by Section 187.Accordingly, the action before the RTC cannot be deemed to be anything but an original action, and the function of the trial court cannot be limited to reviewing the evidence adduced before the Secretary of Justice.Nevertheless, petitioner maintains that trial is unnecessary in any case because all the court had to do was determine whether the rates fixed in the assailed ordinance conform to Department of Interior and Local Government Memorandum Circular No. 93-63, specifically the provision limiting the return of investment to 12 to 15% and that requiring a cost recovery scheme. Presumably, this determination can be made, as both the Secretary of Justice and the RTC did, by a mere examination of the documents submitted by petitioner.However, it is precisely the accuracy of these documents that respondents are disputing. Consequently, respondents may examine the officials who executed said documents. They may present their own evidence, both documentary and testimonial, to prove that the figures in the documents are inaccurate. All these require a trial so that the parties may properly ventilate their respective causes. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that:The lower court based its conclusion that the market rates are just and equitable in accordance with the Local Government Code on the affidavits of one Loreto P. Azores, the City Treasurer of defendant and member of the Local Finance Committee (p. 204, Original Records); and Johnny B. Choa, City Budget Officer of defendant and the Officer in Charge of the City Accountant's Office as well as a member of the Local Finance Committee (p. 207, id.). In view of the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants as to the equitableness, justifiability and affordability of the market rates imposed, it behooved the trial court to conduct trial on the merits which would involve, among others, the cross-examination of said affiants so as to determine whether or not the computation of the Local Finance Committee is based on facts or mere estimates. Fundamental issues as to the details concerning the issue of expenditures in constructing a public market place; the claim of plaintiffs-appellants that the construction of the new public market came from the Mt. Pinatubo Calamity Fund, at no cost to the City (p. 20, Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants); the actual cost of operations and basis of computed revenue; the validity of the schedule of personal services; the actual maintenance and operating expenses, and others, that would be necessary in the determination of the justness of the market rates, would require trial on the merits if proper judgment is to be resolved by the court a quo.[endnoteRef:18][18] [18: ]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 154993 October 25, 2005LUZ R. YAMANE, in her capacity as the CITY TREASURER OF MAKATI CITY, Petitioner, vs.BA LEPANTO CONDOMINUM CORPORATION, Respondent.D E C I S I O N Tinga, J.:Petitioner City Treasurer of Makati, Luz Yamane (City Treasurer), presents for resolution of this Court two novel questions: one procedural, the other substantive, yet both of obvious significance. The first pertains to the proper mode of judicial review undertaken from decisions of the regional trial courts resolving the denial of tax protests made by local government treasurers, pursuant to the Local Government Code. The second is whether a local government unit can, under the Local Government Code, impel a condominium corporation to pay business taxes.1 While we agree with the City Treasurers position on the first issue, there ultimately is sufficient justification for the Court to overlook what is essentially a procedural error. We uphold respondents on the second issue. Indeed, there are disturbing aspects in both procedure and substance that attend the attempts by the City of Makati to flex its taxing muscle. Considering that the tax imposition now in question has utterly no basis in law, judicial relief is imperative. There are fewer indisputable causes for the exercise of judicial review over the exercise of the taxing power than when the tax is based on whim, and not on law. The facts, as culled from the record, follow.Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation (the "Corporation") is a duly organized condominium corporation constituted in accordance with the Condominium Act,2 which owns and holds title to the common and limited common areas of the BA-Lepanto Condominium (the "Condominium"), situated in Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Its membership comprises the various unit owners of the Condominium. The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its Amended By-Laws, to collect regular assessments from its members for operating expenses, capital expenditures on the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. On 15 December 1998, the Corporation received a Notice of Assessment dated 14 December 1998 signed by the City Treasurer. The Notice of Assessment stated that the Corporation is "liable to pay the correct city business taxes, fees and charges," computed as totaling P1,601,013.77 for the years 1995 to 1997.3 The Notice of Assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of the business taxes assessed. Through counsel, the Corporation responded with a written tax protest dated 12 February 1999, addressed to the City Treasurer. It was evident in the protest that the Corporation was perplexed on the statutory basis of the tax assessment. With due respect, we submit that the Assessment has no basis as the Corporation is not liable for business taxes and surcharges and interest thereon, under the Makati [Revenue] Code or even under the [Local Government] Code. The Makati [Revenue] Code and the [Local Government] Code do not contain any provisions on which the Assessment could be based. One might argue that Sec. 3A.02(m) of the Makati [Revenue] Code imposes business tax on owners or operators of any business not specified in the said code. We submit, however, that this is not applicable to the Corporation as the Corporation is not an owner or operator of any business in the contemplation of the Makati [Revenue] Code and even the [Local Government] Code.4 Proceeding from the premise that its tax liability arose from Section 3A.02(m) of the Makati Revenue Code, the Corporation proceeded to argue that under both the Makati Code and the Local Government Code, "business" is defined as "trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit." It was submitted that the Corporation, as a condominium corporation, was organized not for profit, but to hold title over the common areas of the Condominium, to manage the Condominium for the unit owners, and to hold title to the parcels of land on which the Condominium was located. Neither was the Corporation authorized, under its articles of incorporation or by-laws to engage in profit-making activities. The assessments it did collect from the unit owners were for capital expenditures and operating expenses.5 The protest was rejected by the City Treasurer in a letter dated 4 March 1999. She insisted that the collection of dues from the unit owners was effected primarily "to sustain and maintain the expenses of the common areas, with the end in view [sic] of getting full appreciative living values [sic] for the individual condominium occupants and to command better marketable [sic] prices for those occupants" who would in the future sell their respective units.6 Thus, she concluded since the "chances of getting higher prices for well-managed common areas of any condominium are better and more effective that condominiums with poor [sic] managed common areas," the corporation activity "is a profit venture making [sic]".7 From the denial of the protest, the Corporation filed an Appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.8 On 1 March 2000, the Makati RTC Branch 57 rendered a Decision9 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. Accepting the premise laid by the City Treasurer, the RTC acknowledged, in sadly risible language:Herein appellant, to defray the improvements and beautification of the common areas, collect [sic] assessments from its members. Its end view is to get appreciate living rules for the unit owners [sic], to give an impression to outsides [sic] of the quality of service the condominium offers, so as to allow present owners to command better prices in the event of sale.10 With this, the RTC concluded that the activities of the Corporation fell squarely under the definition of "business" under Section 13(b) of the Local Government Code, and thus subject to local business taxation.11From this Decision of the RTC, the Corporation filed a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of Appeals. Initially, the petition was dismissed outright12 on the ground that only decisions of the RTC brought on appeal from a first level court could be elevated for review under the mode of review prescribed under Rule 42.13 However, the Corporation pointed out in its Motion for Reconsideration that under Section 195 of the Local Government Code, the remedy of the taxpayer on the denial of the protest filed with the local treasurer is to appeal the denial with the court of competent jurisdiction.14 Persuaded by this contention, the Court of Appeals reinstated the petition.15 On 7 June 2002, the Court of Appeals Special Sixteenth Division rendered the Decision16 now assailed before this Court. The appellate court reversed the RTC and declared that the Corporation was not liable to pay business taxes to the City of Makati.17 In doing so, the Court of Appeals delved into jurisprudential definitions of profit,18 and concluded that the Corporation was not engaged in profit. For one, it was held that the very statutory concept of a condominium corporation showed that it was not a juridical entity intended to make profit, as its sole purpose was to hold title to the common areas in the condominium and to maintain the condominium.19 The Court of Appeals likewise cited provisions from the Corporations Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended By-Laws that, to its estimation, established that the Corporation was not engaged in business and the assessment collected from unit owners limited to those necessary to defray the expenses in the maintenance of the common areas and management the condominium.20 Upon denial of her Motion for Reconsideration,21 the City Treasurer elevated the present Petition for Review under Rule 45. It is argued that the Corporation is engaged in business, for the dues collected from the different unit owners is utilized towards the beautification and maintenance of the Condominium, resulting in "full appreciative living values" for the condominium units which would command better market prices should they be sold in the future. The City Treasurer likewise avers that the rationale for business taxes is not on the income received or profit earned by the business, but the privilege to engage in business. The fact that theCorporation is empowered "to acquire, own, hold, enjoy, lease, operate and maintain, and to convey sell, transfer or otherwise dispose of real or personal property" allegedly qualifies "as incident to the fact of [the Corporations] act of engaging in business.22 The City Treasurer also claims that the Corporation had filed the wrong mode of appeal before the Court of Appeals when the latter filed its Petition for Review under Rule 42. It is reasoned that the decision of the Makati RTC was rendered in the exercise of original jurisdiction, it being the first court which took cognizance of the case. Accordingly, with the Corporation having pursued an erroneous mode of appeal, the RTC Decision is deemed to have become final and executory. First, we dispose of the procedural issue, which essentially boils down to whether the RTC, in deciding an appeal taken from a denial of a protest by a local treasurer under Section 195 of the Local Government Code, exercises "original jurisdiction" or "appellate jurisdiction." The question assumes a measure of importance to this petition, for the adoption of the position of the City Treasurer that the mode of review of the decision taken by the RTC is governed by Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure means that the decision of the RTC would have long become final and executory by reason of the failure of the Corporation to file a notice of appeal.23 There are discernible conflicting views on the issue. The first, as expressed by the Court of Appeals, holds that the RTC, in reviewing denials of protests by local treasurers, exercises appellate jurisdiction. This position is anchored on the language of Section 195 of the Local Government Code which states that the remedy of the taxpayer whose protest is denied by the local treasurer is "to appeal with the court of competent jurisdiction."24 Apparently though, the Local Government Code does not elaborate on how such "appeal" should be undertaken. The other view, as maintained by the City Treasurer, is that the jurisdiction exercised by the RTC is original in character. This is the first time that the position has been presented to the court for adjudication. Still, this argument does find jurisprudential mooring in our ruling in Garcia v. De Jesus,25 where the Court proffered the following distinction between original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction: "Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law. Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of a lower Court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review."26The quoted definitions were taken from the commentaries of the esteemed Justice Florenz Regalado. With the definitions as beacon, the review taken by the RTC over the denial of the protest by the local treasurer would fall within that courts original jurisdiction. In short, the review is the initial judicial cognizance of the matter. Moreover, labeling the said review as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction is inappropriate, since the denial of the protest is not the judgment or order of a lower court, but of a local government official.The stringent concept of original jurisdiction may seemingly be neutered by Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which lists a slew of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial tribunals or their officers whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. However, the basic law of jurisdiction, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129),27 ineluctably confers appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over final rulings of quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, by explicitly using the phrase "appellate jurisdiction."28 The power to create or characterize jurisdiction of courts belongs to the legislature. While the traditional notion of appellate jurisdiction connotes judicial review over lower court decisions, it has to yield to statutory redefinitions that clearly expand its breadth to encompass even review of decisions of officers in the executive branches of government. Yet significantly, the Local Government Code, or any other statute for that matter, does not expressly confer appellate jurisdiction on the part of regional trial courts from the denial of a tax protest by a local treasurer. On the other hand, Section 22 of B.P. 129 expressly delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, confining as it does said appellate jurisdiction to cases decided by Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Unlike in the case of the Court of Appeals, B.P. 129 does not confer appellate jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts over rulings made by non-judicial entities. From these premises, it is evident that the stance of the City Treasurer is correct as a matter of law, and that the proper remedy of the Corporation from the RTC judgment is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 to the Court of Appeals. However, we make this pronouncement subject to two important qualifications. First, in this particular case there are nonetheless significant reasons for the Court to overlook the procedural error and ultimately uphold the adjudication of the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Appeals in this case. Second, the doctrinal weight of the pronouncement is confined to cases and controversies that emerged prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).Republic Act No. 9282 definitively proves in its Section 7(a)(3) that the CTA exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases original decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their originally or appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, the provision also states that the review is triggered "by filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."29 Republic Act No. 9282, however, would not apply to this case simply because it arose prior to the effectivity of that law. To declare otherwise would be to institute a jurisdictional rule derived not from express statutory grant, but from implication. The jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of a case should be clearly conferred and should not be deemed to exist on mere implications,30 and this settled rule would be needlessly emasculated should we declare that the Corporations position is correct in law.Be that as it may, characteristic of all procedural rules is adherence to the precept that they should not be enforced blindly, especially if mechanical application would defeat the higher ends that animates our civil procedurethe just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.31 Indeed, we have repeatedly upheldand utilized ourselvesthe discretion of courts to nonetheless take cognizance of petitions raised on an erroneous mode of appeal and instead treat these petitions in the manner as they should have appropriately been filed.32 The Court of Appeals could very well have treated the Corporations petition for review as an ordinary appeal. Moreover, we recognize that the Corporations error in elevating the RTC decision for review via Rule 42 actually worked to the benefit of the City Treasurer. There is wider latitude on the part of the Court of Appeals to refuse cognizance over a petition for review under Rule 42 than it would have over an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Under Section 13, Rule 41, the stated grounds for the dismissal of an ordinary appeal prior to the transmission of the case records are when the appeal was taken out of time or when the docket fees were not paid.33 On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 42 provides that in order that the Court of Appeals may allow due course to the petition for review, it must first make a prima facie finding that the lower court has committed an error that would warrant the reversal or modification of the decision under review.34 There is no similar requirement of a prima facie determination of error in the case of ordinary appeal, which is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.35 Evidently, by employing the Rule 42 mode of review, the Corporation faced a greater risk of having its petition rejected by the Court of Appeals as compared to having filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. This was not an error that worked to the prejudice of the City Treasurer.We now proceed to the substantive issue, on whether the City of Makati may collect business taxes on condominium corporations. We begin with an overview of the power of a local government unit to impose business taxes. The power of local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction derives from the Constitution itself, which recognizes the power of these units "to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy."36 These guidelines and limitations as provided by Congress are in main contained in the Local Government Code of 1991 (the "Code"), which provides for comprehensive instances when and how local government units may impose taxes. The significant limitations are enumerated primarily in Section 133 of the Code, which include among others, a prohibition on the imposition of income taxes except when levied on banks and other financial institutions.37 None of the other general limitations under Section 133 find application to the case at bar. The most well-known mode of local government taxation is perhaps the real property tax, which is governed by Title II, Book II of the Code, and which bears no application in this case. A different set of provisions, found under Title I of Book II, governs other taxes imposable by local government units, including business taxes. Under Section 151 of the Code, cities such as Makati are authorized to levy the same taxes fees and charges as provinces and municipalities. It is in Article II, Title II, Book II of the Code, governing municipal taxes, where the provisions on business taxation relevant to this petition may be found.38 Section 143 of the Code specifically enumerates several types of business on which municipalities and cities may impose taxes. These include manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, dealers of any article of commerce of whatever nature; those engaged in the export or commerce of essential commodities; contractors and other independent contractors; banks and financial institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale of any merchandise or article of commerce. Moreover, the local sanggunian is also authorized to impose taxes on any other businesses not otherwise specified under Section 143 which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax. The coverage of business taxation particular to the City of Makati is provided by the Makati Revenue Code ("Revenue Code"), enacted through Municipal Ordinance No. 92