Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.Facts:Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old at the time he received the injuries that gave rise to this complaint. On September 30, 1905, plaintiff and Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to the power plant owned by the defendant to visit one Murphy, an employee. Not being able to find Murphy on inquiry, the boys for curiosity wandered around the premises and reached the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. There they found some 20-30 fulminating caps scattered on the ground. The caps are intended for explosion of dynamites, and have in themselves explosive power. The boys picked up the caps and carried them home. Along the way they met Jessie Adrian, a 9-year old girl. The 3 went to Manuels house and performed a little experiment. They opened the caps and found yellowish substance. They lighted a match and applied it on the contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The substance exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessies neck, burns on Manuel, and loss of Davids eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company for damages.Issue:Whether the company could be faulted for the allowing the children to be exposed to the harmful substancesHeld:Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think also that the evidencetendsto disclose that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or some of its employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company knew or ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, "must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise would be expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.As was said in case ofRailroad Co. vs. Stout, "While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, andthis is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about.We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he wassui jurisin the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.Vda. da Bataclan v. MedinaFacts:The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the Court of Appeals forwarded the case to the Supreme Court due to the amount involved.Issue:What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers?Held:We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show the bus was speeding, as testified by one passengers, and a witnesses, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging,. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:. . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.Fernando V. CA (1992)G.R. No. 92087May 8, 1992Lessons Applicable:Experts and Professionals (Torts and Damages)

FACTS: November 7, 1975:Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao whereinBascon won November 22, 1975:bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from"asphyxia" - diminution of oxygen supply in the body andintake of toxic gas November 26, 1975: Basconsigned the purchase order RTC: Dismissed the case CA: Reversed -law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the ignorant and theindigentISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed. test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?If not, then he is guilty of negligence. standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreetpater familiasof the Roman law Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisancesper seas defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own negligence.Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public respondent.

Sanitary Steam Laundry vs CA

Xxx

MERCURY DRUG CORP. v. BAKINGGR. No. 156037, May 28, 2007

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: (Proximate Cause) Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG, and several examininations, Dr. Sy found the respondents blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal. The doctor then prescribed two medical prescriptions- Diamicron for the blood sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to Mercury Drug Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines. The sales lady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one pill on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, he met an accident while driving his car. He fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting the tablet he took, respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked after finding that what was sold was Dormicum instead of Diamicron. He filed the present complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial court favored the defendant which was affirmed by the CA hence this petition.

ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent, and if so, is the negligence was the proximate cause of the accident?

HELD: YES. Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage suffered by the plaintiff, 2. fault or negligence of the defendant, 3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. Obviously, petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling the wrong prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the physician. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondents negligence in driving his car. Proximate cause is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading the prescription. Without the potent effect of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in collision. Petition DENIED.

Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai

Facts:At 5:30 in the morning, on Highway 54 (now EDSA) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village, Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car from QC to the airport (southbound) to bring his son who was going to Mindoro. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, driven by Bernardo, going to Wack Wack from Paraaque (northbound.) Considering there was no traffic at that time, both cars were traveling a fairly moderate speedsCaedo at 40-50kph, Bernardo 48-56kph. In front of the car of Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai was a carretela going in the same direction. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the carretelas post. The carretela had two lights, one on each side. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did, his car caught the rim of the carretelas left wheel, wrenching it off and carryingit along as the car skidded to the other land, colliding with Caedos car.

Caedo, tried to avoid the collision by going farther to the right, butwas unsuccessful. Caedo and the members of his family were injured because of the accident, so they filed this suit for recovery of damages from Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai.

Issue/s:1. Who was responsible for the accident?2. If it was Bernardo, was his employer, Yu Khe Thai solidarily liable with him?

Held/Ratio:1. Bernardo in the Cadillac. The collision was directly traceable to Bernardos negligence.He tried to beat Caedos car or squeeze between Caedos car and the carretela. He should have known thatpassing thecarretelawas a riskymaneuver, but he still took a gamble. The firstclear indication of his negligence was his claim that he was almost upon the carretela when he saw it in front of him, only 8 meters away. The carretela had two lights, one on each side, which should have given him sufficient warning to take necessary precaution.Even if he claims he didnt see the lights of the carretela, the carretela should have been visible to him if he had been careful, as it must havebeen in the beamof his headlights.

2.No, Yu KheThai cannot be heldsolidarilyliable withBernardo.Art 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Under Art. 2148, if the causative factor was the drivers negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence

Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado, G.R. No. 85331, Aug. 25, 1989

Kapalarans driver had become aware that some vehicles ahead of the bus and traveling in the same direction had already stopped at the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended. Thus, a legal presumption arose the bus driver was negligent, a presumption that Kapalaran was unable to overthrow.Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado

FACTS: On August, 1982, the jeepney driven by Lope Grajera was coming from Laguna on its way to Sta. Cruz. As it reached the intersection where there is a traffic sign yield, it stopped an cautiously treated the intersection as a Thru Stop street, which it is not.

The Kapalaran Bus Line was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna driven by its driver, Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. As the KBL neared the intersection, Llamoso inquired from his conductor if they could still accommodate passengers and learning that they were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the national highway. Virgilio admitted that there was another vehicle ahead of him.

The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the right of way as against a feeder road. Another general rule is that a vehicle coming from the right has the right of way over the vehicle coming from the left. The general rules on right of way may be invoked only if both the vehicles approach the intersection at almost the same time. In the case at bar, both roads are national roads. Also, the KBL Bus was still far from the intersection when the jeepney reached the same. As testified by Atty. Conrado Manicad, he stopped at the intersection to give way to the jeepney driven by Grajera. However, there was a collision between the jeepney and the bus. The KBL bus ignored the stopped vehicles and the other vehicles behind Atty. Manicad and overtook both vehicles at the intersection therefore causing the accident.

Kapalaran filed a suit against the owner of the jeepney and its driver. However, it lost the case. Furthermore, the Court did not hold as liable the driver of the bus.

ISSUE: Whether or not KBL is accountable, considering the driver of the bus was not held liable by the Courts.

HELD: Yes, Kapalaran is liable. The driver violated certain general rules, and provisions in the Land Transportation and Traffice Code. Hence, he can be presumed negligent. The patent and gross negligence on the part of Kapalarans driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligene either in the selection or supervision of its bus drivers. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. If petitioner Kapalaran was interested in maintaining its right of recourse against or reimbursement from its own driver, it should have appealed from that portion of the trial courts decision which had failed to hold the bus driver accountable for damages. The liability of employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent on its own part.

The law requires Kapalaran as common carrier to exercise extraordinary diligence in carrying and transporting their passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds of their drivers.

Anonuevo vs CA

XXX

Mendoza vs Soriano

XXX

Africa vs Caltex16 SCRA 448 Civil Law Torts and Damages Res Ipsa LoquiturIn March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.ISSUE:Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.HELD:Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) which states: where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendants want of care. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury complained of.

FF Cruz and co vs CAFacts:A fire broke up from the furniture shop of the petitioner in Caloocan city early September 6, 1974. Prior to that, neighbor of the said shop requested that the petitioner should build a firewall but failed to do so. The cause of the fire was never discovered. Private respondent got P35k from the insurance on their house and contents thereof.Issue:Whether or not the 35k be deducted from the damages thereofRulingSince P35k had already been claimed by the respondents, the court held that such amount should be deducted from the award of damages in accordance with Art 2207 NCCArt. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.Having been indemnified by their insurer, private respondents are entitled only to recover the deficiency from the petitioner.Whether or not the insurer should exercise the rights of the insured to which it had been subrogated lies solely within the former's sound discretion. Since the insurer is not a party to the case, its identity is not of record and no claim is made on its behalf, the private respondent's insurer has to claim his right to reimbursement of the P35,000.00 paid to the insured.

FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation and LambertErolesG.R. No. 141910August 6, 2002FACTS:G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on June 18, 1994, 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard its Isuzu truck driven by Lambert Eroles, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While traversing the North Diversion Road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.FGU, an insurer of the shipment, paid the value of the covered cargoes (P204,450.00) to Concepcion Industries, Inc.,. Being subrogee of CIIs rights & interests, FGU, in turn, sought reimbursement from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages & breach of contract of carriage against GPS and Eroles with the RTC. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was only the exclusive hauler of CII since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental.GPS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.The RTC granted the motion to dismiss on April 30, 1996. It subsequently dismissed the complaint holding that GPS was not a common carrier defined under the law & existing jurisprudence. The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, FGU interposed an appeal to the CA. The CA rejected the FGUs appeal & ruled in favor of GPS. It also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.ISSUES:1. WON GPS may be considered a common carrier as defined under the law & existing jurisprudence.2. WON GPS, either as a common carrier or a private carrier, may be presumed to have been negligent when the goods it undertook to transport safely were subsequently damaged while in its protective custody & possession.3. Whether the doctrine ofRes ipsa loquituris applicable in the instant case.HELD:1. The SC finds the conclusion of the RTC and the CA to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor & hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering/offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis. The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of passengers/goods, providing space for those who opt to avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. Given accepted standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term common carrier.2. GPS cannot escape from liability. In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract & the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost/suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his:1. Expectation interest interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed;2. Reliance interest interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made;3. Restitution interest interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.Agreements can accomplish little unless they are made the basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, or to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.A default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation gives rise to a presumption of lack of care & corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.Eroles, on the other hand, may not be ordered to pay petitioner without concrete proof of his negligence/fault. The driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have assumed their personality/juridical position. Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which would require the claimant for damages to prove the defendants negligence/fault.3.Res ipsa loquiturholds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the latters management and the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those who have its management/control use proper care. In the absence of the defendants explanation, it affords reasonable evidence that the accident arose from want of care. It is not a rule of substantive law and does not create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. The maxim simply places the burden of going forward with the proof on the defendant.However, resort to the doctrine may only be allowed when:(a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence;(b) other responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence (includes the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons); and(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendants duty to the plaintiff.Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not be responsible.Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties. Nevertheless,for the doctrine to apply, the requirement that responsible causes (other than those due to defendants conduct) must first be eliminated should be understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.On the other hand, while the truck driver, whose civil liability is predicated on culpa acquiliana, can be said to have been in control & management of the vehicle, it is not equally shown that the accident has been exclusively due to his negligence. If it were so, the negligence could allow res ipsa loquitur to properly work against him. However, clearly this is not the case.Laguyan vs IACXXX

Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc., Et Al. V. Sps. Gaudencio And Primitiva Sarangaya (2005)G.R. No. 147746 October 25, 2005Lessons Applicable:Res Ipsa Loquitur (Torts and Damages)

FACTS: 1986: Spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya erectedSuper A Building, asemi-concrete, semi-narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela It has three doors which were leased out The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of the building On the left side of the commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita) 1988:Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its branch manager Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door beside the Matsushita office It was converted into a two door so he had a garage where he parked a company car1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina which he used to supervise different towns July 7, 1988:Pascual went to San Fernando, Pampanga leaving the car 3 days later: When he returned and warmed up the car, it made an odd sound. On the second try, there was again an odd sound and a small flames came out of its engine so he was startled, stopped the car, went out and pushed it out of the garage Soon, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and burned the whole garage where he was trapped so he suffered burns in the face, legs and arms The spouses were busy atching TV when they heard 2 loud explosions, smelt of gasoline and fire burned all their belongings city fire marshall investigated and concluded that the fire was accidental Spouses filed a complaint against Pascual for gross negligence and Perla for lackingthe required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. RTC: Pascual and Perla liable jointly and solidarily Pascual was held liable under the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur CA: affirmed but modified the amount of damagesISSUE:1. W/N the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur is applicable - YES2. W/N Perla lackedthe required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. - NO

HELD: DENIED

1. YES. Res ipsa loquitur Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. defendants responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur 1)the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. Ordinary refers to the usual course of events1. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved.1. Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked - negligence 2)the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and 3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. When there is caso fortuito: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will. human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or contributory cause of the injury or loss -Not because car not maintained (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid - NOTunder the control of pascual (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner - Spouses had no access nor obligation for the maintenance (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that aggravated the accident2. YES. Perla did not includeany rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions There was no guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught fire Did not requireperiodic reports on or inventories of its properties Article 2180 of the Civil Code states that employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees. The liability is imposed on all those who by their industry, profession or other enterprise have other persons in their service or supervision Nowhere does it state that the liability is limited to employers in the transportation business.

Paulan vs Sarabia

XXX

Taylor vs Manila Electric (Supra)

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et al.- Attractive Nuisance Doctrine

Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water tanks) as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.

FACTS:Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didnt have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The lower decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING: NO.The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios death.

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