Case Torts 3

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G.R. No. 157906 November 2, 2006

JOAQUINITA P. CAPILI, Petitioner,vs.SPS. DOMINADOR CARDAA and ROSALITA CARDAA,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for review assailing the Decision1dated October 18, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 54412, declaringpetitioner liable for negligence that resulted in the death of Jasmin Cardaa, a school child aged 12, enrolled in Grade 6, of San Roque ElementarySchool, where petitioner is the principal. Likewise assailed is the Resolution2dated March 20, 2003 denying reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaa was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of a caimitotreelocated within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaa - filed a case fordamages before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.

The Cardaas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on thepossible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principals office. The Cardaas averredthat petitioners gross negligence and lackof foresight caused the death of their daughter.

Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead androtting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting onDecember 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaa to negotiate the sale.

In a Decision3dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of thepetitioner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision. The appellate court found the appellee (herein petitioner) liable for Jasmins death,as follows:

Foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Appellee Joaquinita Capili is hereby declared liable for negligence resulting to thedeath of Jasmin D. Cardaa. She is hereby ordered to indemnify appellants, parents of Jasmin, the following amounts:
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1. For the life of Jasmin D. Cardaa P50,000.00;

2. For burial expenses 15,010.00;

3. For moral damages 50,000.00;

4. For attorneys fees and litigation 10,000.00.expenses

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner now comes before us submitting the following issues for our resolution:

I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS VIS--VIS THE SET OF FACTS STATED IN THE CHALLENGED DECISION, ERRED INFINDING THE PETITIONER NEGLIGENT AND THEREFORE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2206 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND IN

ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO PAY DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS; AND

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.5

On the other hand, respondents posit the following issue:

Whether or not the Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Twelfth Division, in CA G.R. CV. No. 54412 promulgated on October 18, 2002

should be affirmed and respected, thus remain undisturbed.6

Primarily, the issue is whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaa.

Petitioner asserts that she was not negligent about the disposal of the tree since she had assigned her next-in-rank, Palaa, to see to its disposal; thatdespite her physical inspection of the school grounds, she did not observe any indication that the tree was already rotten nor did any of her 15teachers inform her that the tree was already rotten;7and that moral damages should not be granted against her since there was no fraud nor badfaith on her part.

On the other hand, respondents insist that petitioner knew that the tree was dead and rotting, yet, she did not exercise reasonable care and cautionwhich an ordinary prudent person would have done in the same situation.
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To begin, we have to point out that whether petitioner was negligent or not is a question of fact which is generally not proper in a petition for review,and when this determination is supported by substantial evidence, it becomes conclusive and binding on this Court.8However, there is an exception,that is, when the findings of the Court of Appeals are incongruent with the findings of the lower court .9In our view, the exception finds application inthe present case.

The trial court gave credence to the claim of petitioner that she had no knowledge that the tree was already dead and rotting and that Lerios merelyinformed her that he was going to buy the tree for firewood. It ruled that petitioner exercised the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances

require and that there was an absence of evidence that would require her to use a higher standard of care more than that required by the attendantcircumstances.10The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, ruled that petitioner should have known of the condition of the tree by its mere sighting andthat no matter how hectic her schedule was, she should have had the tree removed and not merely delegated the task to Palaa. The appellate courtruled that the deadcaimitotree was a nuisance that should have been removed soon after petitioner had chanced upon it .11

A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situationinvolving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature. A negligent actis one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee suc h an appreciable risk ofharm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.12

The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the schoolprincipal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That shewas unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of herposition.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by theplaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effectbetween the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.13

The fact, however, that respondents daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the schools prem ises shows that the treewas indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquiturapplies where (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happenedexcept for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive management orcontrol of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contributionon the part of the person injured.14

The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquituris to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and rotting treewhich caused the death of respondents daughter was a result of petitioners negligence, being in charge of the school.
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In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,15this Court held:

As a rule of evidence, the doctrine ofres ipsa loquituris peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes thatprima facienegligence may beestablished without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.

The concept of res ipsa loquiturhas been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to aninference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing ortransaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injurymay be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who ischarged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant,and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control ormanagement used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the

defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquituris that petitioners negligence is presumed once respondents established the requisites for thedoctrine to apply. Once respondents made out aprima faciecase of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain. The presumption orinference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due careor innocence, may outweigh the inference.16

Was petitioners explanation as to why she failed to have the tree removed immediately sufficient to exculpate her?

As the school principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and itspremises. That she was unaware of the rotten state of the tree calls for an explanation on her part as to why she failed to be vigilant.

Petitioner contends she was unaware of the state of the dead and rotting tree because Lerios merely offered to buy the tree and did not inform her ofits condition. Neither did any of her teachers inform her that the tree was an imminent danger to anyone. She argues that she could not see theimmediate danger posed by the tree by its mere sighting even as she and the other teachers conducted ground inspections. She further argues that,even if she should have been aware of the danger, she exercised her duty by assigning the disposition of the tree to another teacher.

We find petitioners explanation wanting. As school principal, petitioner is expected to oversee the safety of the schools p remises.1wphi1The fact

that she failed to see the immediate danger posed by the dead and rotting tree shows she failed to exercise the responsibility demanded by herposition.
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Moreover, even if petitioner had assigned disposal of the tree to another teacher, she exercises supervision over her assignee .17The record showsthat more than a month had lapsed from the time petitioner gave instruction to her assistant Palaa on December 15, 1992, to the time the incidentoccurred on February 1, 1993. Clearly, she failed to check seasonably if the danger posed by the rotting tree had been removed. Thus, we cannotaccept her defense of lack of negligence.

Lastly, petitioner questions the award of moral damages. Moral damages are awarded if the following elements exist in the case: (1) an injury clearlysustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission by the defendant as the proximate cause

of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the CivilCode.18However, the person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law alwayspresumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and serious anxiety as the result of the actuations ofthe other party. Invariably, such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.19Under the circumstances, we have toconcede that petitioner was not motivated by bad faith or ill motive vis--vis respondents daughters death. The award of moral damages is thereforenot proper.

In line with applicable jurisprudence, we sustain the award by the Court of Appeals of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Jasmin,20and P15,010 as

reimbursement of her burial expenses.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 18, 2002 and the Resolution dated March 20, 2003, of the Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. CV. No. 54412 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONsuch that the award of moral damages is hereby deleted.

Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 169891 November 2, 2006

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, Petitioner,

vs.ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47567 and its Resolution 2denying themotion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed with partial modification the ruling 3of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,

Branch 20, directing petitioner Philippine National Railways (PNR) to indemnify respondents Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia for the death ofRhonda Brunty, and to pay actual and moral damages, attorneys fees and cost of suit.
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Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior toher departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan with platenumber FU 799, driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by AlfonsoReyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila4as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.

By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita,driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train No.

T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries .5

Acertain James Harrow6brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutesfrom arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred to the ManilaDoctors Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment.7

On July 28, 1981, Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter8to the PNR demanding payment of actual, compensatory, and moral damages, as a result of herdaughters death. When PNR did not respond, Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint9for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila.The case was raffled to Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18645. They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, aswell as the physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the

necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac. They pointed out that there was no flagbar or redlight signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only equipped with a handflashlight.10Plaintiffs likewise averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the performance of their respective tasks and duties, moreparticularly the pilot and operator of the train.11They prayed for the payment of the following damages:

1.) P200,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;

2.) P2,800,000.00 for compensatory damages to plaintiff Ethel Brunty representing lost or unearned income of Rhonda Brunty;

3.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the evidence adduced, to plaintiff Ethel Brunty;4.) At least P64,057.61 as actual damages representing medical expenses to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia and at least P1,000,000.00 as

unearned or lost income of said plaintiff;

5.) At least P72,760.00 as actual damages representing cost of the Mercedes Benz car to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia;

6.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may be warranted by the evidence adduced, to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia; and

7.) Attorneys fees equivalent to at least 15% of the total award to plaintiffs herein.12
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In its Answer,13PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection but also in the supervision of itsemployees.14By way of special and affirmative defense, it stressed that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has nolegal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. It insisted that there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategicallyposted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. It countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelitas negligence, and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncomingtrain and the flashlight signals to stop given by the guard.15As counterclaim, it prayed that it be awarded actual and compensatory damages, andlitigation expenses.16

Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint17dated July 28, 1986 to include, as party plaintiff, Chemical Industries of the Philippines, Inc. (Chemphil),Garcias employer, who claimed to have paid for the latters medical and hospitalization expenses, the services rendered by the funeral parlor of thedeceased, and the expenses in transferring the remains of Rhonda Brunty to the United States.18

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision19on May 21, 1990 in favor of plaintiffs. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia and against the defendant PhilippineNational Railways directing the latter to pay the former the sum of:

1. Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) Philippine Currency, for the death of Rhonda Brunty formerly a resident of 1595 Ashland Avenue, DesPlaines, Illinois, U.S.A.;

2. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) Philippine Currency for moral and actual damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty;

3. Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P72,760.00) Philippine Currency for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz;

4. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency as and for attorney's fees, and;

5. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.20

Aggrieved, the PNR appealed the case to the CA, raising the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF RHONDA BRUNTY AND THE

CONSEQUENT AWARD OF DAMAGES DUE THE HEIRS OF RHONDA BRUNTY.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES SUFFERED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES MERCEDES BENZ IN THE AMOUNT OF SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND SIXTY PESOS (P72,760.00).

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFS -APPELLEES.21

In its Brief, PNR insisted that the sole and proximate cause of the accident was the negligence and recklessness of Garcia and Mercelita.22It insistedthat it had provided adequate warning signals at the railroad crossing23and had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of itsemployees.24The RTC erred in awarding damages to Rhonda Brunty as she cannot be allowed to receive what she is not in a position to give, havingbeen a non-resident alien who did not own a property in the Philippines .25It likewise questioned the award of damages on the Mercedes Benz as wellas the grant of attorneys fees.26At the very least, Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence.27

For their part, appellees countered that appellant was grossly and recklessly negligent in not properly providing the necessary equipment at therailroad crossing in Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac;28appellant was negligent in not exercising due diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision ofits employees, particularly the train operator Alfonso Reyes;29the car was driven in a careful and diligent manner, and at a moderate speed, with dueregard to all traffic rules and regulations at that particular time;30the doctrine of "last clear chance" is not applicable ;31Ethel Brunty is a non-residentalien who can rightfully file the instant case;32and they are entitled to recover damages from appellant.33

The CA rendered the assailed Decision34on August 15, 2005. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with PARTIAL MODIFICATIONS, increasing the death indemnityaward from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, and deleting the award for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz.

SO ORDERED.35

The appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC as to the negligence of the PNR. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatalaccident, it ruled that the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing were not merely inadequate they did not satisfy thewell-settled safety standards in transportation.36However, the CA did not agree with the RTCs findings on the contributory negligence of Mercelita,the driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held that Mercelita could not have foreseen the harm that would befall him and the two other passengers under theprevailing circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty of contributory negligence.37

The PNR, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari on the following grounds:

I.
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKING CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES ANDWHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION SUCH AS:

THE RESPONDENTS DRIVER OVERTOOK ANOTHER VEHICLE BY ACCELERATING AT 70 KILOMETERS PER HOUR WITHIN JUST 50 YARDSAWAY FROM THE RAILROAD TRACKS.

II.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING CONTRIBUTORYNEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS DRIVER.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN THE INSTANT CASE.38

Petitioner insists that the proximate cause of the mishap was Mercelitas disregard of traffic rules and regulations. Had the court considered the factthat Mercelita had overtaken another vehicle a few yards before the railroad track, it would have reached a different conclusion.39Moreover, petitioner

asserts, considering that the decisions of the RTC and the CA vary as to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, the findings ofthe RTC should prevail. Thus, Mercelitas contributory negligence should not havebeen ignored.40Lastly, petitioner avers that since there is freedomof control and greater maneuverability on the part of motor vehicles, it is obvious that in railroad crossings, they have the last clear chance to preventor avoid an unwanted accident from taking place.41

In their Comment42on the petition, respondents reiterate the findings of the RTC and the CA that the breach by petitioner of its legal duty to provideadequate and necessary public safety device and equipment within the area or scene of the accident was the proximate cause of the mishap.43Whileit is true that as a general rule, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate and observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses presentedduring the trial, the CA, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has the vested right to modify, reject, or set aside the trial courts evaluation andfindings.44As to the application of the doctrine of last clear chance, respondents claim that said issue is being raised for the first time in thispetition.45Lastly, respondents cite foreign jurisprudence stating that if the violation is one which gives rise to liability per se for any resulting injury, thedefenses ordinarily available in actions for diligence are barred and the contributory negligence of the person injured is no defense.46

The Court is thus tasked to answer the following factual questions: (1) As between petitioner and Mercelita, whose negligence resulted in theunfortunate collision? (2) Is Mercelita (the driver of the Mercedes Benz) guilty of contributory negligence? Finally, the application in this case of thedoctrine of last clear chance is likewise in question.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of humanaffairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.47In Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company,48this Courtheld that negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
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depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.49In determining whetheror not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence50has laid down the following test: Did defendant, in doing thealleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, theperson is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familiasof the Roman law.

The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent was thoroughly discussed by both the RTC and the CA. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of

the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of law may be put into issue, and questions of fact as a general rule, cannot be entertained. The finding ofnegligence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon as it would entail going into factual matters onwhich the finding of negligence was based.51The established rule is that factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive andbinding on this Court.52

The records of the instant case show that both the RTC and the CA carefully examined the factual circumstances surrounding the case, and we findno cogent reason to disturb the same. It is, however, worthy to emphasize that petitioner was found negligent because of its failure to provide thenecessary safety device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for violating the provisions ofArticle 2176 of the New Civil Code, viz:

Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Suchfault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of thisChapter.

In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (1) damage toplaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection ofcause and effect between such negligence and damage.53Applying the foregoing requisites, the CA correctly made the following conclusions:

It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents herein) sustained damage or injury as a result of the collision. That there wasnegligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil. Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, the alleged safetymeasures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-settled safety standards in transportation. x x x

x x x x

x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself would yield the following:(1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.) inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper lighting within the area. Thus,even if there was a flagman stationed at the site as claimed by PNR (petitioner), it would still be impossible to know or see that there is a railroad

crossing/tracks ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side of the road since ones view would be blocked by a cockpit arena.x x x54
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Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the Moncada side would have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train because of theslight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00 a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide adequate safety equipment in the area.55

It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons andproperty at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings.56Moreover, everycorporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, andsafe crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with largeand distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.57

This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, orsemaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it becausepublic safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.58

In view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of the CA as well as its conclusion on petitioners negligence.

As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, we agree with petitioner. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of theinjured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his ownprotection.59To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries indisregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.60To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causallink, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when itcontributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.61

The court below found that there was a slight curve before approaching the tracks; the place was not properly illuminated; ones view was blocked bya cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not familiar with the road. Yet, it was also established that Mercelita was then driving the Mercedes Benz at aspeed of 70 km/hr and, in fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the

way he did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they nevertheless do not negate petitioners liability. Pursuant to Article 217962

of theNew Civil Code, the only effect such contributory negligence could have is to mitigate liability, which, however, is not applicable in this case, as will bediscussed later.1wphi1

As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in the negative. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where bothparties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault ornegligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stateddifferently, the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant,who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.63The proximate cause of the injury having been

established to be the negligence of petitioner, we hold that the above doctrine f inds no application in the instant case.
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We note that the damages awarded by the appellate court consist of (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Rhonda Brunty; (2) P1,000,000.00as actual and moral damages due the heirs of Rhonda Brunty; and (3)P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. No damages, however, wereawarded for the injuries suffered by Garcia, yet, the latter never interposed an appeal before the CA nor even before this Court. The record is,likewise, bereft of any allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding ofcontributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally has the effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply.

As to the amount of damages awarded, a modification of the same is in order, specifically on the award of actual and moral damages in the aggregateamount of P1,000,000.00.

Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense ofnatural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannotrely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered,and on evidence of the actual amount thereof.64Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of actualdamages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem itproper to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.65This is in lieu of actual damages as it wouldbe unfair for the victims heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot produce receipts.66

The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not proscribed from recovering moral damages in meritoriouscases.67We, therefore, sustain the award of moral damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty.

Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Althoughincapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted.68Inthe instant case, the moral suffering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently established by Ethel Brunty in her deposition,69viz:

Q: What have you felt as a result of the death of Rhonda?A: I felt earnest anguish and mixed feelings of anger and extreme sorrow because she died so far away and alone, and because her death could soeasily be prevented if there had been adequate and appropriate warning signals at the railroad crossing and it is just an unbearable and irreparableloss. In so many ways, she was my life. It seemed to me that losing her was just like losing my own life, or worst, and even now, there is no end to ourbereavement. I am still on constant medication to be able to sleep and to be able to perform my duties effectively in my job but it does not take awaythe pain of loss.70

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,71and in Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,72we awarded moral damages in the amount

of P1,000,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased. In Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Malecdan ,73

the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held inkeeping with the purpose of the law, while in Macalinao v. Ong,74the amount of P50,000.00 was held sufficient.1wphi1
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Considering the circumstances attendant in this case, we find that an award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty isproper. In view of recent jurisprudence, indemnity of P50,000.00 for the death of Rhonda Brunty and attorneys fees amounting toP50,000.00 islikewise proper.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 15, 2005 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The awardof actual damages is deleted, and in lieu thereof, temperate damages ofP25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. The award of moraldamages is reduced to P500,000.00.

G.R. No. 159270. August 22, 2005

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION,Petitioners,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA LATAGAN, RICARDO GENERALAO and PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENTCOMPANY, INC., CORPORATION,Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorariof the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47699 affirming, with modification, thedecision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 93-64803.

The Antecedents

Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. When the MountPinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul viaMagalang, Pampanga, it requestedpermission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) viaDau-Sta. Ines fromMabalacat, and via Angeles from Magalang, and exit at San Fernando going to its milling factory .2The TRB furnished the Philippine NationalConstruction Corporation (PNCC) (the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways) with acopy of the said request for it to comment thereon.3

On November 5, 1991, TRB and PASUDECO entered into a Memorandum of Agreement4(MOA), where the latter was allowed to enter and passthrough the NLEX on the following terms and conditions:

1. PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy;2. Said trucks will stay on the right lane;
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3. A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at the rear end of the convoy with a sign which should read as follows: Caution: CONVOYAHEAD!!!;

4. Tollway safety measures should be properly observed;

5. Accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO;

6. PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their stalled trucks immediately to avoid any inconvenience to the other motorists;

7. This request will be in force only while the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul viaMagalang remain impassable.

PASUDECO furnished the PNCC with a copy of the MOA.5In a Letter6dated October 22, 1992, the PNCC informed PASUDECO that it interposed noobjection to the MOA.

At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Alex Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Eduardo Ducusin and Vicente Pascualwere patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX. They saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and southbound lanes of theroad.7They placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes, including lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of

the obstruction. Sendin, Ducusin and Pascual proceeded to the PASUDECO office, believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was theonly milling company in the area. They requested for a payloader or grader to clear the area. However, Engineer Oscar Mallari , PASUDECOsequipment supervisor and transportation superintendent, told them that no equipment operator was available as it was still very early .8Nonetheless,Mallari told them that he would send someone to clear the affected area. Thereafter, Sendin and company went back to Km. 72 and manned thetraffic. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at theside of the road. The men left the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcaneshad been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was already approaching,Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers.9Sendin went to his off ice in Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan, and made the necessary

report.10

At about 6:30 a.m., Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, a certified mechanic and marketing manager of JETTY Marketing, Inc. ,11was driving his two-door ToyotaCorolla with plate number FAG 961 along the NLEX at about 65 kilometers per hour.12He was with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend RicardoGeneralao; they were on their way to Baguio to attend their grandmothers first death anniversary.13As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, itflew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane.

Police Investigator Demetrio Arcilla investigated the matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the road, on both lanes, which appeared to beflattened.14

On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint15for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC in the RTC of Manila, Branch 16.The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-64803. They alleged, inter alia, that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX
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safe for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it; that PASUDECO negligentlyspilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of suchspillage; and that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Lataganand the damage to Arnaizs car. They prayed, thus:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered for the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants jointly and severally:

(a) To pay unto plaintiff Rodrigo Arnaiz the sum of P100,000.00 representing the value of his car which was totally wrecked;

(b) to pay unto plaintiff Regina Latagan the sum of P100,000.00 by way of reimbursement for medical expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 by way ofmoral damages, and the sum of P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;

(c) To pay unto plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and Ricardo Generalao the sum of P5,000.00 by way of reimbursement for medical expenses; and

(d) To pay unto the plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; plus the costs of suit.

Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs which the Honorable Court may find due them in the premises.16

In its Answer,17PNCC admitted that it was under contract to manage the North Luzon Expressway, to keep it safe for motorists. It averred that themishap was due to the "unreasonable speed" at which Arnaizs car was running, causing it to turn turtle when it passed over some pieces of flattenedsugarcane. It claimed that the proximate cause of the mishap was PASUDECOs gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and i ts failure to clearand mop up the area completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed.

The PNCC interposed a compulsory counterclaim18against the plaintiffs and cross-claim19against its co-defendant PASUDECO.

PASUDECO adduced evidence that aside from it, there were other sugarcane mills in the area, like the ARCAM Sugar Central (formerly known as

Pampanga Sugar Mills) and the Central Azucarrera de Tarlac;20it was only through the expressway that a vehicle could access these three (3) sugarcentrals;21and PASUDECO was obligated to clear spillages whether the planters truck which caused the spillage was bound for PASUDECO,ARCAM or Central Azucarera.22

On rebuttal, PNCC adduced evidence that only planters trucks with "PSD" markings were allowed to use the tollway ;23that all such trucks wouldsurely enter the PASUDECO compound. Thus, the truck which spilled sugarcane in January 1993 in Km. 72 was on its way to the PASUDECOcompound.24

On November 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its decision25in favor of Latagan, dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of evidence.

The case as against the PNCC was, likewise, dismissed. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
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WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:

I. ORDERING defendant PASUDECO:

1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:

a. P25,000 = for actual damages

b. P15,000 = for moral damages

c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees

P50,000

2. To pay costs of suit.

II. The case is DISMISSED as to defendant PNCC. No pronouncement as to costs. I ts counterclaim is, likewise, DISMISSED.

III. The claims for damages of plaintiffs Rodrigo Arnaiz and Ricardo Generalao are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.26

Both the plaintiffs Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao and defendant PASUDECO appealed the decision to the CA. Since the plaintiffs failed to file theirbrief, the CA dismissed their appeal.27

Resolving PASUDECOs appeal, the CA rendered judgment on April 29, 2003, affirming the RTC decision with modification. The appellate court ruled

that Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but that such negligence was merely contributory to the cause of the mishap, i.e.,PASUDECOs failure toproperly supervise its men in clearing the affected area. Its supervisor, Mallari, admitted that he was at his house while their men were clearing Km.72. Thus, the appellate court held both PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and severally, liable to Latagan. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed DECISION is hereby MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered declaring PASUDECO andPNCC, jointly and solidarily, liable:

1. To pay plaintiff Regina Latagan:

a. P25,000 = for actual damagesb. P15,000 = for moral damages
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c. P10,000 = for attorneys fees

2. To pay costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.28

The PNCC, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, alleging that:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND MAKING PETITIONER PNCC,JOINTLY AND [SOLIDARILY], LIABLE WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT PASUDECO.29

The petitioner asserts that the trial court was correct when it held that PASUDECO should be held liable for the mishap, since it had assumed suchresponsibility based on the MOA between it and the TRB. The petitioner relies on the trial courts finding that only PASUDECO was given a permit topass through the route.

The petitioner insists that the respondents failed to prove that it was negligent in the operation and maintenance of the NLEX. It maintains that it haddone its part in clearing the expressway of sugarcane piles, and that there were no more piles of sugarcane along the road when its men left Km. 72;

only a few scattered sugarcanes flattened by the passing motorists were left. Any liability arising from any mishap related to the spilled sugarcanesshould be borne by PASUDECO, in accordance with the MOA which provides that "accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activityrelated to this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO."

The petitioner also argues that the respondents should bear the consequences of their own fault or negligence, and that the proximate and immediatecause of the mishap in question was respondent Arnaizs reckless imprudence or gross negligence.

The Court notes that the issues raised in the petition are factual in nature. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised inthis Court, and while there are exceptions to the rule, no such exception is present in this case. On this ground alone, the petition is destined to fail.

The Court, however, has reviewed the records of the case, and finds that the petition is bereft of merit.

The petitioner is the grantee of a franchise, giving it the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities covering theexpressways, collectively known as the NLEX.30Concomitant thereto is its right to collect toll fees for the use of the said expressways and itsobligation to keep it safe for motorists.

There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person forwhose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurredby the plaintiff.31Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
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Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such faultor negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of thisChapter.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of humanaffairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.32It also refers to the conduct which creates undue risk ofharm to another, the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstance justly demand, whereby that other personsuffers injury.33The Court declared the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in Picart v. Smith,34viz:

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the allegednegligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guiltyof negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamiliasof theRoman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation beforehim. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability bythat.

The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequenceof the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against itsmischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born ofthis provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.35

In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cansand lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground .36The highway was still wet from the juiceand sap of

Case Torts 3

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