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Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 29 December 1986] Resolution En Banc, Cruz (J) : 8 concur

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI] sought a writ of mandamus to compel Hon. Juan C. Tuvera, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, Hon. Joaquin Venus, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, Melquiades P. De La Cruz, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and Florendo S. Pablo, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. The decision was concurred only by 3 justices. Tanada, et. al. move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. They suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. The Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. Meanwhile, the February EDSA Revolution tookplace, which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue: Whether laws should be published in full and in the Official Gazette only.

Held: Omission of publication would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Publication is required, even if their enactment is “otherwise provided” or effective immediately. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. Publication requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Publication requirements does not apply to (1) interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public; (2) Letters of Instructions issued by

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administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties; and (3) instructions of Ministry heads on case studies. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. It should be published in the Official Gazette and not elsewhere. Even if newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly, this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law.

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Webb v. de Leon

Facts: This was a highly-publicized case (dubbed as Vizconde Massacre, and involves a son of a Philippine Senator). On 19 June 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian. Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons, with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation of those charged with the rape and killing on 30 June 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizoonde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Parañaque. During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the sworn statements of Maria Jessica Alfaro, 2 former housemaids of the Webb family, Carlos Cristobal (a plane passenger), Lolita Birrer (live-in partner of Biong), 2 of Vizconde’s maids, Normal White (a security guard) and Manciano Gatmaitan (an engineer). The NBI also submitted the autopsy report involving Estrellita (12 stab wounds), Carmela (9 stab wounds), and Jennifer (19 stab wounds); and the genital examination of Carmela confirming the presence of spermatozoa. The NBI submitted photocopies of the documents requested by Webb in his Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents, granted by the DOJ Panel. Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime as he went to the United States on 1 March 1991 and returned to the Philippines on 27 October 1992. The others — Fernandez, Gatchalian, Lejano, Estrada, Rodriguez and Biong — submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes. Only Filart and Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known address. On 8 August 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against Webb, et. al. On the same date, it filed the corresponding Information against Webb, et. al. with the RTC Parañaque. Docketed as Criminal Case 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by Judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, Judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against Webb, et. al. On 11 August 1995, Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Taguig. Webb, et. al. filed petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95- 404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before the Court.

Issue: Whether the attendant publicity of the case deprived Webb, et.al, of their right to fair trial.

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Held: Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Herein, however, nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors; and their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. At no instance in the case did Webb, et. al. seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. Further , on the contention of the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation, records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that is the only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

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People v. Sanchez [GR 121039-45, 18 October 2001] Resolution of First Division, Melo (J) : 3 concur

Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which was parked in front of Café Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were also with the group, stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayor’s room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea – her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a single gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away. Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawit’s turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileen’s remains behind. Initially, the crime was attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further investigation, and forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's theory.

On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City, Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity, besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility, that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter should have been given full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded have no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent statements pertain to material and crucial points of the events at issue, besides that independent and disinterested

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witnesses have destroyed the prosecution’s version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration was assigned to Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18 September 2001.

Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge handling the case.

Held: Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.

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Anzaldo v. Clave [GR L-54597, 15 December 1982] Second Division, Aquino (J); 4 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part

Facts: In 1974, the position of Science Research Supervisor II (Medical Research Department) became vacant when the incumbent, Dr. Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST). Dr. Anzaldo and Dr. Venzon were both next-in-rank to the vacant position, both holding positions of Scientist Research Associate IV. Dr. Anzaldo finished BS Pharmacy (1950, College of Pharmacy, UP), and MS Pharmacy (1962, CEU), Doctor of Pharmacy (1965, CEU). Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist and supervisor (unassembled). She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served for 28 years. On the other hand, Dr. Venzon finished Medicine (1957, UST). She started working in the NIST in 1960 and has served for 21 years. Dr. Anzaldo is senior to her in point of service. Dr. Quintin Kintanar recommended Dr. Venzon for the position. Dr. Anzaldo protested against such recommendation, to which the NIST Reorganization Committee found such protest to be valid and meritorious. Due to the impasse, the NIST Commissioner, however, did not resolve the issue. The position was not filled up. Dr. Pedro Afable, Vice Chairman, later became OIC of the NIST. He appointed Dr. Anzaldo to the position effective 4 January 1978, after thorough study and screening of the qualifications of both doctors and upon recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation (88-61 votes).

The Civil Service Commission approved the appointment. Dr. Venzon appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines (addressed to Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave, who was concurrently the Chairman of the CSC). The appeal was forwarded to the NIS OIC Jose P. Planas, who reiterated Dr. Afable’s decision. The appeal-protest was later sent to the CSC. CSC Chairman Clave and Commissioner Jose A. Melo recommended In Resolution 1178 dated 23 August 1979 that Dr. Venzon be appointed to the position, in conflict with the 1978 appointment of Dr. Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the CSC. The Resolution was made in pursuance to Section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (PD 807, 6 October 1975), which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the Presidentshall consult the Civil Service Commission." On 5 January 1980, after denial of her motion for thereconsideration of the resolution, Dr. Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines.

Presidential Executive Assistant Clave in his decision of 20 March 1980 revoked Dr. Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Dr. Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Dr. Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Dr. Venzon's protest. In a resolution dated 14

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August 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Dr. Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On 25 August 1980, Dr. Anzaldo filed in the Supreme Court the special civil action of certiorari.

Issue: Whether CSC Commissioner Jacobo Clave can concur with the recommendation of the Presidential Executive Assistant, who is himself, in the appointment of Dr. Venzon.

Held: The 20 March 1980 decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave implemented the 23 August 1979 Resolution (1178) of Clave (as CSC Chairman), concurred with by Commissioner Melo, recommending the appointment of Dr. Venzon as Science Research Supervisor II in place of Dr. Anzaldo. When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with himself . It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission (See also Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals). Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consultedby the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.

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People v. Medenilla [GR 131638-39, 26 March 2001] First Division, Kapunan (J) : 4 concur

Facts: On 16 April 1996, Loreto Medenilla y Doria was caught for illegal possession and unlawfully selling 5.08g of shabu (Criminal Case 3618-D), was in unlawful possession of 4 transparent plastic bags of shabu weighing 200.45g (Criminal Case 3619-D) in Mandaluyong City. Versions of facts leading to the arrest are conflicting; the prosecution alleging buy-bust operations, while defense claim illegal arrest, search and seizure. Arraigned on 25 June 1996, Medenilla pleaded not guilty. The judge therein, for the purpose of clarification, propounded a question upon a witness during the trial. On 26 November 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig (Branch 262) found Medenilla, in Criminal Cases 3618-D and 3619-D, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).

Issue: Whether judges are allowed to asked clarificatory questions.

Held: A single noted instance of questioning cannot justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. The Court have exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. “The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.

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Marcos vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS :Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienza’s dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores’ request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores’ manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor. The SB en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores’ manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its ”decision” convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

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Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000] Resolution En Banc, Puno (J): 6 concur, 1 dissents, 1 concurs based on prior opinion, 1 concurs in result

Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in the United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999) requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary’s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to

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restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, theSupreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process.

Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is no provision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition process’ evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.

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People v. Estrada [GR 130487, 19 June 2000] En Banc, Puno (J): 13 concur, 1 on official leave

Facts: On 27 December 27, 1994, Roberto Estrada y Lopez sat at the bishop’s chair while the sacrament of confirmation was being performed at the St. John’s Cathedral, Dagupan City. Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral, was summoned by some churchgoers. Mararac went near Estrada and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Mararac twice tapped Estrada’s hand with his nightstick. When Mararac was about to strike again, Estrada drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Wounded and bleeding, Mararac slowly dragged himself down the altar. SP01 Conrado Francisco received a report of the commotion inside the cathedral, went inside the cathedral, approached Estrada who was sitting on the chair, and advised the latter to drop his knife. Estrada obeyed. However, when Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, who was also at the confirmation rites, went near Estrada, Estrada embraced Rosario and two wrestled with each other. Rosario was able to subdue Estrada. Estrada was brought to the police station and placed in jail. Maranac expired a few minutes after arrival at the hospital. On 29 December 1994, Estrada was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of Mararac. On 6 January 1995, at the arraignment, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that Estrada could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the BaguioGeneral Hospital in Baguio City. The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on Estrada. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day. The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on Estrada's behalf. On 23 June 1997, the trial court (RTC Dagupan City, Branch 44, Criminal Case 94-00860-D) rendered a decision upholding the prosecution evidence and found Estrada guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, and ordered him to pay P50,000 for indemnity, P18,870 for actual expenses, and P100,000 as moral damages. Estrada’s counsel appealed.

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Issue: Whether a mental examination of the accused should be made before the accused may be subjected to trial.

Held: The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public. It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law. Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental examination." An intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By deprivingappellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified.

Ang Tibay v. CIR [GR 46496, 27 February 1940] En Banc, Laurel (J): 6 concur

Facts: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who were members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather materials. The National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the National Workers’ Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLU’s allegation that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89 workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.

Issue: Whether the CIR’s freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe specialrequirements of due process in administrative cases.

Held: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even

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in proceedings of this character, to wit:

a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after the party is given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration.

c. WHile the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial." Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." The statute provides that 'the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.

e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, CA 103.) The CIR may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute of any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal, a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the CIR may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers (Section 10)

f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally impossible for the titular heads of the CIR personally to decide all controversies coming before them. There is no statutory authority to authorize examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with right to appeal to board or commission, to solve the difficulty.

g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.