Intro To Law Case DigestBy: Ryan A.D. CastilloIn Re Application of Max Shoop for admission to practice law, November 29, 1920, 41 Phil. 213

FACTS:Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in the highest court of the State of New York. The said rule requires that: New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission without examination under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits admission without examination in the discretion of the Appellate Division in several cases. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory of the American Union or in the District of Columbia. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common Law.

ISSUE:WON Max Shoop can practice law in the Philippines

HOLDING:Yes he can practice Law in the Philippines

HELD:The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under a civil gov't. Established by the Congress In interpreting and applying the written laws of this jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and institutions. The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL in its present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to an almost exclusive extent.- New York permits conferring privileges on

Attorneys admitted to practice in the Philippines similar to those privileges accorded by the rule of this court. - Petition granted. Decision is based on the interpretation of the NY rule; doesnt establish a precedent with respect to future Applications.

Government vs. Springer, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 192750 Phil. 259

FACTS:In the 1900s, the Philippine Congress created the National Coal Company (NCC). The law created it provides that: The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of

Representatives.

Some time in November 1926, the Governor-General issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should Be solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government. A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.

However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.

HOLDING:No. E.O. No 37 is valid.

HELD:It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To vest the powers of the congress allowing the Senate President and the House Speaker to appoint the members is an invasion of executive powers.

Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989177 SCRA 668

FACTS:After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the implementation of the Presidents decision to bar their return to

The Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.

ISSUE:Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

HOLDING:

Yes. The President has the Power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

HELD:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.

Thiscase calls for the exercise of the Presidents power as protector of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the government.

The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.

In re Cunanan, March 18, 195494 Phil. 534

FACTS:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

ISSUE:Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid

HOLDING:No, it is unconstitutional

HELD:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license. Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

Angara vs. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L- 45081, July 15 193663 Phil. 139

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for The said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.

Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the election protest.

HOLDING:

Yes the SC has jurisdiction over this matter.Yes, EC did act in excess of jurisdiction

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.

The supreme court has the power of Judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and legal controversies, and has the power and duty to see to it that no branch or agency of the Government overpowers the Constitution.

That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and functions to execute and perform. That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.

Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3 , 1997

FACTS:

Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corp. Only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad which respondent GSIS refused to accept. With the apprehension that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order-enjoining respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

ISSUE:Whether Manila Hotel corporation forms part of the national patrimony as invoked by the petitioner in Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution?

HOLDING:No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is in light of the Filipino First Policy.

HELD:

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing.The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage.When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the termnatural resources, but also to thecultural heritageof the Filipinos. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Its existence, The Manila Hotel is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

Nitafan vs. CIR, G.R. No/ 189600, June 29, 2010

FACTS:Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RegionalTrial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenueand theFinancial Officerofthe SupremeCourt, from making any deduction ofwithholding taxesfrom theirsalaries.

Theysubmitthat "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of theirsalaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the1987 Constitutionmandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by saidConstitution."

ISSUE:Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HOLDING:No , the members of the Judiciary are not exempt from income taxes.

HELD:

The debates and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make thesalariesof members of the Judiciary taxable. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of theConstitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying theConstitutionwere guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates theConstitution", inPerfecto vs. Meer,as affirmed inEndencia vs. Davidmust be declared discarded. The framers of thefundamental law, as thealter egoof the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the1987 Constitutionthat they have adopted

Amores vs. HRET, G.R. No. 189600 , June 29, 2010

FACTS:Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as representative of CIBAC in the HoR.The Petitioner argues Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which was the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector". Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six months prior to elections.

The Respondent RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative only applicable to first three elections after the party list act. There was no resultant change in affiliation

ISSUE:Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva

HOLDING:Villauneva in not eligible to hold office as a member of House of Representatives representing CIBAC

HELD:Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If representative of youth sector, should be between 25 to 30 not 31 years old. Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral representation should be changed SIX MONTHS prior to elections.

Francisco vs. HRET , G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003

FACTS:The case is a petition questioning the constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings being held by the House of Representatives against Chief Justice Davide. Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the Chief Justice, in a period less than the one-year bar provided by the Constitution and the rules of the House of Representatives.

This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as associations questioning the constitutionality of such move by Congress. The petitions contend that the second impeachment proceeding was in culpable violation of the Constitution wherein there is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment proceedings against the same individual. The first proceeding was less than a year away from the filing of the second proceeding.Congress answered that the Supreme Court had no power to meddle about the impeachment proceedings as it is the House of the Representatives has the power to administer Impeachment proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court forcely to do so and do inquires about the proceedings, it will violate the doctrine of separation of powers as well as the doctrine of checks and balances. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of the Congress and is a political question.

ISSUE:1. WON the second impeachment proceeding against Davide is constitutional?2. WON the impeachment proceeding was a political question wherein the SC cannot disturb it? HOLDING:1.The second impeachment proceeding against the CJ is unconstitutional2. No, the SC can inquire regarding the constitutionality of the said case

HELD:1. It is clear that the second impeachment proceeding against the Chief Justice is unconstitutional. Under Article XI of our present Constitution, it says that with regard to the impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a one-year bar provided. No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official within a period of one year. The term initiate refers to the filing of the case against the official. It starts when a complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives.

2. It is said that the SC cannot question or inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it will disturb the separation of power, check and balance between the branches of government, and that the SC has vested interest in the issue.

The Constitution was equal in granting the judiciary, moreover the SC, the duty to settle controversies that are legally demandable and enforceable. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to check if there is a grave or abuse of discretion on any part of the government office. In this Petition especially where constitutionality is questioned, it is very clear that the SC is not barred from interrupting its proceedings. Even if the Legislative is the one commencing and administering the Impeachment, they cannot restrict or deny the Power of the SC to inquire about the Constitutionality of the said case.

Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

FACTS:Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815 are being resolved jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The provisions of EO 284 is as follows:Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

ISSUE:Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

HOLDING:

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void.

HELD:

It is clearly stated that in our Constitution is solely prohibits the Cabinet members to hold multiple offices or employment in the Government other than their positions as Cabinet members. EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiply offices or employment in the government, making a clear manifestation that it is Unconstitutional.

Chiongban vs. De Leon , G.R. No. L-2007, January 31, 1949

FACTS:Herein petitioner is a son of a Chinese citizen who has been elected into office before the adoption of the Constitution, wherein said petitioner was still a minor. Respondents seeks to cancel petitioners registration certificates of vessels and rescind the sale of vessels from the same on the ground that the latter is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is a Filipino citizen

HOLDING:YES he is a Filipino Citizen.

HELD:

Yes, because the petitioner, aside from the fact that he was a minor at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, hefollows the citizenship of his father whom having been elected to public office before the adoption of the said Constitution became a Filipino citizen as provided by the same (Art. IV, 1987 Constitution).

Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003

FACTS:A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo Macalintal, a memer of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. He claimed that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as lawyer.R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions.Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters, who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; andAnd Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress through JCOC to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:1.Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.2.Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.3.Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violates Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution

HOLDING:1. No. Sec 5(d) is valid2. Yes, Section 18.5 is unconstitutional 3. Yes, Section 25 creating the JCOC is unconstitutional

HELD1. The Court has relied on the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which reads:Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.It was clearly shown from the said discussions that the Constitutional Commission intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin, which is in the Philippines. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

2. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency, granting merit to petitioners contention that said Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of President and Vice-President. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.

3. The COMELEC is a constitutional Body that is Promulgated by the people of the Philippines. It is created to play an important role on our Government. In the doing of their functions, it should not be limited with restrictions that would be filly warranted in the case of a less responsible organization.

In this case, the court also has no general powers for supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body , except granted by the Constitution, that is to review its decisions , orders and rulings. It is not correct to hold that because of its recognized legislative power to enact Election laws, Congress may question into the independence of the COMELEC by using its powers over its rule making authority.